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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY

HOLDEN AT MAITAMA ABUJA ON THE 22ND DAY OF OCTOBER 2012

BEFORE HISLORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE MARYANN E. ANENIH (PRESIDING JUDGE)

SUIT NO: FCT/HC/CV/621/09

BETWEEN:

NIGER-DELTA DEVELOPMENT COMM……………………….PLAINTIFF

AND

1. THE HON. MINISTER FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY

2. FEDERAL CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

3. HANNATU YUSUF

4. ESTHER OYERU OSARUGUE………………………...DEFENDANTS

JUDGMENT

The plaintiff claims against the defendants jointly and severally in their amended statement of claim filed on the 28th of January 2010 as follows:

1. A declaration that the purported ejection of the Plaintiff by the 1st and 2nd Defendants from plots 636 A & B Nkrumah Crescent, Asokoro Abuja is illegal, unlawful, unjust, inequitable and malicious.

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2. A declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to plot 636 A & B Nkwame Nkrumah Crescent, Asokoro Abuja by virtue of Certificate of Occupancy No. MISC 55759 dated 25th day of October, 2005 issued to it as the lawful allotee of the plot and also by virtue of the receipt of payment and re-certificate of the same plot in accordance with the directive of the Ministry.

3. An order of the Court declaring the purported sale of the

Plaintiff’s Plots 636 A & B Nkwame Nkrumah Crescent Asokoro Abuja to 3rd and 4th Defendants as illegal, unlawful, malicious and ultra-vires the Defendant since the Certificate of Occupancy granted to it is still subsisting and has not been revoked

4. An order of perpetual injunction restraining all the Defendants

whether by themselves, their agents, privies and servants from further interfering or transferring the plot to any person(s).

5. An order of the court restoring the plaintiff back to the premises.

6. An order of this court directing the ejection of the 3rd and 4th

Defendants to whom the property was purportedly sold by the 1st and 2nd Defendants.

7. The sum of N20,000,000.00 as general damages for causing obstruction to the daily operation of the Plaintiff and for unlawful ejection of the plaintiff from the premises.

8. And such other consequential order as this court may deem fit to make in the circumstances.

The 1st and 2nd Defendant filed a joint consequential amended statement of defence on the 20th of May 2010. The 3rd and 4th Defendant filed a joint statement of defence on the 28th of May 2010.

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The plaintiff filed a reply to the 1st and 2nd defendants statement of defence on the 29th of December 2009. The plaintiff in proof of its case called one witness Mr. Iro Frank Eke-Spiff who testified as PW1 on the 27th May 2010, adopted his witness statement on oath and tendered Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F and G. In their defence the 1st and 2nd defendant called, Kaka Samuel Senchi who testified as DW1 on the 23rd of March, 2011, adopted his witness statement on oath and tendered Exhibits H1 and H2. In their defence the 3rd and 4th Defendant Esther Osarugue Oyeru and Hannatu Yusuf testified as DW2 and DW3 respectively on the 13th of July 2011. They adopted their witness statement on oath both filed on the 2nd of July 2011 and tendered Exhibits J, K1, and K2, L, M, N1 and N2. Under cross-examination PW1 testified that:

He is the deputy Director, head of Human Resources of the plaintiff, and that the Federal Government established Niger Delta Development Commission. The plaintiff is financed by 15% of the oil allocation of the federation Account. The Federation Account is owned by federal, state and Local Government. The property in question is a twin duplex. They were using it as their office. He knows the federal government sold off all its residential properties but this is an office, albeit the certificate says its for residential Use. They were not directly informed of the sale of property, so they did not indicate any interest, as they were not even aware the property was to be sold out.

Under re-examination PW1 testified that:

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The plaintiff bought the property, and it is not a direct allocation from the government.

Under cross-examination by the plaintiff’s counsel DW1 testified that:

He has been working with the Federal Capital Development Authority for 6 years and is now 8 years at the bar. To an extent he knows some of the methods of land transaction in Federal Capital Development Authority. He is aware that NDDC is a creation of an Act of Parliament and not the Government or President. He is aware there is an NDDC Act. He does not know about Section 20 of the NDDC Act. He is aware that the constitution provides that anyone can have property. He does not know how NDDC came about the property. And neither is he is aware that the property was re-certified for NDDC by Federal Capital Development Authority. He is aware of the procedure provided for by the Land Use Act for revocation of title to Land. He is not aware that Exhibit A was issued after re-certification. It was signed by El-Rufai on the 25th of October, 2005. The certificate of Occupancy has not been revoked. It is no longer subsisting because the property was sold as a government property like others and new certificates would be issued. There was no communication to the defendants that it has been revoked. He did not say that right of first refusal was given to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was not given a right of first refusal because they did not express interest to purchase the house. He cannot say if other certificate of occupancy has been issued to the said purchaser. He is not aware that the plaintiff bought the property from another source other than an allocation from the Federal Capital Development Authority.

Under cross-examination by the 3rd and 4th Defendant’s counsel DW1 testified that:

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To the best of his knowledge re-certification of title documents is not a proof of title. The property for sale of federal government houses in question is for federal capital territory alone. After they had sold the property they issued the plaintiff quit notice to enable them hand over the property to the purchasers 3rd and 4th defendants. He is not aware that the plaintiff has approached court for these same reliefs. The 3rd and 4th defendants complied with all requirement of sale before they sold to them. They are bonafide buyers.

Under cross-examination by the plaintiff’s counsel DW2 testified that:

From what she can see Exhibit A, it’s a certificate of occupancy issued to NDDC. It is dated 25th of October 2005. The date on Exhibit J is 13th of June 2006, Exhibit K1 and K2 are dated 12th of July 2006 and 23th of August 2006. It is true she said her certificate of occupancy is ready for collection and she has not collected it yet. It was issued after this Exhibit A. she is conversant with procedure of the Federal Capital Development Authority AD hoc committee of Federal Government sales. The Exhibit A is subsisting as it has to be subsisting for the property to be available for sale. She does not know if the certificate, Exhibit A was revoked after the sale of the property to her.

Under cross-examination by the plaintiff’s counsel, DW3 testified that:

She does not know what Exhibit A is, it is dated 25th of October 2005. The date on Exhibit M is 13th June, 2006, Exhibit N1 is 23rd of September 2006 and Exhibit N2 is 1st of August 2006. She has not been issued a certificate of occupancy in respect of the property.

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At close of evidence the plaintiff and the defendants filed, served and adopted their final written addresses. Both parties by order of court made further address to the court on 23rd October, 2012. Counsel to the 1st and 2nd defendant in their final address raised the following issues for determination:

a. Whether the plaintiff in this suit has discharged the onus of proof required by law to entitle him to the disputed property and the judgment of this Honourable Court.

b. Whether the conduct of the 1st and 2nd Defendants is justified and/or empowered by law with respect to the sale of the property in dispute to the 3rd and 4th Defendants in this suit.

c. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs sought from this Honourable Court.

On the first issue counsel submitted as follows that Section 131 to 134 of the Evidence Act, 2011 states on whom the burden of proof lies in civil proceedings to prove his case on the preponderance of evidence. The plaintiff has failed to adduce sufficient evidence in proving his case against the Defendants as required by the law. In order to determine whom, between the Plaintiff and the 3rd and 4th Defendant is entitled to the house in dispute, it is imperative to make recourse to the approved gazette of August 15th 2005 and this Court is called upon to take judicial notice of same by virtue of Section 122 of the Evidence Act. The information for the sale of all federal government houses was on media and the net, no further proof of such is therefore required. Counsel referred to

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ONWUKA V. EDIOALA (1989) 1 NWLR (PT 96) 182 AGHA V. IGP (1990) 10 NWLR (PT 524) PG 317 AT 321 PARA 4-6 PASCUTTO V. ADECENTRO NIG LTD (1997) 1 NWLR (PT 529) PG 467 Where evidence is given on a vital issue and same is neither challenged nor contradicted by the other party, it is the duty of the trial judge not only to consider such evidence, but also to accept and act on it. See GOV. AKWA IBOM V. UMA (2002) FWLR (PT 110) PG 1793 AT 1817 PARA F AGBI V. OGBE (2006) 26 NSCQR 1257 AT 1277 PARA F-G He urged the court to hold that the plaintiff has failed to substantiate his claims as to enjoy the judgment of the Honourable court. On the second issue 1st and 2nd Defendants counsel submitted that it is trite that pleadings is no evidence and parties are bound by their pleadings. Counsel referred to OLUTUNDE V. ADEYOLU (2000) 10 NWLR (PT 676) 562 CRUSHED ROCK IND. LTD V. UBUBA (2002) 8 NWLR (PT 770) 522 EHIMARE V. EMIOHONYON (1985) 1 NWLR (PT 2) 186 PARA C By virtue of the enabling provisions of the official gazette, the conduct of the 1st and 2nd defendant was justified and excused by law in selling Federal Government non-essential houses in the Federal Capital Territory in accordance with the guidelines, and the sale of

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same to the 3rd and 4th defendant was not wrongful or made in error. Counsel referred to OGUNBIYI V. ISHOLA (1996) 6 NWLR (PT 452) 12 and He urged the court to so hold. On the third issue counsel submitted that it is on record that the plaintiff neither expressed interest to buy the house nor bidded for same during the sale exercise therefore the plaintiff lacks the locus standi to initiate this action. What is in issue is whether the plaintiff indicated interest to purchase the property in line with the official and published gazette. The plaintiff has not proved orally or by documentary evidence that the 1st and 2nd defendant should have sold the house to her. The law is that no one can gain advantage of his own wrong. Counsel referred to ENEKWE V. INT’L MERCHANT BANK (2006) 28 NSCQR PG 594 AT 6623 PARAS E-G EGESIMBA V. ONAZURUIKE (2002) 15 NWLR (PT 791) PG 466 AT 502- 503 PARAS H-B In conclusion, counsel urged the court to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim for being speculative and lacking in merit. Counsel to the 3rd and 4th defendant in their final address raised the following issues for determination:

a. Whether the suit of the plaintiff as constituted disclosed a cause of action cognizable by this Honourable court and or accommodate the grant of the reliefs sought.

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b. Whether the plaintiff has placed before your Lordship sufficient and compelling materials to deserve grant of the declaratory reliefs sought by the plaintiff.

c. Whether the 1st and 2nd defendants acted within the provisions of the law and guiding rules in implementing the policy in favour of the 3rd and 4th defendants.

d. Whether the 3rd and 4th defendants are bonafide buyers for title without notice.

On the first and second issues raised, counsel submitted that a party claiming declaratory relief has to succeed on the strength of his case and not the weakness of the defendants case, the only burden set on the defendant here is to defend the action. A consideration of the defendants case and weakness of it does not arise until the plaintiff has led evidence showing prima facie that he is entitled to the land in dispute. Counsel referred to SECTIONS 135, 136 AND 137 OF THE EVIDENCE ACT GANKON V. UGOCHUKWU CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES LTD. (1993) 6 NWLR (PT 297) 55 SC BELLO V. EWEKA (1981) 1 SC 101 When a litigant claims declaratory relief, he is calling on the court to declare what the law is on that issue. The law in question here is the policy reduced into gazette of No. 82 Vol. 92 of 15th August 2005. Counsel referred to OYEWOLE V. AKANDE (2009) 15 NWLR (PT 1163) 119 AT 148 A-B

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The grant of declaratory relief is discretionary on the court and a declaration shall be declined where its grant will amount to a wrong exercise of discretion. Counsel referred to BAKARE V. LSCSC (1992) 8 NWLR (PT 262) 641 On the third and fourth issue counsel submitted that the power to make binding declaration is discretionary as in IBENEWEKA V. EGBUNA (1946) 1 W.L.R 219 RE BARNATO (1949) CH. 258 Declaratory relief can only be granted if it is the best relief apt and appropriate for the situation presented. Counsel referred to BELLO V. EWEKA (SUPRA) AT 101 and EGUAMWENSE V AMAGHIZEMWEN (1993) 9 NWLR (PT 315) 1 AT 21 The issues raised by the plaintiff are not in dispute, it is basically issue of law. It is trite that a Certificate of Occupancy does not confer legal title over land where same right has either been taken away or there exist a better title on same land. Counsel referred to SECTION 34 OF THE LAND USE ACT OGUNLEYE V ONI (1990) 2 NWLR (PT 135) 745 AT 752, 774 AND 784 The policy and the guidelines have a force of law fused in the Gazette and must be complied with. Counsel referred to

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DINGYADI V. INEC (NO. 1) (2010) 18, NWLR, (PT 1224) PG 1 AT 50-51 H-B The plaintiff is held by SECTION 149 (D) OF THE EVIDENCE ACT as concealed facts are presumed to contain facts that are not favourable to the party who concealed them. In conclusion, counsel also referred the court to AGBAJE V AGBOLUADE (1970) 6 N.S.C.C 15 AT 19 and urged the court to dismiss all the reliefs of the plaintiff. Counsel to the plaintiff in his address raised the following issues for determination:

1. Is the plaintiff a legal person in Law authorized to own property? 2. Can the 1st and 2nd Defendants re-allot/sale the Plaintiff’s

property to third parties without the revocation of a subsisting Certificate of Occupancy?

3. What is the legal implications/effect of allocation to third parties without revocation or compliance with Section 28 of the Land Use Act?

4. Can the Guideline on sale of Federal Government Property override the express provision of the Land Use Act and therefore the 1999 Constitution?

5. The issue of law and sentiments

6. Has the Plaintiff proved its case?

On issue one counsel submitted that the plaintiff was established by NIGER DELTA DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION (ESTABLISHMENT) ACT, CAP N86 LAWS OF THE FEDERATION

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by SECTION 1 (2) (a) and by SECTION 22 the Plaintiff is a corporate body empowered by the Act establishing it to purchase or take or lease any interest in land or other property, construct offices, own premises and maintain same in line with and subject to the provisions of the Land Use Act. Counsel referred to SECTION 43 and 44 OF THE 1999 CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDRAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA AS AMENDED. He urged the court to discountenance the submission of the defendants that the plaintiff does not have power to own and manage its own landed property. On issue two counsel submitted that SECTION 22 OF THE NIGER DELTA DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION (ESTABLISHMENT) ACT specifically stated that the plaintiff’s ownership and acquisition of landed property must be subject to Land Use Act. The 1st and 2nd Defendants do not have the power to re-allot/sell the plaintiff’s property in issue to third parties without revocation of the plaintiff’s Certificate of Occupancy as stipulated by the Land Use Act. Counsel referred to SECTION 9 OF THE LAND USE ACT And OGUNLEYE VS. ONI (1990) 2 NWLR (PT 135) PG 745 AT 784 EZENNA VS. ATTA (2004) ALL FWLR (PT 202) PG 1858 The intendment to SECTION 28 OF THE LAND USE ACT is that before a plaintiff could be robbed of his right of title, the Certificate granted to it must first be revoked in accordance with the provisions of the Land Use Act. Based on the evidence of DW1 there is nothing before the court to show that the above mentioned Section was exercised. Counsel referred to

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SECTION 28 (6) (7) OF THE LAND USE ACT OBIKOYA & SONS LTD V GOVERNOR LAGOS STATE (1987) 1 NWLR (PT 50) AT 385 On issue three, counsel submitted that the failure of the 1st and 2nd defendant to comply with SECTION 28 OF THE LAND USE ACT before re-allotment/sale to the 3rd and 4th Defendant, nullifies the purported sale, and amounts to an illegal act. Counsel referred to PROVOST, LAGOS STATE COLLEGE OF EDUCATION (LACOED) V EDUN (2004) ALL FWLR (PR 201) PG 1628 and SECTION 44 (1) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDRAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA AS AMENDED On issue four, counsel submitted that the guideline and the gazette being administrative policies cannot override the express provisions of the Land Use Act. Under the Land Use Act the Certificate of Occupancy is the only state-backed document that gives valid right described therein. It is the most superior document affecting land in Nigeria presently. Counsel referred to SECTION 26 OF THE LAND USE ACT To this extent, the guideline and gazette that purported to have vested rights on the 3rd and 4th Defendants are null and void. Counsel referred to ADE SANOYE V ADEWOLE (2006) 14 NWLR (PT 1000) PG 242 AT 277 On the construction and interpretation of expropriatory provisions counsel referred to ADOLE VS GWAR (2008) 2 NWLR (PT 1099) PG 562 AT 608

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On issue five counsel submitted that sentiments cannot override the express provisions of SECTION 43 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDRAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA AS AMENDED AND THE NIGER DELTA DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION (ESTABLISHMENT) ACT that empower the plaintiff to own property, neither can the court close its eye to SECTION 28 OF THE LAND USE ACT that stipulates revocation of the Certificate of Occupancy before valid grant can be made to other parties. He urged the court to discountenance the sentimental submissions of the Defendants and follow legality, rule of law and due process. On issue six counsel submitted that by their statement of claim and evidence in chief, they asserted the existence of facts which made the actions of 1st and 2nd Defendant illegal and unlawful. Counsel referred to SECTION 131 (1) OF THE EVIDENCE ACT And that they have been able to prove that by SECTION 43 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDRAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA AS AMENDED and SECTION 22 THE NIGER DELTA DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION (ESTABLISHMENT) ACT the plaintiff is a legal person in law authorized and empowered to own its property in line with the LAND USE ACT. There is uncontroverted evidence before the court that a Certificate of Occupancy was duly issued to the plaintiff, its still subsisting and has not been revoked. The said Certificate has not been revoked by the 1st and 2nd Defendants in line with SECTION 28 OF THE LAND USE ACT to warrant the purported grant to the 3rd and 4th Defendants. They have made out their case that the official gazette and guideline relied on by the 3rd and 4th Defendants has no force of law and therefore in accordance with SECTION 26 OF THE LAND USE ACT

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the actions of the 1st and 2nd Defendants are illegal and unlawful, and therefore the purported grant cannot stand in law. Counsel referred to TRADE BANK PLC V. CHAMI (2003) 13 NWLR (PT 836) PG 158 AT 203 In conclusion he urge the court to grant the reliefs sought by the plaintiff, same having been proved on a balance of probability. Counsel to the 1st and 2nd Defendant further filed on the 23rd of February 2012 a reply on points of law wherein he submitted that

The legal entity of the plaintiff is not in question. And when the chips are down and the federal government decides to liquidate NDDC, the rights, liabilities and assets of NDDC will certainly be shouldered by the said Federal Government. Counsel referred to SECTIONS 14 (1), (2) 15 AND 28 (3) OF THE NDDC ACT

If title is not revoked for reasons under the Land Use Act, then SECTION 28 OF THE LAND USE ACT is inapplicable as in the instant case. Exhibt A could not have been revoked by the 1st Defendant since it does not fall within the purview of SECTION 28 (1), (2), (3) and (4) and certainly not for breaches under (5). The argument of counsel is quite inappropriate and inapplicable to the instant case. Exhibit A cannot defeat the interest of the Federal Government acquired over the property.Certificate of Occupancy therefore does not confer legal title over the property on the Plaintiff; it is the right of Occupancy which the plaintiff has not shown to this Court that he possesses. Counsel referred to

BALA ANGBAZO VS HASSAN SULE & OTHERS (1996) 7 NWLR (PT 461)

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This case bothers on the sale of twin duplex with varied Plot Numbers sold to two different persons and so cannot be covered by a single Certificate of Occupancy. The plaintiff has failed to discharge the onus placed on him by the Evidence Act in proving his case against the Defendants. In conclusion counsel urged the court to dismiss the Plaintiff’s claim and reliefs sought against the 1st and 2nd Defendants for lacking merit.

Counsel to the 3rd and 4th Defendants also filed on the 28th of February 2012 a reply on points of law wherein counsel submitted that

On issue one of plaintiff’s address, the identified status of the plaintiff is not in contention and as such all submissions therein go to no issue On issue two and three of plaintiff’s address, SECTION 22 OF THE NIGER DELTA DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION (ESTABLISHMENT) ACT is also not in contention. The presence of the plaintiff’s valid certificate of occupancy makes the property qualified for sale policy by the Federal Government. The issue in contention is not revocation for overriding public interest rather, a policy sanctioned by the executive arm of government which is a decision and policy the plaintiff is a signatory to and beneficiary under. The plaintiff being part of the executive arm of government is stopped from complaining about the implementation of the policy. Counsel referred to OYEYEMI VS. COMMISSIONER FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT KWARA STATE (1992) 2 NWLR (PT 226) 661. The right of the Federal Government who is the principal of the plaintiff and the 1st and 2nd defendants to use “resourses” within

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its holding to implement its programs has not been challenged by the plaintiff or any other persons. The plaintiff did not refer to the issue of revocation between the plaintiff and the 1st and 2nd Defendant in its pleadings. Parties are bound by their pleadings. Counsel referred to N.I.P.C LTD VS THOMPSON LTD (1969) NMLR 99 The evidence especially of the certificate of Occupancy led on facts of revocation not pleaded goes to no issue. Counsel referred to FERDINARD GEORGE V UBA (1972) 8 & 9 SC 264 TO 274- 276 On issue four of the plaintiff’s address, he argued that the policy has not in anyway contradicted any provision of the Law. Counsel referred to PEENOCK INVESTMENT LTD V HOTEL PRESIDENTIAL LTD (1982) 12 SC 1 There is no override of functions between the guideline and the Land Use Act therefore the case of ADE SANOYE V ADEWOLE is not applicable. On issue five of the plaintiff’s address, he argued that the 3rd and 4th defendants complete, strict and thorough compliance with the regulation or guideline which enjoys a force of law protected in a gazette and tendering of documents to substantiate the claims cannot by any stretch of imagination be a display of sentiment but proof in law. In conclusion he urge the court to discountenance these unsubstantiated and sentimental submissions of the plaintiff and

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hold that having failed to proof its case, the case of the plaintiff fails.

I have considered the entirety of the case placed before this court by the plaintiff, the response of the defendants thereto and all the arguments canvassed by each party to buttress their respective claims and defences. I am of the view that the main issues arising for determination are:--

1. Whether the defendants have successfully shown that the authority under which the 1st and 2nd defendants sold the property in question, to the 3rd and 4th defendants does not conflict with the Land Use Act and the CONSTITUTION in view of the subsisting Certificate of Occupancy issued to the plaintiff and the provisions of Niger Delta Development Commission Act.

2. Whether under the circumstances the property in question has been lawfully sold by the 1st and 2nd defendants to the 3rd and 4th defendants.

3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs sought in this claim.

The gist of this case in summary is that:

Pursuant to an application for consent by Messrs Niger Link Nigeria Ltd to assign the residue of Certificate of Occupancy to Oil Mineral Producing Development (OMPADEC now renamed Niger Delta Development Commission) the interest in the property in question a twin duplex of 5 bedrooms each at Plots 636 A and B Kwame Nkrumah Crescent Asokoro Abuja was vested in the Plaintiff, who purchased same from said Mrs. Niger Link.

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The first defendant re-certified the title of the plaintiff to the property and issued another certificate of occupancy in respect of same on the 25th of October 2005. On the 13th of June 2006 the 1st and 2nd defendants offered the same property to the 3rd and 4th defendants for N14,000,000.00 (fourteen Million Naira) per one 5 bedroom duplex at the said Plots 636 A and 636 B Kwame Nkrumah Crescent Asokoro, Abuja under the ad hoc committee sale of Federal Government Houses guidelines. The 3rd and 4th defendant individually purchased each of the said property in the premises N14,000,000.00 (fourteen million naira) each. The 1st and 2nd defendants ejected the plaintiff from the premises on 23rd November, 2006 and handed over the premises to the 3rd and 4th defendants who have been in possession ever since. Aggrieved by the sale and ejection the plaintiff instituted this action on the 26th of January, 2009 for the reliefs enumerated in her statement of claim.

The first issue above is principally an issue of law since it is evident that after a careful consideration of the pleadings and case of parties, the propriety of the procedure followed in the sale does not form the fulcrum of the dispute between the parties here, but rather the sale itself. The sale of the property itself is the substance of the dispute brought before this court for resolution. Any further deliberations on whether the gazetted approved guidelines for sale of Federal Government Houses provided by the Federal Executive Council for sale of houses was followed or adhered to by the defendants, to my mind would only amount to an academic exercise, since it would not resolve the dispute nor assist one way or the other, in the just determination of this case. Courts have been advised in a plethora of decided cases to refrain from embarking on an academic exercise. See

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AGBAKOBA V. I.N.E.C. (2008) ALL FWLR (PT.410) 799 AT P. 808, PARAS F – G where the court reiterated its position on academic exercises as follows:--

“A court cannot and should not engage in academic exercise. It is not the function or indeed the duty of the court to embark on advisory opinion or abstract or on speculation. The court has no jurisdiction to do that. The courts are established to determine live issues.”

See also ATTORNEY-GENERAL, ANAMBRA STATE V. ATTORNEY-GENERAL, FEDERATION (2005) ALL FWLR (PT. 268) 1557, (2005) 9 NWLR (PT. 931) 572 OLALE V. EKWELENDU (1989) 4 NWLR (PT. 115) 326 OLANIYI V. AROYEHUN (1991) 5 NWLR (PT. 194) 652 MAMMAN V. SALAUDEEN (2005) 18 NWLR (PT. 958) 478, (2006) ALLFWLR (PT. 298) 1169 The undisputed evidence before the court shows that Exhibit A, the Certificate of Occupancy, was issued in favour of the plaintiff on the 25th October, 2005 by the 1st defendant. All the parties before the court also concede to the fact that this Certificate of Occupancy has not been revoked and is still subsisting. The issuance of this Certificate of Occupancy has also not been faulted by any of the parties. The law is clear on the import of a Certificate of Occupancy, issued as in this case pursuant to the LAND USE ACT (hereinafter referred to as LUA). See GANKON V. UGOCHUKWU CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES LTD (1993) 6 NWLR (PT 297) PG 55

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The 3rd and 4th defendant in their reply on points of law proffered that the cases of OGUNLEYE V. ONI (SUPRA) and EZEANA V. ATTA (SUPRA) cannot avail the plaintiff in this regard because a holder of a Certificate of Occupancy enjoys only a presumption rebuttable in law by the existence or subsistence of a better title donated by a person with a higher holding capacity. Unfortunately, they did not go further to show the existence of a better title than Exhibit A, donated by a person with a higher holding capacity than the 1st defendant who issued said Exhibit A. My humble view with regard to the aforementioned decided cases is that they do avail the plaintiff in this instance. I find support for this position in the more recent case of MADU V. MADU (2008) 6 NWLR Pg 296 @ 319 – 320 Para H-A. Where the court cited with approval EZEANNA V. ATTA. And while reiterating this position of the law the supreme court also had this to say:

“Once a person is granted a Certificate of Occupancy over a parcel of land, he is entitled to hold same to the exclusion of any other person unless and until the Certificate of Occupancy is set aside. See GANIKON V. UGOCHUKWU CHEM. IND. LTD (1993) 6 NWLR (pt.297) 55. And documents of title are clear evidence of transaction between the parties thereto. See ATUNRASE & ORS V. PHILIPS & ORS. (1996) 1 NWLR (pt.427) 637.”

The 1st and 2nd defendants in their reply on points of law, also, while conceding to the powers of the plaintiff to purchase land by virtue of the NDDC ACT, argued that the ultimate owner of whatever property so purchased by the plaintiff is the Federal Government. They did not refer this court to the provision of the LAND USE ACT or any other enabling Law where the holder of a Certificate of Occupancy was distinguished from the ‘ultimate owner’ as canvassed by them. The

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Certificate of Occupancy itself clearly shows that, it granted a right of occupancy over the said land to the plaintiff. It is clear and supported by judicial precedent that the holder of a certificate of occupancy is the owner in exclusive possession of the land. And I am fortified in this view by the holding of the court in same MADU V. MADU (Supra) at 320 para C-D where ADEREMI J.S.C. restated this position thus:

“This court in its decisions in OSAZUWA V. OJO (1999) 13 NWLR (pt.634) 286; SHOGO V. ADEBAYO (2000) 14 NWLR (pt.686) 121 and EZEANAN V. ATTA (2004) 4 M.J.S.C.I, held that a Certificate of Occupancy properly issued as in the instant case where there is no dispute that the document was properly issued by a competent authority raised that the holder is the owner in exclusive possession of the land. The Certificate also raises the presumption that at the time it was issued, there was not in existence a customary owner whose title has not been revoked. It should however be noted that the presumption is rebuttable because if it is proved by evidence that another person had a better title to the land before the issuance of the Certificate of Occupancy in which case the Certificate of Occupancy will stand revoked by the court.”

Even if the Federal Government is the absolute owner of the property as canvassed by the defence, the said Federal Government has not been joined in this suit and Exhibits B, C, J, M and L shows clearly that it was the 1st and 2nd defendants that sold the plaintiffs property to the 3rd and 4th defendants. Moreover the 1st and 2nd defendants have not denied selling the property. Even Section 1 and 51(2) of the Land Use Act are still subject to the same provisions of the Land Use Act. It is not in evidence that anyone had a better title than the 1st defendant before the issuance of Exhibit A to the plaintiff, so the presumption of ownership cannot be rebutted on that ground. The

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above aforementioned authorities buttress the fact of the existence of a subsisting certificate of occupancy in respect of the property, the subject matter of this case, being held by Plaintiff. The 3rd and 4th defendants in their written address in one breath concede that the certificate of occupancy is valid, and that it is the said validity that qualified it for the monetization exercise. And in another breath urged the court to hold that it had been revoked by operation of law vis: the monetization policy on sale of Federal Government Houses, with the guidelines which they posit is a rule of practice. The defendants have argued that the ownership of the property in question is in the Federal Government since the plaintiff is a commission of the Federal Government. And that the property in question is meant for residential purpose and not commercial. That based on this the 1st and 2nd defendants, acting as agents of the Federal Government had the requisite authority to sell the property and that they had in fact already issued new Certificates of occupancy in respect of the property in favour of the 3rd and 4th defendants. And that the monetization policy has a force of law fused into the Gazette. The defendants argued in their conclusion that there is no overlap of functions between the Land Use Act and the approved guidelines for the sale. All these having been said, it is expedient at this stage to bear in mind that the main question for determination in these issues is whether the defendants validly sold the property in question to 3rd parties during the subsistence of a certificate of occupancy validly issued to the plaintiff in respect of same property less than nine months before by the 1st defendant.

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As observed earlier on, the issue of an ultimate owner different from the title holder outside the grantor and grantee expressed in the certificate of occupancy is not contemplated by the Land Use Act. Moreover this position has been clarified by the court in decided cases such as those cited above that, the holder of the certificate of occupancy is the owner of the land. See MADU V MADU (SUPRA) EZEANAH V. ATTA (SUPRA) Whereas the defendants argue that they had the requisite authority to sell the property inspite of the pendency of the certificate of occupancy already issued because the property belongs to the Federal Government, the NDDC ACT makes the commission a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal and empowers the plaintiff to purchase, lease construct and sell property. See Section 1 and 22 of the NIGER DELTA DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION ACT (hereinafter referred to as the NDDC ACT) which provides that:

1. “There is hereby established a body to be known as the Niger-Delta Development Commission (in this Act referred to as "the Commission").

2. The Commission- a. shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and

a common seal;

b. may sue and be sued in its corporate name.

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3. The Commission shall have its head office in Port Harcourt, Rivers State and shall establish an office in each member State of the Commission. ”

While SECTION 22 provides that: “

1. For the purposes of providing offices and premises necessary for the performance of its functions under this Act, the Commission may, subject to the Land Use Act- a. purchase or take on lease any interest in land, or other

property; and b. construct offices and premises and equip and maintain same.

2. The Commission may, subject to the Land Use Act, sell or lease

out any office or premises held by it, which office or premises is no longer required for the performance of its functions under this Act.”

There’s nothing in the Act precluding plaintiff from owning property for the performance of its functions, neither is there any provision therein for deviation from compliance with the land use Act. Similarly no provision of the Federal Capital TERRITORY ACT precludes the 1ST & 2nd defendants from compliance with the provisions of the Land Use Act. And the LAND USE ACT itself doesn’t exempt the PLAINTIFF and the 1st and 2nd defendants from compliance. See Sections 4, 5 (3), 9 (1) & (2), 26, 28 (7) and 44 of the LUA.

SECTION 4 “Until other provisions are made in that behalf and, subject to the provisions of this Act, land under the control and

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management of the Governor under this Act shall be administered- a. in the case of any State where the Land Tenure Law of the

former Northern Nigeria applies, in accordance with the provisions of that Law; and

b. in every other case, in accordance with the provisions of the State Land Law applicable in respect of State land in the State,

and the provisions of the Land Tenure Law or the State Land Law, as the case may be, shall have effect with such modifications as would bring those Laws into conformity with this Act or its general intendment.”

SECTION 5 (3) 3. Upon the grant of a statutory right of occupancy under the

provisions of subsection (1) of this section, all existing rights to the use and occupation of the land which is the subject of the statutory right of occupancy shall be extinguished.”

SECTION 9 (1) and (2)

1. It shall be lawful for the Governor-

a when granting a statutory right of occupancy to any person; or

b when any person is in occupation of land under a

customary right of occupancy and applies in the prescribed manner; or

c when any person is entitled to a statutory right of

occupancy, to issue a certificate under his hand in evidence of such right of occupancy.

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2 Such certificate shall be termed a certificate of occupancy and there shall be paid therefore, by the person in whose name it is issued, such fee (if any) as may be prescribed.

SECTION 26 “ Any transaction or any instrument which purports to confer

on or vest in any person any interest or right over land other than in accordance with the provisions of this Act shall be null and void.”

SECTION 28 (7)

“ The title of the holder of a right of occupancy shall be extinguished on receipt by him of a notice given under subsection (6) of this section or on such later date as may be stated in the notice.”

SECTION 44

“ Any notice required by this Act to be served on any person shall be effectively served on him-

a by delivering it to the person on whom it is to be served; or

b by leaving it at the usual or last known place of abode

of that person; or c by sending it in a prepaid registered letter addressed

to that person at his usual or last known place of abode; or

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d in the case of an incorporated company or body, by

delivering it to the secretary or clerk of the company or body at its registered or principal office or sending it in a prepaid registered letter addressed to the secretary or clerk of the company or body at that office; or

e if it is not practicable after reasonable inquiry to

ascertain the name or address of a holder or occupier of land on whom it should be served, by addressing it to him by the description of "holder" or "occupier" of the premises (naming them) to which it relates, and by delivering it to some person on the premises or, if there is no person on the premises to whom it can be delivered, by affixing it, or a copy of it, to some conspicuous part of the premises.”

The defendants in their final addresses made heavy weather about the issue of revocation raised by the plaintiff. They proffered that it is not reflected in the pleadings of the parties and therefore not an issue before the court. With due respect to the defence counsel, that argument is misconceived as the issue of subsistence and non revocation of the Certificate of occupancy was pleaded in paragraph 26 of the statement of claim and the defendants denied this in paragraphs 4 and 1 of their respective statements of defence. Pursuant to that, the defence witnesses testified under cross-examination that they were aware that the certificate of occupancy was not revoked. To say therefore that the issue of revocation did not come up before the court is not quite correct because the non-revocation of the plot has definitely arisen before this court. This is more so when one of the final heads of claim in the statement of claim, No. C is to the effect that the certificate of occupancy has not been revoked. Be that as it may, their argument in this regard is of no moment under the circumstance, as all the parties concede that the

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certificate of occupancy has not been revoked. This is the basis of the contention, that the defendants had no right to sell the property in the first place. The questions raised in paragraph 2.11 of the 1st and 2nd defendants reply on points of law as questions arising from the plaintiff’s issues for determination are misconstrued as they were never part of the issues raised for determination by the plaintiff. The 1st and 2nd Defendants listed them as follows:

a) Whether the sale of FGN houses was formulated and implemented by the 1st Defendant.

b) Whether the money used in purchasing the property in dispute was not sourced from the Federation Account.

c) Whether the 1st Defendant ought to have revoked Exhibit A in line with Section 28 of the Land Use Act bearing in mind that the decision to sale the FGN houses was not of the 1st Defendant but of the Federal Government.

d) Whether it was the 1st Defendant who re-acquired Exhibit A and not the Federal Government.

e) Whether the proceeds from the sale of FGN houses accrued to the 1st Defendant and not the Federal Government.

They are extraneous issues not envisaged by the plaintiff’s statement of claim and merely alluded to in the statement of defence. The said questions actually emanate from the defendants stand point that the sale was in accordance with the gazetted approved guidelines for sale of Federal Government property. Gazette as referred to by defendants to my mind refers to official communication of Government of its’ policies or activities.

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The gazette in question was not tendered nor exhibited before this court, albeit the defendants urged the court to take judicial notice of same in accordance with Sc. 122 of the Evidence Act. The fact that official information in the form of a Gazette exist on the approved guidelines or for a designated subject matter, to my mind does not automatically serve as proof that the said gazette enjoys a force of law over and above other previously existing laws already promulgated on the said subject. The existence therefore of the Gazetted approved guidelines cannot be an automatic rubber stamp for sale of the plaintiff’s property. The court must examine the contents thereof to determine its function in this regard. The weight to be attached to the contents of the gazette is a matter of inference to be drawn from the established surrounding circumstances of the case. See on this OUR LINE LIMITED V. S.C.C. NIGERIA LIMITED & ORS. (2009) LPELR-2833(SC) OR S. C. C (NIG.) LTD. V. OUR LINE LTD. (2009) 17 NWLR (PT. 1170) 382 where the court held that:

“A Gazette therefore serves as official communication of the Government of Nigeria or of any State thereof or of any Local Government. As documentary evidence, the contents of a Gazette, as stated in the law, is prima facie proof of any fact of a public nature, which the Gazette is intended to notify. The subject to be tested for credibility, weight or cogency to determine its acceptability. In this respect, the weight to be attached to a document, like the Official Gazette in the present case, is a matter of inference to be drawn from established facts and in this regard both the trial Court and the Appellate Court are in the same position when the question involved, is the proper weight to be attached to the document. See Attorney General, Oyo State v. Fairlakes Hotels Limited (1989) 5 N.W.L.R. (pt. 121) 255 at 282 - 283; Ayeni v. Dada (1978) 3

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S.C. 35 at 61 and Akinola v. Oluwo (1962) 1 All N.L.R. 224; (1962) 1 S.C.N.L.R. 352." Per MAHMUD MOHAMMED, J.S.C”

One significant thing missing from the submissions of the defendants in their address and their reply to plaintiff’s final address is a suitable clarification and direct reply to the plaintiff’s argument in its issue No. 4 that the gazetted approved guidelines on sale of Federal Government Houses cannot override the LAND USE ACT and therefore the CONSTITUTION. THE DEFENDANTS have not referred to any laws, statutory provisions or authorities giving precedence to or elevating the status of the said gazette over and above the LAND USE ACT, NDDC ACT, FCT ACT and of course the Constitution. As a matter of fact the DW1 under cross examination testified that he is not aware that the property was acquired by the plaintiff other than through Government allocation nor that the plaintiff was issued with a recertified Certificate of occupancy. In effect this defence witness actually had the belief that the plaintiff acquired the property through Government allocation. However this does not form part of their defence. The defendants have not succeeded in drawing that necessary correlation between the said gazetted policy and approved guidelines and the enabling provisions of the Land Use Act and the CONSTITUTION or any other enabling law for that matter. The defendants argument that there is no overlap of functions between guidelines and the Land Use Act cannot avail them under the circumstance, not in the face of the subsisting C of O, Exhibit A and the new Certificates of Occupancy purportedly issued in respect of the same property. The failure of the defendants to establish the propriety of their action by virtue of the said gazetted approved guidelines gives credence to the principle that in the course of compulsory acquisition of a

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person’s property, the enabling provision of the law must be construed strictly against the acquiring authority and sympathetically in favour of the party complaining about the acquisition. On this principle see: C. S. S. BOOKSHOP LTD V. R. T. M. C. R.S (2006) 11 NWLR (Part 992) pg 530 AT 577 para E-G where his lordship adumbrated on this principle as follows:

"The case law is in great proliferation. Any provision of the law which gives or governs compulsory acquisition of a person's property must be construed by the court fortissimo contra preferentes. Such a statute should be construed by the court strictly against the acquiring authority and sympathetically in favour of the complainant or the owner or possessor of the property against any irregularity in the procedure for acquisition as laid down by the enabling statute. See Peenock Investments Ltd. v. Hotel Presidential Ltd. (1983) 4 NCLR 122 at 115; Alhaji Bello v. Diocesan Synod of Lagos (1973) 1 All NLR (Pt. 1) 247 at 268; Nigerian Telecommunications Ltd. v. Chief Ogunbiyi (1992) 7 NWLR (Pt 255) 543; Osho v. Foreign Finance Corporation (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt. 184) 157."

The alleged issuance of new Certificates of Occupancy by the 1st and 2nd defendants to the 3rd and 4th defendants is self defeating. The said newly issued certificates were not tendered before this court, albeit there’s no evidence challenging their existence. That piece of evidence is therefore uncontroverted. It is safe under the circumstance to infer that there are currently several Certificates of Occupancy issued in respect of the same property to different persons at different times. How can that be? This action directly contravenes, inter alia, the provision of Section 9 and 26 of the Land Use Act.

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SECTION 26 of the LUA actually sums it all up. It provides that :

“Any transaction or any instrument which purports to confer on or vest in any person any interest or right over land other than in accordance with the provisions of this Act shall be null and void.”

There cannot be more than one subsisting valid Certificate of Occupancy in respect of one and the same property at the same time, when the right over the subsisting one issued first in time has not been extinguished. Whichever one was issued during the valid subsistence of another, it is void and liable to be set aside. Credence was given to this viewpoint in MADU V. MADU (SUPRA) PAGE 319 PARA H where his lordship ADEREMI JSC reiterated that:

''Once a person is granted a Certificate of Occupancy over a parcel of land, he is entitled to hold same to the exclusion of any other person unless and until the Certificate of Occupancy is set aside.'' Per ADEREMI, JSC.

See also GANKON V. UGOCHUKWU CHEM. IND. LTD(1993) 6 NWLR (PT.297) 55. And CSS BOOKSHOP LTD V. R.T.M.C.R,S (SUPRA) or (2006) LPELR- SC.307/2001 PG 36 Paras.A-C where the court stated that:

“This court has held in several decisions that the mere grant of a right of occupancy over an existing right of occupancy or interest, does not amount to the revocation of such existing interest as was being suggested in various arguments behind section 5(2) of the Land Use Act.”

Per Mohammed, J.S.C.

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The defendants have not succeeded in establishing that the approved guidelines on sale of Federal Government Houses carries a force of law that overrides Section, 9, 26, 28(7) and other relevant provisions of the Land Use Act nor that the purported sale does not conflict with the provisions of the Land Use Act, NDDC ACT and the CONSTITUTION. The Defendants have argued that the approved guidelines carries a force of law. The question is “what force of law” does it carry that has a greater influence than the provisions of statute or enactment such as those mentioned above. To what extent under the circumstance is the approved guidelines Law? It is trite that law generally is embodied in rules and principles of conduct decreed by the legislature, derived from judicial decisions and established by local Customs. They have failed however to show that it was promulgated by the legislature, it derived its force of law from interpretation or enforcement as such in a judicial decision or recognition by the courts as established, as law, by local custom. To which category of these does the “approved guidelines belong?” Suffice to say that the defendants have failed to draw a proper correlation between the Land Use Act, NDDC ACT, the CONSTITUTION and the guidelines on sale of Federal Government Houses in the sale of the plaintiff’s property to 3rd and 4th defendants. They have therefore failed to establish the validity of the sale of the property of the plaintiff to the 3rd and 4th defendants. Issue number one is therefore resolved in favour of the plaintiff. Issue number two is Whether under the circumstances the property has been lawfully sold by the 1st and 2nd defendants to the 3rd and 4th defendants. The question that arises in this issue under the circumstances is whether the 3rd and 4th defendants could have acquired a valid title when the right of the previous holder was not revoked? The answer

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is in the negative because Section 28(7) of the Land Use Act provides that:

“The title of the holder of a right of occupancy shall be extinguished on receipt by him of a notice given under subsection (6) of this section or on such later date as may be stated in the notice”.

Even the defendants in this case have admitted that the plaintiff’s certificate of occupancy was not and has still not been revoked. Since the plaintiff has not received any notice of revocation of its title in the said property, his right to same has not been extinguished and is still therefore valid and subsisting. See MADU V. MADU (SUPRA) PAGE 326 PARA B-D. where his lordship ONU JSC while citing with approval several decided cases had this to say on the above matter: In OLOHUNDE V. ADEYOJU OPIT CIT AT 588 Iguh, J.S.C. held that:

"for a Certificate of Occupancy under the Land Use Act, 1978 to be therefore valid, there must not be in existence at the time the certificate issued, a statutory or customary owner of the land in issue who was not divested of his legal interest to the land prior to the grant. "

See also DANTSOHO V. MOHAMMED (2003) 6 NWLR (PRT 817) PG 457 AT 490 PARA D-E. Where the Supreme Court per BELGORE JSC held that:

“The law is very clear in matters relating to grant of right of occupancy. It is only by the inverted reading of the provisions of Land Use Act and Land Tenure Law of an existing grant of right

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of occupancy that a latter grant could destroy. Once a grant or right exists, it can only be extinguished by a lawful revocation and not by another grant to a different person”

These authorities become relevant in cases where a claimant has proved that he has a prior and un-extinguished title to the land so that the new right of occupancy cannot override, extinguish or have priority over that existing right. This is the situation here where the plaintiff in her evidence has given a blow by blow account of how their title to the property was acquired. The 1st and 2nd defendants who had already issued a subsisting C of O to the plaintiff in respect of the property in question had at that time no such title to pass to the 3rd and 4th defendants. This brings to mind the maxim---NEMO DARE POTEST QUOD NON HABET—meaning—No one can give that which he does not have. See also on this ALHAJI AMINU DANTSOHO V. ALHAJI ABUBAKAR MOHAMMED (2003) 13 NSCQR P.1 @ 18—19 PARA G-C OR (2003) LPELR-926(SC) PG 31 – 32 OR (2003)6 NWLR (PRT 817) PG. 457 @493 PARA H-A the court was of the view that:

“So where a right of occupancy is involved, either in the nature of a statutory or customary right of occupancy upon the issuance of a right of occupancy or through a deemed right of occupancy by operation of sections 34(2) and 36(4) of the Act, a later grant of a right of occupancy under section 5(1) cannot ipso facto, by operation of section 5(2), extinguish the earlier right already vested. It will be necessary first to revoke that earlier right of occupancy for overriding public interest or for any of the other reasons as specified under section 28: see Olohunde v. Adeyoju (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt. 676) 562 at 597.”

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Also in BOYE INDUSTRIES LIMITED & ANOR V. SOWEMIMO (2009) LPELR-8858 (P.23, PARAS.A-F) Per SALAMI, J.C.A. reiterated thus:

“The respondents having failed to establish compliance with the provisions of the Act, the acquisition, in my view, is bad ab initio and any act predicated upon the unlawful acquisition is equally bad. The acquisition on behalf of the Federal Government as well as subsequent grant to the third respondent are bad. Nemo dat qui non habet or nemo dare potest quod non habet meaning he who hath not cannot give or no man can give that which he has not. The purported grant to the third respondent is void ab initio because nothing comes out of nothing, that is ex nihilo nihil fit." See also Lagos State Development & Property Corporation & Others V. Foreign Finance Corporation (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt 50) 413, The Attorney General of Bendel State & Ors V. Aideyan (1980) 4 NWLR (Pt 118) 646, 676 S.C; Osho & Anor V. Foreign Finance Corporation & Another (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt 184) 157, SC and N.E.W Ltd V. Denap Ltd (1997) 10 NWLR (pt 525) 481.”

It is clear that the 3rd and 4th defendants could not have acquired a valid title to the property in question under the circumstance. There cannot exist at the same time two or more valid Certificate of Occupancy issued to different persons in respect of the same property. If actually certificates of Occupancy had been severally issued to them in respect of this property, these documents under the circumstance would only amount to worthless pieces of paper. Suffice to say that the sale of plaintiff’s property to the 3rd and 4th defendant by the 1st and 2nd defendant evidenced by Exhibits J and M was unlawful and invalid. Issue number two is therefore also resolved in favour of the plaintiff.

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The third issue is whether the plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs sought in the statement of claim. In view of the resolution of the first and second issues, the claims before the court would be taken one after the other in the resolution of issue three. The first claim is a declaration on the illegality of the ejection of the plaintiff from the premises. The plaintiff’s averment and evidence that they were ejected by the 1st and 2nd defendants on the 23rd of November 2006 was neither contradicted nor controverted by the defendants. Exhibit C the quit notice and Exhibit L are clear on the fact that the plaintiff was ejected from the premises pursuant to the sale of same to third parties. Having found the purported sale to have been unlawfully done, the ejection of the plaintiff pursuant to the such sale which the plaintiff has proved by a preponderance of evidence, therefore cannot be legal and lawful under the circumstance. The 1st and 2nd defendants cannot be allowed to benefit from their own wrong. See CHIEF S. O. AGBAREH & ANOR V. DR. ANTHONY MIMRA & ORS. (2008) LPELR-235(SC) or (2008) NWLR (PART 1071) 378 @ 424 para F-H where his lordship OGBUAGU JSC pronounced as follows:

“In my respectful view, this is a classic case where greed and perfidy of man are manifested in a very repulsive and often, mean manner. The 2nd respondent although a company and a juristic entity, was/is run by a human being. The lesson however, to humanity men and women alike and the so called businessmen, are firstly, that the courts cannot permit or allow any person to benefit from his own wrong. Secondly, every intrigue or dishonesty by any human being has an "invisible track, a loophole, weak or vulnerable spot.”

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The ejection of the plaintiff is therefore found to be unlawful. The plaintiff has succeeded in proving this claim and same hereby succeeds. The second claim is a declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to the plot in question by virtue of the subsisting Certificate of Occupancy issued to it in October 2005 by the 1st defendant. The action of the 1st and 2nd defendant in selling the property while title is still vested in the plaintiff is in contravention of the provisions of the relevant laws. And the authority under which they sold is ultravires and to the extent of this conflict with the LUA and the CONSTITUTION null and void. Having found the purported sale to the 3rd and 4th defendants unlawful, it is clear without further ado that the title in the property is still vested in the plaintiff. The plaintiff has succeeded in proving this claim, same therefore succeeds. The third claim is for a declaration that the purported sale of the property is unlawful, malicious and ultra-vires the defendant. The defendant has not succeeded in showing that the property was sold to the 3rd and 4th defendant under lawful authority, the purported sale is therefore found to be illegal and unlawful. This claim therefore also hereby succeeds. The fourth claim is for an order of perpetual injunction against the defendants in respect of the plot. The plaintiff having proved the declaratory orders sought ordinarily ought to be entitled to injunctive orders pursuant to the said declarations in their favour. Credence was given to this principle in AKINDURO V. ALANYA (2007) 15 NWLR Prt. 1057 Pg. 312 at 322, where the court reiterated this position as follows:

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“It must always be remembered that a court, at the end of a successful prosecution of a land matter and where there is a claim for an order of injunction; a Court which has granted a prayer for declaration or title, will readily grant an order of injunction to prevent multiplicity of suits or to prevent irreparable damage, or injury or irremediable mischief.”

Suffice to say that it has been established that injunctive orders ought to be made against the defendants under the circumstance. The fifth claim is for an order restoring the plaintif back to the premises. Having found the sale and ejection to be unlawful, it also follows that the plaintiff ought to be restored back to the premises. This claim therefore and the sixth claim also hereby succeeds. The seventh claim is for general damages for causing obstruction to plaintiff’s daily operations. The plaintiff in their statement of claim and evidence before the court restated they were severally issued with notice/and letters to vacate the premises, threatened ejection and eventually forcefully ejected from the premises, on 23rd November, 2006. It is trite that general damages does not requires strict proof. It flows naturally from the wrongful act of the defendant complained of. See OWENA MASS TRANSPORTATION CO. LTD V. IMAFIDAON (2011) LPER – 4810 (CA)

“General damages flow naturally from the wrongful act of a defendant complained of. See THE SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY OF NIGERIA LIMITED V. CHIEF G.B. A TIEBO VII (SUPRA) AT 466 PARA”. C, PER OGUNTADE, JSC.

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To succeed a claimant does not require to strictly prove general damages as in the case of special damages. PROF. AJIBAYO AKINKUGBE V. EWULUM HOLDINGS NIG. LTD & ANOR (2008) LPELR – 346 (SC) OR 2008 12 NWLR (PT. 1098) PG 375 AT 390 – 391 PARA D-G General damage consists in all items of loss which the plaintiff is not required to specify in his pleadings in order to permit proof and recovery of them at the trial. See also UTB (NIG) LTD V. AJAGBULE (2006) 2 NWLR (PT.965) PG 447 AT 498 M.W.T (NIG) LTD V. P.T.F (2007) 15 NWLR (PT.1058) 451 AT 482 – 483 PARA H – A. ARTRA IND. NIG. LTD V. N.B.C (1998) 4 NWLR (PT.546) PG 357 In view of threat of ejection the uncontroverted evidence of eventual forceful ejection and the sale of the plaintiff’s property to 3rd parties who have since been in occupation despite the subsistence of plaintiff’s Right of Occupancy, the claim for damages also hereby succeeds. Consequently and in the light of the foregoing and for the avoidance of doubt, this court hereby makes orders as follows:

1. A declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to plot 636 A & B Nkwame Nkrumah Crescent, Asokoro Abuja by virtue of Certificate of Occupancy No. MISC 55759 dated 25th day of October, 2005 issued to it as the lawful allotee of the plot and also by virtue of the

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receipt of payment and re-certificate of the same plot in accordance with the directive of the Ministry. 2. A declaration that the purported sale of the Plaintiff’s Plots 636 A & B Nkwame Nkrumah Crescent Asokoro Abuja to 3rd and 4th Defendants is illegal, unlawful, and ultra-vires the Defendant since the Certificate of Occupancy granted to plaintiff is still subsisting and has not been revoked.

3. A declaration that the purported ejection of the Plaintiff by the 1st and 2nd Defendants from plots 636 A & B Kwame Nkrumah Crescent, Asokoro Abuja is illegal, unlawful, and unjust. Accordingly further orders are made as follows;

4. An order of perpetual injunction restraining all the Defendants whether by themselves, their agents, privies and servants from further unlawfully and illegally interfering with and/or transferring the plot in question to any other person(s).

5. An order directing the ejection of the 3rd and 4th Defendants to

whom the property was purportedly sold by the 1st and 2nd Defendants.

6. An order of the court restoring the plaintiff back to the premises.

7. Damages of N1,000,000.00 (One Million Naira) is awarded in favour of the plaintiff against the 1st and 2nd defendants.

(Signed) Honourable Judge

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F. C. IKPE Esq., CHINWE UZU (MS) Esq., COSY A. (MISS) Esq., T. B. MAIYANKI Esq., For the Plaintiff C. M. MAKOJI (MRS) Esq., O. J. IKPEGONG Esq., S. A. OKE Esq., S.O. K. GIWA Esq., K. O. LAWAL Esq., and NAMA B. AHMED Esq., For the 1st and 2nd Defendants K. T. SULAIMAN (MISS) for the 3rd and 4th Defendants