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TTable of Contents

1.0 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 1

2.0 RESULTS .......................................................................................... 3

3.0 CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................ 13

Abbreviations Used in This Report

CFR Code of Federal RegulationsDNFSB Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety BoardDOE U.S. Department of EnergyEM DOE Office of Environmental ManagementES&H Environment, Safety, and HealthFY Fiscal YearISM Integrated Safety ManagementKCP Kansas City PlantLLNL Lawrence Livermore National LaboratoryNE DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and TechnologyNNSA National Nuclear Security AdministrationOA Office of Independent Oversight and Performance

AssuranceORNL Oak Ridge National LaboratoryP2 Pollution PreventionPCB Polychlorinated BiphenylSAA Satellite Accumulation AreaSC DOE Office of ScienceSRS Savannah River SiteSTP Site Treatment Plan

FOREWORD

Since 1984, the Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance (OA), within the Office of Securityand Safety Performance Assurance, and its predecessor offices within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) havebeen responsible for evaluating programs of national significance and reporting on their status to the Secretary ofEnergy, senior Department management, and Congress. This independent internal oversight function is unique in theexecutive branch of the government and, over the years, has led to notable improvements in safeguards and security;cyber security; environment, safety, and health (ES&H); and emergency management programs. The OA Office ofEnvironment, Safety and Health Evaluations is responsible for evaluating and reporting on ES&H performancethroughout the DOE complex.

A number of DOE sites house legacy hazards that have not been addressed in a timely manner; these includeunneeded hazardous materials in long-term storage and abandoned, deteriorating buildings for which there are noplans for disposition. Therefore, OA identified management of legacy hazards as a focus area—one that warrantsincreased attention across DOE—during four fiscal year 2004 inspections: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the Kansas City Plant, and the Savannah River Site.

At all four sites, OA found that recent initiatives developed by the site contractors that were reviewed are having apositive effect on addressing legacy hazards. Two of the four sites have generally been effective in the past incontrolling operations to prevent the creation of legacy hazards; these sites had appropriate programs in place tomanage the remaining legacy hazards. However, until recently, the other two sites had not effectively managedoperations to prevent the creation of legacy hazards; these sites face significant challenges but have recentlyimplemented aggressive programs to address legacy hazards. Although these sites have appropriate programs,improvements are needed at the DOE Headquarters level to ensure that legacy hazards are addressed in a timelymanner and to resolve responsibility for functional ownership.

OA will continue to evaluate safety management programs and select focus areas based on a review of operatingevents and inspection results where weaknesses continue to be identified. OA also will continue to periodicallyreview its evaluation results to identify lessons learned that will facilitate improvements. By these means, OA willcontinue to fulfill its mission of promoting improvement in DOE ES&H programs.

1

Introduction1.0

This report summarizes the observations,insights, and lessons learned from evaluating themanagement of legacy hazards during Office ofIndependent Oversight and PerformanceAssurance (OA) environment, safety, and health(ES&H) management inspections conducted in2004. OA, within the Office of Security and SafetyPerformance Assurance, identified managementof legacy hazards as a focus area across the U.S.Department of Energy (DOE) complex based onan analysis of past inspections and otherperformance data, which determined that a numberof sites have not addressed legacy hazards in atimely manner. In 2004, this focus area wasevaluated as part of ES&H inspections at the foursites listed in Table 1. The table also identifies theDOE program office that has primary managementresponsibility for each site: the National NuclearSecurity Administration (NNSA), the Office ofEnvironmental Management (EM), or the Officeof Science (SC).

The four sites OA examined represent threeprogram offices and include waste management,laboratory, and production activities. Therefore,the four sites provide a good sample for gleaninginsights on overall DOE performance of major DOEsites that have clear missions and fully functioningES&H support organizations.

Legacy hazards typically result from past useof hazardous materials, such as beryllium, volatileorganic compounds, fuel oils, and polychlorinated

Table 1. Sites Inspected by OA During 2004

Safety ManagementInspection Site

Savannah River Site (SRS)Kansas City Plant (KCP)Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL)Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL)

HeadquartersProgramOffice(s)

EM/NNSANNSASCNNSA

biphenyls (PCBs), and past disposal practicesinvolving radioactive and/or hazardous waste. Inaddition, there are a number of aging facilities thatare not currently being used or that have beendeactivated and are undergoing or awaitingenvironmental remediation.

OA evaluated site contractor management oflegacy hazards against the applicable requirements:Federal, state, and local environmental regulations;Occupational Safety and Health Administration andDOE/site requirements; integrated safetymanagement (ISM) expectations; and DOE Order430.1B, Real Property Asset Management,requirements in the areas of facility conditionassessment, deactivation, and disposition. OA alsoexamined DOE line management direction to andoversight of site contractor programs for managing

Deteriorating Facility

2

legacy hazards. Performance in this area was evaluatedby reviewing policies, requirements, procedures,guidance documents, plans, and hazard controldocuments; observing work within facilities;interviewing key DOE and contractor personnel;observing work associated with waste storage andtreatment processes and legacy hazards cleanup; andconducting walkthroughs of operating facilities withpotential hazardous legacy concerns and abandonedor unused buildings.

Section 2 of this report discusses OA’sobservations in four topical areas: 1) legacy wastemanagement, 2) legacy hazards within facilities, 3)legacy facility disposition, and 4) environmental legacyhazards. Conclusions derived across the four sites arepresented in Section 3, focusing on effectiveness inaddressing legacy hazards and areas where additionalmanagement attention will be necessary to control and/or eliminate these hazards.

3

Results2.0

For each of the four topical areas, OA discussesoverall observations and insights, positive attributes,and opportunities for improvement. Because site-specific deficiencies and opportunities forimprovement have already been communicated tothe sites as part of OA’s inspection reports, theimprovement items in this report focus on potentialenhancements of DOE performance across thecomplex. However, where appropriate, OA refersto positive attributes at specific sites so thatinterested parties can obtain additional informationabout innovative approaches and noteworthypractices (e.g., by referring to the applicableES&H inspection report or by contacting the site).

2.1 Legacy WasteManagement

The review of legacy hazards associated withwaste management examined two questions: 1)Are current operations and waste handlingperformed in a manner that does not create afuture legacy concern? and 2) Is waste from pastactivities being properly managed to minimize therisk it presents, pending ultimate disposal? Theinspection results show that all four sites aremanaging waste effectively. With only a fewexceptions, newly generated waste is being treatedor disposed of in a timely manner that will not createa legacy disposal concern or pose undue ES&Hrisks. The inspection results also indicate thatwaste management facilities are well maintainedand effectively operated. Specific actions that sites

have

have taken to improve waste disposal or reducethe amount of waste generated include streamliningthe disposal process, constructing new wastemanagement facilities, becoming certified todispose of low-level waste directly to the NevadaTest Site, and implementing strong pollutionprevention (P2) programs. Because the P2programs generally have senior managementsupport and are effectively integrated with missionwork, DOE sites have received several awardsfor these programs.

In a few cases, sites have allowed their longer-term storage facilities to accumulate waste involumes allowing more economical disposal.Methods used for this longer-term storageappropriately minimize ES&H risk and have DOEfield element approval. In addition, by effectivelymanaging current waste streams and pursuingpollution prevention actions, sites are preventingthe creation of future legacy hazards.

All four sites are managing legacy wasteproperly, with one small but notable exception(discussed under Opportunities for Improvement,below) involving storage of hazardous waste insatellite accumulation areas (SAAs). Sites withlarge amounts of legacy waste have programs,currently in various stages of execution, tosignificantly reduce and/or dispose of the waste.For example, a site that previously had deficienciesin management of legacy waste took significantactions to address these issues and is now onschedule to dispose of almost all legacy waste bythe end of fiscal year (FY) 2005. Specific actionsinvolving legacy waste that are being performedby one or more sites include:

• Performing walkdowns of waste storage areasin facilities awaiting deactivation and dispositionas part of a management strategy to ensurethat miscellaneous waste containers are movedinto storage that complies with regulations

• Relocating drums containing uranium chipsfrom outside near the site boundary to inside astorage bay in a recently opened wastemanagement facility and beginning a processLow Level Interim Waste Storage Bins

4

to deactivate the chips as part of a series ofmanagement actions to protect workers, the public,and the environment and to provide an effectivedisposition path for these materials

• Instituting processes and programs within facilitiesas part of a management commitment to locateand properly dispose of legacy waste containers;this action is often performed in conjunction withspace management and cleanout programs, whichare discussed in Section 2.2.

As a result of these actions and programs, the foursites inspected have already significantly reduced thequantity of legacy waste, or are in the process of doingso.

Positive Attributes

Sites have implemented effective programsfor disposing of legacy waste. For example, onesite effectively addressed storage issues affecting over10,000 drum equivalents of transuranic waste, low levelwaste, and mixed waste (radioactive and hazardouswastes); previously, these drums were stored outdoorsin less than optimal conditions, and there was no firmschedule for disposal. In addition, transuranic wastedrums are now being sent to the Waste Isolation PilotPlant, following certification of the drums by theNational Transuranic Program’s mobile vendor. Othersites have been identifying, characterizing, and sendingwaste to disposal as part of their programs to reducelegacy hazards.

Site Treatment Plans (STPs) are beingeffectively used as a management tool by sitesfor legacy mixed waste that cannot go to disposalwithin regulatory time limits. The STP establishesa regulatory framework for exceeding the time thatwaste can be stored. Sites are working effectivelywith regulators as part of the Federal FacilityCompliance Act agreement with their States to establishthe STPs. For example, at one site, legacy mixed waste(totaling 600 cubic meters) has been added to the STP.This site has committed to dispose of 95 percent of themixed waste under the STP by FY 2006, after themixed-waste streams are fully characterized and a pathfor disposal is determined. Other sites are using theSTP process for complying with regulatory requirementsas disposal options are identified and characterizationactivities are completed for mixed waste with difficultdisposal paths.

Opportunities for Improvement

Site management needs to ensure thatprocesses are in place and effectivelyimplemented to ensure the timely disposition oflegacy waste containers held in SAAs. Anenvironmental compliance vulnerability was identifiedat one site—namely, that hazardous waste remained inlong-term storage in SAAs after the generating activityended, resulting in the unnecessary potential forexposure of workers and the environment to thesewastes. This site has several legacy SAAs and hasnot taken adequate corrective actions. Because of thenumber of legacy waste containers, resolution of thisvulnerability is expected to take several years. SAAsare intended to accumulate hazardous waste only froman ongoing process; when the process ends, thehazardous waste from that process must be moved toa compliant storage area. Although this weakness wasnoted only at one site during this review period, otherDOE sites may have similar vulnerabilities that need tobe addressed. Sites need to ensure that waste services,environmental compliance, and/or internal organizationalresources work with line organizations to guide propermanagement of SAAs. Also, sites need to ensure that

Legacy Waste in a Satellite Accumulation Area

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legacy wastes are removed from inactive SAAs.Where funding constraints and/or the volume of wastemake immediate disposal unrealistic, sites shouldconsider moving legacy wastes from SAAs into 90-day storage areas and/or facilities under a Treatment,Storage, and Disposal permit. If regulatory time limitswill be exceeded, sites need to add the waste to theSTP.

DOE needs to ensure that effectivemanagement planning processes are in place andused to provide the necessary facilities andinfrastructure for disposition of legacy wastes.Because of insufficient management planning, no viabledisposition path is available for transuranic waste storedin large boxes because the items in these boxes mustfirst be reduced in size, and there is no facility foropening them safely. This situation could be a concernat sites where special facilities may be required to allowlarge containers to be opened so that the waste can besafely characterized and certified. DOE needs toidentify alternative processes for size reduction anddecontamination of equipment in oversized transuranicboxes and ensure that facilities are available for thedisposition of oversized transuranic boxes across theDOE complex.

2.2 Legacy Hazards WithinFacilities

DOE line management – NNSA and other DOEprogram offices and site offices – have focusedattention on site conditions and resources needed toaddress legacy hazards within facilities. For example,one site office played an active role in responding to aDefense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) 60-day letter about hazardous material safety limitexceedences. In some instances, DOE linemanagement regularly performs oversight of initiativesto remove and disposition legacy hazardous materials.However, not all site offices include identification andremoval of legacy hazards as a regular part ofoperational awareness activities.

At all four inspected sites, legacy hazards posingsignificant risk to the public, workers, and theenvironment are being addressed by programs that focuson legacy hazards. For example, at one site, seniormanagement focused attention on the removal of legacyequipment, facilities, and materials through its Ten YearComprehensive Site Plan, which identified the removalof legacy equipment, facilities, and materials as a majorinstitutional initiative. At most sites, innovative

approaches are used to fund the removal of legacyhazards, including the use of specially-designated fundsfrom DOE Headquarters, direct program funds,overhead, and internal “legacy taxes.” Contractors atsome sites have initiated an institutional tax to fundremoval of legacy hazards and reuse of space, andhave effectively used institutional risk-ranking processesto prioritize legacy hazard removal actions andadequately consider ES&H aspects.

Contractor management has established specificorganizations and programs to assist the institution andline organizations in addressing legacy hazards. Forexample, at one site a Legacy Materials DispositionInitiative program was established to identify,characterize, and remove legacy items; as a result ofthis program, significant quantities of hazardous legacymaterials have been removed from the site over thepast three years. Another site has established anInstitutional Facilities Management organization for thedisposition of legacy materials from all siteorganizations.

Ongoing, sitewide projects and special teams arebeing used to remove hazardous materials fromfacilities. For example, at one site, a LegacyRemediation project was successfully applied at anuclear materials vault, resulting in downgrading thevault from a Category 3 nuclear facility to a radiologicalfacility. A project was initiated in 2001 at that site toidentify and remove legacy materials within a largeradioisotopes facility. Because of these and other similarefforts, approximately 5900 square feet of laboratoryspace that formerly housed legacy materials andequipment have been restored to productive use withinthe past few years. Institutional Space Action Teamshave been effectively used for removal of hazardouslegacy materials and deactivation of facilities. Theseteams have been involved in the removal and dispositionof various hazardous legacy materials, including 80 gaslecture bottles of rhenium hexafluoride from one facilityand approximately 5 pounds of perchlorate salt fromthe ductwork of another facility.

At another site, a Legacy Materials Dispositioninitiative resulted in the removal of significant quantitiesof hazardous legacy materials, including approximately32,400 cubic feet of low-level waste, 56 cubic yards ofasbestos, 4,327 excess chemicals, over 1,100 gascylinders, 8.25 tons of lead, and 1,915 pumps and motorsthat were potentially contaminated. Although significantprogress is being made at this site, legacy materialsfrom past site operations still exist, in part because theresponsible owners have not been adequately identifiedand because disposition pathways are not available.

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At sites dealing with legacy materials that wereidentified as part of DNFSB Recommendations 94-1and 97-1, processes have been developed and used tostabilize and package excess plutonium and uranium inwelded 3013 containers for long-term storage. Thesites have processed and dispositioned these materialsin accordance with the DOE implementation plan. Forexample, significant progress has been made towardremoving americium/curium materials from a canyonfacility by placing them in high-level waste tanks forprocessing in another facility. Excess plutonium anduranium materials have been processed and are readyto be shipped to another DOE site for additionalprocessing; they cannot yet be shipped because theultimate disposition path from that site has yet to bedeveloped.

Most sites have implemented programs to identifyand characterize legacy beryllium areas and usage asrequired by 10 CFR 850, Chronic Beryllium DiseasePrevention Program. However, the rigor applied tothe characterization of beryllium plant areas has variedconsiderably among DOE contractors. As a result,the evaluation of beryllium programs, including legacyberyllium contamination, has been identified as a focusarea for OA evaluations scheduled in calendar year2005.

Although management has systems in place tocontrol the accumulation of hazardous chemicals, manyof these systems have not been fully developed toensure their effectiveness. Institutional chemicalinventory systems are in place to control theaccumulation of chemicals within facilities andlaboratories. However, management attention is stillneeded to ensure that these processes are fullydeveloped in a timely manner so that chemicals are

effectively controlled and owners of chemicals are heldaccountable for managing their inventories. At thefacility level, processes have been implemented (e.g.,laboratory space management, landlord-tenantagreements, and use of checklists) to ensure thatemployees properly dispose of any excess hazardousmaterials before transferring to another position orterminating employment and when ownership oflaboratory space is transferred. Althoughimplementation of a laboratory space managementprogram at one site was observed to be a positive stepfor controlling the accumulation of excess legacymaterials, some aspects of the program have not beenimplemented effectively because roles, responsibilities,authorities, and accountabilities for laboratory spacemanagers are not clearly defined, contributing toinstances where legacy hazards within facilities werenot addressed. For example, some floor panels wereleft open in a vacated area of a facility that formerlyhoused computers and was being cleaned out, exposinga carbon dioxide (CO2) fire suppression system; aninadvertent release of CO2 from the system could lead

Before After

Hot Cell Cleanout

Exposed CO2 Fire Suppression System

7

to injuries or fatalities due to asphyxiation. Thissituation demonstrates the need for having clearlydefined roles and responsibilities for addressingworkplace hazards for individuals who oversee workperformed in areas with legacy materials.

Positive Attributes

Active involvement of DOE and contractormanagement has resulted in the implementationof programs and processes that are effective inaddressing a number of legacy hazards andenvironmental vulnerabilities. At ORNL, a Legacy

Materials Disposition Initiative program was identifiedas a noteworthy practice for identifying, characterizing,and removing legacy items while using rigorous controlsto ensure safety. At LLNL, senior management hasmade a strong commitment to reducing legacy hazardsthrough institutional initiatives and the Ten YearComprehensive Site Plan. As part of that commitment,LLNL senior management has established anInstitutional Facilities Management organization that isused effectively to manage the removal of legacymaterials from the site. At LLNL, a laboratory spacetax, restrictions on creating new space, and ES&Hconsiderations have been effective in reducing legacyhazards and promoting reuse of space.

Opportunities for Improvement

DOE site offices need to strengthen oversightof site contractor management of legacy hazards.Legacy hazards are not always included in regularreviews and operational awareness documents.Further, the site’s implementation plans and associated

procedures do not provide for adequate oversight ofthe site contactor’s management of legacy hazards.

Institutional processes aimed at managingchemical hazards need to be improved. Systemsto track site chemical inventories—ultimately intendedto prevent the accumulation of hazardous legacychemicals in facilities and laboratories—have not beenfully implemented and were being upgraded at the timeof the OA inspection. Increased management attentionis needed to ensure complete and timely implementationso that these systems can be effectively used to performtheir intended function. One important neededenhancement is to establish mechanisms to strengthenprogram owner accountability for management ofchemicals. In addition, some aspects of institutionalspace management and landlord-tenant agreementsneed to be strengthened by extending annual spacemanagement training to tenants and facility managersand including a discussion of the roles, responsibilities,authorities, and accountabilities of space managers,tenants, and facility managers for preventing theaccumulation of hazardous materials in facilities andlaboratories.

2.3 Legacy Facility Disposition

DOE Line Management Organizations. DOEline management organizations have made progress andhave been effective in identifying site issues related todeactivation and disposition of legacy facilities, andproviding effective oversight of facility dispositionprocesses with respect to deactivation and dispositionof facilities. Site offices have provided appropriatedirection to contractors, based on program officeguidance, and tracked progress through monthlyprogress reports and project walkdowns.

However, disposition of legacy facilities at somesites has presented management challenges becauseof: 1) unclear responsibilities among DOE programoffices for implementing disposition and transferprocesses for excess facilities, 2) the lack of agreementon funding responsibilities for addressing legacyhazards, and 3) poorly documented processes withinsome program elements. As a result, not allenvironmental and safety hazards have beenadequately addressed. Program offices have notreached consensus on funding activities to addresslegacy hazards within some buildings. Without thisconsensus, environmental and safety hazards remainto be addressed because of undefined responsibilitiesfor funding.

Legacy Materials Properly Labeled

8

EM and SC have not established a process for thetransition of several waste treatment facilities and wastemanagement programs. For example, EM proposedtransferring liquid and gaseous low-level wastetreatment facilities at SC sites to SC, along with theprogram for newly generated waste. Although thissituation does not pose any immediate environmentalimpacts and the site office continues to actively pursueresolution of this issue, EM and SC have not agreedupon a firm transfer date. At the same site, EM hasnot accepted a number of legacy-contaminated buildingsthat SC submitted before an EM-imposed deadline,including a Quonset Hut Complex consisting of WorldWar II-era buildings with peeling paint chips that contain

PCBs. SC has restricted the use of the ScienceLaboratories Infrastructure program funds to non-contaminated buildings, leaving responsibility for thesecontaminated buildings unresolved. Although someactions have been taken to control these paint chips,sediment samples from the storm drains that serve thesebuildings exceeded the Federal Facilities ComplianceAgreement action levels for PCBs in 1999 and 2002.The Environmental Protection Agency has beeninformed that the buildings are scheduled to bedemolished, but funding for this work is uncertain.

Sites with multiple program facility owners havehazardous legacy facilities with no disposition pathidentified for their removal. This is attributed toinsufficient clarity in ownership of these facilities andacceptance of funding responsibilities for theirdisposition. Questions about program office ownershipof legacy facilities have left legacy hazardous facilitieswith no disposition path for their deactivation andremoval. In one instance, SC funds were used forcleanout of several large buildings used by the DOEcontractor to facilitate transfer to NNSA. NNSA hassince decided not to accept liability for thesecontaminated buildings, but because part of the

contamination in these buildings predated SC-fundedactivities, responsibility for demolition remainsunresolved. Another facility that was originally usedfor a Defense Programs function is currently assignedto the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science andTechnology (NE), which previously used some of theequipment. Although EM has responsibility for fundingsurveillance and maintenance of a portion of theequipment and infrastructure in the building, EM’s rolein eventual deactivation and disposition of the buildinghas not been defined. In yet another instance,ownership and responsibility for the removal of certainlegacy materials, such as chemicals and welding gasesabandoned in place without the necessary hazardcontrols, remain in dispute between SC and NNSA.

DOE Contractors. The framework foraddressing disposition of legacy facilities is in place.DOE contractors have established effective institutionalprocesses and programs for the deactivation anddisposition of these facilities.

A Facilities Disposition program at one site hasbeen used effectively to identify, prioritize, anddisposition excess facilities using available fundingprovided by SC, the DOE Headquarters Health andSafety Initiative, and laboratory overhead. Dispositionactivities for excess facilities have been prioritized usinga process that considered risk reduction, results ofcondition assessment surveys, potential cost savings,and mission impact. A relatively recent initiative, an“AREA Closure” unit concept, has been developed tohelp prioritize legacy hazard management and cleanuppriorities as part of EM’s reengineering of managementpriorities. All “AREAs” are identified on an integratedschedule for sequencing closure activities. Sitewidepriorities reflect the future need for facilities andconsider the fact that many “AREAs” identified foreventual closure still house ongoing or plannedoperational activities to support cleanup. Approximately250 buildings identified for deactivation and dispositionhave been surveyed to determine legacy hazard issuesand to further establish needed priorities.

An institutional facility deactivation and dispositionprocess is being used effectively to reduce legacyhazards at another site. That process involves an annualidentification and risk ranking of projects for removinglegacy facilities or materials from within those facilities.The program owner of the facility has been assignedresponsibility for removing legacy materials andimplementing related requirements, and therequirements must be met before the institutionalorganization accepts responsibility for final facilitydisposition. Once accepted, the institution holds the

Deteriorated Quonset Hut

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facilities for reuse or ultimate demolition. This processhas been effective and has resulted in disposition of150 excess facilities, representing 400,000 square feetof space, over the past ten years.

OA reviewed certain requirements of DOE Order430.1B, including the Facility Condition Assessmentprogram, to determine whether they have beenadequately implemented. Facility condition assessmentsurveys have been performed at frequencies that meetDOE Order 430.1B requirements. The results of thesesurveys were used as one factor in determiningwhether a facility was accepted into the site’sdisposition process, and have been effective inpreventing the creation of future hazardous legacyfacilities. These surveys also identified some ES&H-related hazards, such as PCBs, lead paint, and asbestos.

Although much progress has been made inestablishing the necessary framework for dispositionof legacy facilities, some challenges remain. Someaspects of facility disposition programs, such asprogram plans and procedures, have not beenformalized. The core functions of ISM have not beenincorporated within facility deactivation planning orsurveillance and maintenance activities. Furthermore,surveillance and maintenance plans have not beendeveloped and implemented for facilities awaitingdeactivation and disposition. As a result, ES&H hazardsremain without sufficient controls in place. In addition,facility condition assessment surveys did not identifysome legacy hazards associated with hazardouschemicals and radiological materials.

Positive Attributes

DOE contractors have established effectiveinstitutional processes and programs for thedeactivation and disposition of facilities. Processesare in place at ORNL and LLNL and are being usedeffectively to identify, prioritize, and disposition excessfacilities. Risk ranking processes that consider risk

reduction, results of condition assessment surveys,potential cost savings, and mission impact areeffectively applied to prioritize disposition of excessfacilities.

As part of EM’s reengineering of managementpriorities, SRS implemented the “AREA Closure”concept as a useful means of prioritizing legacy hazardcleanup projects.

Facility condition assessment surveys havebeen performed as required by DOE Order430.1B and are being used to prevent the creationof future hazardous legacy facilities. Facilitycondition assessment surveys have been performed atfrequencies that meet DOE Order 430.1B requirementsat the sites that OA reviewed. The results of thesesurveys have been used effectively for dispositionplanning at ORNL and LLNL.

Opportunities for Improvement

Program offices need to coordinate efforts anddevelop a comprehensive strategy for reachingconsensus on the disposition and transfer ofexcess facilities and the funding of activities toaddress legacy hazards at sites where multipleprogram offices have facility responsibilities. Attwo sites, various program offices (e.g., SC, EM, NE,and NNSA) have responsibilities for dispositioning andtransferring facilities that are no longer needed, foraddressing legacy contamination and demolition, andfor funding. However, these organizations have notreached agreement on assignment of theseresponsibilities and how they are to be carried out. Asa result, buildings with multiple owners containenvironmental and safety hazards that are not beingaddressed.

Site contractors need to review andstrengthen processes for conducting surveillanceand maintenance activities for deactivatedfacilities to ensure that they do not pose undueES&H risks. Surveillance and maintenance plansare not always formalized and effectively implemented.As a result, several excess facilities have deterioratedand pose environmental vulnerabilities. In one instance,the roles, responsibilities, authorities, and accountabilitiesfor developing and implementing surveillance andmaintenance activities have not been established.ES&H subject matter experts do not always conductregular walkthroughs of deactivated facilities to ensurethat the existing hazard controls and surveillance andmaintenance plans are adequate.

Deactivation and Dispositioning Activities

10

Site contractors need to ensure that plans andprocesses for addressing legacy hazards and thedisposition of facilities no longer having missionrequirements are formalized and include ISM.Facility disposition program plans, procedures, andperformance expectations have not been formalizedas required by DOE Order 430.1B. In addition,procedures for conducting surveillance andmaintenance activities at excess facilities have not beenprepared, nor has ISM been considered as part of theseactivities. Plans describing how the contractor is toidentify, manage, and integrate all initiatives involvinglegacy hazards have not always been prepared.

Site contractors need to continue efforts toidentify and remove longstanding legacy hazardsin and around facilities. Although sites haveprocesses in place to address legacy hazards, hazardsstill remain in or around some facilities, or the facilitiesthemselves represent hazards that have not beenaddressed. In some instances, these deficiencies areattributable to an ineffective surveillance andmaintenance program or insufficient managementwalkthroughs.

2.4 Environmental LegacyHazards

OA evaluated restoration/remediation actions attwo sites. Past activities have resulted in groundwatercontamination from industrial solvents, fuels, and PCBs.Although the site office and the site contractor haveaddressed these environmental hazards usingsystematic approaches, PCBs continue to pose acompliance problem. NNSA and EM have notdetermined funding responsibility for further mitigatingPCB releases in a timely manner to address the currentexceedences of environmental requirements.

At another site, final negotiations are in progresswith State regulators for approval of the proposedclosure concept. However, the concept for long-termrestoration and stewardship presented in the Risk-Based End States Vision document is being revisedconcurrently to address feedback from EMHeadquarters to more clearly depict the methodologyand endpoints for site closure, including the basis forthe cleanup endpoints. Therefore, this document hasnot been introduced into the negotiation, so the State’sacceptance of and/or concerns about the concept couldnot be evaluated. A key aspect of the long-term plan isa decision that the Federal government will be the ownerand operator of the site for the long term (greater than

300 years). If this decision is made, the cleanupendpoints will be determined on the assumption thatthe land will not be open to the public, but controlled bythe government, and that cleanup would therefore notbe as extensive.

Positive Attributes

Legacy environmental concerns aboutgroundwater contamination are well characterizedand are being addressed to prevent offsiteregulatory limit exceedences. Past operations atseveral DOE sites used PCBs, fuels, and solvents underconditions that were not effective in preventing theirrelease to the ground in and around facilities. As aresult, several locations have been identified where thegroundwater is contaminated, and a pump and treatsystem is used to control this slowly movingcontamination. Sampling data and analyses generallyindicate that contaminated groundwater has not movedbeyond the site’s boundaries at concentrations aboveregulatory limits.

Opportunities for Improvement

DOE Headquarters organizations need toresolve conflicting positions for ensuringcontinued environmental compliance at siteswhere restoration/remediation funded work maynot have fully eliminated environmental impacts.This situation occurred at a site where several lateralpipes for the roof drains go under the buildings andtransfer collected rain water to permitted storm watersurface discharge points. Because the aging pipes areno longer watertight, PCB-contaminated groundwatercan enter the pipes, mix with rain water, and reach the

PCB Sampling in Storm Water Outfall

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discharge point at PCB concentrations above thedischarge limit. EM has funded several restorationprojects (e.g., lining some underground pipes) thatreduced contamination in the discharge. However,since these actions were completed, a more restrictivestandard has been imposed, thus changing the permittedlimit and sampling method. The more restrictivestandard, along with a reduction in the amount ofpotable water entering the storm water, resulted inseveral more recent instances where the new limitswere exceeded. At the time of the OA inspection,legal actions by the State’s department of naturalresources had resulted in two Notices of Violationsand discussions between the State, the Department ofJustice, and DOE legal staffs on additional enforcement

actions, including a proposed Consent Judgment underthe State’s clean water act. EM stated that additionalfunds for mitigating the PCB exceedances are outsidethe scope of restoration and would not be funded. TheHeadquarters organization for this site does not concurwith EM’s position that mitigating the PCB exceedancesis a stewardship responsibility. While this situationoccurred at one site, similar problems could occur atother sites. A Headquarters strategy for transitioninglong-term stewardship for legacy environmentalconcerns is needed to ensure that sites can meetenvironmental discharge and/or release requirementsas EM-funded activities transition to line organizationsat the sites.

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Conclusions3.0

The four sites that were reviewed haveprocesses in place to treat and/or dispose ofcurrently generated waste effectively and in atimely manner. As a result of well-managed currentwaste streams and pursuit of pollution preventionactions, the four sites are preventing the creationof future legacy hazards. The sites with significantamounts of legacy waste have implementedprograms to significantly reduce and/or dispose oftheir waste. However, OA identified a potentialcomplex-wide vulnerability in environmentalcompliance involving the need for processes toensure the timely disposition of hazardous wasteheld in SAAs after the generating activity hasterminated, which will require additionalmanagement attention. Due to the lack of effectiveplanning processes, facilities and infrastructurenecessary for the disposition of some legacywastes are not in place at some sites.

DOE and contractor management have madegood progress in implementing institutional initiativesand processes aimed at reducing legacy hazardswithin facilities and addressing environmentalvulnerabilities. Several initiatives have beeneffective in managing legacy hazards withinavailable funding. However, several actions havebeen identified that would improve managementof legacy hazards; these include completion ofplanned enhancements to existing chemicalinventory systems and strengthening of spacemanagement programs/landlord-tenant agreementsas mechanisms for preventing the accumulationof hazardous legacy materials in the future.Although most sites have implemented programsto identify and characterize legacy beryllium areas,the rigor of these programs varies considerablyamong DOE contractors, and thus, legacyberyllium contamination has been identified as partof a beryllium program focus area for OAinspections in calendar year 2005. Theaforementioned initiatives could be furtherstrengthened by incorporating legacy hazardsmanagement within site office operationalawareness activities, consistent managementattention to legacy hazards at the facility level in

support of institutional initiatives, and improveddocumentation.

DOE and contractor managers haveestablished effective institutional processes andprograms for the deactivation and disposition offacilities. A Facilities Disposition program at ORNLhas been used effectively to identify, prioritize, anddisposition excess facilities. LLNL hasimplemented an institutional facility deactivation anddisposition process and uses it to reduce legacyhazards and free up facility space for reuse. Facilitycondition assessment surveys have been performedin accordance with DOE Order 430.1Brequirements. Although significant progress hasbeen made in addressing disposition of facilities,several challenges remain. Sites with multiple DOEprogram office facility owners have hazardouslegacy facilities with no disposition path identifiedfor their transfer or removal, in part because ofthe need for program offices to better coordinateefforts and develop a comprehensive strategy forreaching consensus on the disposition and fundingof activities to address these legacy hazards. Otherareas for improvement include the need for sitecontractors to review and strengthen surveillanceand maintenance processes for deactivatedfacilities, ensure that facility disposition plans andprocesses are formalized and incorporate ISMprinciples, and ensure that hazards in or aroundfacilities are identified and removed througheffective management walkarounds.

Restoration/remediation programs have beeneffective at the two sites where OA reviewed thoseprograms. However, uncertainty in responsibilityfor managing legacy contamination needs to beresolved at one site to address current exceedencesof discharge limits. At another site, negotiationswith State regulators are in progress, but becausethe negotiations do not include the concept of usinglong-term DOE ownership requiring lessremediation, the State’s acceptance and theresulting path forward cannot be evaluated. Theimplementation of long-term stewardshiprepresents a possible area for evaluation by OA inthe future.

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