in the united states district court for … · case 1:04-cv-01194-tfh document 538-1 filed 07/29/09...

Case 1:04-cv-01194-TFH Document 538-1 Filed 07/29/09 of 28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

INRE: GUANTANAMO BAY DETAINEE LITIGATION

) ) ) ) ) ) )

Misc. No. 08-442 (TFH)

Civil Action No. 04-CV -1194 (HHK)

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AMENDED FACTUAL RETURN


Respondents hereby submit, as explained herein, an amended factual return pertaining to

the petitioner identified as the subject of the attached Narrative. This amended return is intended

to supersede the material contained in any previously filed return, except for the fact that

petitioner was previously determined by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal to be an enemy

combatant.

This amended return sets forth factual bases' supporting petitioner's lawful, ongoing

detention pursuant to the Authorization for the Use of Military Force and the President's power

as Commander in Chief.

Dated: September 8, 2008 Respectfully submitted,

GREGORY G. KATSAS Assistant Attorney General

JOHN C. O'QUINN Deputy Assistant Attorney General

J Respondents reserve the right to seek leave to further supplement the record with additional factual bases supporting petitioner's detention, as necessary.


JOSEPH H. HUNT (D.C. Bar No. 431134) VINCENT M. GARVEY (D.C. Bar No. 127191) TERRY M. HENRY JUDRY L. SUBAR (D.C. Bar No. 347518) PAUL AHERN DAVID P. A VILA Attorneys United States Department of Justice Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch 20 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20530 Tel: 202.305.9909 Fax: 202.305.2685

Attorneys for Respondents


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

INRE: GUANTANAMO BAY DETAINEE LITIGATION

) ) ) ) ) ) )

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Misc. No. 08-442 (TFH)

Civil Action No. 04-CV-U94 (HHK)

DECLARATION OF REAR ADMIRAL DAVID THOMAS


Declaration of Brigadier General Gregory J. Zanetti

Pursuant to 28 U.s.C. § 1746, I, Gregory.r. Zanetti, hereby declare under penalty

of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that to the best of my

knowledge, information, and beliet~ the l(l\Jowing is true, accurate, and correct:

I am a Brigadier General in the United States Almy, with 28 years of military

service. I currently Serve as Deputy Commander, Joint Task Force-Guantanamo (JTF

GTMO), at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. I have held this position since 26 Janurn:y 2008. As

ofthe date of this declaration, I am serving as the Acting Commander, JTF-GTMO in the

absence of Rear Admiral David M. Thomas,.Jr., the Commander ofJTF-GTMO. As

such, 1 am directly responsible for the successful execution of the JTF-GTMO mission to

conduct detention and interrogation operations in support of the Global War on

Terrorism~ coordinate and impjement detainee screening operations. and support law

enforcement and waf crimes investigations.

The attached nrn:rative and supporting materials from tiles of the Department of

Defense or other government agencies contain information used by the Deparlment of

Defense to establish the status of the individual who is the subject of the narrative as an

enemy combatant aud to substantiate his detention as an enemy combatanl al

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Dated: 28 August 2008


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Omar Ali Al-Mudwani,

Petitioner,

v.

GEORGE WALKER BUSH et a!.,

Respondents.

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

Civil Action No. 04-CV-1194 (HHK)

NARRATIVE FOR MUSAB OMAR ALI AL-MUDW ANI (ISN 839)

Petitioner Musab Omar Ali al-Mudwani ("petitioner') is a~ational, an al-Qaida

operative, and thus an enemy of the United States. Consequently, for the reasons stated below,

petitioner is lawfully subject to detention pursuant to, inter alia, the President's power as

Commander in Chief and the Authorization for the Use of Miltary Force.

a. In or about July 2001, petitioner traveled to Afghanistan at the behest of

individuals associated with al-Qaida.

b. Petitioner then received combat training at al-Qaida's al-Farouq training

camp, where he also attended an Usama bin Laden speech.

c. After the United States campaign in Afghanistan began, petitioner fled al-

Farouq training camp with other members of al-Qaida.

d. For about one year, petitioner continued to associate with known al-Qaida

members in Iran and Pakistan.


e. Petitioner met with the principal architect of the September 11, 2001

attacks on the United States, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, in Karachi, and then associated himself

with Mohammed's close associate,

f. Petitioner was arrested with other al-Qaida members after a two and a half

hour firefight with Pakistani authorities.

Explanation of Source Documents

1. In the materials discussed herein relating to the factual bases of petitioner's

detention and his assessment as a legally detainable enemy combatant, there are documents

reflecting interviews with the detainee and others conducted by law enforcement and intelligence (

personnel, as well as information derived from other sources and methods. Information received

from these sources is commonly reproduced in reports created by the collecting officer. Such

information is also commonly analyzed by intelligence or law enforcement personnel and used to

produce other intelligence products. These reports and intelligence products are routinely relied

upon by military or intelligence personnel in making decisions to act upon threats to our national

security. Declaration De(:larati(lll of Robert H. Holmes;

2. As with all detained enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Petitioner has

been assigned an Internment Serial Number or ISN. The ISN is an administrative code assigned

to military detainees. Petitioner's full ISN is''000839i1in which the number "839" is


Petitioner's unique identifier and the_designation indicates that he is a national o~

Source documents attached as Exhibits to this Declaration may refer to Petitioner by name, full

ISN, or various short forms, such a .b(2)

3. It is common for those engaged in terrorist activities to use an alias, commonly

known in Arabic as a kunya. See Declaration

Declaration - Names, Aliases, Kunyas and Variants. Petitioner Musab Omar Ali al-Mudwani

used the a1iase ,b(l )

4. The following narrative and attached materials set forth the factual bases

supporting petitioner's lawful detention. This narrative is not intended to be a complete

explication of the information in support of petitioner's detention in those documents.

General Background

5. AI-Qaida ("the Base") was founded by Usama bin Laden and others in or about

1989 for the purpose of opposing certain governments and officials with force and violence. See

The 9/11 Commission Report 56 (2004).

6. Usarna bin Laden is recognized as the emir (prince or leader) of al-Qaida. See id.

7. A purpose or goal of al-Qaida, as stated by Usama bin Laden and other a1-Qaida

leaders, is to support violent attacks against property and nationals (both military and civilian) of

the United States and other countries. See id. at 59-61.

8. Between 1989 and 200 1, al-Qaida established training camps, guest houses, and

business operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other countries for the ptupose of training and

supporting violent attacks against property and nationals (both military and civilian) of the

United States and other countries. See id. at 64-67.


9. In 1996, Usama bin Laden issued a public "Declaration of Jihad Against the

Americans." This declaration called for the murder of U.S. military personnel serving on the

Arabian peninsula. See id. at 48.

10. In February 1998, Usama bin ~aden and Ayman al Zawahiri (bin Laden's deputy)

issued a fatwa (religious ruling) requiring all Muslims able to do so to kill Americans - whether

civilian or military - anywhere in the world. See id. at 47.

11. Since 1989, members and associates ofal-Qaida, known and unknown, have

carried out numerous terrorist attacks, including but not limited to: the attacks against the

American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, which killed approximately 250

people, see id. At 68-70; the attack against the USS Cole in October 2000, which killed 17

United States Navy sailors, see id. at 190-93; and the attacks on the United States on September

11,200,], which killed approximately 3,000 people. See id. passim.

12. The Taliban (students ofIslamic knOWledge) is an Islamic fundamentalist group

that was formed in Afghanistan in 1994. See The Taliban in Afghanistan, at

www.cfr.org/publicationll0551. After two years of violent conflict that included the capture of

Kabul, Afghanistan's capital, the Taliban took control of Afghanistan's national government in

1996. See The 9111 Commission Report at 65. Although it was never formally recognized by

the United States, See id. at 124, the Taliban controlled Afghanistan's national government from

1996 until the United States-led military campaign ousted the Taliban from power in 2001. See

id. at 337-38. During the period in which the Taliban controlled Afghanistan's national

government, it provided safe harbor and support to al-Qaida and Usama bin Laden. See id. at 64-

67.


13. On September 18, 2001, following the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United

States, Congress adopted the Authorization for the Use of Military Force. See 115 Stat. 224

(2001). Recognizing that the attacks of September 11,2001, "render it both necessary and

appropriate that the United States exercise its rights to self-defense and to protect United States

citizens at home and abroad," Congress authorized the President "to use all necessary and

appropriate force against those nations organizations, or persons he determines planned,

authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 200 I, or

. harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international

terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons." Within weeks,

United States military forces were deployed in Afghanistan. See The 9/11 Commission Report at

337.

14. The United States led the initial aerial bombing campaign of Afghanistan, with

ground forces composed of United States forces and Afghanistan militia opposed to the Taliban,

including the Northern Alliance. The Northern Alliance is an association of Afghan groups

opposed to the Taliban. The Northern Alliance has assisted the United States in its military

campaign in Afghanistan to defeat al-Qaida and the Taliban. See id. at 330-34; 336-38.

15. In December 2001, the United States-led military campaign removed the Taliban

from control of Afghanistan's national government. See id. at 337~38. Titliban and al-Qaida

forces, however, have continued to operate in Afghanistan and attack coalition forces. Currently,

two major military operations are underway in Afghanistan. First, Operation Enduring Freedom

(OEF) is a multinational coalition military operation, led by the United States, initiated in

October 2001 to counter terrorism and bring security to Afghanistan in collaboration with

Afghan forces. See www.state/gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/60083.htm. OEF operations led to the


collapse of the Taliban government and helped bring security and stability to Afghanistan. Jd.

OAF involves troops from over 20 nations, including about 19,000 United States forces and

about 3,000 non-United States troops. ld. Second, the International Security Assistance Force

(ISAF) is a United Nations-mandated international coalition operating under the command ofthe

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). See www.nato.int/isaf/index.html. ISAF was

established in 2002 with the goal of creating conditions for stablization and reconstruction in

Afghanistan. ISAF is comprised of approximately 50,000 troops from 40 countries. ld.

Petitioner's Background Prior To AI-Qaida Recruitment

16. Petitioner Musab Omar Ali al-Mudwani was born in AI-Hudaida, Yemen, in

1980. See ISN 839 FM-40 (October 29, 2002). He completed high school in 1999. ld. That

summer he attended a two-month course in Islamic studies at the University of Iman in Sanaa,

Yemen. ld. Thereafter, until December 2000 or summer 2001, he worked at his father's

pharmacies. ld.

Petitioner Was Recruited To Go To Afghanistan For Jihad-Related Weapons Training

17. Petitioner has consistently maintained that he was recruited to visit Afghanistan

by two individuals: a Saudi national named a Yemeni national named

See e.g. ISN 839 FM-40 (October 29,

2002). Over the course of several interviews, however, other aspects ofpetitioner's account of

his recruitment to attend military training at the al-Farouq training center in Afghanistan have

varied. J

I In a March 2003 interview petitioner indicated that he was well treated nothing bad was going to happen to him at Guantanamo. See ISN 839 SIR Administrative Review Board hearing in December 2005, petitioner stated individuals in Afghanistan after being detained by Pakistani authorities. Classi11ed his third ARB hearing in December 2007, petitioner again made that American and Afghan soldiers had been present. ISN 839

was fairly confident that At his first by unknown

of ARB Prooeedings. At and this time claimed

In a letter presented to


October 2002 interview, petitioner stated that both ~nd former

"mujahid,"Z and that they were recruiting for the jihad in Afghanistan. ISN 839 FD·302

(November 3, 2002). According to petitiolner, encow'ag!Jd him to

travel to Afghanistan to "check it out" and "stay to train" ifhe liked what he saw. Jd. In

addition, whom petitioner described as having a lot of money, paid for

everything to get him to Afghanistan. ]d. Petitioner also said for

many others to go to Afghanistan as well. Jd.

19. Even though he had previously stated that

former mujahid, and even though he stated that recruiting for jihad in

Afghanistan, petitioner nonetheless claimed in a July 2003 interview that ~made only

vague references to the Taliban but never told petitioner that the Taliban would train him or

require him to fight with their forces. ISN 839 FM-40 (July 25,2003). Petitioner stated that

_never mentioned anything about going to Afghanistan to fight jihad. Id. Petitioner

asserted that as far as he knew, there was no jihad ongoing at that time. Jd. According to

petitioner, before _talked to him about it, he never had it in his mind to go to Afghanistan

at all. Petitioner maintained that when he did decide to travel to Afghanistan for combat training,

he intended only to train for one month to see what it was like and then to decide whether he

wanted to stay. Jd. When asked what he thought he would use the training for if not to fight

the Board by his counsel, additional details were provided, including the claim that American soldiers in Guantanamo threatened him. Petitioner's ARB Statement (February 23, 2007).

2. Mujahideen is often translated as "warriors of God." In recent years those Muslims who engage in armed defense of Muslim lands call themselves or are called mujahideen. See Oxford Islamic Studies Online - Mujahidin


with the Taliban, petitioner stated that he could use the training if Yemen were ever attacked, ld.

Before the Board, however, petitioner claimed that he went to Afghanistan to observe the

situation and that he had no idea or intention that he would end up in Afghanistan for training,

See Summarized Detainee Statement.

20. In an October 2003 interview, petitioner related that _recruited him by

visiting him at a local mosque and telling him that he could receive legal training for a month,

and then return to Yemen, ISN 839 FM·40 (October 4, 2003). It is not clear from the

investigator's report whether "legal training" means training that was not unlawful or training in

the law. Also, in an apparent contradiction of his earlier statement that

his travel, petitioner stated that it was ~ho arranged and financed his travel from Yemen

to Pakistan. ld.

21. b(1), b(6)

b(1), b(6) b(2) b(1), b(6)

b(1), b(6)

b(1), b(6) ld.

b(1), b(6)

b(1), b(6)

b(1), b(6)

b(1 ) ld. b(1), b(6)

b(1), b(6) ,

b(1 ) ld. b(1 )

b(1 ) Id, This is an apparent

contradiction of petitioner's earlier statement that_made only vague references to the

Taliban and never spoke of going to Afghanistan to fight jihad.


Petitioner Traveled to Afghanistan For Jihad-Related Weapons Training

22. In his November 2002 interview, petitioner stated that upon deciding to go to

Afghanistan, he gave his passport to obtain a visa for travel to Pakistan. ISN

839 FD-302 (November 3, 2002). After ten days, petitioner and told him to

meet him in Sanaa, Yemen. Id. Petitioner traveled to Sanaa with two of his friends who had also

been recruited The next day he flew on a Yemeni Airline flight to Karachi,

Pakistan. Id.

23. b(1 )

b(1 ) .. b(2) b(1), b(6) , Id.

b(1), b(6)

b(1 )

Id. b(1), b(6)

b(1), b(6) Id. b(1), b(6)

b(1), b(6)

b(1), b(6) Id.

24. Petitioner stated that he left Yemen on a Sunday at the end of July 2001 3 and

arrived in Kandahar two days later. ISN 839 FD-302 (November 3, 2002). Petitioner and three

other Arabs with whom he had traveled stayed at the Dubai Hotel for One night. Id. The

following day they were taken to the Madafat Riyad guesthouse in Karachi, Pakistan for a one

night stay. Id. Then the next day the Madafat Riyad guesthouse paid for petitioner and one

unidentified Arab compatriot to travel by bus to Quetta, Pakistan. Id.

3 Using petitioner's estimates to count forward from this date does not perfectly account for all the time between this date and September 11, 2002, the date of his capture; gaps and difficulties in petitioner's account remain.


25. In Quetta, petitioner stayed at the al-Qaida affiliated Daftar al-Taliban guesthouse

for four hours, and then was taken across the border to Kandahar, Afghanistan. ISN 839 FD-302

(November 3, 2002); Declaration Houses. Petitioner stayed at the al-

Qaida affiliated Madaft al-Nibras (al-Nibras) guesthouse in Kandahar for seven days. ISN 839

FD-302 (November 3, 2002); Declaration Houses. Petitioner initially

said that he was fed and given new clothes during his seven day stay at al-Nibras. ISN 839 FD-

302 (November 3, 2002). Petitioner later denied, however, that he was given any new clothes

while at al-Nibras. Summarized Detainee Statement.

27. In addition to continning that al-Nibras was commonly used by fighters heading

to al-Farouq, detainee (ISN. also stated that al-Nibras was

4 The author ~ent of Defense Criminal Investigation Task Force (DOD/CJTF) memorandum commented in describin~ISN_statement with respect to ' with interrogators. DODICITF Memorandum [May 14,2004).


used by Usama bin Laden himself. ISN r LI-~C'L (May 24, 2003). According to

the guesthouse was run by a Saudi national, and the day-to-day operation of the guesthouse was

handled by a Kuwaiti, a Yemeni, and a Saudi national. Arabs bound for training at al-Farouq

gathered and stayed at al-Nibras until there were approximately 25 to 30 individuals, at which

point they would be transported to the training camp. Jd. As the TIghters gathered it was not

unusual for passports, money, tickets, and other important documents to be taken away from

each person and kept in an individual safe box, which was kept in a house near the airport for

safekeeping. Jd. When stayed at al-Nibras, Usama bin Laden came to the

guesthouse to greet and encourage the fighters before they went to training. Jd.

29.

b(1), b(2), b(6)

b(2)

Petitioner Trained At AI-Oaida's AI-Farouq Training Camp

b(1), b(2), b(6)

See ISN_

(.states that he did not know Usarna bin Laden was in charge of al-


Farouq until he arrived there). Detainee I stated that all training

books used at aI-Farouq were marked with "al-Qaida" in order to denote ownership. ISN.

FD-302 (May 15,2002). b(1), b(2), b(6)

b(1), b(2), b(6)

b(2) Bin Laden again visited al-Farouq on September 13,2001, to

celebrate the 9111 terrorist attacksS and to encourage trainees to continue their jihad. _

_ Petitioner admitted to seeing bin Laden speak while he was at the camp but said that

bin Laden gave a lecture on the war with Russia. ISN 839 FD-302 (November 10,2002). Even

though petitioner knew bin Laden was the leader of al-Qaida, he claimed that bin Laden's

presence at the camp did not make him aware that al-Farouq was an aI-Qaida training camp. ISN

839 FM-40 (September 2,2003). Instead, he said that he thought it was a general mujahideen

camp. Id.

Pet.itiv.ner claimed that he was given the

option of training for one month or two, and that he chose to train for one month because he only

had a one month visa. ISN 839 FD-302 (November 3, 2002). b(1 )

b(1 )

b(1 ) ISN 839 FD-302 (November 3, 2002); b(2) • b(1 )

b(1 )

.'i When shown the book "September 11 - A Testimony" and having the events of that day explained to him in a GUantanamo interview, petitioner stated that he does not believe that Islam authorizes attacks as depicted in the book. See ISN 839 FM·40 (May 13, 2003).


31. b(1 )

b(1 )

b(1 )

b(1 )

b(2)

32. b(1), b(2)

b(1), b(2)

b(1), b(2)

b(1), b(2) )(2)

II _(ISN. told the FBI that the weapons training included training on the

Kalashnikov rifle, the PK light machine gun, and the RPG-7 launcher. ISN 02 (April 2,

2003). According training also included food and sleep deprivation, an introduction

to tear gas, and entrenchment training - which consisted of digging trenches and preparing

places for setting a weapon. Id.

33. Petitioner's account of the al-Farouq training program is also different than that of

stated that he was trained in map reading and weapons

training atal-Farouq. v"'}'''UlllvU that he trained to use the following weapons: the

Kalashnikov rifle, a pistol, hand grenades, rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and land mines.

r u-:>v£. (April 3, 2003); ISN 02 (November 1, 2002). Althouigh one

time denied being trained in using any explosives, he has On another occasion admitted to being

trained to use plastic explosives (composition-3 and composition-4) and being shown dynamite

at al-Farouq. ISN r U-·:>VL. (April 3,2003); ISN (November 1, 2002).


34. b(1 ) b(2)

b(1), b(2), b(6)

b(1), b(2), b(6)

b(1), b(2), b(6)

b(1), b(2), b(6) b(2)

Petitioner's Continued To Associate With Al-Qaida After Completing Training

35. For about one year following al-Farouq's closure, petitioner traveled through

various locations in several Middle Eastern countries until his capture in Pakistan on September

11,2002. Petitioner's accounts of this time are inconsistent; the below is assimilated from or

otherwise recounts multiple interview reports.

36. Petitioner stated that he and 25 other al-Farouq fighters were evacuated from al-

Farouq on a military bus to Kabul, Mghanistan, whereupon al-Farouq's commander, _

_ immediately sent them all to Khowst, Mghanistan, where a.thought they would

be safe. ISN 839 FM-40 (October 29, 2002). b(1)

b(1 )

b(2) In either case, petitioner claimed that he spent about two and one-

half months in Khowst, where he said that he taught Arabic to Afghani children before returning

to Kabul three days before it fell. ISN 839 FD-302 (November 3, 2002).

37. Although petitioner has denied being a member of al-Qaida, petitioner admitted to

having heard Usama bin Laden speak twice while in Khowst. ISN 839 FD-302 (November 10,

2002). b(1 )

b(1 )

_ See ISN 839 FD-302 (November 10,2002) b(2) In total, petitioner


admitted to attending bin Laden speeches three times: once at al-Farouq and twice in Khowst.

ISN 839 FM-40 (September 2, 2003); ISN 839 FD-302 (November 10, 2002).

38. From Kabul, petitioner fled to Zurmat, Afghanistan for 15 days. ISN 839 FD-302

(November 3, 2002). In Zurmat, petitioner met up who returned petitioner's

passport to him. !d. Up until this point, petitioner's passport had been held for safe keeping at

al-Amanat in Kandahar, Pakistan. ld. Petitioner claims to have then traveled into Pakistan,

staying in Lahore for 12 days. Id. He and 12 other Arabs were housed and cared for in Lahore

by a Pakistani man named Id.

39. Petitioner then moved on to Karachi, where he stayed, moving from place to

place, for the next three and one-half months. ISN 839 FD-302 (November 3, 2002). According

to petiltiOller, also known told

him that it was unsafe for him to stay in Karachi because Pakistani police were looking for and

arresting Arabs. ld. b(l), b(2)

b(1)

_ See ISN 839'FD-302 (November 3, 2002) b(2) b(l )

b(1)

b(1) b(2)

40. Following the orders he had been given, petitioner and an individual named Habib

aI-Somali traveled to Iran. See ISN 839 FD-302 (November 3, 2002), Smugglers had already

been arranged to illegally sneak petitioner and the country and take them to

a pre-arranged destination. See id. Once in Iran, petitioner and first taken to


Zahedan, Iran, to meet with a man narned known as

Id. They were then taken to Chabehar, Iran, where petitioner stayed in the care of two men:

Id.

41. After only two weeks in Iran, petitioner was told that it was no longer safe for him

to stay there because was either an Egyptian or a Syrian) had been

arrested by Iranian authorities. ISN 839 FD-302 (November 3, 2002). Thus, petitioner and

seven other Arabs left Iran and traveled back to Pakistan, this time to Quetta. Id. According to

petitioner, the seven Arabs with whom he travelled to Quetta

and Id.

42. Petitioner said that he and his band of seven compatriots stayed in Quetta,

Pakistan for two months. ISN 839 FD-302 (November 3, 2002). After two months, these men,

went to Lahore, Pakistan, for a one month stay in the home of two

Pakistani men. They then traveled to Karachi, Pakistan, where petitioner stated that they spent

five days in the home of a Pakistani, Dr. and one month and five days in the

Karachi apartment6 in which petitioner was ultimately captured. ISN 839 FD-302 (November 3,

2002).

Petitioner Was Captured Alongside Other Al-Oaida Members

b(l), b(2)


- b(1 )

b(2)

45. b(1 )

b(1)

b(1 )

b(1 ) ld. b(1), b(6)

b(1), b(6) [d.

b( 1 )

b(1 )

b(1 ) Id. b(1 )

b(1 ) Id.


47. Detainee revealed that he lived in the same safehouse as

petitioner, whom he called" and four .other men; • and ISN

.t< U-jUL (June 12,2003).

servant. ld. Like petitioner,

across the hall with his family and a Pakistarri

mn'v~rl into the safehouse about one month before his arrest.

ld. Once he had arrived at the apartment in August 2002, he did not leave for any reason until

his arrest. ld.

48. btl), b(6)

b(l), b(6) b(2)

b(2) b(2) btl), b(6)

b(l), b(6)

b(2) b(2) b(l), b(6) I

,

b(l), b(6) b(2) b(2)

49. b(l), b(6)

b(l), b(6) ,

b(2) b(l), b(6)

ld. b(l) _id b(l), b(6)

b(l), b(6)

b(l), b(6) ISN 839 FD-302 (November 10,

2002); b(2)

50.

an instructor at al-Farouq where he taught

a course in mountain tactics. ISN If" JJ··~tlL (May 15, 2002). b(l)


b(1 )

b(1), b(6)

b(2)

52. b(1), b(2), b(6)

b(1), b(2), b(6)

Petitioner., however,

apartment, as petitioner stated that he interacted

b(2) b(1), b(6)

b(2) I

ISN 839 FD-302

ISN 839 FM-40 (September 2,

moving to the safehouse

at least three distinct periods:

(1) about a month after he arrived in Karachi after fleeing Afghanistan, (2) two or three days

before he left Pakistan for Iran, and (3) again while petitioner lived in the safehouse apartment

from which he was ultimately captured. ISN 839 FD-302 (November 10, 2002).

53. b(1), b(6)

b(1), b(6)b(2)

"


b(1), b(6)

b(1), b(6)

b(2) b(2)

b( 1), b(6)

Items Seized During Petitioner's Arrest Indicate An Intent To Commit Terrorist Acts

..


57

fd.


b(1 )

b(1 ) Id.

59. b(1), b(2)

b(1), b(2)

b(1), b(2)

b(1), b(2)

b(1), b(2)

b(1), b(2) b(2) b(1), b(6)

b( 1), b(6) Ib(2) b(1 )

b(1 )

b(2) ISN 839 FD-302 (November'! 0, 2002).

60. b(1), b(2)

b(1 )

b(1 )

b(1 ) b(2)

61. 01,06

01,06

01,06 01,06


01,06

01,06

Conclusion

62. For the reasons described above and in the attached exhibits, Petitioner is properly

detained by the United States.