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InDefenceoftheEpistemologicalObjectiontoDivineCommandTheoryByJohnDanaher,NUIGalwayForthcominginSophia

Abstract:DivineCommandTheories(DCTs)comesinseveraldifferentformsbutattheircoreallofthesetheoriesclaimsthatcertainmoralstatuses(mosttypicallythestatusofbeingobligatory)existinvirtueofthefactthatGodhascommandedthemtoexist.SeveralauthorsarguethatthiscoreversionoftheDCTisvulnerabletoanepistemologicalobjection.Accordingtothisobjection,DCTisdeficientbecausecertaingroupsofmoralagentslackepistemicaccesstoGod’scommands.Butthereisconfusionastotheprecisenatureandsignificanceofthisobjection,andcritiquesofitskeypremises.InthisarticleItrytoclearupthisconfusionandaddressthesecritiques.Idosointhreeways.First,Iofferasimplifiedgeneralversionoftheobjection.Second,Iaddresstheleadingcriticismsofthepremisesofthisobjection,focusinginparticularontheroleofmoralrisk/uncertaintyinourunderstandingofGod’scommands.Andthird,Ioutlinefourpossibleinterpretationsoftheargument,eachwithadifferingdegreeofsignificancefortheproponentoftheDCT.

1.Introduction

ThisarticlecritiquesDivineCommandTheories(DCTs)ofmetaethicson

thegroundsthattheyinvolveanintimateconnectionbetweenmoral

epistemologyandmoralontology.Moreprecisely,itarguesthatallDCTs

incorporateanepistemicconditionintotheiraccountofmoralontologyand

becauseofthistheyarevulnerabletoanobjection,viz.animportantclassof

moralagentsfailtosatisfythisepistemiccondition.Thiscastsintodoubtthe

metaethicaladequacyofDCTs,andhassignificantimplicationsforanyone

wishingtorelyuponthem.

ThisobjectiontoDCTisnotnew(see:Morriston2009;Peoples2011;and

Wielenberg2014).Itisreferredtoasthe‘EpistemologicalObjection’(Morriston

2009;Peoples2011),thoughthereissomeconfusionastowhetherthisnameis

appropriategiventheargument’simplications(Wielenberg2014).Inthisarticle,

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Ihopetoclearupsomeoftheconfusionassociatedwiththisobjection,and

provideastrengtheneddefenceofit.Idosoinfourparts.First,Iofferasimple,

generalversionoftheobjection.Thisconsistsoftwopremisesandaconclusion.

Second,Idefendthefirstpremiseoftheargument,highlightingtheimportant

connectionsbetweenmoralontologyandepistemologyintheDCT.Third,I

defendthesecondpremise,illustratingtheproblemwiththeprimaryobjection

toitfromproponentsofDCTandshowinghowrecentinsightsintothe

phenomenonofmoralrisk/uncertaintymightilluminatekeyfeaturesofthis

premise.Fourth,andfinally,Iconsidertheimplicationsoftheargument.Doesit

offerastrongobjectiontoDCT?OrcanproponentsofDCTsimplyshrugtheir

shouldersandsay‘Sowhat?’

2.WhatistheEpistemologicalObjection?

Tounderstandtheepistemologicalobjection,wemustfirstunderstand

DCT.Here,ItakeDCTtobealabelthatcanattachtoafamilyofmetaethical

theories,eachofwhichisconcernedwithaccountingfor,explaining,or

groundingtheexistenceofoneormorespeciesofmoralfactbyreferenceto

God’scommands(Murphy2012).

Moralfactscomeintwomainflavours.Therearevalue-basedfacts,which

concernwhetheraparticularstatesofaffairsisgoodorbadorneutral.Andthere

aredeonticfacts,whichconcernwhetherornotparticularactionsareobligatory,

forbidden,permissible,supererogatory(andsoon).1Althoughitispossiblefora

DCTtobestructuredinsuchawaythatitaccountsforbothvalue-basedand

deonticfacts,thisisnotnowthenorm.Themainreasonforthisliesintheclassic

Euthyphrodilemma,whichchallengesproponentsofDCTtoaccountforthe

necessityofcertainmoralvaluesorduties(e.g.thedutytorefrainfromtorturing

innocentchildrenforfun).IfDCTistrue,andifGodisfreetocommandanything,

thenitseemslikethedutytorefrainfromtorturingchildrencouldbecontingent.

1 Deontic logic is multivalent. According to some theories there are more than the four deontic statuses mentioned in the text, hence the ‘and so on’.

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Thatdoesnotsitwellwithmanypeople’sfoundationalmoralintuitions.2Many

DCTistsresolvethisdilemmabyappealingtoGod’snature.TheyarguethatGod’s

naturenecessarilyexemplifiesorinsantiatescertainpropertieslike

lovingkindnessandthatthesepropertiesinturnensurethatGodwouldnever

commandsomethingterriblelikethetortureofinnocentchildren.Thisapproach

ismostcloselyassociatedwiththeworkofRobertAdams(1999),thoughithas

beendefendedbyothers(e.g.Alston1991;Quinn2006).

Theupshotisamorecomplexunderstandingofthepossiblerelationships

betweenGodandmoralfacts.God’scommandsarenowthoughttogrounda

limitedsetofmoralfacts,mosttypicallythefactthatsomeactionsareobligatory,

whileotheraspectsofGod’snaturearethoughttoaccountforothermoralfacts.

Wielenberg(2014)offersausefulcategorisationofthesetheories.Heargues

thatthereisageneralcategoryoftheologicalstateisttheorieswhichholdthat

moralfactsaredependentfortheirexistenceononeormoreofGod’sstates(e.g.

valuesmightbesaidtobedependentonGod’sessentialnature);withinthis

generalcategorythereisamorediscretecategoryoftheologicalvoluntarist

theories,whichholdthatmoralfactsaredependentfortheirexistenceononeor

moreofGod’svoluntaryacts(e.g.hisintendingorwillingthatXbeso);and

finally,withinthecategoryofvoluntaristtheories,thereistheevenmore

circumscribedcategoryofDCTs,whichfocusspecificallyonGod’scommands.

Takingthisonboard,inthisarticleIassumethatallDCTsarerelatively

narrowinscope.TheyfocussolelyontherelationshipbetweenGod’scommands

andmoralfacts.And,inlightoftheresponsestotheEuthyphrodilemma,they

onlyreallyfocusononetypeofmoralfact,namelyobligations.Theytrytoargue

thatmoralobligationsaregroundedinGod’scommands(Adams1999;Quinn

2006).TheessenceoftheDCTisthusthatwithoutadivinecommandthere

wouldbenomoralobligation.Adams(1999)ismostexplicitaboutthis

commitment,holdingthatadivinecommandisessentialbecausewithoutitthere

wouldbenodiscernibledifferencebetweenasupererogatoryact(onethatis

2 Though whether we should trust those intuitions is a separate question. See Joyce 2002 for an analysis and critique of the Euthyphro dilemma.

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aboveandbeyondthecallofmoralduty)andanobligatoryone.Iwillreturnto

thisfeatureofAdams’stheorybelow,butevenifsomeDCTistsrejectthis

particularclaimconcerningthenecessityofthedivinecommandfor

distinguishingbetweensupererogationsandobligations,Ibelievetheywill

acceptthedependency-relationshipbetweenobligationsanddivinecommands.

Itisthisdependency-relationshipthatgivesrisetotheepistemological

objection.Putmostsimply,thisobjectionholdsthatcertainclassesofmoral

agent(specifically,reasonablenon-believers)lackepistemicaccesstoGod’s

commands.Inotherwords,theydonotknoworcannotreasonablybeexpected

toknow,whatGodhascommanded.Theresultisthat,iftheDCTistrue,thenfor

thisclassofmoralagents,moralobligationsnolongerexist.Itis,however,wrong

tosupposethatreasonablenon-believershavenomoralobligations.

Consequently,somethingmustberottenattheheartoftheDCT.That’sthe

essenceoftheepistemologicalobjection.

Thereissomeconfusionastowhetherthisobjectionisstrictly

epistemological(Peoples2011)orontologicalinnature(Wielenberg2014).

Thereisalsosomeconfusionastohowserioustheobjectionreallyis(Peoples

2011).Ihopetoclearupthisconfusioninwhatfollows.Iwillarguethatthe

objectionisbothepistemologicalandontologicalinnature,andthatitcanbe

quiteserious.Thisisbecausethereisanimportantconnectionbetween

epistemologyandontologyintheDCT(and,indeed,inmostmetaethical

theories);andthesignificanceofthisdependslargelyonwhattypeoftheistyou

are.Tofacilitatemakingthesearguments,Iwillworkwiththefollowingsimple

andgeneralisedversionoftheobjection.Thisversionformalisessomeofthe

precedingdiscussionandisrelativelyabstractandnon-committalinitsscope.

Thiscontrastsitwithprevious,narrowerversions(Morriston2009):

(1)DCTs,eitherexplicitlyorimplicitly,includeanepistemicconditionin

theiraccountofmoralobligations,viz.youmusteitherknowor

successfullyreceivecommunication(implyingknowledge)ofdivine

commandsinorderforyoutobemorallybound.

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(2)Therearesuchthingsasreasonablenon-believers(i.e.non-believers

whodonotviolateanyepistemicdutiesintheirnon-belief)andforthese

reasonablenon-believers(RNBs),satisfactionoftheepistemicconditionof

DCTisnotpossible.

(3)Therefore,onDCT,therearenomoralobligationsforreasonablenon-

believers.

IntheremainderofthearticleIclarifyanddefendthetwopremisesofthis

argument,andassessitsoverallimplications.

3.Whyisanepistemicconditionessential? ThefirstpremiseoftheargumentstatesthatallDCTsincorporatean

epistemicconditionintotheiraccountofmoralontology.Itisimportantto

understandwhatthismeans.Itisnotsimplythatitwouldbeagoodordesirable

thingforpeopletoknowwhatGodhascommanded.Itisthatwithoutknowledge

ofthecommand,moralobligationsfailtoexist.SupposeGodhascommanded

youtogive10%ofyourincometocharity.Premise(1)issayingthatunderDCT

thiswouldgiverisetoanobligationonlyifyouhaveknowledgeofthecommand.

Premise(1)isthuspointingtoanintimateconnectionbetweenmoral

epistemologyandmoralontologyinthecaseoftheDCT.

Whatcanbesaidinfavourofpremise(1)?Foronething,proponentsof

DCTalreadyseemtoacceptit.ThisiscertainlythecaseforRobertAdams,

perhapsthemostfamouscontemporarydefenderofamodifiedDCT.Histheory

isexplicitlysocialandcommunicativeinnature.Hesaysthathavinganobligation

issomethingthatonlyarisesinasocialcontext,i.einthecontextofan

interpersonalrelationshipbetweentwoormoreindividuals.Andthat

consequentlybeingplacedunderanobligation‘essentiallyinvolves

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communicativeacts’(Adams1999,262).3Onepersonmustexplicitlytellanother

personwhatisrequiredoftheminorderfortheothertobebound.Inthecaseof

moralobligations,theonlypersonwiththerightkindofauthorityandnatureto

issuesuchdirectivesisGod.Hence,beingunderamoralobligationrequiresthat

oneisinacommunicativerelationshipwithGod.Thisimpliesthatonemusthave

epistemicaccesstotherelevantcommunicativeacts,i.e.God’scommands.Itis

verydifficulttoseehowthisaccountofmoralobligationscouldbesustained

withoutincorporatinganepistemiccondition.Theresult,Ibelieve,isthat

anyonewhofavoursanAdamsianversionofDCTshouldacceptpremise(1).

ButtheAdamsianversionisnottheonlygameintown.Peoples(2011)

arguesthatatleastsomeversionsofDCTdonotincorporateanexplicit

epistemiccondition.AnexampleissupposedlythetheorydefendedbyQuinn

(2006).Thekeyclaiminthistheoryisthatontologyandepistemologyare

separateandseparable.Howsomethingcomestobe(anontologicalmatter)is

distinctfromhowwecometoknowofitsexistence(anepistemologicalmatter).

AsQuinnhimselfsays:

“Ourtheoryassertsthatdivinecommandsareconditionscausally

necessaryandsufficientformoralobligationsandprohibitionstobe

inforce.Itmakesnoclaimsatallabouthowwemightcometoknow

justwhatGodhascommanded...Afterall,itisaphilosophicaltruism

thatthecausalorderandtheorderoflearningneednotbethesame.”

(Quinn2006,44-45)

Thisseemsemphatic,buttwointerpretativepointsneedtobemade.First,itis

notclearfromthispassagewhetherQuinncompletelyrejectsanepistemic

condition.Elsewhereinthesamesectionoftexthetalksabouthowsomeone

couldfirstcometoknowthatsomethingisforbiddenandthencometoknow

thatitwascommandedbyGod.Thissuggeststhathethinksknowledgeofan

obligationisessential,butknowledgeofthesourceisnot.Ifso,thenhedoesnot3 Note: this quote was originally sourced through Morriston 2009

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reallyrejecttheepistemiccondition.Hemerelyoffersamodifiedversionofit.

Hisobjectionthencollapsesintothe‘content-not-source’objectionwhichI

discussinthenextsection.Second,thereissomedisputeintheliteratureasto

thecorrectclassificationofQuinn’smoraltheory.AlthoughQuinnreferredtoit

asacommandtheory(Peoples2011),otherssuchasMorriston(2009)have

suggestedthatitreallybelongstothemoregeneralnon-command-based

voluntaristfamily.

EvenifwegrantthattheQuinn-typetheorybelongstothemoregeneral

categoryofnon-command-basedvoluntaristtheoriesitprobablymakesno

differencebecausesomethingliketheepistemicconditionisgoingtobe

essentialtoallvoluntaristtheories.Themainreasonformyconfidenceinthis

regardisthatmostmetaethicistsnowconcedethataplausibleaccountofmoral

ontologyalmostalwaysrequiresthesatisfactionofanepistemiccondition.If

DCTistswanttodenythisconnection,sobeit:theirtheorywillbeweakerasa

result.Idefendthisviewintwoways:byappealingtocommonmethodologiesof

argumentinthefieldofmetaethics,andbyanalogytoanongoingdisputewithin

thatfieldbetweenmoralrealistsandantirealists.

Let’slookatmethodologyfirst.AsJoyce(2002;2006)notes,most

contemporarymetaethicistsapproachthetaskoffindinganappropriate

groundingformoralfactsinasimilarmanner(e.g.Joyce2002and2006;

Beyleveld1991;Smith1994;Enoch2011;Adams1999).First,theyidentifyaset

ofmoralplatitudes,i.e.widelyacceptedstatementsaboutthenatureofmoral

requirements.Exampleswouldincludethingslike‘moralobligationsareother-

regarding’,‘moralityisimpartial’,‘moralobligationsareconativelyindependent’,

and‘moralobligationsareuniversalinscope(i.e.theyapplytoallsimilarly

situatedmoralagents)’andsoon.4Theselistsofmoralplatitudescanbemore

orlessexhaustive(compareSmith1994andEnoch2011)andtherecanbe

disputesaboutwhichonesshouldbeincluded.Nevertheless,oncetheplatitudes

havebeenidentified,themetaethicist’sjobistoworkoutagroundingthatbest

accountsfortheseplatitudes.Thisisnoeasytask,withsomearguingthatno4 This particular list of moral platitudes is taken, with some modifications, from Beyleveld 1991.

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plausiblegroundingcanbefound(Joyce2002and2006)andothersarguingthat

thebestwecanhopeforisatheorythataccountsforamajorityofthemandso

winsoutbecauseithasthemost‘plausibilitypoints’(Enoch2011).

Whowinsthewarisnothugelyimportantinthepresentcontext.Whatis

importantisthattheDCTwillbemuchlesslikelytowinthewarifitexcludesan

epistemiccondition.Thereasonforthisisthatmostwidely-acceptedlistsofthe

keymoralplatitudes–particularlythoserelatingtomoralobligations–include

conditionsthateitherexplicitlyorimplicitlyrequireepistemicaccesstothe

demandsofmorality.Therearetwoillustrationsofthis.Oneisthatitiswidely-

agreedthatmoralobligationsareaction-guidingandmotivationallysalient.That

istosay,theyhavesomesortofeffectonhowwechoosetobehave(evenifthey

donotcompletelyoverwhelmourotherinternalreasonsforaction).Itisnot

clearhowmoralobligationscouldhavethesepropertiesifthepeopletowhom

theyaredirectedlackepistemicaccesstotheircontent.Similarly,thereisthe

widely-acceptedKantianmaximthat‘oughtimpliescan’.Thissuggeststhatin

orderforsomethingtocountasamoralobligationwemusthavetheabilityto

followit.This‘ability’consistsinthepowertocontrolone’sactionsintheway

specifiedbytheobligationandalso,crucially,theabilitytoknowwhatthe

obligationdemands.5Soanepistemicconditionlookslikeitwouldbean

importantpartofanyplausiblelistofmoralplatitudes,andhencesomethingthat

anysoundmetaethicalgroundingformoralobligationswouldaccountfor.

Thisimportanceisreinforcedbythefactthattheabsenceofaplausible

accountofmoralepistemologyisattheheartofoneofthemostcontentious

contemporarydebatesinmetaethics:thedebatebetweenrealistsand

antirealists.Recentyearshavewitnessedaresurgenceindefencesofnon-

naturalmoralrealism(e.g.Shafer-Landau2003;Parfit2011;Enoch2011;

Wielenberg2014).Accordingtothistheory,moralfacts,includingbothvalues

5 For a defence of the claim that ‘ought implies can’ also implies knowledge, see Howard-Snyder 1997. In that paper, Howard-Snyder specifically critiques objective consequentialism, arguing that people cannot follow the core imperative of objective consequentialism because they don’t always know which action produces the best consequences. This view has been criticized on the grounds that Howard-Snyder confuses know-how with know-that in her argument (Andríc 2016). But even defenders of this criticism concede that know-which (i.e. knowledge of which actions are required by a given moral principle) is essential to the ‘ought implies can’ maxim (Andríc 2017). I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for pushing me on this point.

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andobligations,areakintoPlatonicmathematicalfacts.Theyareabstract,mind-

independentandmetaphysicallynecessaryfeaturesofreality.Theydonot

dependfortheirexistenceonothermoremetaphysicallybasicfacts(exceptto

theextentthatsomemoralfactsdependonothermoralfacts).Moralantirealists

haveanopposingview:theythinkthatmoralfacts(particularlyobligations)are

constructedoutofpracticalattitudessharedbymosthumanagents(Street,

2006;Southwood2010).Antirealistssometimesarguethatthenon-natural

realistpositionisproblematicbecauseitfailstoprovideaplausibleaccountof

moralepistemology(Street2006;Joyce2006).Realistsgenerallyagree(Enoch

2011)thatwemusthaveepistemicaccesstomoraltruth;thatwemustknow,

innatelyorthroughseriousreflectionwhatismorallyrequiredofus.Buthow

doesthiscometobethecase?Ontherealistview,itseemstobeamere

coincidencethatourmoralbeliefsandattitudescorrespondwiththemind-

independentmoralreality.Butantirealistsarguethatthisistroublinginlightof

thefactthatourcognitivefacultiesaretheresultofamessyandhighly

contingentevolutionaryhistory(Joyce2006;Street2006).Realistshavesome

answerstothis.Theytrytoarguethatthereisacorrelationbetween

pleasure/painandthemoralpropertiesofgoodness/badnessandsince

evolutionaryprocessesaresensitivetotheformer,thereisareasontobelieve

thatourevolvedcognitivefacultieswouldpickuponthesedeepermoraltruths

(Enoch2011;Skarskaune2011;Wielenberg2014).Whocomesouttopinthis

debateisunimportant;theimportantpointisthatrealistsgenerallyagreethat

theyowetheantirealistssomeaccountofmoralepistemology,i.e.thatunless

theirmetaethicaltheoryincorporatesanepistemiccondition(onethatexplains

howwecancometoknowwhatismoral)itisdeficientinsomerespect(Enoch

2010).MycontentionisthattheproponentofDCTisinasimilarpositiontothe

non-naturalrealist:6theycanignoremoralepistemologyiftheywish,butthis

meansthattheirattempttoprovideagroundingformoralityendsupbeing

muchlessplausible.

6 Not least because DCT is itself a species of non-natural moral realism, albeit slightly different from the version described in the text.

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Tosumup,Ithinkthatpremise(1)oftheepistemologicalobjectionis

sound.AnyproponentoftheDCTthatadoptstheAdamsiansocialand

communicativeversionofDCTwouldseemboundtoacceptthatknowledgeof

God’scommunicativeacts(i.e.commands)isanessentialpreconditionforthe

existenceofanobligation.AndanyproponentoftheDCT(orvoluntarismmore

broadly)thatwishestohangtoughandinsistupontheseparationofmoral

epistemologyandontologyfacesaproblem:theirtheorybecomesmuchless

plausibleiftheyfailtoincorporateanepistemicconditionbecauseepistemic

conditionsareincludedamongthestandardlistsofmoralplatitudesthatany

satisfactorymetaethicaltheoryoughttoaccountfor.

4.Defendingthesecondpremise:WhyRNBslacktherequisiteknowlegePremise(2)istherealstickingpointoftheepistemologicalobjection.That

premisehastwopartstoit.Thefirstpartclaimsthattherearesuchthingsas

reasonablenon-believers(i.e.nonbelieverswhoviolatenoepistemicdutiesin

theirnonbelief);thesecondpartclaimsthatthesenon-believerslackepistemic

accesstoGod’scommands(i.e.thattheycannotknowwhatGodhasobligated

themtodo).

Ihaverelativelylittletosayindefenceofthefirstpart.Therearethree

reasonsforthis.ThefirstisthatIthinkthiselementoftheargumentmaybethe

onetowardwhichproponentsofDCTshoulddirectmostoftheirenergy.Ireturn

tothispointinthefinalsection.Thesecondisthat,notwithstandingwhatIhave

justsaid,Ithinkthatothershavealreadyprofferedadmirabledefencesofthe

existenceofsuchnon-believers(e.g.Schellenberg2007),7andIhavenothing

newtoaddtosuchdefences.Certainly,Iliketothinkofmyselfasareasonable

non-believer,someonewhowasoncehappytobelieve,butwholosttheirbelief

inthecourseofanhonestsearchforthetruth.Ialsothinktheexistenceof

numerouspeople,bothpastandpresent,forwhombeliefinGodwasneveralive

option(fordemographicorhistoricalreasons)isgoodsupportfortheexistence

7 Schellenberg now prefers the term nonresistant nonbelief for reasons we will not get into. We stick with the term reasonable nonbelief on the grounds that it is still being used in the literature on the epistemological objection to DCT (e.g. Morriston 2009; Peoples 2011; and Wielenberg 2014).

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ofreasonablenonbelievers.ThethirdreasonIhavelittletosayindefenceof

theirexistenceisthatIthinktheargumentmaynotbelimitedtothemanyway.

Aswillbecomeclearinthediscussionbelow,Ialsothinkthatthereare

particularclassesofbelieverswhoarevulnerabletothesameproblem.

Nevertheless,Ikeepthescopelimitedtoreasonablenon-believersattheoutset

becauseIthinkthebestcasecanbemadeinrelationtothem.

Thisbringsustothesecondpartofpremise(2).Thisisperhapsthemost

crucialelementoftheargumentandtheoneuponwhichmostattentionhas

focused.Theprimafaciedefenceofitisstraightforward:reasonablenon-

believersdonotbelieveinGod.Consequently,theycannotinterpretanythingin

theworldasbeingacommandemanatingfromGod.Totakeanobviousexample,

theydonotbelievethatBibleisthedivinelyinspiredwordofGod.Thus,they

cannotbelievethatthetencommandmentsarereallydivinecommands.

Consequently,theydonotknowthatthesearemoralobligations(ifindeedthey

are).Thisisjustanexample.Accordingtopremise(2),anycandidatemoral

obligationunderDCTwillfallfoulofthesamebasicproblem.

Theistshavedevelopedresponsestothisprimafaciedefence.These

defencestypicallystartoutbyarguingforanenrichedunderstandingofthe

possibleformsofdivinecommunication.God,wearetold,neednotsimply

communicatetousviaarevealedtext,hecanalsocommunicatetousvia

conscience,moralintuition,naturallaw(allunderstoodasformsofgeneral

revelation)andspecialrevelation.8Oncewehavethisenrichedunderstandingof

theformsofcommunication,wecanstarttoseehowitispossiblefora

reasonablenon-believertoacquiretherequisitemoralknowledge.Two

8 Several authors make this point about the diverse forms of divine communication. Peoples (2011) summarises the contributions to the debate. See also Evans (2013), pp 37-45 on the different ways in which God’s commands may be promulgated. As one of the anonymous reviewers to this paper pointed out, missing from the list provided in the text are Kant’s suggested methods for using reason to arrive at moral knowledge in the Groundwork on the Metaphysics of Morals (2012/1785 at 4: 401-402 and 4:421-424) and Critique of Practical Reason (2015/1788 at 5:25). The Kantian method would seem to deliver moral obligations as dictates/commands of reason. But it is noteworthy in this regard that Kant did not think that the moral law had an author. He thought God had a role to play in morality, but that it was a regulative/practical role, not a constitutive/grounding role. He argued that we needed to postulate God in order to make it practical to attain the highest good (2015/1788 at 5: 113-132), but that the content of the moral law itself was grounded solely in reason. This Kantian view of God’s role in the moral order is different from the one being targeted by the epistemological objection. On this interpretation of Kant’s argument, see Byrne (2011).

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argumentsinparticularcanbeusedtosupportthisconclusion.Icallthemthem

the‘content-not-source’argumentandthe‘probability-possibility’argument.I

dealwiththembothinturn.

4.1–TheContentnotSourceArgument

The‘contentnotsource’argumentcomesfromtheworkofRobertAdams,as

modifiedandexpandedbyGlennPeoples,andfromtheworkofC.StephenEvans.

Itistheleadingresponseinthecurrentliterature.I’llconsiderboththe

Adams/Peoples’versionandtheEvansversionseparatelysince,althoughthey

arequitesimilarintheiroverallthrust,therearesomesubtleandimportant

differencesbetweenthem.

Let’sstartwiththeAdams/Peoples’version.Asmentionedearlier,Adamsis

oneoftheproponentsofDCTwhoconcedesthelinkbetweenontologyand

epistemology.HethinksthattheDCTistowessomeaccountofhowitisthat

peoplecometoknowwhatiscommandedofthem.Todothis,Adamsoffersan

accountofwhatitwouldtakeforGodtosuccessfullyissueamoralcommand.

ThisresultsinsomethingIshallcall‘Adams’sCommunicativeStandard’.Ithas

threeelementstoit:

Adams’sCommunicativeStandard:‘Inmyopinion,asatisfactoryaccount

ofthesematterswillhavethreemainpoints.(1)Adivinecommandwill

alwaysinvolveasign,aswemaycallit,thatisintentionallycausedbyGod.

(2)IncausingthesignGodmustintendtoissueacommand,andwhatis

commandediswhatGodintendstocommandthereby.(3)Thesignmustbe

suchthattheintendedaudiencecouldunderstanditasconveyingthe

intendedcommand.’(Adams1999,265)

Thefirsttwoconditionsareunproblematic.WecanreadilyconcedethatGod,if

Heexists,wouldhavethepowertointentionallycausethecreationofsignsthat

conveyhiscommands.Thecrucialconditionisthethird.Itisthisonethat

allegedlycausesproblemsfortheepistemologicalobjection.Forwhenyoulook

atit,thisconditionisclaimingthataccesstoGod’scommandsdoesnot

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specificallyrequireknowledgeofthesourceofthecommand.Itonlyrequires

knowledgeofwhatisbeingcommanded.Thiscreatesaproblemforthe

epistemologicalobjectionbecausewhenyoufactorinthedifferentpossible

formsofdivinecommunication(i.e.thedifferentpossible‘signs’)thenyoucan

imaginecasesinwhichthereasonablenon-believerknowswhatismorally

requiredofthemthankstoadivinelycommunicatedsign,eventhoughtheylack

knowledgeofthesign’sorigins.Peoplesillustratestheidea:

“ConsiderforexamplethepossibilitythatGodconveysthe“sign”topeople

regardingsomeact(let’spickmurder)viaaproperfunctionofthehuman

conscience.Nobodyneedstoknowwhatconscienceis,howwegotone,orthatGod

usesittoensurethatwehavesometruebeliefsinorderforthemtoknow,via

conscience,thatmurderiswrong...”

(Peoples2011)

Inshort,reasonablenon-believerscanknowthecontentofmoralcommands

withoutknowingtheirsource.

Thereareatleasttwodifficultieswiththisversionoftheargument.The

firsthastodowithhowAdams’scommunicativestandardoughttobe

understood.Towork,thethirdconditioninthisstandardmuststatethat

knowledgeofcontentisallthatisrequired.ButAdams’soriginalwording

suggeststhatknowledgeofformisneededaswell.Afterall,hesaysthatyou

mustunderstandthesignas‘conveyingtheintendedcommand’,suggestingthat

theagenttowhomthecommandisdirectedmustknowthattheyarebeing

commandedtodosomething.Thisisproblematicbecauseitishighlyunlikely

thatreasonablenonbelievershaveepistemicaccesstoboththeformandthe

contentofthedivinecommands.Suchanonbelievermighthavethe

phenomenologicalfeelingthatmurderiswrongandthattheyoughtnottodoit,

butmayneverthelesshavenosensethattheyarebeingcommandedtorefrain

fromit.Wielenbergputsthepointnicelywhenhesaysthat‘[t]hereisa

differencebetweencommandingsomeonetoperformacertainactAandcausing

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someonetobelievethatheismorallyobligatedtoperformactA.’(Wielenberg

2014,79).AllthatishappeninginPeoples’simaginedcaseisthatthereasonable

nonbelieverisbeingcausedtothatmurderisverybad;notthattheyarebeing

causedtobelievethattheyarebeingcommandednottomurder.Thissuggests

thatinsistingthatthemoralagentmusthaveknowledgeoftheformandcontent

isnotgoingtobesufficienttorebuttheepistemologicalobjection.

ItisprobablyforthisreasonthatPeoplesinsistsonapure‘contentnot

source’objection,goingsofarastoexplicitlystatethatthereasonable

nonbeliever‘doesnotevenneedtoknowthat[whatisbeingcommunicatedto

him]isacommand,providedthecommandcanbeconveyedtohim’(Peoples

2011).Thisseemstobeamoresensiblebutherewerunintoasecondmajor

difficulty.Onceyouinsistthatknowledgeofcontentaloneissufficientforthe

satisfactionoftheepistemicconditionyouseemtounderminethecriterionthat

theDCTistusestodistinguishgenuinemoralobligationsfromotherobligation-

likeclaimsonourmoralagency..TheessenceofDCTisthatanobligationismoral

onlyifitiscommandedbyabeingwiththerightkindsofpropertiesthatcan

createtrulymoralobligations.Butifaparticularmoralagentdoesnotknowthat

theirconscience-deliveredmoralbeliefsderivefromsuchabeing,itisvery

difficulttoseehow,onDCT,moralobligationsaresupposedtoexistforthat

agent.Communicationofthesourcewouldseemtobeessentialtosuccessful

communicationofthecommand.Thetheistmayinsistthattheobligationsstill

existinsomeobjective,agent-independentsense,butthentheyaremovingaway

fromacommunication-basedtheoryofmoralobligation,andendingupwitha

moregeneraltheologicalstateistview.9

WeseetheprobleminthecaseofthemodifiedversionoftheDCT

defendedbyAdams.OnepartofthemotivationforthismodifiedDCTwasto

comeupwithasatisfactoryresponsetotheEuthyphrodilemma.Thiswas

achievedbyinsistingthatGodhastherightkindofessenceornaturetoissue

moraldirectives.AnotherpartofthemotivationforAdams’smodifiedDCTwas

theneedtodistinguishbetweenobligatoryandsupererogatoryacts.Our9 The problems with this move are discussed briefly in the final section.

15

consciencemayoftentelluswhatismorallygoodandwhatismorallybad;

indeed,itmayoftengosofarastotellusthatsomethingisreallyreallygoodor

reallyreallybad.Butit’snotclearthatconsciencealoneissufficientfor

knowledgeofobligations,certainlyformanyhotlydisputedmoralissues.AmI

obligatedgivelargechunksofmymoneytocharitiesinthedevelopingworld,

justasIwouldbeobligatedtorescueadrowningchild,oristhatmerely

superogatory?Adams’spointisthatweneedabeingwiththerightmixof

propertiesandtherightkindofauthoritytohelpustellthedifference.Ifwe

don’tknowthatthepangsofconscienceweexperienceinrelationtocharitable

givingarecommand-likesignsfromsuchabeing,howarewetoknowwhatwe

areobligatedtodo?

Alliedtothis,andmoreimportantly,thereistheproblemthat(moral)

command-likesignsarecheapandeasy-to-fake.Humanscancreatebooks

claimingtocontainGod’scommandsbutwhichareactuallymadeuptosatisfy

theirownselfishpoliticalneeds;preacherscanclaimtochannelGod’s

commandsintheirsermonsfortheirownnefariouspurposes;moreoutlandishly

(butconsistentwithcertainreligiousworldviews)therecouldbedemonsor

devilsinterferingwithourmoralconsciencesandtellingusthatcertainthings

arerightorwrongevenwhentheyarenot.Allofthesecasescouldresultin

command-likesignsbeingcommunicatedtomoralagents,butnoneofthem

resultinthecreationofmoralobligations.Whynot?Becauseineachcasewe

wouldknoworhavereasonabledoubtabouttheauthorityoftheirsources.

Knowledgeofthesourceisthuscrucialifwearetodistinguishmoralcommands

fromfakesandforthosecommandstobesuccessfullycommunicatedtous.In

theend,then,itisverydifficulttoseehowaproponentoftheAdamsian-style

DCTcouldinsistthatknowledgeofcontentbyitselfissufficientforthe

satisfactionoftheepistemiccondition.Forthem,itisthesourceofthe

commandsthatmakesallthedifference

Isthereanywaytoavoidthisproblem?C.StephenEvanstriesvaliantlyto

doso.Initsinitialsteps,hisargumentisthesameasthatprovidedby

Adams/Peoples.HeagreeswithAdamsandPeoplesthatknowledgeofthe

16

contentofGod’scommandsisessentialifmoralobligationsaretoexist(Evans

2013,37).Indeed,headmitsthat‘itishardtoseehowanunknowablemoral

obligationcouldbeanobligationatall’(Evans2013,38).Hegoesontoclaim

thatconscienceisakeysourceofmoralknowledgeandthatconscienceisopen

toall,believerandnon-believeralike(2013,41).Conscience,accordingtohim,

givesusanimmediateintuitiveknowledgeoftherightnessorwrongnessofour

actions,althoughheadmitsthattheknowledgeitprovidesmaybe‘highlyfallible’

(2013,41).WhereEvansdiffersfromAdams/Peopleisinofferingamoreprecise

diagnosisofwhereitisthattheproponentoftheepistemologicalobjectiongoes

wrongandwhyitisthatknowledgeofthesourceofcommandsisnotnecessary

formoralknowledge.10Asheputsit,theproponentofDCTmust:

“defend[]theclaimthatGod’scommandscangenerateobligationsevenforthose

whodonotrecognizethosecommandsascomingfromGod.Todothistwo

distinctionsmustbemade.Firstonemustdistinguishbetweenarecognitionofa

moralobligationandtherecognitionofamoralobligationasadivinecommand.

Thisdistinctioninturnrequiresthatonedistinguisharecognitionofamoral

obligationfromanexplanationoftheexistenceofamoralobligation.Thedefender

ofDCT...mustholdthatitispossibleforareasonablenon-believertorecognizea

moralobligationwithoutrealizingthattheobligationisinfactadivinecommand.

Thisignorance...maypreventthenon-believerfrombeingabletogiveanadequate

explanationoftheexistenceofthemoralobligation,buttherearemanycasesin

whichapersonmayreasonablyaccepttheexistenceofsomething,butlackan

adequateexplanationoftheexistenceofsomething.

(Evans2013,112-113)

Thereisalotgoingoninthisquotedpassage,buttheessenceofitisthis:

Evans’sEpistemicCondition:OnDCT,aRNBcanhaveknowledgeofamoral

obligationMprovidedthattheycanrecognisethatMisamoralobligation;10 I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to engage with this aspect of Evans’s argument. Minor textual note: Evans refers to the epistemological objection as the ‘promulgation objection’. The terminological difference is unimportant here.

17

theydonotneedtohaveanadequateexplanationofwhyMisamoral

obligationinordertohavetherequisiteknowledge.

Hisargumentthenisthatreasonablenon-believercanrecognisetheexistenceof

certainmoralobligations(a)becausetheirconscienceswillrevealtothemthat

particularactionsareright/wrongand(b)becausetheyarefamiliarwithother

kindsofobligationsfromtheirsociallives(likeAdams,EvansdevelopshisDCT

byanalogywiththeobligationsarisinginsociallife).Theydonotneedadeeper

explanationofwhyitisthattheparticularobligationisamoralobligation.

Evansusesalengthyanalogytodefendthispoint.Idiscussthatanalogyin

thenextsectionbecauseitraisesadditionalproblems.Wedon’tneeditto

understandtheflawinEvans’sargument.TheflawstemsfromEvans’sattempt

todistinguishtheexplanationofMfromknowledgeofMinthecontextofDCT.

Theattemptedseparationisunderstandable:DCTis,afterall,usuallyproferred

asanexplanatorygroundingformoralobligationsthatwealreadybelieve

ourselvestohave.Itstatesthatthereasonwhywehavethosemoralobligations

isbecauseGodcommandedthemtobemoralrequirements.Buttheproponent

oftheepistemologicalobjectionishighlightingisthattheattemptedseparation

ofexplanationandrecognitionisnotpossibleinthecaseofDCT.Thereisan

intimateconnectionbetweenknowledgeofmoralobligationsandthekindof

explanationoftheexistenceofmoralobligationsthatDCTpurportstoprovide.

Itiseasiesttomakethispointbywayofanalogy.Considerthefactthat

manypeopleprefertoeatorganicfood.Butorganicfoodisnotsimplyanyold

food,itisfoodthatisproducedbyaparticularcausalmechanism,namely:an

organicfarmingmethod(i.e.onethatisfreefromchemicalfertilisers,pesticides

andsoon).Consequently,forpeoplewhopreferorganicfood,itisessentialthat

theyknowthatthefoodtheyconsumeisproducedbyorganicfarmingmethods.

Inmanycountries,officialcertificationsandfoodlabelsareusedtoprovide

consumerswithknowledgeoforganicfarmingmethods.Providedtheconsumer

hasfaithinthefoodlabellingandcertificationsystem,theycanbereasonably

confidentthatanyfoodtheypurchasewiththerelevantlabelsandcertifications

18

isindeedorganicinnature.Ifsuchaconsumerwandersdownafoodaisleina

supermarketandseesfoodontheselves,theymightbeabletorecognisethat

foodquafoodbyitsgeneralappearance,buttheycannotrecogniseitquaorganic

food,untiltheyseetherelevantlabelcertifyingtheprocessbywhichitis

produced.Inthisscenario,knowledgeoftheprocessthatproducedthefood

explainswhythefoodcountsasorganicfood,butknowledgeofthatprocessis

essentialfortheconsumeriftheyaretorecognisethefoodquaorganicfood.So

inthiscase,theabilitytorecogniseXquaorganicfoodisnotseparableor

distinguishablefromanexplanationofwhyXcountsasorganicfood.11

TheanalogywiththecaseofDCTandmoralobligationsshouldbe

straightforward,butletmespellitout.TheessentialclaimofDCTisthatamoral

obligationisnotsimplyanyoldobligation(orobligation-likesign/command)–

wehavelotsofthoseinsocietyasitis;itisanobligationthatisproducedbythe

rightcausalmechanism(i.e.byacommandissuedbyGod).Consequently,on

DCT,forpeoplewhowanttoknowtheirmoralobligations,itisnotenoughthat

theyrecogniseMasanobligation-likesign/command,theymustknowthatit

wasproducedbytherightcausalmechanism.Withoutthatknowledgetheymay

beabletorecogniseMquaobligationbuttheywillnotbeabletorecogniseM

quamoralobligation.Now,itistruethatthedivinecausaloriginisalsowhat

explainswhyMisamoralobligation,butthatisexactlythepointthatthe

proponentoftheepistemologicalobjectionismaking:explanationofmoral

obligationsisnotdistinguishablefromrecognitionofmoralobligations,given

thewayinwhichDCTpurportstoexplaintheexistenceofmoralobligations.

That’stheessenceoftheepistemologicalobjection:thatgiventhekindof

metaethicalgroundingthatDCTprovidesformoralobligationsitisnotpossible

toseparateexplanationfromknowledge.Consequently,thecontent-not-source

objectiondoesnotwork.

11 There is of course one crucial difference between the cases, but this merely strengthens the epistemological objection to DCT. Organic food will continue to be organic food even if it is mislabeled. But on DCT, a moral obligation will not continue to be a moral obligation unless it is successfully communicated and, according to what is being argued here, it is not successfully communicated until knowledge of its source is provided.

19

4.2–TheProbability-PossibilityArgument

IsthereanotherwaytodefendDCTfromtheepistemologicalobjection?Perhaps.

OnethingthattheprecedinganalysisassumesisthattheRNBcompletely(and

reasonably)deniestheexistenceofGodandsotheyareepistemicallyclosedto

thepossibilityofmoralobligationsemanatingfromGod.But,ofcourse,that

mightnotbeafairrepresentationoftheirphenomenology.TheRNBislikelyto

be(orhavebeen)opentothepossibilityoftherebeingaGod,andthusto

harboursomepotentialdoubtastothesourceoftheirmoralbeliefs.Isthereany

wayinwhichthisdoubtcanbeleveragedintoadefenceoftheDCT?Evans

(2013)hintsatthisinhiswritings,asdoothers.12AsfarasIamaware,however,

noonehasofferedanextendeddefenceandanalysisofthissuggestion.Ithus

havetwogoalsinthissection.Thefirstistopresentthisargument–whichIcall

the‘probability-possibility’argument–inwhatIbelievetobeitsmost

persuasiveform;thesecondistocritiqueit.

Wecanunderstandthegistoftheargumentbyconsideringanextended

thoughtexperimentfromEvans.Thisispresentedaspartofhisdefenceofthe

‘content-not-source’objectionbutitswordingandstructureitisnotfully

analogouswithapureversionofthatobjection.Thisisbecause,asyouwillseein

thequotedpassagebelow,itfocusesonascenariothatcombinesuncertaintyas

tothesourceofacommandwithknowledgeofthecontentofacommand,and

notonascenariothatjustinvolvesknowledgeofacommand.Thethought

experimentisworthquotinginfull:

“SupposeIamhikinginaremoteregionontheborderbetweenIraqandIran.I

becomelostandIamnotsureexactlywhatcountryIamin.Isuddenlyseeasign,

which(translated)readsasfollows:“YouMustNotLeaveThisPath”.AsIwalk

further,Iseeloudspeakers,andfromthemIhearfurtherinstructions:“Leavingthe

pathisstrictlyforbidden.”Insuchasituationitwouldbereasonableformetoform

12 One of the reviewers to this paper suggested that when considering the alleged status of a moral obligation under DCT “[t]he RNB can still examine the commands and properties of the alleged God of DCT, and can even specifically consider the claim that God has employed conscience or natural law to communicate his moral will, as well as verbal commands.” This suggests a scenario in which the RNB is at least open to God as a possible source. Is being open to this possibility enough to generate knowledge of an obligation? That’s they question pursued in the text.

20

abeliefthatIhaveanobligationtostayonthepath,evenifIdonotknowthe

sourceofthecommands.ForallIknow13thecommandsmaycomefromthe

governmentofIraqorthegovernmentofIran,orperhapsfromsomeregionalarm

ofgovernment,orevenfromaprivatelandownerwhosepropertyIamon.Insucha

situationImightreasonablybelievethatthecommandscommunicatedtome

createobligationsforme,evenifIdonotknowforsurewhogavethecommands.”

(Evans2013,113)

Therearethreeessentialfeaturestothisthoughtexperiment:(i)thereisasign

communicatingacommand;(ii)thereisuncertaintyastothetruesourceofthat

sign;and(iii)thereistheprobability/possibilitythatitcamefromsomeonewith

therightkindofauthority.Theconjunctionofthesethreefeaturesisthoughtto

provideknowledgethatissufficienttogenerateanobligationtoobey.Theidea

thenisthatthesituationfacedbythereasonablenon-believerissimilar.Hence

theremightbeknowledgesufficienttogenerateanobligationtoobeyintheir

casetoo.

Therearetwowaysinwhichtointerpretthisargument.One,whichI

shallcallthepragmaticenrichmentinterpretation,seemstobeimpliedby

WielenberginhisresponsetoEvans’sargument(Wielenberg2014).Pragmatic

enrichmentisthewell-knownlinguisticphenomenonwherebythemeaningof

anutteranceisenrichedbythepragmaticcontextinwhichitwasuttered.14So,

forexample,Imightsaytoyou‘Closeallthedoors’.InsayingthisIamissuinga

command,butwhatdoesitrequireyoutodo?Isurelycannotmeanforyouto

closeallthedoorsintheworld.Thatwouldbeextreme,butthatinterpretationis

consistentwiththeliteralmeaningoftheutterance.Asithappens,however,Isay

thistoyouwhilewearesittinginaroomwithtwoopendoors.Thisisthe

pragmaticcontextinwhichthecommandwasissued.Giventhatpragmatic

context,yourightlyinterpretthecommandtomeanthatyoushouldclosethe

13 This phrasing seems crucial. It suggests that, within the thought experiment, there is a live epistemic possibility that the commands come from some particular source. 14 Linguistic philosophers distinguish between semantics, which has to do with the general conventional meanings, and pragmatics, which has to do with the token-specific properties of an utterance.

21

twoopendoors.Themeaninghasthusbeenenrichedbythecontext.Pragmatic

enrichmentofthissortisaroutinefeatureofordinaryconversationsand

communications.Speakersandlistenersshareasetofassumptionsand

understandingsabouthowtheworldworks.Thatsetofassumptionsalways

influenceswhatwetaketoareasonableorplausibleinterpretationofthat

utterance.Theideawouldbethatthereceiverofanycommand-likesignmakes

certainbackgroundassumptionsaboutthereasonablewayinwhichtointerpret

thosecommands,andthoseassumptionsmightincludethepossibilityofthem

emanatingfromGod.

Thereisaproblemwiththisinterpretationoftheargument.Evans’s

originalthoughtexperimentonlyworksexploitssharedbackgroundknowledge

aboutthepragmaticcontextinwhichtheobligation-imposingsignisproduced.

WeallknowthattheIran-Iraqborderissubjecttopolitical-legalcontrol(i.e.that

thereareauthorities,betheypublicorprivate,whocontrolthelandinthat

region).Wealsoknow,giventhecontestednatureofthatlandscape,thatthese

political-legalauthoritiesmayhavegoodreasonfortellingpeopletostayonthe

path.Thesesharedassumptionsmakeitplausibleforustointerpretthesignin

anobligation-imposingway.Theproblemisthatthesesharedassumptions

aboutpragmaticcontextevaporateinthecaseofthereasonablenonbeliever

whoistryingtointerpretallegedlyobligation-imposingsigns.Thereasonable

nonbelieverdoesnotthinkthathisorherconscienceistheproductofadivine

will,orthatthelocalpreacherhasahotlinetoGod,orthattheBibleisadivinely

inspiredtext.Theydonotsharethoseassumptionswiththebelievers.

Consequently,itisdifficulttoseehowtheycouldunderstandthosesignsas

commandscomingfromapotentiallylegitimateauthority(Wielenberg2014,79).

Thereis,however,anotherwayinwhichtounderstandtheargument.

Wielenberg’sclaimthatthereasonablenonbelieverwon’tinterpretthesignas

beingacommandonlyreallyworksinthecaseofmoralconscienceorintuition.

Inthecaseofsignscommunicatedviaaholytextorthroughthemediumofa

prophet/preacher,thecommand-likeformofthesignmaybeobviousenough.In

thosecases,thepragmaticenrichmentinterpretationmissesthecrucialrolethat

22

moraluncertaintyseemstoplayinEvans’sthoughtexperiment.Wecanpaydue

homagetothatrolebyconsideringtheargumentinlightoftheburgeoning

literatureonthetopicofmoraluncertainty(Lockhart2000;Sepielli2008;

Guererro2007;Moller2011;Weatherson2014;Harman2015).

Weneedsomebackgroundfirst.Thecurrentdebateaboutmoral

uncertaintywaskickstartedbyanumberofphilosophers(Lockhardt2000;

Guererro2007;Moller2011)claimingthatuncertaintyastothemoralstatusof

anactshould,onatleastsomeoccasions,influenceourdecision-makingwith

respecttothatact.Ithaslongbeenacceptedthatuncertaintywithrespecttoour

factualbeliefsshouldinfluenceourmoraldecision-making;themoral

uncertaintistsmerelyclaimedthatthesameshouldbetruewithrespecttoour

moralbeliefs.Analogiesandstoriescanillustratetheirpoint.Considerthe

followingtwoexamples(adaptedfromWeatherson2014):

Poisoning:AliceiscaringforhersickfriendBob.Shehasabottlecontaining

whatshebelievestobeusefulbutnon-essentialmedication.Butsheisonly

90%certainofthis.Sheknowsthatthereisa10%riskthatthebottlecontains

alethalpoisionthatwouldinstantlykillBob.

Vegetarianism:Rotimiisinvitedtoamealatherfriend’shouse.Steakison

themenu,butthereisalsoavegetarianoption.Sheis90%15certainthat

eatingmeatismorallypermissible,butsheacceptsthatthereisa10%risk

thateatingmeatisgravelymorallywrong(nearlyasbadaskillingandeating

aninnocenthumanbeing).

Thefirstcaseinvolvesfactualuncertainty,i.e.uncertaintywithrespecttothe

contentsofthebottle.Thereisnouncertaintywithrespecttothemoralityof

lethallypoisoningone’sfriend.Mostpeopleacceptthatthefactualuncertaintyin

thiscaseshouldinfluencetheoutcome:giventhatthemedicationisusefulbut

non-essential,thereisnowayAliceshouldruntheriskoflethallypoisoningBob.15 Obviously these figures are misleadingly precise. No one could accurately estimate the truth of their moral beliefs like this. In reality, we would have to estimate subjective probability ranges. The precise figures are used for illustrative purposes only.

23

MoraluncertaintistsarguethatsimilarreasoningappliestoRotimi’scase.Butin

thatcasetheuncertaintyisdirectlyrelatedtomoralbeliefs,notfactualones.16

Rotimiisnotsureabouttheethicalstatusofeatingmeat.Itcouldbepermissible

butitcouldalsobegravelymorallywrong.Inthatcontext,theuncertaintistwill

arguethatsheoughtnottorunthemoralriskofdoingsomethingthatcouldbe

gravelymorallywrong.Sheshouldtakethelessriskyoption.

TheRotimiexamplehighlightsanargumentativestructurethatis

commonthroughouttheliteratureonmoraluncertainty,somethingwecancall

theriskasymmetryargument(Weatherson2014;Moller2011).Thegistofthe

argumentisthatwhenanagentisfacedwithtwoormoreoptions,oneofwhich

hasanon-negligibleprobabilityofbeinggravelymorallywrong,theotherof

whichisprettycertaintobemorallypermissible,theyoughtnottakethe

potentiallygravelymorallywrongoption.Ifthissoundssomewhatsimilartothe

argumentativestructureunderlyingPascal’sWager,thenbereassured:itis

effectivelyamoralversionofit.

Evans’sthoughtexperimentcanbereinterpretedinlightoftheconcepts

andargumentativestructuresusedinthedebateaboutmoraluncertainty.The

thoughtexperimentfocusesonascenarioinwhich(a)thereissomeuncertainty

regardingthemoralstatusofasign(i.e.whetheritisobligation-imposing)and

(b)whereuncertaintieswithrespecttothemoralstatusofthesignare

sufficientlyasymmetricaltogenerateamoralobligationtofollowthesign.Inthe

caseofthesignontheIran-Iraqborder,theuncertaintystemsfromuncertainty

withrespecttotheoriginorsourceofthesign.Onemightarguethatthisisn’t

reallymoraluncertaintyatallsincethetruthregardingtheoriginorsourceof

thesignisfactualinnature,notmoral.Butthatisn’tquiteright.Althoughthe

distinctionbetweenfactualandmoralbeliefsisfuzzy,thewholepointofthe

Iran-Iraqthoughtexperimentisthatthesourceofacommanddeterminesits

normativestatus.Ifitcomesfromalegitimateauthority,itisobligation-

imposing;ifitdoesnotcomefromalegitimateauthority,itisnot.Theconceptof16 Of course, some people will argue that moral beliefs are factual since moral propositions are capable of being true or false. I don’t dispute this and although I think the distinction between the moral and the non-moral is fuzzy, I think the distinction is clear enough for this discussion to make sense.

24

legitimateauthorityisitselfhighlymoralised,soitisdifficulttoseethisas

anythingotherthanatypeofmoraluncertainty.17Thisappliesafortioritocases

inwhichtheuncertaintywithrespecttotheoriginconcernswhetherornotGod

isthesourceofthesignsinceGodfunctionsasthelegitimateauthorityformoral

obligations.

Thethoughtexperimentalsostructurestheriskasymmetriesinsucha

waythattheobligation-imposinginterpretationofthesignisthemost

compelling.Itis,afterall,basedinadisputedregionbetweentwohistorically

belligerentnations.Inthatcontext,itseemshighlylikelythatthesigncomes

fromsomeonewiththerightkindofauthority,andthatonewouldberunninga

gravemoral/legalriskbynotfollowingthecommand.18Butthisiswherethe

thoughtexperimentunravelsifitattemptstoprovidebroadersupportforDCT.

Thethoughtexperimentseemstoinvolveascenarioinwhichweare90%sure

thatthecommandcomesfromalegitimateauthority.Itiseasyenoughtosee

howthatdegreeofconfidencemightsufficetogeneratebeliefintheobligation.

Thetoughercase(andtheonethatispresumablymoreanalogouswiththecase

ofthereasonablenonbeliever)wouldbewheretheprobabilitiesarestackedthe

otherwayaround,i.e.weare90%surethesignsdonotcomefromtheright

source,butthinkthereisa10%chancethattheydo.Wouldthatbesufficientto

generatebeliefinanobligation?Itmightbe,thoughitwouldpresumablydepend

onthepotentialmoralstatusofdisobeyingthecommand.Ifwalkingoffthepath

confersnoobviousmoralbenefits,thenwemightagreethatthenon-negligible

riskthatthesignisobligation-imposingissufficienttogeneratebeliefinthat

obligation.Butiftherearemoralbenefitsfromdisobedience,thesituationmight

beratherdifferent.Theriskasymmetrymayworktheotherway.

17 It is certainly no different than the kind of uncertainty regarding whether a foetus is a person or a non-human animal an entity with the right not to killed for our consumption. Uncertainty with respect to those kinds of beliefs is accepted as an example of moral uncertainty in the existing literature (Moller 2011). That said, I readily acknowledge that some critics of moral uncertainty think there are subtle distinctions between moral and non-moral facts that may make a crucial difference in this debate (e.g. Harman 2015 and Weatherson 2014). Since I ultimately appeal to the views of these critics in the response to Evans, I don’t believe that my view is in tension with theirs. 18 The thought experiment also layers prudential risk on top of legal/moral risk, with the risk asymmetries working in the same way. This makes it doubly compelling.

25

Considerhowthereasoningwouldapplytothecaseofthereasonable

non-believer.Theidea,presumably,wouldbethatthenonbelieverisalso

confrontedwithasign(e.g.apangofconscience,oranutterancefromaholy

bookorapreacheretc);andthattheyareuncertainastothetruesourceofthat

sign.Theyarereasonablyconfident(say90%)thatitdoesnotcomefromabeing

withlegitimateauthoritytocreatecommands(i.e.God)buttheyacceptthat

thereisanon-negligibleprobabilitythatitdoes(say10%).Theclaimthenwould

probabilityofthesigncomingfromtherightsourceissufficientforthe

reasonablenonbelievertoknowthattheyareunderanobligationandthatthis

inturnissufficienttosatisfytheepistemicconditionofDCT.19

Thearefourproblemswiththisasanattempttowardoffthe

epistemologicalobjection.Thefirstistheologicalinnature.Ithinkitis

questionablewhetherthissortofuncertainty-basedviewofcommunicationis

compatiblewiththepropertiesofGodastraditionallyconceived.Onewould

presumethatGodhasthepowertocommunicateclearlytousthatheisthe

sourceofaparticularsign;justasourlocallegislaturehasthepowertodothe

same.Thefactthathedoesnot,foratleastsomepeople,andthathe

consequentlyhastoleverageuncertaintyinthemannerjustoutlinedseems

surprising.Thetheistowesussomejustification/explanationforwhyGodhasto

adoptsuchanimperfectsystemofcommunication.Theistswillnodoubtoblige

byofferingexplanationsthatarebroadlysimilartothoseprovidedinresponse

totheproblemofevilortheproblemofdivinehiddenness(e.g.Evans2013,114-

115).Butthereisoneproblemwithallsuchattemptstoexplainawaythe

uncertainty.Rememberwhatisatstakeiftheepistemicconditionisnot

satisfied?Moralobligationsceasetoexistforacertainsegmentofthepopulation.

ThetheistneedstoexplainwhyGodisentitledtoruntheriskofexcluding

peoplefromtherealm.ofmoralduty.Forinstance,atypicaltheodicalresponseto

theproblemofevilistoarguethatGodcannotintervenetopreventevilbecause

itwouldcompromiseourabilitytodevelopandacquiretruemoralagency,

wherethisagencyconsistsintheabilitytorecogniserightorwrong,freely19 This interpretation of the argument subsumes the preceding pragmatic enrichment interpretation because what is now being alleged is that uncertainty with respect to the pragmatic context is sufficient for successful communication of the command.

26

decideone’sactions,andtakemoralresponsibilityfortheoutcomes.Atheist

mightbetemptedtoofferasimilarresponseinthisinstance,arguingthatGod

doesn’tcommunicatehiswilltousperfectlyinordertogiveusthefreedomto

developourownmoralagency.Butthistheodicyisnotgoingtoworkinthe

presentcontext.Ifthedivinecommunicationfails,itisn’tsimplythecasethatthe

non-believerislefttodeveloptheirownmoralagencywithouttheguidinghand

ofGod;itisthatmoralobligationsceasetoexistforthisagentandhencethereis

nomoralagencyforthemtodevelop.Thiswouldactuallydefeattherationalefor

theallegedtheodicy.

ThesecondreasonIthinkthisisnotaplausibledefenceoftheDCTisthat

theimpactofmoraluncertaintyonourobligationsisitselfhotlydisputed.

Althoughseveralauthorsthinkthatmoraluncertaintiesandriskasymmetries

cancombinetoalterthecontentofourobligations(Moller2011;Lockhart2000;

Guerrero2007),thereareotherswhohavechallengedthisbelief(Weatherson

2014;Harman2015).Weathersonforinstancearguesthatoneproblemwith

takingmoraluncertaintiesonboardinone’spracticalreasoningisthatitresults

inatypeofmoralfetishism:oneactsforthemoralgoodwhatevereverthatmay

be,notforthereasonsthattypicallymotivatemoralaction(e.g.becauseanact

doesharm).Inessence,theuncertaintistactsmorallydedictoratherthandere.

Harmanagreeswiththisdedicto/deredistinctionandaddstheobservationthat

theuncertaintistpositionrestsonthemistakenbeliefthatfalsemoralbeliefscan

exculpate.Wecannotadjudicateontheseargumentshere,butifthereisindeed

somethingsuspiciousabouttheuncertaintist’spositionitcastsintodoubtthis

renderingoftheargument.

ThethirdreasonfordoubtingthisdefenceoftheDCTisthatifyouaccept

thatnon-negligibleprobabilitiescanalterthestatusofa‘moral’sign,youstart

downaslipperyslope.Thereareplentyofothernon-negligibleprobabilitiesthat

couldleadtoaverydifferentinterpretationoftheallegedly-divinesigns.Fora

non-believer,theprobabilityofGod’sexistencemayberoughlyonaparwiththe

existenceofothersupernaturalbeingswithsimilarpowers(e.g.EvilGod,the

devil,demons,angelsetc.).Whenconfrontedwithaputativelydivinesign(such

27

asapangofconscience)theymayrecognisethenon-negligibleriskthatit

emanatesfromGod,alongsideasimilarnon-negligibleriskthatitemanatesfrom

anothersupernaturalbeinglikethedevilorademon.But,ofcourse,ifthesign

comesfromoneoftheseothersources,itwouldn’tbeobligation-imposing.Quite

thecontrary:itmightbethedeviltryingtotrickthepersonintodoingsomething

genuinelymaliciousorevil.Inthatcase,theywouldberunningagravemoral

riskbyfollowingthesign.Theriskasymmetriesmaythuscounselagainst

viewingthesignasobligation-imposing.Inshort,risk-basedanalysesofthissort

cancutbothways.Isuspectitwillmostoftencutagainstthetheistic

interpretationinthecaseofthetypicalreasonablenon-believer.Infactitiseven

worsethanthatbecausethesameproblemappliestoasignificantgroupof

believers.Manybelieversthinkthatthedevil’sexistenceishighlyprobable.For

them–moresothanthereasonablenon-believer–theriskofmisinterpretinga

signisfarhigher.Theymayfindthemselvesparalysedincaseswherethesource

ofthesignisuncertain.Thesamemaybetrueforthosewhoembracethe

skepticaltheistposition.Manyhavearguedthatskepticaltheismundermines

ourepistemicconfidenceinallegedlydivinesignstosimilarlyparalysingeffect

(Maitzen2007;Wielenberg2010;Law2014).Thissuggests,incidentally,that

theepistemologicalobjectioncouldhaveafarbroaderscopethanoriginally

assumed.Itcouldbeaproblemforbelieverandnonbelieveralike.

Finally,Ithinktheresponsefailsbecauseformanyreasonablenon-

believerstheprobabilityofGod’sexistencemaybetrulynegligible.Most

defendersoftheviewthatmoraluncertaintycanalterourunderstandingofour

moralobligationsacceptthatthisonlyholdstruewhentherisksinquestionare

non-negligible(e.g.Moller2011).SoiftheprobabilityofGod’sexistenceis

negligible,theargumentwillnotwork.

Tobrieflysumup,theprobability/possibilityargumenthassome

interestingfeatures,andishintedatintheliterature,butevenafterdevelopingit

inwhatIbelievetobeacharitableform,Ifinditunsatisfactoryasaresponseto

theepistemologicalobjection.

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5.Conclusion:Assessingtheimplications

Theprecedingdiscussionpointstooneconclusion:theepistemological

objection–intheformpresented–isplausible.DivineCommandTheoriesreally

doincorporateanepistemicconditionintotheiraccountofmoralontology;that

conditionfailstobesatisfiedforasizeableclassofnonbelievers;andtheresultis

thatmoralobligationsfailtoexistforthatclassofnonbelievers.Atthispointwe

returntothequestion:sowhat?Isthissomethingthatshouldbotherthe

proponentofDCT?Orcantheysimplyshrugofftheobjection?Thereareseveral

possibilities.

IfoneisofauniversalistpersuasionwhenitcomestoGodandthemoral

law(i.e.believesthateveryoneissubjecttothesamemorallaw),thenone

shouldbedisturbedbytheargument.Itissuggestingthatasignificant

proportionofthepopulationareoutsidetherealmofGod’smorallaw,abletoact

withimpunityandwithoutmoralconsequence.Attheveryleast,thiswould

seemtobeasignificantpracticalproblem;andmorelikelyadeeptheological

problem.

Ifoneispersuadedbythenotionthatmetaethicaltheoriesbattleitoutby

earningmoreplausibilitypoints,thenoneshouldalsobedisturbedbythe

argument.ItsuggeststhattheDCTmissesoneimportantmarkbecauseithasno

waytoaccountforthemoralobligationsofreasonablenon-believers.Thismight

meanthatthebelievershouldresttheirhopesonanalternativetheistic

metaethicaltheory.Thisstrikesmeasbeingthemostcompellinginterpretation

oftheargumentsinceepistemicconditionswouldseemtobeanimportant

componentinanymoraltheory.

Thatsaid,ahardlineinterpretationisalsoavailable.Thetheistcould

insistonthepureseparationofepistemologyandontology.Thiswouldprobably

requirearetreattoamoregeneraltheologicalstateistposition,andnota

command-basedviewbasedonsuccessfulcommunication.Inthatcase,thetheist

couldarguethattheiraccountofmoralontologyisinternallyconsistent(evenif

29

itfailstoaccountformoralknowledge),20andthensimplynotethatthe

epistemologicalobjectionmerelyconfirmstheirworstsuspicionsaboutan

atheisticworldview:Itturnsoutthatevenreasonableatheistsreallyarebeyond

themoralpale.

Thismay,inturn,pointthewaybacktotheneglectedpartofthe

argument:theexistenceofreasonablenonbelievers.AlthoughIthinkthe

existenceofsuchnonbelieversishighlylikely,IadmitthatIhaveabias.Thebest

hopefortheproponentoftheDCTmightbetochallengetherealityofreasonable

nonbelievers.

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