NO. 11-182

In theIn theIn theIn theIn the

Supreme Court of the United StatesSupreme Court of the United StatesSupreme Court of the United StatesSupreme Court of the United StatesSupreme Court of the United States

ARIZONA, ET AL.,Petitioners,

v.

UNITED STATES, Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF OF JUSTICE AND FREEDOMFUND AS AMICUS CURIAE

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

Becker Gallagher · Cincinnati, OH · Washington, D.C. · 800.890.5001

September 12, 2011

JAMES L. HIRSEN

Counsel of Record505 S. VILLA REAL DRIVE

SUITE 208ANAHEIM HILLS, CA 92807(714) 283-8880hirsen@earthlink.net

DEBORAH J. DEWART

620 E. SABISTON DRIVE

SWANSBORO, NC 28584(910) 326-4554debcpalaw@earthlink.net

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTEREST OF AMICI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THEARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

I. EMPLOYMENT IS TRADITIONALLY ASTATE MATTER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

A. Arizona Regulates Employment—NotImmigration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

B. Arizona Law Imposes No DiscriminatoryBurdens On Lawful Aliens—It ProtectsTheir Rights , Including LawfulEmployment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

C. The Inquiry Begins With A PresumptionThat Federal Law Does Not PreemptArizona’s Regulation Of Employment—APreeminently State Matter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

D. Federal Law Does Not Expressly PreemptArizona’s Right To Regulate Its Workers. . 10

E. IRCA Does Not Occupy The Entire Field OfEmployment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

F. IRCA Regulates Employers Extensively—But Leaves Room For States To RegulateEmployees. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

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II. THE ARIZONA LAW POSES NO THREAT TOFEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OROBJECTIVES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

A. Arizona Law Does Not Conflict WithCongressional Intent Or Frustrate TheAccomplishment Of Federal ImmigrationLaw Purposes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

B. It Is Not Impossible To Comply With BothFederal And Arizona Law—In Fact,Compliance With Arizona Law NecessitatesCompliance With Federal Law. . . . . . . . . . 20

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern NewEng., 546 U.S. 320 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 9

Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano(Chicanos Por La Causa II), 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . passim

Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 10

Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 19, 22

De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 12, 21

Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 21

Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

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Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1876) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc.,471 U.S. 707 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 7

INS v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, 502 U.S. 183 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 9, 16, 19

Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 18

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Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 10, 18

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc. v. INS, 913 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1990), rev’d, 502 U.S.183 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

New York Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 12

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

P.R. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs v. Isla PetroleumCorp., 485 U.S. 495 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 13

Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 9, 12, 21

San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

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Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283 (1849) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 7

Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441 (1937) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202 (1944) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) . . . 9, 11, 15

United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 15

United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 10, 19

Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

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Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Washington State Grange v. Washington StateRepublican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 19, 20

Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 22

CONSTITUTIONS

U.S. Const. art. I, sect. 8, cl. 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

STATUTES

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2928(C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 17

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2928(G) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-211 et seq. (“Legal ArizonaWorkers Act”) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 5, 11, 22

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-212(H) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (“Immigration andNationality Act of 1952”) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 17

8 U.S.C.S. § 1324a et seq. (“Immigration Reformand Control Act of 1986”) . . . . . . . . 2, 11, 15, 22

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1 Counsel of record for all parties have consented to the filing ofthis brief and have received notice at least ten (10) days prior tothe due date of amicus curiae’s intention to file this brief. Amicuscuriae certifies that no counsel for a party authored this brief inwhole or in part and no person or entity, other than amicus, itsmembers, or its counsel, has made a monetary contribution to itspreparation or submission.

INTEREST OF AMICI1

Justice and Freedom Fund, as amicus curiae,respectfully urges this Court to grant the State ofArizona’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, and submitsthat the decision of the Ninth Court should bereversed.

Justice and Freedom Fund is a California non-profit, tax-exempt corporation formed on September24, 1998 to preserve and defend the constitutionalliberties guaranteed to American citizens, througheducation and other means. In this case, JFF isinterested in upholding the Arizona law, in order topreserve the rights of all citizens and lawful aliens toemployment. JFF’s founder is James L. Hirsen,professor of law at Trinity Law School (15 years) andBiola University (7 years) in Southern California andauthor of New York Times bestseller, Tales from theLeft Coast, and Hollywood Nation. Mr. Hirsen hastaught law school courses on constitutional law. Co-counsel Deborah J. Dewart is the author of Death of aChristian Nation, released in 2010.

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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

This case—much like recent litigation in the NinthCircuit upholding the Legal Arizona Workers Act, Ariz.Rev. Stat. § 23-211 et seq.—“is brought against a blankfactual background of enforcement and outside thecontext of any particular case.” Chicanos Por LaCausa, Inc. v. Napolitano (Chicanos Por La Causa II),558 F.3d 856, 861, 861 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Chicanos”). Afacial challenge cannot be sustained against a statutewith a “plainly legitimate sweep.” Washington StateGrange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552U.S. 442, 449 (2007), quoting Washington v.Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 739-740 (1997) (Stevens, J.,concurring in judgments); cited in Crawford v. MarionCnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 202 (2008).

This amicus brief zeroes in on Section 5 of S.B.1070 (A.R.S. § 13-2928(C)), which prohibits unlawfulaliens from soliciting employment. That statute has a“p la in ly leg i t imate sweep , ” regulat ingemployment—traditionally a matter of state policepowers—not immigration. It neither duplicates norconflicts with the Immigration Reform and Control Actof 1986 (“IRCA”), 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324a et seq. On thecontrary, it bolsters federal objectives by regulatingthe conduct of local workers who are subject to fewpenalties at the federal law.

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ARGUMENT

I. EMPLOYMENT IS TRADITIONALLY ASTATE MATTER.

This Court must tread carefully so as not toencroach on Arizona’s historic police powers.Regulation and protection of workers falls within thesebroad state powers: “Child labor laws, minimum andother wage laws, laws affecting occupational healthand safety, and workmen’s compensation laws are onlya few examples.” De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356(1976). This principle undergirds the Chicanosdecision, explaining that “the authority to regulate theemployment of unauthorized workers is ‘within themainstream’ of the state’s police powers.” Chicanos,supra, 558 F.3d at 861, 864, citing De Canas v. Bica,supra, 424 U.S. at 356, 365.

Well-established precedent holds that“congressional intent to supersede state laws must be‘c lear and manifest ’ ” in a f ield—likeemployment—traditionally regulated by the states.English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990),quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525(1977), Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,239 (1947); see also United States v. Locke, 529 U.S.89, 108 (2000). An inference of preemption must bedrawn only with “compelling congressional direction”when the regulated conduct “touch[es]interests...deeply rooted in local feeling andresponsibility.” San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 U.S.236, 244 (1959). It is not enough to find preemptionmerely because a state law “impose[s] liability overand above that authorized by federal law.” English v.Gen. Elec. Co., supra, 496 U.S. at 89, quoting

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California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 105 (1989)(slip. op. 10). In English, nothing in the EnergyReorganization Act revealed that Congress intended tooverride a whistleblower employee’s state law tortclaims for her employer’s outrageous conduct. Englishv. Gen. Elec. Co., supra, 496 U.S. at 83. Here, as inEnglish and Chicanos, the nature of the subject matteris “[a]n issue central to [the] preemption analysis.”Chicanos, supra, 558 F.3d at 864. The subject matteris employment—a preeminently state concern.

A. Arizona Regulates Employment—NotImmigration.

Federal power to formulate immigration policy is“firmly embedded in the legislative and judicial tissuesof our body politic.” Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531(1954). See U.S. Const. art. I, sect. 8, cl. 4; Smith v.Turner, 48 U.S. 283 (1849) (striking down statestatutes authorizing a tax on all passengers arriving ina state port by vessel from a foreign port); Hendersonv. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1876) (strikingdown state bond/tax on incoming immigrantpassengers); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876)(state could not require bond upon arrival of aliensunable to care for themselves). The Immigration andNationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.—“is acomprehensive legislative scheme intended to governall aspects of the admission of aliens to the UnitedStates.” Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc. v. INS,913 F.2d 1350, 1358 (9th Cir. 1990), rev’d, 502 U.S.183 (1991).

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But these basic principles do not end the inquiry:

[T]he Court has never held that every stateenactment which in any way deals with aliensis a regulation of immigration and thus per sepre-empted by this constitutional power....[T]he fact that aliens are the subject of a statestatute does not render it a regulation ofimmigration, which is essentially adetermination of who should or should not beadmitted into the country, and the conditionsunder which a legal entrant may remain.

De Canas v. Bica, supra, 424 U.S. at 355. Arizona hasnot transgressed the immigration boundary. Like theLegal Arizona Workers Act, nothing in Section 5“attempt[s] to define who is eligible or ineligible towork under our immigration laws.” Chicanos, supra,558 F.3d at 866. The law is premised on federaldefinitions and does not “add to nor take from theconditions lawfully imposed by Congress uponadmission, naturalization and residence of aliens inthe United States.” De Canas v. Bica, supra, 424 U.S.at 358 n. 6 (emphasis in original). Nor does it “[touch]the rights, privileges, obligations or burdens of aliensas such.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62 (1941).Much like the California statute upheld in DeCanas,Arizona law “is not aimed at immigration control orregulation” but protects lawful workers—citizens andresident aliens alike. De Canas v. Bica, supra, 424U.S. at 354 n. 3.

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B. Arizona Law Imposes No DiscriminatoryBurdens On Lawful Aliens—It ProtectsTheir Rights, Including LawfulEmployment.

“Opposition to laws permitting invasion of thepersonal liberties of law-abiding individuals, orsingling out aliens as particularly dangerous andundesirable groups, is deep-seated in this country.Hostility to such legislation in America stems back toour colonial history....” Hines v. Davidowitz, supra,312 U.S. at 70.

A lawfully admitted resident alien is a “person”entitled to Equal Protection. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S.717, 719-720 (1973). No state may discriminateagainst lawful aliens by imposing “extraordinaryburdens and obligations upon. . .them alone.” Hinesv. Davidowitz, supra, 312 U.S. at 65-66. A state maynot impose residency requirements on lawful aliens asa condition for welfare benefits, because such amandate would “necessarily operate...to discourageentry into or continued residency in the State.”Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 379 (1971)(striking down state statutes that conditioned welfarebenefits on U.S. citizenship or a specified length ofresidency). A state could limit assistance to citizens,but could not discriminate against naturalized citizensby mandating a minimum period of residence. Id. at381.

A lawfully admitted alien has the right to live inany state and work in the common occupations of thecommunity. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334U.S. 410, 415 (1948) (state could not bar an alien fromearning his living as a commercial fisherman). Denial

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of employment opportunities to lawful aliens “would betantamount to the assertion of the right to deny thementrance and abode, for in ordinary cases they cannotlive where they cannot work.” Truax v. Raich, 239U.S. 33, 42 (1915) (striking down Arizona lawrequiring employers of more than five workers to hirenot less than 80% native-born citizens). See also In reGriffiths, supra, 413 U.S. 717 (striking downConnecticut State Bar rule that prohibited residentaliens from taking bar exam).

Arizona has not intruded upon federal immigrationauthority by imposing “discriminatory burdens uponthe entrance or residence” of lawful aliens. Takahashiv. Fish & Game Comm’n, supra, 334 U.S. at 419. Onthe contrary, Section 5 serves protective purposes forall lawful state residents—unlike the Pennsylvaniastatutes in Hines v. Davidowitz, supra, 312 U.S. 52and Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) thatburdened lawful aliens and conflicted with federal law.De Canas v. Bica, supra, 424 U.S. at 363. Arizona lawis comparable to the California statute upheld inDeCanas, “designed to protect the opportunities oflawfully admitted aliens for obtaining and holdingjobs, rather than to add to their burdens.” Id. at 358n.6. As this Court explained:

Employment of illegal aliens in times of highunemployment deprives citizens and legallyadmitted aliens of jobs; acceptance by illegalaliens of jobs on substandard terms as to wagesand working conditions can seriously depresswage scales and working conditions of citizensand legally admitted aliens....

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Id. at 356-357 (emphasis added). “These localproblems [job shortages and substandard workingconditions] are particularly acute in [Arizona] in lightof the significant influx into that State of illegal aliensfrom neighboring Mexico.” Id. at 357. Arizona hasaddressed those local problems to protect all of itslawful workers and strengthen its economy. In thisfacial challenge, any impact on immigration would be“purely speculative and indirect”—not a“constitutionally proscribed regulation ofimmigration.” Id. at 355-356.

Section 5 parallels the INS regulation this Courtupheld in INS v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights,supra, 502 U.S. 183. The disputed regulation onlyapplied to aliens who lacked work authorization in thefirst place and was never intended to interfere withthe lawful employment rights of aliens authorized towork. Id. at 189-190. Arizona law is similar—it onlyprohibits the solicitation of employment by personswho are in the country illegally and for whomemployment would be unlawful.

C. The Inquiry Begins With A PresumptionThat Federal Law Does Not PreemptArizona’s Regulation Of Employment—APreeminently State Matter.

Immigration is unquestionably a federal matter,but regulation of the employment relationship—toprotect workers in the state and its economy—istraditionally a state prerogative. Although these twoareas intersect when governments regulate theemployment of alien workers, employment generallyfalls within the broad authority of the states. DeCanas v. Bica, supra, 424 U.S. at 356. Section 5

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regulates employment—not immigration—leavingfederal law intact to define the persons who maylawfully seek work.

In upholding the Legal Arizona Workers Act, theNinth Circuit agreed that “because the power toregulate the employment of unauthorized aliensremains within the states’ historic police powers, anassumption of non-preemption applies”—in spite of theHoffman holding that IRCA had made the employmentof unauthorized workers “central to ‘[t]he policy ofimmigration law.’” Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc.v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002) (quoting INS v.Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc., supra, 502 U.S.at 194) (alteration in original). Chicanos, supra, 558F.3d at 861, 864-865. The District Court conceded thisprecedent. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d980, 1000 (D. Ariz. 2010). So did the Ninth Circuit.United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 344-345 (9thCir. 2011). Where Congress legislates in a fieldtraditionally occupied by the states, courts must beginthe preemption query with the presumption that statepowers are not superseded in the absence of expresscongressional mandate. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct.1187, 1194-95 (2009); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S.470, 485 (1996); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505U.S. 504, 516 (1992); P.R. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs v.Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495, 500 (1988); Rice v.Santa Fe Elevator Corp., supra, 331 U.S. at 230. Thatpresumption has long been applied to claims of impliedconflict preemption. Wyeth v. Levine, supra, 129 S. Ct.at 1195 n. 3; see, e.g., California v. ARC Am. Corp.,supra, 490 U.S. at 101-102; Hillsborough Cnty. v.Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 716 (1985).

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This Court has refined the general principle byexplaining that “federal regulation of a field ofcommerce should not be deemed preemptive of stateregulatory power in the absence of persuasivereasons. . .either that the nature of the regulatedsubject matter permits no other conclusion, or that theCongress has unmistakably so ordained.” Fla. Lime &Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142(1963). If the subject matter is “an area where therehas been a history of significant federal presence,”then “an assumption of nonpreemption is nottriggered.” United States v. Locke, supra, 529 U.S. at208. Locke involved international maritimecommerce—a traditionally federal domain—but thereis no comparable federal presence in the sphere ofemployment—a matter of local concern traditionallyreserved for state regulation.

D. Federal Law Does Not Expressly PreemptArizona’s Right To Regulate Its Workers.

Federal preemption may either be express orimplied. Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta,458 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982). Express provisionsrequire courts to “identify the domain expresslypreempted.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, supra, 518 U.S.at 484, quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., supra,505 U.S. at 517. The “task is an easy one” where“Congress define[s] explicitly the extent to which itsenactments pre-empt state law.” English v. Gen. Elec.Co., supra, 496 U.S. at 79, 78.

The Ninth Circuit previously considered IRCA’sexpress preemption clause concerning employers whohire unauthorized alien workers—“those who employ,or recruit or refer for a fee for employment,

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unauthorized aliens.” 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324a(h)(2).Chicanos, supra, 558 F.3d at 867. That provisioncontained a “savings clause” allowing the sanctionsArizona enacted in the Legal Arizona Workers Act. “Itpreempts all state sanctions ‘other than throughlicensing and similar laws.’ 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2).”Id. at 861.

IRCA’s language may be straightforward as toemployers—but it is neither so comprehensive nor soexplicit that it trumps all possible state regulation ofemployees. The Court will thus need to examinewhether Congress has impliedly occupied thelegislative field as to employees.

E. IRCA Does Not Occupy The Entire Field OfEmployment.

The District Court concluded that “Congress hascomprehensively regulated in the field of employmentof unauthorized aliens”—leaving no room for stateregulation. United States v. Arizona, supra, 703 F.Supp. 2d at 1002. The matter is not that simple.

Congress enacted comprehensive regulations foremployers but only minimal sanctions for employees.The decision to limit employee penalties at the federallevel does not automatically handcuff state officialsand strip them of the right to regulate localworkers—a task more suited to local law enforcement.

It is often a perplexing question whetherCongress has precluded state action or by thechoice of selective regulatory measures has leftthe police power of the States undisturbed

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except as the state and federal regulationscollide.

Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., supra, 331 U.S. at230-231. See also Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441,454 (1937) (“[I]f it be assumed that Congress has thatauthority, it has not been exercised and in the absenceof such exercise the State may impose the regulationin question for the protection of its people”); UnionBrokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202, 210 (1944)(“The incidence of the particular state enactment mustdetermine whether it has transgressed the power leftto the States to protect their special stateinterests....”).

Field preemption occurs where “the depth andbreadth of a congressional scheme...occupies thelegislative field.” Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de laCuesta, supra, 458 U.S. at 153; Chicanos, supra, 558F.3d at 861, 863; Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533U.S. 525, 541 (2001) (Federal Cigarette Labeling andAdvertising Act preempted state law that regulatedoutdoor cigarette advertising in order to reduce tobaccoconsumption by minors). A legislative scheme may beso pervasive, or the federal interest so dominant, thatpreemptive intent is reasonably implied. English v.Gen. Elec. Co., supra, 496 U.S. at 79; Schneidewind v.ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988); Fid. Fed.Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, supra, 458 U.S. at153; Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., supra, 331 U.S.at 230. Sometimes Congress deliberately assumesresponsibility for an entire field of legislative activity.In Pennsylvania v. Nelson, supra, 350 U.S. at 504, itwas evident that “Congress ha[d] intended to occupythe field of sedition,” precluding statesupplementation.

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But comprehensive federal regulation of an entirefield is not “created subtly.” P.R. Dep’t of ConsumerAffairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., supra, 485 U.S. at 500.Field preemption is an elusive doctrine:

“Little aid can be derived from the vague andillusory but often repeated formula thatCongress ‘by occupying the field’ has excludedfrom it all state legislation. Every Act ofCongress occupies some field, but we must knowthe boundaries of that field before we can saythat it has precluded a state from the exercise ofany power reserved to it by the Constitution. Todiscover the boundaries we look to the federalstatute itself, read in the light of itsconstitutional setting and its legislativehistory.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 78-79 (1941) (Stone, J., dissenting).

De Canas v. Bica, supra, 424 U.S. at 360 n. 8(emphasis added). The existence of a “detailedstatutory scheme”—“given the complexity of thematter”—might be reasonable even in the absence ofpreemptive intent. New York Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v.Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 415 (1973).

The traditional preemption categories—express,field, and actual conflict—are “not rigidly distinct.”English v. Gen. Elec. Co., supra, 496 U.S. at 79 n. 5.“[F]ield preemption may be understood as a species ofconflict pre-emption” where Congress intentionallyexcludes all state regulation. English v. Gen. Elec. Co.,supra, 496 U.S. at 79 n. 5. In that case, the veryenactment of state law would conflict withcongressional intent. But when “Congress, whileregulating related matters”—employer hiring of

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unlawful aliens—“le[aves] untouched a distinctive partof the subject which is peculiarly adapted to localregulation”—employee regulation—“the state maylegislate concerning such local matters which Congresscould have covered but did not.” Hines v. Davidowitz,supra, 312 U.S. at 68 n. 22. That is exactly whathappened in Arizona.

There is no constitutional rule which compelsCongress to occupy the whole field. Congressmay circumscribe its regulation and occupy onlya limited field. When it does so, state regulationoutside that limited field and otherwiseadmissible is not forbidden or displaced.

Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1937) (Congressdid not “occupy the field” so as to preclude stateinspection of vessels for safety and seaworthiness).

F. IRCA Regulates Employers Extensively—But Leaves Room For States To RegulateEmployees.

The Ninth Circuit grounded its conclusion incertain statements plucked from Nat’l Ctr. forImmigrants’ Rights, Inc. v. INS, supra, 913 F.2d 1350:

While Congress initially discussed the merits offining, detaining or adopting criminal sanctionsagainst the employee, it ultimately rejected allsuch proposals.... Congress quite clearly waswilling to deter illegal immigration by makingjobs less available to illegal aliens but not byincarcerating or fining aliens who succeeded inobtaining work.

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United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 357 (9th Cir.2011), quoting Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc.v. INS, supra, 913 F.2d at 1368. It is reasonable toconclude that Congress has “occupied the field” asapplied to employers, imposing an array of penalties onemployers who “knowingly hire or continue to employan alien without work authorization.” 8 U.S.C.§ 1324a(a)(1)-(2), (e)(4). IRCA contains very limitedsanctions targeting employees: 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(submitting false documents in the context of unlawfulemployment of an unauthorized alien); 8 U.S.C.§ 1324a(b)(2) (attestation requirements as condition ofemployment).

Perhaps Congress elaborated a policy choice at thefederal level “to reduce or deter employment ofunauthorized workers by sanctioning employers,rather than employees.” United States v. Arizona, 703F. Supp. 2d 980, 1001 (D. Ariz. 2010), citing Nat’l Ctr.for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc. v. INS, supra, 913 F.2d at1370. But as the Ninth Circuit made clear, the federalstatutory scheme protects the jobs of lawful employeesby reducing the incentive to hire unlawfulworkers—and the lure of U.S. employment that drawsillegal aliens into the country. Id. at 1367. At thefederal level, Congress strategically focused onemployers to achieve these goals. The employeesanctions are primarily related to documentationrequired for employment—documents aliens wouldreceive from the federal government. This streamlinedfederal legislation does not foreclose the possibility forstates to regulate the conduct of individuals withintheir borders.

The INS regulation struck down in Nat’l Ctr. forImmigrants’ Rights was ultimately upheld by this

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Court. INS v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, supra,502 U.S. 183. The Immigration and Nationality Act,Section 242(a), permitted the Attorney General toimpose conditions on the release bonds of excludablealiens who had been arrested and awaited adetermination of deportability. The disputed conditionprohibited unauthorized employment pending thatdetermination. INS v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’Rights, supra, 502 U.S. at 184-185. Since lawfulemployment was not impacted, the condition washardly controversial:

The objective of this Act was to stop illegalaliens from working, period.... In no way do theexistence of employer sanctions suggest or implythat unauthorized work by illegal aliens issomehow acceptable. The choice of sanctionsdoes not alter the primary thrust of thelegislative scheme which is to deter and toprevent unauthorized employment.

Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc. v. INS, supra,913 F.2d at 1375 (Trotter, J., dissenting) (emphasisadded). Although INS did not involve a state statute,the rationale is similar for Arizona—which is farbetter situated to monitor the activities of its localillegal residents who solicit unlawful employment.Federal law prohibits one side of the coin—unlawfulhiring. State law prohibits the correspondingside—unlawful solicitation of work that would beillegal under federal law.

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II. THE ARIZONA LAW POSES NO THREAT TOFEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OROBJECTIVES.

Arizona law provides that “it is unlawful for a

person who is unlawfully present in the United Statesand who is an unauthorized alien to knowingly applyfor work, solicit work in a public place or perform workas an employee or independent contractor in thisstate.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2928(C) (Section 5 of S.B.1070) (emphasis added). The obvious purpose—toprevent employment that is illegal under federallaw—is entirely consistent with federal objectives. There is no conflict whatsoever—in theory, definition,purposes, or implementation.

A. Arizona Law Does Not Conflict WithCongressional Intent Or Frustrate TheAccomplishment Of Federal ImmigrationLaw Purposes.

A “primary purpose in restricting immigration is topreserve jobs for American workers.” Sure-Tan, Inc. v.NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 893 (1984). The Immigration andNationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq.(“INA”) “’provide[s] for the protection of Americanlabor against an influx of aliens entering the UnitedStates for the purpose of performing skilled orunskilled labor where the economy of individuallocalities is not capable of absorbing them at the timethey desire to enter this country.’ H.R. Rep. 1365, 82dCong. 2d Sess. 51 (1957).” Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’Rights, Inc. v. INS, supra, 913 F.2d at 1374 (Trotter,J., dissenting). IRCA strengthened and reinforced thatpurpose, “reiterat[ing] the desire of Congress to erectat the borders barriers designed to protect U.S.

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citizens, and others here with lawful permission towork, from competition by illegal aliens not authorizedby law to work in this country. The objective of this Actwas to stop illegal aliens from working, period.” Nat’lCtr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc. v. INS, supra, 913F.2d at 1374-75 (Trotter, J., dissenting) (emphasisadded).

Section 5 preserves jobs for all lawful Arizonaworkers—citizens and lawful aliens alike—protectingboth from illegal competition. In Meditronic, thisCourt concluded that overriding the state statute atissue would have “the perverse effect of grantingcomplete immunity. . .to an entire industry that, in thejudgment of Congress, needed more stringentregulation.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, supra, 518 U.S.at 487. It would be equally perverse to squelchArizona’s law enforcement efforts by granting a freepass to unlawful aliens who solicit illegal employment.“It is, to say the least, ‘difficult to believe thatCongress would, without comment, remove all meansof judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct.’Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251(1984).” Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, supra, 518 U.S. at487.

One species of “conflict preemption occurs. . .where‘state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishmentand execution of the full purposes and objectives ofCongress.’” Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, supra, 533U.S. 525, quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, supra, 312 U.S.at 67; cited in Chicanos, supra, 558 F.3d at 863.Federal law preempted a state provision for “noairbag” lawsuits because it conflicted withcongressional objectives—the gradual development ofalternative passive restraint devices for safety-related

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reasons. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861,866 (2000). Similarly, a state could not enforce itslaws regulating oil tanker design and relatedrequirements, because enforcement would frustrateCongress’ intent to establish a uniform federal regimecontrolling oil tanker design. United States v. Locke,supra, 529 U.S. at 109.

Laws consistent with congressional purpose are notso easily stricken. This Court upheld a disputed INSregulation as “wholly consistent with [the] establishedconcern of immigration law”—preserving jobs forlawful American workers. INS v. Nat’l Ctr. forImmigrants’ Rights, supra, 502 U.S. at 194. Thatregulation, like the Arizona law, curbed unlawfulemployment by unlawful aliens—hardly acontroversial measure.

Moreover, even where a state law does frustratefederal objectives, “the proper approach is to reconcilethe operation of both statutory schemes” and pre-empt“only to the extent necessary to protect theachievement” of the federal goal, “rather than holding[the state scheme] completely ousted.” Merrill Lynch,Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127(1973), quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,373 U.S. 341, 361, 357 (1963); De Canas v. Bica, supra,424 U.S. at 358 n. 5. Here, Arizona contributes to theattainment of federal goals through local restraint ofunlawful employment solicitation.

Finally, this Court should exercise judicial restraintbecause “a ruling of unconstitutionality [would]frustrate the intent of the elected representatives ofthe people” of Arizona. Crawford v. Marion Cnty.Election Bd., supra, 553 U.S. at 203; Washington State

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Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, supra,552 U.S. at 451; Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood ofNorthern New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006), quotingRegan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984). Evenwhere a state statute cannot be upheld in its entirety,“courts should not nullify more of a state law thannecessary so as to avoid frustrating the intent of thepeople and their duly elected representatives).” Wardv. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 795-796 (1989),quoted in Washington State Grange v. WashingtonState Republican Party, supra, 552 U.S. at 456.

Much like De Canas, Arizona’s law “mirror[s]precisely the federal policy, of protecting the domesticlabor market, underlying the immigration laws.”Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 208 n. 5 (1982) (state maynot deny public education to children who are illegalaliens—distinguishing DeCanas). It neither conflictswith nor obstructs the accomplishment of thatpurpose.

B. It Is Not Impossible To Comply With BothFederal And Arizona Law—In Fact,Compliance With Arizona LawNecessitates Compliance With FederalLaw.

Where federal and state law conflicts, the result isstraightforward—no matter how urgent the stateinterests:

“The relative importance to the State of its ownlaw is not material when there is a conflict witha valid federal law, for the Framers of ourConstitution provided that the federal law must

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prevail.” Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666(1962).

Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, supra, 458U.S. at 153. But the conflict must be actual—notmerely potential, speculative, or hypothetical.Chicanos, supra, 558 F.3d at 861, 863; citing Englishv. Gen. Elec. Co., supra, 496 U.S. at 89. The analysismust be approached with caution, because the“teaching of this Court’s decisions. . .enjoins seekingout conflicts between state and federal regulationwhere none clearly exists.” Id. at 90, quoting HuronCement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 446 (1960).

If the federal and state regulatory schemes bothcomprehensively regulate the subject matter, theoverlap would be so great that they “must inherentlyeither conflict or be duplicative.” Rice v. Santa FeElevator Corp., supra, 331 U.S. at 230. The Arizonalaw does neither. It complements federal law withoutduplication by regulating unlawful aliens who solicitwork from employers who cannot legally hirethem—under federal law.

Preemption is inescapable where it is impossible tocomply with both federal and state law—even ifCongress has not completely displaced stateregulation—but not a foregone conclusion in theabsence of such impossibility. Chicanos, supra, 558F.3d at 861, 863; English v. Gen. Elec. Co., supra, 496U.S. at 79; Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta,supra, 458 U.S. at 153 (federal regulations pre-emptedconflicting state laws regulating federal savings andloans with respect to their “due-on-sale” practices);Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, supra, 373U.S. at 142-143 (not impossible to comply with both

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the Agricultural Adjustment Act and Californiastatute excluding certain out-of-state avocados); Wyethv. Levine, supra, 129 S. Ct. at 1198 (not impossible tocomply with both FDA and the stronger warning labelrequired by state law—FDA oversight was not theexclusive means of ensuring drug safety andeffectiveness).

In addition to its consistency with IRCA’s overallobjectives, Arizona relies on federal definitions. InChicanos, the Ninth Circuit observed that the LegalArizona Workers Act used the federal definition of“unauthorized alien” (8 U.S.C.S. §§ 1324a-1324b; Ariz.Rev. Stat. § 23-211(11)) and “the federal government’sdetermination of the employee’s lawful status.” Ariz.Rev. Stat. § 23-212(H). Chicanos, supra, 558 F.3d at861, 862. Similarly, DeCanas assumed that theCalifornia statute at issue would apply only “to alienswho would not be permitted to work in the UnitedStates under pertinent federal laws and regulations.”De Canas v. Bica, supra, 424 U.S. at 353 n. 2.

The same is true here. A.R.S. § 13-2928(G) definesan “unauthorized alien” as “an alien who does not havethe legal right or authorization under federal law towork in the United States as described in 8 U.S.C.§ 1324a(h)(3).” Arizona adds no new or conflictingdefinitions, imposing sanctions only on those who areunlawfully present in the U.S. and unauthorized toperform work under applicable federal definitions.

In a facial challenge with no factual context orbackground—as in this case—showing a conflict basedon impossibility poses nearly insurmountabledifficulties. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. ElectionBd., supra, 553 U.S. 181 (facial challenge failed where

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state requirement for government-issued photoidentification to verify voter identity was consistentwith the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 andthe Help America Vote Act of 2002). Arizona’s lawbuilds on federal definitions and achieves federalobjectives. Compliance with both Arizona and federallaw is not only possible—it is unavoidable.

CONCLUSION

Arizona’s regulation of workers within its bordersis a presumptively state matter that Congress hasneither expressly nor impliedly preempted. Arizonaregulates aspects of the employment relationship leftuntouched by IRCA. Federal law provides extensivesanctions for employers who hire illegal aliens—butcarves out sufficient breathing room for states tomonitor the conduct of individual employees.

Respectfully Submitted,

James L. Hirsen Counsel of Record505 S. Villa Real DriveSuite 208Anaheim Hills, CA 92807(714) 283-8880hirsen@earthlink.net

Deborah J. Dewart 620 E. Sabiston DriveSwansboro, NC 28584(910) 326-4554debcpalaw@earthlink.net

Counsel for Amicus Curiae