REPORTABLE

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA

(TRANSKEI PROVINCIAL DIVISION)

CASE NO: 62/05In the matter between:

THE STATE

vsNTSIKANE Z. MTSHABEDate Heard: 18 April 2006 – 21 April 2006 & 12 May 2006 Date Delivered: 26 July 2006Summary: Fraud – misappropriation – applicable principles – accused’s version – test to be applied_________________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT

_________________________________________________________________

CHETTY, J:

[1] The accused is an attorney, who practiced and continues practicing

under the name and style of N.Z Mtshabe Incorporated attorneys at

Mthatha and Engcobo. He is its sole director. He was admitted as an

attorney during 1995 and commenced practicing for his own account

on the 11th January 1996. The charge preferred against him is one of

fraud in contravention of s 167 of the Transkeian Penal Code 1983

alternatively theft in contravention of s 132 of the Code. The gravamen

the charge relates to the submission of 15 statements of account to

the office of the Mthatha State attorney totaling some R458 406. 75.

 

This amount was paid to the accused’s firm over a period of time by

the registrar of the High Court, Mthatha in the form of warrant

vouchers which were duly deposited in the firm’s banking account.

These statements of account were received in evidence as exhibits F1

– F15. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and declined to

proffer a plea explanation. Written admissions in terms of s 220 of the

Criminal Procedure Act were however handed in as Exhibit A which

encapsulates the accused’s defence. Its entire reproduction is

unavoidable as it embodies the edifice of his defence to the charge.

“1. That the accused was a practicing attorney and the sole director of 

the   private   company   namely   N   Z   MTSHABE 

INCORPORATED  with   Co.   No.   96/0016   during   the 

relevant times mentioned in the  indictment.

2. That various individuals as per Column 3 of Schedule 1 of  the  

indictment,   instituted   proceedings   against   the   Government  

Department as indictment in Column 4 of the said Schedule.

3. That   the   office   of   the   State   Attorney   instructed   the   accused’s  

Company to appear on behalf of the State and/or the various said  

Government Departments.

4. That   the   accused’s   Company   duly   accepted   these   mentioned 

instructions.

2

 

5. That the accused’s office submitted the 15 statements of account  

(as mentioned in Schedule 1 of the indictment) to representatives  

of the Government for payment during the time period o 3 March  

1998 and 10 June 1998.

6. That   the   information   as   depicted   in   Schedule   1   of   the   said  

indictment is a true reflection of the facts contained therein.

7. That   the State  Attorney,  Mthatha approved all   the payments  as  

reflected in the said Schedule.

8. That all the said Statements of Account were duly paid out to the  

accused’s   company  by   the  Registrar  Mthatha  between   the  10th 

March of  1998 and the 10th of July 1998.

9. That all warrant vouchers (as mentioned in Column 7, and for the  

total  amounts   as  mentioned   in  Column 8  of  Schedule  1)  were  

deposited into the bank accounts of the accused’s Company.

10. I further admit that the documentation handed in as Exhibits BJ  

are true copies of the original documentation.” 

[2] It will be gleaned from the aforegoing and the uncontroverted

evidence to which I will in due course allude to that there is no dispute

3

 

that:-

2.1) The accused received instructions from attorney Mnyamana of

the Mthatha State attorneys office. Those instructions were to

act for the defendants, the Minister of Defence and Police in 6

separate actions instituted against the latter by the individual

plaintiff’s to wit N.A Patakubi; Luvuyo Makaza; Sakele

Matomane; Vuyisile Tyiso; Gcobani Maqubela and J. Mbali

issued out of the Mthatha High Court for unlawful arrest and

detention. It is common cause that the cause of action in each

of the 6 matters was identical and related to an incident

which occurred on 25 February 1995 when the plaintiffs were

arrested and detained. As adverted to earlier, fifteen

statements of account were submitted, the first seven dated 3

March 1998 (F1 and F2); 6 April 1998 (F6 and F7); 14 April

1998 (F5) and 20 April 1998 (F3 and F4) respectively. They

are identical in all respects, commence on a letterhead of the

accused’s firm, designating the accused as the author and

concluding with the firm’s name and a signature.

2.2) These statements of account form the genesis of the State’s

case and may conveniently be compartmentalized into 3

distinct categories, viz the preliminary stage (F1 – F7), the

engagement of counsel stage (F 8, 9, 12, 13, 14 and 15) and

4

 

the obtaining of advice on evidence stage (F 10 and 11). F 1 –

F 7 deal with the period 6 February 1998 when the accused

was engaged to represent the defendants and culminated on

the 3 March 1998 when, according to each of the statements,

the work performed is detailed on each statement of account

as - “attending to draw the statement, attending to serve the

same to client”. Each commences with a reference to 6

February 1998 and concludes with the date reference 3 March

1998. Save for the amounts which differ in some instances F 1

– F 7 are virtually identical. Each is addressed to the

government attorney, Botha Sigcau building, Umtata and

bears the reference “Mtshabe/1n”. Its reproduction is

unavoidable. The Patakubi statement (F1) as an example

reads as follows:-

“The Government Attorney

Botha Sigcau BuildingUMTATA

Attention MR MYAMANA / TSHIKI

Dear SirRe: MINISTER OF DEFENCE AND POLICE VS N.A PATAKUBI 

STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT

5

 

Dr VAT06/02/98 Received instructions to defend 

the matter; consulted with the client correspondent; perusal of

the letter of instructions  2858.95

09/02/98 Attending to write letter to client;

attending to serve same, telephoned Police to inform of the transfer of File; telephoned Defence force in Pretoria 750.00

10/02/98 Letter to Police Force for the transfer of files, Drawn Notice of 

Withdrawal, drawn the Notice of 

Acting, attending to serve same to Plaintiff and to Court 1500.00

13/02/98 Drawn letter to Adv Pakade, attending 

to serve the same, copies thereof 350.00

16/02/98 Consultation with Police (Nocala) on

various issues, telephoned her for nextconsultation 3 750.95

16/02/98 Drawn Discovery Notices, attending to serve the same to Court and to Plaintiff 350.00;

Perusal of various documents which weresummons 

Notice to Defend, Rule 26, Defendant’s 

Plea and Correspondence between client

 and Plaintiff, Attending on various

6

 

 telephone calls, making copies of statements and letters, perusal of statutes referred to in Plea     4 850.00

03/03/98 Attending to draw the statement, attending

to serve the same to client   350.00

Sundry and Disbursements  2 650.00

Sub Total 17 409.90Add VAT  2 437.39Stamps         2. 45

Total due to us  19 849.94”

 

        

[3] The only difference between F1 – F7 relate to the amounts claimed.

In F1 and F2 the amount claimed is the same. Similarly in F3 and F7.

The difference in the amounts claimed is readily apparent from a

comparison of F1 – F4. In F3 and F4 the amount claimed for work

performed on 9 February 1998 is increased by R100.00; on 16

February 1998 by R1000.00 and sundry and disbursements by

R1000.00. F5 differs from F1 and F2 in one respect only - the amount

claimed in respect of “sundry and disbursements” is increased by

R1000.00 with the resultant increase in the VAT charged. The only

difference between F6 and F3 and F4 is that the amount claimed for

“stamps” is increased by R1.00.

7

 

[4] The next category of statements of account and to which I referred

to as the engagement of counsel stage are exhibits F 8, 9, 12, 13, 14

and 15. The immediately obvious distinguishing feature between this

and the following category of statements from F1 – F7 is the complete

absence of any date when the stipulated work was performed. I shall in

due course allude to this. F8, 12 and 14 are cast in identical terms and

so too F 9, 13 and 15. The only distinguishing and anomalous feature

between F 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, and 15 is that in F8, 12 and 14 there is an

additional claim in respect of “counsel’s fees” and “our two thirds” of

counsel’s fees. They are identical in all other respects. To illustrate this

similarity the reproduction of one of the statements is again

unavoidable. The statement in respect of S Matomane (F8) is as

follows:-

“Government attorneys

Botha Sigcau Building

UMTATA

Dear Sir Att: Mr MnyamanaRe: S MATOMANE VS MINISTER OF DEFENCE AND ANOTHER

____________________________________________________________

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STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT: ATTORNEY & OWN CLIENT SCALE

____________________________________________________________

DRAttending to consultation with correspondent 

To brief counsel; brief Counsel to prepare advise

On evidence; letter to counsel 2500.00

Preparing Rule 35; Rule 37 Notices; letters toPlaintiff’s attorneys; attending to serve to court andplaintiff’s attorneys. 950.00

Attending to receive Rule 35 Notices from plaintiff;

 perusal; receiving letter from plaintiff for

Extension of time; answering client thereof 1050.00

Attending to consultation; preparation and Discussion with adv Pakade; two days in Durbanbefore Adv Alkena, SC 2500.00

Attending to consultation with Adv Alkena SC in

Durban; preparations; drawing files (2/3 of Counsel’s

Fees); one day 2900.00

Preparation and perusal of statement of

 Lwana; Bezuidenhout; Steenkamp; Mdunge; 

Mthengo; Grobelaar and nine others; referring to Affidavit prepared by Brig Mbebe together with 

Annexures thereto 5750.00

9

 

DISBURSEMENTS AND MISCELLANEOUS EXPENSES

Traveling from Umtata to East London Airport

For 3 hours at 247 km at R2.50 per km and back

To Umtata (494 x R2.50) 1235.00Airport traveling from East London to Durban and back 2468.00

Car hire at Avis in Durban for three days of ConsultationFrom 23/04/98 to 26/04/98 2197.68

Traveling time; Umtata/ East London/ Durban (10 hours at R4.00 per hour) 4000.00

Meals and Hotel accommodation for three days 2622.00

Sundry and Miscellaneous; drawing this Statement; 

telephone calls; serving the statement 850.00

SUB TOTAL 29 022.68ADD VAT    4063.18

COUNSELS FEES (ADV PAKADE)

18949.60

COUNSELS FEES (ADV ALKEMA, SC)  1710.00

10

 

20659.60Add counsel’s fees 20659.60Our two thirds thereof 13773.07

Total due including Counsel’s fees R67518.53”

 [5] The last category of statements viz the advice on evidence stage, exhibits F 10 and 11 

are identical in all respects. F10 reads as follows:

“The Government Attorney

Botha Sigcau building

UMTATAAtt: Mr MnyamanaDear SirRe: JONGILIZWE MBALI VS MINSTER OF DEFENCE AND 

ANOTHER______________________________________________________________

STATEMENT OF ACOUNT

______________________________________________________________

DR VAT

DIS

Attending to advise on evidence  500.00

Counsel’s fees   2000.00

2/3 Counsel’s fees 1333.33 256.67

TOTAL 1833.33

11

 

ADD VAT  256.67ADD COUNSEL’S FEES 2000.00

TOTAL DUE TO US 4090.00

”

[6] I have set out these statements in great detail by reason of the

pivotal role they play in relation to the evidence adduced by the

various witnesses who testified on behalf of the State. As adumbrated

hereinbefore the gravamen of the charge is that by submitting the

statements of account the accused misrepresented that he performed

the services as stipulated in the statements of account and/or; he was

entitled to claim the amount stipulated in each statement of

account and/or; he was entitled to receive the amounts

stipulated in each statement of account and/or; he performed proper

and reasonable professional services which entitled him to claim the

amounts specified in each statement of account and/or; that all

claims submitted were for professional services rendered; that no

claim or parts thereof were duplicated and/or; that he did not claim

more than once for the same service rendered; that he had duly

performed the work done as reflected on the statements of account,

had incurred expenses and paid disbursements whereas in truth the

accounts were not only hugely inflated, excessive and exorbitant, but

not based on the tariff of fees laid down in Rule 70 of the Uniform

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Rules of Court and moreover duplicated. Details of the accused

defence, initially suppressed, emerged during the trial and compel an

examination and analysis of the evidence of the accused, the State

witnesses, Hechter, Pretorius etcetera apropos exhibits F1 – F15.

Before I proceed to consider and evaluate that evidence it is apposite

to refer to the dictum of Nugent J in S v Van Der Meyden 1999 (1) SA

447 (W) where the learned judge, whilst emphasizing that a trial court

is required to consider the evidence adduced holistically, elaborated on

the criminal standard of proof as follows at p488f-450b:

“The onus of proof in a criminal matter is discharged by the State if the  

evidence establishes the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The  

corollary is that he is entitled to be acquitted if it is reasonably possible that  

he might be innocent (see, for example, R v Difford 1937 AD 370 at 373  

and 383). These are not separate and independent tests, but the expression  

of   the   same   test   when   viewed   from   opposite   perspectives.   In   order   to  

convict,   the   evidence  must   establish   the  guilt   of   the  accused  beyond  a  

reasonable doubt,  which will  be so only  if   there is  at   the same time no  

reasonable  possibility   that  an  innocent  explanation  which has  been put  

forward might  be  true.  The  two are   inseparable,  each being  the  logical  

corollary of the other.

In   whichever   form   the   test   is   expressed,   it   must   be   satisfied   upon   a  

13

 

consideration of all   the evidence.  A court does not  look at  the evidence  

implicating the accused in isolation in order to determine whether there is  

proof   beyond   reasonable   doubt,   and   so   too   it   does   not   look   at   the  

exculpatory   evidence   in   isolation   in   order   to   determine   whether   it   is  

reasonably possible that it might be true. In R v Hlongwane 1959 (3) SA  

337 (A), after pointing out that an accused must be acquitted if an alibi  

might reasonably be true Holmes AJA said the following at 340H341B,  

which applies equally to any other defence which might present itself:

‘But it is important to bear in mind that in applying this test, the alibi 

does not have to be considered in isolation . . . . The correct approach is 

to consider the alibi in the light of the totality of the evidence in the 

case, and the Court’s impressions of the witnesses.’

Counsel for the accused referred us to three cases which are frequently cited in this  Court in elaboration upon that test. In S v Kubeka 1982 (1) SA 534 (W) Slomowitz AJ said the following at 537FH:

‘whether I subjectively disbelieve (the accused) is not the test. I need  

not even reject the State case in order to acquit him. I am bound to  

acquit him if there exists a reasonable possibility that his evidence  

may be true.’

That passage does no more, in effect, than to reiterate that the conclusion 

14

 

of   a   criminal   court   is   not   to   be   reached   merely   by   choosing   what   it  

considers  to be the better  of  two competing versions (Hlongwane’s case  

supra at 341A; S v Singh 1975 (1) SA 227 (N) ). Purely as a matter of logic,  

the prosecution evidence does not need to be rejected in order to conclude 

that there is a reasonable possibility that the accused might be innocent.  

But   what   is   required   in   order   to   reach   that   conclusion   is   at   least   the  

equivalent  possibility   that   the   incriminating evidence might  not  be   true.  

Evidence which incriminates the accused, and evidence which exculpates  

him, cannot both be true – there is not even a possibility that both might be  

true – the one is possibly true only if there is an equivalent possibility that  

the  other   is  untrue.  There will  be  cases  where  the  State  evidence   is   so  

convincing and conclusive as to exclude the reasonable possibility that the  

accused might be innocent, no matter that his evidence might suggest the  

contrary when viewed in isolation.

 S v Munyai 1986 (4) SA 712 (V) at 715G, to which we were also referred  

by   counsel,   should   accordingly,   in   my   view,   be   approached   with   some  

circumspection. At 715G Van der Spuy AJ interpreted the abovementioned  

passage from Kubeka’s case as follows:

 ‘in other words, even if the State case stood as a completely acceptable 

and unshaken edifice, a court must investigate the defence case with a 

view to discerning whether it   is demonstrably false or inherently so 

15

 

improbable as to be rejected as false.’

It is difficult to see how a defence can possibly be true if at the same time  

the State’s case with which it is irreconcilable is ‘completely acceptable and 

unshaken’.   The   passage   seems   to   suggest   that   the   evidence   is   to   be  

separated into compartments, and the ‘defence case’ examined in isolation,  

to determine whether it is so internally contradictory or improbable as to be  

beyond the realm of reasonable possibility,   failing which  the accused is  

entitled to be acquitted. If that is what was meant, it is not correct. A court  

does not base its conclusion, whether it be to convict or acquit, on only part  

of the evidence. The conclusion  which it arrives at must account for all the  

evidence.   Although   the   dictum   of   Van   der   Spuy   AJ   was   cited   without  

comment in S v Jaffer 1988 (2) SA 84 (C), it is apparent from the reasoning 

in that case that the Court did not weigh the ‘defence case’ in isolation. It  

was   only   by   accepting   that   the   prosecution   witness   might   have   been  

mistaken (see especially at 89J90B) that the Court was able to conclude  

that the accused’s evidence might be true.

I am not sure that elaboration upon a wellestablished test is necessarily helpful. On  

the contrary, it might at times contribute to confusion by diverting the focus of the test.  

The proper test is that an accused is bound to be convicted if the evidence establishes  

his   guilt   beyond   reasonable   doubt,   and   the   logical   corollary   is   that   he   must   be  

16

 

acquitted   if   it   is   reasonably   possible   that   he   might   be   innocent.   The   process   of  

reasoning which is appropriate to the application of that test in any particular case will  

depend on the nature of the evidence which the court has before it.  What must be  

borne in mind, however,   is   that   the conclusion which is  reached (whether  it  be  to  

convict or to acquit) must account for all the evidence. Some of the evidence might be  

found to be false; some of it might be found to be unreliable; and some of it might be  

found to be only possibly false or unreliable; but none of it may simply be ignored.”

[7] Hechter and Pretorius were members of the Special Investigating

Unit (the SIU) established by proclamation pursuant to the enabling

legislation the Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act 74

of 1996 (as amended) (the Act). In terms of its preamble the SIU was,

inter alia, established for the purpose of investigating serious

malpractices or maladministration in connection within the

administration of state institutions, state assets and public money.

During June 1998, Proclamation 71 of 1998 was gazetted. It authorized

the SIU to investigate payments made to various attorneys and

advocates in matters where they had been instructed by the State

attorney, Mthatha to act on its behalf. Hechter was the office manager

of the Umtata SIU and the task of investigating these payments fell to

him. The only other investigative person in the office was Pretorius and

in truth, the entire investigation was done by her. Hechter’s

17

 

involvement was peripheral and seems to have been limited to

receiving updated reports concerning the progress made by Pretorius

and, acting thereon. It was obvious during his testimony that the

passage of time has eroded his memory and that his recollection of

events is not altogether clear. What is important, however, is that

having been appraised by Pretorius of the results of her investigation,

he felt obliged to refer the results of the investigation to the office of

the director of public prosecutions. That decision evoked lengthy and

arduous cross-examination, much of it pointless. Hechter was at pains

to point out that in terms of s 4 (1) (d) of the Act he was obliged to

refer evidence which pointed to the commission of an offence to the

relevant prosecuting authority. The evidence adduced vindicates that

decision. The important aspect of Hechter’s testimony relates to Mr

Mnyamana who, it is common cause was charged with fraud in a

similar matter concerning another attorney. Mnyamana however died

during the course of that trial. It was put to Hechter during cross-

examination that no charges were preferred against Mnyamana in

relation to the present matter and the response sought to be elicited,

to the effect that no collusive fraudulent relationship existed between

the accused and Mnyamana. Although Hechter conceded that he could

not establish that the accused had colluded with Mnyamana that

concession accords neither with the facts nor the probabilities. It is an

aspect to which I will in due course expand upon.

18

 

  

[8] It is common cause that upon receipt of each statement of account

emanating from the accused’s firm Mnyamana approved payment of

the accounts. He did so by not only inscribing the words “Please pay

out” or “plse pay out” followed by his signature and a date at the end

of each of F 1 to F 15 (with the exclusion of exhibit F 5) but moreover

appended a certificate in terms of the relevant treasury regulations

thereto which read:-

“CERTIFICATE   IN   TERMS   OF   K   2.2.8   OF   THE   TREASURY 

INSTRUCTIONS

(a) Goods Suppliedthat the supplies were in fact required for official purposes 

and for an approved service, were on receipt correct  

and in good condition and that the receipt of the supplies  

had been entered in the records;

that the rates are in accordance with a contract or that they  

are fair and reasonable and that the supplier is entitled to  

payment.

(b) Services rendered

19

 

that   the   services   rendered   were   necessary   for   official  

purposes and were satisfactorily carried out, and that the  

charges were according to   the relative  tariff,  contract or  

agreement, or otherwise are fair and reasonable and that  

the supplier is entitled to payment.”   

[8] It is common cause that F5 was not signed by Mnyamana but by

the then acting head of the Mthatha State attorney’s office, Mr

Matiwane (Matiwane). Although Pretorius was reluctantly constrained

to concede that F 5 and F 7 could in all probability have been

innocently duplicated it is important to note that Mnyamana authorized

the payment of F 7 prior to Matiwane authorizing the payment of F5. It

in fact predates F 5 by exactly one week. I will deal with this in more

detail later in the judgment.

[9] Both Hechter, Pretorius and Mr Nick Du Preez (Du Preez), a legal

costs consultant adverted to the fact that the fees charged by the

accused were not in accordance with the tariff laid down in Rule 70 of

the Uniform Rules of Court, were excessive and grossly inflated. There

is no question that the fees charged by the accused are extravagantly

exorbitant, a fact which the accused himself admitted in the

acknowledgement of debt (exhibit O). In his report (exhibit B) Du Preez

20

 

made a comparative analysis of the fees charged by the accused and

the tariff of fees laid down in Rule 70 and concluded that the fees

charged were exorbitant and tantamount to overreaching. That

conclusion is to my mind unassailable, but does overreaching equate

to fraud. In Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope v Tobias and

Another 1991 (1) SA 430 (C), Berman J, with reference to the

aforegoing question stated as follows at p 434H–435B:-

“Before turning to the allegedly agreed fees and the quantum thereof, it is 

convenient at this stage to deal with the concept of overreaching in our law. 

Now when an attorney undertakes to do work in that capacity he prima facie 

undertakes to do so for legitimate fess that he can charge, see Hitchcock v 

Raaff   1920   TPD   366   at   368   and   it   is   unprofessional,   unworthy   and 

dishonorable conduct on his part to charge a client exorbitant fees, see Law 

Society, Cape v Mgwigwi 1964 (4) SA 789 (E) at 790G791C. An attorney is 

not, however, necessarily guilty of misconduct because he chooses to put an 

extravagant value on his services. If the prospective client is a free agent, if 

there is neither fraud nor duress and no advantage taken of him, then if the 

client chooses voluntarily to agree to an extravagant fee, the attorney will not 

be guilty of misconduct, see Cape Law Society v Luyt 1929 CPD 281 at 287. 

On  the other  hand where an attorney,  on presenting  his  bill   to  his  client, 

which was an excessive amount, immediately got his client to agree to pay 

the fees set out therein and to waive any right to a taxed or detailed bill of 

21

 

costs, he was held to have taken an undue advantage of his client and his 

conduct to have been a breach of his professional duty, see Luyt’s case supra 

at 290.

The word ‘overreach’ is defined, insofar as it is relevant to this matter, as ‘. . . .  circumvent, outwit, cheat in dealing’ (the Oxford English Dictionary 1961 vol. 7 at  318) or ‘. . . to outwit or get the better of’ (Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary).  Where an attorney and his fees are concerned, the word ‘overreach’ may be taken as conveying the extraction by the attorney from his client, by the taking by the former of  undue advantage in any form of the latter, of a fee which is unconscionable, excessive  or extortionate, and in so overreaching his client that attorney would be guilty of  unprofessional conduct.”   

[10] I wholeheartedly endorse the learned judge’s reasoning and

emphasize that it is implicit from the judgment that overreaching, in

situations equating to fraud or duress, may amount to misconduct

warranting an attorney’s removal from the profession. This is however

not the proper forum to pronounce upon such issues.

This is a criminal case of fraud and nothing more.

[11] However, the evidence hereanent is not without significance,

regard being had to the testimony of Matiwane. His uncontroverted

evidence was that private practitioners engaged to perform work on

behalf of the State attorney were obliged to levy charges according to

the tariff of fees laid down by Rule 70 and that no deviation from the

tariff was permitted. The particular instructing attorney was required,

on receipt of a statement of account from a private practitioner

engaged by him, to examine the statement of account to ensure that it

22

 

complied with the tariff laid down by Rule 70; only then to append the

certificate thereto prior to forwarding it to him, or, in his absence, the

next most senior attorney in the office, who would them write the

words “please pay” on the statement of account. It is common cause

that save for exhibit F 5 which bears Matiwane’s signature below the

words “please pay” all the other 14 statement of accounts bear the

signature of Mnyamana. It was readily conceded by Matiwane that in

appending his signature to a statement of account and inscribing the

words “please pay” thereon he was a mere rubber stamp but as he

patiently tried to explain, the attorneys in the office were experienced

persons upon whom he could rely to perform their duties properly.

That being so he felt perfectly at ease in appending his signature to

the statements of account without further ado.

[12] The evidence adduced on behalf of the State to the effect that the

fees charged by the accused were not in accordance with the tariff of

fees prescribed by Rule 70 elicited inordinately lengthy cross-

examination. That body of evidence is, as adverted to hereinbefore,

not relevant to the issues which fall for determination and can largely

be ignored.

23

 

[13] The factual matrix surrounding the aftermath of the payments

received by the accused was extensively adverted to by Pretorius. As

adumbrated hereinbefore, she was the person directly involved

thereanent and reported her progress to her immediate superior,

Hechter from time to time. Pretorius is a qualified attorney with

extensive experience relating to bills of costs. The investigation into

the propriety of the fees charged by the accused was entrusted to her.

As a starting point in the investigation she made copies of the

documents in the court files pertaining to the six plaintiffs who had

instituted action against the Ministers of Defence and Safety and

Security.

 [14] The files yielded precious little. It contained the summons, a plea,

a notice of discovery and a notice of withdrawal. Save for the

difference in the name of the plaintiff the pleadings and notices were

virtually identical. Close examination of the 15 statements of account

caused her much consternation for not only were the fees levied

exorbitant but it appeared to be duplicated. A letter was then

addressed to the accused advising him of the SIU’s investigation into

the propriety of the statements of account and concluded by

requesting him either to repay the money or to set the statements of

account down for taxation. He was further advised that non compliance

24

 

would result in a summons being issued against him for recovery of the

money paid to him. There was some dispute whether the letter was

preceded by a telephone call to the accused and who the author of the

letter was but nothing really turns on this. The fact is that the accused,

in response to the letter, visited the SIU’s office in Mthatha.

[15] Pretorius gave the accused her analysis of the various statements

of account and outlined the problems which she had with them. As an

example of this analysis she referred to exhibit L (the Patakubi matter)

but reiterated that she handed him an analysis of each of the 6

matters to which I have earlier referred. Her analysis was thorough.

She approached the matter on the premiss that the fees levied should

have been done according to the tariff of fees laid down in Rule 70 and

inserted these amounts in the appropriate column in her analysis. She

pointed out that the fees had been duplicated and invited the

accused’s responses. She recounted that his initial and immediate

response was that the statements of account be taxed by the Law

Society.

[16] Accepting for the moment that the accused in fact sent the

statements to the Law Society, it is not surprising that the latter were,

understandably, disinterested and communicated its attitude to him.

25

 

The accused informed Pretorius accordingly and the statements of

account were then set down for taxation before the registrar of the

High Court, Mthatha by notice dated 16 April 2002 (Exhibit M). The

envisaged taxation could however according to her not proceed owing

to the absence of the taxing master. It was put to her that her

evidence was incorrect; that the taxing master was indeed present and

that the reason for the taxation not proceeding was because the taxing

master required itemised statements of account. This aspect will be

revisited in due course. Although Pretorius conceded under cross-

examination that the accused may not have been present on that day,

her recollection was that he was indeed present.

[17] Pretorius’s evidence that the accused at no stage denied being

the drafter of the statements of account remained steadfast. It was

repeatedly put to her that the accused denied advising her that he

drafted the statements of account but the import of her evidence was

consistently to the effect that he in fact drafted them. Pretorius’s

evidence that the accused was present at the abortive taxation on 28

June 2002 finds support in the most unlikely source. I have previously

referred to Pretorius’ evidence that the absence of the taxing master

necessitated a postponement of the taxation. That evidence was

placed in dispute. It was put to her that the taxing master’s insistence

that an itemized bill of costs be prepared necessitated the

26

 

postponement of the taxation. This Pretorius vehemently disputed. She

maintained that the itemised account in the Tyiso matter (exhibit G),

together with the itemised statement in the Maqubela matter (exhibit

H) and the itemised account in Makaza (exhibit J) had been handed to

her prior to the abortive taxation. This was strenuously disputed.

Counsel’s attention was then drawn to the fact that exhibit G was

dated 25 June 2002, exhibit H was dated 28 June 2002 and exhibit J 25

June 2002..

[18] Thus, Pretorius’ evidence that the accused was indeed present on

28 June 2002 is, inadvertently confirmed by the accused himself.

Although Mr Zilwa sought to retract what had earlier been put to

Pretorius, it is clear that what was put was done on the instructions of

the accused. It was only after counsel was alerted to the date reflected

on exhibits G, H and J that what was put to Pretorius was sought to be

retracted. What this shows is that Pretorius’s recollection of events is

reliable and that the taxation could not proceed for the reasons stated

by her.

[19] Pretorius sought a new date for taxation and a notice of taxation

(exhibit N) issued to the effect that the taxation would occur on the 20

January 2003. Much was sought to be made of the somewhat lengthy

27

 

delay of approximately 6 months. Again nothing turns on this.

Pretorius satisfactorily explained that she was involved in a plethora of

taxations. She testified that the taxation was attended by the accused

and aborted after several hours because of time constraints. Her

evidence hereanent once more evoked cross-examination in an

endeavour to show that she was neither a credible nor reliable witness.

The exercise proved futile. What emerges from her evidence is that a

combination of factors led to the taxation once more being postponed

and set in motion a whole new chain of events.

[20] Pretorius testified that en route from the taxing master’s office the

accused acknowledged to her that he had erred in drafting the

statements of account and offered to repay the entire amount paid to

the SIU. It was put to her that the accused merely acknowledged that

an error in the preparation of the statements of account had been

made by his office, and, to achieve finality, the statements of account

should be drawn by a competent person and the name of a bills of

costs consultant, a Mr Human was then suggested by her. Pretorius,

whilst conceding recommending Human, reiterated that the accused

continuously referred to the fact that he had erred in the preparation

of the statements of account. Her evidence in this regard not

surprisingly invoked searching cross-examination. Pretorius however

28

 

remained steadfast and her evidence has a ring of truth around it for

as she stated:-

“. . . Mr Mtshabe never at any stage indicated that he did not draft these  

accounts. On the day that Mr Mtshabe and I, when he said it was an error,  

and he wanted to pay the money back. One of the things he did say was at  

the   time   these   matters   were   drafted,   he   was   not   long   admitted   as   an  

attorney and mistakes like this could happen. He said when we discussed it,  

as he asked if he could pay the money back. He said he would realize that  

at the stage when he drafted these accounts, he was not long in practice,  

and it could be that he didn’t realize how the tariff worked.”

[21] Following the discussion with Pretorius, the SIU received a letter

(exhibit P) from the accused a few days later. It reads as follows, warts

and all:-

“The Head of the Office

Special Investigating UnitPRD BuildingSutherland StreetUMTATA

Dear Sir / MadamRe: N.Z MTSHABE INC vs VARIOUS MATTERS

29

 

The above matter refers.

We attended Taxation of these matters on the 20th and 21st January 2003 

in the office of the Registrar, High Court, Umtata and taxation could not  

be finalized due to time constraints and more so that the Taxing Master  

wanted to go and research the issue of his Locus Standi on matters of this  

nature.

During the process of taxation various cases (Case law) was produced by both parties  to convince the taxing master and this cause tremendous delay as one party wanted strict adherence to tariff whilst the other wanted fairness and reasonableness and that  the taxing master must be discretional in dealing with the matters.

The above process is likely to take a little longer and our office has realized  

that there were erroneous payments made by the Department of Justice  in  

particular the office of the State Attorney in Umtata and that our office  

received such payments without realizing such error. This error was caused  

by the fact that the Office of the State Attorney issued several distinct letters  

of appointments and did not consolidate the matter (which consolidation  

was later done after the 31st of July 1998) and by this date payments had 

already been erroneously made as aforesaid.

Realizing that no one should capitalize on the weakness   of the other and 

when an error has been detected one should acknowledge and rectify that,  

30

 

our office takes the responsible position and accepts that such errors were  

indeed done under the circumstances outlined above.

Accordingly we hereby offer to pay back in full and final settlement all the monies that  were unduly and erroneously paid to us or any reasonably negotiated figure. If the  offer is acceptable, considering that about R50 000.00 has already been paid back by our office, we shall make suitable arrangements with you with regard to such payment.  We are prepared to have such arrangement reduced into a legally binding acknowledgement of debt by our office or by Mr Mtshabe in his personal capacity.

We sincerely hope that this reasonable offer, which is made in all good  

faith in a genuine effort to resolve this matter, will be acceptable to you and  

we can have this matter finally resolved with the least delay.

Yours truly,N.Z MTSHABE INC” 

It will be gleaned from the aforegoing that the error, which the accused

as author of the letter acknowledges, is circumscribed. There is no

suggestion in the letter that some other person prepared the

statements of account.

[22] The upshot of the letter was the signing of an acknowledgment of

debt (exhibit O) by the accused on 3 February 2003. It reads as

follows:-

31

 

“ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF DEBT

I, the undersigned, Ntsikane Z Mtshabe , identity number: 5904185157 086 an adult  male, married do hereby acknowledge that:

a) During 1998 and 1997 I did work on behalf of the State Attorney  

Umtata.

b) I submitted accounts and was paid for work done in the following matters:• MINISTER OF DEFENCE / N.A PATAKUBI  NT 542/96

• MINISTER OF DEFENCE / L MAKAZA  NT 607/96

• MINISTER OF DEFENCE / V TYISO  NT 617/96

• MINISTER OF DEFENCE / G MAQUBELA  NT609/96

• PUBLIC WORKS / SIRENGQE  NM 876/96

• PUBLIC WORKS / MENTIS  NM 957/98

• EDUCATION / ILLEGAL OCCUPIERS  NM 302/98

• MINISTER OF DEFENCE /J MBALI  NT 610/96

• MINISTER OF DEFENCE / MATOMANE S  NT 608/96

• MINISTER OF POLICE / MBALENI VF  NM 50/97

c) The   accounts   submitted   were   wrongly   drafted   and   not   in  

accordance with the tariff of the High Court.

d) The accounts submitted for payment were exorbitant and I was  

enriched   in   the   amount   of   R750   441.50   (SEVEN   HUNDRED  

AND   FIFTY   THOUSAND   FOUR   HUNDRED   AND   FOURTY 

32

 

ONE RAND AND FIFTY CENTS).

I am hereby offering to pay back the amount of R750 441.50 (SEVEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED AND FOURTY ONE RAND AND FIFTY CENTS).

I agree to withdraw the accounts submitted for payment and to draft proper  

bills of costs for work done in the abovementioned matters. The said bills of  

costs will be properly taxed and submit for payment.

In the event of the aforementioned amount not being paid in full at the time of the  finalization of the taxations, the amount owing in accordance with the taxed bills of  costs will be offset against the amount still owing in terms in terms of this  acknowledgement of debt.

I promise and agree to pay the said amount to the Special Investigating  

Unit on account of the State Attorney as follows:

1. An initial payment of R80 000.00 and an additional N/A payment  

of R5000.00 each, the first payment to commence on the 1st day of  

March  2003  and   thereafter  on   the   first  day  of   each  and  every  

month.

2. I   agree   to   pay   the   said   amounts   at   the   office   of   the   Special  

Investigating Unit,  13th  Floor PRD Building, Sutherland Street,  

Umtata on the first day of every month commencing on the 1st day  

33

 

of March 2003, until the outstanding amount is fully settled.

3. Should any payment not be made on due date then the full amount  

outstanding shall become due and payable immediately.

4. Agree that in the event of my failure to carry out the terms of this  

offer the Special Investigating Unit shall without notice to me be  

entitled to apply for Judgment for the amount of the outstanding  

balance of the said debt with costs and for an order for payment of  

the   Judgment   Debt   and   costs   in   installments   or   otherwise   in  

accordance with this offer.

5. Agree to pay the costs of drawing this document and the stamp 

duty thereon.

Should I fail as aforesaid for whatever reason then the Department is hereby authorized to levy execution against my assets without first obtaining a court order to  do so in terms of the rules of the Supreme Court applicable to the execution of a  judgment debt.

In   the   event   of   my   committing   a   breach   of   any   provision   of   this  

acknowledgement of debt, at the option of the creditor the said capital sum  

and any other sum whatsoever arising by me to the creditor in terms of this  

acknowledgement of debt shall be considered as legally claimable and due,  

without   notice   and   it   is   expressly   understood   that   the   waiver   of   the  

provisions   of   any   of   the   terms   of   this   acknowledgment   of   debt   by   the  

creditor   at   any   time   previously,   shall   not   under   any   circumstances  

34

 

prejudice the creditor’s right, without any previous legal demand to avail  

himself to the provisions of this paragraph.

The benefits from the legal exceptions non numeratae, non causa debiti and errore caculi with the meaning and effect of which I declare myself to be fully acquainted  with, are hereby renounced.

I choose domicilium citandi et executandi at:No 45 Leeds Road

Flat No 1, Glen Coombe Flats\UMTATA

I agree  and consent   that   the  terms of   this  acknowledgement  of  debt  be 

made an order of the Special Investigating Unit.

___________________Director”

[23] Hechter confirmed that pursuant to the terms of the agreement,

the accused repaid an amount of R215 000.00 to the SIU. There is

some dispute whether R235 000.00 or R240 000.00 was repaid by the

accused. Nothing however turns on this, so too the reasons why the

accused reneged on the undertaking embodied in the

acknowledgement of debt. There is admittedly some discrepancy in

the evidence of the various witnesses whether the relevant files were

handed to the accused or not. Hechter’s evidence that the files were in

35

 

fact handed to the accused was put to Pretorius with the sole purpose

of discrediting her. Pretorius took issue with Hechter’s evidence

thereanent and emphatically denied that the SIU ever had the

accused’s files in their possession. The cross-examination served

merely to enhance Pretorius’s credibility.

[24] The accused’s defence to the charges which the State sought to

prove by the adduction of evidence both viva voce and documentary

through the witnesses hereinbefore mentioned, broadly stated

amounts to a denial that he drafted the statements of accounts

(exhibits F1 – F15) which, as I have stated, constitute the foundation of

the State’s case against him. His narrative of the events amount to the

following. After being admitted as an attorney, he commenced practice

for his own account during 1996 and sometime thereafter employed a

certain Mr Maqolo as a professional assistant. Sometime during 1997

he employed Ms Majokweni as a candidate attorney who was tasked

with attending to the High Court matters, bills of costs and taxation. In

addition to cases which he handled on behalf of individual clients he

also received instructions from the Mthatha State Attorneys office to

act on their behalf in various matters including the six matters in issue.

As far as his charges were concerned he made no differentiation in his

fee structure stating “I will just charge as I please”. At no stage was he ever

advised by the State attorneys office that charges should be levied in

36

 

accordance with the tariff of fees prescribed by Rule 70 of the Uniform

Rule of Court. The accused explained the procedure he employed

before a bill of cost or statement of account was drawn as follows:

“If a bill has to be drawn. Let me just explain this way. In a file outside an 

attorney drafts what has done, and this is what I would do. I would draft what 

I  have  done outside   the   file.  Then after   I  have  drafted  outside   the   file,   I 

present the file to her. She then draw the statement that is exactly what she 

would do.” 

[25] The accused maintained that whatever was written on the outside

cover of the file, in casu, the exposition of the work done on the

various dates as set forth in exhibits F1 – F7 and F8 – F15, he had duly

performed the work and never claimed for work not done. When

Pretorius confronted him in regard to the propriety of the various

statements of account he immediately conceded that there had been a

genuine mistake in submitting the Maqubela statement of account (F5

and F7) twice and repaid the money at once. In regard to the

remaining statements of account, the accused remained resolute,

notwithstanding having been furnished with Pretorius’s analysis of the

statements of account. His evidence reads:

37

 

“No what actually happened was that there was a proposal that I should pay 

back  the  money,  and   then I  said   then said,   ‘no I  can’t  pay you back  the 

money, lets take the files to a neutral person for taxation. So that it can be 

known how much I owed you, how much you owe me. Then in that profess 

of referring the files, you would then the taxing master would then see how 

much is due, how much is not due. That’s how it actually. Because we had a 

problem that i, Marelize and myself did speak about this. That she wanted 

that there must be strict adherence to the tariff. That if you are to claim R10, 

00 you can’t go. I actually said, ‘no lets take it to somebody else, you have 

got another agenda than I have.’ Then now then we said, ‘no lets take them to 

taxation.’ But before that I said to her, ‘this matter must be referred to the 

Law Society.’ Because there was nothing I was hiding. Then I then spoke to 

the   people   in   the   Law   Society.   She   had   no   problems   even   with   that 

suggestion. Then I said Law society they will deal with these matters. The 

Law Society said can’t they be taxed? I said, ‘no to me I don’t know whether 

of they are litigious or nonlitigious matter, because there were summons that 

had been issued’, then they said, ‘no refer them to taxing master.’ Then that is 

how   they   issue   now   turning   to   that   these   matters   must   be   referred   for 

taxation.”

[26] Save for admitting the date for taxation of the statements of

account, the accused denied being present at the abortive taxation on

38

 

28 June 2002 and maintained that Ms Majokweni, as the drafter of the

statements of account, was the person who had to attend the taxation

to “go and defend the decision”. The taxation could however not proceed

because on her return from the taxing master Ms Majokweni reported

to him that the taxing master required an itemized statement of

account and she then proceeded to draft the itemized statements of

account exhibits G, H and J.

[27] During August 2002, Majokweni resigned from her employment

and the accused then had “. . . no choice. I had to be in the picture.” Thus on

20 January 2003, after much parrying between Pretorius, the taxing

master and himself on a host of issues including the certificate

appended to each statement of account, he and Pretorius left the

taxing master’s office. What happened next is described by him as

follows:

“Immediately from there, the first day pulled a strain on me, it also pulled a 

strain  on  Marelize,   the  second day  pulled  a  worse  strain  on  me and also 

Marelize.  I immediately from after  we left  there,  and I said to her, ‘listen 

Marelize, this thing will never be taxed, because this man will not have locus 

standi to tax this matter.’ I said to her, ‘I have realized that the office made a 

mistake, there are monies that I am supposed to pay you back, I will refund 

39

 

those monies.’ We actually went to her car. She had a navy Golf at the time. 

We went to her car, and in her car, she then spoke about this and I said to her, 

‘This is what you do’, not only about what before court now. ‘Go back to 

your office; look at every file I was given by the State attorney. I am putting 

it everyone on doubt. I don’t want to talk about it anymore. Every file. I will 

then accept the responsibility on behalf of my office in respect of every file 

that I was given, on any date even beyond 1998. But as long as it is up to the 

time we are talking. She then . . . we then agreed to drive back to my office. 

When we were in, my office, outside my office now. We then stayed there 

together in her car as well. She then said to me, ‘you know who can do this 

thing for you, we are going to ask Mr Human. We once used him in the case 

of Nontenja he is very good.’ Whatever he agrees we will then be liable for 

that, and we will then be liable for that. His word will be final. No one else 

will deal with this matter. Then we then said that is all.”

The evidence that the taxation took two days was disputed by

Pretorius.

 

[28] Arising herefrom Pretorius drafted the acknowledgement of debt

(exhibit O), forwarded it to him to insert the monthly repayment

amounts which he duly completed and returned the acknowledgement

of debt to her. Although the document reflects that he make an initial

payment of R80 000.00 and monthly payments of R5 000.00

40

 

thereafter, he had at the outset, when he realized “that my office made an 

error when they actually billed them, for issues that were not supposed to be paid for,  

those travellings” repaid the amount of R80 000.00. At the stage that he

stopped repayments because of the SIU’s intransigence in forwarding

the files to him he had already repaid some R240 000.00. He

concluded his evidence by not only disputing Inspector’s Qundu’s

evidence that he seized the files as reflected on annexure A to exhibit

S (the search warrant) but moreover that Qundu was present at the

search itself.

[29] In considering the evidence of the accused it is convenient to

commence with an examination of certain aspects of the statements of

account. Exhibits F1 – F15 and G, H and J. Each commences on a

letterhead of the accused’s firm. On the front of the page is inscribed

the particulars of the firm, including the qualifications of its director,

(the accused) and the professional assistant, Anele Maqolo. These

statements cover the period 3 March 1998 to 10 June 1998 and as I

have earlier recounted, relate to the work allegedly done during the

preliminary stage. These statements of account conclude with the

name of the accused’s firm and save for F3, 4, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14 and 15

a signature which, on the accused’s own admission, bear a remarkable

41

 

similarity to his own signature. During the course of his cross-

examination he sought to distinguish the signatures on F1, 2, 5, 6, 7,

10 and 11 from that of his own by referring to some alleged

dissimilarities between them and in fact challenged counsel for the

State to present the evidence of a handwriting expert to prove that

those signatures were indeed his. He steadfastly maintained that his

office personnel habitually forged his signature on his letters and other

documents, a practice which continues to the present day. His

evidence hereanent is not only nonsensical but improbable in the

extreme. It fails to provide any acceptable explanation, why, if indeed

such a practice prevailed, F3, 4, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14 and 15 should not

have been similarly forged. Each of these exhibits is signed per

procurationem the accused’s firm by one of his personnel.

[30] There are a number of other factors which compel the conclusion

that the accused’s evidence is patently untrue. The entire edifice of the

accused’s case is that the villain was Ms Majokweni. According to the

accused the first time he properly examined the statements of account

was at the taxation on 20 January 2003. The reasons advanced by him

for not looking at them prior thereto is again nonsensical. He had at

the outset been informed by Pretorius that the fees which he had

levied were not only exorbitant but duplicated in several instances. He

had been threatened with legal proceedings for recovery of the money

42

 

paid to him. In such circumstances it is inconceivable that any person,

let alone an attorney, would not immediately have looked at the

statements which, on his version, had been drafted by his candidate

attorney. He admitted that Pretorius’s analysis of each of the six

matters had been handed to him and must have known that her

analysis presaged the letter to him. His evidence that he never looked

at the analysis is blatantly untrue. So too is his evidence that he sent

the statements of account to the Law Society. It would have been

foolhardy in the extreme to have done so because its content reveals

prima facie evidence of overreaching and duplicity of charges.

[31] The circumstances under which Ms Majokweni came to draft the

statements of account are likewise riddled with improbabilities.

Unashamedly, and with no insight into the absurdity of his evidence,

he suggested that Ms Majokweni utilized the information on the

individual file covers to draft F1 – F7, G, H and J. A cursory examination

of F1 - 7 relating to the work allegedly performed on the various dates

reflected thereon reveals the absurdity, for example - on his own

admission there was only one consultation with the ‘client’ on 6

February 1998 and one telephone call to the police and defence force

on 9 February 1998; etcetera. It is inconceivable that he would have

entered such details on each of the six files that he opened on having

received instructions from the State attorney. To add to the absurdity

43

 

is his evidence that Ms Majokweni, of her own volition, computed the

fees. How and on what basis she did this, defies imagination. When

regard is had however to the detailed statements of account, G, H and

J the full extent of the accused’s untruthfulness and deception is

glaring.

[32] The accused stated that the taxation could not proceed on the

28th June 2002 because the taxing master insisted on an itemized bill.

Pretorius’s evidence that the absence of the taxing master

necessitated the postponement was challenged and disputed on that

basis. When Mr Zilwa’s attention was drawn to the fact that the date

on exhibits G and J predated the taxation and the date on exhibit H

bore the very date on which the taxation was scheduled to take place,

he found himself in a quandary and sought to circumvent the issue.

The accused however persisted with this version in his evidence. He

testified that Ms Majokweni left the taxation and then went to draft the

statements. Clearly, that did not happen as the dates confirm.

Furthermore the question arises that even assuming that for some or

other reason incorrect dates were inserted on exhibits G, H and J what

was the source of the information exhibited on these itemized

statements of account. It could clearly not have been the cover file for

that information was, on the accused’s version, incorporated in

44

 

exhibits F1 – F7. The only logical explanation is that the source of the

information was the accused himself. Exhibits G, H and J in fact

corroborate Pretorius’s evidence that the reason for the postponement

of the taxation was in fact the absence of the taxing master and puts a

lie to the accused’s evidence.

[33] During the accused’s cross-examination I had occasion to ask the

accused to explain the methodology of Ms Majokweni’s fee

computation. His reply was that she had carte blanche to charge

whatever she desired. That answer corresponds to the accused’s

earlier evidence that he charged what he wished and it was for the

client to object. When regard is had to exhibits G, H and J the falsity of

this aspect of the evidence becomes evident. Two examples will

suffice. Items 3 and 4 on page 2 of exhibit H lists the work done as

“attending on receipt of letter of instructions from client” and “perusing the same” 

respectively. The accused’s explanation why separate fees were

charged amounts to this – the office staff would in the normal course

open the letter. That would constitute the work done as per item 3 on

exhibit G. Thereafter he would peruse the letter, hence item 4. Items

74 on exhibits G and H are identical. It refers to “airport traveling from East  

London to Durban and back” and the fees levied amount to R2 468. 00. No

time period is stipulated. The fees levied are not rounded off but an

45

 

exact amount.

[34] The absurdity of the accused’s evidence that Majokweni could

charge what she wished is emphasized by his evidence that:-

“Accused: On issues relating to attorney and client, on issues relating  

to that.  There is no money to put.  There us precisely no  

money to put. The only money to put, which you can not  

then   draw,   are   money   that   are   disbursements,   because 

there   he   is   having   the   receipt   to   check   to   that,   but   on  

attorney  and   client,   you  put   as   you  please.  Then   if   the  

client is not happy with that the client complains.

Court: So if she had put on each of those bills a million rand?Accused: She can put a million rand, if the person is happy with the million rand it will be paid. That’s what happened even today. That’s what happens.Court: Are you serious Mr Mtshabe?Accused: Sir I don’t know, I am actually hundred percent serious that on an attorney . . . [intervene]Court: Are you telling me that you entrusted this person to put any amount she wanted  to in these statements of account? ”

The accused’s blatant untruthfulness, highlighted in the

aforementioned examples, permeate every aspect of his evidence. He

was not only a shocking witness with no regard for the truth but

moreover he was an extremely evasive witness, whose answers during

46

 

cross-examination bore little relation to the questions asked.

[35] He was questioned about the authenticity of the signatures on

exhibits F1, 2, 5, 6, 7 and 10 and this line of questioning spawned the

following responses:-

“Mr Cilliers: I also come back to this point later. I just want to find out 

first. Reference was made by the witness that well your 

initial appears on some of the statements of accounts, and 

compared to, do you suspect that this initial was falsified:

Accused: Not   falsified,   it  means only   that   they   took  that   initial   is  

quite  easy  for  everyone  in  the office   to  me.  Even as  we  

speak they easily make it. All that they do is to make that  

initial as they please

Mr Cilliers:. Yes but Sir, if you didn’t do it, they will falsify it.Accused: I wouldn’t put a blame on them.Mr Cilliers: but am I wrong if I say if it was not you that signed the statement of  accounts, these must have been falsified, because they look very similar to yours?Accused: Of course lets look and do what is actually happening at the base. The secretary is there, I know that. Administrative staff put PP, but these legally trained people simply do the S that is supposed to be NZ, they simply do it even today. Because there at the base of that thing it said NZ Mtshabe Incorporated. It doesn’t really refer  to me directly, it refers to the office. If it would then be said NZ Mtshabe as a person, it  would then be NZ Mtshabe. If you look into those things that’s what they do.Court: Sir, Sorry can I just interrupt you? Can I get some clarity on this? On those statements that are before me as exhibits “F1” to “F15”, where a signature of yours 

47

 

appears it wasn’t yours?Accused: A signature like mine appears it wasn’t mine.Court: But the way you sign is very similar to that?Accused: Very, very similar to that, but because everybody knows it they can do it  by heart.Court: You say someone in your office did that?Accused: Someone in my office did that. But I would imagine it was Ms Majokweni, because that is the one person who was actually doing the statements in respect of this matter.Court: So she would have forged your signature on the statements of account?Accused: I wouldn’t say forgery as that word would contain a criminal aspect to  it. I wouldn’t say she actually forged the signature.Court: She reproduced your signature?Accused: She actually did.”

[36] This rather incomprehensible response was no doubt occasioned

because the accused knew full well that he had in fact signed the

aforementioned statements of account and his linguistic gymnastics

underscore the fact that the accused concocted the entire story

concerning Ms Majokweni. If in fact she drafted the statements of

account there is no reason why the administrative staff would have

signed exhibits F3, 4, 8, 9, 12, 13 and 14. The accused conceded that

the itemised statements of account, exhibits G, H and J were signed by

her and had great difficulty in giving a clear answer why the other

exhibits should not likewise have been signed by her. Moreover the

question arises why did Majokweni not forge his signature on F3, 4, 8,

9, 12, 13 and 14 in the same way she allegedly did on F1, 2, 5, 6, 7

and 10.

48

 

[36] It is precisely because of the falsity of that evidence that the

accused exhibited a spell of amnesia in relation to Ms Majokweni’s

status. At an early stage of his examination of chief he was quite clear

that she was a candidate attorney and he, the only director of the firm.

During questioning by me, the firm suddenly had two partners and he

was now unsure whether she was his articled clerk. The most telling

example of his untruthfulness relates to those instances where

counsel’s fees are listed on the statements of account. During cross-

examination of the state witnesses it was pertinently put to them that

where the statements of account listed a fee charged by counsel,

counsel in fact charged such fee in each instance. I questioned the

accused hereanent and referred him to exhibits F8, 12 and 14 asking

whether “counsel charged for the same consultations three times, in the other two 

matters as well, or is that not a duplication as well?” His response was “My Lord I  

can say counsel charged three times.” That answer corresponded to what had

been put to the state witnesses. When I asked the accused to consider

the question carefully he did a complete volte face, saying:-

“  Accused:    My Lord what a pity. What a pity I am not sure my Lord, 

but let me think carefully. But advocate Alkema did advise

           that these files must be consolidated into one so that they 

49

 

          are not charged per brief, per file.

Court:  Hold on I am asking about the globular figure of R20 659.  

60.  Because I  would be very surprised  if  Counsel   for  the  

same consultation charges three times.

Accused: Let me put it this way my Lord. The pleas were separate.Court:  No leave the pleas aside. You have already said to me that that fee relates to the  consultations over that period 24 April, to 26 April in Durban.Accused: My Lord I must be honest I can’t remember, but I know for a fact that I  can’t remember only in respect of whether in respect of Advocate Pakade, but I am definite in respect Advocate Alkema he charged three times. He charged per file.  Advocate Pakade I must be honest as far as he is concerned, I cannot remember  whether in him it is a duplication. But I am sure in respect of Advocate Alkema it’s a  duplication.Court: So it seems to me that as far as Advocate Pakade and you then were, that his  fees must have been a duplication? It’s the exact fee up to the cent, 60 cents?Accused: Yes even with Advocate Alkema it’s exact fee. But what I am saying my Lord is I would say that in respect of Advocate Alkema it’s definitely I know, but I am not sure in respect of whether the lady actually made a mistake in respect of Advocate  Pakade.Court: Pakade?Accused: I must voice that.”

  [37] In addition to the aforegoing there is the clear evidence of  Pretorius that the

accused admitted drafting the statements. I have hitherto adverted to

various unsatisfactory features in the accused’s evidence and am

satisfied that its poor quality demonstrates quite unequivocally that his

evidence is a complete and utter fabrication. He is a patently dishonest

witness and I reject his evidence in its entirety. I am satisfied that he

drafted each of the statements of account.

50

 

[38] I have earlier in this judgment referred to Mnyamana role in

issuing the certificates appended to each statement of account.

Matiwane’s evidence which I accept was clear. Private practitioners

engaged to perform work on behalf of the Mthatha State attorney were

obliged to levy charges according to the tariff of fees laid down in Rule

70. No deviations were permitted. A cursory glance at any of these

statements would have alerted Mnyamana to the fact that the fees

charged were not only grossly excessive but in certain instances

duplicated. The issuing of the certificates in such circumstances

therefore compels the inference that there was a corrupt relationship

between the accused and Mnyamana. That inference is strengthened

regard being had to the evidence of Hechter that Mnyamana was

charged with fraud in circumstances not dissimilar to the present in

matters where another private practitioner was engaged to perform

work on behalf of the State attorney.

[39] It is not in dispute that when exhibits F1 – F15 were presented to

the registrar of the High Court, Mthatha for payment during the period

3 March 1998 to 10 June 1998, each was accompanied by a certificate

signed by Mnyamana in the terms described in hereinbefore. Exhibits

F1 – F7 expressly conveyed that on the dates specified, the work

51

 

stipulated had in fact been performed in each instance. The certificates

appended to each statement of account served not only to confirm the

correctness of the statements but attested to its authenticity. It

induced the registrar to issue payment vouchers in settlement of the

accused’s claims.

[40] One of the essential elements constituting the crime of fraud is

the making of a misrepresentation. It is a perversion or distortion of

the truth and may be made by words or conduct. In order to constitute

the misrepresentation, the words or writing must constitute a

statement which is false. Exhibits F1 – F15 undoubtedly fall into that

category. As previously stated, exhibits F1 – F7 expressly conveyed

that on the specified dates the work stipulated had in fact been done.

It was in fact admitted by the accused that on 6 February 1998 he had

one consultation with the State attorney; he telephoned the police and

Defence Force once, and consulted with the police on one occasion.

The same activity is duplicated on each of the exhibits F1 – F7. Exhibits

F5 and F7 refer to the same plaintiff and bear the same reference

number. It was suggested to the relevant state witnesses that this was

an innocent duplication in that it was obvious from an examination of

the two statements that exhibit F5 had been mislaid and that the

accused was then requested to provide the State attorneys office with

a duplicate statement of account. Mr Zilwa pointed to the word “copy”

52

 

on exhibit F7 and elicited a concession from Pretorius that the scenario

sketched by him in all probability occurred. It was further suggested

that the accused’s conduct in immediately repaying the duplicated

payment served to corroborate his version that a genuine mistake had

been made. This is a speculative hypothesis not supported by the

evidence. Whilst it is undoubtedly correct that the accused repaid the

duplicated amount, it is clear that he had no option. The duplication

was obvious. The word copy on F7 does not lend itself to the

explanation proffered by the accused. Exhibit F6 bears the exact word.

I have already pointed out that Matiwane appended his signature to F5

whilst F7 bear the signature of Mnyamana. Although both F5 and F7

bears the same date viz 24 March 1998, the instruction to pay by

Mnyamana is dated 6 April 1998 whilst the date 20 April 1998 appears

on F5. Given the corrupt relationship between Mnyamana and the

accused, there can be no suggestion that the duplication was

inadvertent and innocent.

[41] I have pointed to the fact that F8 – F15 contain no reference to

any date in relation next to the work actually performed. The omission

of the date is not without significance and it is no wonder that these

statements were authorized for payment by Mnyamana on divers

dates, and, as admitted by the accused in terms of s220, presented for

payment and paid over a period of time. The absence of a date would

53

 

therefore dispel any notion that the statements were duplicated and

any person perusing the individual statements would conclude not only

that the work described thereon had been performed but that

disbursements had in each instance been paid and separate trips

undertaken. The pattern that emerges from the evidence and the

various exhibits is that the deception was conscious and deliberate.

The statements of account drafted by the accused are clearly false and

amounted to a misrepresentation. In presenting the statements of

account (with the collusion of Mnyamana) to the registrar’s office for

payment the accused clearly had the intention to defraud the fiscus

which suffered prejudice.

[42] It was submitted on behalf of the accused that his evidence was

reasonably possibly true and ought to be accepted. I have in the

course of this judgment, in my evaluation of the evidence adduced

pointed to innumerable instances where the accused was deliberately

untruthful and his evidence so improbable that it warranted rejection.

The further submission was however made in paragraph 8 of Mr

Zilwa’s heads of argument, and to avoid any confusion, I quote it

verbatim. It reads as follows:-

“It is respectfully submitted that since the Section 220 admissions that were  

54

 

handed in as Exhibit “A” were handed in by consent, both the State and  

the  defence  are bound by   its  contents  and none of   them may  lead any  

evidence or make any submissions that are contrary to its contents. Indeed  

in casu the State never adduced any evidence that went contrary to any of  

the contents of Exhibits “A”. In the premises it is respectfully submitted  

that on any aspect covered in Exhibit “A” the Court should decide the case  

on the basis of such admissions and treat the contents thereof as evidence 

which is common cause.”

[43] The submission is, to say the least, a startling one and it is not

surprising that no authority was cited in support thereof. There is none.

Where an accused pleads not guilty, it is possible for the accused to

reduce the issues put in dispute by his or her plea by making a formal

admission in terms of s 220 of the Criminal Procedure Act. The state

is thereby relieved from adducing evidence which is not in dispute thus

shortening the duration of the trial. The mere fact that the state raises

no objection to the accused making admissions in terms of s 220 does

not bind the state. The fact that there may have been some discussion

between counsel for the state and Mr Zilwa prior to the latter handing

in the s 220 admission does not make the state party to the

admissions made and signed by the accused. Those admissions were

signed by the accused and are his and not that of the state.

55

 

[44] I have in the course of this judgment referred to the evidence of

the witnesses who testified on behalf of the state. They all impressed

me as honest witnesses and I have no reason to doubt their veracity

and accept their evidence as credible and reliable. In conclusion

therefor I am satisfied that the state has discharged the onus resting

upon it and, in the result the accused is found guilty on the main count

of fraud.

____________________D. CHETTY JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

Obo the State: Adv Cilliers

Obo the Defence: Adv Zilwa

56