in confidence north sydney. nsw 2059 dear albert,...council's dcp and the nsw police. both...

Harris Crime Prevention Services Independent SecurityRisk Management andCrime Prevention Consultants

PO Box 1550Macquarie CentreNorth Ryde NSW 2113

Telephone (02) 9804 8771www.harriscrimeprevention.com.au

Security Master Licence 407778164

IN CONFIDENCE

24 October 2017

Mr Albert LambKrikis Tayler ArchitectsLevel 7, 97 Pacific HighwayNORTH SYDNEY. NSW 2059

Dear Albert,

Final Report - Crime Risk and Design Assessment -30 - 32 Advance Street Schofields New South Wales

On the 16 October we issued a draft report for the above development. We now have pleasure in submittingthis final report. Thank you for engaging Harris Crime Prevention Services.

Yours sincerely,

Leon L. Harris Dip.Sec.Studs.,CPPPrincipal Consultant

m: 0419 462 498e: [email protected]

Toplace Residential Development 30 - 32 Advance Street, Schofields NSW In-Confidence

©Harris Crime Prevention Services, Sydney 2017 All rights Reserved Page 1 of 33

Crime Risk and Crime Prevention Report

Residential Development30 - 32 Advance Street

Schofields NSW

for

Toplace Pty Ltd

October 2017

In ConfidenceTO BE RELEASED AS CONTROLLED COPIES

Unauthorised copying prohibited



Table of Contents

A Executive Summary........................................................................................................................ 3B The Report ...................................................................................................................................... 6

1 The Consultancy Brief ................................................................................................................ 62 Development Description ........................................................................................................... 63 Development Stakeholders ........................................................................................................ 74 The Scope and Consultancy Methodology ................................................................................ 75 Crime Risks to the Development................................................................................................ 76 Council’s Community-Wide Crime Risk Mitigation Goals .......................................................... 97 CPTED Focused Crime Prevention Objectives ....................................................................... 108 Consultancy Outcomes ............................................................................................................ 109 References ................................................................................................................... 24Appendix 1 Crime Statistics for Schofields(Suburb) ............................................................................ 25Appendix 2 High Density (Apartment) Mail Box Tampering and Delivery Advice from Australia Post 26Appendix 3 Crime Prevention as a Design and Management Strategy............................................... 30



A EX E C U T I V E SU M M A R Y

Toplace Development 30-32 Advance Street Schofields NSW

This crime risk and crime prevention Report (the Report) relates to Toplace Pty Ltd’s (Toplace or thedeveloper) residential development at 30 - 32 Advance Street Schofields NSW (the development). TheReport has been prepared as part of the Development Application (DA) documentation to Blacktown CityCouncil (the Council).

The Report's conclusions and recommendations are based on how the development's design and footprintpromotes the safety (security) of residents, visitors and contractors accessing and/or occupying the 11buildings comprising 587 apartments (units), situated as 4 sub-divided lots. The development has sharedbasement and lower ground parking for vehicles and bicycles. There are designated bays for visitors andthere are basement storage facilities for residents.

Building and communal open space design has been assessed in terms of reducing crime and anti-socialbehaviour risks by applying the principles of the Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design(CPTED) template. This is compliance requirement of (a) Blacktown City Council, (b) the NSW Police and(c) the NSW Department of Planning and Environment.

CPTED has five principles - territorial definition, natural surveillance, access control, activity support andtarget hardening (Appendix 3). Where relevant, these principles are applied to our assessment underObjective 2 of this Report, to ensure all three compliance requirements have been met.

CPTED has been broadly re-defined by Harris as ‘applying aspects of architecture, engineering andtechnology to all urban development proposals as an intentional environmental crime prevention strategy’.

The Report’s assessment commentary, conclusions and/or recommendations are presented aroundcontextual and compliance analyses.

The summarised conclusions and/or recommendations hereunder are extracts from each of the Report'sthree (3) crime prevention (security) objectives.

OBJECTIVE 1 Contextual Crime Risk Identification and Mitigation

assessing the development’s physical environment in terms of anti-social behaviour, criminalactivity and/or potential crime risks. (The development should positively impact on crime riskmitigation through sound security design).

Conclusions

The development's context is transitioning from semi-rural to urban residential. There is no evidenceof any criminality occurring near, or in other parts of the 'new' Schofields. This development should'stamp' its intention to contribute to a stewardship model, promoting community safety in and beyondits footprint. There is nothing in the design that would compromise the community safety objective tosustain a zero-tolerance of crime.

The development's 'safe place' marketability will be sustained if the application of crime preventionarchitecture is matched by its maintenance and management through proactive resident stewardship.

As with neighbouring developments, local police, retailers and the Council will be keen to work withAdvance Street residents to continue resisting anti-social or criminal behaviour within their precinct andin the wider (Schofields) community.



Summary Objective 1

Reviewed drawings for DA submission indicate that the development's design shouldcontribute positively to the neighbourhood and wider community goal of providing a'welcoming and safe place' for incumbent residents and their visitor-guests. The overallarchitecture, including the application of CPTED principles, should 'add value' to Council'scommunity-wide crime prevention objectives.

In our view there is no evidence that the development's architecture is likely to cause orcondone any anti-social or illegal behaviour within the footprint or 'spill' into the immediateneighbourhood.

OBJECTIVE 2 Application of CPTED Principles

identifying vulnerable aspects of the development requiring specific security design inputaimed at reducing and/or preventing opportunities to commit crime;

affirming appropriate security design strategies, and/or recommending possible changes toaspects of architecture and/or engineering, likely to enhance security objectives;

outlining specific CPTED applications and recommendations to enhance sustainability andmarketability as a welcoming and safe social and recreational community place.

Conclusions

In our opinion, the 4 sub-divided lots and the 11 buildings have been designed (drawn) with whole-of-site personal and property safety (security) in mind. We have reviewed each of the CPTED-relevantdesign elements and have concluded:

(a) the built form defines each building's space, the entrances to that space, and each lot’s design‘purpose’ characteristics. (Definitional clarity and circulation certainty is a fundamental CPTEDPrinciple);

(b) that, within the spatial definitions and spatial separation, there are ample opportunities to observe(passive surveillance) vehicle and pedestrian circulation within the proposed internal roads, alongpathways, along building axes and within communal zones;

(c) there is definitional and access control clarity throughout the development;(d) design detail should reflect the role of external lighting, perimeter, street edge and communal zone

and appropriate signage to provide way-finding and social gathering certainty for residents, visitorsand contractors;

(e) that two target-hardening measures be agreed to; specifically the installation of IP Network (CCTV)surveillance cameras and the appropriate strengthening and weather-proofing of mail boxes.

Drawings, to be submitted for DA approval and throughout the design development-detail stage, reflectarchitectural understanding and application of CPTED principles as addressed in the specifics ofObjective 2.



Summary Objective 2

In our opinion, drawings indicate an appropriate inter and intra-relationship of the built formarchitecture whereby each CPTED principle is to be applied holistically to achieve safe (secure)liveability.

Building and communal space architecture appropriately defines, separates and secures eachlot. Issues regarding the safety of residents at some street-level entry points and potentialentrapment concerns with basement storage, need resolution through design detail. Overall,the architecture reflects intentional and successful application of CPTED principles.

It is important that the developers follow through on the DA drawings to ensure application ofCPTED principles are incorporated into design development-detail in order to maximise'welcoming and safe place' goals.

OBJECTIVE 3 Compliance with Local and State Planning Instruments

ensuring compliance with the requirements of Council’s Development Control Plan, itsStrategic Plan. Social Plan and Crime Prevention Plan, the NSW Police and with Stateplanning instrument guidelines under Section 79C of the New South Wales EnvironmentalPlanning and Assessment (EPA) Act.

Conclusions

CPTED compliance is an important part of the developer's obligations, especially compliance withCouncil's DCP and the NSW Police. Both stakeholders are concerned to create and sustain a 'new'suburb (community) where personal and property safety (security) are fundamental givens.

Council, the NSW Police and the NSW Department of Planning and Environment, all require similardesign processes and outcomes; that is the application of CPTED principles, where relevant, tointentionally contribute to the above 'givens'. In crime prevention terms, the development's architectureis required to design out opportunities for anti-social and illegal behaviour across the site. This in turncontributes to the intolerance of crime within the site and within the community.

We are confident that the developer has considered these compliance obligations and we affirmcompliance, or intent to comply, on the understanding that design development-detail and constructioncertificate documentation will reflect attention to specific recommendations outlined in Objective 2 ofour Report.

Summary Objective 3

Drawings and documentation provided for this Report have been reviewed to ensure an holisticcompliance with the relevant State and local planning and crime prevention authorities.

We ar Specifically, our view is that Toplace has taken a the matter of anti-social and criminal activityseriously with a view to maximising design-instigated compliance with the legislative,regulatory, policy and/or planning instruments of Blacktown City Council, the NSW Police andthe NSW Department of Planning and Environment.



B TH E RE P O R T

Toplace Development 30-32 Advance Street Schofields NSW

1 The Consultancy Brief

This crime risk and crime prevention Report (the Report) relates to Toplace Pty Ltd's (Toplace or thedeveloper) residential development at 30 - 32 Advance Street Schofields NSW (the development). Thereport has been prepared as part of the Development Application (DA) documentation to Blacktown CityCouncil (the Council).

The Report's conclusions and recommendations are based on how the development's design and footprintpromotes the safety (security) of residents, visitors and contractors accessing and/or occupying the 587apartments (units) in 11 buildings.

Building (apartment and basement) and communal open space design has been assessed in terms ofreducing crime and anti-social behaviour risks by applying the principles of the Crime Prevention ThroughEnvironmental Design (CPTED) template. This is compliance requirement of (a) Blacktown City Council,(b) the NSW Police and (c) the NSW Department of Planning and Environment.

CPTED has five principles - territorial definition, natural surveillance, access control, activity support andtarget hardening (Appendix 2). Where relevant, these principles are applied to our assessment underObjective 2 of this Report, to ensure all three compliance requirements have been met.

CPTED has been broadly re-defined by Harris as ‘applying aspects of architecture, engineering andtechnology to all urban development proposals as an intentional environmental crime prevention strategy’.

The Report’s assessment commentary, conclusions and/or recommendations are presented aroundcontextual and compliance analyses. Application of CPTED should be applied as a strategic and holistic(site-wide) crime mitigation and prevention solution. The aim is to ensure that the development sustains a'safe place' marketing reputation.

2 Development Description

The site was formerly rural (semi-rural) and is now part of neighbouring residential sub-divisions eitherplanned, under construction or under occupancy.

The development comprises four (4) lots.

Lot 1 is bounded by Advance Street to the north and is east-west flanked by future development sites. Thebuilt form perimeters are unmistakable. It is proposed to sub-divide Lot 1 as part of this DA but there is nophysical building work proposed for Lot 1. Any future development on Lot 1 will be under a separate andfuture development application.

Lot 2 abuts a future northern development site, is separated from Lot 3 (west) and has its eastern andsouthern perimeters fronting proposed new streets. B and C

Lot 3's Building F abuts Lot 1 (north) with the other 3 perimeters fronting a new street and 2 site boundaries.Lot 3 comprises Buildings A, D, E and F.

Lot 4 is bounded by an existing southern site; the other 3 perimeters front new streets. G, H J L and K

The development comprises eleven (11) buildings, situated as four (4) sub-divided lots. There are a totalof 587 apartments (units); specifically 147 x 1bedroom, 388 x 2 bedroom and 52 x 3 bedroom. Thebuildings share basement and lower ground parking for vehicles and bicycles. There are designated baysfor visitors and there are basement storage facilities for residents.



Total vehicle parking is for 758 vehicles, 614 bays for residents and 144 bays for visitors. There is a totalof 231 bicycle parking slots spread across each of the basements.

The address has a temporary driveway until new intra-site streets are constructed to accommodate off-street access for residents, vehicles and bicycles. The streetscapes will take account of Council's set-backand building separation requirements. These requirements are critical to maximising visibility andobservation (surveillance) opportunities, a CPTED principle.

3 Development Stakeholders

The primary stakeholders are:

Toplace Pty Ltd, Blacktown City Council, NSW Police, Department of Planning and Environment, owners, residents, rental occupants, visitors and contractors accessing the site.

While each of the stakeholders will have different security expectations, their broad expectations are similarin that personal and property safety is a 'given' of the development. It is essential that residentialstakeholders understand and accept a role in post-construction security awareness to ensure on-goingcrime risk mitigation and management.

4 The Scope and Consultancy Methodology

The scope addressed CPTED solutions as they might impact positively or negatively on the developmentand its stakeholders - residents, visitors and contractors. The Harris consultants:

(a) met with representatives from Krikis Tayler Architects in order to understand the crimerisks and crime prevention (security) goals of the development;

(b) researched the development’s environment in terms of local neighbourhood crime risks ortrends and their likely impact on the development’s personal and property security(safety) outcomes;

(c) physically inspected the site and neighbourhood to better understand the relationship between theproposed development’s footprint including internal roadways and the local community;

(d) reviewed the drawings in relation to Objectives 1 to 3 of this report;(e) identified architectural, landscaping, lighting and signage design characteristics of the

development that may ‘encourage’ the reduction or prevention of crime;(f) specifically assessed internal and external sightlines enhancing observation and/or

surveillance;(g) obtained input from Blacktown City Council’s planning and/or policy documents, from the NSW

Police CPTED Checklist and from State legislative planning guidelines;(h) completed a CPTED report.

DisclaimerThe conclusions and recommendations outlined in the report are based on information provided to HarrisCrime Prevention Services at the time of this assignment. Research and experience that suggest certaindesign and policy approaches can be adopted to reduce opportunities for crime. It is not possible toguarantee that actual crime will be reduced or eliminated if these suggestions and/or recommendationsare implemented.

5 Crime Risks to the Development

Schofields has traditionally been a rural or semi-rural area. Its (partial) re-zoning has seen a bourgeoningof new residential housing, either as apartment or single dwelling approvals.

To date there has been little evidence of anti-social or criminal behaviour across the suburb. There is amixed-market response to purchases of land, house-land packages and apartments. The purchasingdemographic varies but there appears to be a predominance of first home buyers.



All new and large residential sub-divisions are prone to opportunistic or planned anti-social or criminalactivity. There are criminal elements looking to take advantage of the 'newness' of houses and apartmentsbecause there is an abundance of recently installed appliance and other electrical goods, always atemptation for theft.

In medium to high rise residential developments, there are added (crime) risks in relation to common orcommunal property, including basement parking areas, internal roads/streets or lane ways, public spaces,designated collective waste areas and key utilities infrastructure. These higher vulnerability, higher levelcrime risks are applicable to the Advance Street development as they are to other Toplace propertyinvestments.

In our assessment, we have approached the risks as 'potential' and 'perceived'. There is no evidence tosuggest that there has been an immediate targeting of Schofield's transitioning to reasonably densehousing precincts. However, the purpose of applying CPTED to this development is to foreshadow thepossibility that crime will target new developments at some point and that applying a safer-by-designapproach, there will be some architecturally-based protection of residents and their property.

Harris has considered the developer's approach, through CPTED, to the allocation of green (communal)space and each building's relationship to proposed internal roads, streetscapes, inter-building and intra-car park links and how the site's perimeters abut neighbouring property/land.

In general it is a fair assumption that anti-social behaviour creates unease when exhibited in residentialstreets, in public spaces and at social venues. If allowed to go un-checked, illegal (criminal) activity follows.The application of CPTED across the entire footprint is one way of preventing potential anti-social orcriminal behaviour.

5.1 Specific Anti-Social Behaviour and Crime Risks

In summary, the main risks are:

(a) street-based anti-social, intimidating and/or criminal behaviour targeting individuals or groupswithin and/or adjacent to the development;

(b) unauthorised access to the building entry points and vehicle parking zones;(c) unauthorised access to communal spaces and units;(d) unauthorised access to plant rooms, utilities infrastructure, stairwells, lifts, general and/or resident

storage spaces;(e) resultant damage to, or theft of, property and/or harm to persons targeted by individuals or groups

gaining, or attempting to gain, unauthorised access.

Our assessment is based on identifying categories or types of risks. We have not focused on levels of risk;a difficult exercise in assessing developments.

All (crime) risk assessment and management is based on the International Risk Management StandardISO 31000: 2009. In assessing specific crime risks and their treatment (mitigation), Harris has referred tothis Standard's guidelines.

5.2 Crime Risk Mitigation Through Design

Applying CPTED Principles through cost-effective design development initiatives will progress the goal ofproviding a 'welcoming and safe environment':

at each of the building's pedestrian and vehicle entry points; in basement and service areas; within communal spaces and intra-connecting pathways, and along the separating roadways streetscapes.

A welcoming and safe environment may be defined as ‘an environment where crime prevention (security)has been considered as part of master-planning, design development and construction processes andwhere the security outcomes enhance the project's overall reputation’. (Harris).



To this end, crime prevention architecture or security design becomes the desired foundational platformwhich should:

add to the development's creative form and function goals; be unobtrusive and minimalist in overall impact; consider the specific (security) needs of all user/stakeholders; be cost-effective; contribute to the neighbourhood’s security (community safety) expectations.

In crime prevention (security risk mitigation) terms, the development aims to present safe:

(a) building envelopes and intra-site circulation;(b) internal residential and retail circulation;(c) access and egress for residents and visitors;(d) defined ground level communal amenity;(e) basement vehicle access-egress;(f) access-egress for contractor vehicles, and(g) seamless connectivity with adjacent streetscapes, shopping centres, other community amenities

and with Schofields' rail-bus transport hub.

5.3 CPTED Principles

CPTED has five principles - territorial definition, natural surveillance, access control, activity support andtarget hardening (Appendix 3). Where relevant, these principles are applied to our assessment underObjective 2 of this report, particularly to ensure compliance with Council, Police and NSW Governmentrequirements.

CPTED is also referred to as designing-out-crime and/or safer-by-design, defined by Harris as ‘applyingaspects of architecture, engineering and technology to all urban development proposals as an intentionalenvironmental crime prevention strategy’.

(NOTE: Crime risks and criminal activity were once peripheral issues, they are now critical considerationsto this and almost all similar urban developments across Australia. We emphasise that every new urbandevelopment is now partly measured in terms of its reputation for personal safety (security). Thisdevelopment is no exception. Owner/occupier stakeholders must know that every effort has been made toincorporate ‘security’ into the design brief as forethought, not afterthought. It is also essential thatstakeholders accept a role in post-construction security awareness and/or management.)

6 Council’s Community-Wide Crime Risk Mitigation Goals

Council is keen to also identify and prevent (crime) risks from becoming threats or incidents in thisemerging new neighbourhood.

While other parts of Blacktown's LGA have experienced, or are experiencing, significant and often seriouscrimes in established suburbs, the objective of Council in and around Schofields and surroundingneighbourhoods, is to establish a crime prevention mindset by promoting:

(a) good urban planning,(b) innovate cost-effective crime prevention (CPTED) architecture,(c) a cooperative and collective approach to neighbourhood crime risk management, and(d) overall social cohesion and positivity through inclusion and opportunities.

The new north west rail corridor and extensive roadway construction will provide this and surroundingdevelopments with connectivity to transport hubs, shopping centres, educational facilities, sportingcomplexes, churches and other community facilities - all of which are 'attractors' to engage new(residential) communities in positive and productive individual and family pursuits. The aim of thisdevelopment is to complement, and contribute to, these initiatives.

Council’s DCP highlights particular design parameters aimed at minimising crime risks towards achievinga ‘zero tolerance’ policy against anti-social behaviour and street and neighbourhood crime within its LGA.



Council’s aim is to ensure that this policy ’roll-out’ is an integral feature of this and other proposedresidential precincts along the immediate zoned corridors.

Through its crime prevention design and management initiatives, the Council, local police, and otherstakeholders surrounding the development, are committed to accurately identifying the potential forunacceptable crime-related behaviour and reducing that potential through intentional design.

7 CPTED Focused Crime Prevention Objectives

The report’s commentary, conclusions and/or recommendations are presented:(a) around contextualanalysis, (b) the application of CPTED principles and (c) planning instrument compliance. The solutionsare grouped under three objectives.

OBJECTIVE 1 Contextual Crime Risk Identification and Mitigation

assessing the development’s physical environment in terms of anti-social behaviour,criminal activity and/or potential crime risks. (The development should positively impact oncrime risk mitigation through sound security design).

OBJECTIVE 2 Application of CPTED Principles

identifying vulnerable aspects of the development requiring specific architectural input aimedat reducing and/or preventing opportunities to commit crime;



OBJECTIVE 3 Compliance with Local and State (Planning/Policy) Instruments

ensuring compliance with the requirements of Council’s Development Control Plan, its StrategicPlan, Social Plan and Crime Prevention Plan, the NSW Police and with State planninginstrument guidelines under Section 79C of the New South Wales Environmental Planning andAssessment (EPA) Act.

8 Consultancy Outcomes

8.1 OBJECTIVE 1 Contextual Crime Risk Identification and Mitigation

This objective assesses the development’s physical environment in terms of anti-social behaviour, criminalactivity and/or potential crime risks. (The development should positively impact on crime risk mitigationthrough sound security design).

The objective therefore provides opportunity for a collaborative 'safe place - safe neighbourhood' outcome;that is, the development sets the 'tone' for a zero-tolerance of anti-social and criminal behaviour within,and adjacent to, its footprint.

The reason for this objective is to join with the Council, police, other residents and community leaders intheir collective determination to create 'model' urbanisation within this and similar sub-divisions whereby,from the outset, anti-social and criminal; behaviour are not allowed to take hold.

While the development's architecture will have a high visual impact on the overall neighbourhood, from acrime prevention perspective, that impact should 'invite' informal external neighbourhood interest.



This objective also 'flags' whether any CPTED measures need to be strengthened to counter any potentialnegative crime risk impacts on, or from, the immediate neighbourhood.

8.1.1 The New Neighbourhood Environment

Accompanying the transitioning and residential construction boom, is an accompanying boom in utilities,transport and road infrastructure. Community facilities, schools, recreational and open spaces, businessparks and shopping centres will complement the transition. These co-developments will collectively add tothe broader 'safe place' goals. Pedestrian activation will increase as more low to mid rise residential andretail developments come on line.

This development will be a major contributor to increased safe pedestrian activation and liveability.

Planning consultants and Council have observed that this and similar developments are consistent withthe growth centre and mixed housing vision for the locality. The development is in line with the desiredfuture character of Council's 'Growth Centre' vision. Therefore, this development has a design andmanagement role in ensuring a collective 'zero tolerance' of all forms of intimidating and illegal behaviour.

Planning for this locality and the broader north west region of Sydney was first reviewed by Blacktown CityCouncil in 1987. Medium density forecasts largely gave way to higher density zoning as the area has morerapidly opened up, underpinned by improved employment and public transport options.

The changing landscape and demographic of Schofields in 2017 is an outcome of that planning. Thedevelopmental roll-out over the most recent decade has taken note of some of Sydney west's earlierurbanisation which, in some cases, has tarnished some suburbs as crime 'hot spots'. Consequently, it wasoften hard to progress community stewardship goals.

The master planning of residential developments for Schofields is likely to lead to an early up-take ofcommunity ownership and/or stewardship against tolerance of be-spoiling urban newness through anti-social and criminal behaviour. This development should contribute to these ownership/stewardship goals.

8.1.2 New Developments, Old Crime Risks

The application of CPTED is only as effective as the way on-going crime risks are identified and preventedfrom getting a neighbourhood foothold. This means that CPTED in isolation will not work towards this goal.CPTED solutions must blend with CPTEM - Crime Prevention Through Environmental Management,outlined in Appendix 2. CPTEM ensures that design solutions are looked after, maintained and, perhapseven improved upon over time, for example replacing redundant surveillance cameras or further improvinglighting. CPTED and CPTEM should function as a single holistic crime prevention strategy.

In turn, these design and management solutions must merge with broader stakeholder strategies as theneighbourhood, once 'settled', exhibits signs of vulnerability to opportunistic crime. Council, existingresidential neighbourhoods, local schools and the police will be keen to prevent any 'start-up' anti-socialor criminal behaviour, including an often noticed tendency to apply graffiti to newly constructed premises.Graffiti vandalism can lead to theft from or of vehicles, new property break-ins and/or damage to site officesand/or assaults against individuals or groups.

The Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (BOCSAR) data (Appendix 1). indicates that crime rates inthe suburb of Schofields have been relatively stable over the past 5 years (March 2013 - March 2017)Hopefully, with the environment's changing demographic, that trend will not be reversed but rather willtrend downwards.

As with other recently approved developments, vehicle and pedestrian activation in particular, will generateits unique activation patterns. The Schofields transport hub will intensify day-night pedestrian movements.The challenge, from a crime prevention perspective, is to ensure that all such activation will be safe.Normalising neighbourhood activation through welcoming integrated streetscape design will increaselevels of passive surveillance. This of itself will assist in deterring anti-social and criminal behaviour.Streetscape lighting and landscaping along activation zones will add to deterrence.



8.1.3 Preventing Crime During Construction

High levels of construction can attract opportunistic criminal behaviour. Construction fencing does notalways prevent new building damage, theft of on-site equipment and theft of, or from motor vehicles. It iswidely accepted that building sites are targeted by 'specialist' offenders aware of construction securitylapses. It is therefore important for this site to be conscious of construction security, by ensuring that breachopportunity risks are minimised.

8.1.4 Neighbourhood Stakeholder Cooperation in Preventing Crime and Crime Risks

We earlier noted that the Council, local police and community leaders within the LGA are committed to a‘zero tolerance’ strategy against anti-social and criminal behaviour. A ‘roll out’ of CPTED across otherresidential developments, should attract wider interest from neighbouring businesses and residents interms of creating and maintaining a 'safe place' regime throughout the entire (Schofields) suburb.

With regard to the Schofields train and bus hub, Transport for NSW requires CPTED as part of all newstation infrastructure. An integrated approach to CPTED initiatives is therefore likely to work collectivelyacross all new residential, commercial, industrial, health, educational, retail and recreationaldevelopments.

Every new urban development within every new urban landscape is now partly measured in terms of itsreputation for personal and property safety (security). This development is no exception. Owner/occupierstakeholders must know that every effort has been made to incorporate crime prevention architecture intothe design brief as forethought, not afterthought. It is also essential that stakeholders accept a role in thecomplementary post-construction (occupancy) security awareness and/or CPTEM plan.

Conclusions

The development's context is transitioning from semi-rural to urban residential. There is no evidenceof any criminality occurring near, or in other parts of the 'new' Schofields. This development should'stamp' its intention to contribute to a stewardship model, promoting community safety in and beyondits footprint. There is nothing in the design that would compromise the community safety objective tosustain a zero-tolerance of crime.

The development's 'safe place' marketability will be sustained if the application of crime preventionarchitecture is matched by its maintenance and management through proactive resident stewardship.

As with neighbouring developments, local police, retailers and the Council will be keen to work withAdvance Street residents to continue resisting anti-social or criminal behaviour within their precinct andin the wider (Schofields) community.

Summary Objective 1

Reviewed drawings for DA submission indicate that the development's design shouldcontribute positively to the neighbourhood and wider community goal of providing a'welcoming and safe place' for incumbent residents and their visitor-guests. The overallarchitecture, including the application of CPTED principles, should 'add value' to Council'scommunity-wide crime prevention objectives.

In our view there is no evidence that the development's architecture is likely to cause orcondone any anti-social or illegal behaviour within the footprint or 'spill' into the immediateneighbourhood.



8.2 OBJECTIVE 2 Application of CPTED Principles

identifying vulnerable aspects of the development requiring specific security design input aimedat reducing and/or preventing opportunities to commit crime;



The five CPTED principles should be incorporated into private or communal spaces or zones of thedevelopment's architecture, identified as vulnerable or crime risk prone. Each principle contributes to anintegrated CPTED 'whole'. For example, effectiveness of night time natural surveillance requires acoordinated (external) lighting layout plan.

8.2.1 CPTED Principle 1 Territorial Definition - Explanation

Defining territorial boundaries and spatial separation is the foundational CPTED principle. Applying theprinciple in multi-level complexes provides activation certainty. In this multi-building complex, thearchitecture should identify public, communal and private space. Definition increases the level of legitimateaccess knowledge and alertness to unauthorised access.

Territorial Definitions - Solutions and Recommendations

Lots 1 - 4 Territorial Definitions

There is definitional similarity between the 4 lots. The built form of the 11 buildings reflects similarstreetscapes, frontages, footpaths, set-backs, perimeter styles, resident and vehicle entries and definedaccess limitations.

Each boundary (perimeter) reflects longitudinal and latitudinal legibility. Ground plane spatial separationaround perimeters define purpose. From a CPTED perspective, each building within the lots has clearlydefined residential entrances, basement entry driveways and communal spaces. Building and lotseparation is unambiguous. Access points to ground plane, lower ground and basement levels are easilyidentifiable.

The street level approaches and entrances to apartments in all buildings perpetuate perimeter clarity.There is circulation certainty along each boundary axis. All communal spaces and communal rooms areidentifiable, as are their respective entrances. There are unobstructed intra-lot visual connections due toappropriate intra-site spatial separation. Intra and inter lot sightlines are therefore significantly enhanced.

Perimeter axes are defined by low rise walls, topped by steel post fencing, behind which is hedgescreening, where design-appropriate, to provide both security and privacy to ground floor apartments. Inour view combined fencing and wall heights should be around 1500 mm. The style of fencing will provideaesthetic transparency. Drawings specify Palisade style fencing for each lot's street frontage. In thiscontext, Palisade fencing should be avoided as it tends to 'fortress' buildings. There are more decorativeoptions available to define each perimeter.

Stairs defining resident entry porches and approach corridors are clearly visible along each street andperimeter axis. Reviewed images and drawings indicate streetscape ground cover, supported by highcanopy trees, thereby promoting site-wide way-finding certainty.



Drawings for each lot define basement entrances with appropriate driveway widths and off-streetapproaches to ensure legibility. Emergency exits to the (new) road are clearly visible along that axis.Internal pathways and building corridors lead unmistakably to communal open spaces and communalrooms. Connections with apartment corridors is legible and are secured.

Utilities infrastructure, hydrant and booster pumps are defined and protected by sealed and secured plantrooms. This minimises and/or eliminates any likelihood of intentional or unintentional damage. Warningand way-finding signage will indicate authorised contractor and emergency personnel access points.

There is a consistency in defining basement entry and exit ramps. Basement apartment storage zones areclearly drawn, although their security may require 'target hardening' - Refer Principle 5.

Landscaping, lighting and signage (CPTED Principle 4) will enhance day-night site-wide definitional clarity.

From a crime prevention perspective, definitional clarity and precinct separation maximises causalconnectivity and precinct control. The (definitional) architecture minimises confusion, thereby maximisingpurposeful and legible activation. This in turn sensitises residents to one or more persons (or vehicles)aimlessly loitering, whether suspicious or not.

8.2.2 CPTED Principle 2 Observation and Natural Surveillance - Explanation

The principle of natural (informal or casual) surveillance encourages (i) the observation of building formand (ii) the observation and notation of activation function. Natural surveillance is purposeful observation.It is observation that unobtrusively notes and recognises the usual, so that the unusual may be more easilyrecognisable.

Observation and Natural Surveillance - Solutions and Recommendations

Given the definitional certainly of the four lots and the layout of connecting streets, observation aroundlots, internally between buildings and within communal spaces, maximises sight lines, thereby enhancingintentional surveillance opportunities.

The development will contribute to day-night new circulation and activation flows, obviously within the site,but also in the neighbourhood, and along the street corridors leading to the transport hub and retail outlets.In time community amenity will generate even more informal activation. The purpose of surveillance inthese circumstances for residents and non-residents is to observe the 'usual' while becoming alert to theunusual, in terms of noting, recording or reporting suspicious anti-social or crime-related behaviour.

8.2.2.1 Building and Street Axes-Entries

Ground plane observation (surveillance) opportunities by residents moving to and from apartmententrances are enhanced by multi-angle visibility and legibility. Clearly defined building perimeters promotethese opportunities. Drawings indicate no observational encumbrances or concealment 'traps' along anybuilding axes. Where stairs indicate above ground entry to apartment foyers or communal spaces, thereviewed images indicate no obstructive landscaping. The fencing and hedging along all (new) streetsappear as neat, dense foliage which should prevent concealment.

There is ample opportunity to observe residents, visitors or contractors approaching each building'sentrance. There are no landscaping or other obstructions at, and along, the off-street corridors leading tothe apartment lobbies. There is potential entrapment, or the perception of it, when approaching theapartment entry doors, particularly corridors more than a few metres in length.

Depending on design detail of main all main pre-entry corridors, consideration could be given to locatingan aesthetically acceptable mirror on one or both sides of the entry door, whereby residents and visitorscould observe any persons following. While this may seem an extreme suggestion, it would not only providereverse-vision certainty, but would also alert any person following 'with intent'. Ideally, entry doors should



be of structural glass, or if solid (timber), they should have full or partial length structural glass panels oneither side to promote sight line certainty when exiting the lobbies.

8.2.2.2 Communal Spaces: Shared communal open spaces are appropriately secured and furnished forinformal social gatherings. Each (space) demonstrates appropriate ground plane surveillance at theentrances and within the spaces themselves. Each lot either shares, as in the case of Lot 1(Building A), orhas its own designated space(s).

From a CPTED perspective all communal spaces are easily observable from space-facing ground andupper level windows and/or balconies. While these spaces are secured by design, it is critical that, in theevent of unforeseen unauthorised access, all landscaping should maximise observational capability in andaround each space.

8.2.2.3 Basement Surveillance: Basement layouts for all buildings follow a safe (secure) entry andparking pattern. There are appropriate surveillance opportunities within the shared basement levels to viewparking and parked vehicles along the internal ramp. Support columns will limit some sight lines and some'target hardening' through camera surveillance is recommended (Principle 5).

Resident storage zones appear to have their own entry doors and corridors. If this is common to allbasement storage, then we recommend that all storage entry doors be lockable and have eye-level panelsfitted to enable observation (surveillance) on either side of those doors.

Basement layouts vary. Some cross-axes (multi-angle) sightlines are 'interrupted' by layout designpracticalities. Sightlines to and from lift cores and stairs is limited by the same practicalities. For this reason,we would recommend installation of IP Network (CCTV) cameras as an added precaution and to possiblyadditional confidence, when navigating comparatively large spaces, particularly for visitors, unfamiliar withlift core locations.

8.2.3 CPTED Principle 3 Access Control - Explanation

Access control is linked to the surveillance principle. For example, there is a requirement to ensure that allaccess points (a) can be approached with visual certainty and (b) are not likely to cause entrapment.

Access Control - Solutions and Recommendations

We believe that access control to all apartment entrances, communal areas and basements is evidentthrough the DA drawings. The design development-design intention is to ensure that appropriate securityaccess systems will be specified.

8.2.3.1 Residential Entries, Terraces and Foyer Corridors: Approach (external) corridors are ofappropriate design width and provide adequate sight-lines to main apartment entry doors from the street.

Off-street apartment entry into each building is controlled electronically by residents. All visitors (guestsand contractors) should be audio-video intercom identified twice; once at the entry porch, followed by apre-apartment 'check'. We recommend that the systems feature separate wide angle surveillance IPnetwork cameras to enable clear 'contextual' identification.

Internally, apartment corridors and access-egress to communal or separating green spaces are fob/cardcontrolled. All lifts will be electronically access controlled.

There are no CPTED issues with regard to typical apartment designs. Balconies are balustraded toappropriate building code heights.

Ground level apartments are vulnerable to unauthorised entry, despite the fencing, landscaping and walltreatment. Whether street-facing or not, ground level terraces and courtyards should have security-ratedscreen doors as a precaution. (see also Principle 5).



8.2.3.2 Basement Access: Each shared basement has electronically controlled access-egress viatransparent (perforated) roller doors. There are no additional design measures required followingbasement entry. We understand that all vehicles, including visitors and contractors, will be identified and'cleared' for basement access.

There is street level visual clarity to entry ramps. Basement entry, internal ramps and parking bays followa 'standard' layout. There are designated and appropriately located spaces for visitor parking, loading,garbage bin and general waste storage.

Each basement has appropriate bays for disabled and bicycle parking and, from a crime risk perspective,they are all located close to lift lobbies.

Apartment storage is located behind parking bays, mostly un-sighted. Although basement vehicle accessis controlled, it is important to design out potential entrapment spaces in and around these storage areas.We recommend that access to storage corridors have lockable doors fitted with eye-level glass panels, toprovide additional security confidence against potential entrapment.

Where bicycle storage requires corridor access, we recommend similar doors be specified. All waste, binstorage and plant rooms are secured. Loading and collection points pose no crime risks. Drawings indicatethese spaces have restricted security access and will be appropriately signed as to their restricted accesspurpose.

8.2.3.3 Communal and Building Separation Spaces: All communal spaces are only accessibleinternally. There are no foreseeable (potential crime) risks to any of these spaces. Plan views and elevationimages indicate inviting communal and building separation green 'pockets' for resident and visitor socialamenity. As mentioned in Principle 2, there are adequate at-ground and upper level surveillanceopportunities across all lots. The likelihood of unauthorised access to these spaces is remote.

8.2.4 CPTED Principle 4 Activity Support - Explanation

Activity support architecture relates to the design and location/installation of external lighting, landscapingand signage. They are mutually complementary strategies. They 'support' territorial definition, surveillanceand access control design.

Lighting should reflect a consistency in terms of luminarie styles, lighting types, colour consistency andpurpose. CPTED applies to way-finding, decorative and destination lighting.

Landscaping should combine aesthetics and purpose with an added intent to prevent opportunities forconcealment or entrapment.

There are five types of signage to complement other CPTED initiatives - way-finding, destination, accesslimiting (controlling), warning and emergency.

Activity Support - Solutions and Recommendations

Note: There are similar crime prevention design solutions between this development and the Toplacedevelopment at 14 Schofields Road. Principles 4 and 5 in this report reflect the same solutions andrecommendations. We recommend that the advice provided in both principles be the subject of designdevelopment-detail implementation.

8.2.4.1 External and Internal (Way-Finding) Lighting: We are generally concerned that external lightingdesign and layout can become compromised in terms of CPTED's goal. For example, lighting engineersmay specify a P3 or 4 category (from the pathway Standard) when a P2 layout is required.

From a CPTED perspective, ground plane external lighting for this development should be seen as a'model', one that could be replicated in other Toplace developments.



As a fundamental first step, to promote the CPTED goal, design and layout should exhibit coordinatedconsistency, to maximise site-wide way-finding certainty. All way-finding lighting should specify recessedoverhead luminaires. Basement lighting should have similar overhead design specifications.

Site-wide external lighting has both a way-finding and a destination function. Lighting along internalpathways leading to communal or other external circulation spaces should throw a higher lux level thanlighting designed for the communal spaces themselves - destination lighting.

There will be differences in lighting within each of the four lots. Distance variations from apartment corridorsor entrances to communal spaces, for example, may require additional luminaires. Even though residentswill be familiar with internal pathways and communal space locations, there is always a risk that one ormore intruders could breach the perimeters with an intent to cause damage or harm. Hence the need tothink carefully about ways to 'detect and deter' should this happen.

Active communal (destination) spaces should also feature overhead fixtures. Night-time social gatheringwill be a (summer) feature of the development and, from a CPTED perspective, sightline certainty in thesespaces should be guaranteed.

We recommend overhead lighting to reduce the likelihood of glare and dark spaces along buildingpathways, around residential and basement entry ramps and within basements. Each lot's street and intraconnectors, building separation pathways and communal open spaces, should have lighting colourconsistency.

Our preference is a white-light spectrum of LEDs (between 4000 and 5000 Kelvin). The white lightspectrum has advantages over blue, orange or yellow colour output. From a crime prevention perspective,yellow, orange and blue renditions distort natural colour profiles and features. White light installationsstrengthen contrasting colours and identify individual (personal) features more distinctly.

We further recommend overhead, under-eave and/or 'down' lighting, specifically at residential entrances,emergency exists, throughout all basements and interconnecting pathways and, where appropriate,building facades.

The use of bollard and wall-mounted lighting is not recommended as way-finding or decorative solutions.They are prone to vandalism (even within secure areas), they provide limited lighting throw and spill, evenat ground level causing contrast problems, they can cause glare and can become hidden with maturinglandscaping. Wall-mounted lighting is also prone to glare-restricting way-finding.

We acknowledge that too much (external and basement) lighting is counterproductive and can become aprivacy 'invasion' issue. However, the intent is to recommend a 'no dark gaps' policy.

To reiterate, the intention here is to light ‘welcoming and safe places’, achieving both – a welcoming andcreatively lit environment and one that is simultaneously lit for safety (security). ‘Welcoming and safe place’gives way-finding and destination confidence.

The ‘throw’ of light should be directional and focussed to maximise way-finding and destination certainty.Lighting spill beyond the intended general or task lighting target may prove helpful in lighting pathwayedges or adjacent-to-destination spaces. There will also be opportunity to decoratively ‘wash’ buildingfacades. Consideration should be given to a ‘dimming’ capacity for relevant external lighting layouts.

8.2.4.2 Basement Lighting: Basement lighting should cover all areas, vehicle and bicycle bays, residents'and general storage areas, plant room and garbage doorways, loading areas and ramps. We do notrecommend movement-activated lighting, nor dimming in basements. Each (basement) lift lobby areashould feature additional lux levels to ensure access and way-finding clarity, especially for visitors andcontractors.

The mix of basement driveway lighting and street lighting could cause 'colour confusion'. At the very least,driveway entrance lighting should highlight the entry roller door and the space immediately on either sideof the door. Ideally, street and basement entry lighting should be mutually consistent. It is thereforeimportant that lux level and colour rendition be consistent along each of the proposed streets and theirfootpaths.



8.2.4.3 Landscaping: The intended landscaping will 'soften' each buildings physical connection with each(new) road's footpaths and should safely 'invite' intra-site and inter-lot movement, including the communalzones. Detailed landscape plans are being finalised but we note from the supplied images, the mix ofgrasses, ground and deep soil plantings.

From a CPTED perspective, it is important that any tree under-canopy not restrict surveillance. It is alsoimportant that mature deep plantings not overhang balconies or terraced areas. There is sufficientevidence of how easily' tree climbing' can facilitate unauthorised access to upper level apartments.

8.2.4.4 Signage: As with lighting, there should be a coordinated signage sub plan. Way-finding ordirectional signs are the site's welcoming and reassuring ‘guidance systems’. They invite safe destinationaccess.

Destination signs (eg for emergency muster points) through and around the site will complement way-finding signage. They are points of identification when there is any sense (perception) of danger oremergency. Destination signage should be part of a whole-of-site way-finding continuum.

Access limiting or controlling signage is appropriate to indicate restricted spaces within each lot, separationbetween the buildings and within each of the basements. They also indicate restricted access to plant andutilities infrastructure. They may ‘advise’ or they may bluntly indicate.

Warning signs are self-explanatory. They are an ‘escalation’ of access limiting signage. This developmentshould consider international 'pictogram' warning signage.

Emergency (including fire and exit) signage is subject to codified compliance. In addition to codified signs,consideration should be given to locating a series of ‘help’ or assistance signs in the more distant and/orvulnerable spaces with each basement.

8.2.5 CPTED Principle 5 Target Hardening - Explanation

Target hardening is often seen as 'situational' crime prevention. CPTED measures specific risks related tovulnerable physical space. Target hardening design is then applied to reduce risks and vulnerability. Themeasures aim to increase the efforts that ‘offenders’ must expend in their intent to damage property and/orharm or injure people going about legitimate activity.

Measures are often directed at denying or limiting access through the use of more intentional and lesssubtle resistance mechanisms including physical barriers such as security fencing, gates, and locks,electronic alarms, bollards and IP Network (CCTV) surveillance. However, the principle's design goal is toavoid ‘fortressing’.

Target Hardening - Solutions and Recommendations

Note: There are similar crime prevention design solutions between this development and the Toplacedevelopment at 14 Schofields Road. Principles 4 and 5 in this report reflect the same solutions andrecommendations. We recommend that the advice provided in both principles be the subject of designdevelopment-detail implementation.

8.2.5.1 IP Network Camera Surveillance: IP Network camera surveillance is not recommended for eachperimeter orientation. However, we are recommending, or at least advising, the installation of cameras:(a) at the apartment entry (external) corridors and (b) targeting certain basement areas.

With regard to (b), camera installations are recommended for each entry ramp, at the vehicle and bicycleparking bays, along internal ramps, at disabled zones, at lift entrances, loading, and plant room entrances.

Consideration should also be given to locating cameras in the more vulnerable areas, for example focusingon mail boxes and apartment storage or un-sighted bicycle parking spaces.



8.2.5.2 External Building Facades: The ground (street) level facades are the most vulnerable to graffitidamage. While there is a risk of damage to these surfaces, it is less likely with the expected high levels ofpedestrian activation. However, to prevent graffiti and other building damage from non glazed surfaces,vandal resistant coatings should be specified around the relevant perimeter fixtures and finishes. In part,the inclusion of ‘green wall’ landscaping should neutralise the opportunity for graffiti defacing.

8.2.5.3 Mail Boxes: The Crime Prevention Officers at Quakers Hill LAC rightly point out that mailtampering and theft are more likely when boxes are 'grouped' at entrances to residential apartmentdevelopments. They have previously recommended that mailboxes, particularly in large clusters, belocated either inside each ground plane entry foyer, or close to the entry approach.

On receiving advice that Australia Post delivery staff would not conduct mail box drops inside apartmentpremises, we began researching further. Our rationale relates to the increasing risk of mail box tamperingwith the intent of stealing the contents in order to fraudulently duplicate and use a person's identity. In ouropinion, and that of the police, identity theft is becoming a 'crime of choice' in criminal circles. Mail boxtampering, especially in apartment developments, is becoming all too common.

Recently we received further advice from the Quakers Hill Crime Prevention Officers. It is referenced asAppendix 2. The advice has been forwarded to the Council for their consideration. We recommend thatthe police advice be seriously considered and that mail boxes for this development be secured either withinfoyers or under-cover adjacent to or within the residential approach corridors.

8.2.5.4 Unauthorised Balcony Access: It is important to prevent intruders from entering ground level orupper level balconies. Apart from preventative landscaping measures (refer Principle 4), we recommendthe installation of security rated screen doors, and if vulnerable, security rated screen and or window locksfor ground, first, and second levels. From our experience we have encountered evidence of intruders easilyaccessing ground and upper level balconies through non-security rated screen doors and windows.

8.2.5.5 General Storage, Waste Storage and Waste Removal: We have noted (Principle 3) thecontrolled access to all storage areas. Waste storage and garbage rooms should be ‘ordered’ and keptfree of clutter. In addition, consideration should be given to specifying eye-level viewing panels to storageand bin holding rooms.

Fire detection and suppression systems would generally cover these basement spaces, however werecommend that sprinklers and smoke alarms be installed in garbage and general storage rooms as, inour experience, waste bins can be accidentally or deliberately set alight.

8.2.5.6 Lifts, Lift Lobbies, Stairwells and Emergency Exits: Lifts and lift lobbies at ground level foyersand within each basement are appropriately located to maximise passive surveillance from parking spacesand internal ramps. We note the basement lobbies are 'open' (not secure); hence our recommendation forsurveillance camera installations, focusing on the basement lift and stair cores.

The positioning of stairwells and exit points present no obvious security risks. We do emphasise thatfire/emergency exits should be electronically locked with emergency egress capabilities, meeting BCA andfire regulations. All fire exit doors should be under camera surveillance.

8.2.5.7 Plant Rooms and Utilities Infrastructure: We note the secure location and screening of utilitiesinfrastructure throughout each basement. 'Authorised access only' signage will define access limitationswithin basement zones for electricity supply, water, fire, sewage and booster pumps. We are advised thatthere will be no externally visible pumps, pipes or meters which might otherwise be subject to unauthorisedtampering.

We recommended camera installations for all plant room and utilities infrastructure zones We do so assome utilities are seen as (criminal) target opportunities and it is advisable to take this extra precautioneven though access is controlled.



Conclusions

In our opinion, the 4 sub-divided lots and the 11 buildings have been designed (drawn) with whole-of-site personal and property safety (security) in mind. We have reviewed each of the CPTED-relevantdesign elements and have concluded:

(a) the built form defines each building's space, the entrances to that space, and each lot’s design‘purpose’ characteristics. (Definitional clarity and circulation certainty is a fundamental CPTEDPrinciple);

(b) that, within the spatial definitions and spatial separation, there are ample opportunities to observe(passive surveillance) vehicle and pedestrian circulation within the proposed internal roads, alongpathways, along building axes and within communal zones;

(c) there is definitional and access control clarity throughout the development;(d) design detail should reflect the role of external lighting, perimeter, street edge and communal zone

and appropriate signage to provide way-finding and social gathering certainty for residents, visitorsand contractors;

(e) that two target-hardening measures be agreed to; specifically the installation of IP Network (CCTV)surveillance cameras and the appropriate strengthening and weather-proofing of mail boxes.

Drawings, to be submitted for DA approval and throughout the design development-detail stage, reflectarchitectural understanding and application of CPTED principles as addressed in the specifics ofObjective 2.

Summary Objective 2

In our opinion, drawings indicate an appropriate inter and intra-relationship of the built formarchitecture whereby each CPTED principle is to be applied holistically to achieve safe (secure)liveability.

Building and communal space architecture appropriately defines, separates and secures eachlot. Issues regarding the safety of residents at some street-level entry points and potentialentrapment concerns with basement storage, need resolution through design detail. Overall, thearchitecture reflects intentional and successful application of CPTED principles.

It is important that the developers follow through on the DA drawings to ensure application ofCPTED principles are incorporated into design development-detail in order to maximise'welcoming and safe place' goals.

8.3 OBJECTIVE 3 Compliance with Local and State Planning Instruments

ensuring compliance with the requirements of Council’s Development Control Plan, itsStrategic Plan, Social Plan and Crime Prevention Plan, the NSW Police and with Stateplanning instrument guidelines under Section 79C of the New South Wales EnvironmentalPlanning and Assessment (EPA) Act.

8.3.1 Compliance Rationale

Almost 16 years ago, the NSW Government adopted new regulations within Section 79C of theEnvironmental Planning and Assessment (EPA) Act, 1979. The regulations sought to incorporate safer-by-design strategies, formalised by the globally recognised CPTED framework (platform), to applyarchitectural solutions to the prevention of crime.



Subsequently, throughout Australia, state and local governments have adopted versions of thoseregulations and their intent, including a requirement for safer-by-design (CPTED) assessments as part ofmajor urban developments. Councils in NSW have mostly structured these requirements as part of DCPsand/or as part of their local crime prevention plans.

The NSW EPA Act, allows for provision to be made for instruments to regulate or codify issues pertainingto environmental impacts of (normally) large scale and modest developments. Security (crime prevention)is one of the “impacts” allowed for.

In NSW, councils, the NSW Police and the Department of Planning and Environment all request urbandevelopers to realise the value of appropriate CPTED architecture as a crime reducing and/or preventingstrategy within residential and mixed-use developments. There is an emphasis on the safety (security) ofpublic domain precincts associated with such developments.

Therefore, in this instance, compliance with policy and planning instruments is critical to setting andmeeting 'safe environment' standards. Specifically, the development should comply with the requirementsof local and State planning instruments and/or policies, set by the three agencies; Blacktown City Council,the NSW Police and the NSW Department of Planning and Environment. Compliance relates to:

the understanding by Toplace and Krikis Tayler of the purposes and value of CPTED; how, and where relevant, CPTED has been applied to each building, communal spaces,

basement parking and associated intra-site architecture.

Relevant instruments/policies are:

Blacktown City Council: Development Control Plan 2015, the Crime Prevention Plan 2014 -2017, The Social Plan 2012+ and the Blacktown City Strategic Plan;

NSW Police: Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Checklist; NSW Department of Planning and Environment: Environmental Planning and Assessment Act.

Council and the Local Area (Police) Command have requested Toplace to comply with Council's DCP and,by implication, its Crime Prevention Plan 2014 -2017. Council has also requested that the development'sarchitecture be assessed against the NSW Police CPTED Checklist.

The Department of Planning and Environment has issued (regulatory) Guidelines in relation to Section79C (1) (e) of the EPA Act, 1979 (as amended), including CPTED or similar safer-by-design initiativeswithin that Section, Clause and Paragraph. The Guidelines are broad and are open to interpretation by thedeveloper. However, the compliance aspect still applies. This development falls within those (broad)compliance requirements.

Of particular concerns to Council and the NSW Police are architectural (CPTED) aspects that focus on:

the location and connectivity of buildings aimed at maximising passive surveillance, especially inrelation to streetscape observation and opportunities for surveillance into and around publicspaces;

external lighting patterns, signage and landscaping; vehicle parking; access and egress points; design of public and/or communal spaces.

Our assessment of these and other CPTED-related issues are covered in Objective 2.

We point out that (CPTED) compliance is not legislatively compulsory. There are no compelling nationalcodes or standards of practice underpinning designing out crime. There is however state-by-statelegislation and/or guidelines and local authorities (city and shire councils) are able to direct certaindevelopments to consider CPTED within crime prevention and or DCP guidelines.



8.3.2 Blacktown City Council

Blacktown City Council is keen to promote crime prevention (community safety) through two instruments -its Development Control Plan 2015 (DCP) and its Crime Prevention Plan 2014-2017 (CPP). The City'sexpanding and changing demographic compels it to ensure new residents, businesses, institutions andcommunity facilities are seen as 'safe places'. Section 8.4 of the DCP Part A outlines how crime risks canbe reduced through good design.

The CPP concentrates on the management of crime risks and anti-social behaviour in all public spacesand within the private domains of residents, visitors and business people living and working within Council'sboundaries.

Council's Social Plan (2012+) promotes safe social development and inclusion. ‘Council's Blacktown CityStrategic Plan 2036’ is clear about the need to continue to strive for 'community safety', particularly bytargeting graffiti and property damage.

Section 8.4 of Council's DCP outlines its development compliance rationale:

"Council has a responsibility to ensure that development provides safety and security to users and thecommunity. In order to create a safe and defensible environment, Council will have particular regard todesign aspects of all forms of development when assessing applications. Major Development Applicationsmay require the submission of a Crime Safety / Prevention Audit prior to the determination of theapplication. This Crime Safety / Prevention Audit may also be referred to the NSW Police Service fordetailed review and assessment.

8.3.3 NSW Police

Local Area Commands throughout New South Wales have designated Crime Prevention Officers, trainedto assist developers to apply deigning-out-crime architecture as a crime risk mitigation strategy. There isa Police CPTED checklist which the development might wish to review for self-assessment. The Checklistis a reference for this report.

The Checklist is explicit, spelling out the particular form features that consider the practical application ofCPTED principles. The list is all inclusive and complements Council's requirements. There are also mattersrelating to CCTV surveillance, territorial definition, signage, physical security, lighting and landscapingparticularly in public domain areas and streetscapes.

The Checklist particularly stress the importance of (day-night) passive (natural or informal) surveillance.We have noted in Objective 2 that there has been architectural intention to address issues in the Checklist.

The (Quakers Hill) Local Area Command officers are particularly concerned about the increasing level ofmail tampering via unauthorised mail box access. This is an important Checklist item (Refer Principle 5 -Objective 2)

8.3.4 NSW Department of Planning and Environment

The EPA Act Guidelines in relation to Section 79C (1) (e), including CPTED or similarly named safer-by-design or designing-out-crime initiatives. This development falls within those requirements.

Section 79C (1) states: “In determining a development application, a consent authority is to take intoconsideration such of the following matters as are of relevance to the development, the subject of thedevelopment application”.

Section 79 (1) (b) adds: “…the likely impacts of that development, including environmental impacts on boththe natural and built environments, and social and economic impacts in the locality”.Section 79 (1) (e) adds: “…the public interest”.

The Guidelines require Council's and developers to consider how CPTED might be applied - in this caseto 30 - 32 Advance Street..."in the public interest".



The 2001 amendments to the Guidelines for this Section state: “…Crime prevention falls under thesesubsections of 79C. Councils have an obligation to ensure that a development provides safety and securityto users and the community. If a development presents a crime risk, these guidelines can be used to justify:

modification of the development to minimise the risk of crime, or refusal of the development on the grounds that crime risk cannot be appropriately minimised”.

The "public interest” is to reduce and/or prevent anti-social or criminal behaviour within the developmentfootprint that might cause or contribute to, anti-social or illegal behaviour causing property damage or harmto any person accessing the site. With CPTED in mind, the Act and its Guidelines look to crime preventionarchitecture to advance the public interest (residents, visitors, contractors) to reduce and prevent crimewithin the footprint.

There is an argument which extends the "public interest" to anti-social and criminal behaviour occurring ator immediately adjacent to, the site boundaries, for example along each of the streetscapes and along the(internal) public roads. However, strictly speaking, the developer has no responsibility for such behaviour.

Council's DCP, its Crime Prevention Plan and the guidelines/check list developed by the NSW Police areall derivatives of "the public interest" clause.

Conclusions

CPTED compliance is an important part of the developer's obligations, especially compliance withCouncil's DCP and the NSW Police. Both stakeholders are concerned to create and sustain a 'new'suburb (community) where personal and property safety (security) are fundamental givens.

Council, the NSW Police and the NSW Department of Planning and Environment, all require similardesign processes and outcomes; that is the application of CPTED principles, where relevant, tointentionally contribute to the above 'givens'. In crime prevention terms, the development's architectureis required to design out opportunities for anti-social and illegal behaviour across the site. This in turncontributes to the intolerance of crime within the site and within the community.

We are confident that the developer has considered these compliance obligations and we affirmcompliance, or intent to comply, on the understanding that design development-detail and constructioncertificate documentation will reflect attention to specific recommendations outlined in Objective 2 ofour Report.

Summary Objective 3

Drawings and documentation provided for this Report have been reviewed to ensure an holisticcompliance with the relevant State and local planning and crime prevention authorities.

We ar Specifically, our view is that Toplace has taken a the matter of anti-social and criminal activityseriously with a view to maximising design-instigated compliance with the legislative,regulatory, policy and/or planning instruments of Blacktown City Council, the NSW Police andthe NSW Department of Planning and Environment.

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9 References

Blacktown City Council, Crime Prevention Plan, 2014 - 2017

Blacktown City Council, Development Control Plan (2015)

Blacktown City Council, Social Plan (2012+)

Blacktown City Council, Strategic Plan 2036

Crowe T, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Second Ed, Butterworth-Heineman, Boston,2003

Krikis Tayler Architects Drawings and Revisions for 30 - 32 Advance Street Schofields, (various dates): DAApartment Schedule, Drawings DA 001, 002, 003, DA 10, 11, 12. DA 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, DA33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, DA 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47; and 3D Images V1 to V11

New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, Crime Statistics for the suburb of SchofieldsNSW, 2012 - 2017

NSW Department of Urban Affairs and Planning, Crime Prevention and the Assessment of DevelopmentApplications: Guidelines under Section 79C of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act, 1979,April2001

NSW Police Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Checklist

NSW Police, Quakers Hill Local Area Command, Advice regarding mail box tampering andrecommendations

Risk Management Standard - AS/NZS ISO 31000, 2013

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Appendix 1 Crime Statistics for Schofields (Suburb)

It has not been possible to obtain police or other evidence concerning actual levels of criminality withinSchofields. However, the crime statistics below from the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research(BOCSAR) are indicative of reported criminal activity.

5 Year Trend toMarch 2017

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Yearto

Mar2017Rate

Homicide n.c. 0 0 0 0 1 24.6 0 0 1 23Assault - domestic n.c. 11 276.2 12 297.7 11 268.5 25 574.2 27 620.1Assault - non Domestic n.c. 12 301 9 222.5 9 217.8 7 160.8 11 252.6Sexual assault n.c. 1 25.2 4 99.5 2 49.1 2 45.9 2 45.9Indecent assault, act ofindecency and othersexual offences n.c. 1 25.2 5 124.3 4 96.6 1 23 4 91.9Robbery without weapon n.c. 0 0 1 24.9 1 24.6 0 0 0 0Robbery with a firearm n.c. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Robbery with weapon nota firearm n.c. 0 0 0 0 1 24.6 0 0 0 0Harassment, threateningbehaviour & privatenuisance n.c. 12 302 15 372.3 8 196.5 12 275.6 29 666.1Other offences againstthe person n.c. 1 24.9 0 0 1 23 0 0 0 0Break & enter dwelling n.c. 10 252 13 322.3 16 383.4 30 689 54 1240Break & enter nondwelling n.c. 9 225.4 9 223.5 21 506.2 13 298.6 17 390.4Motor vehicle theft n.c. 7 176.4 12 297.4 9 217.8 18 413.4 16 367.5Steal from motor vehicle stable 23 576.8 23 570.3 40 964.8 43 987.6 32 735Steal from retail Store n.c. 0 0 0 0 6 144.2 2 45.9 11 252.6Steal from dwelling n.c. 7 175.7 11 272.3 28 674.9 27 620.1 39 895.7Steal from person n.c. 1 24.9 2 49.7 0 0 0 0 0 0Liquor offences n.c. 0 0 0 0 1 23 1 23 0 0Disorderly conduct n.c. 6 150.8 5 124 3 72.1 1 23 2 45.9Drug offences n.c. 5 125.6 13 321.1 9 219.4 16 367.5 11 252.6Malicious damage toproperty stable 31 778.1 35 868.7 36 871.4 39 895.7 42 964.6Prohibited and regulatedweapons offences n.c. 1 25.2 8 198 4 96.6 6 137.8 4 91.9Arson n.c. 4 100.8 4 98.5 3 73.7 7 160.8 2 45.9

NSW Crime Statistics April 2012 to March 2017 Schofields (Suburb)



Appendix 2 High Density (Apartment) Mail Box Tampering andDelivery Advice from Australia Post

The following commentary by the Crime Prevention Office Quakers Hill Local Area Command, supportsthe relocation of mail boxes to minimise tampering.

“In September 2017, Senior Constable Sue Carter received a Crime Risk and Crime Prevention Reportprepared by Harris Crime Prevention Services (in relation to 14 Schofields Road...Harris clarificationadded). This document has been perused and Police still raise a number of concerns and stronglyrecommend CPTED treatments that are now listed below.

With Identity theft on the rise as organised gangs stealing mail from mail boxes throughout the countryfraud is of a major concern to the Police and community. The Quakers Hill Local Area Command hasrecently experienced this type of crime and police predict that this offence will increase with time if changesare not made to our mail collection points, for example mail boxes.

With large developments being proposed in our LAC, it is anticipated that thousands of mailboxes will lineour streets. Mail Theft will be at its highest in this command. Well designed buildings and education willassist to prevent this type of crime.

Advisory ConditionIt is strongly recommended by NSW Police that the Applicant liaise with Australia Post in relation to mailboxrequirements in the first instance. Mailbox facilities should be installed within the foyer of the building oralong the façade wall of the foyer (front wall of building). Arrangements can be made to purchase a keysafe to facilitate access by Australia Post.

• o Australia Post (Nepean Delivery Facility) – (02) 4729 8600

• o Australia Post (Seven Hills Delivery Facility) – (02) 9674 4027

Police regularly liaise with Australia Post and as a result of this consultation it is strongly recommend thefollowing two options in relation to the placement of mailbox facilities to prevent mail theft and identityfraud:

1. If the entrance to the building is within line of sight of the postal vehicle, mailbox facilities shouldbe built into the external lobby wall or the front glass sections of a lockable unit foyer as per thefollowing photo. This only allows residents with key pad/swipe card entry access into their foyerto access their lockable mail box facility.

2. If the entrance to the building is within line of sight of the postal vehicle, the mailbox facilitiesshould be located in a single group of mail boxes within the secured foyer of the building. For thisoption, Australia Post utilises any one of the following lock systems:

Cyber Lock Box - postal worker holds Cyber key to accessCyber Lock box for swipe card/FOB key into foyer



Keypad Code - Australia Post to be provided with code or fob key for entry into each secured foyer.

Australia Post employees can use wide private pathways between unit blocks, if safe to do so, to deliverthe mail to unit foyers.

Australia Post asks that the Applicant contact them at the Nepean Delivery Facility (Allen Britten) on47298600 to discuss all new mailbox placements to ensure their requirements are met.

Prior to Construction CertificateIt is strongly recommended by NSW Police that prior to the release of the Construction Certificate theApplicant provide a detailed report outlining the following security and or crime prevention measures.

a) The mail box facilities must be located inside the building foyer or secure mailboxes are to befixed along the facade wall of the foyer of each block (i.e. similar to PO boxes where the mailbox isorientated outwards and is opened from inside the foyer).

If this measure is not adhered to an explanation is required.

b) The location and number of CCTV cameras, which shall be installed around the site is required. CCTVcameras must be provided within all communal areas/playgrounds, car park facilities, stairways, lifts,foyers, and entry/exit points, loading bays, the waste room and over mailbox facilities.

c) The application of permanent graffiti resistant coating on all materials along the ground level of thebuilding around the perimeter of the site.

d) Building identification (street number, block number) which shall be provided near the entry of thebuilding and visible from the street to facilitate easy identification of the site for emergency services.

e) Palisade fencing around the site where appropriate, will prevent unauthorised access. All access pointsinto the site and to common areas shall be secured through the use of gates, roller doors or similar andfitted with a security mechanism (i.e. swipe card keys etc to restrict access to authorised persons only).

f) NSW Police strongly recommend that each vehicle garage facility space to be separated by steelwelded mesh fencing, floor to ceiling and annotated on the plans. Each individual roller shutterdoor is to be a ‘tilta’ door with the security bolt locks in place. The contents inside each vehiclegarage facility will not be visible from outside.

g) Basement car park facilities should be well lit, ceiling painted white and have CCTV coverage.

h) Each vehicle garage facility must have a lockable ‘tilta’ roller shutter security door, in a well-litarea with CCTV coverage.

i) A central security panel lift door must be installed at the entrance of the basement parking level. Thisshould be nominated on the plans prior to the release of the Construction Certificate Stage.

j) Security steel welded mesh fencing from floor to ceiling must be installed separating visitors’ parkingfrom residents.

k) A security plan is to be provided prior to the release of the Construction Certificate Stage. This planshould show the location, type and number of CCTV systems per block. The areas that should include;

Cyberlock Cylinder - Tube design goes into wall so cannot be jemmiedout and opened and contains FOB key that Australia Post employeescan access to gain entry into the foyers



Building foyer, Mailbox Facility, Building entry and exit points, Basement car park including bikestorage area, lifts common, areas and waste rooms

During Constructiona) Throughout the length of the construction works, the site is to be appropriately secured to preventunauthorised access.

b) Security Patrols and CCTV Surveillance Systems are to be temporarily installed during this phase.

c) Construction periods are to reflect the hours of proposed works.

d) Traffic Management plan is to be adhered to during construction.

Prior to Occupation CertificateIt is strongly recommended by NSW Police, that prior to the release of the Occupation Certificate theapplicant provide a detailed report outlining the following security and or crime prevention measures.

a) A security plan is to be provided prior to the release of the Construction Certificate Stage. This planshould show the location, type and number of CCTV systems per block. The areas that should include;

Building foyer, Mailbox Facility, Building entry and exit points, Basement car park including bikestorage area, lifts common, areas and waste rooms

b) Back-of-room facilities / A steel strong room is to be accessed via a secured locking system. No publicaccess is to be available to this area. This room could be where the Building Site Manager operates fromand is also the CCTV Systems Storage room.

c) Installation of all required CCTV around the site. Cameras shall monitor common areas/playgrounds,car park facilities, stairways, lifts, foyers, and entry/exit points, loading bays, the waste room and mailboxfacilities. Appropriate signage shall be installed at the site to notify occupants and visitors that CCTVcameras are present.

d) All lighting details shown on the submitted lighting plan shall be installed at the site. This includes lightingaround all entry/exit points to the building, along all footpaths within the site, car-parking areas and to thestreet number to facilitate identification of the site/building.

e) The building/site shall be provided with maps, directional signage, building identification (i.e. streetnumber, block number) which must be installed near the entry of the building and visible from the street tofacilitate easy identification of the site for emergency services.

f) All materials used along the ground level of the building around the perimeter of the site shall havepermanent graffiti resistant coating applied.

g) NSW Police strongly recommend that all fencing should be installed around the site where appropriate,preventing unauthorised access. Access points into the site and common areas shall be secured throughthe use of gates, roller doors or similar and fitted with a security mechanism (i.e. swipe card, keys, etc.) torestrict access to authorised persons only.

h) It should also be noted that the latch/locking mechanism for the gates inside the development, shouldnot be within the arm reach of any person externally.

i) Mailbox Facilities must be located either along the façade wall of the foyer (i.e. similar to PO boxes wherethe mailbox is orientated outwards and is opened from inside the foyer) or located inside the building foyer.Where mailboxes are located internally within the foyer, the applicant is required to purchase and install akey safe (preferably cylindrical) from Australia Post. This key safe shall be located near the buildingintercom or other suitable location near the entry. To purchase a key safe contact Australia Post:

• o Australia Post (Nepean Delivery Facility) – (02) 4729 8600

• o Australia Post (Seven Hills Delivery Facility) – (02) 9674 4027



j) Where sites have multiple buildings, a site plan shall be provided near each building entry. This planshall show the location and name/number of each building on-site to orientate people.

k) All ground floor units shall be fitted with motion sensor lighting.

l) Patio bolt locks (or similar) installed to any sliding door and any open able window along the groundlevel.

m) *Important* Quakers Hill Police to be afforded the opportunity to inspect the development withBlacktown City Council prior to Construction Certificate Stage.

Operational Conditiona) All security measures required by this consent to be installed are required to be appropriately

maintained and in good working order.

b) Contact details for the Body Corporate and Building Manager must be forward to the Quakers HillLAC, NSW Police, Riverstone Police Station once the Body Corporate is formed and in the event ofany changes to these contact details.

c) Security management plan and evacuation plane to be forwarded to Riverstone Police Station.

In conclusion,

Prior to 2016 this area of Schofields would have been described as semi rural with market gardens andfarmland. Crime rating for this area was known as ‘Extremely Low’.

Rezoning has changed the use of this land to High Density Residential therefore the crime rating prior tothis development application should not be used as it is not a true measure of crime. This statement mustbe taken into consideration when applying security treatments to the application.

The Quakers Hill Local Area Command would be supportive of this Large Development, providing that allmeasures listed above in this report are adhered to.”

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Appendix 3 Crime Prevention as a Design and Management Strategy

A 2.1 Rationale

Crime prevention has been linked to urban design since the late 1970s. The concept originated in the UnitedStates and Canada when sociologists, criminologists and architects began to link criminal behaviour inpublic spaces with poor design and layout of those spaces.

Today, there are four broadly defined models of crime prevention. They may be implemented individually,although ideally initiatives derived from each will overlap. The four models are:

Crime Prevention By Social Intervention – a model that sustains the integrity and safety of (oftendisadvantaged) communities through government and corporate and local support for programs,development initiatives and improvements to infrastructure.

Crime Prevention By Community Development – a model that encourages settled communities to developpartnerships in accepting responsibility for protecting personal and neighbourhood assets through acommitment to networking and sharing responsibility for community development goals.

Situational Crime Prevention – a model that focuses of place-specific crimes, targeting offences andoffenders by pro-active and responsive security or law enforcement strategies.

Crime Prevention By Environmental Design – a model that incorporates aspects of architecture,engineering and technology to enhance the form, function and reputation of the built environment as “safespace”.

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) is a coined version of the Crime Prevention ByDesign model; one that is takes a specific approach to reducing and preventing crime by applyingarchitectural design principles to urban developments which focus on territoriality, surveillance and accesscontrol. CPTED and the other models have largely been adopted throughout the developed world aslegitimate crime prevention strategies.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, State and local authorities within Australia, responsible for urbandevelopment approvals, have been gradually adopting the CPTED or similar crime prevention (design)concepts when approving both large and small scale development applications.

Within Australia, there is recognition by all stakeholders involved in urban development, (however the termis defined) that designing out crime should form part of mandated development application criteria.

In 2001-2, the New South Wales Parliament assented to changes in guidelines under Section 79C of theEPA Act to include crime prevention as one of the “matters of public interest” which must be considered inapproving development applications.

Increasingly, local authorities are introducing instruments and/or guidelines requiring ‘security’ to form partof DA documentation.

Notwithstanding local and State based regulatory requirements, it would seem prudent that developersseek to incorporate crime prevention-by-design guidelines to all projects, especially given the marketingand legal emphases on personal and community safety (security) Australia.

It is conceivable that, if built environments can be “secured” by adopting agreed crime prevention designguidelines, (protocols, etc.), then such guidelines will in time become mandatory in much the same way asBuilding Codes and Occupational Health and Safety standards have been adopted.

Incorporation of crime prevention architecture and engineering into relevant planning documentationthroughout the design-and-construct stages is the ideal way to ensure compliance with local and Staterequirements.



A 2.2 Aims: Crime Prevention By Design

The broad aim of crime prevention design principles is to create and sustain safer communities byincorporating crime prevention design initiatives into all urban development.

From the literature, it is possible to identify two specific aims:

To promote the legitimate and safe use of all natural and built environments by incorporating crimeprevention or security design codes or guidelines into all development planning and approvalprocesses.

To enhance the reputation of developed environments by ensuring that crime prevention or securitydesign criteria are integral to all architectural and engineering documentation submitted for reviewand approval by relevant authorities.

Oscar Newman (1972) coined the term. He developed the concept in relation to significant crime problemsin high-rise ghetto type housing developments of New York City in the 1960s. Newman suggested that theurban design of inner city precincts was directly attributable to anti-social behaviour and high crime rates.Newman recognised that there were three spatial issues that should be addressed in all future urbanplanning – territoriality, surveillance and access control. Each can be linked with architectural and/orengineering documentation in a coordinated approach towards making public and private spaces relativelycrime free.

A 2.3 CPTED Principles

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED or security design) is based on five principles– territorial definition, access control, natural surveillance, activity support and target hardening.

A 2.4 The Principle of Territorial Definition

Crowe (2003) suggests that the right physical design contributes to a positive sense of territorial use andownership – a sense of territorial influence. In urban developments, territory may be defined or classifiedas public space, semi-private or communal space, restricted space and private or secure space.

Mixed use sub-divisions are particular cases in point. Each such development concept should flag spatialuse and spatial hierarchy. This hierarchy should be evident as concepts, principles and foreshadowedspecifics at the DA stage, to be followed by detail submitted throughout relevant aspects of designdocumentation.

The DA stage and design documentation architecture (and engineering) of vehicle or pedestrian corridors,commercial, retail, recreational, institutional, and residential precincts is as important as the architecture ofthe buildings that will eventually occupy those precincts. One without the other contributes to a sense ofterritorial confusion where territorial clarity is required.

Early on in the designing-out-crime research, Geason and Wilson (1989:5) claimed that well designedhousing projects make it clear which spaces belong to whom – some being completely private, some beingshared and some public. Architects and developers of course claim that these aspects are always part ofconcept design, master-planning and detailed documentation. The difference is that they are seldomdesigned to standards or principles aimed at repelling crime.

A 2.5 The Principle of Surveillance

Spatial design should maximise opportunities for surveillance – formal and informal. The design principlehere is to increase the number and length of sight lines; the capacity of people and technology to observemovement and activity at distance.

The location, mass, height, proximity and form of buildings therefore become critical design features. Therelationship of buildings to all open spaces and to roads, pathways, cycle-ways, parks and other streetscapeforms, is equally critical. There are three agreed forms of surveillance that should be encouraged: natural,social and technological.



Natural surveillance encourages casual observation and monitoring of all users and owners of known anddefined urban space.

Social surveillance encourages casual observers, through natural surveillance, to routinely monitor,challenge or report suspicious pedestrian and vehicle movements through precincts or into buildings.

Technological surveillance employs CCTV and other monitoring devices to alarm premises or spaces todeter/detect and respond to unlawful access or unlawful behaviour. In the past, analogue CCTVsurveillance technology consumed personnel resources including managing the recording, e.g. replacetapes of these early systems. Network cameras and network video recording (NVR’s) offers a more cost-effective alternative. Modern fast moving ‘dome’ cameras, which respond to alarm pre-set positions can beutilised. The ‘alarm’ may be a help call button being activated, a secured door being opened (using a doorcontact) or movement (using a passive infrared detector) and transmitted real time to wireless hand heldtechnology.

A 2.6 The Principle of Access Control

Debate continues about ways to control, restrict or prevent access to buildings and to open precincts. Thedeployment of technology has been the recent favoured design strategy. This (in our view) over-relianceon technology has tended to limit creative physical design alternatives.

In the mid-1980s a significant study was carried out in the UK into some of England’s (often referred to as)notorious or infamous housing estates – high and medium rise ghettos where crimes against property andpeople has been running rife. Later studies have support these claims.

The point of all physical (built environment) design from a crime perspective is to define and indicatepurpose. For example a gate to a property must be positioned to indicate whether or not it is a main entryand, if so by signage, mechanical, electronic or other means, entry is generally allowed or is by permissiononly. A gate’s design and integration with a fence or adjoining building gives some indication of who andhow entry is to be gained.

While gates (and similar barriers) present as recognised objects for territorial definition and separation,crime prevention-by-design principles encourage broader and less intrusive definitional architecture;architecture which not only restricts or halts access, but which encourages entry, access and movement.Lighting, pathways, landscaping, low-line fencing, steps and doorways are obvious examples.

By applying crime prevention design principles to housing estates, to commercial, institutional and industrialcomplexes, to retail and recreational outlets and to transport infrastructure, there is more than oneopportunity to clearly define appropriate entry and movement corridors.

A 2.7 The Principle of Activity Support

This involves the use of creative signage, (external) lighting and other landscaping way-finding design toencourage intended patterns of usage, generating activity certainty or liveliness, particularly in the publicdomain. The activity support principle reinforces activity purpose and location security.

A 2.8 The Principle of Target Hardening

Target hardening increases the efforts that ‘offenders’ must expend in their intent to disrupt legitimacy andput at risk legitimate activity. It is directed at denying or limiting access to potential criminal targets throughthe use of more intentional and less subtle access control design including deliberate physical barrierssuch as security fencing, gates, locks and electronic alarms. However, the design goal is to avoid‘fortressing’.

A 2.9 Crime Prevention Through Environmental Management (CPTEM)

The application of CPTED design principles (A 2.4 to A 2.8) must be reinforced by the place managementof identified security (anti-social and criminal behaviour) risks. The two strategies complement each other.Design seeks to reduce risks through creative physical intervention.



Management seeks to build on the design outcomes by monitoring and managing on-going risks throughstakeholder awareness protocols, through technology maintenance and renewal and through cooperativeplace management by police, security and facilities operatives.

There are five CPTEM Principles:

design maintenance - maintaining design ‘hardware’ eg. lighting, landscaping, signage systems management –maintaining security technology for faults, repairs and redundancy procedures and incidents – ensuring occupancy procedures are known and followed crime risk reviews – knowing and 'rehearsing' responses to threats and incidents outcome evaluation – documenting success or otherwise from CPTEM measures.

Each principle is part of a CPTEM ‘whole’.

CPTEM is often over-looked to the detriment of a development’s reputation outcomes – marketability andstakeholder duty-of-care. On-going security management may fail if it is not approached strategically andresponsibly. Ad hoc and/or intermittent attention to CPTEM can negate the design strategy and can leaveowner-occupiers exposed to litigation in the event of threats or incidents occurring on any part of adevelopment’s footprint.

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in confidence north sydney. nsw 2059 dear albert,...council's dcp and the nsw police. both...

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