improving incident analysis in the dutch railway sector
DESCRIPTION
Improving incident analysis in the Dutch railway sector. Mark Dabekaussen (Tebodin Consultants & Engineers) Linda Wright (ProRail) Tjerk van der Schaaf (Eindhoven University of Technology). Overview. What is a SPAD? Research goal SPAD analysis methods Results Discussion - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Improving incident analysis
in the Dutch railway sector
Mark Dabekaussen (Tebodin Consultants & Engineers)
Linda Wright (ProRail)
Tjerk van der Schaaf (Eindhoven University of Technology)
Slide: 2
Overview
• What is a SPAD?
• Research goal
• SPAD analysis methods
• Results
• Discussion
• Study constraints
• Conclusions
Slide: 3
What is a SPAD?A Signal Passed at Danger incidentoccurs when a train driver passes ared signal without permission
Bron: IVW – trendanalyse 2004
Nu
mb
er
of
SP
AD
’s
Year
Slide: 4
Research goalTo determine whether a more comprehensive analysis approach would provide additional insight on the root-causes underlying SPAD incidents.
- Existing analysis method: Bow-tie
- Alternate analysis method: PRISMA
Slide: 5
SPAD bow-tie model (1)• Developed to specifically investigate
relationships between causes and consequences of SPAD’s
• 10 main causal factors (63 sub-cat’s)
• Factors similar to those reported in other countries (including UK)
• 10 possible consequences
• Possible to include multiple causes and multiple consequences!
Slide: 6
SPAD bow-tie model (2)
SPAD Incident
Previous signal perception
Braking operation
Network Control process
Communication
Expectations
Information processing
Driver actions
Network Controller actions
Contributing factors
Signal perception
No injuries
Material damage
Minor injuries personneland/or passengers
Serious injuries personneland/or passengers
Death to personneland/or passengers
Further escalation – fire, explosion etc.
Collision – damaged infrastructure
Collision – level crossing
Only financial consequences
Derailment
Slide: 7
PRISMABasic components:
Analysis: Causal trees
Result: Root-causes
Classification: Eindhoven Classification Model
Result: Profile of root causes
Countermeasures: Classification / action matrix
Output: Appropriate countermeasure(s)
Slide: 8
Requirements of a Taxonomy
Taxonomic criteriaSPAD Bow-tie
modelPRISMA
1. Underlying theory
2. Tech./org./human factors
3. Reliable 4. Comprehensive 5. Quantitative 6. Recommendations 7. Differentiation
Slide: 9
Method of Analysis (1)Analysis using the Bow-tie modelAim: to translate bow-tie causes
into applicable PRISMA categories
Method: algorithm constructed by bow-tie analyst
Dataset: 69 incidents selected from 2003 incident set
Reliability: inter-rater reliability trials for both data and algorithm
Slide: 10
Method of Analysis (2)Analysis using the PRISMA method
Aim: examination of effectiveness of analysis
Method: reanalysis of data using causal-trees & PRISMA classification
Dataset: same 69 incidents selected from 2003 incident set
Reliability: inter-rater reliability trial of analysis and classification
Slide: 11
Results
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Technical Organisational Staff Customer &Public
Unclassified
PRISMA Category
Per
cen
tag
e
Bow-tie analysis PRISMA analysis
**
*
* Statistically Significant difference
Slide: 12
Discussion (1)• Significant differences in the types of
root-causes being found using PRISMA vs. SPAD Bow-tie model
• Not all information being used in analysis (i.e. focus on “active” rather than “latent” errors)
Slide: 13
Discussion (2)• Bow-tie analyst admitted to further
interpretation of data
• Difference in complexity of analysis- supported by tentative results of 3rd study
Causal factor
Causal factor
SPAD Bow-tieanalysis
Causal factor
Root cause
PRISMA analysis
Root cause
Root cause
Slide: 14
Study constraints• No examination of recovery factors
• No examination of specific consequences
• Limited information in dossiers, did not enable a full PRISMA analysis
• Accuracy of information in dossiers
Slide: 15
Conclusions• Current SPAD analysis process is
not as effective as possible
• Primary focus on staff and little focus on org./tech. factors
• Including multiple causes in incident analysis is an insufficient qualification for effective analysis
Underlying taxonomy must meet minimum set of criteria
Slide: 16
Questions?
Cuestiónes?
Vragen?
Fragen?
Pregunta?
Вопросы?
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