Opinion » Lead

February 7, 2015

Updated: February 7, 2015 00:33 IST

India’s tango with the great powers

Knee Pain Treatment - Suffering from Knee Pain? Get Best Knee Pain Treatment @ Home

portea.com/Physiotherapy-Treatment/

Ads by Google

Srinath Raghavan

Comment · print · T T

Tweet

TOPICS

diplomacy

India-China

international relations

summit

Geopolitical and economic factors and the re-energised

relationship between the U.S. and India are the drivers of

change in the trilateral relationship between India, Russia

and China. The cumulative impact of these two trends points

to a new, emerging configuration of the triangular

relationship

The latest trilateral meeting between the foreign ministers of India,

Russia and China was held on shifting strategic sands. It would be no

exaggeration to say that the triangular relationship between these

countries is entering a new phase — one that differs significantly from

the past. India’s ability to navigate this unfolding terrain will not only

impinge on its relationships with Russia and China, but also on its wider,

international objectives and choices.

The drivers of change in this trilateral relationship are primarily

geopolitical and economic. The civil war in Ukraine shows no sign of

abating, nor indeed does Russia’s involvement in the conflict. The

resurgence of the fighting in eastern Ukraine has left the peace talks in

tatters. And Russian support for the rebels has ensured that the

Ukrainian forces cannot gain the upper hand. Indeed, the Ukrainians

have suffered heavily in the recent fighting. This has led to a chorus of

calls in the West to arm the Ukrainian forces. Although U.S. President

Barack Obama has demurred against this, several influential voices —

including Mr. Obama’s nominee for Defence Secretary, Ashton Carter

— have come out in favour of providing heavy weapons to Ukraine.

Any such move will lead Russian President Vladimir Putin to dig in his

heels still deeper. Russia already faces a raft of economic sanctions

imposed by the European Union (EU) and the U.S. The Russian

economy is apparently wilting under the one-two punch of these

sanctions and the free-fall in oil prices. The projected slowdown in

growth, the depleting foreign exchange reserves, the rising inflation, the

downgrading of Russia’s credit rating to junk status: all point to a

serious economic crunch. The economic sanctions have already led

Russia to tilt closer towards China. The talk of providing weapons to

Ukraine or imposing further sanctions will accentuate this shift.

The second driver of change is the re-energised relationship between the

U.S. and India. The U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision put out during Mr.

Obama’s visit not only singles out the South China Sea dispute but also

commits India and the U.S. to work together with other democracies in

the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific region. The wisdom of issuing such a

statement is debatable. Are we staking our credibility before creating

capabilities? Does it needlessly restrict our room for diplomatic

manoeuvre in the event of a crisis in the South China Sea? New Delhi

insists that a strategic embrace of the U.S. need not limit its relations

with China. While this may be true in some generic sense, we should not

forget that every move on the chessboard of international politics will

invite countermoves. We do not yet live in a world that is free of

consequences.

India-Russia relationship

The cumulative impact of these two trends points to a new, emerging

configuration of the triangular relationship between India, Russia and

China. Going forward, Russia-China ties might become the strongest

side of the triangle. From India’s standpoint, this is historically

unprecedented. New Delhi’s strategic ties with Moscow first took shape

in the late 1950s. The backcloth to the blossoming of this relationship

was provided by India’s deteriorating relationship with China owing to

the disputed boundary. At the same time, ideological and strategic ties

between Moscow and Beijing were coming apart. Although the Russians

played an ambivalent role during the war of 1962, Indo-Soviet ties,

especially in defence, continued to tighten.

The clashes between Soviet and Chinese forces in 1969 led Moscow to

propose a treaty of friendship with India. The treaty was eventually

consummated at the height of the Bangladesh crisis of 1971. This crisis

also saw the American opening towards Maoist China, which

subsequently led to a strategic nexus aimed at the Soviet Union. While

New Delhi and Moscow were pulled together by their shared concerns

about Beijing, India found its choices being circumscribed in other areas

as well. For instance, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979,

India publicly supported the Russians, while the Americans and the

Chinese covertly assisted Pakistan and the Mujahideen against the Red

Army.

By the time the Cold War drew to an end, there was a rapprochement

between Russia and China. The collapse of the Soviet Union also led

India to look more towards the West. Yet, at no point, was there a

possibility of a Russia-China entente of the kind that is now

crystallising. Nor did the normalisation of the Russia-China relationship

outweigh Indo-Russian ties. Most importantly, the developing

relationship between Moscow and Beijing did not impact on New

Delhi’s immediate interests.

All this appears to be changing. In June 2014, Russia announced the

lifting of its long-standing embargo on arms sales to Pakistan. In

November, Russia and Pakistan signed their first ever military

cooperation agreement. The Russians argue that if India can buy defence

equipment from the U.S., why couldn’t they sell to Pakistan. The

problem for India, of course, is the strategic import of such moves by

Russia. Then again, we must realise that our growing proximity to the

U.S. reduces our leverage over Russia. As does Russia’s increasing tilt

towards China. As always, a bit of history can be useful.

“Russia-China ties might become the strongest side of the

triangle. From India’s standpoint, this is historically

unprecedented.”

Back in the 1960s, the Russians first mooted the idea of selling military

equipment to Pakistan. The Indian response was swift and sharp. In a

meeting with Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin, Prime Minister Indira

Gandhi bluntly said that “nothing should be done from which it could be

inferred that the Soviet Union treated India at par with Pakistan.” India,

she added, was “especially worried with regard to Soviet help [to

Pakistan], as such help might neutralise what we have obtained from the

Soviet Union.” Moscow promptly backed off. The Russians did so

because they needed Indian support in their own problems with China.

Moreover, India — unlike Pakistan — was not an American ally.

Security architecture

The strategic picture now is rather different. Discussions in the recent

trilateral meeting underscored the complexities that will confront India.

The joint statement issued in Beijing makes the usual noises about the

desirability of a multipolar world. Yet, several points need to be

unpacked. The statement calls for a security architecture in Asia that

must be “open, inclusive, indivisible and transparent”. The use of

“indivisible” is interesting. This refers to the American “pivot” and

attempts at rallying its allies. By contrast, the India-U.S. statement

supports — at least rhetorically — the U.S.-led efforts. The Chinese and

Russians have clearly taken note.

Things would be easy for India if it confronted stark choices between the

U.S. and China. Consider the position taken by the three countries on

climate change. The statement hopes that in 2015, a legally-binding

instrument would be arrived at on the basis of “equity, common but

differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.” This fits with

India’s negotiating position so far. But the fact is that the U.S. and China

have already agreed upon a plan that effectively carves out an

exceptional space for themselves and leaves little for countries like India

to work with. This is a nice example of the “G2” solutions for which

India will have to watch out.

Another instance of this might be in international trade. The joint

statement affirms that the World Trade Organization (WTO) must

remain the “preeminent global forum trade”. This reflects their concern

about U.S. efforts to create new regional trading blocs in Europe and

Asia. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) being negotiated by the

Obama administration aims to bring into force a very different kind of

Free Trade Agreements (FTA) in Asia-Pacific, which will bring on to

the trade agenda a new set of norms and standards. The Chinese have

been explicitly kept out of it by the Americans — in the hope that China

will eventually have to come to terms with this trade agenda. Indeed, as

the TPP negotiations near completion, the Chinese have informally

conveyed to the U.S. their desire to get on board. As in climate change, a

U.S.-China convergence on this issue will hurt Indian interests.

Then again, there are issues where the three countries’ interests seem

closely aligned — and in opposition to the U.S. They have agreed to

support a U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) resolution prohibiting

intervention and “forced regime change”. This cuts against the idea of

Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which was introduced by the western

powers through the UNGA and sought to be built up as a norm

governing interventions.

India’s relations with the great powers, then, are entering a period of

unprecedented complexity. There are no pat solutions or simple trade-

offs. And every move we make will be consequential.

(Srinath Raghavan is Senior Fellow, Centre for Policy Research, New

Delhi.)

Keywords: India-China-Russia bilateral relations, trilateral

meeting, Sushma Swaraj, Sushma Swaraj China visit, India-China

bilateral relations, India-Russia bilateral realtions, Sino-India

relations, UN General Assembly, Responsibility to Protect