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IT WILL BE ANSWERED AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE.MONDAY, JULY 15, 2013suit for partition of joint family properties = even suit items 1 and 2 though were also purchased in the name of the first defendant yet they were joint family properties and therefore, the plaintiffs were entitled to claim a share in all the three items of the suit schedule properties.= The trial Court while granting the relief in favour of the appellants, considered the oral evidence of P.W.1, the mother and Ex.A-17 in particular. The High Court while reversing the judgment of the Trial Court placed reliance upon the release deed executed by the first respondent in the year 1959 viz., Ex.A-3 and partition deed of the year 1973, which was entered into between the four plaintiffs in which document the first respondent affixed his signature. the release deed of the year 1959 viz. Ex.A-3 and the partition deed of the year 1973 viz., Ex.A-28, it was established that the first and second items of the suit scheduled properties which were purchased in the name of the first respondent were the exclusive properties of the first respondent and therefore, the appellants were not entitled for partition in those properties. whether there was total misreading of evidence by the High Court by not considering or referring to Ex.A-17 while interfering with the judgment of the Trial Court and whether legal principles of gift were established in regard to the first item of the suit schedule property.; Section 17 of the Evidence Act reads as under: S.17. Admission defined:- An admission is a statement, oral or documentary or contained in electronic form, which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact, and which is made by any of the persons, and under the circumstances, hereinafter mentioned. 24. As far as the principle to be applied in Section 17 is concerned, the Section as it reads is an admission, which constitutes a substantial piece of evidence, which can be relied upon for proving the veracity of the facts, incorporated therein. When once, the admission as noted in a statement either oral or documentary is found, then the whole onus would shift to the party who made such an admission and it will become an imperative duty on such party to explain it. In the absence of any satisfactory explanation, it will have to be presumed to be true. It is needless to state that an admission in order to be complete and to have the value and effect referred to therein, should be clear, certain and definite, without any ambiguity, vagueness or confusion. - "admissible evidence irrespective of whether the party making them appeared in the witness box or not and whether that party when appearing as witness was confronted with those statements in case it made a statement contrary to those admissions." - when we consider the contents of Ex.A-17, which is in Tamil, is a letter written by the first respondent himself on 24.06.1974. The said letter was addressed to the third plaintiff Mr.Manickavasagam. The contents of the said letter read as under: The second plaintiff Saravanamurthi, came to my house the day before yesterday at around 09.30 p.m. He stated that something should be immediately arranged, as regards the house properties. He also asked what is the justification in all the three house properties in my name. I told him that you can be called and some arrangement can be made. I am not able to explain everything in this letter. He was in a very rash mood and was behaving in an unruly manner. At one stage, I was driven to the position that he can do whatever he likes. At 10.00 clocks in the night, I told him what arrangement could be made. But he was not in a sane mood. However much I told him that it was not my fault in purchasing all the three properties in my name and that I am not keen to have all the three properties. I was terribly upset by his behavior. At one stage, I asked him to get out. While going out, he expressed that the relationship cannot be continued thereafter. About this you need not inform mother or murthi himself. While examining the contents of the said letter, the Trial Court concluded that the three house properties, referred to therein, only related to the suit scheduled properties. Going by the statements made by the first respondent himself in the said letter Ex.A-17, it was explicit and apparent that the first respondent was fully aware that even though the properties were in his name, he was not responsible for purchasing the same in his name and that he was not interested in having all the three properties for himself.; The ingredients of Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act relating to gifts were not shown to have been complied with in order to support the said claim. In fact, while considering the relevance of Ex.A-17 and its application to the case on hand, the Trial Court noted the contradictory statement of the first respondent made in his written statement, vis--vis the oral evidence. The Trial Court has specifically noted the funds, which were available with the first respondent pursuant to his fathers demise, which was to the tune of Rs.20,887.93/- and which was kept in deposit in two accounts in the name of the first respondent himself. One account was under Ex.A-25, which was a current account in which a sum of Rs.10,919.44/- was available and the other one was under Ex.A.26, which was a savings bank account, where a sum of Rs.9,968.49/- was available. Both put together a sum of Rs.20,887.93/- was available and therefore, even after the purchase of the third item of the suit schedule property, the first respondent had a further sum available with him. The trial Court has also noted that except the ipse dixit of D.W.2 and 3 that a sum of Rs.10,000/- was paid to the first respondent by way of gift at the time of marriage of the first respondent with his daughter, there was no other evidence to support and provide credence to the said version. Unfortunately, the Division Bench of the High Court completely omitted to examine the above material piece of evidence, which was considered in detail by the trial Court, while decreeing the suit. In the light of our above conclusions, the judgment of the Division Bench cannot be sustained. The appeal stands allowed and the judgment of the Division Bench is set aside and the judgment and decree of the Trial Court shall stand restored.published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40476Page 1ReportableIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCIVIL APPEAL NO.1241 OF 2005Vathsala Manickavasagam & Ors. .AppellantsVERSUSN. Ganesan & Anr. . RespondentsJ U D G M E N TFakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.1. This appeal is directed against the Division Bench judgment ofthe Madras High Court dated 19.06.2003, in A.S.No.367 of 1985.2. Originally the suit for partition was filed by one lateMrs.Nagarathnam, along with her two sons late Manickavasagamand Saravanamurthi as well as her daughter Sethulakshmi asplaintiffs 3, 2 and 4.The present first appellant is the wife of thelate Manickavasagam, the third plaintiff, along with her sons, thesecond appellant and the third appellant. The fourth appellant isthe second plaintiff and the fifth appellant is the fourth plaintiff.The first defendant who is the first respondent herein is also theson of the first plaintiff. The second respondent was the secondCivil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 1 of 24Page 2defendant in the suit, who purchased the property from oneBarnabass Nadar, to whom the first defendant earlier sold thesuit property on 11.11.1978.3. The suit was for partition. The plaintiffs claim 4/5th shares inrespect of three items of the suit properties, which was decreedby the Trial Court, as against which, the first respondent/firstdefendant, filed the first appeal before the High Court. The HighCourt by the impugned judgment, modified the judgment anddecree of the Trial Court and held that the decree with referenceto item Nos.1 and 2 of the suit properties, cannot be sustainedand that the decree of the Trial Court for partition, was confirmedonly in respect of the third item of the suit property and that thepreliminary decree for partition in respect of the third item of thesuit property was alone granted.It is against the said judgmentand decree of the Division Bench of the High Court, theappellants have come forward with this appeal.4. The simple case of the plaintiffs in the suit was that theplaintiffs and the first defendant, are the descendants of the lateNithyanandam, who died intestate on 22.09.1956.They filed thesuit for partition for their 4/5th shares in respect of items 1 to 3.The first item of the suit property was sold by the first defendantto one Barnabass Nadar, on 11.11.1978, who in turn sold theCivil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 2 of 24Page 3property to the second defendant/second respondent. It was thecommon case that the deceased Nithyanandam had no ancestralproperty and that his wife, sons and daughter have got equalshare in the property. Therefore, as regards the eligibility andextent of share, there was no dispute. According to the firstdefendant/first respondent herein, out of the three items of thesuit properties, the first and second items of properties were theexclusive properties of the first defendant and therefore, otherswere not entitled for any share in it.5. So far as the first item of the property was concerned,according to the first defendant, the said property was gifted tohim by his father and that the second item of the property waspurchased by him by selling the jewels of his wife, as well as fromthe money advanced by his father-in-law to him.6. The trial Court framed as many as 8 issues for consideration.Issue Nos.1 to 3 related to the stand of the first respondentherein that the first item of the suit property was gifted in hisfavour by his father and that the second item of the property waspurchased from the proceeds of the jewels belonging to his wife,as well as, from the money advanced by his father-in-law. Thethird issue related to the question as to whether items 1 to 3 ofthe suit schedule properties, were the joint family properties, asCivil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 3 of 24Page 4claimed by the plaintiffs. The question relating to limitation, withregard to the claim of items 1 and 2 of the suit properties, wasthe 4th issue. The 5th issue related to the question whether,proper Court Fee was mentioned in the plaint. The sixth issuerelated to the entitlement of equity claimed by the seconddefendant/second respondent herein, as regards the first item ofthe suit schedule property. The last two issues related to theentitlement of the plaintiff for partition and the relief to begranted.7. The first item of the suit property is a house property, in a sitemeasuring 10,000/- sq.ft. in T.S.No.2951/3, at Arulananda Nagar,Thanjavur. The said house site was allotted by a Housing Societycalled Little Flower Colony House Building Co-operative Society,and the same was purchased by late Nithyanandam, in the nameof his eldest son viz., the first defendant/first respondent herein. 8. The second item of the suit property is also a house sitebearing Door No.17/35, purchased in the name of the firstdefendant on 21.10.1964, from one Visalakshmi Ammal, which islocated in Rajappa Nagar, Thanjavur. The third item of the suitproperty is also a house and since there is no dispute about theCivil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 4 of 24Page 5status of the property as a joint family property, we need not dealwith the same in detail. 9. The trial Court while answering the issues, considered theevidence both oral and documentary and reached a conclusionthat even suit items 1 and 2 though were also purchased in thename of the first defendant yet they were joint family propertiesand therefore, the plaintiffs were entitled to claim a share in allthe three items of the suit schedule properties. 10. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellants, as wellas the respondents and having bestowed our seriousconsideration to the judgments of the Division Bench of the HighCourt, as well as that of the Trial Court and other material papersplaced before us, we feel that the controversy, which centersaround this appeal will have to be briefly stated to appreciate therespective contentions of the parties.11. The appellants and the first respondent are the descendantsof late Nithyanandham, who died intestate on 22.09.1956. Hiswife, the first plaintiff, along with her deceased sonManickavasagam, 4th and 5th appellants, filed a suit for partition,as against the first respondent herein. During the pendency ofCivil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 5 of 24Page 6the litigation before the High Court, the first plaintiff viz., the wifeof the late Nithyanandham, as well as one of her sons, the thirdplaintiff Manickavasagam also died. The wife and the children oflate Manickavasagam viz., appellants 1 to 3, therefore, came tobe impleaded along with appellants 4 and 5.12. The suit was for partition in respect of three items ofproperties. As far as the third item of the property is concerned,the first respondent tacitly admitted the same to be a joint familyproperty and conceded for partition of 4/5th share of theplaintiffs.As far as the first item of the suit schedule property isconcerned, according to him, though funds were provided by thelate Nithyanandham for purchasing the same from a Co-operative Housing Society viz., Little Flower Colony House Building Cooperative Society, it was gifted to him by his father and therefore,it was purchased in his name. The first respondent, therefore,claimed that the suit property was his absolute property.13. As far as the second item of the property is concerned, thefirst respondent claims that the suit property was purchased fromout of the funds provided by his Father-in-law at the time of hismarriage, which he kept in a Fixed Deposit in a Co-operativeBank, which got matured in 1964 and that the balance amountCivil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 6 of 24was paid by disposing of his wifes jewels.The first respondenttherefore, claimed that the suit property was also his ownproperty and, therefore, the appellants were not entitled for anyshare in the 1st and 2nd items of suit properties.14. As already stated, the trial Court rejected the stand of thefirst respondent and held that the appellants were entitled forpartition in respect of all the three properties, as they were jointfamily properties. The High Court however, held that except thesuit third item of the property, the first and second items ofproperties were exclusive properties of the first respondentherein and therefore, the preliminary decree was restricted to thethird item of property and in other respects the judgment of thetrial Court was set aside.15. The trial Court while granting the relief in favour of theappellants, considered the oral evidence of P.W.1, the motherand Ex.A-17 in particular. The High Court while reversing thejudgment of the Trial Court placed reliance upon the release deedexecuted by the first respondent in the year 1959 viz., Ex.A-3 andpartition deed of the year 1973, which was entered into betweenthe four plaintiffs in which document the first respondent affixedhis signature. The High Court took the view that having regard toCivil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 7 of 24Page 8the release deed of the year 1959 viz. Ex.A-3 and the partitiondeed of the year 1973 viz., Ex.A-28, it was established that thefirst and second items of the suit scheduled properties whichwere purchased in the name of the first respondent were theexclusive properties of the first respondent and therefore, theappellants were not entitled for partition in those properties.16. In light of the above factors, the question of law that arise forconsideration in this appeal is as to whether there was totalmisreading of evidence by the High Court by not considering orreferring to Ex.A-17 while interfering with the judgment of theTrial Court and whether legal principles of gift were established inregard to the first item of the suit schedule property.17. Mr.S.Nanda Kumar, learned counsel for the appellantsvehemently contended that at the time when the first item of thesuit scheduled property was purchased, the first respondent wasonly a student, that the evidence of the mother P.W.1, disclosesthat the property was purchased in his name after duedeliberations by the husband and wife and in order to avoid anyviolation of service conditions of the late Nithyanandham, whowas then working as a Joint Registrar of Co-operative Society.The learned counsel contended that the Trial Court consideredCivil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 8 of 24Page 9the documents relating to the said properties as per Ex.No.A-10produced by the plaintiffs, which persuaded the Trial Court tohold that the first item of the suit scheduled property waspurchased by the late Nithyanandham in the name of his son onlyto avoid any violation of the rules relating to his serviceconditions and that the first respondent failed to show that it wasgifted to him by his father as claimed by him.The learnedcounsel contended that none of the ingredients relating to giftwas neither pleaded nor proved by the first respondent.18. As far as the second items of the suit scheduled property isconcerned, the learned counsel contended that in the first place,the trial Court had specifically found that the terminal benefits,which were settled pursuant to the demise of lateNithyanandham, were sufficient enough for the purchase of thesecond item of the suit scheduled property, as well as, the thirditem of the suit scheduled property and that the claim of the firstrespondent that the same was purchased from the fundsprovided by his father-in-law and from the sale proceeds of thejewels of his wife, were not conclusively proved. 19. The learned counsel pointed out that while the firstrespondent in his submission claimed that for purchasing theCivil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 9 of 24second item of the suit schedule property, he utilized a sum ofRs.10,000/- advanced by his father-in-law at the time of hismarriage and for the balance, he utilized the sale proceeds of hiswifes jewels, in the oral evidence let in on his side was to theeffect that the balance sale consideration was paid by his fatherin-law and his brother-in-law in several installments, which wascontradictory to his earlier stand in the written statement.20. The learned counsel further contended that having regard tohis prevaricating stand, one in the written statement and theother in the oral evidence, the trial Court rightly rejected theclaim of the first respondent and chose to decree the suit. Hefurther pointed out that de hors the above glaring contradiction inthe written statement and the oral evidence let in by the firstrespondent, there was a tacit admission in Ex.A-17, which wasrelied upon by the Trial Court to conclude that all the threeproperties of the suit schedule were the joint family properties inwhich the plaintiffs and the first respondent were entitled forequal share. The learned counsel further contended that theHigh Court miserably failed to examine the above relevantmaterial piece of evidence namely Ex.A17, while reversing thejudgment of the trial Court.Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 10 of2421. As against the above submissions, Mr.A.T.M.Sampath,learned counsel appearing for the respondents contended thatthe Division Bench of the High Court was well justified in relyingupon Exs.A-3 and A-28 apart from Ex B-11 viz. the sale deedwhich stood in the name of the first respondent, to hold thatitems 1 and 2 of the suit scheduled properties exclusivelybelonged to the first respondent. The learned counsel pointedout that if really items 1 and 2 of the suit scheduled propertieswere also part of the joint family properties, it was not known asto why they were not part of the release deed executed by thefirst respondent under Ex.A-3 and also part of Ex.A-28 thepartition deed, as between the four plaintiffs, in which document,the first respondent also affixed his signature.22. The learned counsel further contended that the parties werewell aware by 1959, as well as by 1973 that items 1 and 2 of thesuit schedule properties, were the exclusive properties of the firstrespondent and, therefore, the parties never intended to includethose two properties, either for the purpose of the release to beexecuted by the first respondent nor for the purpose of partition,as between the plaintiffs and the first respondent in the year1973.Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 11 of24Page 1223. Having heard the learned counsel for the respective parties,we are of the considered opinion that at the forefront, it will benecessary to consider the effect of Ex.A-17, in as much as, thesaid document is fully controlled by Section 17 of the EvidenceAct.Section 17 of the Evidence Act reads as under:S.17. Admission defined:- An admission is astatement, oral or documentary or contained inelectronic form, which suggests any inference as toany fact in issue or relevant fact, and which is madeby any of the persons, and under the circumstances,hereinafter mentioned.24. As far as the principle to be applied in Section 17 isconcerned, the Section as it reads is an admission, whichconstitutes a substantial piece of evidence, which can be reliedupon for proving the veracity of the facts, incorporated therein.When once, the admission as noted in a statement either oral ordocumentary is found, then the whole onus would shift to theparty who made such an admission and it will become animperative duty on such party to explain it. In the absence of anysatisfactory explanation, it will have to be presumed to be true.It is needless to state that an admission in order to be completeand to have the value and effect referred to therein, should beCivil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 12 of24Page 13clear, certain and definite, without any ambiguity, vagueness orconfusion.In this context, it will be worthwhile to refer to adecision of this Court in Union of India Vs. Moksh Buildersand Financiers Ltd. and others - AIR 1977 SC 409 wherein itis held as under:It has been held by this Court in Bharat Singhv. Bhagirath [1966] 1 SCR 606 = AIR 1966 SC 405 thatan admission is substantive evidence of the factadmitted, and that admissions duly proved are"admissible evidence irrespective of whether the partymaking them appeared in the witness box or not andwhether that party when appearing as witness wasconfronted with those statements in case it made astatement contrary to those admissions." In taking thisview this Court has noticed the decision in AjodhyaPrasad Bhargava v. Bhawani Shanker - AIR 1957 All 1(FB) also.25. Keeping the said statutory provision in mind,when weconsider the contents of Ex.A-17, which is in Tamil, is a letterwritten by the first respondent himself on 24.06.1974. The saidletter was addressed to the third plaintiff Mr.Manickavasagam.The contents of the said letter read as under:The second plaintiff Saravanamurthi, came to my housethe day before yesterday at around 09.30 p.m. Hestated that something should be immediately arranged,Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 13 of24Page 14as regards the house properties. He also asked what isthe justification in all the three house properties in myname. I told him that you can be called and somearrangement can be made. I am not able to explaineverything in this letter. He was in a very rash moodand was behaving in an unruly manner. At one stage, Iwas driven to the position that he can do whatever helikes. At 10.00 clocks in the night, I told him whatarrangement could be made. But he was not in a sanemood. However much I told him that it was not my faultin purchasing all the three properties in my name andthat I am not keen to have all the three properties. I wasterribly upset by his behavior. At one stage, I asked himto get out. While going out, he expressed that therelationship cannot be continued thereafter. About thisyou need not inform mother or murthi himself.26. While examining the contents of the said letter, the TrialCourt concluded that the three house properties, referred totherein, only related to the suit scheduled properties. Going bythe statements made by the first respondent himself in the saidletter Ex.A-17, it was explicit and apparent that the firstrespondent was fully aware that even though the properties werein his name, he was not responsible for purchasing the same inhis name and that he was not interested in having all the threeproperties for himself.Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 14 of24Page 1527. When we examine the said document, we find that theconclusions arrived at by the trial Court based on the contents ofEx.A-17, cannot be found fault with. In fact, Ex.A-17, came intoexistence only on 24.06.1974. It is not as if the first respondentdisowned the said document. The contents of the said documentwere also not disputed by the first respondent. It is not the caseof the first respondent that the three houses referred to in thesaid document, related to any other properties other than thesuit-scheduled properties. It is also not his case that the nameand persons mentioned therein, related to somebody else otherthan his own brother, the second plaintiff and his mother. Thefirst respondent had also not lead any evidence to disprove Ex.A-17.28. Keeping the above factors in mind, when we apply Section 17of the Evidence Act, we find that Ex.A-17 is a statement and thedetails contained therein, which pertains to the suit scheduledproperties, constituted a tacit admission at the instance of thefirst respondent. If after Ex.A-3, release deed of 1959 and thepartition deed, Ex.A-28 of 1973, in 1974, the first respondent onhis own, came forward with the said letter to the third plaintiffadmitting in so many words as to the status of the suit scheduledproperties, vis--vis the concerned parties themselves, we fail toCivil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 15 of24Page 16understand as to what wrong was committed by the Trial Court inplacing reliance upon the same to decree the suit. If in reality,the first respondent had his own reservations as to the ownershipof the suit scheduled properties, in particular items 1 and 2, noone prevented him from stating so in uncontroverted terms, whilecommunicating the same in the form of writing, to one of his ownbrothers. In fact, the grievance of the second plaintiffSaravanamurthi, was that since the properties were purchased inthe name of the first respondent and he being the eldest son ofthe family, was having an upper hand over all the others and wastrying to snatch away the properties. The tone and tenor of theletter viz., Ex.A-17, authored by the first respondent, disclosesthat he too was not very keen to grab all the three properties,simply because those properties were purchased in his name. Hewent to the extent of stating that he was not responsible forpurchasing all the three house properties in his name. He wentone step further and stated that he did not want to possess allthe three properties all time to come. If, such a clear-cut mindsetwas expressed by the first respondent though Ex.A-17, it wasfutile on his part to have come forward with any other story afterthe suit came to be filed by the plaintiffs.Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 16 of24Page 1729. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for theappellants, the stand of the first respondent in his statement asregards the second item of the suit schedule property, was thatthe sale consideration of Rs.18,200/- was paid partly from a sumof Rs.10,000/-, paid to him by his father-in-law and the remainingsum by disposing of his wifes jewels. The Trial Court has notedthat in support of the said stand, no piece of evidence was leadbefore it. On the other hand, giving a go-by to the said standthat the balance sale consideration was met by disposing of hiswifes jewels, evidence was lead to show as though the remainingsale consideration was paid by his father-in-law and brother-inlaw in installments. The above stand contained in the writtenstatement and lead by way of oral evidence, were fullycontradictory and, therefore, the one belied the other.30. The specific case of the first respondent, as regards thefirst item of the suit property was that his father gifted the saidproperty to him. Except for the said plea ipse dixit, there wasnothing on record to support the said stand. Reliance wasplaced upon Exs.B1 to B6, which were the communicationsbetween Nithyanandam and Little Flower Colony HouseBuilding Society Ltd., Thanjavur in the year 1955-56. Ex.B4,was a letter by the said Society dated 24.02.1955, whichCivil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 17 of24informed Nithyanandam about the allotment of plot in hisfavour and also asking him to deposit the sale value ofRs.300/- and a sum of Rs.150 for reclamation and charges fortransfer of land in his favour. On the same day, under Ex.B5,he wrote a letter expressing his acceptance. Under Ex.B6, hedeposited a sum of Rs.150/- towards charges for transfer ofthe land in his favour.31. P.W.1, the wife of Nithyanandam, the first plaintiff,deposed that both of them discussed together and ultimatelydecided to purchase the first item of the suit property in thename of the first respondent. Through her, Exs.A1 and A2were produced to show that the house tax were paid in theyear 1971-72, 1972-73 and 1973-74 by the family members, inrespect of the said property though it stood in the name of thefirst respondent.32. It has also come in evidence that at that point of time, thefirst respondent was undergoing his graduation. There was nogift deed by the late Nithyanandam in favour of the firstrespondent. Till the lifetime of Nithyanandam, no evidencewas placed before the Court to demonstrate thatNithyanandam gifted away the said property in favour of theCivil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 18 of24Page 19first respondent, absolutely and that the first respondentexpressed his acceptance of the said gift.33. Keeping the above facts in mind, when we examine thelaw relating to gift, under Section 122 of the Transfer ofProperty Act, a gift is defined as transfer of certain existingmovable or immovable property made voluntarily and withoutconsideration, by one person, called the donor, to another,called the donee, and accepted by or on behalf of the donee.The section also mandates that such acceptance must bemade during the lifetime of the donor and while he is stillcapable of giving. If the donee dies before acceptance, thegift is void.34. We are not concerned with the last part of the section.Going by the facts placed before the Court as stated earlier,except the ipse dixit statement made in the written statement,that late Nithyanandam gifted away the first item of the suitproperty in his favour, there was no other evidence lead insupport of the said claim of gift.35. In fact, at that time, when the property was purchased, thefirst respondent was a college going student. Merely becauseCivil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 19 of24Page 20the property was purchased in the name of the firstrespondent, it cannot be held that there was a valid gift in hisfavour, without any other evidence supporting the said claim.36. Per contra, his own mother P.W.1, made it clear that sinceher husband Nithyanandam, was in the service of the Stateand was aware that a purchase of property would result in adirect violation of the rules relating to his service, the husbandand wife viz., the father and mother of the first respondent,discussed about it and after great deliberation, decided topurchase it in the name of the first respondent. If the propertyas contested by the first respondent had been gifted away tohim in the year 1955, then it was not known, as to why he wasnot able to produce any other document connected with theproperty, such as tax receipts or other revenue records toshow that he was enjoying the property absolutely, withoutany hindrance from the other heirs of late Nithyanandam.37. Per contra, Exs.A1 and A2, tax receipts, were produced bythe plaintiffs to show that the property was managed andmaintained by the family and not by the first respondent. Thatapart, under Ex.A17, the first respondent himself admitted thatpurchase of the said property, along with the other twoCivil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 20 ofproperties in his name, was not his fault. In the said document,he also made it abundantly clear that he was not interested inretaining the property, simply because the property stood inhis name. Therefore, the claim of gift relating to the first itemof the suit property was not proved to the satisfaction of theCourt, both on law as well as on facts. 38. Having regard to such a prevaricating stand taken by the firstrespondent, as compared to his tacit admission made in Ex.A-17,we are of the considered view that the Trial Court was fullyjustified in holding that all the three items of the suit scheduledproperties, were joint family properties, in which the plaintiffs and the first respondent were entitled for equal share.39. Having regard to our above conclusions, when we examinethe judgment of the Division Bench impugned in this appeal, wefind that the Division Bench has completely omitted to examinethe implications of Ex.A-17 which has relevance in respect of allthe three suit schedule properties. As noted by the Trial Court,Ex.A-17 was a very crucial piece of evidence, in as much as, itcontains the tacit admission voluntarily made by the firstrespondent, while also establishing as to why the veracity of itsnature was never questioned by him. Since, there was no contraCivil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 21 of24Page 22evidence to disprove Ex.A-17, the first respondent was totallybound by the said document. Since every ingredient of Section 17of the Evidence Act, relating to the said document, Ex.A-17 wasfully complied with, the non-consideration of the same by theDivision Bench of the High Court, in our considered opinion,would certainly amount to total misreading of the evidence, whileinterfering with the judgment of the trial Court. Similarly, theDivision Bench miserably failed to examine the issue relating togift as regards the first item of the suit scheduled properties.Though, such a claim was made by the first respondent, therewas no iota of evidence to support the said claim. Theingredients of Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act relatingto gifts were not shown to have been complied with in order tosupport the said claim.40. In fact, while considering the relevance of Ex.A-17 and itsapplication to the case on hand, the Trial Court noted thecontradictory statement of the first respondent made in hiswritten statement, vis--vis the oral evidence. The Trial Courthas specifically noted the funds, which were available with thefirst respondent pursuant to his fathers demise, which was to thetune of Rs.20,887.93/- and which was kept in deposit in twoaccounts in the name of the first respondent himself. OneCivil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 22 of24Page 23account was under Ex.A-25, which was a current account in whicha sum of Rs.10,919.44/- was available and the other one wasunder Ex.A.26, which was a savings bank account, where a sumof Rs.9,968.49/- was available. Both put together a sum ofRs.20,887.93/- was available and therefore, even after thepurchase of the third item of the suit schedule property, the firstrespondent had a further sum available with him. The trial Courthas also noted that except the ipse dixit of D.W.2 and 3 that asum of Rs.10,000/- was paid to the first respondent by way of giftat the time of marriage of the first respondent with his daughter,there was no other evidence to support and provide credence tothe said version. Unfortunately, the Division Bench of the HighCourt completely omitted to examine the above material piece ofevidence, which was considered in detail by the trial Court, whiledecreeing the suit. 41. In the light of our above conclusions, the judgment of theDivision Bench cannot be sustained. The appeal stands allowedand the judgment of the Division Bench is set aside and thejudgment and decree of the Trial Court shall stand restored. ....J.[Dr. B.S. Chauhan]Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 23 of24Page 24.....J. [Fakkir Mohamed IbrahimKalifulla]New Delhi;July 02, 2013.Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 24 ofPosted by advocatemmmohan Mandagaddi murali mohan at Monday, July 15, 2013 Email ThisBlogThis!Share to TwitterShare to FacebookShare to PinterestLabels: suit for partition of joint family propertiesReactions: No comments:Post a CommentNote: Only a member of this blog may post a comment. Links to this postCreate a Link Newer Post Older Post HomeSubscribe to: Post Comments (Atom)TOTAL PAGEVIEWSSparkline 1,561,084FOLLOWERSSUBSCRIBE TO Posts CommentsBLOG ARCHIVE? 2015 (501)? 2014 (598)? 2013 (1015)? December (85)? November (59)? October (64)? September (77)? August (85)? July (120)Section 32G of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural...Doctrine of Equality in awarding punishment in dep...Stamp duty and penalty = Whether the sale deed exe...right to receive pension as per the revised...mere non-joining of an independent witness - not...Evidence Act, 1872-Section 32 Clause (5)-Date of b...Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: s. 45 - R...Letter of deceased which can not be treated as Dy...Death penalty to imprisonment for life; circumstan...The medical evidence also to a large extent ...Even if the prosecutrix is of easy virtue/uncha...Land Acquisition Act = whether the officers of ...grant of study leave = whether the appellant-inst...The Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 & the Juvenile Jus...Service matter - appointment of trained teachers i...the NEET= the Medical Council of India ...Section 193 Cr.P.C. =Constitution Bench for consid...whether reservation was inapplicable to specialt...the University Grants Commission Act, 19...declaration of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Prot...Or. 40, rule 1 CPC - Appointment of interim receiv...Acquittal =Death was caused by head injuries - as ...Acquittal of murder case= It is a well settled pr...driver of the said taxi involved in the offence un...Preventive detention order passed under the pr...Granting of protective relief even after withdrawa...Custody of Child =no relief could be granted to ...Sec.391 of company Act - seeking approval for comp...Prohibition imposed under Bombay police Act on the...A Daily worker on termination of his service not e...A contract for sale of shares is not valid as per ...Unauthorized Adjustments not valid - Defendant N...Hindu Marriage Act - Jurisdiction of Indian court ...Allotment of Water to Kutuch District fro Sardar S...As per Hindu Law and Hindu Succession Act sec.6 - ...Retd. Employee can not file a complaint before the...Right to Vote & Right to Contest When arise = A r...Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)...Service matter = revised merit list drawn ...failures of Appellate court = the Appellate Court ...Service matter - whether in the facts and circumst...Extra-ordinary delay even charge sheet not filed d...Dying Declaration =It may not be an absolute p...Mistake on the face of record = The Trial Court ha...mines and minerals = whether the owners of jenmom...Company Owned Company Operated outlets (COCO) as...Negotiable Instruments Act - Punishments -substant...Land Acquisition Act = The reference court like an...service matter - an Assistant Wireless Operator w...Alteration of conviction under sec302 to sec. 325 ...whether the mother tongue or the regional language...Whether the promises at the time of election amoun...the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occu...Service matter = in case the Disciplinary Authori...Rape by Police in Custody - absence of medical exa...MERE ABSENCE OF EXTERNAL INJURIES ON BODY OF VICTI...Price fixation Notifications dated 30th April, 200...Therefore, a reading of Section 311 Cr.P.C. and Se...3 contradictory Dying declarations not proved fre...Dowry death sec. 498 A , 304 B of IPC =death was d...sec. 302, 498 A = Non - Explanation of LIGATURE M...Section 106,113 A,113 B of Evidence Act, 498 A 304...When the prosecution failed to prove the basic cas...Land Acquisition Act = Advance possession payment ...service matter - weightage= There is a clear dist...Enforceability of Foreign Awards under Section 48 ...JURISDICTION = whether, in view of clause 18 of t...Service matter - voluntary retirement application ...When sec. 304 part II applies instead of sec. 302...Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act,=Chap...Maharshi Mahesh Yogi Vedic Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniy...The Persons with disabilities (Equal Opportunities...offences punishable under Sections 498A, 304-B, 40...whether a pronouncement as to the vires of Section...Confirmation of conviction with out assigning vali...Land Acquisition Act - fixation of market value - ...Periyar river - Environmental protection = Doctr...service matter - selections to police constable = ...The Persons with disabilities (Equal Opp...Mining lease - cancellation - When the litigation ...Military service - while in service, the claimant ...The Persons with Disabilities (Equal Oppor...M.V. ACT - INSURANCE CLAIMS = THE POSITION OF VEHI...Service matter = (i) Whether two different age of ...Section 498A and Section 302 read with Section 34 ...suit for partition of joint family properties = ev...Section 302 read with 149, 307 read with 149, as w...claimants are entitled to same compensation fixed ...Mere Delay in sending FIR not fatal to the prosecu...Enhancement of compensation - insurance claim = we...compensation for wrongful detention by abusing the...whether complaints filed by the respondent...JURISDICTION AND POWERS OF GRAMA SABHAS / NYAYALA...No writ is maintainable when alternative remedy is...NO REDUCTION OF SENTENCE ON THE GROUND OF COMPROMI...sec.302 ,/sec. 323 I.P.C. = No grounds to convert...M.V. ACT = whether compensation in a motor vehicle...Section 302, read with Section 34 of the Indian Pe...the Swadeshi Act 27. Penalties Any person who.:-...Cheque dishonor case = under Section 138 of the N...whether the Court, where a cheque is deposited for...Damages to the standing crop +The question rel...Declaring sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Repr...Non- official as co - accused can be prosecuted al...Upgrade to Municipal corporation = Section 8-AA(1...sale with condition to repurchase is not a mortga...sec.319 Cr.P.C. = no order to the prejudice of an ...can an Insurance Company disown its liability on t...BENEFIT OF DOUBT - TWO WEAPONS , NO BLOOD STAINED ...Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure QUAS...AGREEMENT HOLDERS HAVE NO LOCUS STANDI TO QUESTION...PROMOTION = Seniority was only to be taken into co...eloped out of free will - has no place = On the af...motive is not a very strong one= The motive may ...BUT NOT BY ACCUSED - NO VALUE ON FACTS OF THE CASE...WRONGFUL CONFINEMENT AND MURDER = the confessions ...CHEATING - HAVING SEXUAL INTERCOURSE ON THE PROMIS...HINDU MARRIAGE ACT SEC. 13 [1] [1A] & [III]She mer...Scope of Sec.120 B of I.P.C. = what will be the ef...Police case under sec.498 A and 306 I.P.C. ended i...? June (51)? May (106)? April (91)? March (76)? February (71)? January (130)? 2012 (1225)? 2011 (388)? 2010 (186)POPULAR POSTSwhether a civil court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit when the schedule lands were acquired under the land acquisition proceedings and whether the High Court was justified in remanding the matter to the trial Court without examining the question with regard to the maintainability of the suit? = Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting those that are expressly or impliedly barred which reads as under: 9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred.- The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.- It is clear that the Land Acquisition Act is a complete Code in itself and is meant to serve public purpose. By necessary implication, the power of civil Court to take cognizance of the case under Section 9 of CPC stands excluded and a Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the question of the validity or legality of the notification under Section 4, declaration under Section 6 and subsequent proceedings except by the High court in a proceeding under 1Page 14 Article 226 of the Constitution. It is thus clear that the civil Court is devoid of jurisdiction to give declaration or even bare injunction being granted on the invalidity of the procedure contemplated under the Act. The only right available for the aggrieved person is to approach the High Court under Article 226 and this Court under Article 136 with self imposed restrictions on their exercise of extraordinary power.Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1051 OF 2013 (Arising out of S...INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATE BOARD=This is an appeal under section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) directed against the order dated 1.5.2006 passed by the Senior Examiner of Trade Marks whereby the application for registration of Trade Mark OFLEX has been refused.=After having perused the documents, we are in agreement with the observation made by the Senior Examiner of Trade Marks that the opponents and applicant both have filed half hearted evidences not bothering seriously, the concern. But certainly the onus is more upon applicants to show that they have right of registration and hence applicants stand to loose if evidence of applicant does not over weigh against evidence of opponents, the registered owner of conflicting mark. The appellant has failed to establish it use of the mark since 4.1.2000. The appellant has on the basis of available documents on our record has proved the user only since 9.4.2002. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the conclusion arrived at by the Senior Examiner of Trade Marks.Mr. Vikash Rajgarhia v. Aristo Pharmaceuticals Limited - OA/51/2006/TM/AMD [2008] INIPAB 2 (19 March 2008) INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATE ...the Entrance Examination for Post-Graduate (Medical) Selection 2012, Odisha are challenging the validity of Clause 11.2 of the Prospectus for selection of candidates for Post- Graduate (Medical) Courses in the Government Medical Colleges of Odisha for the Academic Year, 2012, as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. -they are undergoing studies from May 2012 onwards and, at this distance of time, if they are displaced, that will cause serious injustice to them since they have already left the government service/public sector undertakings for joining the post graduate course. In view of the stand taken by the Medical Council -of India that seats for post-graduate courses cannot be increased, we are inclined to give a direction to the State of Odisha or their undertakings to take back the in-service candidates into their service and permit them to serve in the rural/tribal areas so that they can compete through the category of in-service candidates in the 50% seats earmarked for them for admission to the post-graduate course.We are, therefore, inclined to allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the Division Bench as well as learned Single Judge by quashing the proviso to clause 9(2)(d) of the MCI regulations to the extend indicated above as well as clause 11.2 of the prospectus issued for admission to the Post Graduate Medical Examination 2012 in the State of Odisha. The State of Odisha, the Medical Council of India and respondents 1 to 4 are directed to take urgent steps to re-arrange the merit list and to fill up the seats of the direct category, excluding in-service candidates who got admission in the open category on the strength of weightage, within a period of one week from today and give admission to the open category candidates strictly on the basis of merit. - 36. Appeals are allowed and the judgments of the High Court are set aside accordingly. REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA ...whether under Section 154 Cr.P.C., a police officer is bound to register an FIR when a cognizable offence is made out or he (police officer) has an option, discretion or latitude of conducting some kind of preliminary enquiry before registering the FIR. 110. Learned counsel appearing for the Union of India and different States have expressed totally divergent views even before this Court. This Court also 8REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL...Tamil Nadu Pattathari Asiriyargal Velaivaippu Sangam (Tamil Nadu Graduate Teachers Employment Opportunity Association) represented by its Secretary. In this writ petition, the Association has challenged on behalf of some of its members the order passed by the State Government in G.O.Ms.No.181, School Education Department, dated 15.11.2011 so far as it has prescribed Teacher Eligibility Test even for persons who have completed certificate verification conducted by the Teachers Recruitment Board for appointment to the post of Graduate Assistants and for consequential direction to respondents 1 and 2 to appoint the members of the petitioner association as Graduate Assistants on the basis of the seniority in the Statewide list kept by the employment exchange as was done in the case of Secondary Grade Teachers.=while the candidates who appeared in the typewriting test had no indefeasible or absolute right to seek an appointment, yet the same did not give a licence to the competent authority to cancel the examination and the result thereof in an arbitrary manner. The least which the candidates who were otherwise eligible for appointment and who had appeared in the examination that constituted a step-in-aid of a possible appointment in their favour, were entitled to is to ensure that the selection process was not allowed to be scuttled for mala fide reasons or in an arbitrary manner. 17.It is trite that Article 14 of the Constitution strikes at arbitrariness which is an antithesis of the guarantee contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Whether or not the cancellation of the typing test was arbitrary is a question which the Court shall have to examine once a challenge is mounted to any such action, no matter the candidates do not have an indefeasible right to claim an appointment against the advertised posts." 14.As held by the Supreme Court, the candidates do not have indefeasible right to claim appointment against the advertised posts. If the State explains the reason for prescribing the particular mode of selection and cancellation of the earlier process, such a decision cannot be frowned upon as violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. On the other hand, in this case, the impugned G.O clearly explains the mandatory directions issued under the RTE Act which has to be obeyed by the State Government. 15.Secondly, the State Government has taken a policy decision to screen the candidates before their entry to the post. In these days because of mushrooming the Teachers Training Institutes and colleges all over State, such standardization process is inevitable. The petitioner cannot be heard to say that their case should be treated differently only because of their selection in the earlier selection process and on the basis of the old policy. 16.In view of the above factual matrix and legal precedents, the petitioner Association has not made out any case. Hence the writ petition will stand dismissed. No costs. Consequently connected miscellaneous petitions stand closed.IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED : 10.02.2012 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.CHANDRU W.P.No.2108 of 2012 and M.P.Nos.1...registration with the Pharmacy Council of the State of Rajasthan (respondent No.1 herein - `Rajasthan Council' for short) under Section 32 of The Pharmacy Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act'). =The purpose of a welfare statute cannot be permitted to be defeated by the methods such as the one employed by the appellant. As stated earlier, the Act is passed for making better provisions for the regulation of the profession and practice of pharmacy. As is seen, the primary qualification for such a person is to have a degree or diploma in pharmacy. It is only as an alternative qualification that some other degree with three years experience is permitted. The last alternative qualification is that of five years experience in dispensing drugs which has to be in the concerned State. This is because under Section 31 of the Act, the person who wants to be registered as a pharmacist has to be of 18 years of age, and he has to reside and carry on the business or profession of pharmacy in that particular state. The State Pharmacy Council which issues the certificate of registration ought to satisfy itself that the person concerned did have atleast five years of experience, and which experience has obviously to be in that State for the State Council to assess it. In the instant case, the appellant did not reside or carry the business or profession of pharmacy or dispensing of drugs in Sikkim for more than five years. If any such method, as adopted by the appellant is permitted, persons who claim to have experience of five years in one State, will go to another State for a few months only to obtain registration in that State, and thereafter seek transfer of that registration to their own state. In the instant case, the first respondent did not have any opportunity to examine as to whether the appellant did have theREPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION ...Juriprudence: Possession Held-In the absence of proof of better title, possession or prior peaceful settled possession is itself evidence of title-Settled possession or effective possession would protect a person without title even as against the true owner-High Court's order upheld. The plaintiff-respondent was in possession of a piece of land and was raising a construction over it which was objected to by the defendant- appellant claiming that the said land formed part of his property and was owned by him. The plaintiff-respondent filed a suit for declaration of his title, as also his possession, of the disputed land. The trial court found that although the respondent failed to prove his title, he had succeeded in proving his possession over the suit property. Accordingly, it issued an injunction restraining the appellant from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property by the respondent. The High Court upheld this order. Hence the appeal. On behalf of the appellant, it was contended that the suit ought not to have been decreed merely on the fact that the respondent was in possession of the suit property since he could not prove his title. Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD : 1. The person in peaceful possession is entitled to retain his possession and in order to protect such possession he may even use reasonable force to keep out a trespasser. A rightful owner who has been wrongful dispossessed of land may retake possession if he can do so peacefully and without the use of unreasonable force. If the trespasser is in settled possession of the property belonging to the rightful owner, the rightful owner shall have to take recourse to law; he cannot take the law in his own hands and evict the trespasser or interfere with his possession. The law will come to the aid of a person in peaceful and settled possession by injuncting even a rightful owner from using force or taking the law in his own hands, and also by restoring him in possession even from the rightful owner (of course subject to the law of limitation), if the latter has dispossessed the prior possession by use of force. In the absence of proof of better title, possession or prior peaceful settled possession is itself evidence of title. Law presumes the possession to go with title unless rebutted. The owner of any property may prevent even by using reasonable force a trespasser from an attempted trespass, when it is in the process of being committed, or is of a flimsy character, or recurring, intermittent, stray or casual in nature, or has just been committed, while the rightful owner did not have enough time to have recourse to law. In the last of the cases, the possession of the trespasser, just entered into would not be called as one acquiesced to by the true owner. [856-A-E] Midnapore Zamindary Co. Ltd. v. Kumar Naresh Narayan Roy, (1924) PC 144, Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya v. Anil Panjwani, [2003] 7 SCC 350,Lallu Yeshwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh, [1968] 2 SCR 203, Nair Service Society Ltd. \. K.C. Alexander, [1968] 3 SCR 1, M.C. Chokalingam v. V. Manickavasagam, [1974] 1 SCC 48, Krishna Ram Mahale v. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao, [1989] 4 SCC 131 and Nagar Palika, Jind v. Jagat Singh, Advocate, [1995] 3 SCC 426, relied on. Yar Mohammad v. Lakshmi Das, AIR (1959) All. 1, approved. Salmond on Jurisprudence : 12th Edn., referred to. 2. It is the settled possession or effective possession of a person without title, which would entitle him to protect his possession even as against the true owner. [856-E-F] Munshi Ram v. Delhi Administration, [1968] 2 SCR 455, Puran Singh v. The State of Punjab, [1975] 4 SCC 518 and Ram Rattan v. State of U.P., [1977] 1 SCC 188, relied on. Horam v. Rex, AIR (1949) All. 564, approved. 3.1. In the present case the Court has found the plaintiff-respondent as having failed in proving his title. Nevertheless, he has been found to be in settled possession of the property. Even the defendant-appellant failed in proving his title over the disputed land so as to substantiate his entitlement to evict the plaintiff. The Trial Court, therefore, left the question of title open and proceeded to determine the suit on the basis of possession, protecting the established possession and restraining the attempted interference therewith. The Trial Court and the High Court have rightly decided the suit. [858-C-E] 3.2. It is not necessary for the person claiming injunction to prove his title to the suit land. It would suffice if he proves that he was in lawful possession of the same and that his possession was invaded or threatened to be invaded by a person who has no title thereof. [859-C-D] Fakirbhai Bhagwandas v. Maganlal Haribhai, AIR (1951) Bom. 380, approved. Sri Dasnam Naga Sanvasi v. Allahabad Development Authority, AIR All. 418 and Kallappa Rama Londa v. Shivappa Nagappa Aparaj, AIR (1995) Kar. 238, held not applicable. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 7662 of 1997. 2004 AIR 4609, 2003(6 )Suppl.SCR850 , 2004(1 )SCC769 , 2003(10 )SCALE950 ,CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 7662 of 1997 PETITIONER: Rame Gowda (D) by Lrs. RESPONDENT: M. Varadappa Naidu (D) by Lrs. ...A.P. ASSIGNED LANDS [PROHIBITION OF TRANSFERS] [AMENDMENT] ACT 2008SEC.4[1][b][i] :- re assign the said resumed land, other than those lands/ areas as may be notified by the govt. from time to time in public...whether the transfer of land from a member of Scheduled Caste to a juristic person, other than Scheduled Caste, is void, in view of the provisions of Section 42(b) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (for short the Act). 3. The High Court of Rajasthan has answered the above question in several cases holding that such a transfer would not be hit by the above mentioned provision, since the expression person would not take in a juristic person and that juristic person does not have a caste and, therefore, any transfer made by a Scheduled Caste person would not be hit by Section 42(b) of the Act. 7(2). If the khatedar of Scheduled Caste / Scheduled Tribe executes sale to such a person of Scheduled Caste / Scheduled Tribe who is office-bearer of any firm/society/company/legal institution, then the mutation on the basis of registration shall be made only in the name of that particular person/vendee who is a member of Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe and not in the name of that firm/society/company/legal institution wherein he is office-bearer or member. 17. The above mentioned condition makes it amply clear that the mutation on the basis of registration shall be made only in the name of that particular person/vendee who is a member of Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe and not in the name of any firm/society/company/legal institution wherein a person is office-bearer or member. When we apply the above principles to the transfer of land in question, we have no hesitation to hold that the sale deed effected on 26.9.2005 was void and therefore rightly denied mutation in Revenue records. Property, therefore purchased by the respondent from the members of Scheduled Caste vide sale deed dated 26.9.2005 and other sale deeds, therefore are void since hit by Section 42(b) of the Act and it is so declared. The State can, therefore, re- possess the lands and return the lands to the original owners who are members of Scheduled Caste. Section 42(b) may go against the interest of the members of Scheduled Caste / Scheduled Tribe as well. There may be several situations where they intend to sell the property for purposes like marriage of son/daughter or to purchase a better property and so on, but in that event sometimes they may not get a better competitive price, if the sale is made only among the members of Scheduled Caste / Scheduled Tribe. We have come across legislations where provisions are made enabling them to sell their lands to the members of non-Scheduled Caste / Scheduled Tribe, on getting permission from the prescribed authority. Such a provision may be sometimes helpful to the members of Scheduled Caste / Scheduled Tribe to get a better price for their land but it is for the legislature to incorporate appropriate provision in the Rajasthan Act. 19. Consequently, the appeals are allowed and the judgments of the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court are set aside. However, there will be no order as to costs. REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA ...As defined in s 14(1) of the Act, namely the same goods and/or goods of the same description. [6] As defined in s 10 of the Act, which provides that a trade mark is taken to be deceptively similar to another trade mark if it so nearly resembles that other trade mark that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion. [7] In the context of closely related goods and services, but relevant also in the context of similar goods as defined in s 14(1) of the Act. [8] And were also approved by the Full Federal Court (Burchett, Sackville and Lehane, JJ) in MID Sydney Pty Ltd v Australian Tourism Co Ltd (1998) 42 IPR 561. [9] Burchett J was specifically referring to the words goods of the same description as used in s 23(2) of the repealed Trade Marks Act 1955, but his remarks are no less applicable to the current legislation, as confirmed by the Full Federal Court in E & J Gallo Winery v Lion Nathan Australia Pty Limited [2009] FCAFC 27(29 July 2009) at [71] in holding beer and wine to be goods of the same description. [10] See also the discussion by the Hearing Officer on this subject in Socit des Produits Nestl SA v Strasburger Enterprises Inc (1995) 31 IPR 639 (QUIK v QUIX) at 646 to 649. [11] Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths Ltd [1999] FCAFC 1020; (1999) 45 IPR 411 at [50]. [12] Australian Woollen Mills Ltd v F.S. Walton & Co [1937] HCA 51; (1937) 58 CLR 641 (at 658); Shell Co of Australia Ltd v Esso Standard Oil (Aust) Ltd[1963] HCA 66; (1961) 109 CLR 407 (at 415) [13] Being Re Application by the Pianotist Co Ltd (1906) 23 RPC 774 at 777; 1a IPR 379 at 380, Australian Woollen Mills Ltd v F.S. Walton & Co [1937] HCA 51; (1937) 58 CLR 641 (at 658) and CA Henschke & Co v Rosemount Estates Pty Ltd (2000) 52 IPR 42 (Henschke) at [40] to [42]. [14] I note Windeyers earlier quoted words were are to be (or can be) used, not are used or can be used. [15] I note in passing that as far as s 44 is concerned it is not strictly relevant what goods the Opponent may have used its marks for; indeed they need not have been used at all. Certainly there was no suggestion by Ms Chrysanthou, or support in the evidence, for the proposition that the Opponents trade marks had the kind of notoriety acquired through use contemplated by the Federal Court in Woolworths or Henschke and which may impinge on s 44 considerations. [16] Citing Torpedoes Sportswear Pty Limited v Thorpedo Enterprises Pty Limited [2003] FCA 901; (2003) 59 IPR 318 per Bennett J at [78] and Jockey International, Inc v Darren Wilkinson [2010] ATMO 22 at [38]. [17] Cooper Engineering Company Pty Ltd v Sigmund Pumps Limited [1952] HCA 15; (1952) 86 CLR 536, Frigiking Trade Mark [1973] RPC 739, Reed Executive plc v Reed Business Information Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 47; [2004] RPC 40 and Pfizer, Inc v Schering-Plough Animal Health Corporation [2006] ATMO 92 are cited as authorities for this proposition. [18] The search was conducted on 20 December 2010, but all but ten of the 80 marks disclosed have priority dates earlier than the Trade Mark. Moreover several registrations for such marks covering milk or milk based goods which post-date the opposed application, including the Opponents registration 1262221 CALPIS (Stylised), in any event appear to further confirm that the prefix CAL- might reasonably be considered common to the trade in such goods. [19] [1952] HCA 15; (1952) 86 CLR 536 (at 539) [20] Being the words of French J in Woolworths at [45] quoted in paragraph 14 above. [21] These being the often quoted words of Evershed J (as he then was) in Smith Hayden & Co Ltds Application (1946) 63 RPC 97, at 101. [22] Mr Matsumoto annexes an (undated) extract from the 3rd edition of a publication by the International Association for the Protection of Intellectual Property of Japan called (in English) Famous Trademarks in Japan showing an entry for the CALPIS mark. [23] Cullens had earlier submitted that the CALPIS branded milk based product, being based on a cultured milk concentrate, was unique to the Australian market, but even if this were so, the coverage of the opposed application is wide enough to embrace the Opponents goods in my view. [24] Based on an average case price of 2,500 and an exchange rate of 85 = A$1.00, or approximately A$30.00 per case. [25] Cullens submissions were of course prepared before it was known that the Opponents s 60 ground was based on the claimed reputation of the CALPIS trade mark only.Calpis Co., Ltd v ALDI Foods Pty Ltd [2012] ATMO 44 (3 May 2012) Last Updated: 14 June 2012 TRADE MARKS ACT 1995 DECISION OF A DELEGAT...LABELS"2G Spectrum Scam Case". (1)& 27 - Takeover Regulations- ejusdem generis principle (1)& Section 306 & 460 of Cr.P.C. - Granted Pardon - sec.164 Cr.P.C. (1)'Invitation to Tender' (1)'the 1959 Act') (1)'the 1966 Act') (1)'the Act'). (1)(b) (1)(n) read with Regulation 64(b) read with section 46 of the M.R.T.P. Act (1)- (3)- Rajasthan Environment and Health Cess Ru les (1)- Husband died pending trial - No prima faice proof of conspiracy- The Accused are entitled for discharge = (1)- private complaint against STERN magazine and Anandabazar Patrika (1)- Promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General - before retirement post fell vacant (1)- proviso (g) to Section 60 (1) of the Code (1)- sec.192 (1)- Since it is Licence - there is no right of renewal - (1)- the Drugs (Prices Control) Order (for short (1)- the decision of the Chancellor is final = (1)- when arbitrator was appointed by High court - whether District Judge or High court (1)- 28. Notice for payment of duties (1)-2014 OCT.MONTH-S.C (1)-COFEPOSA (1)00 (2)000 from Rs. two lakhs = (1)000/- (1)000/- for alleged embezzlement in to trial court as per order of Apex court (1)000/- from out of Rs.5 lakhs receivable by the petitioner towards the gratuity (2)08 (1)10 A and or.1 (1)100 of T.P. Act Charge - Deposit of Title Deeds - Mortgage - mere undertaking not to sale the property till the discharge of loan with out registration (1)102 of Evidence Act - Sec.100 of C.P.C = Suit for Declaration of title and consequential reliefs (1)108 B (e) and sec.114 of T.P.Act - Destroy of leased property - No Doctrine of frustration of contract (1)110 (1)120B IPC and Section 5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act (1)125 CRPC (2)139 and sec. 118 of N.I.Act - Burden of proof (1)14 (3)142 (1)142 N.I.Act Sec.482 Cr.P.C. - Limitation (1)142 of the NI Act (1)144 (1)145 and land encroachment act (1)147 (1)148 (3)148 and 302 IPC -mere presence or association with other members alone does not per se be sufficient to hold everyone of them criminally liable (1)148 and 147 IPC. (1)148 and 302 read with Section 149 of the IPC - except for his role (1)149 (1)15 (7) of Delhi Rent Control Act - Power to strike out the defence (1)15 and 16 which are in dilapidated condition. (1)15 and sec.42 (1)151 B and Electricity -Rules (1)16 and 20 of C.P.C - Sec.24 of C.P.C- Jurisdiction - (1)17CPC (1)18 (1)1860 (3)1860 (hereinafter referred to as IPC) and Sections 3 (1)1860 ('IPC' for short). (1)1860 (hereinafter referred to as the `IPC) (1)1860 (in short the IPC). (1)1860 High court acquitted (1)1872 (2)1872-Section 32 Clause (5)-Date of birth-Proof of-Horoscope-Evidentiary value of (1)1881 (1)1881 - failure of complainant to plead (1)1881 (in short the N.I. Act) (1)1882 (1)1882 - s.13(b) - Easement rights - Easement by grant - Suit for declaration of easement rights over `B' schedule property of the plaint as a pathway (1)1882 and Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC. AT INTERIM STAGE NOT NECESSARY TO BE DECIDED ON ADMISSION OF POSSESSION OF PLAINTIFF IN BARE INJUNCTION SUIT (1)1888 (1)1888 for running a Eating (1)1890 for the welfare of the minor any person (1)1899 (1)19 (1)19 of Army Act and Art.309 (1)1908 (4)1908 is bound by the assessment of stamp duty (1)1910 - Theft of Electricity (1)1913 (for short (1)1923/Workmen compensation Act - Appeal against the order of commissioner arise only when there is substantial question of law (1)1925 (1)1925: s.372 - Nominee (1)1927 (2)193 and Sec.211 of I.P.C - scope of sec.195 and sec. 340 (2) of Cr.P.C - No victim should go remediless when there is a prima faice case (1)1940 not barred - Secs.8 (1)1944-Rules 57AA (1)1946 - the Prevention of Corruption Act (1)1947 (1)1947 (for short the P.C. Act) - (1)1947 - the employee of the tenant company was permitted to stay indirectly with out eviction even after his termination of employment amounts to subletting (1)1947. (1)1948 (1)1948 (the Act (1)1948 ( (1)1948 - complaint should be filed with in 3 months by Inspector of factories (1)1949 (1)1950 (1)1951 (2)1951-Sections 33 and 36- Nomination paper-Substantial Defect-Meaning of-Name of candidate incorrectly mentioned in the electoral roll- (1)1953 (3)1954 (1)1955 (1)1955 - sec.42 (1)1956 (5)1956 = selling of minor's property with definite share is void (1)1956 - (1)1956-ss. 4 (1)1956. (1)1957 - illegal mining (1)1958 - (1)1959 (for short (1)1959 (for short the Act) as applicable in Uttarakhand read with Article 243Q(2) of the Constitution (1)1960 (1)1961 (2)1961 (for brevity the Act) to file the suit for eviction.= (1)1961 (for short the Act). (1)1961- Consumer Disputes - Agricultural Market yards (1)1961. (1)1962 (1)1962 and Section 18(2) read with Section 28(2) of the Customs Act (1)1962-5. 135-Scope of (1)1962.- sec.14 (1)1963 For Specific performance of a (1)1963 - Agreement to sell land - Non-execution of - Suit for specific performance - Grant of decree and plea of seller that time was essence of contract rejected - (1)1963 - Section 29 the State Financial Corporation Act - suit against Contract of Indemnity arose only after execution of main contract (1)1963 for condonation of delay of 2500 days in filing the petition to set aside the ex parte decree. (1)1963-Section 65 Explanation (a)- (1)1963: s.12 (1)1963: s.6 (1)1964 (1)1965 (1)1966 (1)1966 (for short (1)1968 (2)1969 (1)1969 - whether a fee increase needs (1)1971 (for short 'the Act') (1)1971 (in short the Act) (1)1972 (4)1972 - suit for injunction - (1)1972 as amended in 2006. - not enforceable - (1)1972. (1)1973 (2)1973 - reopening of a case already decided under repealed Act (1)1973 Memorandum of FLM by RBI.- Section 49 (3) & (4) of Foreign Exchange Management Act FEMA). (1)1973 - s.239 (1)1973: Sections 244 (1)1974 (2)1974" (1)1975 (1)1975 the Delhi Value Added Tax (1)1975 Sections 9(2) and 9(4) = charitable purpose as per Section 3(1)(b) of the Act in order to hold it exempt from paying building tax? (1)1976 (1)1976 (for short ULC Act) (1)1977 (for short 'the Act 7 of 77) (1)1977 (for short the Act) (1)1977). (1)1977. (1)1980 and Tamil Nadu Hill Stations Preservation of Trees Act and the Environment (Protection) Act (1)1983 (for short the Apartment Act) - Development Act - Declarations in respect of common areas and facilities (1)1985 (4)1985 (hereinafter for short SICA) are applicable to the foreign companies registered in India (1)1985 (for short the NDPS Act) (1)1985 (for short the SICA). - Application for protection of sec.22 (1) of SICA by Guarantors (1)1986 (3)1986. (1)1986. - Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) were enacted (w.e.f.19th February (1)1987 (for short 'the Rules') (1)1987. - Sale of Temple land - (1)1988 (7)1988 (for short the PCA). (1)1988 (for short (1)1988 - mere recovery of rexine bag is not sufficient (1)1988 - No approval from the central government is necessary (1)1988 - vs- sec.313 Cr.P.C.- Bribe case - alleged that the prosecution failed to prove the demand of Bribe (1)1988 -a Municipal Councillor and Board member is a public servant (1)1988 absolves the insurer of its liability to the insured. - NO (1)1988 read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code.- Non- filing of original complaint not fatal when not relied upon it (1)1991) - The guidelines (1)1993 (1)1993 (in short the Act) (1)1994 (for short 'the Act'). (1)1995 (4)1995 (hereinafter to be referred as the Act) (1)1995 (in short the Act) (1)1995 (Act No.37 of 1995) (1)1995 (for short Regulations 1995) (1)1995 (hereinafter referred to as DPCO (1)1995 (in short PUDA Act) (1)1995 Mental disorders - benefits under disability act (1)1995: s.83(5) - Wakf Tribunal - Power of - (1)1995 for short). (1)1996 (for short (1)1996 - interim injunction pending arbitration proceedings (1)1996: s. 45 - Reference to arbitration under - Scope of - International commercial arbitration - Multi-party agreements - Joint venture agreements (1)1997 (for short the Tenancy Act) -Vs- Arbitration & conciliation Act - (1)1999. - Suit for injunction (1)1999.-notice dated 17.2.2005 under Section 10(5) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act (1)200 (1)2000 (4)2000 (for short the 2000 Act) (1)2000 (the J.J. Act (1)2000-Central Excise Rules (1)2000. (1)2000. (1)2000) (1)2002 (1)2002 - Sale against the rules are null and void - (1)2003 (2)2003 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)- Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) (1)2003 in the selection held by UPSC; (1)2004 - No explanation was offered to show that the random sample of sale for two days not correct (1)2005 (5)2005 (for short the DV Act) - live in relationship in the nature of marriage - A concubine (1)2005 (for short 'the PWD Act (1)2005') (1)2005. - Section 50 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act (1)2006 Section 17 of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act (1)2008 (1)2008- levy of cess on mineral right (1)2009 (in short the RTE Act) (1)2009 and the Commission for Protection of Child Rights Act (1)201 and 202 Cr.P.C.-Accused out of jurisdiction does not contemplate any separate recording system of evidence before taking cognizance (1)2011 [2] ALT 8 [SC] SUPPRESSION OF MATERIAL DOCUMENT (1)2011 {6} ALT 237 A.P. ADMISSIBILITY OF A DOCUMENT (1)2011. (1)2012 (1)2013 - fixing cut off marks at 60% (1)2013 (for short (1)2014 Oct.Month - S.C. (1)2014-S.C. OCT.MONTH. (1)204 (1)208 and 210 and sec.319 of Cr.P.C. (1)22 of MMDR Act - vs- Sec. 378 (1)227 and 228 of Cr.P.C.- one out of 3 no charge sheet was filed under sec.302 I.P.C. - but committal court famed charge under sec.302 of I.P.C against this accused too (1)23 ( 1A) - (1)24 (1)245 (1)246 (1)252- (1)256. Non-appearance or death of complainant. (1)25FF sec.25N and Section 17B of I.D. Act - Estopel - Already decided case attained finality - and same is applied with some suitable modifications (1)26 and 27 of Consumer Act (1)27 (1)276CC and 278E of the Income Act - Discharge petition under sec. 245(2) Cr.P.C (1)27A and 37 (1)2G Scam (2)2G Spectrum case. (1)3 contradictory Dying declarations - ends in acquittal (1)3 of Grants Act - Cantonment board - resumption of land - claimed that the grant is free from holds - mere entry in GLR survey never confirm title (1)302 (1)302 and 201 of Indian Penal Code (1)302 and 306 IPC (1)302 IPC (1)302 read with Section 149 and Section 307 read with Section 149 of the IPC. and read with sec.34 of I.P.C. - Appreciation of Evidence (1)302 read with Section 149 of the IPC - powers of appellant court --- not to disturb acquittal due to possibility of other view (1)304 B (1)304 B - death within 9 months of marriage - burnt (1)304 B - No conviction under sec.302 I.P.C. (1)304 B and 302 of I.P.C. (1)304 B and 306 I.P.C. - sec.116 A of Evidence Act (1)304 B of I.P.C. r/w sec.113 B &Section 114 Illustration (a) of Evidence Act (1)304 B of I.P.C.- A 1-husband acquitted - A 2 sentence was reduced - mitigating circumstances (1)304 Part I & Sec.300 - Exception 4 (1)304-B (1)306 AND 498 A I.P.C. - When wife stated that she committed suicide as she was fed up with the acts of husband with out disclosing the activities - (1)306 I.P.C. r/w 34 I.P.C. (1)306 of I.P.C. - DISCHARGE OF REST OF ACCUSED (1)306 r/w 34 of I.P.C. (1)307 (3)307 read with 149 (1)308 r/w 34 of I.P.C. -Circumstantial Evidence not proved - Sec.27 of Evidence Act recovery at the instance of accused not proved- Abscond not proved- common intention not established (1)310 and 311 - Doctrine of Pleasure -Doctrine of finality- whether amenable to judicial review on the ground of camouflage- Apex court held No (1)32 - Termination of Arbitration proceedings by the Arbitrator for one reason or the other - Remedy is to approach concerned Civil court (1)323 (1)324 (2)326 (1)33 (1)34 (1)35 (1)354 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code (1)364 (1)366 376 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code (1)366 and 363 IPC (1)368/34 (1)376 (1)376 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code (1)376(2)(g) and 302/34 (1)376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code; (1)376-D (1)379 (1)379 /114 of I.P.C. (1)38 (1)4 (1)4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act (hereinafter called the DP Act). (1)406 (1)406 and 34 of IPC (1)409 (1)411 (1)412 IPC (1)417 (2)418 (1)420 (5)420 and 120(b) IPC (1)423 (1)424 r/w Section 34 IPC - Anticipatory bail - (1)424/- (1)43 of Electricity Act - Application for Switch over from BEST to TPC FOR ELECTRICITY (1)447 (1)448 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short the IPC). (1)450 and sec.302 of I.P.C - rape and murder of minor girl (1)458 and 477 IPC (1)467 (3)468 (2)47 - A of Schedule 1-A of the Stamp Act - admissibility of a document (1)47 OF INSURANCE OF ACT (1)471 (1)471 IPC and sec. 3 (1)498 A (1)498 A etc. (1)498 A I.P.C (1)498 A IPC & under Sections 3 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act (1)498-A and 306 of the IPC. (1)498A or 306 (1)5 A (1)5 of P.C. Act -Jurisdiction of Special court on the death of public servant against non-public servants- (1)50 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (1)500/- - Deposited Rs.5 (1)506 (1)506 I.P.C. - Love marriage -when earlier complaint was closed as civil disputes pending (1)54 = No enhancement basing on 6 km far away situated land in developed area - (1)550/ crores compensation to N.R.I. for the death of his wife = Medical Negligence Compensation was fixed based on principles and theories of M.V. ACT = (1)57 (1)57AB and 57AC and erstwhile Rules 57A to 57J-CENVAT credit (1)57B and 57D alongwith Rule 57CCModvat/ Cenvat Credit (1)58 (1)59 (1)59 and sec.61 - Sec.457 of Cr.P.C - Release of vehicle seized while transporting illicit liquor by police - Magistrate dismissed (1)6 (1)6 years old child was raped murdered and her legs were chopped upto anklets for silver ornaments (1)6(5) (1)64 and 65 (1)66 and 175 - the registered sale deed dated 12.01.1962 executed prior to 1.5.1964 against the provisions of Act cannot be held to be void (1)69. Effect of non- registration. (1)7 & 8 (1)76 (1)8 and 19-Property of father who dies intestate-Whether devolves on son (1)83(1) (1)86 and 111 of new Act (1)86 and sec.123 1)(A) and (4) of R.P. Act - allowed (1)87 and 102 of R.P. Act - Election petition and Recrimination petition - MLC - Equal votes on first count (1)92 and 96 of Limitation - suit filed against ex trustee (1); interim mandatory injunction ;the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance (1)a related and interested witness (1)A contract for sale of shares is not valid as per sec.13 (1)A Daily worker on termination of his service not entitled for re-employment as of right as the termination is not amounts to retrenchment of an employee (1)a fake encounter (1)A person having 100 per cent burns can make a statement (1)a statement in made in other proceeding does not confer possession of palintiff (1)a Koshti by Caste and not a Halba (1)A.P. (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act (1)A.P. Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act (2)A.P. Legal Metrology (Enforcement) Rules (1)A.P. Legislative Council (Disqualification on ground of Defection) Rules (1)A.P. State Public Distribution System (Control) Order (1)A.P. VAT Act (1)A.P. Water (1)A.P.Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act (1)A.P.COURT FEE ACT (2)Abduction & Murder - Circumstantial Evidence - Last seen theory - in the absence of first link in the chain (1)ABDUL AZEEZ P V. AND OTHERS . Petitioners Versus NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY . Respondent (1)absence of contract with regard to rate of interest (1)absence of valid sanction from the competent authority (1)abusing the court process (1)acb (1)Accident claim (2)Accident claim - 100% disability - for reducing the claim (1)Accident claim - Hindu succession Act and M.V. Act (1)Accident claim - M.V. Act (1)Accident claim - M.V. Act - Employee died at his age 46 years - future potentiality (1)Accident claim - M.V. ACT - Goods vehicle - accident - Gumasthe died - Gumasthe also covered with in the clause "engaged in operation" (1)Accident claim - M.V. Act - Just compensation (1)Accident claim - M.V. Act - Liability of Requisition department (1)Accident claim - M.V. Act - Over taking a bus at red light area after green light on by a motor cyclist invites danger - motor cyclist was at wrong but not bus driver (1)Accident claim - M.V. Act- Notional monthly income (1)Accident claim - M.V.Act - composite negligence & contributory negligence - Truck and Geep colluded -for passengers - third parties both are jointly and severally liable to pay compensation (1)Accident claim - M.V.Act - Death (1)Accident claim - M.V.Act - Embroider - a skilled worker (1)Accident claim - M.V.Act - how to determine Functional Disability (1)Accident claim - M.V.Act Section 149(2)(a)(i)(a) - Tractor and trolley with sand for tank bed in field - Not other than agriculture purpose (1)Accident claim - M.V.Act- what is net salary or take home salary ?- Voluntary savings deductions can not be considered as expenses (1)Accident claim - sec. 147 - Gratuitous passenger not included except goods owner and his authorised agent in good carrier (1)Accident claim - Sec.103 and 157 of M.V. Act - Transfer of ownership - mere failure to intimate the same to the insurance company (1)Accident claim - Temporary Registration - Not applied for permanent registration - meanwhile accident took place - Vehicle damaged - Claim for insurance - rejected (1)Accident claim - trial court awarded Rs.37 lacs and odd (1)Accident claim -Section 166 of M.V. Act- clause (C) of Rule 2 of the Mizoram Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Rules (1)Accident claim M.V. Act - Contributory Negligence - absence of any cogent evidence- (1)Accident claims-M.V.Act (1)accused right to have lawyer (1)Acquittal - one of the accused - Apex court held that While considering the involvement of Satbir Singh in the occurrence (1)Acquittal -No consistence with Medical evidence - Scene of offence not clear - Blood stained Earth not sent for chemical examination - weapons not recovered (1)Acquittal basing on general diary and opinion of public not correct - Trial court did wrong (1)Acquittal of murder case (1)ACQUITTAL under Section 302 read with Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the IPC). (1)adds (1)admissiblity of a document (2)admissions (1)Admissions to children in schools transferred from different states to Delhi in the middle of sessions (1)Admissions to MBBS & BDS- NRI quota (1)admitted execution (1)admitted possession only is to be considered (1)adoption (1)adulterer compulsory as per high court rules (1)Adverse comments against a person who is not a party to the proceedings (1)adverse possession can be used as a shield/defence but not as a weapon (1)Adverse remarks against the Accused in his absence by High court and Bail Application - to M.P. in Murder case (1)Advocate-Commissioner to gather evidence not maintainable (1)Advocates Act (1)affixing adhesive stamps on white paper sale agreement is not proper payment of stamp duty - liable to be send for impounding the same (1)after termination of contract there exists no relationship between the parties as the consumer and service provider and complaint is also time barred. (1)AGREEMENT HOLDERS HAVE NO LOCUS STANDI TO QUESTION THE ACQUISITION - NO SUFFICIENT GROUNDS TO CHALLENGE THE ACQUISTION (1)Agreement/Compromise was arrived at between the Federation and the State Government (1)Agricultural Market Committee (1)Air India Ltd. - Hotel Corporations of India Ltd - workmen employed in canteens of Air India are worker of Air India or the workers of Hotel Corporations of India Ltd. (1)alibi - delete - cognizance (1)Alibi - Medical evidence - Non examination of senior counsel to prove alibi instead of office college is not a ground for discard the evidence (1)alleged recovery of gold chain at his instance. That cannot connect the appellant to the theft. The Trial Court has stated that since (1)Allotment of civic amenity sites (1)Allotment of share as per advocate commissioner plan valid (1)Allotment of site by CIDCO (1)Allotment of Water to Kutuch District fro Sardar Sarovar (1)allowance in lieu of kilometerage (ALK). (1)Along with Section 501 I.P.C. (1)Alternative pleas/contradictory pleas holds no significance when suit was decreed on main relief (1)Amendment of Preliminary Decree Sec.152 C.P.C. & Or.18 (1)amendment to bye laws (2)an offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC for murder (1)An application for modification/clarification (1)and 419 I.P.C.- Marriage with already married man and living with him for some time - disputes arose due to elders interference No Rape 376 (1)and 16 of Securities Contracts ( Regulation) Act and as such transfer and registration of share in the name of purchaser is not valid (1)and a certificate of fitness provided by a doctor is not a condition precedent for placing reliance upon a dying declaration. (1)and power dispute and compensation disputes (2)and Rules 63 (1)and sec. 29 of Indian Limitation Act (1)and sec. 3 (1)another witness going to be examined should not be there (1)Anti corruption act (1)Anti corruption case (1)AP ASSIGNED LANDS ACT (1)apex court confirmed the same (1)Apex court converted the sentence from sec.302 to sec.307 of I.P.C. (1)APEX COURT GAVE SOME DIRECTIONS IN RESPECT OF OFFENCE UNDER SEC.376 I.P.C- (1)Apex court held that same principles laid down in death cases- would apply with little modifications for assessing the sentences in other cases (1)Apex court placed the same before the constitution Bench (1)APEX COURT UPHELD THAT THE SUIT FILED BY NATIONAL HOUSING BAND UNDER SPECIAL ACT ENACTED FOR PURPOSE OF HARSHAD S. MEHTA (1)Appeal by informant of FIR for cancellation of Bail (1)APPELLANT COURT CAN DECIDED IT (1)APPLICATION FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY OF 193 DAYS IN FILING APPEAL - REFUSED (1)applied for a refund of Rs.8 (1)Appointment as Director (Finance ) in B.S.N.L (1)appointment of chairman (1)appointment of quasi judicial authorities who have no knowledge in legal filed (1)Appointment of Special police officers from ex-service men (1)appointment to the post of Lokayukta or Upa Lokayukta (1)Apportionment of liability among the Respondents for their respective Negligence which caused death of several persons in a fire accident in RAJIV MARRIAGE PALACE (1)appreciation of evidence (1)appreciation of evidence of a witness (1)Ara Municipal Corporation (1)Arbitration & Conciliation Act (1)Arbitration & conciliation Act (1)Arbitration & Conciliation Act - Facilitation Deed - Allegations of Fraud - ca