indo-pakistan relations: the indian perspective...to resume them, but pressure tactics from outside...

Ved Marwah

Indo-Pakistan Relations: The Indian Perspective

2000

© Swiss Peace Foundation · Institute for Conflict Resolution and SDC · Department of Foreign Affairs


TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface 2

1. Executive Summary 4

2. Policy Options/Recommendations 5

3. Indo-Pakistan Relations: The Indian Perspective 7

3.1. Background 7

3.2. Military factors 8

3.3. Nuclear dimension 8

3.4. Sponsorship of cross-border terrorism 9

3.5. The role of Pakistan’s army 9

3.6. Deep rooted hostility 11

3.7. Political factors 12

3.8. Social factors 13

3.9. Economic factors 14

3.10. Drug Trafficking 15

3.11. Hostile elements in establishment 15

3.12. International Risk Assessment 16

3.13. Jammu and Kashmir 18

3.14. Conclusion 21

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Preface

The present paper is part of a series of case studies on Pakistan presented and discussed at the workshop “Early Warning and Conflict Resolution: Pakistan and its Neighbors” in November 1999 in Bern. The workshop was organized by the Swiss Peace Foundation's early warning project group FAST (Early Recognition of Tension and Fact Finding) and brought together scholars, local experts, and representatives of NGOs dealing with the South Asian region.

FAST's main objective is the early recognition of impending or potential crisis situations for the purpose of early action towards the prevention of armed conflict. Combined with a collection of statistic evidence and systematic monitoring of conflictive and cooperative events, the present Country Risk Profile is part of FAST's early warning methodology linking early warning and early action by relevant decision makers.1 FAST is mandated by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC).

Providing for an in-depth analysis of the current situation in

and around Pakistan – particularly after the military coup in October – the case studies on Pakistan (Ejaz Haider), Indo-Pakistani relations from the Indian perspective (Ved Marwah), and the Afghan dimension (Waseem Hussain) shed light on the various political, socio-economic, demographic, and ecological causes of the ongoing conflicts in the region.

This paper clearly depicts the Indian perspective (and

security concerns) toward Pakistan and also should be seen in light of several events that negatively influence Indo-Pakistan relations:

The Kargil Invasion in May 1999; The military coup in Pakistan on October 12, 1999; and

1 For a detailed presentation of FAST see KRUMMENACHER, H. and S. SCHMEIDL (1999): "FAST: An Integrated and Interactive Early Warning System: The Example of Central Asia", in The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review, 24, No. 3, pp. 147-59; and KRUMMENACHER, H.; G. BAECHLER, and S. SCHMEIDL (1999): "Beitrag der Frühwarnung zur Krisenprävention - Möglichkeiten und Grenzen in Theorie und Praxis", in Friedensbericht 1999, Chur; Zürich: Rüegger, pp. 77-99.

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The hijacking of an Indian Airlines Airplane by Kashmiri separatists in December 1999.

We also should not forget the impact of the 1947 partition

and the associated “two nation theory” if we want to fully understand current Indo-Pakistan relations. Thus, ideology is still the main raison d'état that continues to fuel the conflict. Here it is especially important to understand who the actors are, and acknowledge their motifs. Furthermore, one needs to differentiate between the structural causes of the conflict(s) and the way actors perceive them (causes, solutions, etc.). Often there is no direct link between the two (reality and perception of reality). Thus, even though the leaders of both countries have historically tried to achieve peace, both the Indian and Pakistan armed forces have a special interest in the Indo-Pakistan conflict and its maintenance. It is not only the Pakistan army which is profiting from the conflict, but the Indian one as well. Therefore there is an involvement of mutual destabilization by both countries.

It is very important to keep in mind the complexity of the

current situation and acknowledge that there are common traits for the causes of conflict in southern Asia. In addition, while domestic and international conflicts (Pakistan) are often interlocked, local conflicts have domestic root causes as well, mainly due to strong ideological/religious dimensions. This means, not all conflicts in India are just due to outside influence (sponsorship) from Pakistan, but would exist in some fashion even if Pakistan was not a factor.

Finally, it is important to bear in mind that there are lots of

positive interactions between Pakistan and India on an individual level. However, as soon as it comes to collective action (especially at the level of politics), the relations tend to turn hostile. India has also been very cautious on third-party mediation, given it has made negative experiences in the past.

Susanne Schmeidl, Ph.D. FAST Coordinator for South Asia

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1. Executive Summary From the very beginning the Pakistani rulers had two obsessions: military parity with India and break up of the Indian Union. To achieve the first objective it continued to spend disproportionately large chunks of its budget on strengthening its military machine; and to achieve the second, it supports every subversive and secessionist group in India. The Talibanisation of Pakistan has led to the strengthening of the non-state Islamic fundamentalist groups. The new military government is directly supporting them. The line between the Pakistani military and the fundamentalist militia groups has disappeared. The Pakistani government is taking no action to stop their campaign to destroy India. As the recent Kargil war has shown, it is these fundamentalist forces who play the most crucial role in deciding Pakistan’s India policy. These forces are now out of control, and a crisis situation can develop at any time unless the Pakistani leadership recognises the danger and reins them in. Even though the possibility of the conflict escalating into a nuclear exchange is remote, the possibility of an irrational government in Pakistan taking the extreme step cannot be entirely ruled out. The danger of some terrorist groups getting hold of weapons of mass-destruction is very real. A nuclear Pakistan, openly aiding and abetting international terrorism, is now a reality that can no longer be ignored. Since the over-throw of the democratically elected government in Pakistan and the establishment of a military regime the risk of an armed conflict between the two countries has increased. The military can be tempted to launch another offensive against India to escape internal pressures on his government. Cross-border terrorism being sponsored by Pakistan is the biggest hurdle to the improvement of relations with India and poses the biggest threat to peace and security in the region. It is not confined to the borders of Jammu & Kashmir. In recent years it has been extended to other parts of India, more so in the North East, in the coastal region in South India and West Bengal. The new military ruler, because of his background and actions, has not reduced Indian fears about the "Islamic jihad". One cannot be too optimistic about the actions of a nuclear Pakistan, where the army and the fundamentalist forces are calling the shots. One of the first actions of the new government was to grant permission to Lashkar-e-Taiba to hold its convention, where the bugles of a "jihad' against India were sounded. However, the military leadership will be too preoccupied internally, at least for the next few months, to launch another war against India, though it is likely to intensify the proxy war. Another army coup with the help of the fundamentalist forces, the possibility of which cannot be ruled out, could aggravate the situation.

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2. Policy Options/Recommendations Due to the conflict prone nature of the Indo-Pakistan relationship, the two countries need to develop a certain degree of tenacity and steadfastness in the Confidence Building exercise. Even relatively trivial issues can raise the temperature on both side to cause a setback to the process. Hardliners are present on both sides and any move to improve the relations is bound to be opposed by some sections of the people, the media and, of course, the opposition parties. Against this backdrop of hostility and uncompromising attitude, the aim of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) should be not so much to resolve the Kashmir dispute in a short span of time, but to create an environment in which a solution can ultimately emerge. It is in this context that the role of the non-official dialogue assumes great importance. Ultimately, a solution to the Kashmir dispute will have to be found around the Line of Control (LoC) with some adjustments to satisfy the aspirations of the people in both countries, but that solution cannot emerge immediately. To succeed it will have to be a long-drawn process. A third-party mediation cannot hasten it. As there is little likelihood of an early breakthrough over the Kashmir dispute, because of the fundamental nature of differences and internal compulsions, efforts to improve relations should concentrate on issues where the differences are not so fundamental. Both countries have a lot to gain if economic and cultural ties are strengthened. Holding the relations hostage to the Kashmir issue will not help matters and even make it more difficult to find a solution to the Kashmir dispute. It is not impossible to recapture the spirit of peace and friendliness of the Lahore Declaration signed in February this year by the two Prime Ministers and so rudely betrayed by the Kargil war. There is no alternative to restarting the bilateral talks, though this may take some time for things to cool down. For the bilateral talks to succeed on issues like Kashmir, they must be conducted in low profile without too much publicity. The two governments should be encouraged to resume them, but pressure tactics from outside will hinder rather than help. Pakistan should be pressed to contain the fundamentalist forces. The sub-continent has huge Muslim population, and fundamentalist rhetoric and actions can create serious problems. Pakistan should be asked to close down all the terrorism training centres being run in Pakistan, directly or indirectly with government help. They should not allow the holding of the Lashkar-e-Taiba type conventions in future. CBMs are not likely to produce results until the most important item - the welfare of the people - comes on the centre stage of the political agenda in the subcontinent. Strengthening of civil society in the sub-continent, particularly in Pakistan, provides the biggest hope in reducing tensions. The silent majority which wants improvement in the people to people relations must be given all support to articulate its views

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without fear. In this the NGOs and track-2 diplomacy can play a useful role, but a more effective role will have to be played by the international community. The need to negotiate nuclear related CBMs is both immediate and vital. However, past experience is that CBMs are best sought in an incremental manner, since an evolutionary step by step approach works better. A building block approach commends itself. Greater attention should be given to non-military CBMs. Article III of the Simla Agreement provides a framework for such measures. Concrete steps should be taken to stop the diffusion of small arms and explosives in the region. Government of Pakistan should be asked to strictly enforce its arms control laws. Both India and Pakistan should be asked to maintain the sanctity of the LoC. Violation of the LoC, like recently in Kargil by Pakistan, should lead to international sanctions against the offending country. A dialogue between the armed forces of the two countries should be encouraged, but it cannot be expected to find solutions to intricate issues. Unlike in Pakistan the responsibility of policy-formulation on the issues, like J & K, rests in India solely with the political leadership. The two armed forces can only discuss military issues and agree on measures to reduce tension on the borders. India and Pakistan should be encouraged to strengthen their economic relationship. Pakistan should be asked to reciprocate the Indian gesture and agree to give the most-favoured nation status to India. The two countries should also be encouraged to co-operate in tackling the problem of drug traffic and organised crime. Pakistan should be persuaded to restore the democratic government early. This will facilitate restarting a dialogue between the two countries.

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3. Indo-Pakistan Relations: The Indian Perspective

3.1. Background The hostile relations between India and Pakistan have deep historical roots. The territorial dispute over Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is not the sole cause of this continuous and unending hostility. The relations between the two countries are not likely to improve even if the Kashmir dispute were to disappear from the scene with the help of a magic wand. Pakistan was the creation of a bloody partition. The end of colonial rule in India was not peaceful. The country was torn by Hindu-Muslim communal violence, in which hundreds of thousands innocent men, women and children were brutally massacred. Millions had to flee from their homes and migrate to the other half. This was the bloodiest partition in human history. The partition took place against the backdrop of continuing communal riots. Initially, the Congress Party was opposed to the very idea of partitioning the country, as it was against the very concept of the two-nation theory. It accepted partition unwillingly as the price for independence. Gandhi opposed the partition until the very end. He wanted the Hindus and the Muslims to live together in peace and harmony in one country. But if the partition of the country was expected to bring peace and harmony in the sub-continent, then those hopes were totally belied. The partition caused even more bloodshed and human suffering. From the very beginning the relations between India and Pakistan have been hostile. The Kashmir dispute was the consequence and not the cause of this hostility. The government of the newly formed state of Pakistan pushed out all the Hindus and the Sikhs from the three provinces - Punjab, North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan - as a matter of state policy. The Indian leaders on the other hand did everything possible to reassure the Muslims that they would be safe in India. Some left, but most stayed back. Unlike Pakistan, where the Hindus were unwanted, in spite of occasional tensions, the Muslims community has been accepted as an integral part of the Indian society. This view finds support from the latest data on population in India. The population of the Muslims in India has actually increased, both in terms of absolute numbers and as proportion of the total population. According to the 1991 figures, the Muslim population in India was 101.596.057, and it was 12.12% of the total population.2 From the very beginning the Pakistani rulers had two obsessions: military parity with India and break-up of the Indian Union. Huge defence expenditure, totally disproportionate to its financial resources, is one consequence of its first obsession. Pakistan is one-seventh of India’s size. Its desire to have military parity with India 2 Census of India 1191, Paper 1 0f 1995. Published by Registrar General & Census Commissioner, India.

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will inevitably lead to its economic ruin, but the Pakistani leadership refuses to accept the reality. The first obsession has led to the second. As it perceives India as a security threat, it has been attempting for its break-up with all possible means, from subversion to direct military intervention. There is enough evidence to support the allegation that every subversive and secessionist group in India finds immediate support in Pakistan. It has a direct role in supporting the Sikh secessionist movement in Punjab and the insurgent groups in the North East. It has been systematically and consistently trying to subvert the loyalty of the Indian Muslims. There is evidence of the Pakistani hand in fomenting the recent Hindu Muslim riots in South India, an area which was so far free of any communal tension. All the insurgent leaders from the North East make regular trips to Pakistan to supply arms and offer support. Sikh secessionist leaders wanted for heinous crimes have been given sanctuaries in Pakistan.

3.2. Military factors Pakistani strategic thinkers openly talk of gaining strategic depth and the balkanisation of India as the two prerequisites for Pakistan's security. General Zia's vision of an Islamised Pakistan being the anchor of an Islamic empire extending through Central Asia to the borders of Russia pose a serious threat to India's security. Sharif's vision, and for that matter of the current Chief Executive, General Musharraf, is no different. Pakistan’s involvement in the Afghanistan situation since 1979 has profoundly influenced Indo-Pakistan relations. The Afghanistan crisis gave Zia the opportunity he was looking for. The US supplied him with huge quantities of arms and explosives and financial resources to train and equip the mujahideen to fight the Soviet army. But he also kept a huge quantity of these arms and explosives for future use by the Pakistani intelligence agency, the Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) that is still widely involved in Afghanistan. Encouraged by the success of the mujahideen and more recently by the Taliban forces, trained and equipped by the Pakistan army and the ISI, Pakistan is today playing a much bigger role in escalating the conflict not only in J&K, but in the expansion of its operations in many other parts of the world in pursuance of the jihad - a holy war against the “infidels“ in all countries with sizeable Muslim minority. Pakistan's ambitions in India go far beyond J&K. ISI's extension of its covert campaign of subversion in other parts of India only confirm these fears.

3.3. Nuclear dimension Even though the possibility of the conflict escalating into a nuclear exchange is extremely remote, there are fears about the possibility of an irrational government in Pakistan taking the extreme step. India is concerned that the control over the nuclear weapons has now passed on completely to the military. These concerns do not get mitigated, because the control over the nuclear establishment rested with the army

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even earlier during a civilian government. There is now a qualitative change in the situation. Earlier, the decision to use nuclear weapons, at least in theory, rested with the political leadership. The military coup has removed this check. During the recent Kargil intrusion Pakistan's nuclear calculations went wrong. It did not anticipate India's strong reaction, hoping that the fear of a nuclear war would prevent it from escalating the conflict. A nuclear war would be as much suicidal for Pakistan, if not more, as for India. Therefore, it cannot be a factor in the assessment of India's military response in terms of conventional forces.

3.4. Sponsorship of cross-border terrorism The biggest constraint in the resumption of the dialogue is the intensification of Pakistan-sponsored cross-border terrorism in J&K, the North East, and other parts of India. It is difficult to have a meaningful dialogue when one side is waging a proxy war. Pakistan has extended its terrorist campaign to the parts of India, far beyond J&K. Pakistan does not have any excuse for intervention in Punjab or the North East in the name of protecting the Muslim population there. And yet, it has been giving support to the Sikh secessionist movement in Punjab. Even today, a number of Sikh and other secessionist leaders are operating from sanctuaries in Pakistan, though they are wanted for heinous crimes by the Indian Police. There is even less justification for Pakistan's support to insurgency in the North East, thousands of miles away from the borders of Pakistan. A recent upsurge in the number of terrorist incidents in this remote region of India is directly related to increased Pakistani ISI’s support to these groups through Nepal and Bangladesh. The Indian fear is reflected in Army Chief General V.P. Malik's statement on Pakistan's game-plan: "Pakistan is attempting to replicate in J&K the military strategy it followed in Afghanistan with its army regulars and militants working as single entity. State-sponsored militancy and terrorism by Pakistan today is replication of its Afghanistan strategy. Today there is greater collusion of the Pakistani army regulars and the so called mujahideen or militants.....The ISI was an adjunct of the armed forces....... Radio intercepts of the militants showed how happy they (the militants) were about the military take over in Pakistan."3

3.5. The role of Pakistan’s army The senior army officers in Pakistan's army used to pursue the same western liberal traditions as their Indian counterparts. But this is no longer the case. This has changed since the days of Zia-ul-Haq, who systematically Islamised the army, including its senior ranks. The ideologically committed army and the fundamentalist militias pose the biggest threat to peace and stability in the region.

3 A report in the Times of India on 20 October, 1999.

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Ever since Pakistan's creation, the army has incrementally acquired an institutional identity and role of a supra-government. It transcends all other constitutional arrangements of governance in Pakistan. The army is not just an instrument of the government to safeguard national security against internal and external threats and maintain its territorial integrity; it has been the final arbiter on all vital issues, including purely political issues that should not at all be under the domain of the armed forces. The army has arrogated to itself the role of defending Pakistan's Islamic ideological base and of protecting and consolidating its nationhood. The Army always had a special place in Pakistan's power structure. The army in Pakistan has maintained a firm hold on the power structure for the last fifty years, directly or indirectly. This was highlighted by the graffiti on a Karachi wall in 1990, as noted by journalist Christina Lamb: "We apologize for this democratic interruption. Normal martial law will be resumed shortly."4

To retain its number one position in the power structure it is compelled to don an anti-India mantle. It is an historical fact that Pakistan army has always played a decisive role, during all the governments in Pakistan since its birth, including the non-military governments, in formulating the policy towards India. It has a vested interest in keeping the level of hostility against India high. This unfortunately is not likely to change in the near future. Pakistan army leadership's contemptuous view of India's army is in some way also responsible for its adventurous bravado and miscalculations. This mind-set is reflected in an amusing anecdote recorded by a former chief of Pakistan's army, General Musa, in his book The 1965 War: My Version. His Defence Secretary pressed him to go to war with India because the disarray there had created a most opportune time for Pakistan. Musa agreed, but on one condition: that the government sanctioned two additional divisions he had asked for in view of India's much larger armed forces. Pat came the reply as quoted by General Musa: "Don't you know one Pakistani soldier is equal to ten Indian soldiers?" Musa replied, "Yes, I know, but what do I do when the eleventh comes along?"5 The army in Pakistan is today in the forefront of jihad against India. "The army has even interpreted the Koran since the late 1970s to justify the use of terrorism in pursuit of warfare which in this concept must be total. Hence, the linkages with militancy, terrorism and radical violence waged through the Taliban phenomenon."6 Pakistan has achieved the synthesis of regular and irregular warfare in the Taliban success after two decades of experimenting and experience in Afghanistan. The line between the regular Pakistan army and the Islamic militias is getting obliterated.

4 Quoted in an article by Jasjit Singh, One Coup Over the Sharif’s Nest, in the Times of India of 17 October 1999. 5 General Mohammed Musa, The 1965 War: My Version, Published by Wajid Ali’s Gulbarga, Lahore, Pakistan and by ABC publishers, New Delhi, India. 6 ibid.

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3.6. Deep rooted hostility The ruling establishment in Pakistan hates everything that they consider as Indian. There can be no improvement in the relations between the two countries until a change of this "hate-India attitude". Their anti-India rhetoric is reflected in Pakistan's waging of proxy war. As long as the rulers in Pakistan, supported by the fundamentalist organisations, regard each terrorist incident "as another step in their strategy to destabilise India, spread conservative Islam, undermine Indian democracy...", one cannot be optimistic about an improvement in the relations.7

The military dictatorship of Gen. Pervez Musharraf is even more suspect in the Indian eyes than the democratically elected Nawaz Sharif government. These suspicions are confirmed by the fact that one of the first acts of the new government was to grant permission to Lashkar-e-Taiba to hold an open convention in Pakistan, something which was not being granted by the predecessor government of Nawaz Sharif. The militant organisation is well-known for its terrorist role in India. The rhetoric of the Convention was openly anti-India. It exhorted intensification of the terrorist movement against India. It gave a call for India’s destruction.

The fact that the Kargil war took place so soon after the Lahore Declaration reflects a deep-rooted Pakistan’s hostility against India. The Lahore Declaration could not change this attitude of compulsive hostility. US South Asian security expert, Stephen P. Cohen calls the Kargil offensive "tactically as brilliant as Pearl Harbor but strategically as suicidal."8 Kargil has reversed the trend for improvement in the relations. The recent Kargil conflict has brought about a qualitative change in the relations between the two countries. Never trustful of each other's intentions, the relations have reached a new low. It has entered a new phase of bitterness. Pakistan has not reconciled to the fact that it is a part of the sub-continent. The difficulty is that after 50 years of independence, Pakistan has still to make up its mind whether to be a part of the Middle East or an integral part of South Asia. Until this Pakistani dilemma is resolved, there is little hope of stability in the region.9

7 Pamela constable in a despatch from Islamabad published in the New York Herald Tribune of 19 October 1999. 8 Quoted in its lead story in the Indian Express of 15 October 1999. 9 Newsweek. Spectacular Failures by Pranay Gupte. October 25, 1999 issue.

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3.7. Political factors For India, dealing with Pakistan has always been problematic - initially for the mother country to deal with its severed adjunct, and later for a secular and democratic country to deal with a military dictatorship, feudalism and theocracy. There is something about Pakistan and its political culture that scoffs at legalities and favours authoritarian rule. It appears the only way to survive politically in Pakistan is to beat the anti-India war drum. Though Pakistan was created on the basis of religion, its society and polity could not escape the centrifugal conflicts among the various ethno-linguistic groups. This has created a crisis of identity for Pakistan. As a consequence, the ruling establishment in Pakistan has been compelled to emphasise its Islamic identity even more to contrast it with India's secular orientations. The ideology of a secular India in their view poses a bigger threat to its survival than India's superior military strength. A secular India challenges the very logic of the creation of Pakistan. This ideological conflict is at the heart of the adversarial relationship.

Political development in either country has a direct bearing on the events in the other country. Indian election results could have been one of the important factors which brought the ongoing power struggle between the army and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to a boil, just as political uncertainty arising out of the fall of the Vajpayee government last April might have persuaded the military-planners in Pakistan to believe that the time was ripe for undertaking a risky operation in Kargil, which as we now know, had been earlier rejected by Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto when proposed by the army.

Internal political compulsions are the biggest hurdle in the way of improving bilateral relations. The principal reason for non-implementation of most of the measures even after agreements, is the lack of political will in Pakistan. Successive governments in Pakistan have intentionally gone very slow in implementing measures to strengthen economic ties and bolster people to people contact, because of strong political opposition from within the country, especially from the Islamic fundamentalist forces. For them an improvement of relations with India is an anathema. The fundamentalist lobby in Pakistan believes friendship with India will somehow dilute Pakistan's ideology and religious identity. Maleeha Lodhi, the noted editor and Pakistan's ambassador to the US, has spoken about the psyche of the people in Pakistan. They are frightened of being culturally swamped by India. According to her, such fears emanate from the fact that "Pakistan has not yet built a nation but...only a large state where the process of functional integration is still underway."10

10 Quoted by Navnita Chadha in her thesis to the University of Kent at Canterbury, Confidence Building Measures in South Asia, 1993, p. 345.

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The raison d'être of the creation of Pakistan has disappeared. There are more Muslims living today in India than in Pakistan. The paradox is that while India has accepted the existence of a theocratic state on its borders as a price for peace and stability, and treats the new state as an independent entity, Pakistan has difficulty accepting the reality of a secular India. The partition of the country has acquired a totally different meaning for Pakistan. It goes beyond the notion of inter-state equality when dealing with India. Pakistan continues to behave as if it is still the guardian of the Indian Muslims. For Islamabad concern for the Indian Muslims transcends international frontiers. The people in Pakistan, fed on the daily diet of the "hate India campaign", overwhelmingly perceive India as a Hindu country which is intrinsically antithetical to an Islamic country like Pakistan. The Islamic lobby never misses an opportunity to denigrate India. It uses its street power to raise a hue and cry against any effort to open the doors of socio-cultural links with India. The Islamic fundamentalist lobby has exercised tremendous influence on every government in Islamabad, irrespective of who headed it. Their influence has increased over the years, despite of their relative failure in general elections. Successive governments have tried to win public support by adopting their agenda. The breaking away of East Pakistan, and the failure to annex Kashmir have only increased the hostility of Pakistan's power structure towards India. "The failure in organising a political system genuinely responsive to the aspirations of the Pakistani people, the nexus between the military establishment, the landed elite and the business class in Pakistani society accentuated ethno-linguistic fissiparous tendencies on the one hand and resulted in a chequered journey through military dictatorships and tenuous democratic experiments on the other."11 Pakistan's defence and foreign policies have become hostage to this threat perception from India.

3.8. Social factors Pakistani society has still not come out of the era of feudalism. The strangle-hold of the feudal landlords over Pakistan's polity, economy and society has not weakened. It is not a coincidence that large number of politicians come from feudal background. They are against all measures to modernise the Pakistani society. They have close links with the army and the civil service. As an important component of the power structure, they have a vested interest in sustaining India-Pakistan hostility. They have successfully resisted all attempts for land reforms. They will continue to do so. They have too much to lose if Pakistan becomes a modern state. They have kept up the anti-India bogey to divert public attention from their own greed and misdeeds. Religion comes in handy to sustain this campaign.

11 Quoted by Navnita Chadha in her thesis to the University of Kent at Canterbury, Confidence Building Measures in South Asia, 1993, p. 345.

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The spread of madrassas (schools of Islamic teaching), funded by Pakistan in many parts of India, especially in the border region, has serious implications for India's integrity and security. The memories of the 1947 partition are still too fresh for India to ignore these developments. Another important element in Pakistani society is its tribal culture. Loyalty to tribe takes precedence over everything else. The rule of law as understood in the Western concept simply does not exist. In Pakistani ethos, tribal honour and vendetta, for real or imaginary humiliations, rank very high. These traits of the Pakistani society explain its irrational conduct in its confrontation with India. Treaties and agreements have little sanctity in tribal warfare. It has to be militaristic by definition, because it makes brute force as the only arbiter of disputes. The image of Pakistan is that of a reckless country driven to engage India in one war after another. India-related subjects dominate the media. All its external policies are India-centred. India looms large in the internal scene also. This is not likely to change in the foreseeable future. If at all the relations are likely to get worse. To maintain its macho image the military dictatorship has to continue its anti-India policies.

3.9. Economic factors Pakistan's fears of Indian hegemony extend to the field of trade and socio-cultural links. India is viewed a an "economic Leviathan". India does not view trade relations with Pakistan in terms of arithmetic of balance. It wants to build them in the hope of their favourable impact in improving the overall relations between the two countries. There is an opening here for improving relations. Economic cooperation and trade is an important component of the confidence building process. It offers valuable underpinning to a sound relationship mutually beneficial to both countries. India has unilaterally granted Pakistan the most-favoured-nation status, but Pakistan has so far refused to reciprocate. The Colombo summit meeting of the SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) countries in 1991 had taken a decision to work towards establishing a South Asian Preferential Trade Area (SAPTA) by 1997 and ultimately the creation of a South Asian Economic Community. Pakistan has, however, consistently opposed all moves to implement it. The SAARC vision of a free-trade zone by the year 2003 has so far remained only on paper. The difficulty is that politics have dominated Indo-Pakistani relations so completely, that every other issue has been pushed aside. The issues of territory and sovereignty invoke strong emotional reaction in both countries and have overtaken rational thinking. It needs a lot more courage and common-sense to admit that the two countries can benefit enormously from economic and trade ties. Faced with the problems of crippling poverty and illiteracy, they cannot afford to ignore economic benefits of cooperation. The potential is huge. It is therefore not a coincidence that –

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even during the Kargil operations – “behind the scene” Track Two negotiations were being conducted by the representatives of big business from India.

3.10. Drug Trafficking The newer security threats also arise from non-military causes like cross-border movement of population; ethno-political, socio-economic, and communal religious politics; drug traffic and organised crime, environmental degradation, related problems of deforestation and desertification’ internal migration’ chaotic urbanisation, and so on. But the current focus is only on military sources of insecurity. There is scope for cooperation in dealing with serious problems like drug traffic and organised crime. Pakistan has become the world's biggest transhipment point for drug-traffic from Afghanistan. Last month the United Nations announced that Afghanistan had become the largest producer of raw opium, accounting for three quarter of global output.12 The terrible fall out of this very profitable trade should worry Pakistan. India cannot afford to ignore this development either, as its ill-effects have already started spilling over into India from the borders with Pakistan. The illicit trade is subverting all the institutions in Pakistan as never before. Gangs devoted to heroin trade have multiplied and are flooding the big cities with guns and drugs. Karachi, once a peaceful port, is one of the most violent cities in the world, with an annual murder rate exceeding 2000.13 "Yet certain officers in Pakistan's military and intelligence services, aiming to maintain political alliance with their chaotic neighbour (Afghanistan), also have tight links with Taliban militia and these criminal gangs. Some analysts, who note the spread of radical fundamentalist values across the border from Afghanistan, now worry about the 'Talibanisation of Pakistan'."14

3.11. Hostile elements in establishment New Delhi finds it hard to be optimistic about the military take over by General Musharraf. His strong Islamic affiliations and contacts with fundamentalists elements, and his background and role in the army are a cause of concern. He was in the Special Service Group and one of the original organisers of the Taliban as a military force in Afghanistan. As the Commander of the Northern area he was instrumental in mounting major attacks on Siachen. The Special Service Group is deeply involved in sponsoring and supporting terrorism in J&K, and earlier in Punjab. His agenda on India goes beyond J&K. He recently said that even if the Kashmir issue was resolved, the war against India would continue.15 His role in 12 Quoted by Navnita Chadha in her thesis to the University of Kent at Canterbury, Confidence Building Measures in South Asia, 1993, p. 345. 13 Ibid. 14 ibid. 15 Quoted by Navnita Chadha in her thesis to the University of Kent at Canterbury, Confidence Building Measures in South Asia, 1993, p. 345.

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conceptualising, planning and executing the Kargil operation is still fresh in Indian mind. "New Delhi cannot be blamed if it is wary of his moves and does not put an optimistic interpretation on his words as do the Americans."16

The new appointments of known hardliners has not helped matters. This is what the newly appointed Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Abdul Sattar, told the then Indian Foreign Secretary, J.N. Dixit in 1992: “I have spent nearly half my diplomatic career dealing with India, I do not think India and Pakistan can be friends or have normal relations in our lifetimes. Not perhaps for another two generations. One can keep on trying, but it seems pointless.”17

The religious leaders from the Islamic fundamentalist parties have been at the forefront of the anti-India campaign. They will continue their campaign. According to their interpretation of Islam, the use of force, overt or covert, against "the Hindu India" is justified. One has only to read Pakistan’s Urdu press to find out how poisonous their rhetoric is. There is unlikely to be any let up in their inflammatory rhetoric. The rhetoric is now backed by the actions of their militant militias, who take pride in counting every terrorist action as a nail in India's coffin. Harkat-ul- Ansar, now renamed as Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Al Badar, and Lashkar-e-Taiba are three out of many of the organisations who are openly operating from Pakistan against India. They are being openly funded and supported by the Pakistan government. They get support from some other Islamic countries also, like Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia. The drug-traffickers, and the smugglers of arms and explosives also do not like the relations to improve, because the Pakistani police instead of taking legal action against them provides them with legal cover for it finds them useful in launching anti-India activities. They will not like to lose this cover, which they would if the relations improved.

3.12. International Risk Assessment The Taliban control of Afghanistan has already created a difficult situation for India. The Taliban rulers have been openly making threatening statements against what they call the “Hindu India.” The close links between the new military rulers in Pakistan and the Taliban leaders in Afghanistan have created serious misgivings in India. “India finds itself wedged in an arc of authoritarianism states stretching from extremist-ruled Afghanistan to the world's largest autocracy, China and to Burma (Myanmar) under a military junta. Pakistan and Burma are close strategic allies of China. The rabidly fundamentalist Taliban regime has been propped up by the Pakistan military.”18

16 K.K. Katyal in an article: “The case for a pro-active approach“ in The Hindu on 25 October 1999. 17 J.N. Dixit. Anatomy of a Flawed Inheritance. Konark Publishers, New Delhi. 1995, p.1. 18 Brahma Chellaney, „The Coup in Pakistan ....“, Herald Tribune, dated 13 October 1999.

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The Taliban government in Afghanistan has become directly involved in the conflict. They are providing men and material to the so called jihadis committing terrorist actions in J&K. The non-state groups, like the one led by Osama bin Laden, are providing training, sanctuaries, arms and explosives, and even volunteers to fight the proxy war. Saudi Arabia and some other Islamic countries are also providing funds and volunteers for the terrorist movements. According to reports, Osama Bin Laden has threatened to launch a jihad (a crusade) against India, especially in J&K, and the US. Mualana Fazlur Rahman has threatened in public statements to attack every American in case the US attacks Afghanistan to flush out Osama bin Laden. The exact role of the Taliban leaders in Afghanistan and their supporters in Pakistan played in the timing of the coup is still not known, but the coincidence that Nawaz Sharif government was thrown out soon after its statement against the Taliban has not been ignored in India. Thus, the success of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the spread of Taliban brand of fundamentalist philosophy in Pakistan has completely changed the scene in this region. The fundamentalist leaders in Afghanistan are no longer content to spread their philosophy in their own country. Helped by the official agencies, they are doing everything possible to spread their brand of religious philosophy in Pakistan and even among the Indian Muslims. The ISI is now reported to be funding madrassas in as far away places as Coimbatore in South India. The US as the only super-power will continue to take keen interest. And Britain as the erstwhile colonial rulers has also been deeply involved in Indo-Pakistan disputes from the very beginning. India considers them as part of the problem and not of the solution. Many other countries are also concerned about the developments in Pakistan. The anxieties over international terrorism originating from Pakistan, which affects a number of countries, including the United States, many European countries, Russia and Central Asia, have increased manifold. A military leadership with close linkages to terrorist groups in and outside Pakistan would only aggravate these fears from international terrorism. Pakistan's military alliance with the US and China and its ganging up with India's other neighbours in its anti-India policies are looked upon with great suspicion in India. An increase and somewhat intrusive input from the only super power in favour of Pakistan has influenced the dynamics of the regional balance and has had essentially negative impact. China's assistance in nuclear and missile field has serious implications for Indian security. Most observers in India believe that financial constraints are unlikely to prevent the new rulers from making further investments in their nuclear and missile programme. The success of the Taliban in Afghanistan has given the military establishment new hope to fulfil their long-cherished ambitions against India.

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The United Nations has been involved from 1947 when India went to the world organisation as a complainant against the Pakistani aggression. The Kashmir dispute continues to figure on its list of unresolved disputes. It has Observer Missions on both sides of the LoC. The International Red Cross has also been operating in the Indian side for the last few years. The other neighbours of India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and Nepal, are also concerned about the recent deterioration in India Pakistan relations. Nepal and India have open borders; and the India-Bangladesh borders are also quite soft. According to Government of India the ISI has built its bases in Bangladesh and Nepal for its anti-India operations. The Indian security forces have arrested a number of ISI's agents who entered India from Nepal and Bangladesh.

3.13. Jammu and Kashmir The dispute dates back to 1947, when armed tribals from the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) backed by the regular troops of the Pakistan army invaded the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Though the majority of the state subjects were Muslims, it was a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious state. Even today both the Indian side and the Pakistani side of the state can be divided into distinct ethnic groups which transcend their religious identity. Calling the whole state "Kashmir" is responsible for creating a lot of avoidable confusion. The Valley, which could be called Kashmir, is a relatively small area in this huge state. It is not generally appreciated that the Muslims of the Valley have no ethnic or cultural affinity with the Muslims in the Pakistan side of the state, or for that matter with the Muslims in the other areas on the Indian side. Similarly, the Hindus in the Valley -the Kashmiri Pandits- are from the same ethnic stock and have closer cultural ties with the Muslims in the Valley than the Hindus in the Jammu area. And the Muslims in Kargil on the Indian side have closer cultural and ethnic ties with the Buddhists in Ladakh than the Muslims in other parts of the state. Most of them are from the Shia sect. Similarly, the inhabitants of the Northern areas in the Pakistan side have a distinct identity of their own and would hate to be called Kashmiris. When some Kashmir experts refer to the wishes of the "Kashmiri people", they must identify which people are they referring to. The Indian Independence Act 1947 had given the option to the ruling princes to either accede to India or Pakistan, or become independent. Fearing the Maharajah’s (ruler) accession to India, the new rulers of Pakistan decided to forcibly occupy the state. It invaded J & K. The Maharajah asked for the Indian assistance to throw out the invaders. He signed the Instrument of Accession on 26 October 1947. The Indian troops landed in the state on the next day only after it had legally acceded to India. The invaders, who had reached on the outskirts of the summer capital Srinagar, were later driven out by the Indian army. Pakistan did not learn from its failure to mobilise the Muslims of the state to support its military campaign. It had also underestimated India’s resolve to defend its borders. It committed the same error in 1965 and again recently during the Kargil war.

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When the cease-fire agreement was signed on 1 January 1949, under the auspices of the United Nations, the Valley had been completely cleared of the invaders. Nevertheless, a huge chunk of the state territory, more than half, was still under Pakistan's occupation. Jawahar Lal Nehru, then Prime Minister of India, had to face much criticism for agreeing to the cease-fire. Some relevant facts about the dispute need to be highlighted. It was India, which went to the United Nations with a complaint against Pakistan's aggression, but the issue soon got involved in world's power politics. The Security Council adopted two resolutions, on 17 January and 21 April 1948. They called for the restoration of peace and order and holding of a plebiscite, subject to the condition of the Pakistani withdrawal from all parts of the state. This condition Pakistan did not fulfil. The subsequent UN resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 provided for a plebiscite after a cease-fire and truce agreement between India and Pakistan. Though the cease-fire agreement was soon concluded, the process of a truce agreement proved much more difficult. It is important to recall that it was India which unilaterally offered to hold a plebiscite to find out the wishes of the people at the time of signing the Instrument of Accession, much before the dispute was referred to United Nations on India's complaint. The Indian leaders went to the United Nations as a victim of Pakistani aggression. They went to the UN as a complainant in the belief that they will get justice from the world body. They were, however, disillusioned very soon. The inexperienced Indian leadership were to learn their first lesson in the intricacies of international power-plays. Countries invariably pursue their own national agenda, and seldom an issue is decided purely on its merits. The bitter Indian experience with the UN and the many eminent international mediators who led the international effort explains its reluctance to accept any third party mediation. The first unsuccessful mediator was General A.G.L. McNaughton, President of the Security Council in 1949. He was followed by Sir Owen Dixon, a judge of the Australian High Court. Even he soon realised the difficulties and complexities of the problem. He was the first to recognise that there was no immediate prospect of settlement of the issue and that de facto division of the state at some stage was inevitable. His successor Dr. Frank Owen of the United States also came to the same conclusion and therefore recommended that the two countries negotiate the dispute bilaterally. A number of other heavy weights like the US Presidential candidate, Adlei Stevenson, also visited the state and created more problems than solving them. As result, India perceives international meddling into the dispute more a part of the problem than a part of the solution. It suits Pakistan to project the issue as a dispute between Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan, notwithstanding the total rejection of this projection by its own erstwhile eastern half. J&K is not so much a territorial dispute as an ideological dispute. It was a test case for the ideology behind the creation of Pakistan, that the Hindus and the Muslims were two distinct people and incapable of living peacefully in one country. Hence,

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the belief that if J&K, with its Muslim majority, did not join Pakistan as part of an Islamic state, the whole ideological foundation of Pakistan would collapse. Stakes are equally high in India. India cannot survive as a nation without its secular base. The Simla Agreement signed between the two countries in 1972 seeks to solve the dispute within a bilateral framework. However, successive governments in Pakistan have been doing everything possible at the diplomatic and military level to sabotage the agreement. The difficulty about the Kashmir dispute is the lack of any meeting ground between India and Pakistan. The fundamental problem about the so called core issue is that they do not even agree on the nature of the conflict. For Pakistan the raison d'être of the Kashmir conflict lies in India's refusal to hold the plebiscite according to its own interpretation of the UN resolutions. It conveniently skips the lines in the resolutions which had committed Pakistan to withdraw its armies from the entire state before a plebiscite could be held. Until today Pakistan is occupying by force of more than half the state. It has consistently refused to honour its commitment for the last fifty years. Pakistan also refuses to recognise the fact that the situation in the state has not remained static since 1947 on both sides of the state. Today Pakistan does not even recognise that the Northern areas in its side are part of the disputed state. It has fully integrated these areas into Pakistan, though they were an integral part of the state at the time of the independence in 1947. Pakistan has even ceded a huge chunk of the state territory to China under an agreement signed with that country without any discussion with India. It is ironical that the demand for a plebiscite is now being made by the new rulers, who had few qualms in dismissing an elected government in their own country. It is a phoney demand. Who is to decide the parameters of the right for self-determination? Will the plebiscite decide the choice of accession between India and Pakistan, or between independence and accession to either state, or will it give the option to partition the state on religious or ethnic lines? And what about the Northern areas and the territory ceded to China? There are insurmountable practical difficulties. It only clouds the main issue of transforming the environment of hostility in the sub-continent to one of peace and stability. The likely consequences of encouraging fundamentalist forces in secular India are too serious to be ignored. They can destabilise the whole political situation in the country. In the highly surcharged environment of competitive politics, the divisive forces, not too far from the mainstream politics, are bound to take advantage and exploit the opportunity to press their own agenda. These forces have the potential to unleash communal violence on a massive scale. Violence is not likely to remain confined to the borders of J&K. Fifty-two years cannot simply be wiped off, as if the situation is the same as it was in 1947. Both India and Pakistan face too many serious social, economic and political problems, to fritter away their energies in the repeat of the post-partition communal violence.

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Ultimately, a solution to the Kashmir issue, which takes care of the internal compulsions for governments in both the countries, will have to be found. That solution, in my view, will have to be around the Line of Control (LoC). It is not generally recognised that the LOC is no arbitrary line; it goes along clearly-demarcated ethnic regions. It could, with some adjustments, become the international boundary. This is, however, not acceptable to either India or Pakistan. This hard attitude can change only when the two appreciate each others' internal compulsions. Neither India nor Pakistan can agree to any solution that will create more internal problems for them than the existing dispute. A solution on communal lives will only rekindle the animosities of the pre-partition days. It is in the interest of both countries to let the old animosities die down, so that a fresh start can be made to improve the relations. If the aim is to improve the relations between the two countries, then the Kashmir dispute has to be put on the back-bone until Pakistani rulers accept the reality on the ground and the dreams of changing the LoC by force. To expect that because India is a much bigger country than Pakistan it should make more concessions, is unrealistic. No government in India, from any political party, will surrender any part of the state to Pakistan under military or international pressure.

3.14. Conclusion The list of those who are likely to work against the process of improvement of the relations is long, but there is also a positive side to the picture. One to one relations continue to be good. There is a small, but growing, constituency in Pakistan which advocates improvement in Indo-Pakistan relations. The media in Pakistan has become more independent, and some question the benefit of the huge cost the country is paying for the anti-India obsession. The process of an improvement of the relations could be set in motion by people to people contact. The unending hostility tends to obscure the positive side of the picture. The strong socio-cultural ties between the people cannot be ignored. They have common languages and the same customs and traditions. There is a kind of chemistry between the people of the two countries. In spite of all the efforts Pakistan has made to forge stronger ties with the Islamic countries at the cost of its links with India, these ties continue to be strong. Every Indian who visits Pakistan and every Pakistani who visits India is struck by the similarities between the two countries. The paradox is that the hostility between the two countries at the level of the government is only matched by the strong friendship at the level of individuals. In an human encounter between an Indian and Pakistani, the two are able to relate to each other intimately and talk positively about various issues without acrimony and distrust. But put them together in groups, and they behave very differently. The media and the daily dose of hostile government propaganda has conditioned the people in Pakistan to believe that they are two different and rival people. The resolution of the Kashmir dispute will become easier with improvement in the relationship. Neither country can ignore geographical and cultural factors. Pakistan must accept the reality that its future lies in the sub-continent and not in building an anti-India Islamic bloc. The belief that Pakistan has the capability to harm India seriously has

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encouraged the Pakistani rulers to become more aggressive and keep on doing just that through military and diplomatic means even at the cost of Pakistan's own self-interest. The looming economic crisis may force them to eschew this path and take a more rational view of the relations. No sensible person in India wants Pakistan to break up or become a "failed state". Stability and prosperity in Pakistan, according to most political analysts in India, is in India's own interest. Before talking of making any progress in confidence building, one should focus on how to start the process. The difficulty of the task must be judged from the fact that the two countries do not even agree on the scope of the task. For Pakistan the Kashmir dispute must take precedence over everything else; and for India Pakistan must stop its subversive activities in India. As long as Pakistan continues to insist that the accession of J&K to Pakistan remains an unfinished task of the partition, there can be little progress on this complex dispute. In that case the phrase "result oriented (bilateral) talks on Kashmir within a given time-frame" means no progress at all. A time bound discussion in the absence of a willingness to understand the complexity of the problem and each other's viewpoint is bound to fail. It will become a zero-sum game, where one's gain becomes other's loss. No one in India, believes the Pakistani claim that it was providing only political and moral support to the terrorist movement in the state. It is clear to most observers in the world, including independent observers in the West, that what is happening today in the state is far from an indigenous moment. The oft-repeated Pakistani statement lacks credibility. For the bilateral talks to succeed, they must be conducted in low profile without too much publicity. It is not true to say that bilateral talks can never succeed. Talks in the past have resulted in a number of important agreements. To name a few of them: an agreement not to attack each other's designated nuclear facilities and installations signed in 1987; advance notification of military exercises, manoeuvres and movements (1991); and a joint declaration not to use, produce, or stock chemical weapons, or transfer related technology to others in 1992. Several nuclear CBMs were listed in the Memorandum of Understanding accompanying the Lahore Declaration in February 1999. Among the important non-military agreements are: Indus Water Treaty (1969), Rann of Kutch Agreement (1968), Simla Agreement (1972), Salal Dam Agreement (1978), and the establishment of the Joint commissions. CBMs can establish trust between the two countries, but the paradox is that trust is required before CBMs can be negotiated. And continued adherence to them requires India and Pakistan to perceive that the balance of advantage lies in their implementation, particularly during crisis. Obviously hotlines can be relevant during a crisis situation only if minimum trust obtains. Both countries should look beyond the Kashmir dispute. The time is now ripe to create a more stable security environment. Trust has its risks, and has been the biggest casualty of the Kargil war, but it is worth taking as there is no other option for both India and Pakistan.

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In the backdrop of hostility and uncompromising attitude, the aim of CBMs should be not so much to resolve the Kashmir dispute in a short span of time, but to create an environment in which a solution can ultimately emerge. It is in this context that the role of the non-official dialogue assumes great importance. Many think tanks have floated a number of proposals including one about converting the LoC into a soft border. It is unrealistic because it is not possible to agree to a soft border between two hostile neighbours. Ultimately, a solution will have to be found around the LoC with some adjustments to satisfy the aspirations of the people in both countries, but that solution cannot emerge immediately. To succeed it will have to be a long-drawn process. A third-party mediation cannot hasten it. That could be counter-productive. In view of the volatile nature of Indio-Pakistan relationship, the two countries need to develop a certain degree of tenacity and steadfastness in the Confidence Building exercise. Even relatively trivial issues can raise the temperature on both side to cause a setback to the process. Hardliners are present on both sides and any move to improve the relations is bound to be opposed by some section of the people, the media and, of course, the opposition parties. The problem is more serious in Pakistan than in India. Past experience reveals that CBMs are best sought in an incremental manner, because evolutionary step by step approaches work better. A building block approach commends itself. Thus, the agreement not to attack each other's nuclear facilities and installations could be extended to identified populations and economic targets. Greater attention should be given to non-military CBMs. Article III of the Simla Agreement provides a framework for such measures. It proposes: i) steps to resume communications, postal, telegraphic, sea, land and air links including flights; ii) steps to promote travel facilities; iii) cooperation in trade and economy; and iv) and exchange in the fields of science and culture. The need to negotiate nuclear related CBMs is both immediate and vital. India and Pakistan had agreed under the Lahore Declaration to provide each other with “advance notification in respect of ballistic missiles flight tests;” notify an “accidental, unauthorised or unexplained incident;” maintain a “unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear test explosions;” “conclude an agreement on prevention of incidents at sea”; “review the implementation of existing CBMS;” “review existing communication links ...with a view to upgrading and improving these links;” and “engage in bilateral consultations on security, disarmament, and non-proliferation issues.” India needs peace with Pakistan. But all the landmark treaties between India and Pakistan Tashkent and Simla Agreements, and now Lahore Declaration have been blatantly violated. Confidence Building measures are not likely to produce results till the most important item - the welfare of the people - comes on the centre stage of the political agenda in the subcontinent.

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indo-pakistan relations: the indian perspective...to resume them, but pressure tactics from outside...

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