Improving the quality of elementary schooling

Anjini KocharStanford Center for International

Development

Kerala – outstanding achievements in schooling quantity

• In 1991, literacy rates in Kerala were 81% for males, 75% for females, compared to the India average of 53% for males, 32% for females

• In 1996, total expenditure on education as percentage of SDP was 5.6%, compared to 3.2% for India, with 85% if expenditure on education going to primary and secondary schooling

Challenge: quality of schooling

• 1994 NIEPA survey (National Institute of Educational Planning Administration) ranked Kerala 18th amongst all states in terms of reading, writing and mathematical capacity of the student.

• Base-line DPEP surveys conducted in Malappuram district by NIEPA found that about 30% of the children who complete primary school do not reach the necessary achivement level in literacy and numeracy.

Most strikingly revealed in Kerala’s SSLC results

• In 1981, pass rate was 34.4%. This improved to 51% in 1991, but has stayed at around that level (53% in 1999, 57% in 2004)

– SCERT document states that the current pass percentage is at its present level only because grace marks are given after the papers are marked. If there was no such “moderation” the pass percentage would be lower.

• Passing rate is separately reported: “before moderation”=57% (2004), “after moderation”=70%

– Chandrasekhar, Ramachandran and Ramakumar (2001) note the high drop out rate in class 10, and state that it reflects the fact that schools detain children after the secondary stage (particularly class 9), in order to inflate the pass percentage in the SSLC examination.

2nd challenge: schooling inequalities across socio-econ groups

How can we improve the quality of elementary education? This presentation:

• Existing institutional arrangements for schooling lack flexibility -- inability to respond to changing socio-economic conditions. Result: wide variation in school quality (as measured by resources per school), and an increasingly costly system

• Perhaps because of high cost of school system, attempts at reform have been piece-meal, negatively affecting possibility of success

• Given existing high costs, prospects of reform closely tied to institutional arrangements for school finance – ability to raise funds for schools – discuss these, and their ability to raise funds required for school reform

Existing institutional framework for schools• GOI policy which determines school location on the basis of

habitations rather than villages, generated large number of schools (most Kerala villages have 5 or more schools)

• School size tied to habitation size, so wide variation in number of schools, with many small schools.

• This effect exacerbated by decline in fertility and consequent reduction in enrollments

• Problem of “uneconomic schools” with total enrollment <100

– For Kerala as a whole, 21% of schools in 2004, but as many as 31% of LP schools were uneconomic (2,111 out of 6,716 – Ecoomic Review 2004). 81% of uneconomic schools are lower primary schools

School size, rural schools, Wayanad district, 2000 (AIES), 20% of LP schools have total enrollment < 100 (Wayanad has the lowest number of uneconomic schools) 0

.002

.004

.006

Den

sity

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650 700 750 800total enrollment

Implications of large number of small schools• Impossible to exploit economies of scale, so relatively

high costs of school system (larger number of schools means greater costs of monitoring and oversight, administration, and higher costs due to fixed cost items such as libraries, science labs, computer facilities)

• And, small schools does not necessarily mean small class sizes: Because of rules which relate number of teachers to an integer function of enrollment, get multi-grade teaching in smaller schools and generally higher STR in these schools, both factors known to reduce school quality

Rural, Wayanad, 2000, 20% of primary schools have < 4 teachers

Number of teachers0

.05

.1.1

5.2

.25

Den

sity

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18Number of teachers

Student-teacher ratios in rural Wayanad schools with < 100 students (mean=39)

0.0

1.0

2.0

3D

ensi

ty

10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80str

Given research on imp of class size effects, this implies that smaller schools will generally be of poorer quality

• Case and Deaton (1999, S. Africa) find that halving class size from 40 to 20 would result in ¾ of a year additional schooling by age 10, and 1 ½ yrs by age 15

• Urquiola (2005, Bolivia): a 1 std. dev. Reduction in class size raises test scores by 0.3 s.d., enough to move a student from the bottom quartile to the median.

Supported by evidence from survey of A.P. schools – drop out rates are higher in smaller schools

Quartile of school size distribution

Mean drop out rate

1st (smallest) 0.17

2nd 0.10

3rd 0.01

4th 0.09

average 0.09

Drop out between 4th and 5th grade

Suggests that closure/re-organization of schools is necessary• But closing uneconomic schools has proven to

be difficult

• Giving rise to the phenomenon of “protected” teachers – those who are redundant because of low number of students, but who continue to receive full salary – has been equally difficult

– “Protection” first came into effect in 1969; in 1970, it was extended to cover non-teaching staff in addition to teachers.

Political factors slow closure of schools, reduction in “protection”

• Strike of state govt employees in 2002 against many of the austerity measures proposed by the UDF Govt

• Govt won the right to close uneconomic schools (if there was another school within a 2 km. radius), but had to concede on cutting salary of protected teachers in half (continued to pay full salary for the year)

– Govt’s approach is to re-deploy them, in other schools, and in the new BRC and CRC posts being created under SSA

But re-deployment of teachers and school closure also hindered by existing institutional arrangements:

• Kerala’s schooling system is unique in that it primarily comprises “private aided schools” – schools where teachers are paid by the govt and have all the protection of a govt job, but where they are appointed by the school

• Of elementary schools (2004), 59% are private aided, 36% are govt schools

• Most of protected teachers are in aided schools and cannot be redeployed in the BRCs or CRCs.

Inflexibility of existing institutions evidenced in data on lower primary schools, students

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002year

lower primary schools, total lps_tot

schools

Students in ‘000

And, in the considerable variation in student-teacher ratios, even within a district – unlike other Indian states where teachers belong to a district cadre

0.0

2.0

4.0

6D

ensi

ty

10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80str

Student-teacher ratios, rural Wayanad primary schools

2nd point: Resource scarcity partly explains failure of past attempts to reform the system -- best illustrated through Kerala’s experience with DPEP

• DPEP initiated in 3 districts in 1994, subsequently extended to 6 districts (Kasargod, Malappuram, Trivandrum, Palakkad, Wayanad and Idukki)

• In other parts of India, DPEP financed classroom and school construction, but GoK used resources primarily to finance a curriculum change, with complete change in textbooks (recommended by several committees – Kothari Commission (1968), Yashpal Committee (1993))

DPEP

• While DPEP resources (Rs. 40 crores per district) were only available for 6 districts, GoK decided (1998) to extend the programme to all districts, and to all grades (not just primary)

• Change was considerable. Major change in textbooks, curriculum, learning methods: child-centred learning; focus on child’s interests and how he/she learns, rather than on what is learnt, reduce work load, increase the quality of schooling and teachers

Apparently, a failure

• Change in govt from LDF to UDF in May 2001 also marked a shift in political support for curriculum reform

• But, aside from this, Terminal Assessment Surveys (TAS) conducted in 2001-2003 revealed that the average score in language was 52.3, and 40.8 in Mathematics

– Both scores were the lowest of the sample states (Assam, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala and Maharashtra)

– Maharasthra score was 60.9 for language and 57.6 for maths),

One reason: Because of extension of program, available funds were sufficient for new textbooks, but not for additional resources or other institutional changes in school structure

• Activity based learning required considerable infrastructure in learning materials

• “A DPEP based Geography textbook requires every student to have a map of India and a globe of their own because these are mostly learn-by-yourself methods. How can a govt school that has about 60 students in each primary class have that many maps to provide?”

• Large class sizes make group-based learning impossible

Comparison with urban pvt schools which are well-funded:

• “these schools arrange field trips, organize exhibitions, put up a fashion show to teach about the textile industry, plant paddy crops in the backyard during their social science period and cook bhelpuri and chaat inside the classroom for their chapter on Mumbai.”

Lack of resources also affected teacher training

• Resources (Rs. 40 crores per district) were provided for the 6 DPEP district; when programme was extended to all districts (textbook revision actually covered all grades, not just elementary), resources were not sufficient

• In non-DPEP districts, intended 25 days of teacher training programme was reduced to 5 days.

Lessons from Kerala DPEP

• Textbook, curriculum overhaul requires considerable teacher training, community training, new teaching materials – significant additional resources

• Success of school reforms is closely tied to institutional arrangements for school finance

Govt recognized the need for additional funds, and assumed that they would be forthcoming from community/state

• GOI documents: “… the funds under the DPEP may not be sufficient to meet all the requirements. … The gap between what is actually required and what is actually allocated by the programme is to be funded by the state. In this sense, the DPEP funding needs to be seen more as a mechanism to reduce the financial pressure on the district and state than as sufficient allocations to achieve the targets.”

• But, additional funds were not forthcoming

3rd point: What are the institutional arrangements for school funding in Kerala?

• October 1995: Transfer of powers and functions to local govts – The Kerala govt transferred all the 29 functions listed in the XI Schedule of the Constitution to the PRIs.

• Primary and upper primary schools became the responsibility of the Village Panchayat

• But, Kerala broke from other states in following a “big bang” approach in 1996, almost concurrently with DPEP

Decentralization in Kerala

• Gram Panchayat’s assigned the right to collect taxes (property tax, professional tax, entertainment and advertisement tax, service tax)

– Level of per capita “own resource revenues” increased from Rs. 24 in 1994 to Rs. 57 in 1999.

Expenditure decentralisation

• Really distinguishing feature of Kerala decentralization: devolution of 35 - 40% of the approved state plan to local govts as untied funds (“ local govts can decide any scheme and prepare detailed projects according to their priority”)

– In 1995, Panchayats controlled only 32% of the expenditure for functions assigned to them – increased to 68% over a 5 year period.

• Not completely unrestricted: 40% must be spent on ‘productive sectors (agriculture, livestock, industry), at least 10% on Women Component Plan, component for SC/STs.

• Education, paradoxically, placed in “service” sector, with environ., drinking water, health, woman and child services, cultural activities, social services

Implications for schools?

• All expenses related to the running of institutions except wages, scholarships and stipends, textbooks, and mid-day meal to be borne by the Panchayat out of total Panchayat funds – Panchayat has broad discretion in funding

• What has happened to educ expenditure with decentralization?

Decentralization and education funding: Educ exp as % of SDP, Kerala, 1993-2004

22.

53

3.5

44.

55

5.5

6ed

shar

e

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002year

Share of education exp in total expenditure

• Analysis of Panchayat income and expenditure for 2001, all Panchayats, 10 districts (718 Panchayats)

• Mean education share = 2.4%

• 11% of Panchayats reported no expenditure on education (in given year)

• Regression analysis of determinants of educ share:

Regression analysis of determinants of educ share of exp• Consider whether it exacerbates schooling

inequalities, by examining how it varies with prop. SC/ST, female literacy rate (1991)

• See whether legislation requiring 1/3rd of Sarpanch positions to be reserved for women generates more educ exp (literature suggests that it does in Rajasthan and WB)

• Consider how it depends on local Panchayat income (tax on buildings)

Regression analysis

• Concern that variables such as Female Sarpanch, Panchayat income could reflect underlying preferences for schooling in the Panchayat

• Identify effect of female Sarpanch,by exploiting rule which requires 33% of panchayts to have female sarpanch (in other states, allocation of resrved panchayats is random, but in Kerala it is done by rotation based on female share of population – exploit this rule to get identification).

• Control for endogeneity of Panchayat income by instrumenting it by the proportion of thatched homes (negatively correlated with income)

Regression of Educ Share of Total Panchayat Expenditure

Variable coeff Std. error

Prop. SC/ST -0.064* (0.024)

Prop of literate females, 1991

0.0004+ (0.0002)

Reserved for female sarpanch

0.004 (0.06)

Number of hholds 5.95 e-6 (4.53 e-6)Number of hholds sq. -6.86 e-10* (3.14 e-10)

Sample size 610

Panchayat control appears to exacerbate existing schooling inequalities: Effect of prop SC on Educ share of exp of Panchayats

-6-4

-20

24

e( le

dsha

re |

X )

-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2 .3e( propsc | X )

coef = -3.5758961, se = 1.4112877, t = -2.53

Similarly, panchayats with a higher proportion of literate women devote more to schooling

Effect of panchayat income on educ expenditure: negative

. Variable Coeff. Std. Error

Log Panchayat income (predicted)

-0.03* (0.013)

Prop. SC/ST -0.05* (0.023)Prop. Literate females 0.0003 (0.0002)

Households 7.87 e-6+ (4.66 e-6)Households squared -8.38 e-10 (3.33 e-10)

Female Sarpanch -0.002 (0.004)

Similar evidence from survey of AP schools – look

at community support for schools

• Significant difference in community funding across “hamlet” (SC) schools and “main village” schools

– Main village schools, average annual community contribution, 2004=Rs. 30,000

• (Rs. 39,000 in villages with model schools, Rs. 20,000 in villages without)

– In hamlet, schools, average community contribution = Rs 3,000

Institutional arrangements for school finance

• Kerala’s approach to decentralization motivated by desire to give Panchayat control over funds in areas they were responsible for

• Recognized negative aspect of decentralization is that it could exacerbate inequalities, with historically backward regions spending less, advanced regions spending more

– Borne out by regression analysis: shouldn’t count on educationally backward states to raise necessary funds for schooling

Effect of own income

• Additional interesting result that increases in Panchayat own resource income (as reflected by building wealth) associated with less spending on schooling

– Could be because increase in progressive taxes makes it less likely that wealthy households will support goods with strong public good component

– This effect may increase in years to come, as private unaided schooling grows (in 2004, out of 50 new schools constructed, 80% were pvt unaided)

• Suggests the need for state/central funds for education, with clear guidelines for

Conclusion

• Existing institutional arrangements for elementary schooling are inflexible, and ill-suited to handle changes in socio-economic environment, primarily because of unions, institutional arrangements which limit mobility of teachers

• Result: relatively high cost schooling system, and corresponding lack of funds to finance reforms except in a piece-meal fashion (dooming them to failure)

• While decentralization can generate additional funds in some regions, may also heighten schooling inequalities – need to combine decentralization with some measure of central control and framework for educational spending