in the supreme court of ohiosupremecourt.ohio.gov/pdf_viewer/pdf_viewer.aspx?pdf=...that she is able...

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

Disciplinary Counsel

Relator,

v.

Marilyn Cramer, Esq. Respondent.

Case No. 2019-1739 On Certified Report by the Board of Professional Conduct

Relator’s Answer to Respondent’s Objections

Joseph M. Caligiuri, Esq. (0074786) Disciplinary Counsel Relator Donald M. Scheetz (0082422) *Counsel of Record Chief Assistant Disciplinary Counsel Office of Disciplinary Counsel 250 Civic Center Drive, Suite 325 Columbus, Ohio 43215 Telephone: (614) 461-0256 [email protected] Counsel for Relator

Marilyn Cramer, Esq. Respondent MARILYN A. CRAMER, Atty. Reg. No. 0032947 THE CRAMER LAW GROUP, LLC 11459 Mayfield Road, Suite 202 Cleveland, OH 44106 Telephone: (216) 650-2707 Email: [email protected] Respondent, in propria persona

Supreme Court of Ohio Clerk of Court - Filed March 04, 2020 - Case No. 2019-1739

i

Table of Contents

Pages Table of Authorities ................................................................................................... ii Introduction ................................................................................................................ 1 Statement of Facts ...................................................................................................... 2 Argument ................................................................................................................... 2

Answer to Objection No. 1: Respondent first objects that she filed numerous motions…......................... 2

Answer to Objection No. 2: Respondent objects to that her filings were frivolous………. ....................... 2 Answer to Objection No. 3: Respondent objects that she falsely claimed to have a buyer……………… 5

Answer to Objection No. 4: Respondent objects that she lacked evidence of ex parte communications ............................................................................................. 6 Answer to Objection No. 5: Respondent objects that she spoke disparagingly or disrespectfully toward a court ................................................................................................ 7

Answer to Objection No. 6: Respondent objects that she drafted a false affidavit ..................................... 8 Answer to Objection No. 7: Respondent objects that she trespassed .......................................................... 9

Answer to Objection No. 8: Respondent objects that she misrepresented her authority before becoming ancillary administrator ................................................................................... 10 Answer to Objection No. 9: Respondent objects that Patrick Lavender testified credibly ......................... 13

Answer to Objection No.’s 10 & 11: Respondent objects that she has unaddressed mental or physical issues. ...... 14

ii

Answer to Objection No. 12: Respondent objects that she had a dishonest or selfish motive. .................... 15 Answer to Objection No. 13: Respondent objects that she impugned the integrity of the court .................. 15

Answer to Objection No. 14: Respondent objects that she engaged in multiple offenses ............................ 16 Answer to Objection No. 15: Respondent objects that she failed to cooperate ............................................ 16

Answer to Objection No. 16: Respondent objects to the finding of a single mitigating factor .................... 17 Answer to Objection No. 17: Respondent objects that she was late for prehearing conferences ................. 18

Answer to Objection No. 18: Respondent objects to findings regarding how the clerk handled a filing in the probate matter .. ................................................................................... 19 Answer to Objection No. 19: Respondent objects that she was late for a probate hearing without explanation ..................................................................................................... 19

Answer to Objection No. 20: Respondent objects that Paul Hartman disrupted a probate hearing .............. 20 Answer to Objection No. 21: Respondent objects that she was unprepared ................................................. 20

Answer to Objection No. 22: Respondent objects that she failed to prepare exhibits. ................................. 21 Answer to Objection No. 23: Respondent objects that she was ordered to file a post-hearing brief ............ 22

Answer to Objection No. 1: Respondent objects to the standard applied by the board…………………. 22 Answer to Objection No. 2: Respondent objects that she trespassed .......................................................... 23

Answer to Objection No.’s 3, 4, and 5: Respondent objects to the recommended sanction ........................................ 23

iii

Table of Authorities

Cases Pages Disciplinary Counsel v. Pullins, 127 Ohio St.3d 436, 2010-Ohio-6241, 909 N.E.2d 1271 .............................. 7, 23, 25 Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Statzer, 101 Ohio St.3d 14, 2003-Ohio-6649, 800 N.E.2d 1117 ................................ 13

of 27

Introduction

Respondent’s objections have made clear that she is either incapable or unwilling to

acknowledge her misconduct. A trial court has sanctioned her, an appellate court has affirmed

those sanctions, and now the board has ruled against her, yet she continues her misconduct.

Respondent has now set her unprofessional, irresponsible, and inaccurate allegations upon the

panel, the board, and the disciplinary system itself. It is inconceivable that she would now levy

her vitriol against the panel – three volunteers who were subjected to her incompetence and

unrepentance and who spent untold hours wading through voluminous frivolous filings and

arguments postulated by respondent.

The record clearly demonstrates that respondent is not currently fit to practice. Whether

physical, mental, or both, it is clear that respondent suffers from some impairment that inhibits

her ability to ethically practice law, and there is no available term suspension long enough to

ensure that she can ethically re-enter the practice of law. Thus, in order to protect the public,

relator respectfully requests that this court overrule each of respondent’s objections, adopt the

board’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, and indefinitely suspend respondent from the

practice of law with any reinstatement conditioned upon respondent (1) submitting to an

evaluation by the Ohio Lawyers' Assistance Program and complying with any recommendations

resulting from that evaluation; (2) providing an opinion from a qualified health care professional

that she is able to resume the competent, ethical, and professional practice of law; and (3)

providing proof that she has paid the fees and costs assessed by the probate court in its December

19, 2017 order.

of 27

Statement of Facts

The facts underlying respondent’s misconduct are cogently set forth in the Board of

Professional Conduct’s (“board”) Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation

(“report”).

Argument

Respondent’s Objections to the Findings of Fact

Answer to Objection No. 1:

Respondent first objects to the characterization that she filed numerous motions.

Focusing on this detail demonstrates that respondent does not appreciate the gravity of the instant

case and is in denial about her own conduct. Relator’s Exhibits 1 and 2 comprise most, but not

all, of the court record from the underlying cases. Together, those exhibits are over 2,000 pages

and are replete with examples of respondent’s “bad conduct and frivolous filings” that “turned

what should have been a simple land sale into a circus devoid of any respect to the Court and its

officers.” Bd. Report ¶ 51. Despite agreeing that her mother’s home should be sold and that it

was only worth approximately $30,000, respondent repeatedly filed repetitive arguments and

argued moot issues. Ex. 1 REL417 – 418; Ex. 2 REL481. Further, just as respondent “failed to

grasp the reality that when she was removed as Ancillary Administrator, she lost the ability to

dictate the terms of sale,” she fails to grasp the reality of her conduct and the instant disciplinary

matter as her first objection over the word “numerous” demonstrates. Id.

Answer to Objection No. 2: In her second objection, respondent objects to the board’s characterization of her filings

as frivolous. Similar to her first objection, respondent’s second objection makes plain that

respondent is in complete denial about her misconduct. She repeatedly argued irrelevant or moot

of 27

issues without regard to the rulings from the court. Bd. Report ¶¶ 48 – 54.

First, the court repeatedly advised respondent that any issues relating to the estate case in

Alabama would not be heard by the court in Franklin County. It did so during its first hearing, in

its first entry, in its Letters of Authority, and in its entries during the case. Ex. 1 REL74 – 75;

REL129. However, respondent ignored the court and insisted on arguing that issue at every

possible opportunity, including her May 28, 2015 Motion to Consolidate (Ex. 1 REL207 – 217);

August 4, 2015 Objections (Id. at REL284 – 359); January 20, 2016 First Partial Account (Id. at

REL454 – 458), which was only an accounting of the assets in Franklin County; Answer to the

Complaint in Case No. 567794A (Ex. 2 REL052 – 057); and the May 30, 2017 Opposition to the

Motion to Confirm Sale (Id. at REL883 – 901). The above constitutes many - but not all - of the

times that respondent continued to argue this wholly irrelevant issue throughout the litigation

despite being notified of the court’s limited jurisdiction and despite admonishments from the

court.

Second, respondent argued that attorney Taneff violated Loc.R. 71.3 of the Franklin

County Probate Court by filing for his attorney’s fees without meeting the rule’s requirements.

The court disposed of that argument in its March 30, 2017 Entry, stating that the local rule only

applied to estates, whereas Taneff’s matter was a land sale and was governed by R.C. 2127.38.

(Id. at REL687 – 708). Despite the clear ruling of the court and language of the relevant rule and

statute, respondent continued to make this argument time and time again. She argued it in her

May 24, 2017 Motion to Strike (Id. at REL867 – 878); May 30, 2017 Opposition (Id. at REL883

– 901); June 19, 2017 Motion to Stay (Id. at REL910 – 919); June 22, 2017 Objections (Id. at

REL920 – 967); and February 15, 2018 Motion to Postpone (Id. at REL1311 – 1316).

of 27

Third, despite not appealing her removal as ancillary administrator, she insisted on

repeatedly arguing that her removal was improper and that she should be reappointed. She

argued it in her February 23, 2016 Answer to the Complaint in Case No. 567794A (Id. at

REL052 – 057); June 10, 2016 Emergency Motion (Id. at REL 132 – 154); November 29, 2016

Motion for Stay (Id. at REL295 – 298); and November 30, 2016 Reply (Id. at REL321 – 335).

Fourth, the record contains numerous other examples of respondent arguing cumulative,

irrelevant, moot, false, and frivolous issues, including, but in no way limited to, the following:

• Arguing in her January 20, 2016 First Partial Account (Ex. 1 REL454 – 458) that the property had numerous code violations in order to continue attacking her sister and incorporating her previously overruled objections, all of which was entirely irrelevant to an accounting of the property that was subject to the ancillary administration;

• Arguing in her untimely June 29, 2016 Objections (Ex. 2 REL184 – 190) that the magistrate’s decision was voidable because she did not include findings of fact and conclusions of law; however, this issue was without merit because neither respondent, nor any other party, requested findings of fact and conclusions of law;

• Attaching a document setting “forth the true facts” of the conversation she had with the buyer to her Reply in Further Support of a Motion to Stay (Id. at REL321 – 335) she had filed the day before, which was entirely irrelevant;

• Incorporating several previously-denied motions into her December 8, 2016

Preliminary Objections (Id. at REL364 – 388);

• Arguing in her June 22, 2017 Objections (Id. at REL920 – 965) that the heirs had not been given a fair opportunity to make an offer on the property, when, in fact, respondent had been given access to the home in the summer of 2016 (Joint Ex. 7), and had failed to make any offer to purchase the home following that inspection or at any time before, which included a substantial period during which she was the administrator and had unfettered access to the home; and,

• Arguing in her June 22, 2017 Objections that the sales price of the home was

suspiciously high, while also arguing that attorney Taneff had failed to obtain a high enough sales price. (Id. at REL920 – 965)

Finally, it is not a defense that another attorney filed similar documents. The court admonished

that attorney for acting negligently and for “filings that suspiciously mirrored [respondent’s]

of 27

filings.” Id. at REL1230.


In her third objection, respondent objects to the board’s finding that she falsely claimed

to have a buyer. However, the board properly found the respondent made false and misleading

statements regarding an alleged buyer and that those statements significantly hindered the

administration of her mother’s estate. Bd. Report ¶¶ 45 – 47.

For example, in respondent’s January 20, 2016 First Partial Account (Ex. 1 REL454 –

458), she falsely stated:

• That she had negotiated a purchase agreement;

• That there was an agreed-upon contract;

• That she would not provide the contract because it was her “work product.”

• That the purchase price was $101,000;

• That the transfer and move-in date were scheduled for spring; and,

• That the purchase would have no realtor commission.

These representations were patently false or mislead the reader into believing that there was a

written contract. In fact, respondent and the realtor admitted that this alleged buyer never gave a

written offer to purchase the home. Id. at II-372 – II-375, and II-416. Thus, there was no “work

product” to provide. Additionally, there was no contract, the purchase price had not been set,

and no transfer or move-in dates were set. Similarly, respondent’s statement regarding the

commission was false. During the hearing, both respondent and the realtor testified that there

was a listing agreement that required a 3% commission if respondent sold the house using

respondent’s own buyer. Hearing Tr. II-363 & II-479. Thus, there was to be a commission

regardless. Finally, at no time from the September 2014 probate hearing through the court’s

of 27

May 2017 order, ordering that bids be submitted by May 26, 2017, did she or any of her

“buyers” actually submit a bid. Relator submits that these statements were calculated falsehoods

aimed at continuing her unjustified attacks and obstructing the transfer of the property.

Beyond the First Partial Accounting, respondent continued to falsely and misleadingly

argue that she had negotiated this sale, which she had not, and that attorney Taneff had interfered

with that sale, which he could not have done because no offer ever existed. She continued to

argue this falsehood in her February 22, 2016 Answer to the Complaint in Case No. 567794A

(Ex. 2 REL052 – 057); June 10, 2016 Emergency Motion (Id. at REL132 – 154); June 29, 2016

Objections (Id. at REL184 – 190); during the November 9, 2016 hearing (Id. at REL462);

November 29, 2016 Motion for Stay (Id. at REL295 – 298); November 30, 2016 Reply in

Further Support (Id. at REL321 – 335); December 8, 2016 Preliminary Objections (Id. at

REL364 – 388); January 6, 2017 Supplemental Filing of Transcripts (Id. at REL419 – 421);

February 2, 2017, Memo Contra (Id. at REL574 – 588); and June 19, 2017 Motion to Stay (Id. at

REL910 – 912). Respondent’s misconduct was pervasive and the board’s finding is well

supported by the record.

Answer to Objection No. 4: In her fourth allegations, respondent objections to the finding that she lacked any

evidence to support her allegation of ex parte contact.

However, the board correctly found that respondent lacked a reasonable factual basis to

support her repeated allegations of ex parte communications. Bd. Report ¶¶ 18 – 37. Despite

alleging that she had personally witnessed an improper ex parte communication between

Magistrate Green and attorney Michael, respondent admitted that she could not hear the

conversation and did not know what they were discussing. Hearing Tr. I-66 – I-77. Similarly,

of 27

respondent alleged that attorney Cohen engaged in an improper ex parte communication with

Magistrate Green based on the fact that a scheduler allegedly told her that Magistrate Green had

already advised attorney Cohen of a hearing date; however, respondent failed to produce any

evidence that conversation between Magistrate Green and attorney Cohen was anything more

than a permitted communication regarding scheduling.

Finally, respondent accused the court of engaging in ex parte communications with

attorney Taneff based solely upon billing entries indicating calls to the court. Id. at I-117.

Attorney Taneff testified that those calls would have included calls to schedule hearings and to

locate documents that respondent had filed but that were not available online. He expressly

denied that he had any substantive contacts with the court. Ex. 2 at REL456 – 457. Later in the

hearing, when the magistrate pressed respondent and asked her what allegations she was making,

respondent stated “I don’t choose to make any allegations at this time.” Id. at REL464. As this

court stated in Disciplinary Counsel v. Pullins, 127 Ohio St.3d 436, 2010-Ohio-6241, 909

N.E.2d 1271, ¶ 53:

Respondent objects to these findings of misconduct, arguing that he had a reasonable factual basis for making the allegations in his affidavit of disqualification. Respondent's evidence, however, consisted mainly of his own testimony that he had observed the judge enter his chambers with the prosecutor and the assistant prosecutor on more than one occasion and his speculation that they were engaging in improper ex parte communications regarding pending cases.

Respondent has failed to develop or provide any evidence of ex parte contacts with the court, and her objection should be overruled. Answer to Objection No. 5:

In her fifth objection, respondent objects, stating that she never spoke disparagingly or

disrespectfully to any court or the board. Because respondent failed to include any cites in this

objection, relator is unsure to what she is referring. When this court reviews the record, it will

of 27

see that many, if not all, of her filings contained repeated disrespectful and disparaging remarks.


In her sixth objection, respondent objects to the board’s finding that she drafted and

submitted a false affidavit.

Without question, respondent drafted a false affidavit, submitted that false affidavit to the

trial court, submitted that same false affidavit as evidence in this disciplinary proceeding, and

now insists on continuing this charade before this court. Ex. 2 REL957 – 964. During the

disciplinary hearing, respondent called John Dunno as a witness, who testified that he narrated an

eight-page affidavit to respondent over the phone. A cursory review of the affidavit in the

context of all of respondent’s filings in the underlying matter shows that he did not narrate this

document. The language used does not reflect how anyone talks; rather, it mirrors the language

respondent uses in virtually all of her letters and pleadings. Further, Dunno’s testimony during

the hearing demonstrates that he does not speak in this fashion. Hearing Tr. II-490 – II-542.

His affidavit stated that he had “first-hand knowledge of the facts contained” therein.

However, he admitted that he did not have first-hand knowledge of everything in that affidavit,

and because respondent helped him create the affidavit, she knew that too. Id. at II-526.

Although his affidavit states that he was aware of a flurry of motions, Dunno’s testimony at the

hearing clearly indicates that he was not aware of the substance of those motions since he never

attended a court hearing, nor reviewed the docket. Id.at II-518, II-526 – II-528. Additionally, he

has no legal training or expertise. Id. at II-528.

Next, Dunno swore in his affidavit that attorney Taneff was refusing him access to the

home and that he would not negotiate with Taneff because of Taneff’s “dishonesty.” However,

he testified that he never spoke with Taneff and would have negotiated with Taneff. Id. at II-518

of 27

– 519. Likewise, in paragraph 22 of the affidavit, Dunno swore that the magistrate gave the

parties less than a week to submit written purchase agreements, but he testified at the hearing

that he was not told about the submission deadline. Id. at II-520.

Finally, the panel was in a unique position to see the witnesses and to make credibility

determinations based upon a variety of factors that one cannot glean from a transcript. Based on

how Dunno presented as a witness, including his contradictory testimony, the panel concluded

that Dunno did not dictate his affidavit. Those factors demonstrate that Mr. Dunno did not

narrate this affidavit to respondent. It is clear that respondent wrote the affidavit based upon the

language used, how Mr. Dunno’s presented as a witness, how his testimony contradicted his

affidavit, and common sense. Yet, respondent submitted this affidavit during the disciplinary

hearing as if it was based upon Mr. Dunno’s personal knowledge.


In her seventh objection, respondent objects to the characterization that she trespassed on

estate property.

Presumably, respondent is objecting to the findings in paragraph 44 of the board report,

which found that respondent “deliberately violated the probate court orders by interfering in the

administrator’s ability to secure the property.” Bd. Report ¶ 44. On December 23, 2015, the

judge adopted the magistrate’s decision and removed respondent as the fiduciary of the estate,

finding that the “ongoing conflict among the heirs is apparent from the file and surely delays the

proper administration of the estate.” Ex. 1 at REL441 – 448. On January 8, 2016, attorney

Thomas Taneff was appointed as Successor Ancillary Administrator. Id. at REL449.

Upon his appointment, attorney Taneff contacted a realtor to secure and winterize the

property. He instructed the realtor to place a padlock on the property and contact an appraiser to

of 27

appraise the property. When the appraiser visited the property, respondent was there and had

entered the home. Because respondent had been removed as Ancillary Administrator, she had no

authority to enter the property. Later, attorney Taneff then contacted the realtor and asked him to

check on the property. The realtor indicated that, while his padlock remained, an additional

padlock had been added to the door. Respondent had added the padlock, and she had failed to

provide a key to attorney Taneff. Ex. 2: REL153 and REL1455 – 1457.

Thus, the record shows that instead of simply calling the new administrator to gain access

to the home, respondent forced her way into the home in January 2016. She forcibly entered the

home by removing the locks that the new administrator had installed, then removed property,

arranged for attorney Taneff’s appraiser to enter, installed new locks, and failed to provide the

keys to the administrator. Id. All of this interfered with the administration by preventing the

lawful administrator from entering the home, which required additional time and money to

remedy. By engaging in this misconduct, respondent far exceeded her authority as an heir and

prejudiced the ancillary administration.


In her eighth objection, respondent objects to the board’s finding that she misrepresented

her authority prior to becoming the ancillary administrator.

Relator is perplexed by respondent’s contention that the board report failed to specify

when and to whom she misrepresented her authority. In paragraph 39, the board specifically

found that “before Respondent was appointed as administrator and, without legal authority, she

notified the realtor…that she was appointed the ancillary administrator and threatened the realtor

by misrepresenting her authority.” The board then cited specific statements in specific emails.

Id. at ¶¶ 39 – 40.

of 27

The first hearing in the underlying matter occurred on September 25, 2014 hearing,

during which the following occurred:

a. The magistrate stated that she could not rule on respondent’s application to become Ancillary Administrator until respondent provided authenticated documents from the underlying estate in Alabama. Ex. 7, timestamp 6:07 – 6:30

b. The magistrate stated that she would continue the matter, and she instructed

respondent to file the documents from Alabama, advising her that the appointment paper work could be processed at that time. Id. at timestamp 7:55 – 8:21.

c. Respondent indicated that she did not have any questions and did not object at

any point during the hearing. Id. at timestamp 10:00 – 10:07; Ex. 1 REL074 – 075.

Consistent with what had occurred during the hearing, Magistrate Green issued an order, which

stated “[Respondent] shall file an amended application for appointment of ancillary

administrator. Upon the presentation of the appropriate filings, and bond in the minimum amount

of $40,000, [respondent] shall be appointed ancillary administrator.” Id.; Bd. Report ¶ 10 – 12,

& 38.

No one moved to set aside Magistrate Green’s order. Joint Exhibit 1. Before hiring

Attorney Michael to file for an Ancillary Administration, respondent’s sister, Callie Lipka,

contracted with a realtor to sell the property. On October 16, 2014, respondent emailed the

realtor a copy of the Magistrate’s Order. In her accompanying email, she falsely stated the

following:

a. That the Magistrate’s Order appointed respondent the Ancillary Administrator.

b. The “loser attorney [Lipka] hired failed to order the file from Alabama.” Bd. Report ¶ 39. Joint Ex. 4.

On October 23, 2014, just before 1:00 a.m., respondent emailed the realtor, withdrawing

the listing and indicating that she had removed the realtor’s sign. Bd. Report ¶ 40; Joint Ex. 5.

of 27

Attached to the email was a letter regarding “Demand to Remove Illegal Listing and Demand for

Documents and Records” that was also directed to the realtor who had listed the property.

Respondent’s letter included, but was not limited to, the following statements:

a. That Magistrate Green held a hearing and appointed respondent as the administrator;

b. That Magistrate Green confirmed the appointment with her subsequent written order;

c. That respondent provided a copy of that order to the realtor; d. That Lipka had no authority to list or sell the property “even apart from the

illegality of her fraudulent appointment in Alabama.” e. “You also know that [Lipka’s] appointment in Alabama was illegal.” f. That the realtor immediately remove the listing and provide all

communications between the realtor and Myron and Lipka. g. “If you continue to be unresponsive to these legal concerns, or continue to

have fantasies that you can continue an illegal listing, then we will be forced to proceed by subpoena, deposition, and other compulsory process.” Bd. Report ¶ 40; Joint Ex. 6.

Respondent misrepresented both what occurred during the September 25, 2014 hearing

and the content of the magistrate’s order. Per the magistrate’s statements during the hearing and

the subsequent order, respondent would only become the Ancillary Administrator when she filed

an amended application and posted the ordered bond, which she had not done as of October 23,

2014 when she emailed the realtor. In fact, she did not do so until she filed her amended

application.

Finally, on November 28, 2014, respondent filed her amended Application to Administer

the Estate along with evidence that she had secured the appropriate bond, thus effectively

complying with the magistrate’s order. Bd. Report ¶ 13; Ex. 1: REL100 – 128. The same day,

the court issued an entry appointing respondent as Ancillary Administrator. The same document

acted as Letters of Authority for respondent to act as the fiduciary. In its entry, the court stated

that “Fiduciary Appointed Solely to address Real Estate located in Franklin County, Ohio.” Bd.

of 27

Report ¶ 13; Ex. 1 at REL129. Respondent was not the Administrator before November 28,

2014 and had no authority to act as such.


In her ninth objection, respondent objects to the board’s finding that Patrick Lavender

testified credibly, while respondent did not.

Patrick Lavender’s testimony was found to be credible by the panel, while respondent’s

was not. Bd. Report ¶ 41. The panel observed witnesses firsthand and “thus possesses an

enviable vantage point in assessing the credibility and weight of their testimony. For this reason,

[this court] ordinarily defer[s] to a panel's credibility determinations…unless the record weighs

heavily against those findings. Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Statzer, 101 Ohio St.3d 14, 2003-Ohio-

6649, 800 N.E.2d 1117, ¶ 8. Here, there is no evidence to support R’s contention that

Lavender’s testimony was “obviously coerced and perjured.” As such, her claim should be

rejected. She offers no support for that allegation, and she failed to offer any support for it

during the disciplinary hearing. Bd. Report ¶ 43.

Additionally, Lavender’s testimony was consistent and logical for a police officer.

During the sanctions hearing on October 27, 2017 before the probate court, respondent falsely

testified that Lavender assisted her in entering the home by using a crowbar and that they then

entered the home together. Ex. 2 REL1455 – 1457. She maintained the same position during her

disciplinary hearing. Bd. Report ¶ 43. However, Lavender contradicted respondent’s testimony,

both in his own testimony before the panel and in an affidavit, which was submitted to the

probate court. Id. at ¶¶ 41 & 42; Ex. 2 at REL1198. He testified that as a police officer, he

would not help anyone enter a home unless they had authority to be there. Hearing Tr. I-157 – I-

204. He then testified that he knew something was wrong when there were locks from another

of 27

party on the home and that respondent had indicated that another attorney might have installed

them. Id. He testified that he left after receiving that information. Id. He expressly denied

helping remove any locks with a crowbar, and he denied entering the home or helping

respondent enter the home. Id. His testimony at the disciplinary hearing was consistent with the

affidavit he provided to the probate court. There is nothing in the record supporting respondent’s

objection; thus, the panel’s credibility determination warrants deference.

Answer to Objection No.’s 10 and 11:

In her tenth and eleventh objections, respondent objects to the finding that unaddressed

mental or physical issues may be impairing her ability to practice law.

Because respondent has consistently failed to provide citations, relator is left to presume

to which paragraph she is objecting. As such, relator presumes that respondent’s objections 10

and 11 are centered on the board’s recommended conditions for reinstatement. The board clearly

determined that respondent has unaddressed mental or physical issues; therefore, the board has

recommended that respondent’s reinstatement be conditioned upon respondent submitting to an

OLAP evaluation, complying with any recommendations resulting from the evaluation, and

providing an opinion from a qualified health care professional that she is able to resume the

competent, ethical, and professional practice of law. Relator urges this court to adopt these

recommendations in order to protect the public. Respondent’s conduct in the underlying matter,

which continues into these very objections, and her concerning behavior during the hearing,

including her utter lack of preparation and disregard for the disciplinary process, warrant these

requirements.

of 27


In her twelfth objection, respondent objects to the board’s finding that she had a selfish or

dishonest motive.

Respondent had a dishonest and selfish motive for her misconduct. Much of the

underlying probate matter involved a personal conflict with the other heirs over a variety of

issues. Respondent used the underlying probate matter selfishly as a way to fight with her

siblings. She further exhibited a dishonest motive by testifying falsely concerning Lavender’s

alleged assistance helping her enter the home. Respondent knew that she had been removed and

had no authority to enter the home; consequently, she lied about the involvement of a police

officer to make her actions seem proper. Lastly, in a bid to bolster her position against her

siblings and the administrator, respondent submitted false evidence in the form of Dunno’s false

affidavit, which she also submitted in the instant case. Thus, the board properly found a selfish

or dishonest motive as an aggravating factor.


In her thirteenth objection, respondent objects to the boards finding that she impugned the

integrity of the probate court.

Respondent’s pervasive misconduct is cogently outlined in the board report. Bd. Report

¶¶ 18 – 37. As the board found, respondent failed to provide anything approaching a reasonable

factual basis for her statements. Id. at ¶¶ 35 & 36. In fact, throughout the disciplinary

proceedings, respondent’s position has been that the court record will support her statements.

Prehearing Tr. 22 – 23; Hearing Tr. II-568 – II-569, II-581 – II-582, II-596 – II-599, and II-619.

The Panel Chair asked respondent, “you believe…you stated things accurately based on the

record, and if we review the record, we could only conclude that way?” And respondent

of 27

answered, “Yes. Yes.” Id. However, as shown above and in the following responses, the

underlying record is devoid of any support for respondent’s extreme and outlandish statements,

and relator asks this court to overrule her objection.

Answer to Objection No. 14: In her fourteenth objection, respondent objects to the board’s finding that she engaged in

multiple incidents of misconduct. This objection is predicated solely on her incorrect belief that

she has not engaged in any misconduct. In fact, for years she has repeatedly impugned the

integrity of judicial officers without any reasonable factual basis; she has engaged in dishonest

conduct by misrepresenting her authority, testifying falsely and submitting false evidence; and

she has severely prejudiced the administration of justice as found by the board. This flawed

objection merely highlights respondent’s complete lack of insight into her own conduct and her

total inability to acknowledge the wrongfulness of her actions.

Answer to Objection No. 15: In her fifteenth objection, respondent objects to the board’s finding that she failed to

cooperate with the disciplinary process.

The board report details respondent’s utter failure either to competently and diligently

handle this matter or to respect the board’s orders and the panel’s time. Respondent’s ill-

preparedness for her own disciplinary hearing presented incredible challenges for relator and the

panel. As the board found, respondent missed or was late to multiple prehearing calls, was an

hour late to her disciplinary hearing on the first day and 90 minutes late on the second day, failed

to prepare and mark exhibits, and failed to file a post-hearing brief pursuant to the panel chair’s

order. Her actions and lack of preparation can only be interpreted as contempt for the

disciplinary process, lack of cooperation, and incompetence.

of 27


In her sixteenth objection, respondent objects to the board’s finding of a single mitigating

factor.

Lack of prior discipline is the only mitigating factor in this case. In contrast, there are

multiple aggravating factors. As discussed in relator’s answer to objection 12, respondent acted

with a dishonest and selfish motive. Further, she offered no real evidence of good character and

reputation. While she did seek to file affidavits, she did so over two weeks after her disciplinary

hearing and the closing of the evidentiary record. And as stated in relator’s June 25, 2019

objections, the character letters respondent filed are from 2016. There is no indication that the

authors of the letters knew that their affidavits were being offered in this matter, and there is no

indication that they even knew this proceeding existed.

Additionally, while the court sanctioned respondent nearly $23,000, there is no evidence

that she has paid any of that amount.

Finally, relator forwarded respondent’s response to the Notice of Intent to File Formal

Complaint to the board, as required by Gov.Bar R. V(10)(F). On Friday, June 22, 2018 at 5:46

p.m., respondent submitted a response addressed to relator rather than the board. Relator then

emailed respondent to confirm that she wanted that response submitted to the board, and after

receiving confirmation, relator forwarded the response as required by the rule. Although

respondent claims she has an email to support her allegation that relator failed to forward her

response, she has failed to provide this email to either relator or the panel. As such, relator

submits that respondent’s allegation is as empty as those she made in the underlying probate

matter.

of 27

Answer to Objection No. 17: In her seventeenth objection, respondent objects to the board’s finding that she was late

for prehearing conferences.

Relator is particularly disturbed by this objection as it is completely untethered from

reality. Without citing to any transcript or order, respondent states that during the in-person

prehearing on February 4, 2019, the panel chair indicated that the next hearing would be in

Columbus in the morning. She then alleges that she paid a driver and rented hotel rooms for the

two of them to appear for this “hearing.” However, she alleges that when she appeared in court,

she was informed that there was no hearing scheduled and that she subsequently learned that the

hearing had been cancelled and converted into a phone conference without notice to her. This

story has no basis in fact.

The transcript from the in-person prehearing conference reflects that during that hearing,

the panel chair discussed a date for a telephone conference to which respondent stated “I know

that that would be all right for a phone conference.” Prehr. Tr. 45 (emphasis added). Then, at

the end of the prehearing, the parties discussed dates for the formal hearing. Id. at 52. Everyone

agreed on the last two weeks in May, and the panel chair indicated that she would follow up with

her fellow panel members regarding specific dates. Id. Finally, the panel chair reiterated that

there would be a telephone conference on March 15th at 3:00 p.m. Id. No one ever discussed a

further in-person prehearing. Following the prehearing, the panel chair issued an order on

February 5, 2019 scheduling a telephone conference on March 15, 2019 at 3:00 p.m. and

provided call-in information.

What respondent describes in this objection simply never happened. Additionally,

respondent has never before mentioned this alleged trip to Columbus. She has never mentioned

of 27

it to relator, she did not raise it any subsequent telephone conference, and she did not mention it

during her disciplinary hearing or in any of her filings. If the record in this case and the

underlying probate matter make anything clear, it is that respondent will not hesitate to mention

any perceived slight against her, whether real or imagined. She never mentioned this event

before because it never occurred. It is fiction. This objection is further evidence of respondent’s

dishonesty and unaddressed mental health problems, and it supports the board’s recommendation

of an indefinite suspension.

Answer to Objection No. 18: In her eighteenth objection, respondent objects to the board’s finding regarding how the

clerk handled a filing in the probate matter.

Respondent deposited funds with the clerk in Franklin County Probate case number

567794. The Answer respondent is referring to was filed in case number 567794 A. While the

two cases are related in that they both deal with the sale of her mother’s home, they are two

different case numbers. Respondent did not have any money deposited with the clerk in the “A”

case number; thus, her Answer was originally rejected for failing to pay the filing fee. The court

explained this to respondent multiple times. Bd. Report ¶ 25; Ex. 2 at 101 – 107.

Answer to Objection No. 19: In her nineteenth objection, respondent objects to the board’s finding regarding her

lateness to a probate court hearing.

The board found that respondent was 45 minutes late for the November 9, 2016 hearing.

Bd. Report ¶ 26. Respondent does not deny she was late, but claims that she notified a scheduler

of her late arrival. Regardless of whether respondent called the scheduler, she was still late to

of 27

the hearing, which was what the board found. This is another example of respondent’s failure to

accept responsibility for her conduct.


In her twentieth objection, respondent objects to the board’s finding that Paul Hartman

disrupted a probate court hearing.

After arriving 45 minutes late for the November 9, 2016 hearing, respondent’s

investigator, Hartman, blurted out “Who’s this asshole?,” disrupting the proceeding and

requiring an admonishment from the magistrate. Id.; Ex. 1 REL434 – 436. Although respondent

claims that Hartman’s statement was directed to Taneff, and not the witness, there is nothing in

the record to support her explanation, and she again fails to provide any citation. Hartman was

there as respondent’s assistant and investigator; consequently, she was responsible for his

behavior.

Answer to Objection No. 21: In her twenty-first objection, respondent objects to the board’s finding that she was

unprepared for the disciplinary hearing.

Respondent was wholly unprepared for her own disciplinary hearing. As the board

found, “Respondent appeared late for both disciplinary hearing dates and was ill prepared.

Respondent presented as rambling, argumentative, and unable to answer questions without

turning the focus on how she had been victimized by the probate court and the disciplinary

process. Bd. Report ¶ 68, citing Hearing Tr. II-318 – II-342. Throughout the disciplinary matter,

respondent’s defense has been that the record in the probate matters support her allegations

against the magistrate, the judge, and the court. Because the probate court record does not

support her allegations, and in fact contains many of her violations and improper statements,

of 27

relator submitted the court record as exhibits. The exhibits were organized chronologically, as

any court record is, and the relevant dockets were exhibits as well, which acted as a table of

contents for those exhibits. Moreover, the exhibits were Bates stamped, allowing relator to

easily locate exhibits as needed.

Because relator had no confidence that respondent would prepare her case, relator

allowed respondent to utilize relator’s exhibits during the hearing. To try and facilitate the

orderly presentation of evidence and out of respect for the panel members’ time, relator even

offered to display exhibits; however, relator asked that respondent provide the page numbers she

wished to use. She failed to do so. Hearing Tr. I-238 – I-239. Additionally, the underlying

cases were respondent’s cases, and many of the filings were made by her. She should have

known the record after living the case for years. Even so, relator stated during the February 4,

2019 prehearing that the court record would be submitted as exhibits. Prehr. Tr. at 20. Relator

provided the exhibits to respondent in March 2019, over two months before the disciplinary

hearing. Further, as respondent states in her objection, she filed a list of her exhibits six months

before the hearing. Yet she failed to produce virtually any of them during the hearing, and she

failed to produce a single page number from relator’s exhibits, despite having months to do so.

Respondent was only hampered by her choice not to prepare.

Answer to Objection No. 22: In her twenty-second objection, respondent objects to the board’s finding that she failed

to prepare exhibits.

Relator strenuously objects to respondent impugning the integrity of the panel and the

board by characterizing their findings as “deliberate misrepresentations.” Respondent came to

the hearing with nothing prepared. As stated, she had access to relator’s exhibits well in advance

of 27

of the hearing. Further, she was a party to the underlying probate case. She was not only

familiar with the record, she created much of it. Respondent had every opportunity to prepare

her exhibits. For her to now say that the board’s findings are dishonest is deeply troubling and

utterly inaccurate.

Answer to Objection No. 23: In her twenty-third objection, respondent objects “to the false contention that the parties

were ordered to file a post-hearing brief.” This objection should be overruled as the panel chair

expressly ordered the parties to file post-hearing briefs. On May 31, 2019, the panel chair issued

a written order, which stated “On or before June 28, 2019, the parties shall file post-hearing

briefs. The…briefs…shall succinctly address the facts…violations…aggravating and mitigating

factors…sanction…and case law in support.” The order was clear; respondent’s objection lacks

merit.

Answer to Respondent’s Objections to Board’s Conclusions of Law

Answer to Objection No. 1: In her first objection, respondent objects that the board failed to apply a de novo standard.

However, there is no indication that the Board failed to review the record or apply the correct

standard. Respondent has failed to cite anything indicating the board failed in this regard; thus,

relator and this court are left to guess about what she is referring to. As such, relator presumes

respondent is referring to a discussion with a panel member that the board is not a reviewing

court. Hearing. Tr. II-567 – II-571. He accurately explained to her that the board does not have

the power to review or overturn any decisions by the probate court or the Tenth District Court of

Appeals. Finally, respondent has failed to cite any evidence that refutes any court’s findings.

of 27

Answer to Objection No. 2: In her second objection, respondent objects to the board’s characterization that she

trespassed on estate property.

After being removed as administrator, respondent used a crowbar to remove locks placed

by the new administrator. Bd. Report ¶¶ 41 – 43; Ex. 2 REL1455 – 1457. She then entered the

home, removed property, and arranged or an inspection and appraisal, all without legal authority.

Finally, respondent placed new locks on the home and failed to contact the new administrator

and provide him with keys, locking him out of the property. The Board found that this interfered

with the administration of the property. Bd. Report ¶ 44. The board’s finding is correct and

amply supported by the record.

Answer to Objection No.’s 3, 4, and 5: In her final three objections, respondent objects to the recommended sanction.

Relator respectfully submits that respondent’s conduct before the probate court, the

board, and now this court warrants an indefinite suspension from the practice of law. As the

board found, the instant case most closely resembles Disciplinary Counsel v. Pullins, 127 Ohio

St.3d 436, 2010-Ohio-6241, 909 N.E.2d 1271. Like the lawyer in Pullins, respondent has

engaged in multiple offenses spanning years, including repeatedly impugning the integrity of

three judicial officers. Respondent has also engaged in multiple acts of dishonesty throughout

both the probate matters and the instant case. Further, respondent’s case shares many of the

same aggravating factors as Pullins, but less mitigation. Finally, it appears that respondent’s

misconduct may be the result of unaddressed mental health or other physical issues.

Like in Pullins, respondent’s misconduct has spanned years and has included multiple

instances of improperly impugning the integrity of judicial officers. Pullins at ¶ 85. Starting in

of 27

the summer of 2015, respondent began accusing Magistrate Green of corruption, laziness, and

dishonesty. Bd. Report ¶ 21. Then when Judge Montgomery ruled against her, respondent

continued her attacks, accusing him of corruptly appointing someone who worked on his

campaign. Id. at ¶¶ 23 & 29. Respondent even continued her misconduct during her disciplinary

hearing. When the panel asked respondent if she understood the meaning of the sanction order

issued by Judge Spicer, respondent replied “That means the judge lied.” Hearing Tr. 254:2 – 6.

Now, in 2020, five years later, respondent is levying her baseless attacks against the

Board of Professional Conduct. Throughout her objections, she impugns the integrity of the

panel members and the board, by accusing them of distorting the record, hiding and concealing

evidence, having a predetermined conclusion in this case, and engaging in deliberate

misrepresentations. Her unfounded attacks include:

• “Hoping to avoid scrutiny of its distorted Recommendation, [the panel] withholds from

the Court the substantial evidence (documents and testimony) that directly contradicts its

predetermined conclusion and agenda.” Resp. Obj. at iii;

• “By withholding critical evidence, the Recommendation’s one-sided and misleading

presentation works an injustice to the Court.” Resp. Obj. at viii;

• “These substantial omissions from the Recommendation operate to conceal the true

context of the actions of Respondent…” Resp. Obj. at ix;

• “The Recommendation conceals the fact…” Resp. Obj. at x;

• “The Court’s review should include scrutiny of the portions of the record that Relator

chose to ignore and conceal. The Brief demonstrates that the nature of the excluded

(hidden) evidence further refutes the allegations and demonstrates that Relator’s

Recommendation is one-sided, rendering it not only an unconstitutional denial of

of 27

fundamental fairness to Attorney Cramer, but also a disservice to this Honorable Court,

to the profession, and to the public…” Resp. Obj. at x;

• “Whether intentional or unintentional, the Recommendation misleads the Court when it

mischaracterizes and distorts the fraction of the evidence it offers.” Resp. Obj. at 1; and,

• “Respondent objects to what is more disconcerting, however; that is the Board’s

deliberate misrepresentations concerning Respondent’s preparation of her exhibits.”

Resp. Obj. at 16.

Respondent will simply not be dissuaded or deterred. An indefinite suspension is necessary to

protect the public.

The aggravating factors substantially outweigh the migration in this case. The board

found five aggravating factors: (1) dishonest and selfish motive; (2) multiple offenses; (3) refusal to

acknowledge the wrongful nature of her conduct; (4) submitting false evidence, false statements, or

deceptive practices during the disciplinary process; and (5) lack of cooperation in the disciplinary

process. Respondent has only a single mitigating factor – no previous discipline. This contrasts

with the attorney in Pullins, who was found to have three mitigating factors. Pullins at ¶ 74.

Additionally, respondent’s lack of cooperation and her dishonesty were so severe, the board

believed they required elaboration. Bd. Report ¶ 55. Respondent not only failed to cooperate

throughout the formal disciplinary process, she appeared late and completely unprepared for her

own hearing. Respondent then knowingly submitted a false affidavit to the panel and this court.

Id. at ¶ 57.

Finally, not only has respondent failed to acknowledge her misconduct, she believes that

she was “brave and exemplary.” Hearing Tr. II-595:15 – 16. As in Pullins, respondent’s

misconduct may be the result of unaddressed mental-health issues. Pullins at ¶ 87. Thus, given

of 27

the similarities between to Pullins and the instant matter, relator respectfully requests that this

court indefinitely suspend respondent from the practice of law.

Conclusion

Relator respectfully requests that this court adopt the board’s findings of fact and

conclusions of law, and indefinitely suspend respondent from the practice of law with any

reinstatement conditioned upon respondent (1) submitting to an evaluation by the Ohio Lawyers'

Assistance Program and complying with any recommendations resulting from that evaluation;

(2) providing an opinion from a qualified health care professional that she is able to resume the

competent, ethical, and professional practice of law; and (3) providing proof that she has paid the

fees and costs assessed by the probate court in its December 19, 2017 order.

Respectfully submitted,

/s Joseph M. Caligiuri Joseph M. Caligiuri (0074786) Disciplinary Counsel Relator

/s Donald M. Scheetz Donald M. Scheetz (0082422) Chief Assistant Disciplinary Counsel Counsel for Relator

of 27

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Relator’s Answer to

Respondent’s Objections was served on Marilyn Cramer, by electronic mail at

[email protected] on this 4th day of Month 2020.

/s Donald M. Scheetz Donald M. Scheetz (0082422) Counsel for Relator