CHAPTER III

CHANGE IN SOVIET LEAD ERSHIP : A PERSPECTIVE ON CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE OF RELATIONS

CHAPTER III

CHANGE IN SOVIET LEADERSHIP : A PERSPECTIVE 9N CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE OF RELATIONS

Pakistani leadership's intention to improve relations

with the Soviet Union coincided with a change in the Soviet

leadership from Khrushchev to Brezhnev in October 1964. This

,event sent a stream of happiness in Pakistan as the Pak:istani

leadership by aligning itself with the western powers over

the years, had developed a psychological feeling that

Khrushchev followed·an anti-Pakistani and pro-Indian policy,

notwithstanding his consistent efforts to improve relations

with neighbouring Pakistan compelled by ideological as well

as strategic considerations. Nevertheless, the change in

the Soviet leadership created a favourable condition for

Pakistan to improve its relations with the Soviet Union,

as Ayub Khan could now approach the new Soviet leadership

with greater confidence and boldness. By improving relations

with Moscow, Pakistan wanted to weaken the Soviet sympa.thy

for India and to demonstrate that she had not become a camp-

follower of China. Moreover, this policy waS in tune with

Pakistani tactics of playing one great power against the

other to gain maximum benefit out of both.

Brezhnev's assumption of power in the Soviet Union

and Ayub Khan's visit to Moscow led a score of Indian and

foreign scholars to indulge in shift-watching exercises.

They alleged that the new leadership in the Soviet Union waS

: 138:

139

maintaining "equidistant", "neutral ll and nnon-partisan"

attitude in its relationship with India and Pakistan. In

their enthusiasm for justifying their new hypothesis, they

completely forgot the Soviet Union'S ideological as well

as strategic compulsions in maintaining normal good-

neighbourly relations with Pakistan from 1949 onwards as

has been shown earlier in this work. An Indian scholar

argued that there were IItwo major and interrelated reasons

which prompted it (the Soviet Union) to make various

overtures to Pakistan : the growing detente between the

Soviet Union and the United States and the growing conflict

and friction between the Soviet Union and Communist China". 1

Similarly Roger E. Kanet along with an Indian SCholar M.

Rajan Menon explained that "the deterioration of Sino-Soviet

relations coupled with the growing ties between China and

Pakistan suggested the need to counter Peking by setting

Soviet-Pakistani relations on a new footing. n2 But they

chose to ignore the Soviet ideological and strategic

compulsions which forced her to offer her hand of friendship

to Pakistan3 at a much earlier period when there was no

1 Mohanunad Ayoob, "Pakistan's Soviet Policy, 1950-1968: A Balance Sheet ll

, in M.S. Rajan (ed.), Studies in Politics (Delhi, 1971), p.235.

2 Roger ~.Kenet and M. Rajan Menon, IISoviet Policy Toward the Thl.rd World", in Donald R. Kelley, Soviet Politics in the Brezhnev Era (Praeger, New York, 1980), p.253.

3 Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History (London, 1954), vol.8, p.691.

140

indication of Soviet-American detente, Sino-Pal< ties and

Sino-Soviet rift. However, the Soviet-American detente

helped in Soviet-Pak rapprochement in another way. Now

Pakistan was free of fears of annoying or displeasing the

United States and other Western Powers in improving relations

with MoscOW. 4 It is thus wrong to say that the Soviet

Union under Brezhnev made special efforts to improve Soviet-

Pakistan relations, rather .. at no point did the Soviets

completely close their doors on PakistanI!. In order to win

the friendship of Pakistan it always kept dangling the

carrot of economic aid.S

And if it failed to gain the

confidence of Pakistan, it was primarily due to mental

reservations of Pakistani leadership. Later in early and

mid sixties, the moment Pakistan started responding favourably

to Soviet overtures after her disappointment and disillusion-

ment with the United States and other Western powers, "Soviet-

Pakistani relations too started growing, and they grew very

rapidly indeed". 6 In this regard the comment made by Werner

Levi seems most plausible whO wrote, itA shift in sympathies

and a reappraisal of policies in Pakistan, favouring the

Soviet Union, resulted not so much from positive measures

4 Ayoob, op.cit., no.1, p.227.

S Bhabani Sen Gupta, The Fulcrum of Asia : Relations among China, India, Pakistan and the USSR (Praeger, New York, 1970), p.70.

6 K.D. Kapur, Soviet Strategy in South Asia (Young Asia, New Delhi, 1983), P.29.

141

in Soviet-Pakistan relations as from growing dissatisfaction

with the American policies and actions ... 7

Although the reason for Soviet-Pakistan rapprochement

in early and mid-sixties cannot be entirely attributed to

Soviet-American detente, or Sino-soviet rift or Sino-Pak

detente, the role of fastly changing global and regional

environment cannot be altogether ignored. The ball for

improvement of Soviet-Pak relations was not in the Soviet

but in the Pakistani court. When she started playing the

ball, relations improved. In this period Pakistan'S rela-

tionship with the United States was strained as the latter

had shown promptness in giving arms assistance to India in

the wake of the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962. China

became a cause of concern for all the three - India, the

Soviet Union and the United States. Pakistan resorted to

cultivate China in this period to improve its bargaining

power vis-a-vis all these three states. It further aggravated

the Soviet anxiety to wean Pakistan away from the Chinese

fold. Moscow was, at the same time, uneasy with the political

developments in India in the post-Nehru period as certain

sections had started demanding a review of India's friendship

with the USSR. All these factors provided additional sti-

mulus to the Soviet Union to mend her fences with Pakistan

which Moscow had been trying since 1949, though unsuccessfully.

7 Werner Levi,"Pakistan, the Soviet Union and Chinall,

PacifiC Affairs, vol.35, 1962, p.217.

142

Without any Llarge-scale disengagement from India, Soviet

policy sought to broaden the base of its South Asia poiicy

in such a way as to bring about the establishment of a

mutually beneficial relationship with Pakistan as well.8

In an exercise in this direction, the Soviet Union

under Brezhnev renewed her invitation to President Ayub

Khan to visit Moscow. He waS initially invited by Khrushchev

in September, 1964. Before Ayub Khan's visit to Moscow, the

Pakistani Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto set out to tha't city

on a probing mission in January 1965, and it cieared the

deck for President Ayub'svisit in April 1965. Bhutto held

high-level talks with the Soviet leaders on global as well

as regional issues.9

Through these talks Bhutto wanted to

enhance his understanding with Moscow and to explain to the

Soviet leaders the rationale of Pakistanis foreign policy.

He was quite satisfied with his talks in MOSCOW. 10 Through

this diplomatic exercise both sides ensured the success of

President Ayub Khan's projected visit to the Soviet Union.

Moscow Radio on Bhutto's visit observed, "We are sure that

as a result of this visit, the first visit of the Pakistani

Foreign Minister to the USSR, the sphere of our cooperation

will expand and this visit would be of great importance in

strengthening the relations between the two countries.1111

8 Zubeida Hasan, II Pakistan 's Relations with USSR" , World Today(London), January 1969, p.27.

9 Pravda, 13 and 14 January 1965.

10 ~, 19 January 1965.

11 Ibid., 26 January 1965.

143

Thus, after eradicating all the obstacles, the process

of normalization of relations between the two countries was

hastened by President Ayub Khan's official visit to Moscow

early in April 1965. He was accorded official welcome on

his arrival and had his first round of talks with the Soviet

leaders the same day, in the office of Premier Kosygin. It

was the first direct personal contact in 18 years between

the top leaders of Pakistan and the Soviet Union. Welcoming

the distinguished guest, Prime Minister Kosygin said, "We

have been eagerly looking forward to the visit of President

Ayub to the USSRII, which waS "a momentous event in the

history of Soviet-Pakistan relations" and "will contribute

to the further strengthening of mutual understanding and

good neighbourliness between our two countries" .12 Premier

Kosygin in a conciliatory statement said, "We have different

views on the laws governing the development of human society

and on some concrete questions of international policy too.

It is our conviction that different views on public system

should not prevent our peoples from becoming good neighbours

and even friends and our governments from cooperation with

13 each other". In addition, mentioning identity of common

views, he further said, "We note with satisfaction the

identity of the Soviet Union's and Pakistanis approach to

such important problems of our time as struggle against

12 Pravda, 4 April 1965.

13 Pakistan Observer, 5 April 1965.

144

imperialism and colonialism, guaranteeing of the people's

lawful right to an independent development, general and

complete disarmament, and banning of nuclear weapons. This

is a good requisite for our cooperation in international

aff airs .,,14

In .a similar vein the Chairman of the Presi'cfum of the

Supreme Soviet of the USSR, President Anastas Mikoyan lauded

Ayub as It a great statesman". He said, "It is our profound

belief that the development of relations between the USSR

and Pakistan in a spirit of friendship and neighbourliness

would bring appreciable benefits to the peoples of our states

d t · b t t th' " II 15 an con rl ute 0 s reng enlng peace ln Asla •••• Even

Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU observed that the

talks with President Ayub Khan were "epoch-making" .16 During

their talks they had a frank exchange of opinion on a broad

range of topics. President Ayub complained that Sovil2t

military assistance to India had led her to follow aggre-\

ssive and expansionist policies and Indo-Pakistani disputes

remained unresolved, because "Whenever we brought the matter

to the world forum, India had the assurance that she would

be bailed out by the Soviet veto ll•

17 Premier Kosygin while

14 Op.cit., no.12.

15 ~., 6 April 1965.

16 Dawn, 7 April 1965.

17 Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters : A Political Autobiography (OUP, Lahore, 1967), p.171.

145

denying that Soviet military aid to India had aggravated

tension in the sub-continent, argued that Indo-Pakistani

dispute could be resolved through Ildirect negotiations ll

and suggested to uevolve some kind of practical coexistencell

18 between themselves. Included in the talks were not only

various aspects of Soviet-Pakistani relations and how they

might be improved but also basic international issues,

including the question of maintaining world peace, easing

international tension, end settling international conflicts.

The joint communique issued after the end of Ayub

Khan I s vis it dec lared that "In spite of the differences in

their socio-economic systems, there are real possibilities

for the further development of good neighbourly relations

between the two states, and for strengthening trust and

business collaboration on a mutually advantageous basis". 19

Expressing the need for disarmament, the communique stressed

the conviction of both sides that \I it is of good importance

in the present stage to prevent the proliferation of nuclear

weapons in any form and to establish nuclear-free zones in

the various areas of the worldll • 20 Inclusion of this clause

in the declaration was of a special significance to Pakistan

as at that stage India was debating as to whether it should

divert part of its resources in the development of nuclear

weapons in the wake of recent Chinese entry into the nuclear

18 Ibid., p.172.

19 For the text of the communique Pravda, 11 April 1965.

146

club. The communique waS, however, couched in sufficiently

ambiguous terms on many a topic on which neither of them

wished to commit itself. Omitting any direct reference to

the Kashmir dispute, it stated that the Soviet Union and

Pakistan "declare resolute support for the peoples who are

waging a struggle for their national liberation and indepen-

dence and for the peoples who are fighting for the right to

determine their future in accordance with their own will". 21

Although this statement was vague enough to be regarded as

applicable to Kashmir, it was widely propagated in Pakistan

as an evidence of Soviet endorsement of Pakistanis stand on

Kashmir. Pakistan Institute of International Affairs waS the

main propagater of this interpretation. Similarly, the jOint

declaration stressed the need for immediate implementation of

all international agreements for the sake of world peace and

cooperation. This Part of the communique was also interpreted

by many Pakistani sources as the Soviet affirmation of

Pakistani stand on implementation of Security Council resolu-

tion on Kashmir, which demanded immediate holding of plebiscite

22 in the state. Thus, the joint communique was well received

in Pakistan. The Soviet leaders described the communique as

II a milestone in the Pakistan-Soviet relations 11.23

21 Ibid.

22 Pakistan Times and~, 13-15 April 1965.

23 Pravda, 11 April 1965.

1~7

President A~b Khan at the press conference at Lahore

airport after his return from the visit, expressed his satis-

f action over the IIfrank and cordial talks". He said that a

II good many misunderstanding of the pastil were reso lved, making

the way "clear for friendship and cooperation between the two

• 11 24 countr~es • He later wrote in his autobiography, lilt waS

not until April 1965 that Pakistan was able to establish

direct contact with the USSR. For eighteen years we knew

little about each other at the human level. Inevitably, both

sides acted under preconceived notions and suffered from a

sense of distance l1• 25 He further added, liMy visit to the

Soviet Union was essentially intended to cover the lost links.

The fact of neighbourhood was a physical and geographical one,

and I wanted to re-establish the validity and compulsion of

this fact". 26 Later, he summed up his impress ion of his talks

with the Soviet leaders in the following words: "I think there

was general recognition on both sides that the meeting might

prove a turning point in our relations and that there were

tremendous possibilities of cooperation. I found the Soviet

leaders extremely knowledgable. They were courteous, polite

and hospitable, but firm on their basic assumptions. I

venture to think they recognised our sincerity and came to

h b tt . t· f ·t· II 27 ave a e er apprec~a ~on 0 our pos~ ~on • So, the

24 Dawn, 12 April 1965.

25 Ayub Khan, °E·cit., no .17, p.169.

26 ~. 27 Ayub Khan, °E·cit., no: 17, p.173.

148

Pakistani President ' s visit to Moscow cleared many misunder-

standings between them and proved out to be a turning point

in the history of Moscow's relations with Rawalpindi.

Ayub Khan's visit resulted in three agreements relating

to trade, economic cooperation and cultural exchange. Under

one of the agreements the Soviet Union agreed to provide 50

million dollars for oil exploration and purchase of industrial

machinery and extended the existing oil-exploration agreements

for another five years. In another agreement it was designed

to double the Soviet-Pakistani trade by 1967. The third

28 agreement was related to a cultural exchange programme.

The Soviet Minister for Foreign Trade, Nikolai Patolichev

mentioned that the Soviet exports to Pakistan "will mainly

consist of machinery and equipment necessary for the develop-

ment of Pakistan'S industry and agriculture. They will

include power equipment, road building machinery, as well as

29 ferrous rolled stock, asbestos, cement and other goOOs ll •

Thus, the Soviet Union's long-cherished desire of

establishing cordial relations with Pakistan without pre-

judicing the decade-old warm relations with India materialised

in the year 1965. The new Soviet orientation towards Pakistan

became more apparent when Pakistan along with Turkey and Iran

figured into Soviet May Day slogans. In May Day slogans only

28 S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis (London, 1973), p. 302.

29 ~, 8 April 1965.

149

those countries I names appear with whom Moscow has warm and

cordial relationships. However, Soviet efforts to balance

relations with India and Pakistan caused much concern in

India. Ayub Khan's visit to MOScow in April was followed

by Lal Bahadur Shastri's in May 1965. It appears that Prime

Minister Shastri raised this issue during his visit to Moscow

but the Soviet leaders assured publicly that Soviet-P~(istani

relations would not be developed at the cost of Indian interests.

Kosygin in his speech at the reception of Shastri at Kremlin

Palace dec lared, "When the Soviet Union is striving to improve

its relat~ons with a third country this does not have to be

at the cost of Soviet-Indian friendshipll.30 However, the

Soviet policy of maintaining equal friendship with both India

and Pakistan was put to ac id tests during 1965 when an armed

conflict arose over the Rann of Kutch in April-May 1965 between

the two neighbouring countries. Although the border clashes in

Kutch area had started from January 1965, it was only in the

month of April that serious fighting broke out in the region.

Moscow projected its neutral posture and refused to go into

the merits of the case. It warned that the solution of

problems between India and Pakistan through war would only

help imperialist powers by providing opportunities to fish

in the troubled waters. It cited the recent statements of

30 Pravda, 16 May 1965.

150

Ayub and Shastri regarding peaceful solution of disputes

between the two countries and emphasised the necessity of

d . t d fIt·' 31 h t t t J.rec an peace u nego J.atJ.ons. T e Tass s a emen on

8 May 1965 hoped that It India and Pakistan will solve their

differences through direct negotiations taking into account

the interests of both sides" and asserted that a military

solution would be contrary to the interests of both India

and Pakistan. 32

Both sides accepted British mediation and consequently

ceasefire was effected. Contrary to the Soviet view, the

British Government was against any direct negotiations between

India and Pakistan to settle their dispute. When Dixon Report

came up for discussion before the Security Council in 1957,

the British representative Gladwyn Jebb declared that his

government could not accept Dixon Report. 33 The Report had

recommended direct negotiations between the parties concerned.

The Rann of Kutch conflict was only a prelude to a major

military conflict in September 1965. For Pakistan this clash

was only a probing operation to test India's military capa­

bility and her will to fight. 34 Better performance of Pakistani

31 Ibid., 9 May 1965.

32 Ibid.

33 A. APpadorai, The Tashkent Declaration, 1969, p.ll.

34 Vijay Sen Budhraj, Soviet Russia and the Hindustan Subcontinent (Somaiya, Bombay, 1973), pp.156-157.

151

army in this war emboldened their morale to seek a military

solution to the Kashmir problem. 35 However, some Indian

scholars have blamed Soviet neutrality for Ilan increase in

Pakistani aggressiveness against Indiall• 36 It is difficult

to understand how Soviet neutrality helped Pakistan in its

aggressive designs against India. Pakistan could have never

imagined that Moscow would fight India's battle as a price

for Indo-Soviet friendship, when it could not bombard

Peshawar during U-2 incident. Even India could have never

seen Moscow in that role. The other way of helping one's

ally at war with a third country is to maintain regular

supply of arms and ammunition which Moscow did without fai.l,

very much unlike western powers who imposed arms embargo on

India and Pakistan during the war. Moreover I if the Indo-

Pakistani conflict of September 1~65 was the outcome of

Soviet neutrality in Kutch dispute, why it cannot be inter-

linked with Soviet neutrality on Kashmir dispute. Soviet

suggestion in both the cases was peaceful and direct nego­

tiations over differences between India and Pakistan. 37

35 See "Ayub Khan talks to his countrymen" in London, Dawn, 20 June 1965.

36 R. Vaidyanath, "Recent Trends in Soviet Politics Towards India and Pakistan", International Studies, vol.VII, No.3, January 1~66, p.437; V.S. Budhraj writes "India's moderation and Moscow's neutrality must have encouraged Pakistan to launch another military adventure again at a place where its army had an edge over India", op.cit., no.34, p.157; K.D. Kapur writes, "The non-partisan stand of the Soviet Union on the dispute over the Rann of Kutch further encouraged Pakistan in its aggressiveness", op.c it., no.6, p.49.

37 Devendra Kaushik, Soviet Relations with India and Pakistan (Vikas, Delhi, 1971), p.86.

152

However, it cannot be denied that it was during President

Ayub's visit to Hoscow that the Soviet Union got a breakthrough

in its long-cherished desire of establishing cordial relations

with Pakistan in addition to India, and it was bound to have

some bearings on Indo-Soviet relations as well. But this

did not mean that India's importance in Soviet eyes had

diminished and they became insensitive to India's feelings. 38

The Soviets would have never liked to wipe out the decade-old

gains of Indo-Soviet friendship for the sake of a dubious

improvement in Soviet-Pak relations. The policy of the Soviet

Union towards the subcontinent from the very beginning was to

maintain equally good relations with both India and Pakistan.

The security interests of the Soviet Russia demanded that she

should consider Indo-Pakistani subcontinent as a single unit.

Moreover, the subcontinent itself was historically a single

unit, artificially cut apart by the imperialist machinat.ions.

But even after partition the facts of geography remained the

same. Strained relations with Pakistan could have easily

neutralised the strategic advantages obtained by strengthening

Indo-Soviet relations or vice-versa. Knowing this fully well

and prompted by ideological considerations too, the Soviet

Union strived to develop equally good relations with both the

neighbouring countries since their independence undeterred

38 R. Vaidyanath holds the view that after the breakthrough in Soviet-Pak relations, the Soviet Union became insensitive to India's feelings, op.cit., nO.36.

153

by Pakistan's initially negative response. A piecemeal

state-wise approach was not expected to enhance the proper

understanding of Soviet policy towards India and Pakistan.

It would be rather very misleading. The comment made by the

Times of London on Soviet neutrality during Kutch dispute

that "it goes to confinn that Russia's policy on the sub-

continent is changing I turning from its previous out-'and-out

commitment to India's case over Kashmir and everything else

at issue with Pakistan to a more wary and detached stance

between the two neighbours ll ,39 reflects the same piecemeal

approach. Mikoyan' s suggestion on his visit to New Delhi in

June 1964 "that it was time for India and Pakistan to seek a

settlement of all their differences .. 40 and the August 1965

remark of Soviet Vice-Premier K. Mazurov, in New Delhi "that

the Soviet union should not be expected to allow its relations

with India and Pakistan to be governed by the mutual relations

of these two countries"41

were but aff inn at ions of the Soviet

integral approach and not examples of Soviet hardening of

attitude towards India as an Indian scholar R. Vaidyanath

has maintained in one of his articles. 42

39 The Times, 10 May 1965.

40 QUoted by Selig S. Harrison, "Troubled India and Her Neighbours", Foreign Affairs, Vol.43, No.2, January 1965, p.323.

41 Link, 28 August 1965, p.9.

42 R. Vaidyanath, op.cit., nO.36.

154

A. SOVIEI' UNION AND INDO-PAl< WAR, 1965

Encouraged by better performance of the Pakistani army

in the Kutch conflict, Ayub Khan on 5 August 1965 decided to

send well-trained armed guerillas into the Kashmir vall.ey on

the pretext of waging "a war of national liberation". Ayub's

strategy was to instigate a largescale uprising in the valley

to undermine Indian control over the region and thus to impose

on India a negotiated settlement of Kashmir problem favourable

to Pakistan. He assumed that Indian Muslims would support

Pakistan in its war with Pakistan and India would soon dis­

integrate under the stre·ss of war. 43 Armed guerillas intru­

sion into Kashmir boiled down to fighting among regular army

units. The conflict became more fierce when Pakistani army

crossed international border on 1 September. Their main

concentration was on Chhamb-Jaurian sector where they had

some strategic advantage too. They were just 20 miles away

from Jammu by 5th September and thus, India was forced to

open another front in Lahore and Sialkot sectors by'September

in order to release the pressure mounted in Jammu sector.

This move of Indian army was unexpected for Pakistan.

The Soviet union which had traditional friendship with

India and waS striving to improve relations with Pakistan

vlith a recent limited breakthrough in the form of President

Ayub's visit to Moscow, was caught in a dilemma. But it

43 Budhraj, op.cit., nO.34, p.158.

155

played its cards with admirable skill. Guided by reason

and realism, the Soviets assigned to themselves the role of

a peace-maker in the Indo-Pakistani dispute~ Moscow observed

strict neutrality throughout the conflict and emphasized from

the very beginning the ruinous economic implications of war

in the subcontinent. The Soviet Union pointed out that the

conflict would weaken both India and Pakistan and would lead

to their instability. Even before the Pakistani army's

actual intrusion into Indian territory on 1 September, Soviet

newspaper Pravda in an article elaborately brought out Soviet

perspective of the situation in the subcontinent. Without

blaming India or Pakistan for the initiation of war, it

emphasized that "the main thing is to find a way to stop the

bloodshed immediately and to liquidate the conflict". 44

While praising Indian policy of peaceful coexistence and

non-alignment and India's fight against colonialism, it held

that the Soviet Union had .. a long-standing, traditional

friendship with India" and was .. striving for further deve lop-

ment of its relations with Pakistan". It further ascertained

that the Soviet improvement of relations with Pakistan would

not be directed against her friendship with any third country.

The Pravda artic Ie maintained that 11 strengthening the ties

between the USSR and Pakistan must be regarded as a part of

a general policy aimed at ensuring peace in Asia and throughout

44 ~, vol.XVII, No.34, 15 September 1965, p.15.

156

the world ll • While laying stress on peaceful settlement of

dispute, it pointed out that like her traditional friendship

with India, Soviet-Pak relations would be a stabilising

factor for normalisation of relations between India and

Pakistan.45

On 4 September the Soviet Premier Kosygin sent almost

similar notes to both Lal Bahadur Shastri and Ayub Khan

expressing concern over the military conflict II in an area

directly contiguous to the borders of the Soviet Union"

and pleaded for the II immediate cessation of military opera­

tions" .46 He further explained, uIn the present grave

situation, the main emphasis should not be placed on the

question of the cause of the conflict or of ascertaining

who is right and who is wrong. The main efforts should be

concentrated ••• on halting the tanks and silencing the

guns". Kosygin urged the warring parties to stop fighting

and withdraw their forces behind the ceasefire line agreed

by India and Pakistan in 1949. He also offered Soviet

Government's IIgoOd offices if both sides consider this

47 useful". On the same day Indo-Pakistani conflict in

Kashmir came up for discussion in the Security Coune il,

where the Soviet delegate while urging both fighting states

45 Ibid., pp.15-16.

46 Pravda, 12 September 1965.

47 Ibid.

157

II to put an immediate end to the bloodshed in Kashmir and

halt this conflict" almost again repeated the Soviet stand

of 1964 on Kashmir for a bilateral solution by peaceful

means. He said, liThe two neighbouring states must resolve

the outstanding issues between them by peaceful means, with

due regard for their mutual interests ... 48

People's Republic of China just contrary to the Soviet

stand started instigating Pakistan against India from the

very beginning. Peking vehemently attacked India's stand on

Kashmir. On 4 September when Soviet Premier Kosygin in his

special letter to heads of the government of India and

Pakistan urged peaceful solution of dispute, the Chinese

Foreign Minister Chen Yi landed in Pakistan to pledge his

country's "moral and material support to Pakistan ... 49

China's

People's Daily supported IIPakistan's counter-attack in self-

defence against India's armed aggression and openly blamed

Moscow for vy~ng with the US in aiding and abetting the

d . .... 50 In ~an react~onar~es •

The Security Council discussed the Kashmir question

on 4 and 5 September which led to the passage of two unanimous

resolutions demanding ceasefire and withdrawal of troops from

each other's territory. In the course of discussion in the

48 ~, Yr. 20, mtg.1237, 4 September 1965, pp.36-37.

49 See H.P. Klaus, "China's Role in India-Pakistan Conflict", China QUarterly, No.24, October-December 1965.

50 Peking Review, vol.8, No.37, 10 September 1965, pp.7-8.

158

Security Council, Moscow openly acknowledged that Kashmir

was a matter of IIdispute" between India and Pakistan. The

Soviet delegate in the Security Council on 6 September

extended full support to the Council resolution which asked

for immediate cease-fire followed by mutual withdrawal of

troops to positions occupied before 5 August 1965. A ~

statement of 7 September once again expressed Soviet concern

as the conflict was taking place in an area neighbouring

its frontiers. It again offered Soviet IIgood offices" to

settle the issue and to restore peace in the area only if

they deemed them useful. 51 People's Republic of China on

the other hand on the same day in order to raise PakistanIs

morale issued a statement which criticized India IS Itnaked

aggression" arid warned lithe Indian Government that it would

bear the responsibility for any consequences arising out

of its criminal aggression". 52 In continuation the Chinese

Government on 8 September sent a note to the Indian Govern-

ment alleging border violations. The Soviet Union condemned

these Chinese actions.

Unaffected by China I s outbursts against India I.Belyaev in

a commentary on Moscow Television made a passionate appeal

for ending the conflict. He said, liAS it is a war between

two peoples who were one people and lived in one country,

51 Pravda, 8 September 1965.

52 Peking Review, op.cit., no.50, p.6.

159

India, before it was divided in 1947". He further added,

IIPeople of India and Pakistan must not allow outside forces

to use religion to play one against the other to serve their

own vested interests". 53 The reference of "outside forces"

in the above statement was an indication towards China.

Expressing his genuine concern for peace and good-neighbourly

relations between the people of India and Pakistan, whom

Brezhnev called Ilblood brothers ll at the Soviet-Rumanian

friendship meeting in Moscow,54 the Soviet leader on 11

September in an indirect reference to China said that "third

forces" "sometimes added fuel to the fire n • In a speech

before the Rumanian leaders in MOscow, Brezhnev made a friendly

reference to both India and Pakistan and appealed to them to

stop fighting. He said, "Bonds of friendship which have

already become traditional exist between us and India. We

are accustomed to appreciate and respect India'S peace-loving

foreign policy, her fidelity to the principles of non-alignment,

national freedom and friendly international cooperation".

While referring to Pakistan, he declared: IIWe want to develop

good neighbourly relations with Pakistan as well ••. and we

have noted with satisfaction that this striving of ours met

55 wi th understanding on the part of the Pakistani Government".

53 Quoted by Bhagat Vats, Foreign Intrigues Against India, (New Delhi, 1967), p.137.

54 Pravda, 11 September 1965.

55 Ibid.

160

He further advised declaration of ceasefire by both parties

and withdrawal of their troops to the positions they held

before fighting commenced.

An explosive situation was created by China by her troops'

movement in various strategic points in the north of India and

open provocations near Sikkim border whose defence was t:he

treaty obligation of India. Knowing fully well the various

implications of Chinese provocations, the Soviet Union through

another Tass statement of 13 September condemned the acts of

"certain forces seeking to profit by the worsened India­

Pakistan relations and trying to push the two countries

towards aggravation of the military conflict ••• by their

incendiary statements". It indirectly warned China by stating

further that "those who facilitate the fanning of the conflict

by their incendiary statements and by their policy ••• aSsume

grave responsibility for such a policy, for such actions.

No government has any right to add fuel to the flames".56

The ~ statement asserted that there was no possibility

for settling the conflict other than by peaceful means. A

Soviet weekly, Za Rubezhom also condemned the Chinese action. 57

However, China in order to coerce India and to relieve

Pakistan of mounting Indian military pressure in the Lahore

Sector and in a bid to thwart Soviet move for mediation in

the Indo-Pak conflict, issued an ultimatum to India on

56 Ibid., 14 September 1965.

57 See Bhagat Vats, op.cit., no.53, p.147.

161

16 September demanding the removal of all 'Indian' milita~

establishments on the Chinese side of the Sikkim-Chinese

border and the return of four kidnapped Tibetans, 800 sheep

58 and 59 yaks within three days. Cautiously watching the

Chinese move, Premier Kosygin, on 17 September, i.e., the

day on which Chinese ultimatum was received in New Delhi,

in another message to Prime Minister Shastri and President

Ayub Khan proposed direct meeting between the leaders of

India and Pakistan on the Soviet soil, preferably in Tashkent

.. in order to achieve agreement on the reestablishment of

peace" 1:1etween the two countries and offered his good offices

59 on request. The Security Council once again took up the

matter on 18 September in the wake of Chinese ultimatum to

India. Moscow put forward its earlier three proposals for

the establishment of peace.60 The Soviet delegate said, "It

is quite obvious that such a turn of events is not at all

in the interest of the peoples of India and Pakistan or the

peoples of Asia as a whole •••• It is equally clear that

the continuation of this conflict benefits only the forces

which are pursuing the criminal policy of dividing peoples

t h . th" . l' t d ., t . 'I 61 so as 0 ac ~eve e~r J.mperl.a ~s an expanS~onl.S a~ms.

58 Lok Sabha Debates, Third Series, vol.46, 1965, col.6334.

59 Pravda, 20 September 1965.

60 §fQB, 20 Yr, 1241 Mtg., 18 September 1965, pp.27-28.

61 Ibid.

He further said that the Soviet Union felt concerned "because

the hostilities are taking place in a region immediately

adj acent to the frontiers of the Soviet Union" .62 He again

asserted: "It goes without saying that it is first and foremost

the Governments of India and Pakistan themselves which can

and must settle the present conflict. The Charter of the UN

and the Bandung principles_cry out for statesman-like wisdom

on the part of the leaders of both countries. ,,6 3

Prime Minister Shastri in a statement in the Lok Sabha

on 17 September outrightly rejected the Chinese allegations

contained in China's first ultimatum to India. However, the

deadline of Chinese ultimatum expired and India remained

unmoved. But China served another ultimatum to India on

19 September. Taking stock of latest developments in the

s-q.bcontinent, in the wake of second Chinese ultimatum to

India, the Security Council held an emergency meeting on

20 September. The Soviet delegate voted for the Security

Coo.ncil resolution which demanded that l1a ceasefire should

take effect on Wednesday, 22 September 1965, at 0700 hours

GMTII, and demanded IIboth Governments to issue orders for a

ceasefire at that moment and a subsequent withdrawal of all

armed personnel back to the positions held by them before

5 August 1965 11•64

The resolution without naming China or

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid.

64 For the text of the Resolution see Rahmatullah Khan, Kashmir and the United Nations (Vikas, Delhi, 1969), pp.176-177.

163

any other power aPpealed to 11 all states" to refrain from

any action nwhich might aggravate the situation in the area".

It was a most strongly worded resolution ever passed by the

Security Council with regard to the Kashmir conflict.

The ceasefire resolution of the Security Council influenced

the course of conflict and resulted in its termination, although

a little bit late, in the early hours of 23 September. Pakistan,

after the passage of the resolution, was left with only ·two

options. It could have either ignored the ceasefire resolution

in the hope of intervention by the Chinese forces in the

conflict in its favour, or to readily accept the ceasefire

demand contained in a unanimous Security Council resolution.

Pakistan hesitated in the beginning and sent her Foreign

Minister to Washington but she soon realized that President

Johnson would not intervene in the conflict except through

the world body and that the Chinese only issued incendiary

statements with no intention to enter into the conflict as

the sUbsequent events also revealed. President Johnson on

22 September telephonically assured President Ayub Khan of

his country's support to Pakistan if she agreed to the

cease-fire call of the Security council.65 Thus, Pakistan

was left with no choice except to accept the ceasefire

resolution, which neither included the right of self­

determination for the Kashmiri people, nor the withdrawal

of troops from other's territory. Pakistan, thus reluctantly

65 Hindustan Times, 23 September 1965.

164

accepted the ceasefire demand. Peking first extended and

later allowed to expire its ultimatum to India. Premier

Kosygin expressed happiness over the development and viewed

th- t J."t ld th" t f t th' 66 a wou serve e J.nteres s 0 s reng enJ.ng peace.

In continuation of its initiative to bring two warring

nations to the negotiating table, Moscow viewed that they

could meet only under Soviet auspices because the Western

powers had failed to maintain peace in the subcontinent and

had always tried to create bad blood between Asian and African

67 peoples. India immediately agreed to the Soviet proposal

of its mediation and venue of the conference to be on the

"Soviet soil". But it took some time before Pakistan agreed

to meet in Tashkent. President Ayub sent a letter to Premier

Kosygin stating that II such a meeting would not at present be

fruitful" and Moscow shOUld try for a "meaningful resolution ll

in the Security Council, IIthat can lead to an honourable

settlement of the Kashmir dispute ll • 68 But Pakistan also

soon realized that due to their neutral posture throughout

the course of Indo-Pakistani war the Soviet Union only,

among all the powers, could successfully mediate and in

their bid to improve relations with Pakistan, they would not

play with their national interests during the course of

66 Pravda, 24 September 1965.

67 Ibid., 22 September 1965.

68 Ibid., 26 September 1965.

165

mediation. So, they also agreed to Soviet mediation at the

conference which finally took place from 4 January to 10

January 1966.

China, however, waS not satisfied with the Security

Council resolution and condemned it outrightly. The Chinese

Government had from the very start of the conflict openly

favoured Pakistan, issued provocative statements against

India, communicated threatening ultimatums and tried to

disrupt the soviet move for mediation and efforts to end the

war through the world body. China supported Pakistan in her

war with India because Pakistan seemed to fight its battles.

If Pakistan could have defeated India, the latter would have

ceased to be a rival of China in Asia. In this regard

Indian Foreign Minister rightly observed that China was

fighting through Pakistan.69

Moreover, China supported

Pakistan as it would have provided her an opportunity to.

fish in the troubled waters of the subcontinent and to

undermine the growing Soviet influence in Pakistan.

Indo-Pakistani conflict gave birth to a dilemma for

the Soviet diplomacy. Any Chinese attack on India would

have compelled Moscow to review its neutral posture in the

conflict. However, the ·Soviets wanted to avoid an open

confrontation with Peking. Moscow, on the other hand,

knew that any Chinese intervention in the war would strengthen

the hands of reactionary forces and undermine the progressive

69 Indian Express, 20 September 1965.

166

forces in India. That was what happened, after all, in 1962

as a result of Sino-Indian war. This apprehens~on of Moscow

proved quite realistic as immediately after the war the Jan

Sangh Party alleged that Moscow deserted India during her war

with Pakistan.70 Similarly, the Swatantra Party pleaded for

review of Indian foreign policy as the Soviet Union did not

give qny preferential treatment to India in her war with

Pakistan.71

Moreover, the Chinese intervention would have

led New Delhi to seek military assistance from Washington,

which would have ultimately affected the Indo-Soviet relations

in general and Soviet interests in South Asia in particular.

Moscow never wanted any growth of Chinese and Western powers'

influence in the subcontinent. Western involvement in the

subcontinent as a result of Chinese intervention would have

turned this area into another Vietnam, and Soviets would not

have liked war so close to its frontier.

Moreover, it had been alleged by many scholars that

during Indo-Pak war, the Soviet and American policies ran

pgrallel to each other and equated India and Pakistan, i.e.

aggressor and the victim by putting them on the Same plane.

It should be noted that it was the United States not the

Soviet Union who equated the aggressor with the victim.

When India protested to Washington against the use of US

70 Organiser, Vol.19, No.8, October 1965, p.l. ¥

71 Swarajya, Vol.9, No.22, October 1965, pp.18-19.

167

arms by Pakistan against India, which Rawalpindi received

under Mutual Security Pact with the United States to contain

communism only, the US administration imposed arms embargo on

both the countries placing them on equal footing. It waS the

White House, which keeping Pakistan on par with India, cancelled

the proposed visit of Shastri and Ayub to Washington. The

Soviet Union, on the other hand, never cancelled her arms

agreement with India. When Indo-Pak war was about to end,

a high-level Indian defence delegation was busy in finalising

an arms agreement in Moscow.72

Just a few days before the

outbreak of war, Moscow had readily agreed to supply submarines

to India along with training and maintenance f aci lities. 73

The defence of Indian coast-l~ne was quite vulnerable to

Pakistani attack due to the outdated ships of the Indian navy.

India's earlier endeavours to purchase submarines from both

Britain and the USA had bore no fruit. When India, disappoin-

ted with western powers, approached Moscow for the said purpose,

Britain threatened to severe the existing connections of the

74 'Royal Navy with the Indian Navy. The USA which had already

sold a few submarines to Pakistan in 1964, termed Indian deal

75 wi th MOSCOw for submarines as .. over-preparedness" •

Some Indian and foreign scholars also blamed the Soviet

Union for letting down India during its impending need for

72 Times of India, 18 September 1965.

73 Ibid., 6 August 1965.

74 Hindu, 5 August 1965.

75 Times of India, 11 August 1965.

168

Soviet support. However, it is quite unreasonable to accuse

Krem1in of a changed stance towards India because it could

not condemn Pakistan as an aggressor, consistently demanded

bilateral negotiation for the settlement of mutual dispute

and finally favoured ceasefire resolutions on the Kashmir

issue in the Security Council. There was, however, hardly

anything new in the Soviet stand. Moscow, from the very outset

urged bilateral negotiation for the settlement of any dispute

between India and Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan had, in

f act, accepted this view after the Security Counci I discussion

on the Kashmir issue in May 1964. The Soviet Union did not

change her view on the Kashmir issue in the Security Council.

Kremlin finally supported the Council resolution which had

only asked for cease-fire without any reference to withdrawal

from or even self-determination in Kashmir. Indian stand in

the Security Council during the war was precisely the same.

This resolution later on became acceptable to both the warring

parties. So it would have been quite foolish on Soviets'part

to veto this unanimous resolution which became acceptable to

both the parties.

For the relaxation of tension in the subcontinent, the

Soviet demand for immediate cease-fire and peace waS the

most appropriate stand. In the difficult situation of war,

which was made much more explosive by People's Republic of

China'S provocative stance, the Soviet initiative proved quite

decisive in defusing the crisis. Kremlin's open support to

169

India would have only aggravated the tension and delayed the

cease-fire process. Chinese leadership would have been

irritated over Soviet support to India and would have given

them more excuses to create trouble on India's northern border.

Ultimately it might have led to the Chinese military adventure

leading finally to US intervention. A warning to this effect

had already been conveyed by the US Secretary of State Dean

Rusk to People's Republic of China.76 Later, when China gave

its first ultimatum to India, the US Ambassador Cabott Lodge

warned his Chinese counterpart, Wan Kuo-chuan in Warsaw, of

77 the consequences of such an adventure.

The Soviet diplomacy in the'Indo-Pak conflict was guided

by reason and pragmatism. If they had to develop equally good

relations with both India and Pakistan, they had no other

choice but to maintain a neutral posture in the war. Moscow

assigned to itself the role of a peace-maker. Even though

Moscow was fully aware of the fact that right from the time

of Kutch conflict up to the naked aggression along the Indo­

Pak border Pakistan was the real trouble-maker, yet this truth­

telling would have cost Moscow its mediatory role. Further,

it would have delayed the military disengagement which was

draining their hard earned rare resources and would have

ultimately led to instability in these countries. So, given

the facts, it is wrong to assume that Soviet policy towards

76 See New York Times, 14 September 1965.

77 Hindustan Times, 18 September 1965.

170

India during its war with Pakistan in any way amounted to

withdrawal of Soviet support to India.

Although Soviet policy during the Indo-Pakistani conflict

was largely sympathetic towards India, MOscow deliberately made

attempts not to criticize or condemn Rawalpindi. The Soviets

were primarily interested in a sensible, satisfactory and

durable peace settlement between two warring neighbours on

the southern flank of their border and to establish equally

balanced bond of friendship with both the neighbours.

B. TASHKENT AGREEMENT

India after the ceasefire was disturbed over a particular

phrase of the Security Council resolution 211(1965) of 20 September

1965 which envisaged that the Security Council would consider,

as soon as the fighting had stopped, "what steps could be taken

to assist towards a settlement of the political problem under­

lying the present conflict". The reason for Indian anxiety

was that it implied reopening of Kashmir problem in the Security

Council. But the Soviet representative to the Security Council

Fedorenko on 25 October 1965 assured India in the Council that

since ceasefire resolution called for a complete ceasefire and

the withdrawal of armed personnel had not been fully materialised,

it would be . utter disregard to the letter and spirit of the

resolution 211(1965), if it discussed other aspects of the

problem without solving the previous one. Thus he urged the

Council to discuss only those problems which were directly

connected with the settlement of the armed conflict between

171

India and Pakistan.78

He further asserted that the withdrawal

of troops and armed personnel by both sides to the positions

occupied by them upto 5 August 1965, must proceed more rapidly.

Fedorenko took special care in making statements, otherwise

it would have been misunderstood in Pakistan. While making

assertion that withdrawal of troops must precede taking up

of other issues, he did not rule out the possibility of Security

Council considering the Kashmir question at some future date.

. .. He emphas1zed that these are the questions that must be settled

first, these are the questions to which attention must be given

in the situation that has now arisen If. The Soviet Union had

"constantly called for, c;md calls for strict compliance with

the Council's resolution". 7

9 These calculated and balanced

statements indicated that Kremlin was eager to preserve its

neutral posture and was not willing to let slip its opportu-

nities for playing the useful role of a mediator between

India and Pakistan.

Although India and Pakistan both accepted the Soviet

offer of mediation, Ayub Khan before its acceptance paid a

visit to the United States to extricate President Johnson's

support on the Kashmir issue. However nothing specially

significant came out of this ·visit. The Soviet Union once

again repeated her offer for mediation in th~ middle of

78 UN Document S/PV. 1247.

79 Ibid.

172

November. Left with no other alternative, President Ayub

Khan on 11 November 1965 agreed to meet Prime Minister Shastri

at Tashkent for summit talks. Moscow formally announced that

the summit meeting would take place at Tashkent on 4 January

1966. Peking was very critical of the meeting and alleged

that Tashkent conference was a US-Soviet design to support

Indian 'reactionaries'.

The press release of 12 November 1965 (a day after

Pakistan's acceptance of Soviet mediation) by the Press

Information Department-of the USSR Embassy in Karachi clearly

reflected the neutral posture of the Soviet Union in the Indo-

Pakistani conflict. The release stated that "attempts are at

times made to claim that the Soviet Union is allegedly not

objective and is inclined to support one side at the expense

of the other side. Such opinions are far from reality. The

only thing desired by the Soviet Government is the establish-

ment of a stable peace between Pakistan and India and, as far

as this basic desire is concerned, the Soviet Government

equally appeals to the leaders of Pakistan as well as to those

of India with the call to display wisdom, restraint and

patience. Soviet people are convinced that only under these

conditions, not on the battlefield but at the round table of

peaceful negotiations, can and should a final and stable

agreement be reached between Pakistan and India on the

Kashmir problem ll • 80 This non-Partisan attitude was essential

for building confidence in the parties concerned to accept the

Soviet mediation effort.

80 ~, 13 arid 14 November lY65.

173

Mediation is a very difficult job, and particularly if

mediation has to be done between India and Pakistan, it

becomes a herculean task. Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur

Shastri before leaving for Tashkent declared that India, in

any case, would not compromise on Pakistani strategic posts in

Pakistani-occupied Kashmir seized by India, namely - Kargil,

Tithwal, Hazi Pir - through which Pakistani infiltrators had

sneaked into Kashmir valley. In addition, he declared that

Indian sovereignty over Kashmir was not negotiable. Ayub Khan

on the other hand insisted upon a self-executing machinery

for the settlement of the Kashmir problem before the final

withdrawal of forces. The Tashkent conference began on 4

January 1966 against this background. It was the first

diplomatic move on the part of Khrushchev's successor Brezhnev

and for that reason also Moscow made special efforts to make

it successful.

Premier, A.N. Kosygin inaugurated the conference and in

his welcome address he pointed out that the purpose of calling

this summit meeting was to assist both India and Pakistan in

their search for peace. He asserted that Moscow was not only

interested in strengthening ties with ,both these countries

but also in cordiality of good neighbourly relations between

India and Pakistan itself. He highlighted the economic

implications of war and the seriousness of the economic tasks

before them. Kosygin hopefully emphasized that "Tashkent

might start a turning point in Indo-Pak relations, if they

would create a climate of mutual trust and understanding" .81

81 Pravda, 5 January 1966.

174

Ayub Khan and Shastri on their turn outlined the central

points of their respective positions. Before the inauguration

of the conference Kosygin met both these dignitaries and it

appears that he persuaded both of them to tone down the final

drafts of their inaugural speeches. Kosygin successfully

arranged a brief meeting between them before the beginning of

the plenary session. As a result Ayub Khan did not mention

Kashmir in his inaugural speech and Shastri stressed the

importance of multidimensional improvement in Indo-Pakistani

relations. Shastri in his inaugural address underlined the

importance of a II no warll pact between the two countries and

the gradual elimination of points of differences. Ayub Khan

on the other hand doubted the feasibility of "no warll pact

until all those disputes which divided the two countries were

82 resolved.

The first major obstacle in Indo-Pakistani negotiations

came in the shape of question of agenda. However, a formula

agreeable to both was worked out. Both sides decided to

exchange views on various issues even without an accepted

a~nda. Further deliberations of the conference centered

on troops withdrawal, Kashmir question, restoration of

economic and trade relations, repatriation of prisoners of

war, problem of refugees, illegal immigrations and the vital

issues of war and peace on the subcontinent. The task before

175

Kosygin was to reconcile the irreconcilable divergent points

of view of the two countries. Pravda correspondent while

covering the inaugural session of the Tashkent Conference

commented, liThe opening of the meeting between Indian and

Pakistani leaders is a good omen. An important step has

been taken towards a real settlement of the Indo-Pakistan

conflict. This step has been interpreted by the people of

the world as a manifestation of goodwill and statesmanship

on the part of Indian and Pakistani leaders .1183

Premier Kosygin had a difficult time shuttling from one

dignatory to another in order to settle the main hurdles. In

this process he met President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister

Shastri almost dai ly. The discussion on lithe entire range

of problems involved in making the Tashkent meeting a success ll

between the guest dignitaries continued on 5 and 6 January

1966. On 7 January the meeting between Shastri and Ayilb Khan

got deadlocked in the presence of Kosygin. The following day

Tass observed that the two delegations were lIapproaching the

stage of diff icult negotiations". 84 There was no meeting on

8 January and stalemate continued. JI.yub'Khan's inability to

get concessions from India forced him in desperation to

threaten to walk out of the conference and return to Rawalpindi

85 on 11 January. The Indian delegation also decided to return

on the same day. 9 January proved to be most crucial day.

83 News and Views from Soviet Union (New Delhi), Vol. 25, no. 3, 5 January 1966, P.13.

84 Pravda, 9 January 1966.

85 ~, 9 January 1966.

176

~ reported on the same day that the participants were

evolving a new path to narrow down their differences on a

score of important issues.86

After the deadlock it was left

to the diplomatic skill of Premier Kosygin to convert the

dead meeting into a live and successful one. He made frantic

efforts in that direction, meeting Shastri three times that

day. Once in the morning for two and a half hours, second

time in the evening for three hours and at last at the end

of the day. Simil~ly, he had two meetings with President

Ayub, one of two and a quarter hours duration and the other

of 45 minutes duration. His labour was well-rewarded that

day, as due to his efforts only a nine-clause declaration

was concluded which was eventually signed by them on 10

January. This last minute breakthrough took even the Soviet

press people by surprise as Pravda's report on the conference

on 10 January was far from encouraging.

Indian scholar M.S. Rajan acknowledged Kosygin's great

personal contribution to the success of the meeting. He

wrote, II ••• the Soviet Prime Minister firmly stuck to the

letter and spirit of the offer of good offices. He did not at

makeLany stage any propoposals, or pressurise either of the

leaders to accept the proposals of the other. Contrary to

inspired and malacious press reports, there was no Soviet

armtwisting of India or Pakistan. All that the Soviet Prime

Minister tried to do was to bring to bear on the two leaders

86 Pravda, 10 January 1966.

177

his tremendous powers of persuasion to make them see each

other's point of view in the interest of peace in the Indian

b . t 87 su contl.nen • The Soviet leader was not only interested

in the withdrawal of troops from each other's territories

and obserVance of cease-fire line, but also in laying "a

solid foundation for peace and security in Hindustan". 88

The declaration had a two-pronged object - First, the

immediate resumption of cordial relations between India and

Pakistan and, secondly, to chalk out a procedure for the

settlement of all disputes ·between the two countries through

peaceful means.

The highlight of the nine-clause declaration was the

resolve by the two major powers of the subcontinent to

renounce the use of force and settle their mutual differences

through peaceful means. I t announced that II all armed personnel

of the two countries shall be withdrawn not later than 25

February 1966 to the pOSitions they had prior to 5 August 1965,

and both sides shall observe the cease-fire terms on the cease-

fire line". They further agreed on the principle of non-

interference in the internal affairs and to discourage hostile

propaganda against each other. It envisaged resumption of

normal diplomatic ties, to "consider measures towards the

87 M.S. Raj an, "The Tashkent Declaration : Retrospect and Prospect", International Studies, vol.8, July 1966-Apri 1 1967, p.8.

88 Y. Lugovkai, "International Commentary - Hindustan Second Anniversary of the Tashkent Declaration", International Affairs, No.2, February 1968, p.83.

178

restoration of economic and trade relations, communications,

as well as cultural exchanges", to "continue the discussion

of questions relating to the problems of refugees, evictions,

illegal immigrations ", to repatriate prisoners of war. The

joint declaration did not mention Kashmir question directly.

It simply said that II it was against this background that

Jammu and Kashmir was discussed, and each of the sides set

forth its respective position". It further envisaged joint

meetings at ministerial and other levels and the setting up

of joint Indo-Pakistani bodies to consider problems of common

89 concern. But the jOint ministerial meeting held at Rawalpindi

in March 1966 did not achieve any substantial progress though

the joint declaration at the end of the meeting observed:

"Considerable progress was made in clarifying the issues

involved. The talks which were of an exploratory nature,

1 d f 1 h f · II 90 e to a use u exc ange 0 v~ews • Similarly, restoration

of trade and cultural relations made very slow progress chiefly

because Pakistan considered meaningful talks on Kashmir

question as an essential condition for such normalization

of re lations.

The Soviet Union was very happy over the outcome of

the Tashkent meeting. Replying to the queries of the Soviet

journalists, Premier Kosygin stated that the Tashkent Declaration

89 Foreign Affairs Record, Vol.12, No.1, January 1966, p.9.

'90 Dev Sharma, Tashkent : A study in Foreign Relations with Documents, Allahabad, 1966, p.121.

179

had ushered in a new era of good relations between India

and Pakistan and had laid a solid base for the creation of

conditions of peace in the subcontinent.91

The Soviet'

leader reiterated that the declaration might become lithe

symbol of eternal friendship between India and Pakistan" and

at the same time also II s trengthen friendship between India

and the Soviet Union and between Pakistan and the Soviet

Union ll .92 Kosygin was thankful to both the visiting state

guests for the II anergy , patience, and ••• perseverance they

had shown in search of a mutually acceptable solution, the

implementation of which will promote the strengthening of

93 peace and friendship between people".

Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri immediately

after the signing of the document in a private conversation

with Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan stated that "we have fought

in this (rndo-Pakistan conf lict) with all our strength. Now

94 we have to fight for peace with all our strengthll

• According

to Shastri the declaration had achieved "very tangible results".

He expressed that establishment of peaceful relations between

India and Pakistan would promote the IIcause of peace in Asia

95 and throughout the world u • According to him Tashkent

91 Pravda, 11 January 1966.

92 Soviet Review (Information Department of the USSR Embassy, New Delhi), 14 January 1966.

93 Pravda, 11 January 1966.

94 Quoted by Devendra Kaushik, op.cit., nO.37, p.97.

95 See Summary of World Broadcasts, Series 2, SU/2059, 12 January 1966, p.SU/2059/A3/2.

180

Conference was a lIunique experiment in international diplomacy". 96

President Ayub Khan also praised the conference as livery good

and fruitful meeting" and assigned its accomplishment to lithe

untiring and commendable endeavours of the Soviet Prime Minister,

• II 97 ... h Mr. Kosyg1n. In an 1nterv1ew w1th Tass newsmen e expressed

his dissatisfaction over the inability of the Conference to

discuss the Kashmir question but he whole-heartedly praised

Premier Kosygin I s role. He Observed, liThe Tashkent declaration

has not gone as far as it should have gone to resolve the

Kashmir dispute. It should have been attempted because that

is the basic problem that creates stresses and strains between

India and Pakistan •••• Prime Minister Kosygin has shown a

unique example of statesmanship and far-sightedness in convening

the Tashkent meeting, and the initiative shows the Soviet

98 Union I s genuine interest in peacell

• He said that although

the Soviet union itself was not directly involved in the

conflict, it had set a unique example in international diplomacy

by using its good offices in resolving the dispute between

neighbouring countries.99

The Tashkent declaration proved to be an embodiment of

the policy of peaceful co-existence as it was Signed by the

Prime Minister of non-aligned India and the President of aligned

96 Times of India (New Delhi), 11 January 1966.

97 ~, 11 January 1966.

98 Ibid.

99 ~.

181

Pakistan in the presence of a Soviet socialist Premier. It

convinced ASia in general and Pa.kistan in particular that

Moscow was genuinely interested in maintaining peace in the

region. The US intervention in the South Asian region in

1954 multiplied the tension in the area and brought cold war

at the doorstep of the subcontinent. Similarly, Chinese entry

into South Asia in the early 1960s further aggravated the

tension and virtually created a second front for India.

However, the Soviet involvement in this area in the form

of Tashkent mediation generated a harmonious atmosphere -

something which the United Kingdom and the United Sta~es

, 100 attempted in 1962-63 but without any tang1ble result.

Chinese reaction to the Tashkent declaration was one of

hostility and animosity. China, which wished Indo-Pakistani

conflict to be prolonged, called this meeting "a neo-

colonialist gathering" and denied the significance of the

declaration. Peking branded the declaration as II a product

of US-Soviet plotting ll that would weaken the struggle against

, '1' 'A' d f' 101 1mper1a 1sm 1n Sla an 'A r1ca. It accused the Sovie"t

Premier of "aiding the aggressor and disguising himself as

, t' 1 't II 102 an 1mpar 1a negot1a or • While the Tashkent meeting was

in progress, the Chinese Government sent a strong note to

India on 6 January, alleging that Indian troops were creating

100 Budhraj, op.cit., no.34, p.166.

101 Peking Review, vol.9, no.5, 4 February 1966, p.l1.

102 Asian Survey, vol.8, no.3, March 1967, pp.185-86.

182

trouble at the Chinese border and China would repulse them

unless Indian intrusion into Chinese territory ceased. 103

It was an indirect Chinese move to make it difficult for

the parties to come to an understanding at Tashkent.

Major Western powers' reaction to the Tashkent Declaration

was a mixture of applause and hosti Ii ty. The Press and the

leaders of these countries were astonished at the fact that

104 India and Pakistan - two major countries of the Commonwealth,

one of them, in fact, aligned with them, who fought the war

largely with Western weapons, had decided to settle their

dispute under the aegis of their camp opponent-USSR.

Washington followed a dubiOUs policy towards the holding of

the Tashkent Conference. Whereas President Johnson openly

and wholeheartedly supported the Soviet mediation efforts,

his defence secretary Robert ¥lCNamara made a statement which

waS quite contrary to the President's spirit. President

Johnson supported the move for holding the conference during

Ayub's visit to Washington. He, at the same time, on the eve

of the conference emphasized the need for peaceful solution

f h d ' 'h be ' t 105 b h' d o t e lspute ln t e su on tinen • The purpose e ln

this support to the soviet Union was to isolate Peking in

playing an effective role in South Asia. Defence Secretary

McNamara, on the other hand, on the eve of the conference told

India's Minister of Food, S.K. Patil, that Washington would

103 Dawn, 10 January 1966.

104 See The Daily Telegraph, 13 September 1966.

105 ~, 3 January 1966.

183

recognise Tashkent agreement only when it suits its interests,

otherwise the US Government would resume its arms supply to

Pak. 106 ~stan.

Similarly, Prime Minister Harold Wilson of the United

Kingdom who welcomed the outcome of the Tashkent Declaration,107

had earlier on 6 January showed his ill-will by releasing his

letter to Noel Baker in which he had branded India as an

aggressor in the September war.108

These double-edged policies

of the USA and UK and open threatening note to India by China

were aimed at supporting PakistanIs tough attitude towards the

conference to enable her to extract few more concessions from

India. It should be remembered that it was around 6 J-anuary

that the talks at Tashkent were deadlocked. Perhaps Ayub

Khan had got some external support for his tough stance at

the conference.

The Western press especially the British newspapers were

skeptical of the achievement of the Tashkent Declaration.

The Times of London after the signing of the agreement wrote

next day, "This is far from the no-war dec laration that wou ld

have assured the Indians that Kashmir was closed to future

. I II 109 v~o ence • It emphasized that the declaration was only a

no-force declaration. Alastair Lamb viewed Tashkent spirit

106 Quoted by P. Krukov, World Economy and International Relations (Moscow, 1966), (Russian).

107 ~, 11 January 1966.

108

109'

Times (London), 6 January 1966. ~b-i..el. ~k5j,g~ (London), 11 January 1966.

184

as II a phrase of little meaningll and advised partition of

Kashmir on communal lines for the solution of the problem.110

Michael Edwardes opined that the declaration was II a negative

achi evement" and branded it as a "funerary monument to the

dead Prime Ministerll• He observed that lithe dialogue he

had begun, instead of continuing fruitfully, petrified into

an obituary" .111 However, all these misinterpretations were

less directed towards analysing the event in proper persPec-

tive than devaluing the Soviet efforts.

However, Pakistan IS willingnes's to accept Soviet mediation

indicated that Chinese influence on Pakistan had diminished

as Peking was never in favour of stopping the conflict, much

112 less to accept and implement Tashkent agreement. Soviet

mediation pointed out that not only Chinese influence on

Pakistan was on wane but also the Western influence. Thi.s

could be easily observed in the 11th meeting of the SEATO

Council of Ministe~s, held in Canberra, Australia, some six

months after the Tashkent meeting. Pakistan did not send her

minister to the meeting, instead she was represented by her

high commissioner in Australia. Pakistan in this meeting

refused to support the resolution which stroke of communist

aggression in south Vietnam and Laos.

110 Alastair Lamb, Crisis in Kashmir, 1947 to 1966 (London, 1966), p. 137 & 149.

111 International Affairs (London), Vol.42, No.3, July 1966.

112 S.W. Simon, liThe Kashmir Dispute in Sino-Soviet Perspec­tive", Asian Survey, Vol.VII, No.3, March 1967, PP.185-86.

185

The Tashkent conference became a turning point through

which Moscow acquired political influence in both India and

Pakistan. Normalization of relations between India and

Pakistan was beneficial not only to these two countries but

also to the Soviet Union because it involved its own security

interests owing to the geographical proximity and strategic

-location of the South ASian region. Apart from Soviet anxiety

for peace and stability in the subcontinent, there was also a

desire in Kremlin to insulate the growing Chinese and Western

influence in Pakistan. This conference left a significant

imprint on Soviet-Pakistani relations. Just in contrast to

the previous history of Soviet-Pak relations, the Kremlin

had the satisfaction that like India, now Pakistan too had

confidence and feeling of friendship towards Moscow. The

significant part of the success of the Soviet diplomacy was

its ability to cultivate Pakistan without alienating India.

C. TASHKENT' S AFT E..RMATH

So far as the implementation of the provisions of the

Tashkent Declaration was concerned, most of them were executed

in the letter and spirit of the Declaration. For some time,

it appeared that this agreement would start a new phase in

Indo-Pakistani relations. But soon it was realized that

the atmosphere of mistrust and hostility persists and all

hopes to start good neighbourly relations between the two

remained unfulfilled.

186

Some immediate positive results of the declaration may

be recalled. Both the countries withdrew their armed personnel

before 25 February 1966 to the positions they held before 5

August 1965. They at the same time exchanged Prisoners of War.

Diplomatic missions were restored with the return of the High

Commissioners to their respective posts in New Delhi and

Rawalpindi. Communication f~cilities - air, postal and tele­

graphic - between the two neighbouring countries, which were

disrupted by the war were restored, inter-state travelling was

resumed through two points on the common land border and the

cargo and ships seized during the war were returned.

The provisions which were not implemented in the spirit

of the declaration were the establishment of the joint meetings

at ministerial and other levels and the resumption of trade and

cultural relations. The joint Indo-Pakistani bodies were to

be instituted to consider the problems of common concern. But

to Moscow's disappointment the head of the Governments of the

two countries did not meet again, though the officials of the

two countries did have some unsuccessful meetings. The Foreign

Ministers of India and Pakistan met at Rawalpindi on 1 and 2

March 1966, but their meeting did not result in substantial

progress though the joint communique issued at its conclusion

Observed: "Considerable progress was made in clarifying the

issues involved. The talks, which were of an exploratory

nature, led to a useful exchange of views" .113 Similarly I the

113 Dev Sharma, op.cit., no.90.

187

resumption of trade and cultural relations envisaged in the

agreement had been very slow, primarily because Pakistan

considered that meaningful talks on Kashmir were essential

for such normalization of relations. Thus, Pakistan made

it obvious that there could be no rapprochement with India

as long as the Kashmir dispute existed.

Despite several demonstrations and mass meetings orga-

nised by some political parties against this agreement and

several motions against this document tabled in the Indian

Parliament, the Government of India did not withdraw its

t th O d 1 t' 114 support 0 1S ec ara 10n. The newly elected Prime

Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi Observed about this declaration

that Lal Bahadur Shastri had put the seal on the document

with his own life and thus she was prepared to implement

this agreement in toto. In contrast to India's positive

response, Pakistan's attitude towards Tashkent declaration

was from the very beginning far from encouraging and was full to

of misgivings. The news of Tashkent agreement le~an explosive

situation in Pakistan. Students, women, doctors, lawyers - all

staged a big demonstration in Pakistan. Police had to open

fire to control the mob. High-placed authorities in Pakistan

started indulging in mud-slinging over the declaration. The

anti-declaration feelings in Pakistan were fanned by Foreign

Minister Z.A. Bhutto~ Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmad, Information

Secretary Altaf Gauhar and few other havJks. Bhutto who was in

114 See Lok Sabha Debates (New Delhi), Vol.50, No.3, 1966, cols~ 652-653; No.5, cols. 1284-1286.

188

the entourage of President Ayub Khan to Tashkent, a£ter

returning home, publicly attacked the agreement. He formed

his own party after his expulsion from Ayub's cabinet. He

alleged that the Tashkent Declaration was a "betrayal" of

Pakistani interests. Ayub Khan, in fact, was under tremendous

pressure not only from political but also from military and

corrmunal quarters of Pakistan which was being encashed by

Bhutto. During National ASsembly debates on the declaration,

Bhutto alleged that the Tashkent agreement did not provide

any specific solution to the actual problems which lie

between India and Pakistan. He further stated that the

Tashkent Declaration was "not a contractual obligation" and

it could not deter Pakistan from" espousing the cause of

Jammu and Kashmir", and its people whose defence was the

I 't' t 'ht of PakJ.'stan. 115 eg1 J.ma e rJ.g

The Foreign Secretary of Pakistan Aziz Ahmad suggested

that the II armed personnel" who were to be withdrawn under

Tashkent agreement, did not inc lude II freedom fighters in

Kashmir" .116 The Information Secr~tary of Pakistan Altaf

Gauhar in a speech to the Pakistan Institute of International

Affairs on 2 March 1966 asserted that the Tashkent document

permitted Pakistan to resort to war if Kashmir dispute was

not settled through peaceful means. He further observed that

the ceasefire line in Kashmir was II a temporary arrangement ll

115 ~, 16 March 1966.

116 Pakistan Times, 12 January 1966.

189

and lithe freedom fighters had the right to be there where

117 they were."

The opposition parties in Pakistan during the course of

National Assembly debates considered Tashkent agreement as a

IIdownright betrayal of the political aspirations of the people

of Jammu and Kashmirll, a diplomatic defeat, a surrender, an

t f II d It' wl.'th Indl.' all .118 agreemen or a no-war ec ara l.on Some of

the National Assembly members viewed the declaration as a

design of American imperialists and still others saw in the

agreement a IIdiplomatic victory for Russia over China in South

ASiall ,119 and still few others felt that the accord under the

leadership of Soviet Russia amounted to a betrayal of Peking.120

President Ayub Khan when he Saw that the general opinion waS

against the declaration, also thought it fit to return to a

policy of confrontation with India in the name of Kashmir.

In an unscheduled broadcast to the nation on 14 January 1966,

he announced that the agreement did not-affect PakistanIs

position on Kashmir as IIhe had not signed a no-war pact with

I d ' 11121 n l.a.

117 QUoted in Pakistan Horizon (Karachi), vol.19, No.1, 1966, pp • 2 3- 2 5 •

118 National Assembly of Pakistan, Debates, vol.1, 15 March 1966, pp.435-437.

119 !bid., pp.425-429.

120 ~., 14 March 1966, p.360.

121 ~, 15 January 1966.

190

The anti-Tashkent campaign of Bhutto and others led to

the rise and growth of pro-Peking element~ in Pakistan. China

was too happy over this development. In order to encourage

the anti-Tashkent feelings in Pakistan and to boost their

morale, the Chinese Head of the State Liu Shao-chi visited

Pakistan first in March and once again in Apri 1 1966. During

his first visit, in the course of his various speeches in

Pakistan, he declared that "when Pakistan resolutely fights

against foreign aggression in defence of its national inde-

pendence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the 650

million Chinese people wi 11 stand unswervingly" for them

d 1 ... 1 d'" 122 h' an wou d provlde reso ute support an asslstance. C lnese

were knowing that the successful execution of Tashkent Decla-

ration would enhance the prestige of the Soviet Union in Asia

and at the same time it would result into reduction of Pakistan'S

dependence on China. Pakistan also knew the importance of the

Chinese trump card through which it wanted to extract maximum

economic and political concessions from the Soviet Union and

mili tary assistance from both the superpowers simultaneously.

The post-Tashkent period was marked by the Soviet Union's

endless efforts as earlier to strengthen its relati.ons with

both India and Pakistan and to bridge the gap between the two

countries. L.I. Brezhnev in his report to the Twenty-Third

Congress of the CPSU (29 March-8 April 1966) significantly

122 The Times (London), 28 March 1966.

191

mentioned that Moscow's traditional friendship with New Delhi

had further developed and, above all, it had proceeded along

with a certain improvement in its relations with Rawalpindi.

He further added that the Soviet Union was interested in

closer cooperation with Pakistan and that the Soviet people

appreciated the efforts made by the Pakistani people to

123 strengthen their country's independence, economy and culture.

Thus, the Soviet Union sincerely wished to improve its relations

with Rawalpindi. The year 1966 Saw a marked improvement in

Soviet contacts with Pakistan. After the Tashkent conference

Moscow and Rawalpindi signed, in the same month, a barter

agreement which provided for the exchange of Pakistani rice

for Russian vehicles and road-building and engineering

machinery.124 Similarly, when a nine-member Soviet parlia-

mentary delegation under the leadership of K.T. Mazurov

visited Pakistan in April-May, a contract was Signed in Dacca

for the construction of a thermal power station in Gorzala,

East Pakistan with an optimum capacity of 110,000 kilowatts. 125

AS a result of the agreement, there was increase in Soviet

economic assistance to Pakistan. 80 million dollars of economic

aid was offered towards the end of 1966. It also signed an

agreement under which it granted a credit of Rs 600 million

to Pakistan for the execution of twenty-one projects which

included two plants for the production of electrical machinery,

123 Pravda, 30 March 1966.

124 ~, 19 January 1966.

125 Sangat Singh, Pakistan's Foreign Policy - An APpraisal (Bombay, 1970), p.151.

192

fifteen broadcasting stations, the Guddu thermal power station,

a high voltage transmission line, and a rai lway-cum-highway

bridge across the river Rupsa.

The post-Tashkent period in Soviet policy towards Pakistan

reflected the development of multi-dimensional Soviet relations

with Rawalpindi, which remained operative more or less till

the serious upheaval in the sub-continent in 1971. A number-

of pelegations were exchanged ranging from political to military,

cultural, sports, and also of journalists. Pakistanis position

in the list of May Day slogans, issued on 17 April 1966, waS

also elevated. Pakistan which was earlier grouped with Iran

and Turkey, had now been placed next only to India. Pakistan

in Soview view was no longer detestable despite her negative

attitude towards the Tashkent agreement and the ever-growing

friendship with China. The new Soviet policy towards Pakistan

was aimed at weaning her away frOm both China and the USA,

whereas Pakistanis new stance towards the Kremlin was directed

towards neutralising the Soviet Unionls traditional friendship

with India. The Soviet desire to improve relations with

Pakistan found frequent expression in the Soviet media. Soviet

print media established that there were no unmanageable gaps

between the Soviet Union and Pakistan. The internal development

of Pakistan was'also painted positively by the Soviet press.

A four-man delegation of SOviet journalists led by vishnevsky

reached Pakistan in March 1965. Vishnevsky expressed satisfaction

over the improvement of relations betvleen the Soviet Union and

193

Pakistan especially after President Ayub Khan's visit to

Moscow. He hoped that these relations would further improve

with the successful implementation of the Tashkent declaration.126

A nine-member Soviet parliamentary delegation composed of different

Soviet nationalities and headed by K.T. Mazurov reached Pakistan

in April 1966. He laid emphasis on normalisation of relations

between India and Pakistan, expressing Soviet willingness to

offer its mediatory role in this matter.127

Pakistan on its

part conve~ed her concern over Soviet arms supplies to India,

through Pakistan's Home and Kashmir Affairs Minister, to the

S · l' d 1 . 128 OVlet par lamentary e egatlon.

, In the post-Tashkent period, Soviet arms supply to India

and PakistanIs demand to supply similar quantity of arms to

it also on par with India, became the focal point of foreign

policy issue in Pakistan. It became more important for

Pakistan as Britain and the United States had imposed arms

embargo on the shipment of arms to both India and Pakistan

in the wake of September 1965 war. In this situation India

was getting her arms supply from the Soviet Union. It was

reasonable for Rawalpindi to be concerned about this deve1op-

mente Pakistani leaders were fully aware of the fact that the

Kremlin had a stake in the political, economic and military

developments in India and it would be difficult for the Soviets

126 ~, 10 March 1966.

127 Pakistan Times (Lahore), 29 May 1966.

128 ~,30 May 1966.

194

to disengage themselves from that country. Pakistan's conten-

tion was that even if Moscow could not stop its arms supply

to India, they could easily supply arms to Rawalpindi on terms

similar to India.

In June 1966, in a bid to get military supply from the

Soviet Union, a Pakistani military delegation led by the

Cornmander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Air Marshal Nur Khan

visited the USSR, apparently on a "goodwill-cum-educational

129 tour. The military mission included a group of senior army,

navy and air force officers. These officers were expected to

establish personal contact~ with the Soviet military authori-

. . . f' ld 130'. h 11 Kh t f t1es 1n var10US 1e s. A1r Mars a Nur an me De ence

Minister Marshall Malinovsky and held extensive discussions

131 with his Soviet counterpart. The Pakistani military mission

inspected a number of Soviet military establishments and watched

carefully the performance of several supersonic aircraft. Nur

Khan also held talkS with G.S. Sidorovich, a high SOViet official,

who dealt in military transactions with foreign countries.132

However, there were unconfirmed reports and the activities of

the Pakistani military delegation in the Soviet Union also

suggested that the Kremlin had agreed to sell arms to Pakistan

on similar terms and conditions as it had been dOing in the

129 Pravda, 26 June 1966.

130 ~, 26 June 1966.

131 Ibid.

132 Christian Science Monitor, 4 August 1966.

195

case of India. It was also reported that MOscow, had conveyed

its decision in this regard to Pakistan through K.T. Mazurov,

First SOViet Deputy Prime Minister during his visit to Rawalpindi

as the leader of Soviet Parliamentary delegation. However,

133 the Indian Embassy in Moscow denied this report. The newly

elected Indian Prime ~dnister, Indira Gandhi, after her return

from the Soviet Union, in July 1966, categorically announced

that MOscow had not concluded any agreement with Pakistan on

the supply of arms. Pakistani rnili tary mission, despite no

agreement on arms supply, expressed satisfaction that "we

succeeded in developing ••• a sense of mutual confidence and

134 understanding betvleen our two states".

The Soviet desire to improve relations with Pakistan also

found expression in a speech by Premier Kosygin before the

135 Supreme Soviet in August 1966. This announcement of the

Soviet Premier followed the Soviet Government's offer of

Rs 600 million credit to Pakistan to execute 21 projects in

that country. In September 1966, N.P. Firyubin, the Soviet

Deputy Foreign Minister paid an urgent visit to Pakistan with

a two-fold purpose. Firstly, he had to assuage Pakistani

feeling on failure to get Soviet arms supply and secondly,

to restrain Pakistan from its decision to raise the Kashmir

question in the Security Council. Firyubin had a message from

133 K.D. Kapur, op.cit., no.6, pp.84-85.

134 Pakistan Times, 8 July 1966.

135 Pravda, 14 August 1966.

196

Premier Kosygin asking Pakistan to work in the Tashkent spirit

to settle differences with India.136

However, Pakistan once

again raised the issue of arms supply with the visiting

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister.

In continuation of the Soviet efforts to establish multi-

pIe contacts with Pakistan, Soviet Minister for Geology, A.V.

Sidorenko also visited Pakistan in the very first month of

the year 1967. He held talks with various Pakistani leaders

and officials. Pakistan received felicitations from Soviet

President, Premier and Foreign Minister on the occasion of

.. Pakistan Day". The messages mentioned that the recent deve-

lopment of good-neighbourly relations "meet the interests of

the Soviet Union and Pakistani people and promote the streng-

137 thening of peace in Asia and throughout the world".

A peculiar incident led Pakistan to depute its Foreign

Minister, Pirzada, to Pay an urgent visit to the Soviet capital

in May 1967. The Soviet Premier was supposed to visit Pakistan

in May 1967138

but for unforseen reasons the visit was postponed

for the next year. Pakistani invitation to Premier Kosygin waS

pending since April 1965. The reported postponement of visit

caused considerable anxiety in Islamabad and led Pirzada to

hurriedly arrange his visit to Moscow. The main Pakistani

concern was related to obtaining military weapons from the

Soviet Union. The cauSe of Pakistani anxiety over weapons

136 Pakistan Times, 27 September 1966.

137 Ibid., 25 March 1967.

138 Ibid., 8 April and 21 April 1967.

197

supply was the US decision to half the quantity of weapons

shipments to both India and Pakistan in the wake of 1965 war.

The Foreign ~dnister waS accorded war~welcome at Moscow.

Hosting a dinner party in honour Pirzada, his Sovieb counter-

part A. Gromyko mentioned that the two neighbouring countries

.. have every possibi lity of continuing to develop and consolidate"

their ever-growing relations in economic and cultural fields. 139

The joint communique issued after the end of Pakistani Foreign

Hinister I s offici al visit, recognised that in recent years the

relations between the two neighbouring countries in the economic,

political and other fields had developed to the full satisfaction

of the two countries. 140 The Soviet Union in a bid to accornmo-

date the differences with Pakistan, went to the extent of ignor-

ing any specific reference to the Tashkent agreement in the

joint communique.141

Speaking about his discussions with the

Soviet leaders at MOscow, Pirzada on his return observed that

it had been "cordial, candid and constructive" and he expressed

full satisfaction over the conversation he had with the Soviet

142 leaders. Howev~r, despite expression of satisfaction over

the con~ersation held at Moscow, the visit waS a failure in

its mission of acquiring arms from the Soviet Union.

To add some more salt to the Pakistani wound, there came

a report that the Soviet Union had agreed to sell hundred SU7B

139 Pravda, 9 May 1967.

140 ~., '13 May 1967.

141 For the text of the Soviet-Pak Joint Communique, see ~, 14 May 1967.

142 Pakistan Times, 14 May 1967.

198

fighter bombers to India in the early 1968. This report

created uneasiness and anxiety in Rawalpindi which was

communicated by Foreign Minister Pirzada to Soviet Premier

Kosygin in New York on 21 June 1967. However, Kosygin did

143 not make any commitment in this regard. The Soviet decision

to supply arms to India was not intended to promote an arms

race between India and Pakistan but to offset an impending

IIthreat to Indian security from the rnili tary hardware, valued

at 2,000 million dollars, supplied by the USA to Pakistan.1l144

TOP-LEVEL EXCHANGE OF VISITS

It was in the wake of this development that the Govern-

ment of Pakistan announced President Ayub Khan's official

visit to Moscow (his third visit) from 25 September to 4

October 1967. However, before the proposed visit of Ayub

Khan, three Parliamentary delegations were despatched to the

Soviet capital for the purpose of creating congenial atmosphere

before the actual visit of the President. Among the three

parliamentary delegations, one was comprised of nine members

of the National Assembly led by the Speaker Abdul Jabbar Khan,

the other two were - one from the East Pakistan Assembly and

145 the other from the West Pakistan Assembly.

The Soviet media portrayed a positive image of Pakis.tan

and the development of SOViet-Pakistani relations before Ayub

Khan's visit to MOscow. It extensively covered President Ayub's

143 Ibid., 23 June 1967.

144 Devendra Kaushik, op.cit., no.37, p.106.

145 Pakistan Times, 14 August 1967.

199

visit and his discussions with the top leaderships of the

Soviet Union. Speaking at a Kremlin bauquet hosted by

Premier Kosygin on 25 September, President Ayub Khan complained

that "indiscriminate increase in armaments and the growing

mili tary imbalances in the sub-continent were also a danger."

While doubting India's nuclear intentions, he observed, "The

interests of all nations demanded that the emergence of a sixth

nuc lear power should be prevented under all circumstances and

that a Non-Proliferation Treaty be concluded without further

delay.1I He further urged for speeding up a solution of the

Kashmir problem, which was, according to him lithe main stumbling

block in the way of good-neighbourly relations between Pakistan

d I di II 146 an n a.

The Soviet Union on its part emphaSized the need for a

peaceful solution of the Kashmir dispute. In his welcome

speech Premier ~osygin outlined the importance of the Tashkent

Agreement in the following words., liThe 'rashkent meeting conf irmed

that the road to the solution of existing differences can and

must be patiently sought, and the profound community of interests

of the peoples which had struggled together against colonialism

can be stronger than the differences and contradictions from

14, the Past. 1I Referring to the bonds of friendship between

the Soviet Union and Pakistan, Kosygin observed that the

II current visit (of Pakistan's President) is further proof that

146 Pravda, 26 September 1967.

147 Ibid.

200

there has emerged in the relations between our two countries

tabl t d t d f · dl d . . II 148 a seen ency owar s r1en y an construct1ve cooperat1on.

The joint communique issued after the conclusion of Ayub

Khan's Moscow visit reflected that Pakistan had changed its

stance on many international issues and both the countries had

now better understanding of each other's view than during

Pakistani President's first visit to Moscow in April 1965.

Earlier, they had identity of views on generalised problems

of world at large, e.g., problems of disarmament and arms

race, colonialism and imperialism, nuclear proliferation, etc.

But during this visit the area of agreement had further deve-

loped, extending upto the specifiC issues of international

relations like Middle East and Vietnam crises. However,

these shifts in Pakistani attitude towards specific issues

of international politics were aimed at impressing upon the

Kremlin leadership that Pakistan had loosened its ties with

the Western military alliances. The jOint communique testified

that both countries had similar views on Israeli aggression

against the Arab states in June 1967. They demanded "wi thdrawal

wi thout delay of Israeli forces from the Arab terri tories" and

condemned the Israeli aggression. Moreover, they pressed for

II immediate cessation of war in Vietnam in acknowledgement of

the right of the Vietnamese people to decide their fate for

themselves without outside interference as envisaged in the

Geneva agreement bf 1954". Both sides favoured II an interna-

149 tional treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons ll

•

149 For text of the joint communique see~, 5 October 1967.

201

The joint communique further expressed the desire of

both the countries to Il s trengthen the existing ties and to

enlarge the areas of cooperation in political, economic, and

cultural and other spheres". They agreed to multiply the

activities of economic cooperation and trade and "expressed

their intention to widen Pakistan-Soviet ties in the sphere

of sc ienc e and tec hno logy" • 150

President Ayubls visit to Moscow proved more or less

successful. Ayub Khan himself was satisfied with the outcome

of the visit and called it a success. Pakistan succeeded in

getting Soviet assurance for economic assistance till 1975.

Politically, Ayub Khan succeeded in persuading Premier Kosygin

to visit Rawalpindi which was due since April 1~65. Moreover,

on Pakistanis insistence the jOint communique did not include

any reference to the Tashkent Declaration. In the milital~

sphere, Ayub Khan forcefully presented Pakistanis case for

arms assistance. However, Pakistan did not succeed in her

prime motive, either of limiting the Soviet arms supply to

India or with regard to acquisition of arms for Pakistan.

Thus, like other efforts of Pakistan to acquire Soviet arms,

the Pakistani President l s visit to Hoscow also proved futile

at least so far as the acquisition of Soviet arms was concerned.

On the contrary, in early 1968 there came a report

that the Soviet Union had decided to supply 139 SU-7B fighter­

bombers to India, which came in for sharp attack in Rawalpindi.

150 Ibid .•

202

The Pakistan Times wrote, "Thinking people cannot help asking

why the Soviet leaders should pursue a policy which not only

runs contrary to their professions of friendship with Pakistan

and concern for the security of Asian Powers ••• it also

tends to raise doubts about the Soviet doctrines of peaceful

. d 1" , f' . 1 fl' .. 151 co-eXlstence an e lmlnatlon 0 lnternatlona con lct.

The official circles in Pakistan also expressed their resent-

mente Foreign Minister, Pirzada warned that the indiscriminate

supply of arms to India by the Soviet Union would jeopardise

HOSCOvl l s efforts of establishing good neighbourly relations

between India and Pakistan.152

The Soviet decision of

supplying arms to India definitely proved an irritant in

Soviet-Pakistani relations.

Under the cloud of this disquiet, the Soviet Premier

Alexei Kosygin decided to pay long standing visit to Rawalpindi

from 17 to 20 April 1968.153

The prime motive behind the visit

was to allay the Pakistani fears aroused by Soviet decision to

supply arms to India. Besides that the Soviet Prime Minister

wanted to discuss with Ayub Khan the question of renewal of

the US military and communication facilities at Peshawar and

Rawalpindi I s- ties with Peking. Americ an communic ation base

agreement was to expire on 1 July 1969. The terms of the

agreement provided for its termination after serving one year's

151 Pakistan Times, 8 February 1968.

152 Ibid., 11 February 1968.

153 Ibid., 4 April 1968.

203

notice by either of the two signatories. The date of notice

was due within less than three months after the conclusion

of Kosygin's visit to Pakistan. The Soviet Union wanted

Pakistan not to further extend the lease to the offensive

American intelligence unit beyond 1 July 1969. Pakistani

President Ayub Khan wanted to study the Soviet mood and

their inclination to supply arms to Pakistan. In a shrewd

move Pakistan served notice to Washington for the termination

of the lease on 6 April 1968, just eleven days before Kosygin's

visi t to Rawalpindi. Through this act Pakistan wanted to

demonstrate her disenchantment with Washington. This waS

an indication that Pakistan could even jump out of military

pacts if the Soviet Union agreed to supply weapons and support

them on the Kashmir issue.

The Soviet Premier on arrival at Rawalpindi's airport

was greeted with slogans like, "Give us tanks, not tractors",

"Down with India", etc. These slogans were perhaps instigated

by·the state machinery. However, Kosygin underlining the

basic premises of Soviet policy towards Pakistan stated that

lithe Soviet Union has good normal relations with all these

(West Asian and South Asian countries) including the close

neighbours of Pakistan.... We are strangers to designs for

using the relations with others ••• to sow the seeds of discord

between the states and peoples which have freed themselves,

to seek to confront each other is the favourite policy of

colonisers. They seek to pursue it now after they have been

154 thrown away." He also emphasized the need for peaceful

154 Dawn, 18 April 1968.

204

settlement of disputes between India and Pakistan in the

spirit of the Tashkent Declaration.

In the jOint communique issued after the conclusion of

Kosygin's visit both countries expressed "deep concern at the

continuing war in Vietnam" and desired normalization of the

situation in accordance with the Geneva Accords. Similarly,

on the situation in the Middle East both countries "condemned

the continuing acts of aggression of Israel against the Arab

states." They I?rophesied that "peace in this area would be

restored only when Israel would withdraw its troops frOm

the occupied territories and would respect the territorial

integri ty and independence of the Arab States. tI Both sides

expressed tlurgent necessity of an early conclusion of a treaty

on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons". The joint communi-

que also declared that the Soviet Union would provide technical

and economic assistance in the construction of a steel mill

in Kalabagh costing 100 million dollars, an atomic power

station at Rooppur in East Pakistan, supply of a number of

high-powered medium and short-vlave redio transmitters to

provide a radio link between Karachi and Moscow, to finance

a fisheries development project and cooperation in the

exploration of oil and gas in Pakistan. They also agreed

to accelerate their mutual trade to three times within

the next two years. Both sides expressed happiness over

the steady growth of cooperation in political, commercial,

economic, cultural, scientific and technological fields.1SS

15S For the Soviet-Pakistan jOint communique see Pakistan Horizon, Vol.21, no.2, 1968, pp.199-202.

205

The K~sygin visit to Rawalpindi made it obvious that

the Soviet Union desired to establish closer relationship

with Pakistan but not at the cost of its traditional friendship

with India. That is why Kosygin on his return journey decided

to touch the Indian capital out-of-schedule. He was fearful

that his visit to Rawalpindi might be misunderstood in India.

Thus, through his stopover at New Delhi, he conveyed to the

Indian Prime Minister that the Soviet Unionls closer relations

wi th Pakistan would not influence Moscow I s customary cordiality

wi th New Delhi.

However, Pakistanis disenchantment with the west in

general and the United States in particular, their resultant

decision to impose arms embargo on Pakistan, Pakistanis action

of serving notice to Washington on PeShawar communication base

facilities and Pakistanis persistent demand for the supply of

Soviet weaponry to the extent of using state controlled slogan-

shouting on Kosyginls arrival at Rawalpindi airport compelled

Moscow to review its earlier decision of not supplying arms to

Pakistan. Premier Kosygin during his Pakistan visit "reached

an agreement in principle with President Ayub Khan on the

delivery of Soviet arms to Pakistan" .156

D. SOVIET ARMS SUPPLY TO PAKISTAN

Soon after Kosyginls visit to Pakistan a high-powered

military'mission of Pakistan led by the Commander-in-Chief

156 Zubeida Hasan, "Soviet Arms Aid to Pakistan and India", Pakistan Horizon, vol.21, nO.4, 1968, p.352.

206

of the Army, General A.M. Yahya Khan visited Moscow from 27

June to 8 July 1968, on an invitation from the Soviet Government.

This Pakistani military delegation visited Moscow with a shopping

list. General Yahya Khan met the Soviet Defence Minister, Marshal

Andrei Grechko and held discussions and negotiations for the

purchase of Soviet arms. The Soviet decision to supply arms

to Pakistan was conveyed to India on 7th July 1968 through a

letter of Soviet Premier Kosygin to Indian Prime Minister Indira

Gandhi. The letter was handed over by the Soviet Charge d'Affaires

, lh' 157 1n New De 1.

India took serious view of the Soviet decision to supply

arms to Pakistan. The matter was discussed in the Foreign Affairs

Committee meeting of the Union Cabinet, the day this news was

broken to Government of India. The meeting was:"organised to

discuss the possible Indian course of action in view of the

latest developments. Suggestions came from some quarters in the

meeting that the impending visit of President Zakir Hussain to

Moscow due to commence next day should be cancelled as a protest

against change in Soviet policy. But keeping in view New Delhi's

economic and military dependence on the Soviet Union, this drastic

step was rejected.

India made big hue and cry against the Soviet decision to

.. give a very limited quantity of arms to PakistanI! .158 An Indian

scholar refutes Devendra Kaushik's contention that the Soviet Union

157 Times of India, 9 July 1968.

158 Devendra Kaushik, op.cit., no.37, p.l07.

207

agreed to supply only limited quantity of arms to Pakistan, as

futile and mischievous without substantiating his own conten-

t ' 159 1 f 'I ~on. Western scho ars Wyn red Joshua and Stephen P .G~ bert

have shown in their work that Soviet supply of weapons to Pakistan

was worth 5 to 10 million dollars only. According to them, India,

on the other hand, had received Soviet military assistance to the

tune of 600-700 million dollars. They further contend that even

Iran and Afghanistan received much larger Soviet military aid

than Pakistan i.e. 100 million and 260 million dollars respec-

160 tively. Even this limited Soviet supply to Pakistan was

consisted of weapons of defensive nature e.g. helicqpters, spare

parts for aircraft, medium tanks and field guns. No sophisticated

weapons like supersonic fighters and bombers were part of the

consignment. President Ayub Khan commented that Soviet arms

161 supply to Pakistan would only 11 fill some gaps here and there"

in Pakistani defence needs. Even Government of India conceded

that the amount of supply was not very spectacular. Giving

answers to 'Half-an-Hour Discussion' on Soviet arms to Pakistan,

Indian Defence Minister Swaran Singh told the Parliament on

9 April 1969, "I would also like to say in fairness to the

Soviet Union that they (Soviet Union) have been assuring us

that they want to normalise the relations with Pakistan. They

159 Budhraj, op.cit., nO.34, p.191.

160 wynfred JoshUa and Stephen P. Gilbert, Arms for the Third World : Soviet Military Aid Diploma£y (London, 1969), p.102. ----

161 ~, 22 July 1968.

208

Want to have friendly relations with Pakistan, but this will

never be done at the cost of friendship with Indi a • .. 162 He

further said that they continued to assert that "they will

supply comparatively a small quantity of II 163 arms •

Despite the knowledge of the SOviet intentions in supplying

arms to Pakistan, the Indian Government, members of ruling Party

and the entire OPPOSition parties raised hulla-balloo over this

issue. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, whi le conceding that II every

country is free to give aid to any other, it is none of our

business to interfere ll• She further remarked, "we are not happy

with the reported Soviet offer of arms to Pakistan •••• We doubt

whether the Soviet Union will be able to control Pakistan, if

P k · t th . db' t . t II 164 . a 1S an uses e arms rece1ve y 1 agalns us. Expresslng

concern over the Soviet supply, Indira Gandhi wrote a letter to

her Soviet counterpart Premier Kosygin in which she argued that

Pakistan had no "reasonable justi fication to seek augmentation

of its armed strength ll, as she was already in possession of

large quantities of arms from its Western allies and China.

She further argued that far from having any external threat to

Pakistan, it had itself attacked India thrice in the past and

had consistently rejected India'S offers of no-war pact. In

such a situation, r~s. Gandhi pointed out,the Soviet arms would

instigate Pakistan's II intransigent and aggressive attitude towards

Indiall, and IIcut right across the objective of serving step-by-step

162 Lok Sabha Debates, vol.27, 9 April 1969, cols.345-346.

163 Ibid., cols. 343-344.

164 Statesman, 10 July 1968.

209

relaxations of tensions within the subcontinent. II Mrs. Gandhi

further wrote that the Soviet decision had put Indian non-

alignment and Indo-Soviet relations under the "severest possible

strains", and instead of promoting peace and stability, it would

II accentuate tension in the subcontinent" .165

The issue was raised at the Congress Parliamentary Party

meeting on 19 July 1968 in New Delhi. The members were unanimous

that the Soviet supply of arms to Pakistan would further increase

tension in the region and would create an atmosphere of cold war

between Indi a and Pakistan. Mrs. Indira Gandhi was also of the

similar view. She, however, tried to explain the circumstances

under which the Soviet Union might have decided to sell arms to

Pakistan. She observed that in the fast changing international

relations, MOSCOW must have decided to improve relations with

countries on its southern periphery, e.g., Turkey, Iran and

Pakistan who were also members of western military alliance

system. Thus, to retain her influence in P~(istan, the Soviet

Union might have decided to respond to Pakistan's call for arms.

She told her Party members that the Soviet Union had assured

India that her relationship with Pakistan would not affect her

, 'h d' 166 tles wlt In la.

The right-wing opposition parties and anti-Soviet forces

in India got an upper hand in this development. Their reactions

were quite sharp. They raised their voice for a change in India's

foreign policy. They even demanded exploration of possibilities

165 Ibi£., 11 July 1968.

166 National Heral£, 20 July 1968.

210

of a dialogue with China. Despite feelers that India was prepared

lk 'f h' , II' th f P k' 167 to ta 1 C lna was Wl lng, ere was no response rom e lng.

That means India could have started dialogue with China, if Peking

would have responded favourably to Indian gestures. An anti-

ComlTRlnist weekly observed: "Once again, a ComlTRlnist country has

betrayed our friendship. It was China in 1962. It is Russia in

1968."168

Among the opposition, the Jana Sangh was most vocal. It

even organised a demonstration before the Soviet embassy1s

Information Centre in New Delhi. The crowd became unruly which

waS finally controlled by Police after a light cane charge.

Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the President of Jana Sangh described the

Soviet action as stabbing at the back of India.169

The Jana

Sangha saw in Soviet supply II a link between arms supply to

Pakistan and Soviet quest for an outlet to the Persian Gulf •••• 1I170

The Deputy Leader of the Praj a Socialist Party in the lower house

of the Parliament, Nath Pai, moved a resolution condemning Soviet

arms supply to Pakistan. 171 Piloo Mody of Swatantra Party on 22

July piloted an adjournment motion with the help of opposition

parties in the house, which waS designed to censure the govern-

ment for its failure to safeguard India1s national interestS.

167 Budh£aj, op.cit., nO.34, p.194.

168 Quoted by J.p. Jain, /Soviet Policy Towards Pakistan and Bangladesh (Radiant, New Delhi, 1974), P. 97.

169 National Herald, 12 July 1968.

170 Ibi£., 22 July 1968.

171 Hindustan Times, 20 July 1968.

211

But, the motion was defeated by 206 votes to 61. Another

Swatantra Party leader Minu Masani sharply criticized II Soviet

policy of equi-distance between India and Pakistan. 172

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on 22 July informed the Lok

Sabha that she had written a letter to the Soviet Government

expressing India's concern over Soviet supply of arms to Pindi. 173

She further observed that like any other country, even the Soviet

Union waS "enti tIed to form her own judgement as to where her

interests lie and how to promote themll, but " we are" also IIbound

to express our misgivings and apprehensions to the Soviet leaders

in all frankness ll•174

However, if at all the Government of India did not take any

drastic step during the whole crisis, it was only because of its

economic and military dependence on the Soviet Union. They knew

that annoying the Soviet Union would harm their own national

interests. They, however, sent feelers to China for improvement

of mutual relationships. China did not respond favourably otherwise

there would have been an altogether different permutation and

combination of powers in this region. However, India should not

have made such a big hue and cry over Soviet decision to supply

a small quantity arms to ~ Pakistan. The SOviet Union had always

assured India that improvement of relations with Pakistan would not

affe~t/in any way, the traditional friendship between the Soviet

Union and India. At a luncheon given by President Zakir Hussain

172 Ibi£., 9 July 1968.

173 Lok Sabha Debates, vol.18, 22 July 1968, col.289.

174 Ibid., col.290.

212

to Premier Kosygin at MOscow, Kosygin warned of certain "outside

forces which were trying to invent all sorts of things to affect

our relations". He further observed that the forces which were

trying II to put a wedge in the relationship betvJeen the Soviet

Union and India would suffer defeat ll• He announced, IIWe are

convinced of the depth of our relations and sincerity of these

relations. These are tested by time and tested in the hard days

h ' hId' 'd" 175 w ~c n ~a exper~ence •

In the changed international scenario, the Soviet Union was

simply interested in improvement of her relations with Pakistan

as Pakistan was both ideologically and strategically important

for the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union knew that no amount of

economic aid would be as effective as a symbolic supply of arms

to Pakistan. MOscow provided these weapons to Pakistan just to

wean Pakistan away from China and tl\Testern camp and to consolidate

peace on the subcontinent. The Soviet supply of weapons to

Rawalpindi was not aimed at exploiting the Indo-Pakistani differ-

ences but to enhance its influence in Pakistan. It wanted to

improve relations with both the countries of the subcontinent as

it consisted of a single geographical unit. Neglect of any of

the two countries would have been detrimental to the national

interests of the Soviet Union. That is why since the days of

Indo-Pakistani vJar of 1965 and Tashkent declaration, the Soviet

Union tried its level best to bridge the gulf between the two

countries. It always favoured mutual and bilateral settlement

175 Times of India, 11 July 1968.

213

of disputes between India and Pakistan. This sincere Soviet

desire could be witnessed in the Soviet media reports which

always highlighted the gains of the Tashkent agreement. They

always stressed that Indo-Pak conflict would provide ground for

the Western powers to fish in the troubled waters. Thus, simply

to have some l~erage with Pakistan, the Soviet Union decided

to supply limited amount of weapons to her. Hence, it should

not have been misunderstood in India.

The Chinese connection with Pakistan had led to increased

tension in the subcontinent. Thus, in order to consolidate peace

in this region, it waS imperative to arrest Chinese influence in

Pakistan. And the only way to minimize Chinese influence in

Pakistan was to agree to sell arms to Rawalpindi. Hence, the

Soviet Union decided to supply arms to Pakistan, which was Pakistan's

long standing demand. "I f Moscow were to persuade Pakistan not to

undertake any military adventure, at least in collusion with

Peking, or not to invite foreign intervention, it was necessary

for the Kremlin to further im~rove its pOSition in Pakistan, so

that it could influence the decisions of the policy-makers in

Rawalpindi". "But ll, the irony was that lIany step t2.ken to increase

MOSCOW's influence in Rawalpindi was misunderstood and resented in

New Delhi. 11176

Although a powerful India would have been a real

check against China, a friendly Pakistan with its strategic

advantages, along with India, would have been most effective in

arresting the growing influence of China and the West in the

South Asia.

176 Budhraj, op.cit., no.34, p.155.

214

Consideration from another angle also suggested that India

should not have made Soviet decision to supply limited quantity

of arms to Pakistan a big issue, keeping in view Pakistan's

limited prnver to purchase Soviet arms. Pakistan, so far, had

received arms from the United States either as a gift or at a

very low price. But the commercial aspect of the Soviet-Pakistani

arms transaction put a limitation on large-scale inflow of Soviet

arms into Pakistan. For every item of arms, Rawalpindi had to

pay either in hard currency or through large quantity of exports

and reduced quantity of imports in its trade with the Soviet

Union. But, Pakistan's limited capacity to export and limited

foreign reserves suggested that there would be only limited

S 't 1 f t Pak' 177 h k ' . . OVle supp y 0 arms 0 lstan. T us, eeplng In Vlew

Pakistan's commercial constraints and sale of sophisticated

weapons to India e.g. setting up of a MIG factory, SPares and

training facilities, submarines, etc. there was hardly any reason

for the Indian fear that the Soviet arms deal with Pakistan would

upset the military balance in the subcontinent. 178

Even if we go by logic, India had no prima facie ground

for protest against the Soviet supply to Pakistan. If India

herself had imported arms from both the superpowerS for her

defence requirements, why should she object to one of the two

177 JI.1ohammed Ayoob, "Soviet Arms Aid to Pakistan", Economic and Political Weekly, 19 October 1968, p.1614.

178 Aswini K. Ray I "India, Pakistan and the Soviet Union" I

Mainstream, 27 July 1968, pp.8-10.

215

superpowers' decision to sell arms to both India and Pakistan.

Moreover, earlier Pakistan was importing arms not only from

the USA but also from China, Britain and France, but India had

never bothered to register its protest by Passing a resolution

in the Parliament. The passage of such a resolution as waS

proposed by the opposition parties in the parliament would

have caused great harm to IndO-Soviet relations.

So, the Soviet decision to sell some non-lethal weapons

to Pakistan \,las not designed to alienate India but to enhance

its influence in Rawalpindi. No amount of economic aSSistance

would have helped the Soviets in this regard. Keeping in view

their serious differences with the Chinese leadership, the

Soviets were interested in containing the influence of a belli­

gerent China in strategically well-placed Pakistan. Arms supply

was the most appropriate move to achieve a break-through in

relations with Pakistan. AnY break-through in Soviet-Pakistani

relations would have brought peace in the subcontinent. But

unfortunately, this Soviet move waS misunderstood in India and

strongly resented.

E. SOVIET UNION AND YAH¥A KHAN REGIME

The Soviet hope for better relations with Pakistan waS

dashed to the ground when their expectations about Ayub Khan

proved illusory. The Soviet Union had come to be lieve that

Pakistan under Ayub Khan had achieved stability. But in late

1968 there were nationwide anti-Ayub demonstrations in favour

of parliamentary democracy. Opposition parties were adamant

on consti tutional reforms. Students were in favour of educational

216

reforms. East Pakistan was agitating for effective autonowI.

An American daily wrote, "instead of stability, ten years of

military rule have brought the young South Asian nation to the

b " k f t lOt" 1 "" ,,179 rln 0 mos acute po 1 lca crlsls. In order to divert

popular discontentment President Ayub declared that he would

not seek re-election as President. When even this assurance

did not satisfy the people, he resigned his post and power

slipped into the hands of the Army Chief, General Yahya Khan

on 25 March 1969. While Peking maintained complete silence

over Ayub's resignation, Pravda reported the incident without

180 any comment.

The Soviet Union was quite surprised over this development

though not disheartened. General Yahya Khan was also considered

to be sympathetic to the Soviet Union. He was instrumental in

successful arms negotiation with the Soviet Union. It was just

a cOincidence that when Yahya Khan assumed power, Soviet weapons

deliveries started arriving in Pakistan. General Yahya Khan

assumed Presidentship of Pakistan on 31 March 1969 and in search

of international support to his regime, he wrote a letter to

Premier Kosygin. Kosygin in reply to Yahya Khan's letter assured

him that Pakistan could II always count on the friendly understandi.ng

and support of the Soviet Union" .181 He hoped that friendly rela-

tions between the two countries would further develop under

President Yahya Khan. The Soviet support to Yahya Khan's rule

179 The New York Times, 19 February 1969.

180 Pravda, 26 March 1969.

181 Ibid., 9 April 1969.

217

was extended onc.e again to reduce Pakistan's dependence on China

and the USA.

Although, Premier Kosygin arrived in New Delhi on 5 May 1969,

he could not utilize this opportunity to visit Pakistan, as he had

come to Delhi to attend President Zakir Hussain's funeral. In

his anxiousness to stabilize Soviet-Pakistani relations, Kosygin

arranged an unscheduled visit to Rawalpindi on 30 May 1969.

During his visit, he tried to evolve a scheme of regional economic

cooperation in South Asia comprising India, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

He tried his level best to persuade Pakistan to settle her differences

with Afghanistan and India on the basis of bilateral negotiations.

Kosygin at the same time promised all possible help to proDote

this idea.182

The Soviet Union was interested in this regional

economic Pact because it thought that if these countrieS settle

their differences among themselves peacefully, their energies

could be utilized for a stable peace in South Asia. President

Yahya Khan's initial response to the economic cooperation scheme

. f>O~iJ.e.. 183 was qul te ~_!5lOJEka. The Soviet Union hopeful of success of

this scheme proposed another scheme - a system of lIe!ollective

Securi ty in ASia". Both these plans were proposed by Moscow in

the wake of serious armed clashes between the USSR and the People's

Republic of China at Damansky Island on the Ussuri River. It was

directed to contain the hegemonistic plans of China and the designs

of the USA in Asia.

182 Times of India, 1 June 1969.

183 IbiQ., 7 April 1971.

218

The jOint communique issued at the end of Kosygin's visit

expressed desire lito expand areas of cooperation between the

two countries in the economic I cultural and other fieldS". It

also stressed that the cooperation between the peoples of the

two countries would serve the interest of peace in Asia and

the world and was "not directed against any third statell. 184

President Yahya Khan expressed his feelings that Soviet-Pakistan

friendly relations would "continue to grow in strength fl in

fu ture. Kosygin on his part promised that the Soviet Union

would "continue to work for the consolidation of friendly ties

wi th Pakistan fl•

However I it seems that General Yahya Khan's support to the

Soviet proposals was directed to obtain international support

for his own regime and to consolidate his position at home.

Once this objective waS fulfilled l he gave second thought to

his ccmmitment made to Premier Kosygin. At home Z.A. Bhutto had

generated a hostile public opinion making it difficult for Yahya

Khan to support the Soviet proposal which had anti-Chinese

aims. Under the domestic preSsure Pakistan rejected the Afghan

invitation to jointly consider the Soviet proposal for regional

trade and transit facilities. Pakistan gave more importance to

its relations with China than to its ties with the Soviet Union.

It made its intention clear by sending a goodwill and friendship

delegation to China on 12 July 1969. The mission was led by Air

Marshal Nur Khan who was also the second most important man in the

184 Dawn I 1 June 1969.

219

administration of Pakistan. In Peking, Nur Khan expressed

his country's desire for stable friendship between Pakistan

and China and thanked China for her support in the Kashmir

d ' 185 lspute.

Despite Pakistan's unfavourable response to the Soviet

proposal, Soviet Union signed an agreement with Pakistan on 29

July 1969, to provide machinery and technical assistance for

setting up a general electrical manufacturing plant at Chittagong

in East Pakistan186

and at Taxila in West Pakistan. Similarly,

the Soviet Union agreed to discuss the question of collaboration

between the two countries for setting up a steel plant in Karachi.

An agreement to this effect was signed on 22 January 1970 to study

the feasibility of the project.187

The two countries also Signed

a ten-year agreement on 20 May 1970 for technical cooperation in

the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy. SPare parts, machi-

nery, equipment and materials required for the development of

atomic energy were to be supplied by the Soviet Union under this

188 agreement.

President Yahya Khan visi ted MOSCOw on 22 June 1970 and

remained there till 26 June 1970. Hosting a state banquet in

honour of visiting President Yahya Khan, President Podgorny

said that there was no difference between the two countries and,

therefore, there was hardly any reason for not strengthening and

f h . h' f' d h' 189 h ,. t . urt er cementlng t elr rlen s lP. T e JOln cammunlque

185 Peking Review, vol. XII, no. 2 9, 18 July 1969.

186 2~' 30 July 1969.

187 Ibig. , 23 January 1970.

188 Ibig. , 21 May 1970.

189 Pravda, 23 June 1969.

220

issued at the end of Yahya Khan's visit reaffirmed the faith

that both sides were "convinced that the developing fruitful

cooperation in the political, commercial, economic, scientific

and technical, cultural and other spheres conforms to the national

interests of the peoples of the USSR and Pakistan ll• They further

reaffirmed their desire lito strengthen existing contacts and to

expand good-neighbourly cooperation". They also recognised the

usefulness of "periodic consultations through the Foreign

Ministries ll• In the international arena both sides demanded

"wi thdrawal of Israeli troops frcm all Arab terri tories, occu-

pied in June 1967, as the main condition for a settlement of

the Middle East conflict". They further reaffirmed their faith

in the "u ncondi tional wi thdrawal of foreign troops from Indo-

China" and "the inalienable right of the peoples of this area

to decide their own destiny". with regard to Indo-Pakistani

relations, Moscow was convinced that II a settlement of disput.ed

questions between Pakistan and India by means of bilateral nego-

tiations in the spirit of the Tashkent Declaration would accord

with the vital interests of the peoples of Pakistan and India as

11 . th h' t f . h t' hI" 1 90 we as Wl t e lnteres s 0 peace ln t a reglon as a woe •

However, the major achievement of Yahya Khan's visit to

the Soviet Union waS in the sphere of economic and technical

assistance for the construction of a steel mill in Karachi with

an annual capacity of a million tons of steel. The Soviet Union

also agreed to provide a sum of £200 mi Ilion on credit to cover

190 See R.K. Jain, Soviet-South ASian Relations, 1947-78; vol.2 (Ratiant: Delhi, 1978), pp.81-84.

221

the cost of the machinery and equipment needed for the construc-

tion of the steel plant. The jOint communique at the Same time

mentioned that the II Soviet organisations would closely study

the list of other projects for which the government of Pakistan

would like to obtain economic and technical assistance from the

Soviet Union during the period of the 4th Five-Year!:Plan of

Pakistan" .191 Both sides also resolved to conclude a long-term

trade agreement for 1971-75 for the gr~lth in the volume of

trade. However, the Pakistani press vias critical of the successes

of General Yahya Khan's visit to Moscow. Nevertheless, the

General himself described the visit as extremely successful.

According to him it was a great steP forward because the nation

which was hunting for the steel plant for the last fifteen years

had ultimately got it.192

had no reason to be dissatisfied with the amount

commercial and economic help provided by the Soviet

Unlon. All this assistance waS provided by Moscow without any

pre-conditions. Kremlin supplied arms to Pakistan while risking

its traditional friendship with India. Moreover, they agreed to

construct and finance a steel mill in Karachi, for which Pakistan

was lOOking for collaboration for the last fifteen years and this

was done by the Soviet Union at a juncture when Pakistan had

rejected their regional economic cooperation scheme. The reason

behind such unilateral Soviet assistance was to reduce Pakistan'S

dependence on the west in the key sector, so that she could play

191 Ibid.

192 Daw£, 27 June 1970.

222

more independent and meaningful role in the international field.

The Soviet union was aware of Pakistanis obsession of achieving

military parity with India which left room for China and the

west to manoeuvre Pakistan away from the folds of the Soviet

Union. Another reason for cooperative attitude towards Pakistan

'"las the hope that the December 1970 general election might

provide a government which would be pro-Soviet in its foreign

policy. This hope waS based on the positive results of the

popular movement at the last quarter of 1968 and the beginning

of 1969. It had forced the President of P~~istan to lift martial

law and release political prisoners, establishment of Parliamentary

democracy and universal suffrage. Thus, the Soviet Union thought

that the democratization of the political processes in Pakistan

might provide a progressive government in that country. It thus

persisted with assisting its next door neighbour,Pakistan.

However, Pakistanis alignment with China remained unaltered as

ever, even under the new regime of General Yahya Khan.

If we scrutinize the Soviet policy in the South Asian

region in the post-Tashkent period, we find that it wa$ pri­

marily intended to further consolidate the gains achieved through

the TaShkent declaration. Throughout this period, the Soviet

Union tried to establish close relations with both India and

Pakistan and worked for mutual settlement of disputes between

the two countries without outside interference. This policy

was in sharp contrast to the policies pursued by China and

other Western countries in this region. These powers tried to

223

play one country against the other with the sole purpose of

gaining ground in this region. The Soviet Union on the other

hand tried to sustain the Tashkent spirit which served the

interests of peace and stability in the region.