Feudalism An history overview

IMPORTANT POLITICAL EVENTS IN PAKISTAN (1998-1999) 11

IMPORTANT POLITICAL EVENTS IN PAKISTAN (1998-1999)

QURAT UL AIN44

Institute of Communication Studies,University of the Punjab,Lahore.

1998sPolicy Framework in 1998Pakistan Educational PolicyThe current National Education Policy (1998-2010) was framed in the light of historical developments, modern trends in education and the newly emerging requirements in the country. The policy aiming Education for All (EFA), included elementary education, adult literacy and early childhood education. The stress to the National Education Policy is on three categories of education discussed above.Aims and objectives of Education and Islamic EducationEducation and training should enable the citizens of Pakistan to lead their lives according to the teachings of Islam as laid down in the Quran and Sunnah and to educate and train them as a true practicing Muslim. To evolve an integrated system of national education by bringing Deeni Madaris and modern schools closer to each stream in curriculum and the contents of education. Nazira Quran will be introduced as a compulsory component from grade I-VIII while at secondary level translation of the selected verses from the Holy Quran will be offered.General Sales Tax (GST)In the 1998/99 Budget, all fixed tax schemes were abolished, and the GST was extended to the retail sector a full year ahead of schedule. Administration of the GST in the textile sector will be improved in 1998/99 and the GST will be formally extended to services, petroleum products, electricity and agricultural inputs in 1999/2000. These actions, which are ahead of the schedule of the original policy framework, will constitute a major strengthening of the GST base, promote a much larger degree of documentation in the economy, and impart beneficial effects on other taxes. To reduce the burden of compliance under the GST, the return and payment forms have been simplified, restrictions on the crediting mechanism have been removed and the refund system will be reformed by March 1999 to ensure expedited payments of refunds to exporters.The government remains fully committed to the implementation of a meaningful agricultural income taxation.. All four provinces will strengthen their collection mechanisms and ensure achievement of the 1998/99 budgeted revenue target of PRs 2.5 billion.Issue of Kala Bagh Dam:In 1998, the issue to built Kala Bagh dam was raised by the government. The court had earlier called for records of meeting minutes of the CCI on the construction of Kalabagh dam. In reply, a senior CCIsecretary of the ministry of inter-provincial coordination on Thursday informed that two decisions had been taken by the CCI regarding the Kalabagh Dam project.The first of these was on September 16, 1991 when express approval for construction of Kalabagh Dam multipurpose project was given.Later on May 9, 1998 the CCI re-visited the project when the Natural Water Resources Development Program (NWRDP) headed by the ministry of water and power was directed to prepare for detractors a document explaining the issues involved in the construction of Kalabagh Punjab chief minister Shahbaz Sharif, whos province has pushed for the construction of the damHowever, it believes that the construction of Kalabagh Dam should only be undertaken after a broad national consensus. According to the party, if the people of all the provinces are not taken on board and their consent not obtained for new water reservoirs particularly Kalabagh Dam, it would lead to unhappiness and unrest. Sindh, which has long opposed the Kalabagh dam, reiterated that the dam deeply splits public opinion and faces more opposition than takers.Khuhro urged the Supreme Court to set aside the LHCs judgment in larger interest of the country. He also asked the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) Chief Mian Nawaz Sharif to get a resolution passed against the Kalabagh Dam project.Thus Kala Bagh dam issue stayed unresolved and the plan of its construction was postponed. Motorway:Motorway was formally inaugurated in 1998 under Nawaz sharifs 2nd government whose plan was made but remained unconstructed in Nawaz Sharifs 1st government (1990-1993).Resolution to rename NWFP as KPK:According to 1998 census, mother tongue of 74% people in NWFP and 99% in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) was Pushto which is also the second largest language, next to the Punjabi, in the country. Hence it was a legitimate demand of the people of the province to demand that the name of their province should reflect the language and ethnicity of its people just like Balochistan, Punjab and Sindh.In 1997-1998, sparked an acrimonious argument between the Awami National Party (ANP) and the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz group).Pakhtunkhwaresolution, was supported by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the JamiatUlema-i- Islam (JUI) (F) while the PML (N) abstained. It was opposed only by two members from the PML (J) SalimSaifullah and HumayunSaifullah. By February 1998, the situation in the NWFP reached a point of acute polarization between the pro-Pakhtunkhwa campaigners, particularly those from the ANP, and the opposing group led by veteran Muslim Leaguers. Cenus:The last census of Pakistan was held in 1981. No census was conducted after that until 1998 because different linguistic groups wanted to show their population greater so they used to pressurize the government. But, then the fifth census of Pakistan was compiled in 1998 under Nawaz sharifs 2nd government because he won with 2/3 majority and his government had a strong hold so he conducted the 5th census of Pakistan and according to it Pakistan had a population of more than 13 crore and Karachis population was estimated to be more than 1 crore. Many political parties rejected this census.

Important Political events15th Amendment:TheFifteenth Amendment bill to theConstitution of Pakistanwas Passed byNational Assembly of Pakistanon 28 August 1998. It was then moved to theSenatewhere it was never passed.The amendments include addition of a new article 2B in the constitution and amendment in Article 239 of theConstitution of Pakistan. It seeks to imposeSharia Lawas supreme law inPakistanin light of theObjective Resolutionof Pakistan.Addition of new Article 2B in the Constitution:In the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as the said Constitution, after Article 2A, the following new Article shall be inserted, namely: 2B The Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) shall be the supreme law of Pakistan.Explanation:- In the application of this clause to the personal law of any Muslim sect, the expression "Quran and Sunnah" shall mean the Quran and Sunnah as interpreted by that sect. The Federal Government shall be under an obligation to take steps to enforce the Shariah, to establish salat, to administer zakat, to promote amrbilma'roof and nahianilmunkar (to prescribe what is right and to forbid what is wrong), to eradicate corruption at all levels and to provide substantial socio-economic justice, in accordance with the principles of Islam, as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah. The Federal Government may issue directives for the implementation of the provisions set out in clauses (1) and (2) and may take the necessary action against any state functionary for non-compliance of the said directives. Nothing contained in this Article shall affect the personal law, religious freedom, traditions or customs of non-Muslims and their status as citizens. The provisions of this Article shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution, any law or judgement of any Court".Amendment of Article 239 of the Constitution:In the Constitution, in Article 239, after clause (3) the following new clauses shall be inserted, namely: (3A), Notwithstanding anything contained in clauses (1) to (3), a Bill to amend the Constitution providing for the removal of any impediment in the enforcement of any matter relating to Shariah and the implementation of the Injunctions of Islam may originate in either House and shall, if it is passed by a majority of the members voting in the House in which it originated, be transmitted to the other House; and if the Bill is passed without amendment by the majority of the members voting in the other House also, it shall be presented to the President for assent. (3B), If a Bill transmitted to a House under clause (3A) is rejected or is not passed within ninety days of its receipt or is passed with amendment it shall be considered in a joint sitting. (3C), If the Bill is passed by a majority of the members voting in the joint sitting, with or without amendment, it shall be presented to the President for assent. (3D), The President shall assent to the Bill presented to him under clause (3A) or clause (3C) within seven days of the presentation of the Bill". Pak-India Relations:The gear of 1998 was highly significant in the India and Pakistan history because the two nations became nuclear powers in 1998 and also Kargil issue that was a time when the two nuclear powers brought to the verge of war. In 1998, the Foreign ministries of both countries had been initiating peace process to ease up the tension in the region. On September 23, 1998 both governments signed an agreement recognizing the principle of building an environment of peace and security and resolving all bilateral conflicts, which became the basis of the Lahore DeclarationPakistan becomes Atomic Power:On May 28, 1998, Pakistan became a nuclear power when it successfully carried out five nuclear tests at Chaghi, in the province of Baluchistan. This was in direct response to five nuclear explosions by India, just two weeks earlier. Widely criticized by the international community, Pakistan maintains that its nuclear program is for self-defense, as deterrence against nuclear India. A former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, offered justification for Pakistans nuclear program when he said that if India were to produce a bomb, Pakistan would do anything it could to get one of its own. It has always been maintained by Pakistan that a nuclear threat posed to its security can neither be met with conventional means of defense, nor by external security guarantee. Pakistan announced the moratorium on June 11, 1998, and offered to join in new peace talks with India. Even long before these tests, Pakistan has time and again proposed for a nuclear weapon-free zone in South East Asia.1999 Kargal warIn the summer of 1999, a 73-days military conflict was fought at Kargil unveiling new insights into an asymmetric conflict wherein opposing combatants employ markedly different resources and strategies in order to maximize their advantages and exploit the opponents weaknesses. . The confrontation was manifestation of a 50 year-old Kashmir dispute that remained limited in terms of time, geographical area, and weaponry. The operation at Kargil was planned meticulously by the top Pakistani army establishment in a bid to capture the deserted heights in the Valley left by Indian army during the inhospitable weather conditions and then taking control of the vital Srinagar-Leh highway. The Pak army contemplated that by capturing the strategic heights they will be in a commanding position to get the status of the Line of Control (LoC.) altered. The whole area of Kargil belonged to Pakistan. It was captured by India in the war of 1965, but restored to Pakistan under Tashkent Agreement. In the 1971 war, Kargil was again occupied and retained by India by dint of force. Kargil operation was downright an upshot of the Kashmir dispute. Kashmir is both cause and consequence of the India-Pakistan conflict and conundrum. From historical, geographical, cultural and strategic point of view, Pakistan could not remain aloof from the question of liberty of over 13 million people of Kashmir. Hence Pakistan has always been obliged and committed to support the Independence movement of the downtrodden people of Kashmir and get the issue resolved as soon as possible so that they could get their right of self-determination. Kashmir has contributed to the overall dispute between India and Pakistan. The military establishments on both sides of the border insist that control over Kashmir is critical to the defense of their respective countries.. The Valley is strategically important because of the communication links that run through it to Ladakh and to Siachin, where the Indians and Pakistanis remain frozen in conflict. The threat to Kargil, in 1999, was more serious than Siachin, because it overlooked the already perilous road from Srinagar to Siachin and Leh. Pakistan has a quite different view of Kashmirs geopolitics. Its strategists point out that for years the major access roads to Kashmir led through what is now Pakistan, and that the proximity of the capital, Islamabad, to Kashmir makes it vulnerable to an Indian offensive along the Jhelum river. Further, Pakistanis argue that the inclusion of Kashmir would give it a strategic depth that Pakistan otherwise lacks. . . Finally, Kashmir is the source of many vital South Asian rivers, including the Indus and the famous five rivers of the Punjab: Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas and Sutlej. . . The second Kashmir, found in the minds of politicians, strategists, and scholars, is a place where national and sub-national identities are ranged against each other. The conflict in this Kashmir is as much a clash between identities, imagination, and history, as it is a conflict over territory, resources and peoples. Competing histories, strategies, and policies spring from these different images of self and other.The people of Kashmir have been fighting against Indian occupation for the last 51 years. Exceedingly disappointed with the fate of the UN resolution that guaranteed their basic right for freedom and the Indian Governments deceitful tactics and later on their claim of Kashmir as their atootung, the Kashmiri Muslims started their freedom movement against all the means and powerful machinery of coercion, aggression and regimentation of 700,000 Indian troops. As Pakistans nuclear weapons capability grew, the sub-conventional war in the valley kept escalating. The uprising in Kashmir turned out to be more persistent when the Kargil heights were occupied and held intrepidly by the freedom fighters who took the Indian troops by surprise and beat them with strategic ramifications. Indias sharp reaction to the Kargil operation was based on three major factors. Firstly, there was a change in the tactics, as instead of the usual hit-and-run tactics of the guerrilla fighters the Kashmiri freedom fighters were for the first time holding ground and defying the Indian army to attack and suffer losses. Secondly, they were interdicting the Srinagar Kargil Leh supply route that provided the main logistics support for the Indian troops holding the Siachin Glacier. The Indian troops at Siachin ran short of fuel for heating and ammunition Supplies, as for winter they couldnt stockpile during the few summer months. Thirdly, the Indian elections were not far off and the present caretaker Indian government was earnestly keen to take advantage of the Kargil situation to gain some extra seats.As usual, our freedom fighters successfully attempted a direct and frontal approach to this extra-ordinary military operation. By taking the heights overlooking Kargil and Drass the freedom fighters had placed the Indian army at a tactical and strategic disadvantage. The Kargil sector extends to about 150 km, with Drass at one end and Batalik at the other. The intrusions of freedom fighters covered over 100 km of the Kargil sector. Tactically the heights were difficult to clear. Strategically forced to concentrate troops at Kargil for the safety of Siachin, India had unbalanced herself. Kargil is at the extreme end of two vulnerable supply routes. By concentrating 30,000 troops there, other areas were denuded where freedom fighters activity had increased, as in the Kashmir valley and on the Srinagar-Jammu road. India was so much baffled that at first it denounced the freedom fighters as Taliban of Afghanistan and Pakistani infiltrators. As Indias military position in Kargil did not improve, the freedom fighters were re-classified as Pakistan Army personnel. This was a crude attempt to cover up Indian Armys operational failures in Kargil and to catch the attention of the West. India succeeded in both her objectives. The armed confrontation in Kashmir was certainly a source of some concern to the world community as both sides have nuclear weapons though the fighting was restricted to shelling across the Line of Control. The warriors had occupied areas that were not held by Indian troops. The main targets for Kargil Operation were to a) Occupy approximately 700 sq km area on the Indian side of the LoC in Kargil-Turtuk Sector, b) Interdict Srinagar-Kargil-Leh Road, c) Capture Turtuk and cut off Southern and Central parts of Siachin Glacier Sector, and d) Intensify freedom fighters activities in J&KIt was enigmatic how the strong Indian army, after 30 days of skirmishes with a band of few hundred freedom fighters entrenched on one mountain had to scout around the world for artillery and other ammunition as there was headline in the Indian Express of June 3, 1999: India shops abroad for ammunition. It was further amazing that India had to deploy a force of 50,000 soldiers in an attempt to dislodge a lightly armed band of a couple of hundred freedom fighters, a mind boggling ratio of 250 to 1, bogged down on the ground despite the passage of one full month of combat under Indian Air force and artillery cover.The Prime Minister of Pakistan met the U.S. President on July 4, 1999 and agreed to use his influence with the freedom fighters to stop the fighting in Kargil and withdraw from the heights cutting off Indias strategic supply route from Srinagar to Kargil. In the joint statement signed by President Clinton and the Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif it was once again agreed that concrete steps would be taken for the restoration of the Line of Control in accordance with Simla Agreement. The War ended on 26 July 1999 when all Pakistani troops were finally evicted from our side of the LoCWajpai visit:In response to an invitation by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister of India, ShriAtalBihari Vajpayee visited Pakistan from 20-21 February, 1999, on the inaugural run of the Delhi-Lahore bus service.The prime minister of Pakistan received the Indian prime minister at the Wagah border on 20 February 1999. A banquet in honour of the Indian Prime Minister and his delegation was hosted by the Prime Minister of Pakistan at Lahore Fort, on the same evening. Prime Minister AtalBihari Vajpayee visited Minar-i- Pakistan, Mausoleum of AllamaIqbal, GurudawaraDera Sahib and Samadhi of Maharaja Ranjeet Singh. On 21st February, a civic reception was held in honour of the visiting Prime Minister at the Governor's House.The two leaders held discussions on the entire range of bilateral relations, regional cooperation within SAARC, and issues of international concern. They decided that :a) The two Foreign Ministers will meet periodically to discuss all issues of mutual concern, including nuclear related issues.b) The two sides shall undertake consultations on WTO related issues with a view to coordinating their respective positions.Prime Minister AtalBihari Vajpayee thanked Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif for the warm welcome and gracious hospitality extended to him and members of his delegation and for the excellent arrangements made for his visit.Reaction of military establishment of Vajpai visit:Even as Prime Minister Nawaz Sharief rolled out the red carpet for AtalBihari Vajpayee, the Pakistani military establishment refused to participate in the historic ceremony at the Wagah border. Following serious differences with Sharief over his decision to welcome Vajpayee with such enthusiasm, the three service chiefs boycotted the ceremony in honour of the Indian prime minister. Reports said General Parvez Musharraf, Air Chief Marshal Parvez Mehdi and Admiral FasihBokhari protested that the government should not "welcome an enemy nation in this manner". They also told Sharief their presence at Wagah would send out wrong signals and jeopardise the prestige, dignity and honour of the Pakistani armed forces. Though Sharief invited the defence chiefs to join him in welcoming Vajpayee at Wagah, they politely declined to travel to the border. The military establishment also argued that the three chiefs were duty-bound to attend a banquet hosted by Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz in honour of visiting Chinese Defence Minister Chi Haotian. The military establishment's opinion is that Chi's visit is more important than Vajpayee's bus trip.Last months of Nawaz Sharif and clash with army:On the morning of 12 October 1999, Nawaz Sharif finally made up his mind. His army chief would have to go. Like many Pakistani leaders before him, Sharif had surrounded himself with a tightly woven cocoon of sycophants. Family relatives and business cronies filled the key posts of his administration. The chief of army staff, General Pervez Musharraf, did not fit in.Sharif had appointed Musharraf in October 1998 and quickly came to regret the decision. He regarded his army chief with distaste. The origin of the antagonism, which was mutual, lay in the snow-clad, Himalayan peaks of Kashmir. In the spring of 1999 Musharraf gave the final order for Pakistani troops to cross the line of control that separates the Indian and Pakistani armies in Kashmir. The soldiers, posing as divinely-inspired Islamic militants, clambered up the snowy passes that led to one of Kashmirs most strategic locations: the dusty, run-down town of Kargil. Having caught the Indians off guard, the Pakistani troops made significant territorial gains. Tactically, the operation was a success. Politically, it was a disaster. As India cried foul, Sharif found himself in the midst of a major international crisis. And while General Musharraf had sent the troops in, Prime Minister Sharif was left with the unenviable task of getting them out. For three decades the Pakistani people had absorbed a steady flow of vitriolic propaganda about the Kashmir issue: Sharif s decision to withdraw seemed incomprehensible and humiliating. As the man who had defied world opinion and tested Pakistans nuclear bomb, Sharif had been acclaimed as a national hero.The generals, though, were also unhappy. By deciding to pull out of Kargil without negotiating any Indian concessions in return, they argued, Sharif had squandered a militarily advantageous position and caused a crisis of confidence within the Pakistan army. After the Kargil withdrawal Musharraf faced a surge of discontent within the army. As he toured a series of garrisons he repeatedly faced the same question: If Kargil was a victory then why did we pull back? Musharraf told his men that it was the prime ministers fault and that the army had no choice but to obey his order. It was a disingenuous response. Musharraf had been fully consulted on the withdrawal order and had raised no serious objection to it.Sharif was never in any doubt that removing Musharraf would be a high-risk exercise.Sharif was furious that his few allies in the military were being sacked and demoted. It was now just a question of timing. The prime minister knew that Musharraf was due to be out of Pakistan in October to attend the fiftieth anniversary celebrations of Sri Lankas army. The army chief was due to return on 12 October; since he would be airborne for four hours, Sharif calculated, the army would be caught off-balance and left unsure how to react to his sacking. By the time Musharraf touched down, his removal would be a fait accompli and a new army chief would have taken his place. Sharif was relying on the element of surprise and felt constrained by his fear that he was being bugged. On 10 October he arranged a flight to Abu Dhabi ostensibly for a meeting with Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Nahyan. He took a very limited group consisting of his son Hussain Nawaz, his speechwriter NazirNaji and the man he wanted to succeed Musharraf, the ISI chief General Ziauddin. Confident that any conversation on the plane could not be overheard, Sharif spent the entire flight talking to Ziauddin: the final plot was being hatched.On the fateful day, Sharif knew he had to give the appearance of conducting business as usual. At 10.00 a.m. on 12 October he left Islamabad to make a routine political speech in the town of Shujaabad, near Multan. Before leaving, Sharif gave instructions that he wanted his defence secretary, Lt. General (Retd.) Iftikhar Ali Khan, to meet him on his return. He also scheduled an appointment with President RafiqTarar for that afternoon, giving instructions that the meeting should not be reflected in his official programmer for the day. The prime minister again took a small group with him: Hussain Nawaz, NazirNaji and the chairman of Pakistan Television (PTV), Pervez Rashid. When the plane landed in Multan, Sharif told NazirNaji that he should remain on board for a discussion with his son and Pervez Rashid. All the crew, Sharif said, had been told to leave the plane and they could talk in confidence. Once the aircraft door was closed the three men sat down and Pervez Rashid asked NazirNaji for his mobile phone. Sharif, he explained, could not afford any of the information he was about to divulge to be leaked. Naji was then shown a speech written in HussainSharif s handwriting that his father planned to give on television that evening. Although the punch line the dismissal of Musharraf was not included in the draft, it was clear that the speech would announce that decision. Naji then worked on the draft, translating it into Urdu.Two hours later the prime ministers plane was heading back towards Islamabad and when he touched down at the military airbase at Chaklala his defence secretary, as arranged, was there to meet him. As the two men were driven to the prime ministers residence, Sharif declared his hand. The sacking of Lt. General Tariq Pervez, he said, has started creating the impression that there is a gap between the government and the army which is not good for the security of Pakistan . . . I have decided to appoint a new army chief. The defence secretary was shocked: he could guess the armys likely reaction. He suggested that the prime minister might want to discuss the issue with Musharraf but Sharif was adamant. The time for this discussion, he said, is over.As the prime ministers car drew up outside his official residence in Islamabad his principal secretary Saeed Mehdi was, as ever, on hand to greet him. Mehdi was already aware of the prime ministers plans and Sharif now told him to prepare the official papers for the handover of military power. As he walked into his office, the prime minister confirmed that the new army chief was to be none other than the man he had wanted to appoint twelve months before, Lt. General Ziauddin.As Sharif s officials got to work, General Musharraf had already completed his official programmed in Sri Lanka and was preparing to board flight PK 805 which would take him back to Karachi, along with 197 other passengers and crew, including the pilot, Captain SarwatHussain. Because the army chief was on board there were extra security checks and the plane took off forty minutes late at 4.00 p.m. At the very moment Musharraf s plane was climbing into the sky, the man who confidently expected to replace him was reaching the prime ministers residence. By the time Sharif went to see him at 4.20 p.m., Saeed Mehdi had completed drafting the official notification. It stated that:It has been decided to retire General Pervez Musharraf, Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and Chief of the Army Staff with immediate effect. Lt. Gen. Ziauddin has been appointed as the Chief of Army Staff with immediate effect and promoted to the rank of General. Before orders to this effect are issued, President may kindly see.By 4.30 p.m. Sharif had signed the document. The deed was done.He told Ziauddin to assume his command and went to the presidents residence to show him the notification. Perhaps aware that the army might not accept the change, and that Sharif s days might be numbered, Tarar displayed some of the political cunning that had enabled him to achieve high office. Rather than writing the word approved on the notification, he employed the more neutral term seen and signed it. With the formalities completed Sharif told Pakistan Television (PTV) to broadcast the news of Musharraf s sacking. It did so on the 5.00 p.m. bulletin. PTV was also told to take pictures of Ziauddin receiving his badges of rank.Ziauddin was now the de jure army chief, but he knew that to become the de facto leader as well he would have to move fast. Rather than waste time by driving back to the ISI headquarters, he stayed in the prime ministers residence and started making phone calls from there. He thought two men, the chief of general staff Lt. General Aziz Khan and the commander of the 10th corps Lt. General MehmoodAhmed, were likely to offer him the stiffest resistance. Both were Musharraf loyalists who, within army circles, had been outspoken in their criticism of Sharif. Ziauddin decided to remove both of them. He called an old engineering corps friend, the quarter-master general Lt. General Akram, and offered him the job of chief of the general staff. Excited by his promotion, Akram said he would come straight round to the prime ministers house. Ziauddin then called the man who had recently been removed by Musharraf, General SaleemHyder. Hyder was playing golf and was not immediately available. Eventually the two men spoke and Hyder was offered General Mehmoods job: 10th corps commander.Having sorted out the two key posts, Ziauddin called round other corps commanders. Most were non-committal. They were in an awkward position: they did not want to repudiate the new army chief but were also aware that Musharraf loyalists might resist him.

While Ziauddin was trying to shore up his new position, the two men best placed to stop him, Lt. Generals Aziz and Mehmood, were playing not golf but tennis. They realised that there was a problem when both their mobile phones started ringing on the side of the court. The man who called them was the Peshawar-based Lt. General Syed uzZafar. As the longest-standing corps commander, he was serving as the acting chief of army staff in Musharraf s absence. Consequently, Ziauddin had called him to tell him about his own elevation and Musharraf s sacking. But rather than simply accept Ziauddins statement as a fait accompli General Syed uzZafar called Aziz and Mehmood in Rawalpindi. The second they were told what was happening Aziz and Mehmood held a brief conversation and decided to act. As one eyewitness put it, I have never seen two senior officers move so fast. They sped to GHQ and, as they changed out of their sports kit, considered their options. One thing, they decided, was beyond doubt: they could not permit a change of army chief while Musharraf was out of the country. The first priority, then, was to get the news off PTV. The two generals dispatched Major Nisar of the Punjab Regiment, together with fifteen armed men, to the PTV building in Islamabad. He was ordered to block any further announcement about Musharraf s sacking. As the major set off, Aziz called a meeting of all available corps commanders and other senior officers at army headquarters in Rawalpindi. Some already knew what was up: they had received the telephone calls from Ziauddin. And with Mehmood and Aziz determined to resist Ziauddins appointment, the corps commanders decided to implement the decision they had taken in principle in September: Sharif had to go. Within minutes, the infamous 111 Brigade was ordered to do its jobAwazHatao move:Dr. Qadris Agenda in 1999 was Hatao Nawaz Sharif. He was then part of the Grand Democratic Alliance (GDA), led by PPP, ANP, MQM and Imran Khan. They succeeded in installing General Musharraf and waited to be rewarded. He supported Musharraf through the referendum and the elections 2002, and was expecting a big reward for the services rendered, but got only a seat in the National Assembly. Out of frustration, he left the country and acquired the citizenship of Canada. For over seven years he preached and propagated the concept of liberal and political Islam and gained acceptability by the West, and returned to Pakistan, armed with a mission: Get the elections postponed and restrain Nawaz Sharif, coming to power because he was not considered a friend of USA as Washington Times then lamented after the 2008 elections.ReferencesKhan.M (2013) National Education Policy1998-2010. Retrieved October 18th, 2014,from,http://educationproblems.wordpress.com/2013/04/02/national-education-policy-1998-2010/Abdullah.T. (2013) Nawaz Sharif announces Karachi-Lahore motorway. Retrieved October 18th, 2014,from, http://tribune.com.pk/story/585055/nawaz-arrives-in-karachi-visits-mazar-e-quaidAnonymous (1998) Reform of tax administration. Retrieved October 18th, 2014, from,http://www.imf.org/external/np/pfp/pakistan/INDEX.HTMWikipedia (n.d.) Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan. Retrieved October 18th, 2014, from, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fifteenth_Amendment_to_the_Constitution_of_PakistanAnonymous (2003) Pakistan: A Nuclear Power. Retrieved October 18th, 2014, from,http://storyofpakistan.com/pakistan-a-nuclear-powerAnonymous (2008) Exclusive: How India became a nuclear power. Retrieved October 18th, 2014, from,http://ibnlive.in.com/news/exclusive-how-india-became-a-nuclear-power/46293-3.htmlAnonymous (n.d.)Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan. Retrieved October 18th, 2014, from,http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourteenth_Amendment_to_the_Constitution_of_PakistanAnonymous (n.d.) Nawaz Sharif. Retrieved October 18th, 2014, from,http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nawaz_SharifKifl.Z. (2003) The Story of Kargil. Retrieved October 18th, 2014, from,http://storyofpakistan.com/the-story-of-kargilAnonymous (1999) Lahore declaration.Retrieved October 18th, 2014, from, http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/lahore_declaration.htmlKhan.C. (2012) Nawaz Sharif is a Security Risk: QaziHussain Ahmad.Retrieved October 18th, 2014, from, http://chagataikhan.blogspot.com/2012/06/nawaz-sharif-is-security-risk-qazi.htmlAnonymous (n.d.) Tale of Musharrafs Coup in 1999.Retrieved October 18th, 2014, from,http://pakteahouse.net/2013/03/24/tale-of-musharrafs-coup-in-1999Beg.A. (2013) Pakistan: The end of time for rulers. Retrieved October 18th, 2014, from, http://www.opinion-maker.org/2013/01/pakistan-the-end-of-time-for-rulers