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Improving US Healthcare Through Payment Incentives Denis A. Cortese Director, ASU Healthcare Delivery and Policy Program Robert K. Smoldt Associate Director, ASU Healthcare Delivery and Policy Program Washington, D.C. January 17, 2011 1

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Page 1: Improving US Healthcare Through Payment Incentives Denis A. Cortese Director, ASU Healthcare Delivery and Policy Program Robert K. Smoldt Associate Director,

Improving US Healthcare Through Payment Incentives

Denis A. CorteseDirector, ASU Healthcare Delivery and Policy Program

Robert K. SmoldtAssociate Director, ASU Healthcare Delivery and Policy

Program

Washington, D.C.January 17, 2011 1

Page 2: Improving US Healthcare Through Payment Incentives Denis A. Cortese Director, ASU Healthcare Delivery and Policy Program Robert K. Smoldt Associate Director,

Objective for US Healthcare:

– Better Health– Better Care Delivery– Lower Cost

• Value = Patient Outcomes + Safety + Service/Cost over time

2

Page 3: Improving US Healthcare Through Payment Incentives Denis A. Cortese Director, ASU Healthcare Delivery and Policy Program Robert K. Smoldt Associate Director,

Two Key Points on Cost:

• 20% of Population = 80% of cost

• Total Cost = Price per unit of service x Use RateUse Rate

3

Page 4: Improving US Healthcare Through Payment Incentives Denis A. Cortese Director, ASU Healthcare Delivery and Policy Program Robert K. Smoldt Associate Director,

Use rate is the key

• "… utilization - not local price differences - drives Medicare regional payment variation…" *

• “Most of this variation (Medicare spending) was not due to differences in the price of care in different parts of the country, but rather to differences in the volume…." **

• There is a two fold difference between the MSA with greatest service use (Miami, FL) and the MSA with the least service use (Lacrosse, WI).” (After adjusting for regional prices, added payments for GME, IME, etc., demographics and beneficiary health statues)***

*"Prices Don't Drive Regional Medicare Spending Variations” Gottlieb, Zhou, Song, Gillman Andrews, Skinner and Sutherland ; Health Affairs, March 2010, vol 29. no 3, pp 537 -543** "Tracking the Care of Patients with Severe Chronic Illnesses” Wennberg, Fisher, Goodman, and Skinner; The Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care 2008*** MedPac Report to Congress, January 2011, “Regional variation in Medicare services use.” 4

Page 5: Improving US Healthcare Through Payment Incentives Denis A. Cortese Director, ASU Healthcare Delivery and Policy Program Robert K. Smoldt Associate Director,

The Medicare Price Control CycleExhibit 1: The Medicare Price Control Cycle

Cost too high

Reduce payment rateto providers

Providers

See more patients per day

Order more tests, images

Costs go up anyway

5

Reduce line item payment rate to providers

Page 6: Improving US Healthcare Through Payment Incentives Denis A. Cortese Director, ASU Healthcare Delivery and Policy Program Robert K. Smoldt Associate Director,

Annual Rates of Increase in Physician Fees and Expenditures/Fee-for-

Service Beneficiary

3.4

-0.7

7.4 7.4

-2

0

2

4

6

8

3.4

-0.7

7.4 7.4

-2

0

2

4

6

8

Fees

SGR-relatedexpenditures/fee-for-servicebeneficiary

Fees

SGR-relatedexpenditures/fee-for-servicebeneficiary

Annual percent change

Annual percent change

1997-20011997-2001 2001-20052001-2005

Source: Letter to Glenn M. Hackbarth, Chair, Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, from Herb B. Kuhn, Director, Center for Medicare Management, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, dated April 7, 2006.Available at: http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/Guterman_McareMDpayment_testimony_942.pdf

Annual Rates of Increase in Physician Fees and Expenditures/Fee-for-

Service Beneficiary

3.4

-0.7

7.4 7.4

-2

0

2

4

6

8

3.4

-0.7

7.4 7.4

-2

0

2

4

6

8

Fees

SGR-relatedexpenditures/fee-for-servicebeneficiary

Fees

SGR-relatedexpenditures/fee-for-servicebeneficiary

Annual percent change

Annual percent change

1997-20011997-2001 2001-20052001-2005

Source: Letter to Glenn M. Hackbarth, Chair, Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, from Herb B. Kuhn, Director, Center for Medicare Management, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, dated April 7, 2006.Available at: http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/Guterman_McareMDpayment_testimony_942.pdf

6

Page 7: Improving US Healthcare Through Payment Incentives Denis A. Cortese Director, ASU Healthcare Delivery and Policy Program Robert K. Smoldt Associate Director,

Where to start given the two key points:

– Expensive Patients – (those hospitalized)– Expanded DRG lump sum payments (to encourage

judicious use rates)• Expanded DRGs = Present DRG + longer time than

hospitalization + include physician services– Announce plan, give providers two years to self

organize– Start with Medicare's most expensive DRG and go

DRG by DRG– Providers define outcomes

7

Page 8: Improving US Healthcare Through Payment Incentives Denis A. Cortese Director, ASU Healthcare Delivery and Policy Program Robert K. Smoldt Associate Director,

Third Key Point – How to set the payment amount

– Not formulas– Reality based pricing concept (Dr. Hal Luft*)

• Cost of resources used by medical centers getting best risk adjusted outcomes + 3%

* Luft, H., “Total Cure,” Harvard University Press, 2008, Pages 94-95 8

Page 9: Improving US Healthcare Through Payment Incentives Denis A. Cortese Director, ASU Healthcare Delivery and Policy Program Robert K. Smoldt Associate Director,

9

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Hypothetical Example of EDRG payment amount based on concepts suggested by Dr. Hal Luft*

Cost for EDRG “x” ($000s)

Outcomes for EDRG “x”

Proposed pricing point

Proposed pricing point

*Luft, H., “Total Care,” Harvard University Press. 2008

Experience of teaching hospitals for EDRGx

Median Cost all teaching hospitals

Top 1/3 of hospitals on outcomes

Median cost of top 1/3 of hospitals on outcomes