indonesia political dynamics

7/28/2019 Indonesia Political Dynamics

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Indonesia-Political Dynamics

Openness

In his 1990 annual National Day address to the nation, Suharto confirmed his

mandate for more openness in political expression. "We must no longer be afraid of the multifarious views and opinions expressed by the people," he declared. This newtolerance was first given attention in the domestic political dialogue that began after his inauguration for a fifth term. The year 1989 saw an outpouring of opinion,discussion, and debate asketerbukaan (openness) promised a breath of fresh air inwhat many felt was an atmosphere of sterile platitudinism and sloganeering. Therewas in 1989, according to American political scientist Gorden R. Hein, "a dramaticexpansion in public discussion of important political and economic issues facing thecountry." Officials, politicians, retired generals, nongovernmental organizations, andstudent leaders expressed their views on controversial subjects ranging fromenvironmental degradation to business conglomerates, from the role of the military to

party politics. Many who had previously felt excluded from meaningful involvementhoped that keterbukaan would encourage greater political participation, not only inthe national policy dialogue but in access to the political process. The most seriousstructural manifestation of keterbukaan was the establishment in 1991 of theDemocracy Forum. The forum was chaired by Nahdatul Ulama's secretary general, Abdurrahman Wahid, and participated in by well-known academics, journalists, andother intellectuals. Its goal was to loosen existing political arrangements to assure"that the nation matures politically."

The turn toward keterbukaan was a welcome thaw after the chill of the mid-1980scrackdown on what the government considered "subversive" opposition. Thepassage of the Mass Organizations Law in 1985 stoked the incendiary environmentin which more radical Muslim activists were prepared for direct action against agovernment that resisted demands that the state itself should express an Islamicquality. In September 1984, the situation had deteriorated over an incident in which asoldier allegedly defiled a mosque in Tanjung Priok (in the northern part of Jakarta).The incident was a pretext for rioting and clashes between the army and mobsprovoked by fiery Islamic invocations. This was followed by bomb blasts and arsonthat to an alarmed ABRI presaged a call for jihad (holy war). The Tanjung Priok affair was the most destabilizing open confrontation between the government andopposition since the anti-Japanese riots that took place during Japanese prime

minister Tanaka Kakuei's visit to Indonesia in January 1974. Again, the government'sreaction was swift and stern. Thirty defendants were jailed from one to three years inthe wake of the Tanjung Priok riot. Ten people were convicted of conspiracy in the1985 Bank Central Asia bombing following the Tanjung Priok affair, including former cabinet minister Haji Mohammad Sanusi. At the heart of the legal assault on theopposition were the trials of prominent Islamic and retired military figures who werevaguely linked by the government to the Bank Central Asia bombing but whose realcrime was association with the Petition of Fifty group.

The Petition of Fifty was a petition by former generals, political leaders,academicians, students, and others that was submitted to the MPR in 1980. The

petition accused Suharto of using the Pancasila to attack political opponents and tofoster antidemocratic, one-man rule. The signers of the statement were roundly



excoriated by Suharto loyalists. The signers escaped arrest but were put under tightsurveillance and lost many of their official perquisites.

Lieutenant General (retired) H.R. Dharsono was the most prominent of the Petition of Fifty group. After the Tanjung Priok affair, Dharsono was arrested because of a

position paper he and twenty-one others had signed in September 1984, challengingthe government's version of the affair. According to the prosecution, this positionpaper "undermined the authority of the government." Dharsono also was accused of "mental terrorism" for having made statements that could cause social unrest, aswell as of associating with persons allegedly involved in the subsequent bombings.In an extraordinarily open trial, he was found guilty in January 1986 and sentencedto ten years' imprisonment. Unrepentant, Dharsono was released in the looser atmosphere of keterbukaan in September 1990. Clearly, the Dharsono trial andothers, as well as the social and economic pressures on extraparliamentary critics of the government, such as the Petition of Fifty group, were meant as reminders of theacceptable boundaries of political comment. As if to drive the point home, nine PKI

prisoners who had been jailed for twenty years were executed in October 1986. Twoothers were executed in 1988. These exemplary punishments were warnings againstthe consequences of "left extremism."

The fact that the legal and official regulatory framework that stifled opposition for somany years remained intact required cautious conclusions about keterbukaan. Although the dialogue was more open and included more "political" subjects in theearly 1990s, limits could be quickly and arbitrarily set by the government, whoselevel of tolerance was unpredictable. The limits were ambiguous because theytended to be applied capriciously. Still, there were indicators that a more participativepolitical system would evolve in the mid- to late 1990s. American political scientist R.William Liddle identified six characteristics of the Indonesian economy, society, andpolitics that appeared to favor a move in that direction: growing dependence ondomestic taxes and thus taxpayer approval; wide distribution of the benefits of economic growth with increased resources for groups to become politically active;greater connections to the outside world; greater education and literacy; moreinterest in democratization; and an institutionalized strong presidency. This lastfactor ensured that as more political voices were heard there would be no return tothe parliamentary impotency that paralyzed Indonesia in the 1950s. Thus, it wasargued, democracy and stability could coexist.

Much, of course, would depend upon the succession scenario. According to a lesssanguine assessment, a more open political dialogue could be manipulated by themajor actors positioning themselves for the succession--ABRI, Islam, bureaucraticinterests, and Golkar. These groups sought support among a growing middle-classconstituency which, intermittently at least, was moved by the kinds of issues raisedby socially conscious nongovernmental organizations and students, as well asnonestablishment political organizations like the group that issued the Petition of Fifty. The succession issue itself, as long as it remained unresolved, had thepotential of being a destablilizing factor. Outside the bureaucratic inner circle, thepolitical actors most directly affected by succession could only imperfectly transmittheir messages about democracy, equity, corruption, the environment, and

succession to the public because the nongovernmental media was subject to the



same constraints as the other institutions in Pancasila democracy (see The Media ,this ch.).

Data as of November 1992

indonesia political dynamics

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