in the aftermath of invalidation: shaping judgment rules on...

JOURNAL OF CONSUMER PSYCHOLOGY, 9(4), 213-222 copyright O 2000, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

In the Aftermath of Invalidation: Shaping Judgment Rules on Learning That Previous Information Was Invalid

David Mazursky School of Business Administration Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Yaacov Schul Department of Psychology

Hebrew University of Jerusalem

This study explores whether and how judgment procedures used in evaluating product information are modified after consumers have found that information they had received in the past was invalid. It shows that, following exposure to invalidating messages, respondents tend to switch their dominant mode of processing. In particular, those who focused on the source in making a judgment prior to invalidation (i.e., those using simple processing) switch to a more complex processing of the product information. In contrast, those who previously relied on product information simplify their processing and consider information they have about the source in making judgments. The results are consistent with a cognitive resource explanation that attributes switch in processing mode to the enhanced cognitive demands imposed by attempts to cope with the invalidation.

Consumers are sometimes offered information about products, including claims later found to be invalid. Such claims might result from attempts to mislead consumers (i.e., decep- tive advertising) or from more mundane errors that are not the consequence of an intention to deceive (e.g., when a reduced price tag is unintentionally misplaced). Past research has focused on the effectiveness of policies that are aimed at cor- recting or undoing the impact of the invalid information. This has been investigated in research on corrective advertising (e.g., Dyer & Kuehl, 1978; Mazis &Adkinson, 1976; Schul & Mazursky, 1990), in the discounting paradigm (e.g., Ander- son, Lepper, & Ross, 1980; Golding, Fowler, Long, & Latta, 1990; Schul & Burnstein, 1985), and in research on the sleeper effect (e.g., Hannah & Sternthal, 1984; Mazursky & Schul, 1988). This study explores the consequences of invalidation experiences for processing information about other brands. Specifically, we examine whether and how the judgment procedures used in evaluating product information are

Requests for reprints should be sent to David Mazursky, Hebrew Univer- sity of Jerusalem. School of Business Administration. Mount Sco~us. Jerusa-

modified by consumers who found that information they had received in the past was invalid.

At a general level, the invalidation of information might lead consumers to question their past judgments and reassess the strategies they previously employed in forming their judgments (Bettman, 1979). In persuasion research, two general classes of strategies for making judgments have been identified-simplified and complex types of processing. Simplified processing involves the invocation of a few (often one) decision rule(s) based on surface aspects of the persuasive communication. The procedure is termed simple to de- note the reduction of the complexity of the task through the use of a single surface cue to evaluate the message. Use of simple procedures has been termed heuristic processing (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989) or use of theperipheral route (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). For example, the persuasive impact of a communication might be determined by the ex- pertise of the source (Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 198 1) or by his or her attractiveness (Petty, Cacioppo, & Schumann, 1983). In these situations, processing is simplified by relying on the source (whlch is not an inherent part of the product description) and by avoiding processing of attribute information. Complex processing, in contrast, involves extensive . ,

lem 91905, Israel. E-mail: [email protected] processing of the informational content of the message. It has

21 4 MAZURSKY AND SCHUL

been shown that decisions based on evaluation of the different claims in the message are costly in terms of the time they take and the cognitive resources they require (Burnstein & Schul, 1982; Sanbonrnatsu & Fazio, 1990).

Past research does not provide a clear answer as to whether the exposure to invalidating messages leads to a more complex or a more simplified processing of new information. On the one hand, several studies are consistent with the idea that following invalidation consumers might switch fiom complex to simplified processing if the task is, or is expected to be, complex. Such shifts were observed when cognitive resources were taxed by counterattitudinal messages (Osterhouse & Brock, 1970), when the medium used for transmitting complex messages reduced processing capacity (e.g., video, as opposed to written presentations; Chaiken & Eagly, 1976), and when the expected ability to complete a task successfully was low (Frieze, Parsons, Johnson, Ruble, & Zellman, 1978; see also Payne, 1976, for a similar prediction in the decision-malung literature). Indeed, Petty and Cacioppo (1 986) predicted that when receivers have limited available cognitive resources, they rely on peripheral cues even when they are highly motivated to process message information. Because consumers who have discovered the in- validity of previous information might view the task of processing new information as more complex, they might switch fiom the more effortfil complex processing to the less complex, simplified processing mode. Accordingly, hypothesis H 1 predicts simplification of the judgment procedure following invalidation.

H 1 : Following invalidation of previous information, consumers switch to a simplified judgment mode in forming new judgments.

On the other hand, arguments can be marshaled in support of the opposite tendency-namely, that consumers increase the complexity of their processing following the invalidation of previous information. Chalken et al. (1989) suggested that people are "economy-minded souls," meaning that they attempt to process information with the least amount of effort needed to achieve a judgment. They argued that at the time people make a judgment they set a threshold for their desired confidence in the judgment response. Receivers are assumed to continue processing information for their judgment until that confidence criterion is met. It follows that factors such as the invalidation ofprevious information that could elevate the threshold would lead to an increase in processing effort.

Increase in the complexity of processing following invalidation is also consistent with an analysis ofthe effect of suspi- cion on processing new information: Having experienced information invalidation, consumers might become alert to the possibility that the new information will also contain invalid claims. Suspecting receivers might increase the complexity of their processing in an attempt to identify the invalid claims and prepare to cope with them once they are identified

(Schul, Bumtein, & Bardi, 1996). This rationale leads to the alternative hypothesis H2.

H2: Following invalidation of previous information, consumers switch to a complex processing mode in forming new judgments.

The question emanating fiom this analysis is whether one of the two contrasting effects of invalidation-namely, in- creasing and decreasing processing complexity-tend to appear ubiquitously or whether the dominating effect depends on the way judgments were made prior to invalidation. It is quite possible that the effect of the exposure of invalidation for those who used complex processing prior to an invalidation experience differs fiom those who previously used simplified processing.

The invalidating cue calls into question both the reliability of the source communicating the message and the message information itself. Those who previously utilized complex processing might seek a cue for examining the reliability of the source and the information so as to minimize the high expected resources needed for evaluating and comparing the new information with the previously processed information. Because concern about reliability is heightened following invalidation, relative reliance on the source is likely to increase. Thus, former complex processors might decrease the complexity of processing after invalidation.

The invalidation experience might lead to opposite consequences for those who previously utilized a simplified processing strategy. This strategy, often characterized as inertia decisionmalung (Solomon, 1996), is interrupted by the invalidation experience. The invalidating cue indicates the inap- propriateness of simple processing as a sufficiently accurate judgment rule. Because processors who previously allocated minimal efforts to the judgment task have more cognitive resources to spare, they might have both the ability and opportunity (Sanbonmatsu & Fazio, 1990) to engage in more efforthl processing. As a consequence, they are likely to increase complexity of their processing following an experience of invalidation. These contrasting effects are summarized in our thud hypothesis, H3.

H3: Following invalidation of information, participants switch their dominant mode ofprocessing.

In particular, H3 predicts that those who focused on the source in making a judgment prior to invalidation (i.e., those using simplified processing) switch to a more complex processing of the product information. In contrast, those who previously relied in the main on the product information and ignored information about the source simplify their strategy and base their judgments on information they have about the source.

The two experiments, described following, classified individuals according to their processing orientation (simplified or complex) to explore whether their processing approaches

SHAPING JUDGMENT RULES 21 5

are affected differently by the invalidation of information. In Experiment 1 individuals were classified as simplified versus complex processors according to their status of car ownership, whereas in Experiment 2 simplified versus complex processors were categorized according to their issue involvement. Despite the very different ways in which simplified and complex processors were classified, we expect to find in both experiments that, following invalidation of previously ac- quired information, complex processors would switch their processing orientation to simplified processing, whereas simplified information processors would shift to complex processing. Use of complex versus simplified processing is indicated in the two experiments by three different measures: sensitivity to information about the source, sensitivity to the attribute information, and amount of time needed for processing. Experiment 2 further investigated the potential mecha- nisms that underlie the switch in strategy.

EXPERIMENT 1-

Overview

Participants in Experiment 1 received information about several cars. They were classified according to whether they ever owned a car (high-experience group) or never owned a car (low-experience group). Past research suggests that high-experience individuals are more llkely to use complex processing in evaluating relevant products than individuals with low experience (Wood, Kallgren, & Priesler, 1985). We hypothesize, therefore, that, prior to invalidation, owners (high experience) utilize complex processing, whereas nonowners (low experience) tend to process the message in a more simplified manner. More important, it is hypothesized that, following invalidation, owners will resort to simplified processing, whereas nonowners will switch to a more complex processing.

The experiment consisted of two phases. In the first phase participants received attribute information regarding three cars. After receiving the information about these cars, halfthe participants were given a counter-message challenging the validity of one of the attributes. This constituted the manipulation of invalidation. Shortly afterwards, all participants received information about three new cars. Halfthe participants were told that the source of the information was the same one that had provided the information in the first phase, whereas the other half were told that the source was a different, more credible source. None of the attributes were marked invalid in the second phase. Participants' evaluations of the new cars, the variance in evaluations, and their judgment time serve as our dependent variables.

Participants. A group of 116 students participated in Experiment 1 as part of their class requirement. A prize of $60 was offered for the best performance, defined as the one most

similar to that of experts in this field. The experiment was run in a setting of 1 participant per monitor in a computer interactive task. The experimenter monitored groups of 3 to 5 participants in each session.

Stimuli and procedure. In a computer interactive task, participants were provided with information about three cars. The information was attributed to a car review reporter on a daily newspaper. Six attributes were used to characterize the cars. Each of the attributes appeared on a different screen along with the values of the attributes for the three cars. The attributes included were: (a) road performance, (b) driving convenience, (c) the internal space, (d) maneuverability when driving in the city, (e) ease ofdriving in highways, and (f) reliability of the brakes. Attribute values were presented on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (low) to 9 (high).

After participants inspected all the information about the three cars, half of them (hereafter the "invalidation" condition) were provided with a counter-message that invalidated the earlier report pertaining to the reliability of the brakes. This counter-message was attributed to a group of experts who evaluated the cars. It contended that the reporter's evaluation was based on the manufacturer's information and did not contain feedback from various car repair shops. This was problematic, so the counter-message continued, because information obtained by these shops indicated they encoun- tered dissatisfaction and complaints by car owners regarding problems with the brake system. Consequently, it was recommended that in evaluating the car, the information provided by the reporter concerning the brakes should be ignored. At thls point, participants evaluated the three cars.

Shortly afterwards, three new cars were described to the participants. The descriptions were in the same format and along the same six attribute dimensions used in the first set. The identity of the source of the information about the new cars served as the second experimental factor and was manip- ulated between participants. Orthogonally to the invalidation factor, half the participants were told that the information about the second set of cars was provided by the same reporter as in the first set. The remaining participants were informed that the information was provided by adifferent source-are- porter on a well-known TV program that focuses on car safety issues. This reporter was reputed to be highly credible.' After viewing all the information about the three cars, participants evaluated the cars. Note that none of the attributes was challenged during this phase.

1A separate pretest conducted with a group of 30 participants drawn !?om the same population confirmed that the TV reporter was perceived as more credible than the first reporter(M= 7.03 and 5.53 forthe two sources, respec- tively), f(29) = 6.56, p < .0001.

Measures. Overall evaluation of each new car was indicated on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (very bad) to 9 (very good). Judgment time was taken by measuring the time interval between the appearance of the questions on the screen and the clicking on the keyboard when participants marked their judgments.

Design. The experiment involved a 2 x 2 x 2 (Ownership x Source Credibility x Invalidation) between-subjects design.

Results

Preliminary analyses. To permit the interpretation of analysis of invalidation effects, we first examined the assumption that car owners engaged in more complex processing than nonowners. Indeed, measurement of the time participants spent on reading the information in the first phase (i.e., the time between appearance of the information on the screen and clicking on the keyboard to observe the next screen) suggested that car owners engaged in relatively more complex processing than did nonowners: The average time owners spent reading the information was 23.9 sec compared to 17.3 sec spent by participants who did not own a car, t(114) = 3 . 1 6 , ~ < .01.

Baseline condition. Half the participants had not undergone the invalidating experience. These participants, therefore, provide a baseline for testing our assumptions that car owners use more complex processing than nonowners. Complex (vs. simplified) processing is indicated by three measures, whose means appear in Tables 1 and 2. Inspection of the entries shows that relative to nonowners, owners who had not experienced invalidation (a) relied less on the characteristics of the source in making their judgments, (b) differen- tiated more between the cars, and (c) took more time in making the judgments. All three tendencies are consistent with our assumption that owners use more complex processing than nonowners. More detailed analyses appear in the three sections following.

Overall car evaluation. The analyses reported following are based on the car evaluations presented during the second phase of the experiment. In this phase, participants were exposed to information attributed to one oftwo sources: either the same source as in the first phase or a source who is well known in our participant population as a highly credible person. Therefore, when participants engage in simplified processing and rely on the source in evaluating the cars, then the difference between the two sources should be pronounced. Under these conditions, evaluations that are based on information conveyed by a superior (highly credible) source ought to be more favorable than those that are based on information conveyed by the same source from the first phase. Conversely, when processing is complex, difference as a fimction of the two sources in evaluations of the cars should be attenuated, because under complex processing the evaluations are based mainly on the qualities of the cars.

According to H3, owners who had experienced invalidation would resort to simplified processing and thus increase reliance on the source relative to owners who did not experience invalidation. In contrast, nonowners would switch from simplified to complex processing and thus decrease reliance on the source relative to nonowners who did not experience invalidation. Opera- tionally, such a pattern of judgments should produce a triple interaction between ownership, source credibility, and invalidation experience, as is exemplified in Table 1. In contrast, H1 and H2 predict main effects with no interactions.

A multivariate analysis ofvariance (MANOVA) was conducted with the three car evaluations as dependent measures and ownership, source credibility, and the invalidation of prior information as three explanatory factors. Means are shown in Table 1. The three-way interaction, F(3, 106) =

3.02, p < .04, was the only significant term in this analysis. Subsequent analyses showed that patterns of judgments for the three cars were similar. To wit, when the three individual car judgments were analyzed as repeated measures, the repeated measure (i.e., the "car" factor) was significant only as a main effect, F(2, 106) = 14.9, p < .001. This effect was expected, due to the planned differences in attribute values among the cars. However, and more important, none of the interaction terms was significant, allowing a meaningful interpretation of the pattern of findings when they were collapsed over the cars.

TABLE 1 Mean Judgments Obtained for the Various Ex~erimental Conditions

Experiment I Experiment 2

Nonowners Car Owners Low Znvolvement High Involvement

Same Credible Same Credible Same Credible Same Credible Mean Judgments Source Source Source Source Source Source Source Source

No invalidation (baseline) 5.67, 6.62b 6.08, 5.88, 6.59, 7.3%~ 6.85, 7.00, Invalidation 5.69, 5.98, 5.62, 6.33b* 7.1 1 , b 6.53, 6.63, 7.40b

Note. Means relating to the same dependent measure that do not share the same subscript differ atp < .05. Subscript b* is different from a atp < .07


TABLE 2 Judgment Variances

Experiment I Experiment 2

Nonowners Car Owners Low Involvement High Involvement

Same Credible Same Credible Same Credible Same Credible Judgment Variance Source Source Source Source Source Source Source Source

No invalidation (baseline) 1.66 1.61 2.21 2.71 1.87 1.68 2.42 2.50 ~nvalidation 2.15 2.21 1.91 1.27 2.97 2.65 1.91 1.67

Note. Painvise comparisons between means indicated no significant difft

H3 predicts a particular form of a triple interaction. Next, we explore this prediction in more detail. Use of complex processing is indicated when the cars are evaluated according to their characteristics rather than according to the source who provides these characteristics. Nonowners who had not had previous information invalidated were expected to use simplified processing, whereas nonowners who had undergone such an experience were expected to switch to the more complex processing of the car attributes and, therefore, to pay little attention to the information about the source. This was indeed the case. An analysis of simple effects conducted within the nonowners group indicated that nonowners who did not experience invalidation used the source information in their evaluation of the car4ifference in evaluations of cars described by hlgh- and low-credibility sources was significant, F(1,106) = 5 . 6 4 , ~ < .02. In contrast, nonowners who were exposed to the invalidating messages did not use the information about the source in evaluating the cars, F(l, 106) = .49, ns.

The opposite pattern occurred with car owners. Car owners who were not exposed to the invalidating message employed complex processing, as indicated by their insensitivity to the characteristics ofthe source, F(l , 106) = .27, ns. In contrast, the evaluations offered by car owners who were exposed to the invalidating message were sensitive to the characteristics of the source, as indicated by the marginally significant differences, F(l , 106) = 3 . 4 4 , ~ < .07.

Judgment variance. Complex processors should be more sensitive than simplified processors to the attribute information. Because the cars were constructed to vary in the attributes and consequently in their overall desirability, it was expected that those using complex processing strategy would differentiate between the cars more strongly than those using simplified processing strategy. Differentiation is estimated by the variance in judgments between the cars. Large variance indicates complex processing, whereas small variance indicates that judgments of the cars are relatively insensitive to the attribute information and might reflect other factors such as the reliability of the source.

We computed the variance of the three judgments in the second phase for each participant. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted with the variance as dependent mea-

sures and ownership, source credibility, and the invalidation of prior information as three explanatory factors. Means are shown in Table 2. The analysis is consistent with the contention that nonowners who experience invalidation show a greater variance of judgments (indicating more complex processing) relative to nonowners who do not experience invalidation. In contrast, owners who experience invalidation show smaller variance of judgments (indicating more simplified processing) relative to owners who have not experienced invalidation. These opposite tendencies lead to a margully significant two-way Ownership x Invalidation interaction, F(l, 106) = 3.40, p < .06. No other terms, including pairwise comparisons between the means (see Table 2), were significant in this analysis.

Judgment time. A third indicator of complexity of processing is judgment latency. Complex processing is more laborious than simplified processing and should therefore take more time. An ANOVA was conducted on judgment time as a dependent measure with the same explanatory variables as in the previous analysis. The means ofjudgment time in the eight experimental cells are presented in Table 3. The results show that among nonowners the invalidation of previous information triggered a complex judgment process, as indicated by the longer judgment latencies. In contrast, invalidation of information had an opposite impact on judgment time among car owners. To wit, judgments of owners were faster following an experience of information invalidation. This pattern was confirmed statistically by the significant two-way (Ownership x Invalidation) interaction, F(1,106) =

4 . 8 5 , ~ < .03. No other terms, including pairwise comparisons between the means, were significant in this analysis.

Finally, controllmg for judgment time and variance in the MANOVA design, with car evaluations serving as a dependent and ownershp, source credibihty, and the invalidation of prior information as three explanatory factors, resulted in elimination of the three-way interaction effect, F(l, 106) = 2 . 4 0 , ~ > .lo.

Discussion

Exposure to an invalidating message led to a change in the way consumers processed new information and arrived at

TABLE 3 Response Time

Experimenr I Experiment 2

Nonowners Car Owners Low Involvement High Involvement

Same Credible Same Credible Same Credible Same Credible Response Time Source Source Source Source Source Source Source Source

No invalidation (baseline) 26.38 20.79 26.49 26.52 17.85 18.63 12.63 25.24 Invalidation 34.21 24.58 19.86 16.67 21.53 25.25 19.37 19.33

(55.42)

Note. Except for 55.42 (marked inparentheses), which is significantly different, pairwisecomparisons between means indicatedno significant differences.

product evaluations. Participants who generally tend to use more complex processing in evaluating cars (owners) shifted their processing strategy following invalidation to reliance on simpler decision rules. Conversely, participants who generally tend to make judgments in a simplified way (nonowners) changed to a more complex mode ofprocessing following the invalidation of previous information.

Converging evidence for these conclusions is afforded by the pattern of judgments, the analysis of judgment variance, and the time participants took to make these judgments. When participants shifted from simplified to complex processing, as manifested in weaker reliance on the source, their judgment variance increased and judgment time was prolonged; when they switched from complex to simplified processing, judgment variance and time was shortened.

mation to render judgments (Chaiken, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).

In Experiment 2 we expected that highly involved participants who had not experienced invalidation would engage in complex processing, whereas those who had experienced invalidation would use simplified processing. In contrast, participants with low involvement who had not experienced invalidation would utilize simplified processing, whereas those who had experienced invalidation would use more complex processing. In short, following an experience of invalidation, participants would switch their processing mode. In addition, Experiment 2 utilizes a measure of prior knowledge to assess the potential impact of such knowledge on the judgment process.

Method EXPERIMENT 2

Experiment 2 was designed to replicate the findings of Exper- iment 1 using a different product stimulus-personal computers. More important, Experiment 2 sought to explore why experienced consumers process information differently &om inexperienced consumers. In particular, two factors associated with experience were found in past research to influence the choice of complex and simplified processing-involvement (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and prior knowledge (Wood, 1982). In the marketing literature, involvement has been examined in a wide variety of products and settings and found to be a successful classifying factor. Thus, in Experi- ment 2 involvement was used as a proxy for the initial tendency to use complex versus simplified processing, replacing the ownership factor of Experiment 1. Accordingly, it is hypothesized that complex processing is invoked when involvement is high and, conversely, simple processing is expected when involvement is low. This hypothesis is based on the suggestion by past research that, when involvement is high, consumers seek to form accurate judgments and are willing to exert the cognitive effort needed to systematically scrutinize the information content. When involvement is low, however, cognitive effort is minimized, and characteristics of the source might be seen as providing sufficiently accurate infor-

Participants. A group of 104 students participated in Experiment 2 as part of a class requirement. As in Experiment 1 a prize was offered for the participant whose performance was closest to that of experts in this field. Each participant performed the task on a computer, with 3 to 5 respondents participating in each session.

Stimuli and procedure. The experiment involved a computer-interactive task similar to that of Experiment 1. In the fmt phase, participants were provided with information about two computers. The information was attributed to a daily newspaper section called Home and Ofice. Participants were first presented with a detailed explanation of the attributes used to characterize the computers. It was printed on a page that was available for inspection throughout the experiment. After the participants had familiarized themselves with the six attributes, two computers were described. Spe- cifically, participants were presented with different attribute values characterizing the computers. Information was displayed by attribute; that is, each ofthe attributes appeared on a different screen along with the attribute values of the two computers. The attributes were (a) quality of the processor, (b) quality of the external cache, (c) the RAM, (d) quality of


the controller, (e) reliability of the computer, and ( f ) service quality. Attribute values were given on a 3-point scale ranging from 1 (low) to 3 (high).2

The service quality was subsequently challenged by a counter-message for the participants assigned to the "invalidation" condition. The counter-message was attributed to a group of computer experts who had reviewed the evaluations presented in the Home and Ofice section. According to the experts, the evaluations of the service quality were based on information provided by computer dealers but did not reflect customer complaints and dissatisfaction. Consequently, cus- tomers were advised to ignore the newspaper's assessments of service quality in any future computer judgments.

The first phase of the experiment also included a short proficiency test that was devised to tap participants' prior knowledge about personal computers. The test consisted of 11 multiple-choice questions.

In the second phase ofthe experiment, participants viewed information about two new computers in a presentation format that was identical to the first phase. Half of the participants were told that the information about the second set of computers was provided by PC Magazine, a highly credible source. The remaining participants were informed that it was provided by the same source as in the first set. After viewing the information, participants provided overall evaluations of the computers as well as ratings of their involvement with computers and the credibility of the sources.

Measures. In the first phase, a short multiple choice proficiency test consisting of 1 I questions (e.g., "Is 'FOR- MAT' a DOS command or does it belong to utility pro- grams?," "What does DX stand for?," "What type of screen is most commonly used in today's personal computers?') was administered. For each participant we counted the number of correct responses. This serves as an indicator for the participants' knowledge. Following the second phase, the participants' overall evaluation of the computers was measured on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (very bad) to 9 (very good). Judgment time was assessed by computing the time interval between appearance of the questions on the screen and the clicking on the keyboard when participants indicated their judgments. Participants were asked to indicate their involvement level along three involvement facets: (a) "To what ex- tent is apersonal computer important for you?' with scale anchors ranging from 1 (not at all important) to 9 (very important), (b) "How useful is a personal computer for you?" with scale anchors ranging from 1 (not at all usefil) to 9 (very usefil), and (c) "How central is a personal computer for your needs?" with scale anchors ranging from 1 (not at all central)

2The average reading time of the attributes was significantly correlated with involvement, r = .2 1,p < .03. See the description of the involvement index used in computing the following correlation.

to 9 (very central). Source credibility was assessed by two questions, the first pertaining to the Home and Ofice reporter and the second to PC Magazine, both on scales ranging from 1 (low) to 9 (high).

Design. Experiment 2 involved a 2 x 2 x 2 (Involve- ment Level x Source Credibility x Invalidation) between-subjects design.

Results

Manipulation check. Participants rated the credibility of the reporter fiom Home and Ofice and the one from PC Magazine. As expected, the credibility of the PC Magazine reporter was seen as superior to that of the Home and Ofice reporter (M= 6.7 1 and M = 5.73 for the two sources, respec- tively), t(103) = 5 . 4 4 , ~ < .001. This difference made it possible to explore the source effect in the subsequent analysis: If participants engage in simplified processing and rely on the source, then the difference between evaluations of computers described by the two sources should be pronounced; conversely, ifprocessing is complex and reliance on the source is minimized, the difference should be attenuated.

Participants' involvement. Participants were asked to indicate their involvement with computers by responding to three questions relating to different involvement facets: im- portance, usefulness, and centrality of computers for the participants. The measures show a high reliability level (a = .9 1). They were averaged to form an index of involvement. Partici- pants were classified as high versus low involvement according to a median split (Mdn = 6.0).

Computer overall evaluation. According to H3, computer evaluations are determined by three factors: participants' involvement with computers, the invalidation of previous information, and the credibility of the source. Partici- pants' involvement determines the initial tendency of participants to employ simple or complex processing. Ac- cording to H3, and in line with the results of Experiment 1, it is hypothesized that, after being exposed to an invalidating message, participants switch from simple to complex processing and vice versa. This is indicated by participants' use of information about the source: Participants who employ simplified processing should be influenced by information about the source; those using complex processing ought to be less influenced by source information.

The analyses of overall evaluations concern only the computers shown in the second phase of the experiment. A three-way MANOVA was conducted with overall evaluative

220 MAZURSKY AND SCHUL

judgment of the computers as a dependent variable, and involvement, source credibility, and invalidation as explanatory variables. Means are displayed in Table 1.

Comparison between the experiments suggests that the pattern of judgments in Experiment 2 is similar to that observed in Experiment 1. This pattern is reflected statistically in a significant three-way interaction, F(2,95) = 5 . 2 3 , ~ < .03. Before turning to the interpretation of this interaction, the pattern of judgments of the two computers was tested to see whether they could be collapsed. Indeed, the pattern ofjudg- ments was similar: When the two computer judgments were included as a repeated measure factor, the only significant term obtained was the main effect, F(1,96) = 2 8 . 7 , ~ < .001, which was expected due to information differences. How- ever, none of the interaction terms were significant (all Fs < l), indicating that the pattern of the independent factors was similar for the two computers.

As in Experiment 1, we performed a series of simple-effect analyses to verify that the pattern of interaction fits with the one predicted by H3. Planned comparisons indicated that, w i t h the low-involvement condition, the difference in the evaluation of computers due to the characteristics of the source was significant when participants had not had previous information invalidated, F(l, 96) = 5.0 1 , p <: .03, but not after having been exposedto the invalidating message, F(l,96) = 1 . 3 4 , ~ > .20. In contrast, the opposite pattern was obtained under the hgh-involvement condition. Specifically, when highly involved participants were not exposed to an invalidating message, the source factor did not have a statistically significant impact, F(1,96) < 1. However, the source did affect judgments following invalidation, F(1,96) = 6.15, p < .03.

As posited earlier, the choice ofjudgment procedure might also be affected by prior knowledge. To assess the impact of prior knowledge on judgment formation, we computed for each participant the number of correct answers (out of 11 questions) in the proficiency test. The resulting measure of prior knowledge had very weak correlation with involvement, r = . 1 1, ns. In addition, this measure was subsequently inserted as a covariate in the design described earlier. The analysis showed that the effect due to prior knowledge was not significant ( F < 1, ns) and &d not affect the pattern of results reported earlier.

Judgment variance. Judgment variance was computed for each participant. An ANOVA was conducted on judgment variance as a dependent measure with the same three explanatory variables as in the previous analysis. The means of judgment variance in the eight experimental cells are presented in Table 2. The results show that, among low-involved participants, the invalidation of previous information triggered an efforthl judgment process, as indicated by the larger variance ofjudgrnents. In contrast, invalidation of information had an opposite impact on judgment variance among highly involved participants. This pattern was con-

firmed statistically by the significant two-way (Ownership x

Invalidation) interaction, F(l , 96) = 6 . 3 0 , ~ < .01. No other terms, including painvise comparisons between the means (see Table 2), were significant in this analysis.

Judgment time. An ANOVA was conducted with judgment time as the dependent variable and the three factors in the aforementioned analysis serving as explanatory variables. Means of judgment time appear in Table 3. The three-way interactionwas significant, F(l,96) = 6.17,p< .02. All other effects were not significant. The pattern ofjudgment time replicated the pattern found in Experiment 1, with one exception: Under the condition of high-credibility source-high involvement, judgment time in Experiment 2 was prolonged following invalidation (rather than shortened, as in Experiment l).3

As in Experiment 1, controlling for judgment time and variance in the MANOVA design with overall evaluative judgment of the computers as a dependent variable and involvement, source credibility, and invalidation as explanatory variables resulted in elimination of the three-way interaction effect, F(l, 96) = 1 . 7 5 , ~ > .15.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The invalidation of previous information leads consumers to reassess the adequacy of previously used judgment rules (Bettrnan, 1979). This study explores the potential outcome of such reassessment. The findings are consistent with hypothesis H3 that, following invalidation, consumers tend to change theirjudgment procedure for evaluating new information. Such changes occurred in two opposite directions: For participants who tend to use simplified processing, invalidation led to an increase in processing effort and a tendency to utilize complex processing; conversely, participants who tend to employ more complex processing resorted to more simplified processing following invalidation. Increase in the processing effort among participants who were exposed to invalidating messages was indicated by decreased reliance on the source, prolonged judgment time, and increase in the variance of the product evaluations. The hypotheses predicting that individuals universally decreased processing complexity (HI) or, alternatively, that they all increased processing complexity (H2), were not supported.

In Experiment 1 participants were classified according to whether they had ever owned a car. Experience itself has previously been shown to affkct various factors, which might have

3The data in the cell "same source, invalidation" in the high-involvement condition should be interpreted with caution. The value 55 is due to two aber- rant participants, the only two that, when normalized, had a z score larger than 2. When removed, the value in this cell is reduced to 19.37.

SHAPING JUDGMENT RULES 221

mediated the choice of processing mode. In the context of choice of complex versus simplified processing, these factors are level of involvement (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and prior knowledge (e.g., Wood, 1982). Experiment 2 measured both factors. There was no indication that prior knowledge was associated with judgment response. The fact that involvement was the stronger explanatory variable is particularly interesting because it coincides with much of the evidence and the theoretical explanations provided in the reviewed research.

Consistent with findings in related domains, our research indicates that high motivation is not sufficient to induce complex processing. Such processing requires sufficient amount of cognitive resources in addition to the high motivation (Moore, Hausknecht, & Thamodaran, 1986; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Ratneshwar & Chaiken, 1991). Invalidation of prior information might be a significant experience that imposes high cognitive demands in processing new information. It might activate a search for cues that can help untangle inconsistencies between new information and prior knowledge in order to identify the valid and invalid components of the new information. Thls is a complex task, which requires a good deal of cognitive capacity and quite rapidly generates a high cognitive load (Schul et al., 1996). Under these conditions, effortful processing is llkely to be attenuated or even avoided completely.

The findings ofthis study are consistent with such a cognitive resource explanation: The choice of processing strategy is assumed to stem fiom the fit between the amount of cognitive resources the task requires and the processing strategy that receivers choose to allocate for the task. Receivers who had utilized complex processing (and therefore have relatively little processing capacity to spare) tend to resort to simpler processing rules following invalidation. In contrast, receivers who had used simple rules when they have not been exposed to invalidating messages (and therefore have a great deal of processing capacity to spare) use a more complex strategy of processing following invalidation.

One of the strengths of this study is the use of three different dependent measures: judgment responses, latencies, and judgment variance. Although it is possible to come up with alternative interpretation for the findings with each individual measure, we think that the interpretation we offer provides the most parsi- monious way to explain the overall pattern of findings of the three measures. For example, the variance of judgments has been considered a proxy for attribute processing. Large variance indicates that respondents were sensitive to differences between products, and hence it suggests an enhanced attribute processing. Small variance, in contrast, could indicate that respondents were using source credibility, but it could also indicate the use of any one of the many other peripheml cues the situation affords. However, given the entire pattern of results, we believe the interpretation we offer is reasonable. Still, because our theoretical analysis is not lirmted to the use of source as a simplified cue, converging evidence for our interpretation should come fiom research that compares complex and simplified processing using the direct impact of other peripheral cues.

The evidence in this study is based on source effects and judgment time. Namely, it assesses how invalidation of a source's evaluation for one set of brands affects judgments of a new set of brands. Although the source effect perspective represents an important outcome ofresource htors, it is recommended that future research firher pmues the depletion-of-resources explanation. A complementing approach might be achieved by manipulating the resource fixtors directly.

Another alternative explanation might attribute the results to demand factors. Namely, individuals engaging in complex processing might interpret the invalidation instruction as a cue that they are expected to ignore "the information" (as appearing in the invalidating cue), whereas those engaging in simple processing might interpret the invalidation instruction as an indication that they ought to react to "the reporter" (again, as appearing in the invalidating cue). However, it is unclear why the demand explanation predicts the complex interaction obtained in the two experiments using three different dependent measures. A more intuitive prediction would be that individuals either simplify or increase processing complexity following invalidation cue. More important, individuals are blind to their initial classification as complex or simple processors and are unaware of the labels associated with strategy dfferences. Attempting to outguess the experi- menters in such a case seems unlikely.

The findings of this study illuminate the important role of processing ability in the choice of processing strategy. Al- though both motivation and ability have been considered key factors in the persuasion process (e.g., Chaiken, 1987), much more attention has been devoted in the marketing literature to the impact of motivation (see Petty et al., 1983, for involvement effects; and Park & Hastak, 1994, for an extension fo- cusing on time-based effects). Nevertheless, the increased availability of brand information, which grows as a function of brand proliferation trends, might impose on consumers the need to allocate cognitive resources efficiently, even when motivation to process is high. This situation calls for addi- tional examination of information processing under capacity constraints in future research.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This research was supported by grants from the K-Mart Foun- dation and Davidson Center, the United States-Israel Bina- tional Science Foundation, and the Israel Science Foundation.

We thank Paul Herr and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and guidance.

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