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volume12,no.2 january2012

Cartesian Consciousness

Reconsidered

Alison SimmonsHarvard University

© 2012 AlisonSimmons <www.philosophersimprint.org/012002/>

D escartes revolutionizedour conceptionof themind by identifyingconsciousnessasamarkofthemental:theCarte-sianmindisessentially(anduniquely)athinkingthing,and

Cartesianthoughtisbyitsverynatureconscious.1,2Orsothestorygoes.Idonotdenytherevolutionstory,butIwanttoaskwhatitamountsto.Inparticular,IwanttoexplorehereDescartes’ratherastonishingclaimthatall thoughtisconscious:“Norcantherebeanythoughtinusofwhich,attheverymomentitisinus,wearenotconscious.”3

1. SeePrinciples I.9,ATVIII-A7,andSecondReplies,ATVII160. Inboth thetextandnotes,Iuse“AT”toabbreviateCharlesAdamandPaulTannéry,eds.,ŒuvresdeDescartes,nouvelleédition(Paris:J.Vrin,1996).Translationsaremyown,buttheyhavebenefitedfromconsultingJ.Cottingham,R.Stoothoff,D.Murdoch,andA.Kenny,trans.andeds.,The Philosophical Writings of Des-cartes(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1984–1991).

2. Tosaythatthoughtisbyitsverynatureconsciousisnottosaythatconscious-ness exhausts thenature of thought or even that it gets at the essenceofthought. Intellectionalsoplaysan important role inDescartes’ conceptionof thought(see,e. g.,Meditation6,ATVII78,andPrinciples I.48,ATVIII-A23).Theprecisenatureoftherelationshipamongconsciousness,intellection,andthoughtisacontroversialmatterthatIaddressbelowinSectionI.B.AtthemomentwhatmattersisthatDescartescommitshimselftotheclaimthatallandonlythoughtisconscious;henceitsstatusasamark,whateverelsethoughtmaybe.

3. FourthReplies,ATVII246;seealsoFirstReplies,ATVII107,andMeditation3,ATVII49.Strictlyspeaking,thispassagesaysonlythatoccurentthoughtsareconscious.Whatofdispositionalthoughtslikestandingbeliefs,emotions,andmemories? Iwillsaymoreabout theminwhat follows inSectionII.A,butsufficeittosayfornowthattheyarenotsomuchthoughtsintheCarte-sianontologyastheyarepotentialthoughtsordispositionstohavethoughts.Thoughts proper are occurent thoughts.Why?Descartes’ substance-modeontologywillrestrictthethoughtsofamind(asitdoestheshapesofabody)tothosethataremodifyingitfrommomenttomoment.Justasthefactthatasphericalpieceofclaywascubicalyesterdayandmaybecubicalagainto-morrowdoesn’tmake cubicalness a property (that is, amode) of the claynow,sothefactthatIfeltapangofregretyesterdayandmayagaintomorrowdoesn’tmakeregretaproperty(thatis,amode)ofmymindrightnow.Mightstandingemotions,beliefsandmemoriesbementalbutnot thoughts?No.Apartfromthetranscendentalpropertiesthatbelongtoallsubstances(e. g.,duration),Cartesiansubstanceshaveonlyoneprincipalattributeofwhichallof itspropertiesaremodes(Principles I.53,ATVIII-A25).Thesubstance-modeontology,then,willrestrictthemindtoaseriesofoccurent(conscious)thoughts.Thankstoananonymousreaderofthejournalforpressingmetobecleareraboutthispoint.

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cometoseempreposteroustomostphilosophers.7DescartesscholarshavebuiltupagooddealofevidencetosuggestthatDescarteswasnot,afterall,committedtoanimplausiblystrongversionofmentaltransparencydespitefirstappearances.8 Iwilloffersomemoregristfortheirmill,butIwillfocusonthelessexaminedandsimplerclaimthatallthoughtisconscious.

MyaimisnotsimplytodemonstratethatDescarteswasasubtlerphilosopher-psychologistthanwethoughtandthattherearehiddendepths to the Cartesianmind. I also want to underscore the shifti-nessinourownconceptofconsciousness.Thatasurgeonslicingintoanabdomen isconsciousand theanaesthetizedownerof theabdo-menisunconsciousisclearenough.9Butmostofourmentallifefallssomewherebetweentheconcentratedeffortof thesurgeonandthe

7. SydneyShoemakerobserves:“AdistinctfeatureofrecentphilosophyofmindhasbeentherepudiationofCartesianism”akeyaspectofwhichissupposedto be his commitment to epistemological transparency (“First Person Ac-cess”,Philosophical Perspectives4(1990),187).QuassimCassamhelpfullyandsympatheticallyexplorescontemporaryattacksonDescartes’theoryofmind, includingattacksontransparency,in“ContemporaryReactionstoDescartes’sPhilosophyofMind”, inA Companion to Descartes, ed. JanetBroughtonandJohnCarriero(Malden,MA:Blackwell,2008),482–495.

8. SeeLilliAlanen,Descartes’s Concept of Mind (Cambridge,MA:HarvardUni-versityPress, 2003), 54–56, 99–100; JanetBroughton, “Self-Knowledge”, inA Companion to Descartes, ed. Janet Broughton and John Carriero (Malden,MA:Blackwell,2008), 179–195;EdwinCurley,Descartes Against the Skeptics (Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress, 1978), 170–193;RobertMcRae,“Descartes’DefinitionofThought”,inCartesian Studies,ed.R.J.Butler(Oxford:BasilBlackwell, 1972), 55–70;DaisieRadner, “ThoughtandConsciousnessinDescartes”,Journal of the History of Philosophy26(1988),439–452;MarleenRozemond, “TheNatureofMind”, inThe Blackwell Guide to Descartes’ Medi-tations,ed.StephenGaukroger(Malden,MA:Blackwell,2006),48–66;andMargaretWilson,Descartes(NewYork:Routledge,1978),150–165.

9. Orperhapsitisnot.GüvenGüzelderepointsoutthatanesthesiologistsstrug-gle to produce a clear operational definition to distinguish consciousnessfromunconsciousness(“TheManyFacesofConsciousness:AFieldGuide”,in The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, ed. Ned Block, OwenFlanagan,andGüvenGüzeldere[Cambridge,MA:MITPress, 1997], 1–67).AntonioDamasioexploressomeofthecomplexityinvolvedindrawingalinebetweenconsciousnessandunconsciousnessinthecontextofneurobiologi-caldisordersinThe Feeling of What Happens(NewYork:Harcourt,1999).

Todaysuchaclaimseemseitherhopelesslynaïveorblindlydog-matic, and certainlywrong. Empiricalwork in cognitive and socialpsychologysuggeststhatsomuchofourmental lifetrundlesalongunconsciouslyitisawonderthemindbotherswithconsciousnessatall.4Philosopherscomfortablypositzombiesthathavemental livesdevoid of consciousness.5 Psychiatrists have been appealing to un-consciousmental processes to explain both normal and abnormal humanbehaviorsincethe19thcentury.6But theproblemwithDes-cartes’claimisnotsimplythatitsoundswrongbytoday’slights.Theproblem is that it seems to conflictwith his own treatment of themind.Descartesintroducesallsortsofthoughtsintothehumanmindthatappeartofalloutsidethereachofconsciousness:innateideas,in-tellectualmemories,sensoryprocesses,habitual judgments,hiddenbeliefsandpassions,andmore.Somethingisnotasitseems.EitherDescartesisremarkablyinconsistent,orhisclaimthatallthoughtisconsciousismorecomplicatedthanitappears.

Theclaimthatallthoughtisconsciousisnot,ofcourse,theonlycontentiousthingthatDescartessaysaboutthemindanditsrelationto consciousness. His alleged commitment tomental transparencyhas been the object of much philosophical scrutiny. Transparency,in this context, implies that consciousness confers on us a host ofepistemic privileges with respect to our ownminds: indubitability,incorrigibility,andeveninfallibility.Theseepistemicprivilegeshave

4. TwohelpfuloverviewsoftheempiricalliteratureareTimothyWilson,Strang-ers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Self-Conscious(Boston:BelknapPressofHarvardUniversityPress, 2004), andR.Hassin, J.S.Uleman, J.A.Bargh,eds.,The New Unconscious(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2005).

5. For an introduction to these theoretical creatures and a list of philosophi-calpapersthatdiscussthem,seeDavidChalmers’“Zombiesontheweb”athttp://consc.net/zombies.html.

6. Freudistheobviousexample,butmorephysiologicallyinclinedpsychiatristsbeforeFreudwerealreadyarguingfortheexistenceofanunconsciousmen-tallife.See,e. g.,HenryMaudsley,Physiology and Pathology of Mind(London:D.Appleton,1867)andWilliamCarpenter,Principles of Mental Physiology with their Applications to the Training and Discipline of the Mind and the Study of its Morbid Conditions(NewYork:D.Appleton,1874).

http://consc.net/zombies.html



consciousnessatworkinhistheoryofmind.13TogethertheyprovidethetoolsforarichandmultifacetedpsychologyevenwithinentirelyconsciousconfinesoftheCartesianmind.

I. The Conscious Mark

Before looking at the scope of Cartesian consciousness, we needsomesenseforwhatitmightbe.Unfortunately,Descartesshowslittleinterest in explainingwhat consciousness is.He never defines theLatinconscientia ortheFrenchconscience.Infact,herarelyusesthem.14 Whenhedoes,he seems todepart fromhistoricalusage,divestingthe termsof theirnormativemoral connotation, capturedbetterbytheEnglish“conscience”,andrenderingthempurelydescriptiveandpsychological.15Andsoquestionsarise.WhatexactlyisthisnewCar-tesianconsciousness?What’stheprecisenatureofitsrelationshiptothought?Andwhatkindofanalysis,ifany,mightwegiveofit?

13. Iamnotthefirsttosuggestthattherearedifferentconceptsofconsciousnesslurking inDescartes’work.For twodetailedexplorationsofconsciousnessinDescartes, see Radner, “Thought andConsciousness inDescartes”, andViliLähteenmäki,“OrdersofConsciousnessandFormsofReflexivityinDes-cartes”,inConsciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy, ed.SarahHeinämaa,ViliLähteenmäki,andPaulinaRemes(Dordrecht,TheNetherlands:Springer,2007),455–484.

14. Asmany have noted, the adjective conscius occurs only once in the bodyoftheLatinMeditations (ATVII49),andthenounconscientia notatall.Thetermsturnupintermittentlyintherestofthecorpus.

15. GenevièveRodis-LewissuggeststhatDescartesisinfactthefirsttousetheterm in this purely descriptive and psychological sense (see Nicolas Mal-ebranche[Paris:PressesUniversitairesdeFrance,1963],175).ShediscussesthetransformationofboththeLatinandFrenchtermsinLe problème de l’inconscient et le cartésianisme(Paris:PressesUniversitairesdeFrance,1950),39,113ff.,not-ingthat theFrenchtermwasslowertochangemeaning,astestifiedbytheresistanceofFrenchtranslatorsofDescartestousetheFrenchconscience fortheLatinconscientia.Foranotherhelpfuldiscussionofthetransformationoftheconceptduringthe17thcentury,includingtheEnglishpartofthestory,seeUdoThiel,“CudworthandSeventeenth-CenturyTheoriesofConsciousness”,inThe Uses of Antiquity,ed.StephenGaukroger(Boston:Kluwer,1991),79–99.BorisHennighasrecentlychallengedtheclaimthatDescartesusesthetermsinadescriptiveandpsychologicalsenseinhisarticle“CartesianConscientia”,British Journal for the History of Philosophy15(3)(2007),455–484.

wholesaleunconsciousnessof thepatient.Howweunderstand thatin-betweendomain(isitamixofconsciousandunconscious?amixofdegreesandkindsofconsciousness?)dependsagooddealonwhatconceptofconsciousnessweareworkingwith.Therearemanysuchconcepts at work in the philosophical and psychological literaturetoday,10andtherehavebeenforages.11Relativelylittleattentionispaid,however,tosortingoutthesedifferentconceptsandthedifferentrolestheyplayinunderstandingthelifeofthemind.12SinceDescartesgotus started down the road of connecting thementalwith conscious-ness,exploringhisuseoftheconceptisagoodplacetostart.AlthoughIdonotclaimthatDescarteswasexplicitabout it,orpossiblyevenself-conscious about it, I argue that there are different notions of

10.NedBlockdescribesconsciousnessasa“mongrelconcept”inhispaper“OnaConfusionaboutaFunctionofConsciousness”(The Behavioral and Brain Sci-ences 18(2) (1995), 227–287), andhedoes sowithgood reason.TheOxford English Dictionarytodaylistseightdistinctmeaningsfortheterm;theRoutledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy distinguishesfourconcepts;andthemainentryonconsciousnessintheStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophydistinguishestwelve.

11. WithinafewdecadesafterRalphCudworthintroducedtheterm“conscious-ness” into philosophical English in 1678, Samuel Clarke disentangled nofewer thanfivedistinct sensesof the term (seeA second defense of an argu-ment made use of in a letter to Mr Dodwell, to prove the immateriality and natural immortality of the soul. In a letter to the author of A reply to Mr Clarke’s Defense, &c (London,1710),38).Acenturylater,in1877,GeorgeHenryLeweswrotean article for the fledging journalMind alerting readers to the “great am-biguity” in the terms “conscious” and “unconscious” (see “ConsciousnessandUnconsciousness”,Mindos-2(1877),156–167).AlexanderBainfollowedLewes’salvointhe1894editionofMind withbothanattempttodisentanglethemanydifferentusesofthetermandanargumentthatsuchamangled conceptshouldbynomeansserveasthecentraltermofpsychology(see“Definition and Problems of Consciousness”, Mind 3 (1894), 348–361).ThankstoDonaldAinsliefordirectingmetoClarke’stext,whichantedatesa textmore frequently cited in this context, viz., JohnMaxwell’s Appen-dixtoRichardCumberland’sA Treatise of the Laws of Nature (London,1727). Maxwell’sAppendixsimplysummarizesClarke’stext.

12. Oneobvious exception is the attentionpaid toNedBlock’s distinctionbe-tweenphenomenalandaccessconsciousness,whichhasbecomecentraltocontemporarydiscussionsofconsciousness.



B. Cognition (of the Mind by the Mind)Inadditiontorenderingourmental lifephenomenal,Cartesiancon-sciousness is a kind of cognition—away of being acquaintedwithsomethingorsomefact.Weareneversimplyconscious.Wearecon-sciousof something orperhapsconsciousthat something is the case.17Butwhatdoesthisclaimamountto?

Ononereading, theclaimthatconsciousness isakindofcogni-tion is not very informative.That’s the reading according towhichconsciousness and thought amount to the same thing. To be con-sciousistothink;tothinkistobeconscious.Thisviewissuggestedby texts like the following: “Thereare…actswhichwecallactsofthinking,suchasunderstandingorimaginingorsensing,etc.,whichallfallunderthecommonconceptof thought[cogitationis]orpercep-tion[perceptionis]orconsciousness[conscientiae]”(ThirdReplies,AT VII176;seealso lettertoGibieuf,ATIII474).Thispassagesuggeststhatthewords“consciousness”and“thought”aresynonyms.Ifthat’sright, then insofar as understanding, sensing, imagining, judging,andhopingaredifferentwaysof thinking,so tootheyaredifferentwaysofbeingconscious;andinsofarasthesemodesofthinkingarecognitive(ornot),sotooconsciousnessiscognitive(ornot).18

17. Descartes is indifferent to the distinction we now make between objectthoughtsandpropositionalthoughts(e. g.,seeingadogvs.seeingthatthereisadogintheroom).AsfarasDescartesisconcerned,thesearejusttwodif-ferentlinguisticwaystodescribeasinglementalphenomenon,andtheycanbothbeusedtodescribeeithersensory/imaginativethoughtsorintellectualthoughts (seehis letter toMersenne, July1641,AT III395).Hedoesdistin-guishperceptionsfromjudgments,butthedifferencehereisthatajudgmentincludesthewill’saffirmationordenialofwhatisrepresentedbyapercep-tion;thereisnodifferenceintherepresentationalcontentitself.

18. Theviewthatthoughtandconsciousnessaresynonymousisroutinelyattrib-utedtoDescartesbyahandfulofFrenchcommentators(see,e. g.,FerdinandAlquié,Oeuvres philosophiques [Paris:Garnier frères, 1963], v. 2, p. 586, n. 1;ÉtienneGilson,Discours de la Méthode [Paris: J.Vrin,1970],293;andJeanLa-porte,Le Rationalisme de Descartes[Paris:PressesUniversitairesdeFrance,1945],78).Morerecently,GalenStrawsonhasendorsedthisreading(seeSelves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics[NewYork:ClarendonPressofOxfordUniver-sityPress,2009],338–339).

A. PhenomenalityWhateverelseDescartesmeansbyconsciousness,heprettyclearlymeans something that confers what wemight today call phenom-enality on our mental life. Consciousness is responsible for the“lights-on”orexperientialcharacterofourmentallife.ThisisimpliedbyDescartes’ persistently including sensations likepain, titillation,heat,andcoldamongourmostprimitivethoughts.InaletterforAr-nauld,Descartesidentifiesthe“firstandsimplethoughtsofinfants”with things like “the pain they feel from somewind that distendstheir intestines,or thepleasure they feel frombeingnourishedbysweetblood”(ATV221).16Iftheyarenothingelse,sensationsofpain,titillation, pleasure, heat, and cold arephenomenal statesofmind.There is something it is like to have or be in oneof thesementalstateswhenitoccurs.

Asforourmoresophisticatedintellectualthoughts,thoughtsthattheadultmindhas the freedom toenjoy, they too seem tohaveacertain phenomenology. Descartes offers a comparative phenom-enology of imaginative and intellectual thought in Meditation 6:imaginingapentagon involvesan imagewhileunderstandingonedoes not; imagining a chiliagon involves a certain effort of mindwhileunderstandingonedoesnot.Onemightthinkthepointhereisthatimaginativethoughthas aphenomenologywhileintellectualthoughtdoesnot.Butthatcan’tberight.Intellectualthoughtat itsbestisclearanddistinctperception,andthatmustsurelyhaveaphe-nomenology.Afterall,DescartesspendsthebulkoftheMeditations tryingtogetusto(a)recognizeitwhenitoccurs,(b)distinguishitfrommoreobscureandconfusedperceptions,and(c)withholdourassenttoanyperceptionthatisnotabsolutelyclearanddistinct.Hemust,then,thinkthatthereissomethingitisliketohaveaclearanddistinctintellectualthought.Insayingthatallthoughtisconscious,Descartesisatleastsayingthatthoughtissomethingweexperiencewhenwehaveit;ithasaphenomenology.

16. SeealsolettertoHyperaspistes,ATIII424,andPrinciplesI.71,ATVIII-A35.



sincethoughtsaresimplymodifications(ortemporarywaysofbeing)ofthemind.Putfirstpersonally:inbeingconscious,Iamconsciousofmythoughtsandsoofmyselfquathinkingthing.Consciousness,onthisview,isaspecialsortofcognitionofthemindbythemind.Iwanttopressonthequestionwhatsortofcognition(of themindby themind)consciousnessamountsto,butfirstlet’stakestock.

Descartesinsiststhatall thoughtisconscious.Onthereadingac-cordingtowhichconsciousnessandthoughtarethesamething,theclaimthatallthoughtisconsciousisrelativelyuninteresting:ifthoughtjust isconsciousness,thenofcoursetherecan’tbeanyunconsciousthought.Onthereadingaccordingtowhichthoughtistheprincipleobjectofconsciousness,however,theclaimismoresubstantive.Onthisreading,allthought(beitasensation,amomentofunderstand-ing,adesire,oravolition)issuchthatitistheobjectofthisspecialformofcognitioncalled“consciousness”,whichconfersakindofphe-nomenalityonit.Andthisiswherethingsstarttogetbothinterestingandtroublesome.Whydoesall ofthatthoughthavetobetheobject

commentators have duly noted, however, Descartes frequently identifiesthinkingsubstancewithintellectualsubstanceandtherebysuggeststhatintel-lectionconstitutesthenatureofthought(Meditation2,ATVII27;Meditation6,ATVII78;andPrinciples I.48,ATVIII-A23).But it’snotclearwhat intel-lectionamountstoorhowthathelpsustounderstandwhyunderstanding,sensing,andwillingareallformsofthought-cum-intellection.IfintellectionamountstosomethingsophisticatedliketheapprehensionofuniversalsthenitseemstoonarrowtocaptureeverythingthatDescartesincludesundertherubricofthought.JohnCarrieroendorsesadifferent,butequallysophisticat-ed,conceptionofCartesian thought-cum-intellection: “full-fledgedrationalagency”(Between Two Worlds: A Reading of Descartes’ Meditations [Princeton:Princeton University Press, 2009], 368; see also 24). Lili Alanen similarlyidentifiesthought-cum-intellectionwithasetofnormativerationalcapacitiesassociatedwithspeech,conceptualization,andjudgment(Descartes’s Concept of Mind, ch.3).MarleenRozemondexploresdifferentpossibleinterpretationsofthought-cum-intellectionbutfindsnosingleoneofthemdecisive(Descartes’s Dualism[Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1998],58–60).Amorein-clusivepossibility,exploredbybothJanetBroughtonandGaryHatfield,isthatintellectionamountssimplytotheapprehensionofarepresentation(orformoridea),bethatrepresentationaconcretesensoryimageorauniversalconcept(Broughton“Self-Knowledge”,187–192,andHatfield,Descartes and the Medita-tions[NewYork:Routledge,2003],325–326).MyownviewisthatBroughtonandHatfieldareontherighttrack,butthequestionremainsvexed.

Idon’t thinkthisrepresentsDescartes’consideredview.Ontheoccasionswhenhe speaks as if “thought” and “consciousness” areinterchangeable, he is drawing a general distinction between thephysicalandthementalandsoisreachingforahostoftermsthathe thinks distinctively describe themental.He is not offering anycarefulanalysisofthenatureofthementalitself.IntheThirdRepliespassagequotedaboveDescartesgoesontosay,“Wecallthisthingathinkingthingormindorwhatevernameyoulike,solongaswedonotconfusethissubstancewithcorporealsubstance”(ATVII176).

Whenheisbeingmorecarefultosaywhatthenatureofthemen-talconsistsin,Descartes’languagesuggestsadistinctionofsomesortbetweenconsciousnessandthought.Considerthetwofollowingdefi-nitionsoftheterm“thought”:“Bytheterm‘thought’Iunderstandallthosethingsthatweareconsciousofhappeninginusinsofarasweareconsciousof them inus” (Principles I.9,ATVIII-A7; italicsmine).Andagain:“Theword‘thought’includeseverythingthatexistsinusinsuchawaythatweareimmediatelyconsciousof it”(SecondReplies,ATVII160;italicsmine).

Inpassageslikethese,thoughtseemstobewhat I am conscious of. It’s not that thought is consciousnessbut rather that thought is theprinciple object of consciousness. And so too the variousmodes ofthinking—sensing, understanding, imagining, hoping,willing—arenotkindsofconsciousnessorwaysofbeingconscious,butratherob-jectsofconsciousness.Ifthat’sright,thenconsciousnessappearstobeaspecialkindofcognition,onethattakesthoughtinparticularasitsobject.19Ifthoughtistheobjectofconsciousness,thensoisthemind,

19. Thisraisestheimportantquestionwhatthoughtitselfissupposedtobe,thisstuffofwhichweareconsciousandthatconstitutestheveryessenceofthemind.Totheextentthatthepassagesquotedabovearesupposedtobedefini-tionsofthought,theyarespectacularlyunhelpful.Definingthoughtaswhatoneisconsciousofisabitlikedefiningtheheavensaswhatoneseesthrougha telescope. It givesusatbest anextensionaldefinition, tellingushow tofindthestuffwithouttellinguswhatitis.Descartesisnotoriouslyresistanttogivingproperdefinitionsforthingshethinkshavesimplenaturesonpainofmakingthemattermoreobscureratherthanclearer(seePrinciplesI.10,AT VIII-A8,andSearch for Truth, ATX523–524).Thoughtisonesuchthing.As



consciousnessdiffersfromtheviewIrejectedearlier,thatconscious-nessjustisthought,despitethefactthattheybothtreatconsciousnessasafirst-orderaffair:onthereflexive-propertyaccount,thoughtandconsciousnesshavedifferentobjects,viz.,celeryandthethinkingofcelery,respectively;ontheidentityview,consciousnessandthoughthavethesameobject,viz.,celery.)21

AsaninterpretationofDescartes,Ithinkweshouldoptforthere-flexive-propertyviewofconsciousness.First,itmakesbettersenseofDescartes’convictionthat thought isconsciousby itsverynature. Ifconsciousness involves twodistinct thoughts, it’s not at all obvious

thoughtsareconsciousbecause they are modifications of thinking substance, which has the (suigeneris) property of being aware of itself(cf.thoughtsareconsciousbecausetheythemselveshavethesui generispropertyofbeingawareofthemselves).Intheend,Idon’tthinkthereisarealdifferencebetweenthetworeadings,thoughIagreethatBarth’swayofputtingitismorelinguisticallyfelicitous.IntheCartesiancontext,modesarenothingmorethanchangingmodificationsofthesubstanceitself,asforinstancethechangingshapesofapieceofclayinachild’shand.Justasitmakeslittledifferencewhetherwesay,atatime,thattheshapeoftheclayissphericalortheclay isspherical(locatingthepropertyinthemodeorthesubstance,respectively),soitmakeslittledifferencewhetherwesaythatathoughtisconsciousorthemindisconscious.Foramodeofthoughttobereflexivelyawareofitselfjustis forthethinkingthingtobereflexivelyawareofitselfatthetimethatthatparticularmodificationofitsthinkingoccurs.

21. Onemightwonder(asananonymousreaderofthispaperforthejournaldid)whattheontologicalstatusofconsciousnessturnsouttobeonthereflexive-propertyview:ifit’snotafirst-orderthoughtorasecond-orderthought,butareflexivepropertyofafirst-orderthought,isitamodeofamode?Thatisprobablythebestwaytothinkaboutit,buttheissueiscomplicatedbythefactthatthoughts,asmodesofmind,arealreadyontologicallymessy.Agiventhoughthasbothformalandobjectivereality;thesearesupposedtobejusttwoaspectsofasinglemodeofmind,buttheyinvolvedifferent“modesofbe-ing”(essendi modus),thelatteran“imperfect”(imperfectus)modeofbeingthat“belongstoideasbytheirverynature”(ATVII41–42).Sothereisthefurtherquestion:isconsciousnessamodeoftheformalortheobjectivebeingoftheidea,orofthetwotogether?I’mtentativelyinclinedtothinkit’samodeoftheformalbeingofathoughtfortworeasons:(a)theformalbeingofathoughtis,asitwere,thestuffofthinking—theperceptualorvolitionalaspectofthink-ing,whiletheobjectivebeingistiedtotheobjectofthought(therebyprovid-ingthethoughtwithrepresentationalcontent),andCartesianconsciousnesswouldseemtoderivefromthinkingratherthantherepresentational aspectofthought;and(b) if therearenon-representationalmodesof thoughts(bestcase:objectlesspassions),thenDescarteswillhavetosaythatconsciousnessispresentwithnoobjectivebeingpresentatall.

ofconsciousness?Whycan’tsomeofitbeanobjectofconsciousnessandsomenot?Weneedafewmoredetails.

C. Structure of ConsciousnessAssuming that thought is the object of consciousness, we can askwhetherconsciousnessisahigher-orderphenomenonorafirst-orderphenomenon. Does it involve having a thought of a thought, suchthattheconsciousness-conferringthoughtisdistinct fromthethoughtofwhichweareconscious? Orisconsciousnessasui generis propertyof thefirst-order thought itself, so that theconsciousness-conferringthoughtisidenticaltothethoughtofwhichweareconscious?IntheCartesiancontext,thehigher-orderviewwouldhavetogosomethinglike this:afirst-order thoughtrepresents(or, inCartesianterms,hasforitsobjectivereality)someobject,saycelery;adistincthigher-orderthoughtthenrepresents(i. e.,hasforitsobjectivereality)thefirst-ordercelery-representingthought,renderingitconscious.Onthefirst-orderview,bycontrast,consciousnessisakindofreflexivepropertyofthefirst-order thought itself, so that every thought effectively has twoobjects:invirtueofhavingobjectiverealitythethoughthas,say,cel-eryas itsobject;and invirtueofhavinga reflexiveproperty it alsohasitselfasobject.Inthinkingaboutcelery,athinkerthusbecomesawareatonceofboththeceleryandheractofthinking,butthroughdifferent featuresof thefirst-order thought, viz., representationandconsciousness,respectively.20(Notethatthereflexive-propertyviewof

20.In commentingonanearlier versionof thispaper (23 June2009,Humboldt-UniversitätzuBerlin),ChristianBarthproposedanotheroption:consciousnessisnotsomuchareflexivepropertyofeachfirst-orderthought(invirtueofwhichthemindthathasitbecomesawareofit),butratherareflexivepropertyoftheminditself(invirtueofwhichitbecomesawareofanythoughtthatturnsupinit).AsBarthpointsout,consciousnessisasui generis propertyonbothreadings,butonhis reading theproperty isfirstand foremostattachedto the thinkingsubstanceitself(oritsprincipalattribute,thought)ratherthanitsmodes(itspar-ticularthoughts).Barth’sreadinghasacoupleofprimafacieadvantages.First,inattachingtheconsciousnesstothemindratherthantoeachofitsthoughts,itmakesitclearthatit’sthesubstancethatisawareofitsthoughts(thusavoidingtheodd-soundingclaimthatathoughtisconsciousofitself).Second,hisread-inggivesexplanatoryprivilegetothemind’sprincipalattributeoveritsmodes:



Third,inhisRepliestoPierreBourdin’selaborateandtestyobjec-tions to theMeditations, Descartes recognizes thatwe are capableof thinking about our thoughts, but he explicitly rejects that ideathat this ability to engage inhigher-order thinking about thinkingconstitutestheconsciousnessthatispervasivethroughoutthemind.Bourdinhadsuggestedthatwhatdistinguishesspiritualsubstancesfrommaterial substances is thatwhile they both think, only spiri-tualsubstancescanthinkthattheythinkandthat“thisisreallywhatit is tobe conscious [quod vere est esse conscium]” (ATVII 533–534).Descartes objects that thiswouldnot get Bourdin anywhere sincefirst-andsecond-orderthoughtsareexactlythesamesortofthingaseachother;soiffirst-orderthoughtsdon’tdistinguishspiritualfromcorporealsubstances,thensecond-,third-orfourth-orderthoughtsarenotgoingtodistinguishthemeither.Ifthedistinguishingmarkof a spiritual substance, consciousness, is not present at the first- order level of thought then no amount of higher-order thinkingaboutthinkingisgoingtoprocureit(ATVII559).

Fourth,whenDescarteshimself invokeshigher-order thinkingofthinking, it isclearthathehassomethingotherthangarden-varietyconsciousness inmind, somethingmore likevoluntary reflectionorintrospection.Thisthinkingofthinkingpresupposestheexistenceofconsciousthought;itdoesnotconstituteit.I’lltakethispointupbe-lowinSectionIII.C.1.

Finally, it isworthnotingthattwoofDescartes’closestfollowers,LouisdelaForgeandAntoineArnauld,arequiteexplicitthatthecon-sciousness that servesasamarkof themental is afirst-orderaffairthatneedstobecarefullydistinguishedfromhigher-orderformsofre-flectionorintrospectiononourthoughts.Theformeraccompaniesallthoughtbyitsverynature;thelatteraccompaniesonlysomethoughtsbythevoluntaryeffortofthethinker.Here’sLaForge: 24

24. Traité de l’esprit de l’homme(Amsterdam,1666;photoreproductionNewYork:Goerg Olms Verlag, 1984), 54. Hereafter cited in text and notes as Traité.Translationsaremyown,buttheyhavebenefitedbyconsultingTreatise on the Human Mind, trans.D.M.Clarke(Boston:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1997).

whyafirst-orderthoughtisconsciousbyitsverynaturesinceitisnotclearwhyitcouldn’texistwithoutsomedistinctsecond-orderthoughttaking it for an object. The higher-order view is prima facie morecompatiblewitha theoryofmind that includesbothconsciousandunconscious thoughts: conscious thoughtshave,whileunconsciousthoughtslack,second-orderthoughtsthattakethemfortheirobject.22 By contrast, the first-order view takes consciousness to be genuine-lybuilt intothenatureoffirst-orderthoughtsthemselves.Thisviewdoesn’tdomuch in thewayofexplaining consciousness.But itdoeshelp tomake sense ofDescartes otherwise unexplained convictionthatallthoughtisconscious.

Second, the first-order view avoids the charge of infinite regressthat the higher-order theory faces. The charge: Cartesian thought isconscious; on the higher-order view, a first-order thought requires asecond-order thought inorder tobeconscious;but thesecond-orderthoughtmustalsobeconsciousandsoitrequiresathird-orderthought;thethird-orderthoughtmustalsobeconsciousandsorequiresafourth-orderthought;andsoonadinfinitum.23Philosophically,Descartesisonbettergroundwiththefirst-orderview.

22. Leibnizendorsesahigher-order theoryofconsciousnessandexplicitlyar-guesfortheexistenceofunconsciousfirst-orderperceptionsthat lackanyaccompanying second-order, consciousness-conferring perceptions. SeeRoccoGennaro,“LeibnizonConsciousnessandSelf-consciousness”,inNew Essays on The Rationalists,ed.RoccoGennaroandCharlesHuenemann(NewYork:OUP,1999), 353–371;MarkKulstad,Leibniz on Apperception, Conscious-ness, and Reflection(Munich:PhilosophiaVerlag,1991),167;andmy“ChangingtheCartesianMind: Leibniz on Sensation, Representation andConscious-ness”,The Philosophical Review110(2001),31–75.LarryJorgensenhasrecentlytakenissuewiththisreadingofLeibnizin“ThePrincipleofContinuityandLeibniz’sTheoryofConsciousness”, Journal of the History of Philosophy47(2)(2009),223–248.

23. ThereismuchdiscussionofthisobjectionafterPierre-DanielHuetaccusestheCartesiansofjustsucharegress.TheCartesian,Pierre-SylvainRegis,deniesthecharge,sayingineffectthatwecanbeawareofourthoughtswithoutanysec-ond,higher-orderactofthoughtbeinginvolved.ThisexchangeisdiscussedinGeneviève(Rodis-)Lewis,Le problème de l’inconscient and le cartésianisme,116–123andalsoinTadSchmaltz,Malebranche’s Theory of Soul: A Cartesian Interpretation (NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1996),fn.20,240.



itsreflexivity).Iwanttonotethatonthisviewconsciousnessisnotsomuchaformofrepresentationasitisaformofimmediateacquaintance.ItakeCartesianrepresentationtobetiedtothenotionofobjectivebe-ing,sothatathoughtrepresentswhateverhasobjectivebeinginit(inmyexample,celery),andthereisnoindicationthatDescartesthinksthatthoughtsexistobjectivelywithinthemselves,orthatsuchafeatwouldexplaintheirbeingconscious.Consciousnessdoesnotseemtobeanalyzableintoanyotherfeaturesofthought.26

II. Problems for the Conscious Mark

ThoseofuswhoteachDescartestoundergraduatesgetanuncomfort-able feelingwhenwe tellour students that allCartesian thought isconscious.AsIindicatedatthestart,thetroublecomesnotfrompost-Freudian sensibilities or fromknowledge of the latest experimentalwork in cognitive and social psychology. It doesn’t come from stan-dardphilosophicalworries aboutmemories and standingbeliefs orevenfromagutsuspicionthatthis justhastobewrong.Theworrycomes fromknowing fullwell thatDescartes himself introduces allsortsofthoughtsintotheCartesianmindthatseembyhisownlightsnottobeconscious.Howcouldthechampionoftheconsciousmarkintroducesomanyapparentlyunconscious thoughts into themind?Let’ssurveyafewproblematiccases.

26.Onemightarguethathavinganobjectistantamounttorepresentingit,soifathoughtisanobjectforitself,itmustthereforerepresentitself.Descarteshadnoofficialtheoryofintentionalityorrepresentation.Twoofhisclosestfollowers,ArnauldandMalebranche,famouslydisagreedaboutwhatitisforhumanthoughttohaveanobject,theformerarguingthatit istantamounttorepresentingitviaobjectivebeingintheintellect,thelatterarguingthattherearefourdifferentwaysofbeingintentionallyrelatedtosomething(di-rectly[e. g.,ourcognitionofGod],indirectlybywayofrepresentationalideas[e. g., our cognition of bodies], by consciousness [cognition of one’s ownmind], and through conjecture [cognitionof otherminds]). I have arguedthatMalebrancheineffectdistinguishesintentionalityfromrepresentationinhisaccount,andthathisviewofconsciousnessinvolvesintentionalitywith-outrepresentation(seemy“SensationinaMalebrancheanMind”inTopics in Early Modern Philosophy of Mind,ed. JonMiller [Dordrecht:Springer,2009],105–130).ItseemspossiblethatDescartestoorecognizesinconsciousnessaformofintentionalitythatdoesnotinvolverepresentation.

[T]he nature of thought consists in this consciousness[conscience], this testimony and this inner sentiment bywhich themindnoticeseverything itundergoesand, ingeneral,everythingwhichtakesplaceimmediatelyinitselfatthesametimeasitactsorisactedon.Isay‘immediately’toletyouknowthatthistestimonyandinnersentimentisnotdistinctfromtheactionorpassionandthattheactionsandpassionsthemselvesmakethemindawareofwhatistakingplaceinitself.Thusyouwillnotconfusethisinnerfeelingwiththereflectionthatwesometimesmakeonouractions,whichisnotfoundinallourthoughtsbecauseitisonlyonetypeofthought.

Arnauldsimilarlywrites: 25

[O]urthoughtorperceptionisessentiallyreflexiveonit-self[essentiellement reflechissante sur elle meme];or,asonesaysmorehappilyinLatin,est conscia sui [isconsciousofitself]….Beyondthisreflection[reflexion]thatonecouldcallvirtual,thereisanothermoreexplicit,inwhichweex-amineourperceptionbyanotherperception.

Consciousness for theseCartesians isbuilt into theground levelofthoughtasakindofimmediateawarenessofitself.

Cartesianconsciousness,then,isakindofreflexivecognitionthateverythoughthasofitself.Isaidabovethatonthefirst-orderreadingeverythoughteffectivelyhastwoobjects,eachinvirtueofadifferentfeatureof thought. Seeing abunchof celeryhas celery for its objectin virtueof its representing celery (i. e., in virtueof its objective real-ity);ithasitselfforitsobjectinvirtueofconsciousness(i. e.,invirtueof

25. Des Vrayes et Des Fausses Idées (Cologne: 1683; reprinted with modernizedtypography but original orthography and punctuation at Paris: LibrairieArthèmeFayard,1986),52;seealso226.HereaftercitedintextandnotesasVFI.Translationsaremyown,buttheyhavebenefitedbyconsultingOn True and False Ideas,trans.ElmarJ.Kremer(Lewiston:TheEdwinMellenPress,1990).



tracesinthebrain“disposeit[thebrain]tomovethesoulinthesamewayasitmoveditbefore,andthustomakeitremembersomething”(letter to [Mesland],AT IV114; seealsohis letter to “Hyperaspistes”,ATIII425,andTreatise on Man, ATXI177–178).Soit’sreallythebrainthathas thedisposition toproduceaconscious idea in themind invirtueofanactual tracepersisting in it.28 Inthecaseof innate ideasand intellectualmemories,however, there isnoobviousground forthedisposition.Itcan’tbelocatedinthebrainsincetheideasinques-tionareintellectualideas;thebrainissimplynotinvolved.Descartesdrawsthecontrasthimself:“besidesthismemory,whichdependsonthebody[sensorymemory],Irecognizealsoanotherone,entirelyin-tellectual,whichdependsonthesoulalone”(lettertoRegius,AT III 48;seealsohisletterstoMersenne,ATIII143;toHuygens,ATIII598;and to [Mesland],AT IV 114).MaybeDescartes is comfortablewiththemind’shavingungroundeddispositions,butIdon’tthinkso.Inatleasttwodiscussionsofintellectualmemoryhespeaksofitrelyingon“impressionsofitsown”(lettertoMersenne,ATIII84–85)or“tracesthatremainintheminditself”(letterto[Mesland],ATIV114).Whatarethesetracesinthemind?AlasDescartesdoesn’tsay.Butifthereare traces in themindeitherput therebyGodbeforebirth (innateideas)oronce I’veactuallyentertainedan intellectual idea (intellec-tualmemory), theyappear tobeunconscious.Andthat’saproblemfortheconsciousmark.

28. InthecaseoftheinnatesensoryideasoftheComments,theremaynotbeanantecedenttraceoftheideastoredinthebrainfrombirth,buttherewillbeabrainevent thatcauses(oroccasions) thesensory idea in themind inac-cordancewiththeinstitutionofnature.Soagainweneedn’tthinkthattheseideasaresittingaroundinthemindwaitingtobebroughttoconsciousness.Descartes’pointincallingsensoryideasinnateintheCommentshasmoretodowithhisrejectionofanyresemblancebetweensensoryideasandtheir(dis-talorproximate)causesthanwithanysuggestionthattheyareinthemindfrombirth(seeATVIII-B358–359).Foranexcellenttreatmentofthetopic,seeTadSchmaltz,“DescartesonInnateIdeas,Sensation,andScholasticism:TheResponsetoRegius”,inStudies in Seventeenth-Century European Philosophy,ed.M.A.Stewart(Oxford:ClarendonPress,OxfordUniversityPress,1997),33–73.

A. Innate Ideas and Intellectual MemoriesInnate intellectual ideasand intellectualmemoriesposeanobviousproblemfor theall-consciousCartesianmind.27Theproblemis thattheseideasaresupposedtobesomehowstoredinthemindwithoutourbeingawareof themformostofour lives. Innate ideasare “im-planted[inthemind]bynature”(PrinciplesII.3,ATVIII-A224),sothatthatthemindofaninfant,thoughconsumedbythebloomingbuzz-ingconfusionofitssensations:“hasinitselftheideasofGod,ofitselfandofallsuchtruthsasaresaidtobeself-evident[per se notae],justasadulthumanbeingshavethemwhentheyarenotattendingtothem”(letter toHyperaspistes,ATIII424).Similarly, intellectualmemoriesaresaidtoremaininthemindforlaterrecall(letterto[Mesland],AT IV 114).Herewehave intellectual ideas that are in themindbutofwhich Descartes himself recognizes we are not typically conscious.Howdoesthatsquarewiththeconsciousmark?

Onemight think the answer is easy. Descartes several times ex-plains that innate ideas (andpresumably intellectualmemories)arenotactual ideasbutratherdispositionstohaveactual ideas(andsoactualthoughts).Thus:

Whenwesaythatanideaisinnateinus,wedonotmeanthatitisalwaysobserved.Thiswouldmeanthatnoideawasinnate.Wesimplymeanthatwehaveinusafacultyforelicitingtheidea.[ThirdReplies,ATVII189;seealsoComments on a Certain Broadsheet, ATVIII-B357–358,366]

While actual ideashave tobe conscious, dispositions tohave themevidentlydonot(ATVII246).Themovetodispositionsworksfineforthingslikesensorymemories,whicharealsosaidtobe“inthemind”evenwhilewearenotoccurentlyawareofthem.Inthecaseofsensorymemories,however,themind’sdispositiontorecalltheideaisitselfgrounded in traces left by sensory experiences in the brain. These

27. IsetasidetheinnatesensoryideasoftheComments on a Certain Broadsheetandsensorymemories,whichIdonotthinkposeaproblemforreasonsIdescribeinwhatfollowsinthetextandinfn.28.



From this sensation of color by which I am affected, Ijudgethatthestickoutsidemeiscolored.Andfromtheextensionofthatcolorandfromitsboundariesandposi-tioninrelationtopartsofthebrain,Ifigureout[ratiocinor]thesize,shapeanddistanceofthatsamestick.Although commonlyassigned to the senses… it is clear that thisjudgmentdependssolelyontheintellect.[ATVII437–438;seealsoOptics, ATVI138–140,145;Treatise, ATXI161,163]

Againthis isagooddealmorethanwearelikelytosaywearecon-sciousof.

Finally, ifwe lookatDescartes’ treatmentof sensoryperception intheTreatise on ManandOptics,wefindDescarteshypothesizingyetmorerationalandnowalsoassociativejudgmentsaboveandbeyondthesen-soryideasproducedinusbytheinstitutionofnaturewhenanobjectcausallyimpactsoursenseorgans.Myvisualexperienceofcelerylyingtwofeetinfrontofmeinvolves,onDescartes’account,ajudgmentasso-ciatingamuscularsensationofmylookingeyes(orreachinghands)withapositionrelativetomybody(ATVI135,142);judgmentsassociatingmyoccurentsensationwithanimagisticmemoryofthecelery’ssize,shape,color,orbrightness (theresulthere isconstancy); judgmentsassociat-ingtheclarityandbrightnessofthesensationswithdistance(Optics, AT VI138–40;Treatise, ATXI160,163);andsoon.29WhileDescartesdoesmanagetoattributeanimpressiveamountofoursensoryprocessingtothingsgoingoninthebrain,andtothepsycho-physiologicalinstitutionofnaturethatgivesrisetoaricharrayofsensoryideas,thereisstillaratherstaggeringamountofprocessingleftfortheCartesianmindtodo,allofwhichitseemstoundertakeunawares.29.Hesayssomethingsimilar inMeditation2whenhe imputes judgments to

ourconceptualizedsensoryexperienceofthingslikewaxandmeninhats:whileitseemstousweseethesethings,infactweonlyseethewax’scolorandshapeand themen’shatsandcoats (whichcouldhideautomata);wejudgethatthereiswaxandthattherearemen(ATVII32).Again,however,thesensingandjudgingarephenomenologicallyindistinguishableintheex-perience.MarleenRozemondgivescloseattentiontothesepassagesin“TheNatureofMind”.

B. Unconscious Mental ProcessesThesecondgroupof thoughts thatposeaproblemfor theconsciousmarkarisesfromanumberofmentalprocessesthatDescartesproposesthemindengagesinbutthatseemtogoonundetectedbyconsciousness.

1. Sensory ProcessingThedetailsofDescartes’accountofsensoryperceptionarefilledwithhypothesizedmentalprocesses.WebarelyhavetoscratchthesurfacetofindDescartesinsistingrepeatedlyintheMeditationsandPrinciples thatoursensoryexperienceistheresultof(a)havingsensoryideas;(b) judgingthatthereissomethingoutsidethemindthat iscausingthoseideas;and(c)judgingthatthosecausesresemblestheirappear-ances(Meditations3and6,ATVII35,75,82;Principles I.66–72,AT VIII-A 32–36).Call (b) and (c) projective judgments, since they col-lectivelyprojectsensoryideasontothecorporealworld,givingusanexperienceofseeingcolored,shaped,movingthingsthataredistinctfromusandatsomedistancefromus(anepistemicdisasterfromDes-cartes’pointofview,sinceitgivesusamisleadingpictureofwhattheworldislike).Ifwewereindividuallyconsciousoftheseepistemicallytroublesomejudgments,therewouldbelittlereasonforDescartestospillsomuchinktryingtoconvinceusthatwearemakingthem.He’djusttellustointrospect.ButDescartesknowsfullwellthatintrospec-tionwillnot turnthemup:wesimplyfindthat“wefeelapainas itwereinourfoot…andseelightasitwereinthesun”(PrinciplesI.67,ATVIII-A33).Theideasandjudgmentspresentthemselvesphenom-enologicallyasasingleseamlesswhole.

Scratchingbelowthesurfacealittlemore,Descartesfamouslyex-pandsonthispointintheSixthReplies.Hereheintroducesintothesense-perceptualmixanumberofwhatwemightcall “constructive”judgments that fill in someof the content of our visual experience.Constructivejudgmentsareresponsibleforagooddealofthethree-dimensionalcharacterofourvisualexperience:



something,itisnotenoughthatthethinghavepreviouslybeenob-servedbyourmindandhaveleftsometraceinthebrainwhichgivesitoccasiontooccurinourthoughtagain;butitisalsonecessarythatwerecognize,whenitoccursthesecondtime,thatthisishappeningbecauseweperceived it before” (letter toArnauld,ATV 219–220).Suppose I remember missing the train yesterday. My imaginationconjuresupan imageof thetrainpullingoutof thestation.This isnotyetanexperienceof remembering. Itmustbeaccompaniedbymyrecognition(orapparentrecognition)thatthisissomethingthathappenedinthepast.The“direct”ideahereistheimage.Theintel-lect’s“reflexive”ideaconceptualizestheexperienceassomethingthathappenedinthepast.Asbefore,thetwothoughtsaresointertwinedthattheygiverisetoaphenomenologicallysingleexperience:theex-perienceofremembering something.

Thesecases,andpresumablyallcasesofaspectseeingorseeing-as,poseanobviousproblemfortheconsciousmarksincebyDescartes’own lights twomental acts are experienced as one; somethinghasgonemissingfromconsciousness.

C. Unconscious Mental ContentsInthethirdsetofproblemcases,whatgoesundertheconsciousradarisnotsomuchmentalprocessingasmentalcontent.

1. True and Immutable NaturesMargaretWilsondrewspecialattentiontoourideasoftrueandim-mutablenatures,becauseshequiterightlyworried that theyposeaproblemfortheomni-consciousCartesianmind.Theseideascontain“implicitly”more thanfirst appears.With concerted effort, those im-plicitcontentscanbedugout.That’swhatapriorilearningisallabout,viz.,unpacking ideas.Here isDescartes: “Idrawout froman innateideasomethingthatwasimplicitlycontainedinitbutwhichIdidnotnoticebefore,as fromtheideaofatrianglethat its threeanglesareequaltotworightangles,andfromtheideaofGodthatheexists,etc.” (letter toMersenne,AT III 383; seealsoMeditation5,ATVII63–4).

2. Conceptualized Thoughts30

There is a smattering of cases outside sensory perception inwhichDescartes introduces structurally complex thoughts whose surfacephenomenologyissimple,andsowhosecomplexityismissedbycon-sciousness.InhisexchangeofletterswithArnauldinthesummerof1648,Descartesdistinguishes“direct”[directam]thoughtsfrom“reflex-ive”[reflexam]thoughts.Directthoughtsinclude“thefirstandsimplethoughtsofinfants”suchasthesensationsofpainandpleasureImen-tionedearlier.Reflexivethoughtsarethoughtstheintellectaddstoadirect thought,and insodoingcasts it inanewlight.TheexampleDescartesofferstoArnauldistheexperienceofapainasanewpain.Apainsensationoccurswiththerecognitionthatithasnotbeenfeltbefore. Whatwehavehereisnotjustabeliefafterthefactthatthatthepainisnew.Thepainitselfisexperiencedasnew.Descartesisclearaboutthat:thetwothoughtsareso“conjoined[conjuncta]”thatthey“occur simultaneouslyandappear tobe indistinguishable fromeachother”(ATV221).Presumablythesameanalysiswouldapplytomyexperienceofthesameoldpaininmyknees.Iwillcallthecompoundthoughtthatresultsa“conceptualized”thoughtinordertohighlightthefactthatitinvolvestheintellect’sroleinaddingaconceptuallayertotheoriginalthought.31Intheseexamples,thepainbyitselfisacon-sciousthought.Descartesisgoingtohavetosaythatthesuperaddedintellectualorconceptualthoughtisconscioustoo.AndyetDescarteshimselfsuggeststhatthetwothoughtsarenotindividuallypresenttoconsciousness.Consciousnessismissingoutonsomething.

Memoryprovides another exampleof a conceptualized thoughtthat requires an intellectual add-on: “In order for us to remember

30.ThissectionisindebtedtoViliLähteenmäki’sterrificpaper,“OrdersofCon-sciousnessandFormsofReflexivityinDescartes”.

31. Lähteenmäki,followingDescartes’lead,callsthese“reflexive”thoughts,butIprefernottousethistermbecause(a)itinvitesconfusionwiththereflexivitythat is involvedineveryCartesianthought invirtueof itsbeingconsciousand (b) it is strictly speaking the intellectual component of the complexthoughtthatDescartes(confusingly)describesas“reflexive”inthiscontext,whereasIwantalabelforthecompoundthoughtasawhole.



Asforalltherest,likelightandcolors,sounds,odors,fla-vors,heatandcoldandtheothertactilequalities,thesearethoughtbymeonlyinaveryconfusedandobscureway. Idonotevenknowwhether theyare trueor false,thatis,whethertheideasIhaveofthemareideasofrealthingsorofnon-things…theideasIhaveofheatandcoldcontainsolittleclarityanddistinctnessthatitisnotpos-sibleformetotellwhethercoldismerelytheprivationofheatorheattheprivationofcoldorwhetherbothofthemarerealqualities,orneither. [ATVII43–44;seealsoFourthReplies,ATVII232–233,234]

Thereisjustsomethingaboutoursensoryideasthatpreventsusfromhavingaclearviewofwhatitistheyarerepresentingtous.ThismightbethoughttobeaproblemforthetransparentCartesianmind.32

ItdoesnothelptonotethatDescarteselsewheresaysthatwehavea clear anddistinctperceptionof color andpain “when theyare re-gardedmerelyassensationsorthoughts”inthemind(PrinciplesI.68,ATVIII-A33).First,thisclearanddistinctperceptionisahard-earnedintellectualachievement;itisnottheresultofconsciousnessalone.Itrequires a clear anddistinct (second-order) perception of our (first-order) color andpain sensations,which iswhat “regards” the colorandpain“assensationsorthoughts”;theconsciousnessthatattendsthe(first-order)sensationsrevealsnosuchthingtous.(Again,ifitdid,Descartes’ jobwouldhavebeena loteasier.) Inanyevent,and thisis the secondpoint,whatwearedoingwhenwe regardcolorsandpainsmerelyassensationsinthemindisexercisingjudgmentalcau-tioninthefaceofanintrinsicallyobscureidea.Wecanknowforsurethatthecolorandpainaresensationsinthemindbecausetheypres-entthemselvestoconsciousness.Thatdoesn’tchangethefactthatwe

32. John Cottingham similarly describes sensory ideas as “opaque” insofar astheir contents are not rationally analyzable (“TheMind-BodyRelation”, inThe Blackwell Guide to Descartes’ Meditations,ed.StephenGaukroger[Malden,MA:Blackwell,2006],179–192).HeexplorestheproblemsthisopacityposesforDescartes’allegedcommitmenttoepistemologicaltransparency.

Theissuehereisclearlytiedtotheissueofinnateideas(whichrepre-senttrueandimmutablenatures),butnowtheissueisnotthatthereliesburiedinmeanideathatIhaveneverbeforebeenconsciousof;nowtheproblemisthatevenoncebroughttoconsciousness,theideacontainsmorewithin it than Inoticeonfirst (orperhapssecondorthirdorfourth)encounter.Iamconsciousoftheideationalchest,asitwere,butnotofitscontents.Butifthosecontentsarejustcomponentsof the idea, shouldn’t they be exposed to consciousness like every-thingelseintheall-seeingCartesianmind?

2. Sensory IdeasInadditiontothehiddencontentsofintellectualideas,thereistheprob-lemofsensoryideas. Ihavealreadydiscussedoneproblemthattheyraise,viz.,ourconfusionofsensoryideaswithunnoticedjudgmentswemakeaboutthem. HereIwanttofocusonadifferentproblem:theob-scurityofsensoryideas.Forevenoncewehavemanagedtodisentangleoursensoryideasfromthevariousjudgmentswehabituallyandcon-fusedlymakeaboutthem,weareleftwithideasthatare,byDescartes’own account, obscure. Sensory ideas are not typicallyphenomenally obscure(tothecontrarytheyare“verynoticeableandsharp[manifes-tus & perspicuus]”[Principles I.70,ATVIII-A34];theyareeven“muchmorevividandpronounced[multo magis vividae & expressae]”thantheintellectualideasweencounterthroughmeditation[Meditation6,AT VII 75]).But theyare representationally obscure in the sense thatwecannottellwhattheyarerepresentingtous;wecannottellwhattheideasareideasof.ThislineofthoughtcomesoutchieflyinDescartes’discussionsofmaterial falsity inMeditation3and in theFourthRe-plies toArnauld.Wecannot tellwhether sensory ideasare ideasofthingsornon-things,ideasofsensationsorideasofcorporealmodifi-cations,ideaswithsomeornoobjectivereality,materiallytrueideasormaterialfalseideas.Sensoryideasseemtocomewithirreparablementalcataracts.Sharpenourintrospectivegazeasmuchaswelike,westillcan’ttellwhattheyareideasof.



themechanismof theirbodies.33Whereverpossible,Descarteswilloutsourcethingsthatlooklikeunconsciousmentalprocessestothe mechanicsofthehumanbody.Heaccountsforskilledautomatedac-tionslikeplayingthelute,e. g.,byappealtoautomatedmechanismsinthebody:theluteplayer“hasapartofhismemoryinhishandsfortheeaseofbendingandpositioninghisfingers invariousways,whichhehasacquiredbypractice”(lettertoMersenne,ATIII48;seealsolettertoMeyssonnier,ATIII20).Theseprocessesareunconsciousallright, but they not unconsciousmental processes. Others have am-plycataloguedthemanyapparentlymentalprocessesthatDescartesrelocatestothebody,andsoIwon’trepeatthemhere.34EventakingtheimpressiverangeofDescartes’mechanizationofthementalintoaccount,however,thereremainsalotgoingonintheCartesianmindproper thatwe appear not to be conscious of. To dealwith itDes-cartesneedsotherresources.

B. MemoryThemostfamous(orinfamous)movethatDescartesmakestoaccountfor the fact thatwedonotseemtobeconsciousofall the thinkinggoingoninourCartesianmindsistoappealtovagariesofmemory.Whenhe tries to convinceArnauld that it isn’t so crazy to supposethatwehaveconsciousthoughtscontinuouslythroughoutoursleep-inglives,hewrites:

Itisonethingtobeconsciousofourthoughtsatthetimewhenwe are thinking and another to remember themafterwards.Thus,we thinkofnothing in sleepwithoutbeing conscious of it at the samemoment, thoughwe

33. SeehislettertoMersenne,ATIII122;lettertoGibieuf,ATIII479;lettertotheMarquessofNewcastle,AT IV574–576;Discourse V, ATVI55–56;andPas-sionsI.50,ATXI369–370.

34. See, e. g.,DennisDesChene,Spirits and Clocks: Machine & Organism in Des-cartes (Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,2001),andGaryHatfield, “The‘PassionsoftheSoul’andDescartes’MachinePsychology”,Studies in History and Philosophy of Science38(1)(2007),1–35.

can’ttell(evenwithapplicationoftheintellect)whatthosesensationsarerepresentingtous.IntheverypassageinwhichDescartesrecom-mendsthisjudgmentalcautionhegoesontosaythatifwe“examinethenatureofwhat is representedby the sensationof colororpain[andpresumablythisexaminationisadeliberateexerciseofintellect]…hewill realize thathe iswholly ignorantof it” (Principles I.68,AT VIII-A33).Thecataractsareonoursensoryideasforgood.Conscious-nessmayrevealtotheminditsmanysensations;butitdoesnotrevealwhattheyrepresenttous.

Thisbriefsurveydoesnotexhausttheproblematiccases.Descartesmaintains that wemake all sorts of introspective errors about ourownmentalstates,suggestingtheyaren’tquiteclearlypresenttocon-sciousness:wetypicallydon’tknowwhatwebelieve(ATVI23);wemistakepreconceivedopinionsforclearanddistinctideas(Comments, ATVIII-B352);thoseofusmostagitatedbypassionsknowthemtheleast(Passions I.28,ATXI349);andmore.Manyofthesecaseshavebeen addressed by authors focusing on transparency of thementalandsoIleavethemasideforpresentpurposes.

III. Cartesian Resources

Whywasn’tDescartesworriedaboutallthesethoughtsandprocessesthat seem to fly about unconsciously in themind?What resourcesmighthehave toaccommodate them?Hehasmany, I’ll argue.ThefirsttworesourcesthatI’lldiscussarereasonablywellknown,sinceDescartesisexplicitaboutthem.Intheend,Idon’tthinkthattheydomuchwork:eithertheydonotsolvetheproblemsI’vediscussed,orDescartesdoesnotinvokethemtosolvetheproblems.ButDescarteshasother(better)resourcesavailabletohim.

A. AutomationDescartes’firstresourceistolimitthedomainofthemind:heremovesfromthemindwhateverhecanexplainthroughthemechanismofthebody.Descartes(in)famouslyclaimsthatweneednotattributemindsto animals at all, since all their behavior can be explained through



passbeforethewakingmindasonewalksdownthestreet,thebulkofwhichfallrightoutofthemindasquicklyastheyenter.36

Intheend,Descartesonlyappealstothevagariesofmemorytoarguefortheexistenceoffleetingthoughtsininfantsandsleepingadultsthatareunaccompaniedbyotherthoughtsthatservetomakethemsalient,andsoremembered,inourcognitivelives.RecalltheconceptualizedthoughtfromSectionII.B.2:a“reflexive”thoughtoftheintellectaccompanyingafleetingsensationconceptualizesitandmakesitstandoutinthelifeofthemind.Infantsandsleepingadults,theclaimgoes,haveonlyfleetingunconceptualizedthoughts,andsomostoftheirthoughtsareunremembered.Thatneednotmeanthattheirmentallivesareunconscious.Thisseemstomenotsuchabadargumentafterall.

The take-home point for present purposes is that simply havingaCartesianconscious thought isnotgoing togetusvery far inourcognitiveendeavors.Mostofthethinkingthatwecareaboutasphi-losophers,andinparticularthebuildingupofasystemofbeliefsandknowledge, isgoing to require theworkofmemoryand,as Iarguebelow,reflection.Consciousnessalonewon’tdoit.Itistootransient.

C. Varieties of ConsciousnessIt’s tempting to think that Cartesian consciousness is all-or-nothing:you’reconsciousofsomethingoryou’renot.Descartesdoesn’tsaythatconsciousnesscomesindifferentkindsordifferentdegrees;hejustsaysthatifsomethingisathought,thenI’mconsciousofit,andifI’mcon-sciousofit,thenit’sathought.AndyetinhisRepliestoCaterus,hesayssomethinginteresting:“therecanbenothinginmeofwhichIamin no wayconscious”(ATVII107;italicsmine).Iamgoingtotakethistinylittlecrowbaranduseittoprythedooropen.Thereare,Isubmit,bothdifferentkinds anddifferentdegreesofconsciousnessintheCartesian

36.Descartesmaybeaheadofhistimehere.Currentempiricalworkonmemorysuggeststhatitisrequiredformuchoftheordinaryoperationofourcognitivelife,andevenforourhavingasenseofself.SeeDanielSchachter,Searching for Memory: the Brain, the Mind, and the Past(NewYork:BasicBooks,1996).

typically forget them immediately. [letter for [Arnauld],ATV221;seealsolettertoGibieuf,ATIII479]

Commentatorscringeatthisresponse.Itseemsutterlyadhoc:ades-perateattempttoclingtotheconsciousmark.EvenLocke,justasmuchachampionoftheconsciousmarkasDescartes,thoughtthememorymovewashopelessandpreferredtochangetheessenceofmindfromactualconsciousthinkingtothecapacityforconsciousthinkingthansaythatthemindforgetsmostofwhatitconsciouslythinks.35

Descartesdoesnotappealtothevagariesofmemoryveryoften,andhedoesn’tneedtoinordertorespondtothesortsofproblemsI’veraised.Still,it’sworthwhilepausingoveritbrieflybecauseitrevealssomeim-portantthingsaboutCartesianconsciousness.InthelettertoArnauld,Descartesiseffectivelypointingoutthatmemoryisarealachievementwhileforgettingisnot.Thoughtscomeandthoughtsgo,onereplacedbythenext.AndwhileDescartesallowsthatsomethoughtstakeupaconsiderableduration (Conversation with Burman, ATV148), it seemsthatmostCartesianthoughtshaveabrieflifespan.Oncetheyaregone,themindhastoworktorememberthem.Whatrequiresexplanationis thefact thatwemanagetorememberanyofourconsciousexperi-ences.AsDescartesunderstandsit,rememberingaconsciousthoughtinvolvesnofewerthanfivesteps:(1)havingaconsciousthought,say,a sensationofpain in theknee; (2) the intellect’s recognitionat thatmomentthatthethoughtisnew;(3)storageofthethoughtintheformofa trace in thebrain; (4) revivalof the thoughtafresh in themind;(5)theintellect’srecognitionthatthisthoughtisonethatthemindhashadbefore (seeATV220).Whateverwe thinkof thedetailsofDes-cartes’accountofmemory,itisnotunreasonabletosupposethatitisanachievement,thatitisselective,andthatmuchofwhatpassesthroughthemindisnot,afterthefact,remembered.Thinkofalltheimagesthat

35. SeeAn Essay on Human Understanding,ed.P.H.Nidditch(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1975),II.i.15.



Bourdinbeforehim,Burman insists that consciousness is a formofthinkingofathought;itisasecond-orderphenomenon.But,headds,thinkingofathoughtcanonlybeaformofretrospectionthattakesplaceafterthetargetthoughthasoccurred.Conclusion:wecanneverreallybeconsciousofathoughtatthetimeitoccurs.DescartesseemstomissthefactthatBurmanismakingacaseaboutconsciousnessingeneral,andaddresseshimasifhe’stalkingaboutthemoreparticu-larphenomenonI’mreferringtoasreflectiveconsciousness(ormoresimply, reflection).Wecan,he retorts, thinkofa thought in second-orderfashionatexactlythemomentwearehavingit:

Tobeconsciousofone’s thought isboth to thinkand toreflecton[reflectere]it.Butitisfalsethatthisreflectioncan-notoccurwhilethepreviousthoughtisstillthere.For,aswehavealreadyseen,thesoulcanthinkofmanythingssimultaneously,anditcanpersistinagiventhought.Itisfreetoreflectonitsthoughtsasoftenasitlikes,andtobeconsciousofitsthoughtsinthisway.[ATV149]

The“consciousness”Descartesistalkingabouthereisclearlyakindofdeliberatereflectionthataccompaniesonlysomethoughtsandnotthemorepervasiveconsciousnessthatheinsistsaccompaniesallthoughts.Foritissomethinghesaysthemindhasapowertodowhenever it likes.Ittakesanactofvolition.Bruteconsciousnessisnotamatterofvolition.

LaterCartesianslikeLaForgeandArnauldmoreexplicitlydrawthedistinctionbetweenwhat I’m callingbrute and reflective conscious-ness. La Forgewrites: “youwill not confuse this inner feeling [thebruteconsciousnessthatallthoughthas]withthereflectionthatwesometimesmakeonouractions,whichisnotfoundinallourthoughtsbecauseitisonlyonetypeofthought” (Traité54).Arnauldsaysmuchthe same inapassagequotedearlier: “our thoughtorperception isessentiallyreflexiveonitself;or,asonesaysmorehappilyinLatin,est conscia sui [isconsciousofitself]….Beyondthisreflection(reflexion)thatonecouldcallvirtual,thereisanothermoreexplicit,inwhichwe

mind.GettingclearonthemcanhelpusacquitDescartesofmanyofthemoreimplausibleimplicationsofhisthoroughgoingconsciousmind.

1. Brute Consciousness vs. ReflectiveCconsciousnessMyfirstdistinction,betweenbruteconsciousnessandreflectivecon-sciousness,isrelativelystraightforward,atleastintheabstract.37Thedifference is first and foremost structural. Brute consciousness isbuilt intoeveryCartesian thought; it is simply (onmy reading) thereflexive aspectof a thought. So there is (onmy reading)onlyonethoughtinplayinbruteconsciousness.Reflectiveconsciousness,bycontrast,requirestwothoughts:afirst-orderthought(completewithbruteconsciousness)andasecond-orderthought(withitsownbruteconsciousness)thattakesthefirst-orderthoughtasitsobject.Thislat-tersortof reflectiveconsciousnessariseswhenweengage ineitherdeliberateintrospection(inordertogetabetterviewofourownmindsandthoughts)orinwhatwemightdescribeasdeliberatereflection(inordergetabetterviewofwhateveritiswearethinkingabout,say,thenature of extension). This reflective consciousness does not accom-panyallCartesianthoughts,butonlythosewedeliberatelytargetforfurtherinspection.38

That’s easy to state in the abstract.What’s the evidence thatDes-cartesrecognizesthisdistinction?FransBurmanreportshavingarguedtoDescartesthatconsciousnessisalwaysaformofretrospection.Like

37. This isnotanuncommondistinction todraw.DaisieRadner (in “ThoughtandConsciousness”)andViliLähteenmäki (in “OrdersofConsciousness”)drawitexplicitlytosortoutdifferentnotionsofconsciousnessinDescartes.

38.Thedistinction I amafterheremightbe rendered simplyas thedistinctionbetween consciousness and reflection, rather than the more cumbersome“bruteconsciousness”and“reflectiveconsciousness”.Myreasonforchoosingthemore cumbersome formulation is that there is substantive debate (andconfusion)inthetextsastowhetherconsciousnessitselfinvolvesreflection.Tothosewhoassumethatitdoes,Descartesandsomeofhisfollowersdistin-guishtheirpositionbyinsistingthereisakindconsciousnessthataccompaniesthoughteven in the absence of any explicit reflection. Thereis,then,consciousnesswithoutreflection(whichI’mcalled“bruteconsciousness”)andconsciousnesswithreflection(whichI’mcalling“reflectiveconsciousness”,butwhichon the Cartesian viewmightjustaswellbecalled“reflection”simpliciter).



illâ internâ] that always precedes reflective knowledge.[W]henanyonenoticesthathethinksandthatitfollowsfromthisthatheexists,eventhoughhemayneverbeforehave inquiredwhat thought is orwhat existence is, hestillcannotfailtohavesufficientknowledgeofthembothtosatisfyhimselfinthisregard.[ATVII422]

The pre-reflective internal cognition that we have of our thoughtsthroughbruteconsciousnessisgoodenoughforthepurposesofget-tingthecogitooffthegroundbecauseitmakesourthoughtspresenttous,andsoacquaintsuswiththoughtandexistence.Butmerepresenceto themindof our thoughts shouldnot be confusedwith reflectiveknowledgeaboutthem(orevenbeliefaboutthem).TotheextentthatthecogitoreasoninginMeditation2yieldscertainknowledgethatwearethinkingandthatweexistasthinkingthings,itrequiressecond-orderreflectiononourfirst-orderthoughts.Consciousnessofourthoughtsmay make this reflection possible, and so may be essential to self-knowledge.Butinandofitselfitdoesnotconstituteself-knowledge.40

IthinkthisdistinctionhelpstotakethestingoutoftheclaimthattheCartesianmind is transparent to itself. If that is taken tomeanthatwehavesubstantiveknowledgeofeverythoughtinourmind,itis simply false. Those things require reflective consciousness. Con-sciousnessgivesussomeacquaintancewiththecontentsandactsofourownmind,andthatprovidesanoccasionforfurtherreflectiononthem,butitdoesnotaffordknowledgeorpossiblyevenbelief.

2. Degrees of Brute ConsciousnessWithinbruteconsciousnesswecandrawsomedifferencesaswell,notinkindofconsciousnessbutindegree.Ithinktherehasbeenatemp-tationtosupposethatthelightofCartesianconsciousnessmusthave

40.For those interested in epistemic transparency of themind, then, the ques-tionthatneedstobeaskediswhethersecond-orderreflectiveconsciousness(thinkingaboutourthoughts)isindubitable,incorrigible,infallible,etc.,andifsotowhatextentfirst-orderconsciousnessgroundsthoseepistemicproperties.

examineourperceptionbyanotherperception”(VFI 52;seealso226).Thedistinction,then,iscertainlyinplaceintheCartesiancontext.

Isaid that thedifferencebetweenbruteconsciousnessandreflec-tiveconsciousnessisfirstandforemoststructural(oneisfirst-order,theotherissecond-order),butitisalsoepistemological,andthisisimpor-tantforpresentpurposes.Bruteconsciousnessgivesusacertainkindofacquaintancewithourthoughts,butthereisnoreasontothinkthatthisacquaintanceamounts toknowledgeofanysubstantivesort.Tothecontrary,anysubstantiveknowledgeofour thoughts(eitherquamodificationsofmindorqua representationsof things) arguably re-quiresreflectiveconsciousness.Therearetworoutestothisconclusion.

First, as Daisie Radner has cleverly pointed out, even having abelief about a thought chezDescarteswould seem to requiremorethanbruteconsciousnesssincebeliefsconstitutivelyrequireanactofthewillinadditiontotheconsciousthoughtoneisformingthebeliefabout.39Ifknowledgepresupposesbelief,thenittoowillrequiremorethansimplyhavingabrutelyconsciousthought.Consciousnessitselfcanconstituteneitherbeliefnorknowledgeaboutmythoughts. Itsim-plymakesthempresenttome.

ThesecondroutetothisconclusioncomesfromtheSixthReplies.Descartesdistinguishestheepistemicoutputofourpre-reflectivecon-sciousnessofourthoughtsfromtheepistemicoutputofourdeliberatereflectiveengagementwithourthoughts:

Itistruethatnoonecanbecertainthathethinksorthatheexistsunlessheknowswhatthoughtandexistenceare.But this does not require reflective knowledge [scientia reflexa], or knowledge acquired through demonstration,much less knowledge of reflective knowledge throughwhichweknowthatweknow,andknowthatweknowthatweknow,andsoonadinfinitum.Itisentirelysuffi-cientthatweknowitbythatinternalcognition[cognitione

39.Radner, “ThoughtandConsciousness”,449. JanetBroughtonmakessimilarpointin“Self-Knowledge”,188.



faintfeelingassociatedwiththemuscularchangesthatturnmyeyeinonedirectionoranotherandalsoinfocusingnearorfar,butIonlynoticeitwhentheeyedoctororaperceptualpsychologistdirectsmetoit(Optics, ATVI135,144;Treatise ATXI162).Whatmattersformypurposes is that although these sensations are so faint or phenom-enologicallyobscure that theyarehighlyunlikely tobe reflectivelynoticed,theyarearguablystillpresenttoconsciousness.For(a)witheffortwecan reflectivelyattendtothem,anditishardtoimagineat-tendingtosomethingthatisinnowaypresentand(b)iftheyweretodisappearaltogetherfromconsciousness,ourexperiencewouldbeverydifferent.(Iwillfleshoutthissecondpointinthenextsection.)

D. The Leibnizian Move, Cartesian StyleIt’sasmallstepfromphenomenalobscuritytothefinalresourcethatIthinkDescarteshasaccesstoinaccountingforapparentlyunconsciousthoughts:phenomenalconfusion.Whena thought is so faint that ithardlystandsouttoconsciousness, itmaywellbethatIcan’tdistin-guish it fromother thoughts in thevicinity (at leastwithouta lotofwork).Itbecomesphenomenallycon-fusedwiththoseotherthoughts.Nowsuchathought,whilenotindividuallypresenttoconsciousatthemomentitoccurs,isstillpresenttoconsciousnessin the whole.

Descartesdefinesadistinctthoughtasonethatinadditiontobe-ing clear is “so sharply separated fromall otherperceptions that itcontainswithinitselfonlywhatisclear”(PrinciplesI.45,ATVIII-A22).So a confused thoughtmay include a clear thought (Descartes’ ex-ampleisapain)thatissoyokedtoanotherthought(theprojectivejudgments that habitually accompany it, the reflexive thought thatthisisanewpain,etc.)thatwecan’tteasethemapart.Butitisnotasthoughthejudgmentsaretherebylosttoconsciousness.Theyturnupintheoverallexperienceofthepainintheformofmyfeelingthepaintobelocatedinmyfootorexperiencingthepainasanewone.Whenthepainandthejudgmentsarecon-fused,theyblurtogethersothatIhaveanoverallexperiencethatisquiteunliketheonethatIwouldhaveifthethoughtsweredisentangled.

justonesetting,viz.,highbeams,withtheconsequencethat Imustbeequallyconsciousofeverythinggoingoninmymind.Notonlyisthatphenomenologically implausible (thepain inmyknee ismuchmorepresenttomymindthanthefeelingofthefloorundermyfeet);itrunscountertooneofDescartes’mostbasicwaysofdescribingandclassifyingthoughts.

What I have inmind ishis classificationof thoughts as clearorobscure.ItalkedearlieraboutDescartes’useofthisdistinctioninarepresentationalcapacity(sensory ideasare intrinsicallyobscureasrepresentationsinsofarasIcannottellwhattheyrepresent),buthealso(andarguablymoretypically)usesthesetermsphenomenologi-callytorefersimplytotheextenttowhichathoughtis“presentandaccessibletotheattentivemind”;that’sthedefinitionofclarity(Prin-ciplesI.45,ATVIII-A22).Ifclearthoughtsare“presentandaccessible”tothemind,thenobscurethoughtsare“notsopresentandaccessible”totheattentivemind.Theycan’tbeinvisibletothemind,sincethatwouldruncountertotheall-thoughts-are-consciousprinciple.Theymustthereforebesimplyless presentandaccessibletotheattentivemind.(Theremust,ofcourse,beanevenlargersetofthoughtsthatfailtobepresentandaccessibletotheinattentivemind.)

The point here is that some conscious thoughts stand outmorethanothers.Descartesdoesnothesitatetosaypreciselythat.Intermsofphenomenalpower,sensoryideasaretypicallyveryclear:theyare“muchmorevividandpronouncedandeven,intheirownway,moredistinct”thanintellectualideasandmemories(ATVII75).Withinsen-soryexperienceitself,notallsensoryideasareequalinphenomenalpower:somestandoutmorethanothers.ThepainIfeelinthefootthatIhaveinadvertentlyslammedinthedoorisalotmorephenom-enally clear than the feelingofpressure that theother foot feels asitstandsonthefloor.Thisdifferenceinphenomenalclarityissurelyagood thing: the foot caught in thedoordemandsmore attentionthantheonestandingonthefloor.Somesensationsaresophenom-enallyweak(orobscure)thattheyarebarelydetectable.Thusforex-ample,whenI lookatapieceofceleryonthetable,thereisavery



consciousness in Descartes.41 Most everyone will agree that innateideasareintheCartesianmindonlypotentially.Descarteshimselfisexplicit about that: “[innate ideas] alwaysexistwithinuspotentially,fortoexistinsomefacultyisnottoexistactually,butmerelypotentially,sincetheterm‘faculty’denotesnothingbutapotentiality”(ATVIII-B361).Butwhatdoes thatmean?Needtherebe,as Isuggestedabove,somegroundortraceexistingpermanentlyinthemindtoaccountforourabilitytoconjureuptheideaforthefirsttimeor,inthecaseofintel-lectualmemory,torecallitonceithasbeenfirstconjuredup?Inshort:no.Innateideasareinthemindpotentiallyinthesensethatthemindhasacapacitytothinkthemnot onthebasisofsomepre-existingtrace(as sensorymemoriesdependona trace in thebrain)but ratherbyreflectingonthoughtsthatare,atthemomentofreflection,presenttoconsciousness.AsMcRaeputsit:“[innateideas]arenotpriortoexperi-enceorconsciousness,theyareprioronlytoreflectiononexperience.”42

Thereflectionatworkhereispreciselythesecond-orderthinkingaboutourthinkingdiscussedearlier.It’sthereflectionthathediscuss-eswithBurmanwhenhesaysthatwehavethepowertoreflectonourthoughtsasoftenaswelike(ATV149)andthatheofferstotheauthorsoftheSixthRepliesaswhatyieldsscientia reflexa(ATVII422).Itstartswithanoccurent,consciousthoughtandtakesitasanobjectforcon-centratedinquiry.Onemaydrawlogicalorconceptualconsequencesfromit;figureoutthelogicalorconceptualpreconditionsonit;infersomethinggeneralfromaparticular;orsimply,throughconcentratedattention,seesomethingthatwasn’tnoticedatfirst.Inreflectingonathoughtwecometounderstand somethingaboutit,eitheraboutwhatitrepresentsoraboutitsstatusasamodificationofmind.Ittakesusfromaseeingorimaginingatriangletounderstandingthattriangleshaveinterioranglesthatsumtotworightangles(Meditation5,AT VII 64–65);fromawarenessofmyownthinkingandexistingatamomenttotheprinciplethateverythingthatthinksexists(SecondReplies,AT

41. “Innate Ideas”, inCartesian Studies, ed.R.J.Butler (Oxford:Blackwell, 1972),32–54.

42. “InnateIdeas”,40.

The confusion I’mdescribing is similar to Leibniz’s treatment ofperceptual confusion in theNew Essays.Descartes cannot go so faras toadmitLeibnizianpetites perceptions into theCartesianmind.Pe-tites perceptions are individually unconscious. Descartes won’t havethat.ConsequentlythereisarestrictiononCartesianconfusion:theingredients of a confused Cartesian thought must be individuallyconsciousthoughts,sothatifyoucoulddisentanglethemtheywouldbeindividuallypresenttoconsciousness.Leibnizcanclaimthatourconsciousexperienceoftheocean’sroarcontainsindividuallyuncon-sciousperceptionsofeachwave.Descartescannot.Nordoeshewantorneedto.He’lloutsourcetheeffectsoftheindividualwavestothebrainandarguethatnothingturnsupinthemindatalluntilthereisasufficientlystrongimpressioninthebraintoproduceaminimallycon-scioussensationinthemind.Still,onceyougetabunchofminimallyconsciousthoughtsinamindtogether,thereisnoreasontherecannotbesomepsychologicalchemistrysuchthatsomestandoutmorethanothersandsomecastadifferent lightonotherswithanet resultofanexperiencethatisdifferentfromtheexperiencewewouldhaveifeachthoughtwerephenomenologicallydemarcatedfromeveryotherone.AllDescartesneedsisthatwebeconsciousofeachthoughtinsomeway.Thekeyforpreservingtheconsciousmark,Ithink,isthateachthoughtmakeacontributiontotheoverallconsciousexperiencethatthemindhas,sothatifitwereremovedourconsciousexperiencewouldbealtered(onwhichmorebelowinSectionIV.B.).

IV. Cartesian Solutions

SohowdoesallthishelpwiththeproblemcasesIdiscussedearlier?

A. Innate Ideas and Intellectual MemoryI will be brief on innate ideas and intellectual memories becausemyownviewdrawsheavilyonRobertMcRae’s excellent andmuchmore detailed work on the relationship between innateness and



experience, and objects would appear two-dimensional. Removeprojectivejudgments,andcolorandflavorsensationswouldseemtobewhat,accordingtoDescartes,theyreallyare(modificationsofthemind)ratherthanwhattheyappeartobe(intrinsicmodificationsofbody).Removethe“thisoccurredinthepast”judgmentfromamem-ory,andIfeellikeI’mmissingthetrainnowratherthanrememberingmissingthetrainyesterday.Thisiswhatweshouldhaveexpectedallalong.ThereasonDescartes introducestheseprocesses inthefirstplaceistoaccountfortheactualphenomenologyofourconsciousexperience.Nowthesevariouscomponentsmaybesoconfusedthatwecannotteasethemapartwithintheexperienceevenwithalotofconcentrated introspective effortor even theorizing.But that’snota problem.Descartes never promised that consciousness itself, orevenintrospection,woulddeliverupaclearanddistinctperceptualcatalogueofthemind’sindividualcontentsandtheirrelations.Thattakes somemetaphysical reflectionandscientific investigation.Allthatconsciousnesshastodoistestifyinsomewaytothepresenceofallthesethoughts.Andthisitdoes.45

C. Unconscious Mental ContentsWhat,then,canDescartessayaboutunconsciousmentalcontentsofthesortthatappeartobetuckedawayinourideasoftrueandimmuta-blenaturesandourobscuresensoryideas?Descartescannotmakethe

45. LähteenmäkiarguesthatwhatI’mcallingconceptualizedthoughtsrequireathirdkindofconsciousnessthatfallsinbetweenwhatI’mcallingbruteandreflectiveconsciousness.Hecallsit“reflexiveconsciousness”andmaintainsthatitisimportantforunderscoringthedifferencebetweenthefleetingandunconceptualizedthoughtsofchildrenandsleepingadultsandmorestableandnotableexperiencesthatwehaveofthingsthatarenotyettheobjectofdeliberatereflection(orwhathecalls“attentivereflection”).Heiscertainlyrightthatthesetwosortsofconsciousexperiencesaredifferent,bothstruc-turally(sinceconceptualizedthoughtsarealwayscomplexandinvolveain-tellectualadd-on)andphenomenologically(sinceonlythelatterisaformofseeing-as).Whetherthisforcesustointroduceathirdkindofconsciousnesshere,Iamnotsure.Formypurposeswhatmattersisthatwecanmakesenseofthecomponentsoftheseconceptualizedthoughtbeingpresent insomewaytothemindthathasthematthetimeithasthem.

VII140);fromimmediateawarenessofmyimperfectionstotheideaofGod(aperfectbeing)thattheypresuppose(Meditation3,AT VII 45–46);fromacquaintancewiththechangingflowofthoughtsinmymindtotheideaofdurationandnumber(Meditation3,ATVII44–45);andsoon.Innateideas,then,arenotsittinginthemindwaitingtobediscovered.Wearrive atthembyreflectingonideasthatoccurinthemind.43TheanalyticmethodoftheMeditationstakesthereaderonajourneyinjustthiskindofreflectivethinking.44

B. Unconscious Mental ProcessesWhat arewe to dowith the apparently simple but in fact complexthoughtsthatseemtohideamyriadofmentalprocessesthatgointotheirmaking, suchas senseperceptual experiencesandconceptual-izedthoughts?ThefactthatDescartesoftendepictstheseprocessesasoccurringveryrapidlyandhabituallyfromchildhoodmaysuggestthathe thinks theywereoriginallymadeconsciously (evendeliberately)andlateraremadesoquicklythat,whilestillconsciouswhenmade,theyareimmediatelyforgotten(SixthReplies,ATVII438,andPrinci-plesI.66–72,ATVIII-A32–37).ButDescartesneednotgothememoryroute.NordoIthinkheshould.Allofthecomponentsofthesecom-plexexperiencesare,afterall,presenttoconsciousnessinsomeway.What Imean is that the overall phenomenologyof these complexthoughtstestifiestoalltheircomponentsatthetimetheyareexpe-rienced.Ifweweretoremoveanycomponent,thephenomenologywould change.Removedistance judgments from senseperceptual

43. I haven’t said anything explicit about intellectual memories in this sec-tion.ThatisbecauseIthinktheyjustamounttoinnateideas.Torememberthattheinterioranglesoftrianglesumtotworightangles,IdothesamethingIdowhenIfirstfigureitout,thoughitperhapsitiseasierthesecondtimearound. (I’massuminghere that intellectualmemory involvesgenu-ineunderstandingandnotsimplyreproducinginmymind’searoreyethesentence“theinterioranglesofatrianglesumtotworightangles”,whichwouldbeamatterofsensorymemory.)

44. SeeDescartes’owndiscussionoftheanalyticmethod,andtheeffortrequiredto“makeourperceptionofprimarynotionsclearanddistinct”intheSecondReplies,ATVII157.



otherthoughtsinsensoryexperience,butinandofthemselvestheyaresimple.(InthiswaytheydifferfromLeibniziansensations,whichappearsimplebutareinfactcomplexconfusionsofpetites perceptions).Thereis thereforenothinginaCartesiansensationthat ishiddenfromcon-sciousness.Thereisnopointengaginginhigher-orderreflectiontogetatsomehiddencontentsthatarenotimmediatelyevidenttoconscious-ness,asthereisforanideaofatrueandimmutablenature,forthatextracontent just isn’t there.(Whathigher-orderreflectioncan doisshowiswhatoursensationsarenot,viz.,intrinsicmodificationsofbodies.)Whatismore,wedon’tneedtoknowwhatoursensationsrepresent.Ournature,accordingtoDescartes,hasinsuredthatweusetheseideasasindicationsofdifferencesinbodiesandasharbingersofbenefitandharm(Meditation6,ATVII74,81).Weareabletodothatinvirtueoftheirphenomenaldifferencesandtheirphenomenalagreeablenessanddisagreeableness.Assuch,sensory ideasserveuswell.Whatever thefurther story is about their status as representationsdoesnotmatter.Maybetheyrepresentthegoodnessandbadnessofthings.Maybetheyrepresentdamage,edibility,andthelike.Maybetheyrepresentpropermodificationsofres extensa,orthemselves,ornothing.Maybetheyrep-resentinvirtueofhowtheyfeel;maybeinvirtueoftheircausalrelationstotheworld;maybebyGod’sfiat.Theonlythingruledoutisthattheyrepresentinvirtueoftheirhiddencontents,sincetherearenone.IfI’mright,thenthereisnothingherehiddenfromconsciousness.

V. Cartesian Consciousness Reconsidered

Sowheredoesthisleaveus?Descartesisindeedunwaveringinhiscommitmenttotheconsciousmark:everythoughtthatoccursintheCartesianmind is conscious at themoment it occurs because con-sciousness is built into thought as a sui generis reflexive property.Descartes’treatmentofconsciousness,however,isagooddealmorenuancedthanonemightexpect.Thebruteconsciousnessthataccom-panies all thought is relativelymodest, andmust be distinguishedfrom the reflective consciousness that does most of the epistemicheavy lifting inDescartes’ philosophy.Thisdistinction tempers the

Leibnizianconfusionmoveherebecausethesearenotcasesinwhichthereisanyhintthattherearemanythoughtspresenttothemindatoncethatareconfusedtogether.Tothecontrary,inthesecasesthereisasingleideapresenttothemindbutsomethingaboutitappearstofallbeneaththeconsciousradar.

Let’stakeideasoftrueandimmutablenaturesfirst.InthiscaseDes-carteshastwooptions,bothofwhichrelyonthedistinctionbetweenbruteandreflectiveconsciousness.Bruteconsciousnessacquaintsuswithanidea,butdoesnotinandofitselfyieldscientiaofitscontents;thattakesreflection.Consideradifferentkindofcase:Iamgenuinelyacquaintedwithmyneighbor,Maya,and the fact that Idon’tknoweverythingthereistoknowaboutherdoesn’tchangethefactthatIamacquaintedwithher. If Iwantto learnmoreaboutherIhavetodosomeinvestigativework.Sotoowithmyideas.IfIwanttolearnmoreaboutmyideaofatriangleIcandosomework:Icanattendtoit,reflectonit,andtherebylearnathingortwo.Nowwhathappenswhenwereflectonanideaofatrueandimmutablenaturemightbeunderstoodintwoways(andtheseareDescartes’twooptions).Des-cartescouldlikenthesetoinnateideas,sayingthatwhenwehaveaconsciousideaofatrianglebeforethemind,thereisreallynohiddencontentthereat themoment,butthroughreflectionweinferthingsthataretrueofit.Onthisview,reflectionisproductive,andinvolvesreasoningfromtheconsciousideatonewonesthatarerelatedtoit.Alternatively,Descartescouldallowthatthecomplexityisthereintheideaall along,andsay that reflection shinesabrighter lighton theidea;itinvolveschangingthefocusofourattentionfromoneaspectoftheideatoanother.AlthoughDescartes’languagesuggeststhelatterreading(“Idrawout froma [nowconscious] innate ideasomethingthatwasimplicitlycontainedinitbutthatIdidnotnoticeinitbefore”[AT III 383]), I thinkone could reasonably treat the languagemeta-phoricallyandapplytheformerreadingtoit.

Asforourrepresentationallyobscuresensoryideas,whatDescartesshouldsayisthattherewasneveranyproblemhere.Sensoryideas(i. e.,sensations)aresimple ideas.Theymaygetconfusedwithallsortsof



claimtomentaltransparency.What’smore,withinthepsychologyofbruteconsciousness,Descarteshastheresourcestoaccommodatearangeofphenomenaintheconsciousmindthatothersmightbein-clinedto identifyasunconsciousthoughtsby(a)outsourcingthemtothemechanismsofthebody(inwhichcaseDescartesagreestheyareunconscious,butnotunconsciousthoughts),(b)pointingoutthatconsciousnessofathoughtisasfleetingasthethoughtitselfis(andathought’sbeingconsciousisnoguaranteethatitwillberememberedamillisecondlater),or(c)appealingtodifferentdegreesofconscious-ness,anddegreesofobscurityandconfusioninourthought,thatmakefor the complexly layered conscious experience that we have. TheconsciousCartesianmindthushasarichstructure:somethoughtsaremoreconsciouslypresenttousthanothers,somearesointermingledwithothersthattheydonotindividuallystandouttoconsciousness,andonlyafewaresubjecttoaformofreflectiveconsciousnessthataffordsphilosophicalknowledge,beitself-knowledgeorknowledgeofotherthings.Descartesdidchangeourconceptionofthemindbytreating consciousness as a mark of the mental. But the Cartesianmindisnot,afterall,uniformlyilluminatedbyahigh-intensitymen-tal lightbulb. It is as fullofperipheralperceptions,unpacked ideas,unacknowledgedjudgments,andunnoticedpassionsasanyproperlyhumanmindshouldbe.46

46. Iamgratefultomanycolleagueswhoreadorlistenedtoearlierversionsthispaperandhelpedmetoreworkitbyofferingtheirinsightfulcriticism.First,mysincerethankstotheaudiencesatTheCentralDivisionAmericanPhilo-sophicalAssociation2009,Caltech’sDepartmentofPhilosophyandHistoryof Science, ColumbiaUniversity’s Department of Philosophy, The LeibnizResearch Group of the Humboldt Universität, the University of Toronto’sPhilosophyDepartment,andtheNewEnglandWorkshopforEarlyModernPhilosophy.More particular thanks go to Donald Ainslie, Christian Barth,MattBoyle,JustinBroackes,ColinChamberlain,MichaeldellaRocca,TylerDoggett,RaeLangton,DougMarshall,SteveNadler,DominikPerler,Amé-lieRorty,andSeanGreenberg for theirquestionsandcomments.Finally, Icouldn’thavestartedthispaperwithoutthehelpfulbrainstormingsessionin-sideacarheadedtoProvidencewithMargaretAthertonandJeffMcDonough,andIwouldnothavehadnearlyasmuchfunwithitalongthewayifIhadnothadtherecentworkofJanetBroughton,ViliLätheenmäki,andMarleenRozemondtoreckonwith.Tothesescholarsmyspecialthanks.

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