implications of the first and second successful large scale securitizations of catastrophe risk
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Implications Of The First and Second Successful Large Scale Securitizations of Catastrophe Risk. Presentation to: The CAS Seminar on Catastrophes October 23, 1998. Presented by: Steve Goldberg SVP, P&C Underwriting & Pricing USAA. Objective of Briefing. To summarize the Residential Re - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
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Presented by: Steve GoldbergPresented by: Steve GoldbergSVP, P&C Underwriting & PricingSVP, P&C Underwriting & Pricing
USAAUSAA
Presentation to:Presentation to:The CAS Seminar on Catastrophes The CAS Seminar on Catastrophes
October 23, 1998October 23, 1998
Implications Of Implications Of The First and Second Successful The First and Second Successful
Large Scale Securitizations of Large Scale Securitizations of Catastrophe RiskCatastrophe Risk
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Objective of BriefingObjective of Briefing
To summarize the Residential ReTo summarize the Residential Re
transaction and its implicationstransaction and its implications
for USAA, the P&C Insurance Industryfor USAA, the P&C Insurance Industry
and investors.and investors.
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How will USAA insulate itselfHow will USAA insulate itselffrom the next mega-hurricane?from the next mega-hurricane?
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Hurricane Andrew made landfall in South Dade County Florida devastating Hurricane Andrew made landfall in South Dade County Florida devastating Homestead Air Force Base.Homestead Air Force Base.
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1992 Hurricane Andrew1992 Hurricane Andrew
USAAUSAA$600,000,000$600,000,000
IndustryIndustry$16,500,000,000$16,500,000,000
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A stormA stormthe sizethe sizeof Andrewof Andrew
just just 40 mi.40 mi.northnorth would wouldhave resultedhave resultedin insuredin insuredlosses oflosses ofoverover
$50 billion$50 billion
HAFBHAFB
Miami40 miles
north
Miami40 miles
north
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Exposure to Mega-HurricaneEstimated U.S. Insured Losses (1/500 Yr.)Exposure to Mega-Hurricane
Estimated U.S. Insured Losses (1/500 Yr.)
$22 Billion$22 BillionHurricaneHurricane
Houston-GalvestonHouston-Galveston
$21 Billion$21 BillionHurricaneHurricane
Northeast RegionNortheast Region
$17 Billion$17 BillionHurricaneHurricane
Southeast RegionSoutheast Region
$76 Billion$76 BillionHurricaneHurricane
Florida RegionFlorida Region
Source: Risk Management Solutions, Inc.; Insurance Services Office, Inc.Source: Risk Management Solutions, Inc.; Insurance Services Office, Inc.
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Strategic Challenge:Industry PerspectiveStrategic Challenge:Industry Perspective
Since 1989, a series of natural disasters has resulted in variability in Since 1989, a series of natural disasters has resulted in variability in insurance losses.insurance losses.
Prior to Hurricane Hugo, the insurance industry had never suffered Prior to Hurricane Hugo, the insurance industry had never suffered losses from a single disaster over $1 Billion.losses from a single disaster over $1 Billion.
Since then, 11 natural disasters have exceeded this amount.Since then, 11 natural disasters have exceeded this amount.
Traditional reinsurance mechanisms are limited in capacity.Traditional reinsurance mechanisms are limited in capacity.
Recent events have caused the insurance industry to reconsider its Recent events have caused the insurance industry to reconsider its approach in handling low frequency, high severity occurrences.approach in handling low frequency, high severity occurrences.
The questions have centered around the following:The questions have centered around the following:
— What steps can we take toWhat steps can we take to reduce lossesreduce losses from future disasters? from future disasters?— What steps can we take to What steps can we take to reduce variabilityreduce variability in insurer results in insurer results
from future disasters?from future disasters?
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Serving members who live in catastrophe-prone Serving members who live in catastrophe-prone areas requires maintenance of a high level of areas requires maintenance of a high level of capitalization and liquidity.capitalization and liquidity.
If such exposures could be mitigated, then If such exposures could be mitigated, then transferred or separately securitized, USAA could transferred or separately securitized, USAA could more efficiently deploy its capital resources.more efficiently deploy its capital resources.
Strategic Challenge:USAA Perspective
Strategic Challenge:USAA Perspective
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Options Considered By USAAOptions Considered By USAATo AddressTo Address
The Strategic ChallengeThe Strategic Challenge
Options Considered By USAAOptions Considered By USAATo AddressTo Address
The Strategic ChallengeThe Strategic Challenge
Expanded Traditional ReinsuranceExpanded Traditional Reinsurance
Catastrophe BondsCatastrophe Bonds
Catastrophe OptionsCatastrophe Options
Surplus Notes and Contingent Surplus NotesSurplus Notes and Contingent Surplus Notes
Contingent EquityContingent Equity
Catastrophe SwapsCatastrophe Swaps
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Options’ Issue: Options’ Issue: Financing vs. HedgingFinancing vs. Hedging
FinancingFinancing HedgingHedging
Impact on:Impact on:
PMLPML NoNo YesYes SurplusSurplus YesYes YesYes LiquidityLiquidity YesYes YesYes Balance SheetBalance Sheet Yes *Yes * YesYes
* Contingent type can be kept off balance sheet until exercised.* Contingent type can be kept off balance sheet until exercised.
Risk TransferRisk Transfer NoNo YesYes
InstrumentInstrumentSurplus NotesSurplus Notes ReinsuranceReinsurance
Cat BondsCat BondsCBOTCBOT
Contingent Surplus NotesContingent Surplus NotesContingent EquityContingent Equity
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- Competitive.- Competitive.- Financially Strong.- Financially Strong.- Highly Rated.- Highly Rated.- No regulatory concerns.- No regulatory concerns.
RR
USAAUSAA
CapacityCapacity CostCost
SecuritySecurity PermanencePermanence
Risk TransferRisk Transfer
CapitalCapitalMarketsMarkets
ReinsuranceReinsuranceMarketsMarkets
USAA Preferred HedgingUSAA Preferred Hedging StrategyStrategy
USAA Preferred HedgingUSAA Preferred Hedging StrategyStrategy
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Hedging Design FieldHedging Design Field
Re-Re-insuranceinsurance
C. B. O. T.C. B. O. T.
Cat BondCat BondIndemnityIndemnity
Cat BondCat BondIndexIndex
Source: “Financial Risk Management For Catastrophes”- Neil DohertySource: “Financial Risk Management For Catastrophes”- Neil Doherty
CCrre e d d i i tt
RRiisskk
Moral HazardMoral Hazard
Basis RiskBasis Risk
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Selected Hedging Selected Hedging InstrumentsInstruments
Selected Hedging Selected Hedging InstrumentsInstruments
Expanded Traditional ReinsuranceExpanded Traditional Reinsurance
Catastrophe BondsCatastrophe Bonds
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Characteristics OfCharacteristics OfCatastrophe BondsCatastrophe BondsCharacteristics OfCharacteristics OfCatastrophe BondsCatastrophe Bonds
Rated security Rated security
Renewable process Renewable process
Supplement to traditional reinsuranceSupplement to traditional reinsurance
Objective risk assessmentObjective risk assessment
Potentially attractive to investorsPotentially attractive to investors
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Special Purpose ReinsurerSpecial Purpose Reinsurer How it Works How it Works
CompanyCompany SPRSPRReinsuranceReinsurance
PremiumPremium
InvestorInvestor
To secure obligations To secure obligations under the Reinsurance under the Reinsurance
AgreementAgreement
Reg 114 TrustReg 114 TrustAccountAccount
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The Reinsurance AgreementThe Reinsurance AgreementThe Reinsurance AgreementThe Reinsurance Agreement
Obligates Residential Reinsurance to pay USAA Obligates Residential Reinsurance to pay USAA for the claims in the layer between $1.0 billion for the claims in the layer between $1.0 billion and $1.5 billion resulting from a single Class 3, and $1.5 billion resulting from a single Class 3, 4 or 5 hurricane in the Covered States during a 4 or 5 hurricane in the Covered States during a 12 month claims period.12 month claims period.
USAA will retain not less than 10% of the risk.USAA will retain not less than 10% of the risk.
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Catastrophe Bond Catastrophe Bond Transaction TimelineTransaction Timeline
Catastrophe Bond Catastrophe Bond Transaction TimelineTransaction Timeline
June 15, 1998 - May 31, 1999June 15, 1998 - May 31, 1999 June 1, 1999 -June 1, 1999 -
Dec 1, 1999Dec 1, 1999 Dec 1, 1999 Dec 1, 2009Dec 1, 1999 Dec 1, 2009
Risk PeriodRisk PeriodExtended Extended
ClaimsClaimsPeriodPeriod
Class A-1 PrincipalClass A-1 PrincipalExtension PeriodExtension Period
June 1June 1 Dec 1Dec 1 June 1June 1 Dec 1Dec 1
Typical Hurricane SeasonTypical Hurricane Season
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Key Issues EncounteredKey Issues Encountered Federal TaxFederal Tax
– SPR off-shoreSPR off-shore– Debt vs. equity interestDebt vs. equity interest
RegulatoryRegulatory– Recognition that investors are not in the business Recognition that investors are not in the business
of insuranceof insurance
SecuritiesSecurities– Public vs. private offeringPublic vs. private offering
Bond StructureBond Structure– Principal at risk vs. principal protectedPrincipal at risk vs. principal protected– Single year vs. multi-year transactionSingle year vs. multi-year transaction
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The Investor’s The Investor’s PerspectivePerspective
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Why Do I Buy?Why Do I Buy?Why Do I Buy?Why Do I Buy?
Increase YieldIncrease Yield
Reduce Portfolio Reduce Portfolio VariabilityVariability
Porfolio Risk
Por
tfol
io R
etu
rn
Before
After
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What Do I Need To Know? What Do I Need To Know? Questions that need to be answered from Investor’s PerspectiveQuestions that need to be answered from Investor’s Perspective
What Do I Need To Know? What Do I Need To Know? Questions that need to be answered from Investor’s PerspectiveQuestions that need to be answered from Investor’s Perspective
How do I assess the risk ?How do I assess the risk ?
How credible is the risk assessment ?How credible is the risk assessment ?
When do I feel that I have become educated enough to buy ?When do I feel that I have become educated enough to buy ?
Is this the first transaction of this kind?Is this the first transaction of this kind?
Is there a pipeline of future deals to further increase Is there a pipeline of future deals to further increase diversification ?diversification ?
Why have they bypassed the reinsurance market ?Why have they bypassed the reinsurance market ?
Can I afford to lose all my principal ?Can I afford to lose all my principal ?
What are the regulatory impacts (especially for life insurers and What are the regulatory impacts (especially for life insurers and pensions funds) ?pensions funds) ?
Isn’t one year too short; wouldn’t a multi-year commitment Isn’t one year too short; wouldn’t a multi-year commitment improve the utility of this instrument ?improve the utility of this instrument ?
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Who Are The Investors?Who Are The Investors?Who Are The Investors?Who Are The Investors?
Bottom line: 90 - 95% of the money is new to the P&C Insurance Bottom line: 90 - 95% of the money is new to the P&C Insurance Industry. This is “found money”; capital that would never have Industry. This is “found money”; capital that would never have been applied to the problem of catastrophe protection through been applied to the problem of catastrophe protection through either investment in primary insurers or reinsurers.either investment in primary insurers or reinsurers.
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Categories Of Investors:Categories Of Investors:This is a Global MarketThis is a Global MarketCategories Of Investors:Categories Of Investors:This is a Global MarketThis is a Global Market
Life InsurersLife Insurers
Pension FundsPension Funds
Reinsurers Reinsurers
Hedge FundsHedge Funds
BanksBanks
Investment AdvisorsInvestment Advisors
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Wall Street JournalWall Street JournalJune 18, 1997June 18, 1997Wall Street JournalWall Street JournalJune 18, 1997June 18, 1997
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Even Nature Even Nature Can Be TurnedCan Be Turned Into a SecurityInto a Security
High Yield and Big Risk High Yield and Big Risk With Catastrophe BondsWith Catastrophe Bonds
Even Nature Even Nature Can Be TurnedCan Be Turned Into a SecurityInto a Security
High Yield and Big Risk High Yield and Big Risk With Catastrophe BondsWith Catastrophe Bonds
THE NEW YORK TIMESAUGUST 6, 1997THE NEW YORK TIMESAUGUST 6, 1997
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ImplicationsImplicationsImplicationsImplications Transaction will be the evidence that Transaction will be the evidence that
securitization of catastrophe risk on a large scale securitization of catastrophe risk on a large scale is possible. is possible.
Renewing transaction will improve cost and Renewing transaction will improve cost and efficiency.efficiency.
Soft reinsurance market may deter rapid growth. Soft reinsurance market may deter rapid growth.
Multi-year periods could be negotiable.Multi-year periods could be negotiable.
New risk capital available.New risk capital available.
Fundamental change in the game.Fundamental change in the game.
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Final ObservationsFinal ObservationsFinal ObservationsFinal Observations
USAA is driven by the need to serve our members.USAA is driven by the need to serve our members.
Traditional reinsurance capacity is limited.Traditional reinsurance capacity is limited.
Reinsurance market must be supplemented to Reinsurance market must be supplemented to increase capacity.increase capacity.
Capital markets offer the potential to supply this Capital markets offer the potential to supply this additional capacity.additional capacity.
Improving efficiency and cost will be a major Improving efficiency and cost will be a major objective as we renew the process.objective as we renew the process.
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ConclusionConclusionConclusionConclusion
This pioneering (and now renewed), mutually This pioneering (and now renewed), mutually beneficial transaction fulfills the strategic purposes of:beneficial transaction fulfills the strategic purposes of:
– Tapping into the vast pool of capital for capacity.Tapping into the vast pool of capital for capacity.
– Introducing a new asset class which supplements Introducing a new asset class which supplements reinsurance.reinsurance.
– Providing a vehicle for investors to increase yield,Providing a vehicle for investors to increase yield,while reducing portfolio risk through while reducing portfolio risk through diversification.diversification.
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Insulating Insulating USAAUSAAfrom thefrom theFinancial Financial ImpactImpactof aof aMega-Mega-CatastropheCatastrophe
Insulating Insulating USAAUSAAfrom thefrom theFinancial Financial ImpactImpactof aof aMega-Mega-CatastropheCatastrophe