impact study on transportation projects in jabotabek · 2012. 9. 18. · in 1981, jica prepared the...

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1 Jabotek is a composite name deriving from the initial letters of the city JAkarta, theBOgor prefecture, TAngeranng prefecture and BEKasi prefecture and it is generi-cally used to identify this region

In 1981, JICA prepared the master plan based onthe “Jakarta Metropolitan Railway TransportationPlan” and implemented the “Integrated TransportSystem Improvement Plan” in 1990 that placedbuses as a “feeder service” for the railway. More-over, since fiscal year of 2001, JICA has initiatedan integrated transport master plan study of Jab-otabek1.ODA loans have performed a significant role in therailway development of the Jabotabek Area with anoticeable population increase. Since the initiationof ODA loans, the number of projects has risen to18, relating to the procurement of carriages;improvement of tracks; construction of communi-cation facilities; electrification; carriage depots andmaintenance factories; renovation of stations; auto-mated signalization; double track modulation; andelevation of the Central Line etc. Thus, a large pro-portion of the funds procured for the Jabotabekarea railway development projects are from ODAloans. It is believed that these ODA loan financed

(1) From the Perspective of Relevance

1) The Relevance of the Fundamental AimsThe undertaking of urban development of largemetropolitan zones, such as the Jabotabek Area,relying solely upon road transportation is impossi-ble. The development of the commuter railway net-

Impact Study on TransportationProjects in Jabotabek

INDONESIA

Report Date: February 2003Field Survey: May 2002

Third-party Evaluation TeamHitoshi Ieda Professor University of Tokyo, School of Engineering, Department of Civil EngineeringShoshi Mizokami Professor Kumamoto University, Faculty of Engineering, Department of Civil and Environmental EngineeringTetsuo Kidokoro Associate Professor University of Tokyo, School of Engineering, Department of Urban EngineeringSeiji Iwakura Associate Professor Shibaura Institute of Technology, Faculty of Engineering, Department of Civil Engineering

1. Objectives

2. Evaluation result

projects have made a large impact on the railwaytransportation and the socioeconomic activities ofthe local population and thus, the undertaking ofimpact evaluation is significant.The primary objective of this evaluation is toassess the degree of achievement of project objec-tives in the master-plan resulting from 18 complet-ed projects since 1977(Please refer to “Areas forEvaluation”, “Summary of Projects for Evalua-tion”), and to undertake ex-post evaluations ofthose projects as per “DAC five criteria” (a)Rele-vance, b)Efficiency, c) Effectiveness, d) Impactand e) Sustainability), and to make recommenda-tions for the improvement of the railway transportservice, taking on-going integrated transport mas-ter plan study into consideration.

Jakarta Central Line

Bekasi Line Commuting Scene

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Impact Study on Transportation Projects in Jabotabek

works is an important issue for a sound develop-ment policy. For this reason, this project with theaim of development of the commuter rail networkcan be said to have been highly relevant and far-sighted from various perspectives, such as manag-ing transportation, city development and environ-mental measures because increase in public trans-port role and alleviation of road transport wasexpected.

2) Strategic Relevance of Track-systemDevelopment

The aim of introduction of track-system into urbantransportation should be highly evaluated. Howev-er, it is still premature to judge issues regardingwhether, at the stage where there was no city railtransport, the development of a suburban networkas in this project should have been prioritized orthe development of a network in and around citycenter should have been prioritized.

3) Relevance from the Perspective ofPoverty Alleviation

This project, through the utilization of individualsfrom the low-income groups, has increasedemployment opportunity in the city and the oppor-tunity of housing with relatively cheap rent in thesuburbs. For this reason, it is believed that it has adefinite role in the enlargement of job opportunitiesand the improvement of living environment for thelow-income groups. It can therefore be regarded asrelevant from the perspective of poverty allevia-tion. On the other hand, it is difficult to verify indetail whether or not rail fares that are regulated ata low amount by the government have a connec-tion with poverty relief.

4) Overall Consistency with the Metropoli-tan Development Plan

The overall Jabotabek railway planning can be saidto be in line with the philosophy of decentraliza-tion of urban districts in the Jabotabek Metropoli-tan Development Plan (JMDP) prepared in the firsthalf of the 1980’s.

5) Consistency in Railway Developmentand Urban Planning

The Central Line of the city center is locatedslightly off the central axis of the developing cityof Jakarta. For this reason, it is hard to say that thecommuter demands along the line are extremelyhigh. The utilization of the Central Line as a com-

muter route resulted from the consideration of alarge number of factors such as the cost for wiringwork modifications at Kota Station, and thus, fromthe view of commuter demand alone, there is apossibility that it was not necessarily a validchoice.

6) The Absence of an Integrated City Trans-portation Planning

Normally, for suburban city railways to be able toproduce adequate results, there is a need that anappropriate public transportation that supports thetransfer within the city centre region and the plan-ning for a feeder transport to suburban stationshould go together with development of the pro-jects. For this to be realized, the comprehensiveand effective city transportation masterplan thatguarantees consistency between the JabotabekMetropolitan Development Plan (JMDP) that hasthe function of land-use planning and individualrailway network development was necessary.However, the Jabotabek Railway Project wasundertaken without planning of the integratedgoals.

7) Consistency with the Development Plan-ning of the Railway Station Vicinity.

For the sound and effective development of cityrailways, the promotion of city development pro-jects around the main stations is essential. Even forthe Jabotabek Railway, although the plan for thesubcenter surrounding Manggrai Station is beingplanned, it has not been realized at the time ofevaluation.

Bekasi Line The view in front of Jatinegara Station

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(2) From the Perspective of Efficiency

1) The meaning of utilizing existing rail-ways (1)

It is believed that the utilization of existing railwaysites, railway facilities and equipment, greatly con-tributed to raising project efficiency through savingconstruction costs. However, it is believed thatconsideration also should have been made as towhether it was possible for existing routes to beorganically integrated with, for example, as a partof a newly developed route along SudirmanAvenue.

2) The meaning of utilizing existing rail-ways (2)

The employment of operators and workforce of theexisting long-distance railway organization is afactor that makes evaluation difficult. The use ofan organization and workforce with experience inrail transportation has a rational aspect. However,at the same time it is also true that the thought-pro-cesses required in the railway management oflong-distance transportation are not necessarily thesame as those required for a metropolitan city rail-way. Therefore it is necessary to reinforce the stafftraining systems.

3) Progress of projects and prioritizationThe functional development, for example of dou-ble track modulation and electrification had beenplanned for completion in 1992, but in fact it hasbeen greatly delayed. The elevation2 of the CentralLine was delayed for 34 months, and the greatestdelay in the procurement of resources and reviewin the mid-term plans etc3., was a delay of 87months, making the 18 projects delayed for 32months on the average. The development of theTangerang Line and the Serpong Line has been fur-ther delayed. The improvement of Kampung Ban-dan Station that was assumed to be used for the“racket operation” and the electrification project ofthe Western Line, were greatly affected due to suchdelay and there was practically no realization ofeffects, greatly reducing the efficiency of invest-ments.

4) From the perspective of investment peri-od and focalization

The 25 years that has been spent for the implemen-tation of projects have shown no small problemsconsidering the social environment into which theywere placed, the delayed manifestation of invest-ment effects, and the burgeoning cost of interest.From the perspective of efficiency, it is believedthat a strategic project management should havebeen required in such a way that, for investmenteffects to be produced substantially in the shortterm, there was a need to limit railway routes andareas, thereby to focus on short term investmentsand accumulate such investments on step by stepbasis.

(3) From the Perspective of Effects

1) The realization level of a high frequencycommuter train operation

The number of trains operated on the Bogor Linein 2001 has increased by over 3 times comparedwith that in 1990, accounting for approximately75% achievement rate compared to the target stipu-lated in the basic plans of 1985. As of 2001, theBekasi Line has increased the number of trains byover twice compared with that of 1990 , and thesteady strengthening of transportation ability canbe valued. But at the same time, compared with thebasic plan of 1985, the level of achievement hasbeen stalled at around 70% .

2) Evaluation of the commuter railwaytransportation record

Within the Jabotabek Railway Network, if theBogor Line and Bekasi Line are assessed, both ofwhich as city railways have high levels of develop-ment, the Bogor Line has approximately 80,000passengers per day (single way), with approxi-

Inside Bogor Station

2 Applies to “13 Jabotabek Area Railway Project Phase V” in the “Summary of Pro-jects Subject to Evaluation”.

3 Applies to “6 Jakarta Metropolitan Transportation System Project III” in the “Sum-mary of Projects Subject to Evaluation”.

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mately 85 train services per day (single way) andthe Bekasi Line has approximately 30,000 passen-gers per day and approximately 30 train servicesper day (single way). As a means of comparison,regarding the all day demand and number of trainoperations (both as of 1999) of representative cityrailways of Japan, the Tokaido Line has 200,000people/day (single way) and the number of trainservices is 206 trains per day (conversion to 8 carformation), the Keisei Dentetsu Line has 95,000people and 200 services per day, while theMusashino Line has 86,000 people and 120 ser-vices per day. From such circumstances, the BogorLine, Central Line and Bekasi Line, from the view-point of transportation volume as city railways, can

be considered, at least, to be used appropriatelyand producing results. Moreover, the Eastern Lineis also moderately operating services. However,the potential is only being partially realized.

3) The standards in service of commuterrail transportation

From the results of a social survey4, the majority ofinhabitants along these railways answered that thelevel of service has improved, for example, traveltime, the punctuality, the frequency of services andsafety. Therefore it can be considered that this pro-ject, which had within its target the improvementin services for commuters and the resulting mod-ernization of rail transportation, has achieved cer-tain results.

4) Issues regarding services, such as over-crowding within trains

The congestion levels during peak times on theBogor Line, the Bekasi Line and the Central Lineare too high, and it can only be said that the servicelevels are extremely low. The results of the socialsurvey also show that requests for improvement interms of alleviating the congestion in the economyclass is the highest at 23%, and the requests arealso applied to express trains at 18%. The mainreasons for this are considered to be the situationthat made it necessary for the limited capacity ofrailways to be shared with medium-long distancetrains, the divergence from the targeted number ofprocured carriages (As of 2001, only 41% of thetarget could be achieved), and the poor-develop-ment of storage warehouses for rolling stocks. Itcan not be commented that the maintenance situa-tion for rolling stocks and other standards in ser-

Passengers hanging onto the doors of a train

4 A questionnaire study was conducted on randomly selected inhabitants who livedalong the railway lines, put together from a total of 600 valid answers.

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vice are at a satisfactory level. Moreover, variousstrategies against dangerous activities from the per-spective of commonsense, such as riding on theroof and clinging onto doors and windows, arebeing implemented.

5) The effects upon road trafficAlong the railway lines that were not financed byJBIC, such as the Tangerang Line and SerpongLine, although the highway network is relativelywell maintained, the road traffic congestion isheavy. On the one hand, compared to the previoustwo lines, it is clear that the road congestion issmaller along the Depok Line and Bogor Linewhose services were raised through JBIC finance.This is thought to have been due to the transporta-tion capacity increase and the rise in service ofboth lines, which comparatively decreased thedependence on motor vehicles, suggesting the effi-cacy of this project from the overall viewpoint ofcity transportation. Moreover, the development ofelevated railway has been appreciated at the locallevel, because they say that the elevation projecthas brought not only the direct effects of transportimprovement but also the raising of image of theconcerned region.

6) Economic effects of the projectAs a result of the cost benefit analysis (period ofcalculation 1975 ~ 2027), the EIRR (EconomicInternal Rate of Return) was estimated at approxi-mately 15% (The B/C (Benefit Cost Ratio) was 1.4at a discount rate of 12%). It can be therefore eval-uated as being beneficial in a broad sense of eco-nomic effect. Although within the results of thebenefit measurements, include the time reductionbenefits for railway users (public transport users)and benefits of the smooth-running of the road

transport resulting from changing modes and ele-vation, the benefits such as the reduction of rail-road crossing accidents due to elevation of theCentral Line have not been included in the calcu-lation. Therefore if such benefits are taken intoaccount, it can be anticipated that the EIRR will besomewhat larger. Yet, as it was necessary to spendmore time for the completion of the aforemen-tioned project, it goes without saying that theeffects of the project were lessened due to thedelay in the manifestation of economic effectsfrom the perspective of urban policy, transportationpolicy and railway operational management.

7) The characteristic of those who enjoyedbenefits

Around 60% of the benefits that occurred werethose received by road users through the reductionin road traffic overload, and the remaining 40% ofbenefits were enjoyed by railway users. Thus, itcan be stated that this project brings about a largerproportion of benefits outside railways.

(4) Evaluation from the Perspective ofImpact

1) Effect of Improving Air Pollution The reduction rate of the six motor exhaust gasessuch as carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxide and particu-late matter etc. is estimated to be as follows: car-bon dioxide 2.49%, carbon monoxide 0.87%,hydrocarbon 0.95%, nitrogen oxide 4.15%, sulfuroxide 6.91% and particulate matter 5.06%. Bylooking at the data in terms of percentage, thereduction effect is not necessarily very large. Thiscan be interpreted in the following manner:Although it is called Jabotabek Railway Network,if one looks at the whole area of the metropolitanarea, its length (150km) is not at all large (a thirdof the area of Seoul, a tenths of the Kyoto/HanshinCity Zone). Reflecting this situation, naturally, itspercentage share in the total transport journeyswithin the whole regional area is extremely limit-ed. Consequently the overall volume of transferfrom motor vehicles can be considered to be limit-ed from the perspective of the car traffic volume ofthe whole city. Taking into consideration the poten-tial that the demand for Jabotabek railways willsubstitute increasing demand of motor vehicles tobe expected according to the future economicdevelopment, the value of Jabotabek railways can-not so easily be judged at this present time.

Central Line (Mangga Besar elevated station)

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2) Enlarging the strata of users The low-income group were the targets of thetransportation plan at the initial planning stage,however it should be noted that in recent years, dueto the operation of express trains, the introductionof middle to high-income individuals was also suc-cessfully achieved. This was effective use of trans-portation improvement investments and thus it canbe inferred that PT.KAI (Indonesia Railway Com-pany) has been recognizing the Jabotabek Railwayto be one of its profit sources, and there appearseffects of alleviation of traffic jams resulting fromthe switch from motor vehicle usage, which couldnot have occurred by low-income individuals, andthe accompanying environmental improvements.

3) The Burden of Road Traffic at GroundLevel Section

The elevation of the Central Line is making notice-able effects upon road transportation and the envi-ronment. However, concerns are being expressedover traffic jams and accidents at the railroadcrossings of the ground level on Bogor and BekasiLines as train operations increase.

(5) From the Perspective of Sustainability

1) Financial situation of the projectThe FIRR (Financial Internal Rate of Returen)between 1975 and 2022 for the Bogor Line is esti-mated to be 13.6%, while the figure is 1.3% for theBekasi Line and negative for the other lines. Par-ticularly, NPV of the Central Line, which is nega-tive, accounts for a share of over 50% of the entireproject’s NPV, which is also negative. This is dueto the large sum of investments into the elevationof the Central Line. This is a very important issuein terms of operational management, and immedi-ate countermeasures are necessary. As statedbefore, 60% of the economic benefits were enjoyedby those other than rail users. Especially, most ofbeneficiaries from the elevation of Central Line areroad transport users. If these are taken into consid-eration, it is clear that one should not expect toomuch of the tariff revenue as a source for financialprofit, and it is necessary to come up with thecountermeasure at the expense of the beneficiaries.

2) Marketing and maintaining tariff rev-enues

Tariff policies are essential in order to secure rev-enue. Although the user of express trains that has

been operational from 1999 only accounts foraround 5%, it occupies a 34% share of the overallfare revenue. This suggests that the marketing tar-get of this project should not only be set for low-income earners. Although the trend of opportuneand solid marketing can be seen as in the case ofintroduction of express trains, business conscious-ness in terms of maximization of revenue cannotbe said to be totally adequate. Furthermore, it isdifficult to say that effective measures are beingundertaken against free riders, which is said to beoccupied a 30% share of overall users in year2000.

3) Maintenance and railway operationalmanagement

There have been incidents and accidents, thedecrease in operational rate of rolling stocks, andthe rise in the incidence of train service delays dueto the lack of rolling stock parts and poor mainte-nance. Moreover, the blocked railway sections can-not be preserved due to the theft of signal partssuch as coils and thus it has also become a factor in

Passengers not going through ticket gates

A workshop lined with parts, of which the dates of manufactureare unknown.

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decreasing transportation volume. For the project’ssustainability and the ability to become indepen-dent, it can only be said that there are many prob-lematic issues.

(4) Training of engineers The privatized PT.KAI cut its full-time staff by30%, as part of cost reduction from the periodbetween1980 to 1998. Although operational man-agement efficiency by rationalization is important,it may lead to the fall in operation and maintenanceservice levels and the rise in accidents if the num-bers of engineers are reduced. A careful handlingfor the preservation of engineering standards,including the bolstering of human resource devel-opment of engineers, is necessary.

and clear-cut rule and moderation.

4) Bolstering human resource developmentFor the sustainability of this project as well as theenhancement of independent development, thereevaluation of the education program should beundertaken rapidly and, in addition to the skill-training of general railway operations, excellentengineers and staffs with high caliber should betrained.

5) Capacity building in Marketing and Tariffstrategy

Express trains are succeeding in finding out poten-tial demand, however compared with express trainswith the noticeable vacant seats during the sametime-slot, there are numerous cases for the econo-my trains that passengers are left behind at sta-tions. It is thought that one of the factors that leadsto such problems is that the fares of express trainscompared with that of the economy trains areextremely expensive by about 6 times, and thatsupply and demand is not being balanced. There issurely room for the revision in the operation ratioof express trains to economy trains during conges-tion periods and tariff levels.

6) Bolstering inner city public transporta-tion

The bolstering of public transport services in thecity center area is crucial even in terms of the over-all transportation of Jakarta’s entire metropolitanarea and the Jabotabek Railway Project. The fur-ther development of inner city transportation canindeed be said to be an “Achilles” heel that affectsthe magnitude of the socio-economic effect of theJabotabek railway in the entire city transportation.

3. Issues and Recommendations forSecuring Sustainability

(1) Aiming for Further Improvements in thisProject

1) Improvements in railway operation pat-terns

As it has been often pointed out previously, the fol-lowing are desired: a) The detachment of com-muter trains from medium to long-distance railwayon the Central Line. b) The implementation ofrotary operations. However, these are only on thepremise that the PT.KAI, as a privatized company,has a high awareness of business management, andit is believed that support from the Ministry ofCommunication and local governments is impor-tant.

2) Bolstering maintenance systemsIncreasing reliability of railway operation, throughthe capacity building of maintenance, is a matter ofgreat urgency. It is necessary to take sufficientcare, so that the management rationalizationaccompanying privatization does not cause short-age of engineers leading to poor maintenance.

3) Support relating to maintenance mattersIt is also believed that assistance from JBIC formaintenance equipment and parts is important.However, there are concerns that an endless supplyof maintenance costs decreases the self-help effortincentives of recipient countries, and becomesobstacle to their independent development. There-fore, in this situation, there needs to be a rational

Commuters (left) and express passenger (right) on the BekasiLine,Jatinegara Station

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Specifically, not only the promotion of the MRT(Mass Rapid Transit) system project, but also ade-quate cooperation adjustments with such inner citytransportation policies, or the shuttle bus coopera-tion in the operational regions can be suggested. Astrategic and serious assessment is strongly soughtby looking back at the basics of integrated citytransportation, without persisting fruitlessly onexisting plans or policies relating to the JabotabekRailway Project.

7) Promotion of developing the vicinitiesaround station points

Moreover, the development and enlargement of thestation square facility and city development pro-jects such as the development of station vicinitycommerce and the improvement of station facilitiesetc. are expected to greatly contribute to uncover-ing potential capacity of the project. Regarding thelatter, active participation by railway operators isconsidered to be significant.

8) Bolstering feeder transportation to sta-tions

The establishment of “Park & Ride” facilities atstations and the creation of a bus route centered onthe station is desired. The inadequacy in the divi-sion of roles and agreement among the concernedorganizations, such as the Ministry of Communica-tion, local governments and PT.KAI, can be raisedas one of the causes behind this issue. In future, theestablishment of rules that stipulates the division ofroles and operational regulation among concernedorganizations is desired.

9) Promotion of housing developmentalong the railway lines

In regard to housing development, the privatehousing development that targets railway com-

muters can partly be seen in Depok City, etc. Withthe increasing convenience of access through thedevelopment of access routes to railway stationsand other developments such as bus terminal facili-ties and “Park & Ride” facilities, it is important touncover the demand for housing developmentalongside the railway.

10) The establishment of stronghold devel-opment participation schemes for railoperators.

It would also be helpful for both urban develop-ment and railway management, if cooperationexisted between PT.KAI, the railway operators,who are land owners (although a part of railwaysites are the property of the Ministry of Communi-cation), with private developers with the know-how and ability to procure funds, and they jointlyundertook urban development projects in the landarea of station vicinities and arrange internal mech-anisms that would allow them to enjoy the devel-opment profits in return for the investment of rail-ways.

11) Fund arrangements for two level cross-ing and station front square

As long as the development of commuter railroutes is designed to contribute to the developmentin not only the autonomous areas along the railwaybut also the entire metropolitan area, it is necessaryfor the central government to construct institutionalframeworks including, but not limited to, budgetmeasures regarding related infrastructures such astwo level crossing and development of stationsquares. At that time it would also be an effectivepolicy to treat a portion of fuel tax as specializedrevenue for projects associated with road trans-portation.

Furthermore, for the implementing similar types ofurban public transportation projects, the executionof the following are desired: ex-ante evaluationconcerning utilization of existing railroads at thestart of new projects; introduction of pilot invest-ments (implementing pilot project and appraisingthe management capacity of the executing organi-zation); supervision of stepwise investments (long-term and large-scale projects should be implement-ed in stages, so that the effects of projects arerevealed at an early stage, and consideration can bemade about subsequent investments after viewingresults); the expansion of the marketing targetPT.KAI Headquarters

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(placing within its scope not only low-incomeearners but also medium to high-income earners);diversification of goal management indicators(besides the frequency of services, the level ofovercrowding, and length of over-crowding sec-tion, will also be introduced as indicators); institu-tional security of coordination function amongassociated departments (apart from more carefulassessments between related organizations, tangi-ble results of the coordination should be treated asnecessary conditions for the continuation of pro-jects); development of the integrated transportmaster-plan; bolstering urban planning systems(prevent inefficient,not environment friendly andill-ordered expansion of urban land); governmentcounterpart initiatives; and compilation of citytransportation data.

The View of JBIC

1. JBIC View 13. (1) Aiming for further improvements

in this project.6) Bolstering inner city public trans-

portation.

JBIC considers it necessary to establishthe strategy by looking back at the basisof integrated city transportation in thelong-term. From the short-term perspec-tive, JBIC consider that the highest priorityissue is, given the present situation of theIndonesian government, bolstering themaintenance system of existing lines andthe accompanying transportation capacitystrengthening.

2. JBIC View 23. (1) Aiming for further improvements

in this project.1) ~ 11)

From the perspective of increasing thesustainability of projects including theaforementioned recommendations, JBICconsiders that the methods for securingfunds that would strengthen the operationand maintenance system such as increas-ing the tariffs of the economy class thathave been set too low should be consid-ered on the Indonesian side.

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Areas for Evaluation

N.B. The red line indicates the Jabotabek Area Railway

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1, 2 Diesel Railcars Project・ Project Outline: Introduction of diesel cars (24 carriages)

into the inter-city transportation of Western Java, aiming

for the increase in rail transportation capacity.

・ Loan Amount/Disbursed Amount: ¥1,798 million/¥1,797

million

・ Exchange Note: July 1972

・ Loan Agreement: December 1974, October 1975

・ Terms and Conditions: Interest rate 3.0%p.a., Repay-

ment period 25 years (7 years Grace Period)

・ Final Disbursement Date: June 1976, October 1976

3, 4 Electric Railcars Project・ Project Outline: Introduction of trains (20 carriages) into

the city environs transportation of Jakarta, aiming for the

increase in rail transportation capacity.


million

・ Exchange Note: July1969, June 1970

・ Loan Agreement: December 1974, October 1975



・ Final Disbursement Date: June 1976, October 1976

5 Jakarta Metropolitan TransportationSystem Project II

・ Project Outline: Procurement of diesel cars (16 carriages

including spare parts), commutator,

communications/crossings/preservation equipment.


million

・ Exchange Note: August 1977

・ Loan Agreement: December 1977



・ Final Disbursement Date: December 1984

6 Jakarta Metropolitan TransportationSystem Project III

・ Project Outline: Procurement of trains (24 carriages),

crossing safety facilities, communication facilities, track

materials and engineering service.


million

・ Exchange Note: December 1978

・ Loan Agreement: August 1979



・ Final Disbursement Date: August 1988

7 Jakarta Metropolitan TransportationSystem Project IV-1

・ Project Outline: Procurement of trains (20 carriages),

crossing safety facilities, communication facilities and

materials for tracks.


million

・ Exchange Note: November 1979

・ Loan Agreement: August 1980



・ Final Disbursement Date: August 1988

8 Jakarta Metropolitan TransportationSystem Project IV-2

・ Project Outline: Trains (16 carriages), electrification of

Western line, development of railway routes, (substation,

crossing safety facilities, communication facilities, materi-

als for tracks, station and fence).

・ Loan Amount/Disbursed Amount : ¥5,836 million/¥4,947

million


・ Loan Agreement: March 1981



・ Final Disbursement Date: September 1988

9 Jabotabek Railway Modernization Pro-ject Phase I

・ Project Outline: Procurement of rails, crossing facilities,

trains (12 carriages), and engineering service.


million

・ Exchange of Notes: January 1982

・ Loan Agreement: May 1982



・ Final Disbursement Date: May 1989

10 Jabotabek Railway ModernizationProject Phase II

・ Project Outline: Renovations of carriage depots and fac-

tories, procurement of trains (4 carriages), and engineer-

ing service.


million

・ Exchange Note: April 1983

・ Loan Agreement: September 1983




Summary of Projects under Evaluation

(Produced by JBIC)

33


11 Jabotabek Railway ModernizationProject Phase III

・ Project Outline: Procurement of trains (4 carriages) and

diesel car (28 carriages).


million

・ Exchange Note: September 1983

・ Loan Agreement: June 1984



・ Final Disbursement Date: June 1989

12 Jabotabek Railway ModernizationProject Phase IV

・ Project Outline: Signaling improvements (between Mang-

garai and Bogor on the Central line 44.9km), double track

construction (Between Manggarai and Depok on the Cen-

tral line 22.8 km), detailed design of the two level crossin-

gof Manggarai station, and project management service.


million






13 Jabotabek Railway ModernizationProject Phase V

・ Project Outline: Electrification of the Bekasi line (14.8

km), improvement of the region around Kamppom and

Bandan stations (The looping of the Western and Eastern

lines), procurement of trains (Central line 8 carriages),

new station and bridge construction, temporary line con-

struction and signaling improvements.

・ Loan Amount/Disbursed Amount: ¥27,661 million /

¥25,254 million


・ Loan Agreement: March 1987




14 Jabotabek Railway ModernizationProject Phase VI

・ Project Outline: Construction of section A (4,050m) out of

elevated bridge (whole length 8,650m) of the northern

end (on the side of Jakarta and Kota station), electrifica-

tion and track construction, consulting service.

・ Loan Amount/Disbursed Amount: ¥13,565 million /

¥11,375 million






15 Jabotabek Railway ModernizationProject Phase VII

・ Project Outline: Elevated bridge construction, track con-

struction and consulting service.


million



・ Terms and Conditions: Interest rate 2. 5%p.a., Repay-



16 Jabotabek Railway ModernizationProject Phase VIII

・ Project Outline: Enlarging and raising the platforms of 4

stations (Manggarai, Jatinegara, Pasar Sunen and Tanah

Abang), improvement construction of footbridges, pro-

curement of trains (24 carriages), project management

service and supplying training machinery and materials.


million


・ Loan Agreement: September 1991



・ Final Disbursement Date: October 1999

17 Jabotabek Railway ModernizationProject Phase IX

・ Project Outline: Automatic signalization of the Eastern

line and Western line, train operation supervision system,

procurement of trains (24 carriages), consulting service.


million


・ Loan Agreement: October 1992



・ Final Disbursement Date: November 2001

18 Depok Depot Construction Project・ Project Outline: Construction of train/carriage mainte-

nance and storage depot in the environs of Jakarta, and

consulting service.

・ Loan Amount/Disbursed Amount: ¥9,223 million/ not

completed

・ Exchange Note: January 1998

・ Loan Agreement: January 1998



・ Final Disbursement Date: not completed

impact study on transportation projects in jabotabek · 2012. 9. 18. · in 1981, jica prepared the...

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