in the united states district court for the middle ... · (title vii and pregnancy discrimination...

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ALICIA DREES,

Plaintiff

v.

STEVENS & LEE, P.C.,

Defendant

:::::::::

Civil Action No.

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

FILED ELECTRONICALLY

COMPLAINT

PARTIES

1. Plaintiff, Alicia Drees (“Ms. Drees” or “Plaintiff”), is a female adult

individual residing at 2315 Longwood Lane, Enola, Cumberland County, PA

17025.

2. Defendant, Stevens & Lee, P.C. (“Stevens & Lee” or “Defendant”), is

a Pennsylvania professional corporation engaged in the practice of law in

Pennsylvania with offices in various locations including 17 North Second Street,

16th Floor, Harrisburg, Dauphin County, PA 17101.

Case 3:02-at-06000 Document 1065 Filed 09/17/18 of 22Case 1:18-cv-01823-JEJ Document 1 Filed 09/17/18 Page 1 of 22

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

3. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action because

Ms. Drees’s claims arise under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title

VII”), 42 U.S.C. §2000e, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C.

§1981a; the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); the

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C.

§12101, et seq.; and the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601,

et seq.

4. At all relevant times, Stevens & Lee employed in excess of 50

individuals and was subject to the above-quoted federal statutes.

5. This is a civil action involving claims in excess of $75,000, exclusive

of interest and costs. Jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. §1331 (federal question).

6. Ms. Drees received EEOC’s notice of right to sue fewer than 90 days

before the filing of this complaint.

7. Venue over this action lies with the United States District Court for

the Middle District of Pennsylvania.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS

8. On or about July 27, 2015, Ms. Drees was hired by Stevens & Lee as

a legal assistant (“Legal Assistant”) in its Harrisburg, PA office.

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9. At all relevant times during her employment, Ms. Drees was qualified

to work as a Legal Assistant and was able to perform her essential job functions

with or without accommodation.

10. In approximately May 2016, Ms. Drees informed her supervisors,

Tammy Arner and Kim DuBois, that she was pregnant with a due date in

December 2016. (Ms. Arner and Ms. DuBois worked in a department known to

employees as “Support Services” or “HR.”)

11. In August 2016, Ms. Drees timely applied for FMLA maternity leave

with her employer, Stevens & Lee.

12. On or about September 1, 2016, Stevens & Lee approved Ms. Drees’s

FMLA maternity leave.

13. Ms. Drees’s last day of work before her FMLA maternity leave was

Friday, December 16, 2016.

14. Ms. Drees went into labor the following night and gave birth to her

daughter, Natalia (“Natalia”), on Sunday, December 18, 2016.

15. On January 31, 2017, Ms. Drees’s two-year-old daughter, Sophia

(“Sophia”), underwent surgery to have an atypical lesion removed from her right

cheek.

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16. On January 31, 2017, while on FMLA maternity leave, Ms. Drees

underwent an operation to remove two moles on her leg and a potentially

malignant lesion, which was subsequently biopsied.

17. In February 2017, Ms. Drees’s surgeon, Dr. Beth McCampbell,

informed her that she needed to perform another surgery on her leg within 30 days

because she had not been able to remove all of the affected area during her

January 31 surgery.

18. Ms. Drees scheduled the surgery for March 16, 2017, the first

available date for Dr. McCampbell.

19. Shortly thereafter, in February 2017, during her FMLA maternity

leave, Ms. Drees called her supervisor, Tammy Arner, and requested an FMLA

application for Natalia’s kidney condition and related testing and treatment.

20. During such conversation, Ms. Drees informed Ms. Arner about

Natalia’s scheduled surgery on February 21, 2017, Ms. Drees’s recently scheduled

surgery on March 16, 2017, and Natalia’s post-surgery appointment in April 2017.

21. Ms. Drees specifically informed Ms. Arner about Natalia’s medical

condition and shared with her the details of her and her daughter’s previous

treatment.

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22. Ms. Drees further informed Ms. Arner that her family would find out

at Natalia’s April 2017 appointment whether her first surgical procedure on

February 21, 2017 was successful or whether she would require further surgery.

23. Ms. Drees further notified Ms. Arner that any future surgery would

take place at the end of 2017 or at the beginning of 2018 (which would be

protected leave under her anticipated FMLA application and approval for Natalia).

24. Ms. Drees asked Ms. Arner whether Stevens & Lee could

accommodate her family with additional medical leave if Natalia needed care

during the first six months of 2017, noting that she would be exhausting her paid

time off during her maternity leave (and would need to wait for additional FMLA

leave to regenerate over the last four months of 2017).

25. Evading Ms. Drees’s request for accommodation, Ms. Arner instead

emphasized the high cost of daycare and questioned why it was financially

worthwhile for Ms. Drees to return to work.

26. In response, Ms. Drees stated that medical insurance was critical for

her family because her and her husband’s daughters (Natalia and Sophia) had pre-

existing conditions.

27. In response, Ms. Arner advised Ms. Drees that she should be looking

for alternate healthcare coverage.

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28. Ms. Drees reaffirmed that she remained committed to her job and to

Stevens & Lee.

29. In March 2017, Stevens & Lee approved Ms. Drees’s FMLA

application for Natalia’s kidney condition including tests and treatment.

30. In early March 2017, shortly after returning to work, Ms. Drees sent

an email to Ms. Arner and Ms. DuBois (and fellow co-workers), reminding them

about her scheduled March 16 surgery and explaining her need to take off a half

day on March 16 and a full day on March 17.

31. On Sunday, March 5, 2017, Ms. Drees became extremely sick with

what was later diagnosed as a sinus infection.

32. On the morning of March 6, 2017, Ms. Drees called off sick to her

supervisor, Ms. Arner, and scheduled an immediate appointment with her primary

care physician, Enola Family Practice, that same morning.

33. After diagnosing her with a sinus infection, Julie Paluch, PA-C, of

Enola Family Practice, informed Ms. Drees that she was too sick to work the

following day (March 7), but might be able to return to work on Wednesday,

March 8, 2017.

34. After Ms. Drees returned from FMLA maternity leave in early March

2017, while battling her sinus infection, she was also experiencing complications

from a recently implanted IUD.

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35. She began having stomach pain with diarrhea and was vomiting.

36. Ms. Drees promptly scheduled an emergency appointment with her

OB/GYN to have her IUD removed on March 16, 2017 (the same half day off she

had previously confirmed in an email to her supervisors, Ms. Arner and Ms.

DuBois).

37. On March 16, 2017, Ms. Drees was working her one-half day as

previously confirmed with her supervisors, Ms. Arner and Ms. Kim DuBois.

38. On March 16, 2017, shortly before Ms. Drees was scheduled to leave

for her scheduled surgery, Ms. Arner and Ms. DuBois arrived unannounced at her

desk and asked that she meet with them in a conference room.

39. Ms. Arner informed Ms. Drees that Stevens & Lee was firing her

because she was “unreliable.”

40. In response, Ms. Drees confirmed that she had not missed any days

without a doctor’s excuse and that she had only recently returned from FMLA

maternity leave.

41. Ms. Drees further affirmed that in February 2017, she had informed

Ms. Arner by phone about her scheduled surgery on March 16.

42. In response, Ms. Arner asserted that Ms. Drees had not mentioned her

scheduled surgery during their February 2017 telephone conversation.

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43. Ms. Drees then stated that she would cancel her surgery immediately

if she could keep her job.

44. Ms. Arner then changed the reason for Ms. Drees’s termination from

her being “unreliable” to her taking 30-minute breaks to nurse her infant daughter,

Natalia.

45. Even though Stevens & Lee had granted Ms. Drees accommodation

to take two 30-minute breaks to nurse her infant daughter (in lieu of taking one 60-

minute lunch break), Ms. Arner accused Ms. Drees of adding time to her breaks.

46. Ms. Drees explained that she had always clocked in within the 30-

minute period and then washed her hands and returned to work.

47. Ms. DuBois accused Ms. Drees of “stealing” time from Stevens &

Lee and asserted that she should have nursed and washed her hands all within her

permitted 30-minute break.

48. Ms. Arner then provided Ms. Drees with another purported reason for

her termination: While Ms. Drees’s co-worker, Deb Koons, was on FMLA leave,

Ms. Drees’s supervising attorneys realized that one floater/Legal Assistant could

handle all 14 attorneys’ and consultants’ work and could simultaneously serve as

the office manager and receptionist.

49. In response, Ms. Drees noted that, as a practical matter, the attorneys

“hold back” work when floaters cover another Legal Assistant’s desk.

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50. While conceding Ms. Drees’s point, Ms. Arner and Ms. DuBois

asserted that, according to the attorneys, they should never have to wait for any

secretary to complete their work based on their experience during Ms. Koons’s

and Ms. Drees’s FMLA leave.

51. Ms. Drees then began to beg to retain her job, emphasizing that her

supervising attorneys would confirm her diligence.

52. Ms. DuBois stated that everyone at Stevens & Lee (including the

supervising attorneys) wanted Ms. Drees to be terminated.

53. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Arner and Ms. DuBois ushered Ms. Drees to

the office elevator.

COUNT ISEX DISCRIMINATION/RETALIATION

(TITLE VII AND PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT)

54. Ms. Drees incorporates by reference herein paragraphs 1 through 53

above.

55. Stevens & Lee’s wrongful termination of Ms. Drees was motivated, in

whole or in part, by the discriminatory and retaliatory animus of its supervisors’

and/or other decision-makers.

56. One or both of Ms. Drees’s supervisors were either authorized to fire

her, participated in the decision, or influenced the ultimate decision-makers.

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57. At all material times, Ms. Drees, a qualified employee, a pregnant

female, and a nursing mother, was entitled to statutory protections under federal

law including:

(a) Title VII, which prohibits an employer from discriminating

against an employee on the basis of her sex; and

(b) the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which codifies that

discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions is a

form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII.

58. On behalf of herself and her daughter, Natalia, Ms. Drees was a

member of a “protected class” and engaged in “protected activity” within the

meaning of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”) and Title VII.

59. Stevens & Lee discriminated and retaliated against Ms. Drees, a

female, and her infant daughter, Natalia, within the meaning of the Pregnancy

Discrimination Act and Title VII, in that:

(a) she timely notified Stevens & Lee that she was pregnant, and

Stevens & Lee approved her FMLA maternity leave;

(b) she gave birth to Natalia on December 18, 2016;

(c) when she returned to work in early March 2017, she was a

qualified employee and had no performance-related issues warranting termination;

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(d) Stevens & Lee treated Ms. Drees differently than her

comparators including Legal Assistants who did not have pregnancy-related

medical conditions including lactation-related needs;

(e) Stevens & Lee’s adverse actions against Ms. Drees violated

federal law, which requires employers to provide reasonable break time for its

female hourly employees who are breast feeding and have lactation-related needs;

(f) Stevens & Lee discriminated against Ms. Drees on the basis of

her past pregnancy, childbirth, or her and her daughter’s related medical

conditions;

(g) Ms. Drees was not accommodated and was not treated the same

as other employees who were not affected by past pregnancy, childbirth, or related

medical conditions, but who were similar in their ability or inability to work;

(h) Stevens & Lee permitted similarly situated workers with

serious health conditions (or who had family members with serious health

conditions) to take FMLA leave without being terminated;

(i) Ms. Drees was not afforded the same rights, leave privileges,

and other benefits provided to similarly situated employees including job

reinstatement;

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(j) in contrast to its abrupt termination of Ms. Drees shortly after

she returned to work, Stevens & Lee did not terminate similarly situated

employees;

(k) Stevens & Lee’s policy and/or practice and its enforcement

thereof resulted in its disparate treatment of Ms. Drees, a pregnant woman and a

nursing mother, as compared to her comparators;

(l) alternatively, assuming Stevens & Lee’s policy and/or practice

was facially neutral, Stevens & Lee’s enforcement thereof had a disproportionate,

adverse effect on Ms. Drees and other women affected by pregnancy, childbirth,

and/or related medical conditions;

(m) Ms. Drees’s pregnancy, childbirth, and her and/or her

daughter’s medical conditions were motivating factors in her wrongful

termination;

(n) Stevens & Lee had no legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for

terminating Ms. Drees;

(o) Stevens & Lee’s ongoing antagonism reflected a pretext for

discrimination and retaliation;

(p) Stevens & Lee’s pretext and retaliatory motive are established

by the close temporal proximity between Ms. Drees’s protected activity for herself

and her daughter and Stevens & Lee’s wrongful termination;

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(q) Stevens & Lee’s shifting, inconsistent reasons for abruptly

terminating Ms. Drees were not legitimate, were discriminatory and retaliatory,

and were pretextual; and/or

(r) Stevens & Lee’s unlawful motive was a substantial motivating

factor in its decision to terminate Ms. Drees.

60. As a result of Stevens & Lee’s unlawful conduct, Ms. Drees has

sustained lost wages, lost retirement, and other benefits, attorneys’ fees and costs,

and other unliquidated losses and damages in excess of $75,000, plus interest and

costs.

61. Additionally, as a result of Stevens & Lee’s intentional wrongdoing,

which was committed with malice or with reckless indifference to Ms. Drees’s

and/or her daughter’s rights, she is entitled to punitive damages under federal law

in excess of $75,000, plus interest and costs.

62. As a further result of Stevens & Lee’s unlawful conduct, Ms. Drees

has suffered emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, depression,

anxiety, related medical and mental health conditions, and loss of life’s enjoyment

in an unliquidated amount in excess of $75,000, plus interest and costs.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Alicia Drees, demands judgment in her favor and

against Defendant, Stevens & Lee, P.C., including the following relief:

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A. reinstatement to her prior position or a comparable position with

Defendant;

B. compensation for back pay, front pay, lost retirement, lost wages, and

other lost employee benefits;

C. compensatory, statutory, and punitive damages in amounts to be

determined at trial;

D. attorneys’ fees, costs, and interest; and

E. such other relief as the Court deems appropriate.

COUNT IIFMLA VIOLATIONS (Interference and Retaliation)


above.

64. During her employment, Ms. Drees was an “eligible employee” under

the FMLA, and Stevens & Lee was an employer subject to the FMLA.

65. Ms. Drees and her infant daughter, Natalia, each had a “serious health

condition” which was known to her employer, Stevens & Lee.

66. During her employment, Ms. Drees separately applied for FMLA

leave for herself and her daughter, Natalia, and Stevens & Lee approved their

respective FMLA leave before Ms. Drees was terminated.

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67. Ms. Drees notified Stevens & Lee of her intention to take leave, and

she was denied benefits to which she and her daughter were entitled under the

FMLA.

68. During her employment, Stevens & Lee interfered with, restrained,

and/or denied Ms. Drees’s exercise of, or attempt to exercise, her and her

daughter’s rights under the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., in that:

(a) in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(c) and related

provisions, Ms. Drees requested FMLA leave under separate circumstances

indicating that she was eligible for leave for herself and for her daughter;

(b) after Ms. Drees requested leave for her daughter, Natalia,

Stevens & Lee failed to timely provide certain required notices to her under

FMLA including confirmation of her right to job restoration, as required by 29

C.F.R. §§ 825.208, 825.300(b)(1), and related provisions;

(c) shortly after she returned to work from approved FMLA

maternity leave, Ms. Drees was terminated for no legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason;

(d) Stevens & Lee violated the FMLA by impermissibly evaluating

and disciplining Ms. Drees while she was on approved FMLA maternity leave;

(e) shortly before Ms. Drees was terminated, Stevens & Lee

approved her daughter Natalia’s FMLA leave;

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(f) in violation of the FMLA, Stevens & Lee failed to restore Ms.

Drees to her prior position or an equivalent job;

(g) as a result of Stevens & Lee’s adverse actions, Ms. Drees was

unable to exercise her and her daughter’s rights including the right to take FMLA

leave for Natalia’s serious health conditions (and the right to request and receive

anticipated leave later in 2017); and

(h) Ms. Drees and her daughter were entitled to FMLA leave and

benefits, and Stevens & Lee interfered, restrained, and/or denied her attempt to

exercise her and her infant daughter’s rights under FMLA.

69. During her employment, Stevens & Lee retaliated against, discharged,

and/or otherwise discriminated against Ms. Drees in violation of her rights under

FMLA in that:

(a) Ms. Drees invoked her and her daughter’s rights to FMLA-

qualifying leave;

(b) shortly after she returned to work from FMLA maternity leave,

and shortly after Stevens & Lee approved her daughter’s FMLA leave, Ms. Drees

was wrongfully terminated in violation of the FMLA;

(c) Ms. Drees’s wrongful termination was causally related to her

invocation of her and her daughter’s rights under the FMLA;

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(d) Stevens & Lee had no legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for

abruptly terminating Ms. Drees;

(e) before and after she took FMLA leave, Ms. Drees had no

performance-related issues warranting termination;

(f) Stevens & Lee’s and/or its supervisors’ shifting, inconsistent

reasons for termination reflected a pretext for retaliation;

(g) Stevens & Lee’s and/or its supervisors’ ongoing antagonism

represented a pretext for retaliation;

(h) Stevens & Lee’s and/or its supervisors’ retaliatory motive and

pretext are established by the close temporal proximity between Ms. Drees’s and

her daughter’s protected activity and Stevens & Lee’s wrongful termination of Ms.

Drees; and/or

(i) Stevens & Lee’s unlawful motive was a substantial motivating


70. After interfering with Ms. Drees’s and her infant daughter’s rights

under the FMLA, and after retaliating against them, Stevens & Lee failed to

restore her to her position as a Legal Assistant and/or failed to restore her to an

equivalent job with equivalent pay, benefits, and other terms and conditions of

employment.

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71. As a result of Stevens & Lee’s wrongful violation of her and her

daughter’s rights under FMLA, and as a result of Stevens & Lee’s wrongful

retaliation, Ms. Drees has sustained lost wages, benefits, liquidated damages,

double damages, statutory interest, and other damages authorized by the FMLA,

all of which are in excess of $75,000, plus interest and costs.



A. reinstatement to her prior position as a Legal Assistant or an

equivalent position;

B. compensation for back pay, lost wages, lost retirement, and


C. compensatory, statutory, liquidated damages, and double

damages in amounts to be determined at trial;

D. attorneys’ fees, costs, and statutory interest; and


COUNT IIIDISABILITY DISCRIMINATION,

FAILURE TO ACCOMMODATE, AND RETALIATION (ADA)


above.

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73. At all material times and as averred more fully above, Ms. Drees

and/or her infant daughter, Natalia, had legally protected disabilities within the

meaning of the ADA, as amended, including:

(a) a physical and/or mental impairment that substantially limited

one or more major life activities;

(b) a record of such an impairment or impairments; and/or

(c) being regarded as having such an impairment or impairments.

74. As averred more fully above, Ms. Drees, a qualified employee and a

member of a “protected class,” engaged in “protected activity” on behalf of herself

and her infant daughter, Natalia, within the meaning of the ADA.

75. Stevens & Lee discriminated and retaliated against Ms. Drees based

on her and/or her daughter’s disabilities and failed to accommodate them within

the meaning of the ADA, in that:

(a) shortly after Ms. Drees returned from FMLA maternity leave in

early March 2017, Ms. Arner denied Ms. Drees’s request to have access to her cell

phone during work hours (a reasonable, necessary accommodation due to daughter

Natalia’s kidney condition);

(b) Ms. Drees’s co-worker and comparator, Deb Koons, was

granted accommodation to use her cell phone to call her elderly mother and adult

daughter on a regular basis;

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(c) Ms. Drees also sought but was denied accommodation for her

past pregnancy, childbirth, her and Natalia’s medical conditions, anticipated

appointments, and/or lactation-related needs;

(d) Stevens & Lee accommodated other employees similar in their

ability or inability to work due to an impairment, but denied Ms. Drees the same

accommodations, rights, leave privileges. and benefits provided to her

comparators;

(e) Stevens & Lee impermissibly evaluated and disciplined Ms.

Drees while she was FMLA maternity leave (and while she was eligible for FMLA

leave for her daughter);

(f) Stevens & Lee failed to engage in an interactive process to

explore accommodation including unpaid medical leave for tests, treatment,

surgery, and medical appointments for Ms. Drees and her daughter;

(g) rather than complying with its obligations under the ADA,

Stevens & Lee was selfishly concerned about Ms. Drees’s and her daughters’ past

and anticipated maternity and medical leave requests and the costs of their

treatment;

(h) Stevens & Lee changed the terms, conditions, and privileges of

Ms. Drees’s employment while she and her daughter had known disabilities within

the meaning of the ADA and after she had requested accommodation;

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(i) in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) and related provisions,

Stevens & Lee coerced, intimidated, and/or interfered with Ms. Drees’s exercise of

or enjoyment of her and her daughter’s rights under the ADA;

(j) based on the reasons alleged more fully in Count I above,

Stevens & Lee’s termination of Ms. Drees was not legitimate, was discriminatory

and retaliatory, and was pretextual; and/or

(k) Stevens & Lee’s unlawful motive was a substantial motivating


76. As a result of Stevens & Lee’s unlawful conduct, Ms. Drees has

sustained lost wages, lost retirement, and other benefits, attorneys’ fees and costs,

and other unliquidated losses and damages in excess of $75,000, plus interest and

costs.

77. Additionally, as a result of Stevens & Lee’s intentional wrongdoing,

which was committed with malice or with reckless indifference to Ms. Drees’s

and/or her daughter’s rights, Ms. Drees is entitled to punitive damages under

federal law in excess of $75,000, plus interest and costs.

78. As a further result of Stevens & Lee’s unlawful conduct, Ms. Drees

has suffered emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, depression,

anxiety, related medical and mental health conditions, and loss of life’s enjoyment

in an unliquidated amount in excess of $75,000, plus interest and costs.

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A. reinstatement to her prior position or a comparable position with

Defendant;

B. compensation for back pay, front pay, lost retirement, lost wages, and


C. compensatory, statutory, and punitive damages in amounts to be

determined at trial;

D. attorneys’ fees, costs, and interest; and


Respectfully submitted,

KEEFER WOOD ALLEN & RAHAL, LLP

Dated: 09/17/2018 By: s/ Bradford Dorrance Bradford DorrancePA I.D. #32147417 Walnut Street, 4th Floor, RearP. O. Box 11963Harrisburg, PA [email protected](717) 255-8014 (phone)(717) 255-8042 (fax)

(Attorneys for Plaintiff)

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in the united states district court for the middle ... · (title vii and pregnancy discrimination...

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