Improving Policing with Mission Command and a Community Problem

Oriented Approach

by

Fred Leland

from:

Why write another group of essays on Mission Command? The simple

reason is that our countries are at war. Many of us have lost friends in

places most of our countrymen have never heard of like Nangarhar

and Tikrit. Many of us will continue to deploy to these places, are

there now, or have recently returned. We care, very deeply, about our

respective countries and our armies and other services, as well as our

law enforcement agencies. We believe we can be better, and we have

bought into the argument that “decentralized execution” and “mission

orders” will “enable initiative” and “empower agile and adaptive

leaders.” Lastly, we are greatly frustrated by the apparent lack of

interest in our institution to publish articles that are critical of current

efforts related to Mission Command. We firmly believe that the

institution is going in the wrong direction and wish to offer

practitioners alternatives to the official white-washed line,

theoreticians a glimpse into why we think the Army continues to

struggle with implementing its official leadership philosophy, and the

institution a chance to consider a mirror image of itself with no

painted-on clothes.

– Donald Vandergriff & Grant Martin

Introduction: Why Did We Write This?

Picture: an officer waiting for further unnecessary orders (just as well his phone is disconnected).

Improving Policing with Mission Command and a Community Problem

Oriented Approach by

Fred Leland

The police, by the very nature of their function, are an anomaly in a free society. They

are invested with a great deal of authority under a system of government in which

authority is reluctantly granted and, when granted, sharply curtailed. The specific

form of their authority—to arrest, to search, to detain, and to use force—is awesome

in the degree to which it can be disruptive of freedom, invasive of privacy, and sudden

and direct in its impact upon the individual. And this awesome authority, of necessity,

is delegated to individuals at the lowest level of the bureaucracy to be exercised, in

most instances, without prior review or control.

Yet a democracy is heavily dependent upon its police, despite their anomalous

position, to maintain the degree of order that makes a free society possible. It looks to

its police to prevent people from preying on one another; to provide a sense of

security; to facilitate movement; to resolve conflict, and to protect the very processes

and rights—such as free elections, freedom of speech, and freedom of assembly—on

which continuation of a free society depends. The strength of a democracy and the

quality of life enjoyed by its citizens are determined in large measure by the ability of

the police to discharge their duties.

Herman Goldstein.1

Policing in a Free Society

What Does It Take To "Win” at Low Cost?

It is not enough to do your best; you must know what to do, and then do your

best.

W. Edwards Deming2

When asked to write on the topic of Mission Command and its relevance to policing,

my first thought was to dive into what I know best— crisis leadership, namely, how police

deal with bad guys and bad situations. 3 But after a long pause, I thought I might challenge

myself and those reading this to look at leadership not from the organization’s point of view,

but from what we call the Mission Command culture and how that culture affects not only

police officers but the communities we police.

In light of all the negative scrutiny police have received over the past few years, it is

imperative that police leaders take a good, solid look at how we lead and how that leadership

methodology affects not only frontline personnel, but their communities as well. We need to

determine what changes to make in regards to how we hire, educate and train police.

To do so, critical questions need to be asked:

1 Herman Goldstein, Policing in a Free Society, (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Printing Company), p. 12. 2 Robert Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,

2002), 29. 3 Grant Tedrick Hammond, The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security (Washington,

DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001), 38.

1. What type of organizational culture must police have to be successful at policing a

free society? Are the policing strategies, operations and tactics viewed as effective

by police perceived in the same way by the citizenry?

2. Do police understand the moral, mental and physical levels within which a crisis

develops?

3. Do our police understand they can win in the physical level, use force, destroy

property, arrest, etc. yet lose in the moral (eyes of the citizenry)?

4. And finally, what type of leadership can sustain a positive culture that brings

about meaningful and lasting change—thus building police legitimacy in the eyes

of the public—and at the same time, allows officers to safely and effectively

perform their duties?4

Means Over Ends Syndrome

The police have been particularly susceptible to the "means over ends" syndrome,

placing more emphasis in their improvement efforts on organization and operating methods

than on the substantive outcome of their work. This condition has been fed by the

professional movement within law enforcement, with its concentration on the staffing,

management, and organization of police agencies. More and more persons are questioning the

widely held assumption that improvements in the internal management of police departments

will enable the police to deal more effectively with the problems they are called upon to

handle. If the police are to realize a greater return on the investment made in improving their

operations, and if they are to mature as a profession, they must concern themselves more

directly with the end product of their efforts.5

Meeting this need requires that the police develop a more systematic process for

examining and addressing the problems that the public expects them to handle. It requires

identifying these problems in more precise terms, researching each problem, documenting the

nature of the current police response, assessing its adequacy and the adequacy of existing

authority and resources, engaging in a broad exploration of alternatives to present responses,

weighing the merits of these alternatives, and choosing from among them.

Improvements in staffing, organization, and management remain important, but they

should be achieved and may, in fact, be more achievable, within the context of a more direct

concern with the outcome of policing. 6

How Do We Improve Decision Making?

We process information and make decisions in our day-to-day law enforcement duties

using the Boyd Cycle. We employ this process of observation-orientation-decision and action

to see the world around us, orient to what we perceive is going on, and then based on this

observation and orientation, we make decisions and take actions to accomplish certain

4 Ibid. 41. 5 Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory (Portland: Frank Cass,

1997), 257. 6 Goldsteien, p. 77.

objectives based on our goals or intentions. As police professionals, we need to not only

understand the Boyd cycle, but to ingrain it in our training so that we become more effective

at applying it on the street.7

How are our efforts at becoming efficient police agencies affecting our ability to

effectively execute timely observation, orientation, and decision and action cycles on the

street?

Can we make room for across the board adjustments to apply efficient processes,

policies and procedures, and produce effective real-time decision-making, making the best

use people and ideas?

One of Col. John Boyd’s most important insights is, “Machines don’t fight wars;

people do by using their minds.” When it comes to law enforcement, this means

understanding what technologies, processes, policies, and procedures work on the street. One

must first understand how people think and act in the uncertainty, fear, and chaos of dynamic

encounters and what creates friction in a cop’s decision-making process. A cop deals with

numerous scenarios, such as interacting with suspects bent on getting their way, or in crisis

situations such as car accidents with mass casualties, blizzards, hurricanes, tornados, or fires.8

Only with this understanding is it possible to develop technologies, processes, policies and

procedures to serve the street cop’s needs.

By understanding the needs of cops who work the streets, it is possible to design a

system that advances police departments’ efficiency and effectiveness, from the streets, all

the way to the courts.

Is It Not Time We Robustly Embrace The Philosophy of Decentralized Control?

Considering the types of environments, crises, and adversaries the police officer will

face on the streets of the future, is it not time to change our bureaucratic processes to create a

better system that effects both individual and organizational decision-making and also

sustains cohesive departments?9

A police cultural change must fully embrace a philosophy of a decentralized bias for

action based upon a high degree of professional trust and confidence between police leaders

and the led. This philosophy will provide principles for exercising good judgment in unique

situations, rather than requiring officers to remember and adhere to formulas and checklists.

Although specific tools (i.e. weapons) and basic procedures are ingrained through training

and repetition, this philosophy advocates adaptability in the application of the techniques on

the street.

Policies and procedures must be written in such a way that specifics are left to the

cops on the street facing the problem, a bottom-up approach that will allow the cop’s vast

experience and education to pick the right solution for the right situation. Mutual trust is

crucial here.

7 Hammond, The Mind of War, 118–20. 8 Coram, Boyd, 322. 9 Kevin Benson and Steven Rotkoff, "Goodbye, OODA Loop: A Complex World Demands a Different Kind of

Decision-Making," Armed Forces Journal 149, no. 3 (2011): 27.

At the tactical level, an officer will make decisions based on:

1. The particular conditions of the environment.

2. The adversary or crisis.

3. His own resources.

4. The overall mission and intent set by the leaders of the department, using his best

judgment.

Currently, police training concentrates on teaching specific techniques or habits so

they can be repeated in a consistent manner, regardless of conditions. It leaves little room for

creative thought, etc.

The difference between how we currently train and prepare versus the philosophy of

Mission Command is comparable to the difference between techniques and tactics.

Techniques (existing philosophy) require inflexibility and repetition, while tactics (new

philosophy) require flexibility, good judgment and creativity. Officers can only gain the

ability to execute tactics with experience and education that stresses free play, force-on-force

training brought to a conclusion with clear winners and losers. Keep in mind no tactical

concept is an end in itself and that there is always more than one solution to a given tactical

dilemma.

Tell Them What To Think and Do… or Teach Them How To Think and Do?

Both effective leadership and developing a supportive organizational culture serve to

develop mutual trust, empathy, common experiences, and self-sacrifice. These attributes

greatly enhance both efficiency and effectiveness. To ensure these attributes are more than

mere words, it is important for leaders to lead daily, not only when a crisis is upon us.

Leadership is an ongoing act, not an event-driven phenomenon. Good leaders develop

their officers on a daily basis to be prepared when crisis hits, compared to poor leaders who

prepare and educate themselves and then try to puppet master their officers through micro-

management, creating more uncertainty and chaos.10

It is important that we focus on identifying outcomes when setting organizational

goals. What is it we expect an officer to do and how do we expect an officer to behave and

perform as he/she carries out their daily duties? After those expectations are identified, we

must develop policy and procedures, rules and regulations, checklists, and training programs

that focus on balancing efficiency and effectiveness. Let’s talk about balancing efficiency and

effectiveness and how it relates to what we do.

Efficiency

Efficiency is commonly described as achieving maximum productivity with minimum

wasted effort or expense. Efficiency is an important aspect to policing. We must ensure that

required tasks (such as information and evidence gathering, dissemination and documentation

10 Fred Leland and Donald E. Vandergriff, Law Enforcement Adaptability Handbook, (Amazon, January 2014).

in reports, etc.) are actually completed. However, it is important for leaders not to get lost in

the efficiency of processes, as this breeds a "zero-defects" environment. Once this happens,

the frontline officers will wait to be told what to think and what to do—rather than thinking

and doing on their own— considerably slowing down the effectiveness of timely decision-

making and tactical problem solving.11

Effectiveness

Effectiveness, on the other hand, is producing a desired or intended result (outcome).

To be effective in human interaction, we need feedback on the policy, procedures, rules and

regulations or checklist we are using. Are they working or not? Feedback—or output, as it is

sometimes called—is information gathered and perceived by the cop on the street. The

feedback the officer makes, and the input the officer on the street accepts as he interacts with

his environment and the people in it, defines the street cop’s orientation of the situation while

effecting the decisions and the cop’s actions.

In this context, we need to understand the differences between being efficient and

effective, learning how to balance them accordingly, based on the unfolding situation.

Efficient policy and procedures must be thought of as a framework based on foundational

principles; they must include room for adaptation, people and ideas, if they are to be fully

effective.12

Why Does Policing Struggle With Means Over Ends Syndrome?

We focus too heavily on efficiently meeting tangible, easy-to-measure standards,

versus developing officers capable of reaching outcomes. This problem is not based on

dishonesty, lack of integrity, or lack of intelligence by us as law enforcement leaders; the

problems are systemic in nature—a complex mix of law enforcement tradition, conditioned

responses, and institutional responses to the world we live and work in. If we want to

continually improve our effectiveness and safety on the street, we must evolve through

continued learning.

We can start by “altering rules, procedures and processes such that any rules that stifle

initiative are eliminated, and simultaneously develop rules, etc. that achieve maximum

productivity." We then work together to develop cohesive top down/bottom up organizations

that trust one another to execute our mission.13

This will leave maneuver room for experienced people to use their own ideas,

resulting in cops who become tactical problem solvers, making them both more efficient and

effective in all aspects of policing. In our efforts to protect the communities we serve, the

desired outcome for our profession is centered on solving complex and evolving problems. In

our strategy to protect and serve, we must keep in mind all aspects of the conflicts and

problems we face, and how cops perform when dealing with these problems. For a law

enforcement officer, this requires the ability to execute critical tasks while working through

constantly changing conditions.

11 Frans P.B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd (New York City:

Routledge, 2007), 235. 12 Robert B. Polk, "A Critique of the Boyd Theory—is it Relevant to the Army?" Defense Analysis 16, no. 3

(2000): 259. 13 John R. Boyd, "Patterns of Conflict," (unpublished presentation slides, December 1986), 10.

The leadership climate and training provided to officers must not only focus on

efficiently meeting tasks, conditions and standards, it must also include the development of

the required attributes for individuals, teams, and organizations to carry out the mission

effectively. These attributes and values are included in most agencies' mission statements and

policies and procedure manuals as BOLD typed words! Is it not time we put those words into

BOLD action?14

Developing Trust: Why is it so Important?

What it takes to win at low cost is mutual trust. Winning at low cost is about

employing strategies and tactics that have positive effects on the moral, mental and physical

levels of conflict and crisis. Winning at low cost is essentially the measurement of the

public’s trust and confidence in the police to do our job. The public must believe that the

police are honest, competent, and treat people with dignity and respect as they carry out their

duties. This leads to mutual trust without which both leadership and monitoring are valueless.

“The “contracts” of intent and mission express that trust works both ways: trust by the

commander that his subordinates will understand and carry out his desires, and trust by those

subordinates that they will be supported when exercising their initiatives.” 15

Such trust is molded by a shared way of thinking. While the specific thoughts and

intended actions of officers and leaders will remain unknown, their thought process must be

clearly understood. All levels of the organization must share a comprehension of the intent,

the mission, the focus of effort, and what these mean. With this understanding, each officer

can be trusted to act appropriately to resolve crisis situations and other problems, “without

having to waste critical time requesting permission to take action or subsequently reporting

the details."16

This two-way trust can only come from a decentralized leadership climate. Mutual

trust can only manifest robustly in an organization that constantly strives to learn and

continuously improve. Winning at low cost means we must develop people to a high level of

professionalism. It takes leaders who understand that leadership is not an event or crisis-

driven phenomenon. Leadership is a day-to-day tool you use to create the trusting and safe

climate that is required to perform at a high level.17

Winning in policing comes in many forms; its meaning varies based on personal

interpretation. Winning in police encounters can mean gaining voluntary compliance through

communication and negotiation, or it can ebb and flow back and forth through a vast array of

outcomes, up to and including deadly force. Winning to the cop on the street means one

thing, while an adversary’s definition of winning implies a totally different outcome. What

about winning in the eyes of the public? How important is public support when we cops use

force? What outcomes can we expect during a dynamic encounter, or in the aftermath—with

public support, or without it? Does winning at low cost affect our safety and effectiveness in

14 John R. Boyd, "Destruction and Creation," (unpublished essay, 3 September 1976), 4–5. 15 Hammond, The Mind of War, 119. 16 William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, Westview Special Studies in Military Affairs (Boulder, CO:

Westview Press, 1985). 17 John R. Boyd, "A Discourse on Winning and Losing," (unpublished abstract, 1987). Accessed at the COL

John R. Boyd collection, Gray Research Center, Marine Corps University, 22 September 16.

a positive or negative way? Is winning at any cost verses winning at low cost something we

should consider more frequently?

Let’s take a look the use of force as an example. We cops know that the use of force is

always an option that should be taken as a last resort when we have both exhausted all other

means and are forced by the actions of the person we are dealing with to use force.

Reasonable and necessary force is not something we police take lightly. Winning in the arena

in real time—the place where interaction and efforts are made to resolve dangerous and

dynamic encounters—requires a certain breed of person, a person capable of remaining

mentally calm, of being able to think both critically and creatively.

What is critical thinking? It is the ability to focus and to achieve understanding (real-

time situational awareness), the ability to evaluate viewpoints and solve problems. Creative

thinking is equally important. Called “fingerspitzenfuhl”, or the feeling in the tip of one’s

fingers (Napoleon called it a “gut” feeling), cops call this ability our sixth sense. A person

who deals with conflict and crisis must be intuitive. This enables rapid decision-making

without conscious awareness or effort, which is basked in training and experience—a lot of it.

Self-awareness—an understanding of one’s own strengths and weaknesses, social skills—the

ability to assess people’s strengths and weaknesses, the use of communication skills, and the

art of listening are also part of the strategic game of interaction and weigh heavily in the

ability for a cop to isolate an adversary and help us to shape and reshape events on favorable

terms.18

Winning requires knowing and applying many other skills, including an

understanding of strategy, tactics, human nature, culture, the environment, the climate of the

situation, psychological and physiological effects, nonverbal communication skills, implicit

and explicit decision making, friction in decision making, tactical skills, combative skills,

firearm skills, focus of effort, uncertainty, adaptability, deception, surprise, time and space,

leadership, and the overall mission etc. When we encounter and interact with people on the

street, all these factors combine in novel and synergistic ways. When considered in the

context of conflict, crisis, and violence from our perspective and the adversary’s perspective,

these skills help us shape or influence events and enhance our spirit and strength, making us

safer and more effective as we handle dynamic encounters.

To maneuver and position yourself to win requires the strategic game of interaction

and isolation as you accord with an adversary, fellow officers, and the community you work

in, if victory is to be completed in the moral, mental and physical dimensions. COL John

Boyd described the outcome of winning in the moral, mental and physical dimensions as

follows:

Unless one can penetrate adversaries’ moral, mental and physical being, and sever

those interacting bonds that permit him to exist as an organic whole, by being able to

subvert, shatter, seize, or otherwise subdue those moral, mental and physical

bastions, connections, or activities that he depends upon, one will find it exceedingly

difficult, if not impossible, to collapse [an] adversaries’ will to resist.19

To gain a better understanding of the moral, mental and physical dimensions of

conflict, let’s look at how Boyd describes these three dimensions and how we play the

18 William S. Lind, "The Case for Maneuver Doctrine," in The Defense Reform Debate: Issues and Analysis, ed.

Asa A. Clark IV (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 89. 19 Coram, Boyd, 398–412.

strategic game of interaction and isolation—a game in which we must be able to diminish

our adversary’s ability to communicate or interact with his environment, while sustaining or

improving ours.20

Moral represents the cultural codes of conduct or standards of behavior that constrain,

sustain, and focus our emotional/intellectual responses.

Morally, we interact with others by avoiding mismatches between what we say we

are, what we are, and the world’s demands, as well as abiding by those other cultural

codes or standards we are expected to uphold. Morally, our adversaries isolate

themselves when they visibly improve their wellbeing to the detriment of others (e.g.

allies, the uncommitted), by violating codes of conduct or behavior patterns that they

profess to uphold or others expect them to uphold.21

Mental represents the emotional/intellectual activity we generate to adjust and to cope

with that physical world.

Mentally, we interact by selecting information from a variety of sources or channels

to generate mental images or impressions that match up with the world of events or

happenings that we are trying to understand and cope with. Mentally, we can isolate

our adversaries by presenting them with ambiguous, deceptive or novel situations, as

well as by operating at a tempo or rhythm they can neither make out, nor keep up

with. Operating inside their OODA loops will accomplish just this by disorienting or

twisting their mental images so that they can neither appreciate nor cope with what’s

really going on.22

Physical represents the world of matter-energy-information all of us are a part of, live

in, and feed upon.

Physically, we interact by opening up and maintaining many channels of

communication with the outside world, hence with others out there, that we depend

upon for sustenance, nourishment or support. Physically, we isolate our adversaries

by severing their communications with the outside world as well as by severing their

internal communications to one another. We can accomplish this by cutting them off

from their allies and the uncommitted via diplomatic, psychological and other efforts.

To cut them off from one another, we should penetrate their system by being

unpredictable; otherwise, they can counter our efforts.23

Police need to study these dimensions and translate them to policing. The idea here is

to destroy an adversary’s moral, mental, and physical harmony, produce paralysis and

collapse his will to resist, while at the same time amplifying our own spirit and strength as

well as the people we serve. This effort is not all about physical force; it’s about maneuver,

interaction, and the balance of persuasion and force in an all-out effort to morally, mentally,

and physically isolate our adversary from his allies or any outside support, as well as isolate

elements of adversary or adversaries from one another and overwhelm them by being able to

penetrate their moral, mental and physical being at any and all levels. We need to accomplish

20 Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook. 21 Frans P.B Osinga. "A Discourse on Winning and Losing: Introducing Core Ideas and Themes of Boyd's

'Theory of Intellectual Evolution and Growth'." slides presented at the Marine Corps University, 2007. 22 Osinga, “Discourse on Winning and Losing,” 234. 23 Ibid.

all of this, while at the same time, enhancing our spirit and strength and winning over the

uncommitted (public support).

Police protect society. We must win the difficult conflicts: rapidly changing situations

that require strength of character, courage, and resolve. These traits are inherent in most cops,

They are identical to the traits the public cheers for and supports in athletes, yet in law

enforcement, the gate keepers are often stoned—criticized by the public for action taken

where the stakes are so much higher and can result in life and death. Cops use force (this

includes all levels) in about one percent of all our contacts…only 1%! Why the lack of

support? What are we in law enforcement missing that could enhance support? Could

winning at low cost (using strategy and tactics that have a positive effect on the moral,

mental and physical levels of conflict and crisis) be the key to winning the trust we seek and

need from our communities?

This brings to mind a question I adapted with policing in mind, from one that Boyd

asked considering connecting strategy and tactics with our national goals. How do we

integrate the tactical and strategic ideas or the theme for disintegration and collapse of an

adversary with our community and law enforcement goals? Boyd had some answers I have

adapted that we in law enforcement should consider:

• Gain support of our goals and the methods we use

• Pump-up resolve, drain away adversaries' resolve, and attract the uncommitted

• End conflict on favorable terms

• Ensure that conflict and terms of justice do not provide seeds for (unfavorable) future

conflict

In Boyd’s view, our strategy must first and foremost be an appealing idea or set of

objectives and interests which inspires and unites the populace, our allies, and the

uncommitted. We need public support in all that we do! Gaining community trust and support

has been talked about much over the last few decades; however, real efforts to do so have

been implemented only sparingly. To win at low cost, we need to implement these ideas more

vigorously in all that we do. We must be more transparent with the public; it is the only way

we will gain complete victory on the street and in the aftermath.24

Over 2,500 hundred years ago, Sun Tzu said; “You must win your battles without

effort. Avoid difficult struggles. Fight when your position must win. You always win by

preventing your defeat.”25 This ancient stanza has much meaning as we in policing attempt

to:

1) Root out serious crime

2) Stop those who would do harm to those we serve

3) Protect ourselves as we operationalize our policing methods

To enhance our spirit and strength while gaining public support, we must learn to win

using the right strategy, operations, and tactics while considering how they affect the moral,

mental, and physical dimensions of conflict if we are to have a complete and full victory.26

24 Coram, Boyd, 371. 25 Osinga, Science, Strategy and War, 3. 26 Ibid. 50.

Do we in law enforcement really need to apply these ideas and principles in our

efforts to win on the street? If so, WHY are we not? To win completely, law enforcement

must understand our overall philosophy, mission, and intent. We must know the objective to

be obtained. We must understand the climate of the situation, and the environment or ground

we are working on and in. We have to know, or at least perceive, what’s going on before we

can make sound decisions and take action.

Mission Command is a key factor. The importance of a proper command system, leading to a

correct distribution of authority and responsibility among the various echelons, is critical to

our success. Without striking the correct balance between centralization and decentralization,

discipline and initiative, authority and individual responsibility, it is impossible for any

organization, let alone a police force, to operate effectively in an environment where disorder,

uncertainty, and confusion are prevalent. Finally, do we understand how to think strategically

and tactically, positioning ourselves to win in any situation?27

27 Ibid. 256.

Table of Contents

Introduction: Why Did We Write This? Donald Vandergriff &

Grant Martin

ix

1st Section – Who and What of Mission Command? 1

The Sinews of Leadership: Mission Command requires A

Culture of Cohesion

Joe Labarbera 3

“Auftragstaktik zur See”- an Impossibility? Tommy Krabberød 17

How the Germans Defined Auftragstaktik Donald Vandergriff 49

Winning Teams to Replace Mission Command Regina Parker 59

2nd Section – Where and When of Mission Command? 67

Auftragstaktik: A Case Study, France 1940 Understanding

Mission Command in the Training of Soldiers

Gerry Long 69

Mission Command and Mental Block: Why the Army Wont

Adopt a True Mission Command Philosophy

Thomas Rebuck 87

The U.S. Army Culture is French! Donald Vandergriff 101

3rd Section – Why of Mission Command? 119

Mission Command in Garrison Darrell Fawley 121

Training for Mission Command Chad Foster 137

How to Develop for Mission Command: The Missing Link Donald Vandergriff 157

Is the U.S. Army's Current Concept of Mission Command

Sufficient for All Situations? Introducing the Notion Of

“Type II” Mission Command

Grant Martin 175

Operationally Fit for Mission Command Daniel Markert & Scott

Sonnon

193

Improving Policing with Mission Command And a_________

Community Problem Oriented Approach _

Fred Leland 207

Conclusion What Does it All Mean? 223

Conclusion: The Liability of an Emotional Leadership Chad Foster 225

Author Biographies 255

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© Fred Leland 2017