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Process, Power & Marine
Improving Plant Safety and LoweringOperational Risks
Intergraph Australia 200815-19 September 2008
Process, Power & MarineSafety is at the Forefront
Process, Power & MarineWas this your plant…………….
Process, Power & MarineSafety is mission critical
PersonnelInjury, death
Attracting the best staff
CostPlant damage, loss of production
Compensation, insurance
ImageCommunity
Brand
Shareholder valueBoard responsibility
LawRegulatory pressure
License to operate
Process, Power & MarineThe Basics
Risk Reduction
Instruments are a well accepted risk reduction system
Safety for personnel, facility and environment
Contributors to an accident
Course
Process deviation
What is released to the atmosphere
Process, Power & MarineRisk Reduction
Increasing
Risk
Process RiskTolerable RiskResidual Risk
Necessary Risk Reduction
Actual Risk Reduction (ALARP)
ProcessDesignBPCSAlarmsReliefSIS
Process, Power & MarineA few definitions on risk
Risk – Combination of the frequency of occurrence of harm and severity of that harm
Tolerable risk – Risk which is accepted in a given context based on the current values of society
RRF – Risk Reduction Factor – The magnitude of risk that has to be reduced by one or more
Independent Protection Layers (IPLs)
Process, Power & MarineWhat is Tolerable risk ?
Process, Power & MarineProcess Industry Systems Integration
- relies onknowledge
of personnel
Control
Maintenance
Asset managementIntergraph
DesignIntergraph
FinanceSAP
Process safety Hazid
Process, Power & MarineThe Standards
ISA S84.01 and IEC 61508
Framework for the design
Key steps are:
Process design
HAZOP and Risk analysis
Determine protection layers
Define Safety Integrity Level (SIL)
Define SIS
Specification of SIS
Design
Operating procedures
Commissioning
Modification coupled back to the process design
Process, Power & MarineRisk Assessment
More for individuals ratherthen a group approachwhich means less inputfrom experience
Very timeconsuming
Very timeconsuming
Need experiencedpersonnel
No new analysiscomponents
Not very thoroughMinus
Very thorough, withdiagrams
Very thoroughVery thoroughGood and fastmethod
Standardizedapproach
Fast and simplePlus
For any type or size systemFor any type orsize system
For larger andmore complexsystems
For proven designsFor repeatablesystems
Smaller systemMethod
FTAFMECAHAZOPWhat if/Checklist
ChecklistWhat if
Process, Power & MarineHAZOP’s – What, Why and How?
DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION
HAZOP = Hazard and Operability Studies
Study of the possibility of deviation from the design intent
HAZOP Fundamentals:
Deviation
Course
Key words are:
Flow, Temperature, Pressure, Level, Separate (settle, filter, centrifuge), Composition, React Mix, Reduce (grind, crush,etc.), Absorb, Corrode Erode
Operational words
Isolate, Drain, Vent, Purge, Inspect, Maintain, Start-up, Shutdown
Secondary Key Words
No, Less, More, Reverse, Also, Other, Fluctuation, Early, Late
Process, Power & MarineHAZOP’s – What, Why and How?
DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDSACTIONNo, Flow Strainer
BlockagePump cavitationsWrong mixing
Pressure measurementAt pumpInspection of filter
Add instr.
Verifying each system
Process, Power & MarineHazops (Hazard and Operability Study)
Application by ICI of work-breakdown methods to process safety in 1960s
The most rigorous method of qualitative hazard identification
Stand-alone data-entry software from 1980s
Cause Consequence
Deviation from design intent
More flow
Less flow
No flow
Reverse flow
More pressure …
Process, Power & MarineHazard identification challenges
Action management process‘Have all the actions been closed off properly? What was the outcome?’
Management of changeOutside of electronic project workflow
‘How does safety know P&IDs have changed?’
traceability
‘Difficult to re-use past Hazops so start again’
Local area study only?
Timing: when P&IDs complete: change costly, limited
Hazardreport
Process, Power & Marine
Hazop study
Industry Challenges – lack of integration
Maintenance Engineering Operation
Plant information requirements
What are thesafeguards?
Dis
connect
What’scausing the
alarms?
What’s the impacton safety?
Process, Power & Marine
Process Design
Instrument design
Piping layout
Material ordering
HAZOP
Found error
Design change ($$)
Change order for material/equipment ($$$$$)
HAZOP’s late in the schedule
Process, Power & Marine
DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION
No, Flow Strainer
BlockagePump cavitations
Wrong mixing
Pressure
measurement
At pump
Inspection of filter
Add instr.
Impact / Follow on Effect:
- DCS Configuration
- DCS HMI (Graphics)
- Alarm Management
- Asset Management
- Instrumentation Design
- Procurement Changes
- Vendor Communications
- Piping Changes
- Material Changes
- Construction Planning
- Commissioning
- Spare Parts Loading
- Documentation
- Etc...
Multiple by thousands of potential “Safe-guards”
HAZOP’s late in the schedule
Process, Power & MarineHAZOP’s – Earlier in the schedule
Process Design
Make HAZOP part of design process early on
Instrument design
Piping layout
Material ordering
HAZOP (final)
No errors
No Design change
No Change order for material/equipment
Reduced design and CAPEX risks
Process, Power & Marine
SmartPlant Process Safety enables to design safety into your plant and
reduces the operational risks.
Design = EPC
Operational = OO
The Solution
Process, Power & Marine
Process, Power & Marine
Intergraph Australia 200815-19 September 2008
Improving Plant Safety and LoweringOperational Risks