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In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs University of Wisconsin – Madison March 16, 2009

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Page 1: In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs

In Search of Stability:The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis

Mark CopelovitchAssistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs

University of Wisconsin – MadisonMarch 16, 2009

Page 2: In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs

Overview

The economics of the crisis

• Causes

• Timeline

• Effects

The politics of financial stability

• Policy responses

• Difficult tradeoffs

• The road ahead

Page 3: In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs

What Went Wrong?Three Faulty Assumptions About 21st Century Finance

Securitization

• Capital markets are so advanced that banks can lend more aggressively while off-loading risk through debt securities

Credit agencies

• Credit ratings agencies offer an easy and cheap “compass” for investors to assess the risk of these complex securities

Risk and financial stability

• The “slicing and dicing” of risk has made the financial system more stable and less crisis-prone

Page 4: In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs

The Initial Problem: Subprime Mortgage Lending

SOURCE: BBC

Page 5: In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs

Subprime Borrowers

“Subprime” borrowers

• Borrowers with “bad” credit (<620 on 300-850 scale)

• NINJAs (~20% of borrowers)

What kind of loans do subprime borrowers get?

• ARMs: Adjustable Rate Mortgages

• “Teaser” rates to start…higher rates later on

Page 6: In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs

Mortgage-Backed Securities (CDOs)

SOURCE: NERA

Ratings agencies play a key role

Page 7: In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs

Subprime Mortgage Lending: Boom and Bust

SOURCE: IMF, BBC

Page 8: In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs

From Housing Crisis to Financial Crisis

Problems of uncertainty

• No one knows how many “bad” mortgages are in the CDOs

• No one wants to lend to banks and other institutions with heavy exposure to these securities

Results

• “Flight to quality” (US Treasuries)

• Spikes in market lending rates

• Stock market crash

• Frozen credit markets

Page 9: In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs

SOURCE: Bloomberg

The Big Freeze

Page 10: In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs

The Big Freeze

Page 11: In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs

Case Study: Northern Rock (UK)

UK’s 8th largest bank in 2007 (£113 billion in assets)

Page 12: In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs

Northern Rock’s Collapse

Bank of England - steps in to bail out (£55 billion in loans/guarantees) and ultimately nationalize NR (2/22/08) once the “run” starts

Page 13: In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs
Page 14: In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs

After Northern Rock, 2008-2009

SOURCE: BBC

Page 15: In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs

…the Financial Losses Mount…

March 2009: $5.1 trillion in family net worth losses (9%) in Q4 2008

Page 16: In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs

…and the Real Economic Impact is Severe

SOURCE: BBC/IMF

GDP growth rates (%), 2008-2009

Page 17: In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs

Policy Responses to Financial Crises: Two Phases

Short-term (management/resolution)

• Crisis lending, rate cuts, etc.

• Preventing bank runs/collapses (“bailouts”)

• Unfreezing credit markets (“toxic debt”)

Long-term (prevention)

• New regulation

• New institutions

• Domestic and international

Page 18: In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs

Short-Term Policy Responses: Crisis Management

Liquidity (bailouts)

• To money markets & directly to troubled banks (TARP)

Bank deposit guarantees

• Extension of safety net to prevent bank runs

Dealing with toxic debt

• A government-sponsored “bad bank”

• Partial nationalization of banks

• The “insurance” model (UK, January 2009)

Page 19: In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs

Short-Term Policies: Key Questions

• Why not let troubled financial institutions fail?

• Why not bail out all firms? Who should be saved?

• What should the government get in return?

• Should non-financial firms get bailouts, too?

Page 20: In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs

How to Choose Policies? Difficult Tradeoffs

• Liquidity vs. moral hazard

• Financial crisis vs. other goals

• Aggregate welfare (“taxpayers”) vs. special interests

• National policies vs. international cooperation

Page 21: In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs

“Bailouts” – Liquidity vs. Moral Hazard

• Government/central bank credit (liquidity) helps banks pay their debts and may “unfreeze” credit markets

• But, bailouts create moral hazard for borrowers and creditors

How to choose?

• A liquidity or solvency problem?

• No clear economic answer ultimately, a political question

More money,fewer “strings”

Less money,more “strings”

Greater moral hazard costs

Page 22: In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs

Financial Stability & Stimulus vs. Other Goals

SOURCE: New York Times

• Economic stimulus package estimated to cost ~$800 billion

• Full scale of toxic assets may be $3-4 billion

Page 23: In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs

Thus Far: Global Crisis, National Responses

SOURCE: BBC

• Unilateral efforts unlikely to be successful

• Threat of “beggar thy neighbor” policies

Page 24: In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs

The Global Reform Agenda: Consensus on Broad Goals…

Strengthen international supervision and regulation

• Bridge the gap between global markets and national regulation

Reform existing institutions

• International Monetary Fund (IMF)

• G-7 / G-20

International policy coordination

• Macroeconomic stimulus

• Exchange rates / global imbalances

• Trade policy

Page 25: In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs

…But Not on Specific Policies & Institutions

Strengthen international supervision and regulation

• Which financial institutions and regulations?

• What institutional form?

Reform existing global institutions

• The IMF debate: resources, conditionality, votes

• New “G” groups: who should be in/out?

International policy coordination

• How much? For how long?

• Sharp disagreements on trade and exchange rates

Page 26: In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs

Why No Agreement? Difficult Tradeoffs

IMF lending

• Liquidity vs. moral hazard

Regulation/supervision

• Confidence vs. competitiveness

Institutional reform

• Accountability/legitimacy vs. effectiveness

Policy coordination

• Domestic politics vs. international commitments

Page 27: In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs

Tradeoffs: The Primacy of Politics

No optimal economic solutions

• Many possible policies, institutions, and regulations

• Conflicts between “good economics” and “good politics”

Key political factors

• Domestic politics (interests, institutions)

• Power and geopolitics

• Collective action and bargaining problems

• Ideology

Page 28: In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs

Example: Reforming the IMF

SOURCE: Financial Times

• IMF needs ~ $750 billion - $1.75 trillion to be effective

• Will new resources lead to governance reform?

Page 29: In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs

The Next Stage: Are the Bailouts Working?

TED Spread, March 2009

Page 30: In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs

The Next Stage: Crises in Emerging Markets

9/-08 – 3/09:

~$50 billion in new IMF loans to Iceland,

Pakistan, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia,

Serbia, Latvia, and Hungary

SOURCE: Financial Times, IMF World Economic Outlook

Page 31: In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs

The Next Stage: World Trade Collapsing?

Page 32: In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs

Some Perspective: We’ve Been Here Before

SOURCE: IMF, World Bank

Page 33: In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs

Some Perspective: The Great Depression, 1929-1933

The Depression’s Effect on the US Economy

SOURCE: Historical Statistics of the United States, pp. 235, 263, 1001, and 1007

Page 34: In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs

Some Perspective: Markets

Page 35: In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs

Some Perspective: Recession vs. Depression

Page 36: In Search of Stability: The Economics and Politics of the Global Financial Crisis Mark Copelovitch Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs