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ImpactEvaluationoftheNigerParticipatory&ResponsiveGovernanceProject:BaselineReport1 October2017 Submittedto: USAID/LAB/HESNUSAID/DCHA/DRG USAID/Niger Submittedby: ArielBenYishay AssistantProfessor,CollegeofWilliamandMary ChiefEconomist,AidData LisaMuellerAssistantProfessor,MacalesterCollegeMember,AidDataResearchConsortium PhilRoessler AssociateProfessor,CollegeofWilliamandMary Member,AidDataResearchConsortium ContactInformation: ArielBenYishay abenyishay@aiddata.wm.edu LisaMueller lmueller@macalester.eduPhilRoessler Proessler@wm.edu

1 This baseline report is submitted to USAID/USAID Niger, USAID/DCHA/DRG, and USAID/LAB/HESN by AidData (AID-OAA-A-12-00096), headquartered at the College of William and Mary. This evaluation is funded jointly by USAID/DRG and USAID/HESN through a contract to NORC and a cooperative agreement currently in place between

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TableofContents

ExecutiveSummary.........................................................................................................................................................................4

Introduction.......................................................................................................................................................................................6

ImpactEvaluationOverview.......................................................................................................................................................6Treatment:PRG-PAImplementation.............................................................................................................7

TheoryofChange.............................................................................................................................................................................9

SummaryofMonitoringandEvaluationStrategy..........................................................................................................12ImpactEvaluationDesignandImplementation.......................................................................................12RandomizationDesign......................................................................................................................................13SamplingDesignandPower............................................................................................................................14Householdsurveysampledesign.................................................................................................................................14

CommuneLevelOfficialSampleDesign......................................................................................................16

DataCollection...............................................................................................................................................................................16HouseholdandLeaderSurveyFieldworkDetails...................................................................................16SelectionandReplacementProtocolsforHouseholds..........................................................................17QualityControlandDataProcessing...........................................................................................................18

HypothesesandMeasures.........................................................................................................................................................19HouseholdSurveyFindings.............................................................................................................................19SummaryStatistics:HouseholdSurvey.....................................................................................................................19Balance:HouseholdSurvey.............................................................................................................................................21Baselineconditions:HouseholdSurvey....................................................................................................................21

CommuneLeaderSurveyFindings...............................................................................................................30SummaryStatistics:LeaderSurvey.............................................................................................................................30BaselineConditions:LeaderSurvey............................................................................................................................30Balance:LeaderSurvey.....................................................................................................................................................36

Fieldchallenges...................................................................................................................................................36Administration,Accesstocommunities,Logistics,andMilitaryincidence...............................................36

Pre-AnalysisPlan..........................................................................................................................................................................37

Timeline............................................................................................................................................................................................38

RolesandResponsibilities........................................................................................................................................................38ResearchTeam:...................................................................................................................................................38AidData:.................................................................................................................................................................39ImplementingPartner(CounterpartInternational):.............................................................................39Surveypartner(NORC):....................................................................................................................................39USAID/Niger:........................................................................................................................................................39USAID/DRG:..........................................................................................................................................................40USAID/HESN:........................................................................................................................................................40

AidDataStaffingandManagementPlan..............................................................................................................................40PrincipalInvestigators.....................................................................................................................................40AdditionalPersonnel.........................................................................................................................................41

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ListofFiguresandTables:

Figure1:TreatmentandControlAssignments.........................................................................................................14Figure2:SimulationResults.............................................................................................................................................15Table1:SummaryStatistics..............................................................................................................................................20Figure3:DoestheMediaAbuseFreedomsbyPrintingUntrueThings?........................................................22Figure4:AreLeadersConcernedWithServingTheirOwnNeedsorPeople’sNeeds?...........................24Figure5:HowFreeAreYouToChooseWhomToVoteFor?..............................................................................26Figure6:HowMuchofaDemocracyisNiger.............................................................................................................27Figure7:VotingintheLastElection...............................................................................................................................28Figure8:FreeandFairnessofLastElection...............................................................................................................29Figure9:HowOftenDoGovernmentOfficialsCommunicateWithResidents.............................................31Figure10:HaveYouEverHeardAboutCorruptionInvolvingtheCurrentPresidentofNiger?..........33Figure11:WhichDescribesWhatHappenedattheLastCommuneAssemblySessionWhenaDecisionHadtoBeMadeonaCommuneIssue?.......................................................................................................35Figure12:DoesAnyParticularGroupAmongPoor,Middle,andRichResidentsDominateDecisionMakingInAssemblies?..........................................................................................................................................................36

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ExecutiveSummary

Acrossmostdevelopmentindicators,Nigerranksclosetothebottomofglobalrankings.Overthepastthreeyears, ithasbeensecondto lastontheUnitedNation’sHumanDevelopmentIndex—justaboveCentral African Republic. At root of the country’s perennial development crisis are unfavorablestructuralconditions. It is landlocked,arid, susceptible toerraticweatherpatterns,andheavily relianton a single export—uranium—making it vulnerable to commodity price shocks. These structuralproblemscontributetoandarecompoundedbysignificantgovernancechallenges.Oneofthebiggestisthe absence of an effective state—one that can provide citizens with basic public services that arenecessary for inclusivedevelopment. In itsplace, thestate isdominatedbyasmallgroupofbusiness,militaryandadministrativeeliteswhocompeteovertheprivatedistributionofscarcepublicresources.A second major challenge is the militarization, or securitization, of the state, in which military andsecurity institutions represent the face of the government for many Nigerien citizens and divertresources from public administration. These governance challenges have given rise to a ‘crise deconfiance’ or ‘crisis of confidence’ between citizens and the state. Low-levels of state legitimacythreaten to continue to erode citizen support for democracy and risk strengthening the hand of themilitaryorextremistorganizations.Tohelpmitigatethesegovernancechallenges inNigerandbolsterstability inoneoftheworld’smostfragile states, USAID is investing in the Participatory and Responsive Governance (PRG) Project. Theoverarching goal of the PRG project is to strengthen the collective responsiveness of the Nigeriengovernment to its citizens’ priority public needs. The project aims to strengthen collectiveresponsiveness through three channels: 1) political party campaigns; 2) collective engagement andcoordination of multiple stakeholders (government, non-government, donors) to undertake reformsthat address citizen priorities; and 3) capacity-building of local think-tanks, media, NGOs, and civilsocietytopromoteparticipatorygovernance.TobetterunderstandhowthePRGmayaffectgovernanceinNiger,ateamofresearchersfromAidDataat the College of William and Mary have teamed up with the implementing partner, CounterpartInternational (CPI), to undertake a rigorous impact evaluation of the program. The impact evaluationfocusesonthePRG’smulti-stakeholderdialoguesthatwillbringtogethercommunityleaders,municipaland regional councilors, private sector actors, professionals and citizens to confer upon, design andinitiateRegionalDevelopmentPlans(PDRs)andCommunalDevelopmentPlans(PCDs).Theexpectationis themulti-stakeholder dialogueswill catalyze development and government responsiveness both interms of process and outcomes: the dialogues are intended to serve as focal points, or coordinationmechanisms,foradiversesetofactorstocometogethertobringmultipleperspectivestobearonthechallenge of community development as well as marshaling the resources and forging the strategicpartnerships necessary to ensure the development plan is implemented.Multi-stakeholder dialogueshavestrongpotentialtoimpactrelationsbetweenNigerienleadersandcitizensbecauseofthehistoricalcontextinwhichtheywilltakeplace.DialogueisamajorpillarofNigeriendemocracydatingbacktothetransition to multiparty competition in 1992, which occurred at a National Conference involvingstakeholdersfromdiversesectorsofsociety(politics,labor,education,religion,etc.).

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Theevaluationemploysarandomizeddesigntotestthistheoryofchange,inwhichthe24communeswheretargetedactivitiesbeheldwererandomlyselectedfromabroaderpoolof48eligiblecommunes.Werefertothe24communesrandomlyselectedfortheseactivitiesasthe“treatment”group,andtheremaining24communesasthe“control”group.Thisreportprovidesanoverviewofthedesignoftheimpactevaluationaswellas findings fromabaselinehouseholdandcommunity leadersurveycarriedoutinJanuary-March2017.Thehouseholdsurveyentailedasampleof1,258householdsusingstratifiedrandomsamplingatthevillage-levelwithincommunes.Theleadersurveytargetwas144surveysacrossthe48communes(3interviewspercommune)butonly118surveyswerecompletedduetoavailabilityandlogisticalchallenges.Follow-upsurveysareplannedforlate2018,withoutcomeanalysistofollow.Thebaselinesurveysarevaluabletogaugelevelsofperceivedlegitimacypriortotheimplementationofthe multi-stakeholder dialogues as well as to evaluate statistical balance between the control andtreatment communes. Overall, the study communes are well-balanced, with similar demographicprofiles,religiousandethniccompositions,levelsofpoliticalparticipation,andsatisfactionwithNigeriendemocracy across the treatment and control groups. As expected, there are a small number ofcharacteristics that are not completely balanced across the groups due to random chance, includingtheir ethnic diversity, political freedom, and voter turnout. We can address these imbalances bycontrollingforthesevariablesinthestatisticalanalysiswhenevaluatingtheimpactofthePRGprogramonperceivedstatelegitimacyandotherrelatedoutcomes.Substantively, aswe describe in the report, the baseline survey highlights the governance challengesNigerfacesandtheimportanceofthePRGprogram.Overall,participantsinthehouseholdsurveyreporta general frustration with government—from the president to the national assembly down to localgovernment—intermsofreceptivenesstocitizendemands,responsiveness,andputtingpublicinterestabovepersonalinterest.Inanothersignoflowsystemiclegitimacy,despitehighdissatisfaction,thereishighlevelsofpoliticaldisengagement.Themajorityofrespondentshavetakenveryfewpoliticalactionswhentheyhavebeendissatisfiedwiththeirgovernment’sperformance.Equallyproblematically,citizensdo not see themedia or political parties as effective institutions in holding government accountable.This crisis of confidence in civilian institutions seems to be filled by higher levels of trust in securityinstitutions.Respondentsindicatethattheyaremorewillingtotrustandrespecttheroleofthemilitaryandpolicethanpoliticiansandpoliticalparties.Despite these significant challenges and important opportunities for strengthening governance, onseveral dimensions citizens’ revealed preferences suggest enduring support for the Nigerien politicalsystem.Forexample,whenitcomestotaxation—thesinequanonofthestate-societycompact—mostparticipantsbelievethegovernmenthastherighttocollecttaxesandcitizenshavetheobligationtopaythem.Similarly,mostseeNigerasademocracyandbelieveitisthebestformofgovernment.Finally,andmostrelevantforthePRGprogram,morethan70percentofsurveyrespondentsagreethatcommunity dialogue among local leaders and citizens is an important vehicle for strengtheninggovernmentresponsivenesstocitizenpriorities.

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Whethercommunitydialoguescanactually inducethegovernmenttobemoreresponsiveand inturnimprove the coverage and quality of priority public goods will be the primary focus of this impactevaluation.

Introduction

This baseline evaluation provides a description of USAID’s Participatory and Responsive Governanceprogram being conducted in Niger. The impact evaluation is being implemented by Ariel BenYishay(CollegeofWilliamandMary),LisaMueller(MacalesterCollege),andPhillipRoessler(CollegeofWiliamandMary). The National Opinion Research Center (NORC) was contracted by USAID to conduct thisbaselinedatacollectioninpartnershipwithAidData.NORCinturncontractedthebaselinefieldworktoKantar Public. Kantar was responsible for conducting the in-country surveys andmanaging the fieldteam.ThesurveyworkbeganonJanuary24thandfinishedonFebruary12th,2017. ThefinaldatasetsweredeliveredtotheresearchteamonMarch28th,2017.

ImpactEvaluationOverview

This document provides an overview of AidData’s monitoring and evaluation (M&E) component ofUSAID’sParticipatoryandResponsiveGovernance(PRG)programinNiger.TheoverarchinggoalofthePRGprojectistostrengthenthecollectiveresponsivenessoftheNigeriengovernmentanditscitizenstopriority public needs in order to help mitigate what Nigeriens call a ‘crise de confiance’ or ‘crisis ofconfidence’betweencitizensandthestateandultimatelybolsterstabilityandgovernanceinoneoftheworld’s most fragile states. The project aims to strengthen collective responsiveness through threechannels: 1) political party campaigns; 2) collective engagement and coordination of multiplestakeholders (government, non-government, donors) to undertake reforms that address citizenpriorities; and 3) capacity-building of local think-tanks, media, NGOs, and civil society to promoteparticipatorygovernance.ThisimpactevaluationwillfocusonevaluatingUSAID’sParticipatory,Responsive,Governance-PrincipalActivity Program (PRG-PA). The PRG is designed to be a principal contributor to the achievement ofDevelopment Objective 2 under the Niger Operational Framework: Citizen Confidence in the stateincreasedamongtargetpopulations.Post-electoral activities focused on targeted citizen priorities under Phase 1 will provide initialcontributionstoresultsunderIR2.2:EquitableaccesstopublicsectorservicesincreasedintargetareaswhilecontinuingtocontributetotheparticipatoryprocessesunderIR2.2,includingcivicengagementingovernance.

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Ourimpactevaluationwillfocusonthepost-electoralactivitiesandIR2.2.OurobjectivesfortheimpactevaluationfollowthosestipulatedintheMonitoringandEvaluationPlanprovidedinthePRGProgramDescription(PD)(p.28),whichstatesinpartthat:

“Given the innovative nature of this proposed project, the project design teamrecognizes the value of also developing an external impact evaluation to test thefundamentalhypothesesandtheoryofchangeembeddedintheprojectdesign,andtodetermine whether changes in outcome measures are directly attributable to theproject. This aligns with the USAID Evaluation Policy, which requires new andinnovative or pilot projects to be subject to impact evaluation and thus thecounterfactualanalysisneededtodeterminecausality.Wealsorecognizetheparticularimportance of being able to show attributable results in USAID governanceprogramming, and see evaluation of this project as an opportunity to try to proveintervention efficacy. Lastly, an impact evaluation of aspects of the PRG principalactivityinitsPhase1wouldallowforfindingstobeappliedtoimprovedprojectdesignand implementation in the anticipated Phase 2 scale-up. In this way, the impactevaluationwillalsoplayanimportantformativeassessmentrolefortheproject.”

Treatment:PRG-PAImplementation

USAID selectedCounterpart International (CPI) to implement the five-yearPRG-PA.CPI’sprogramwillseektoincreasethecapacityofstakeholders–includingCivilSocialOrganizations(CSOs),traditionalandreligiousleaders,governmentandpoliticalparties,themedia,andprivatesectors.CPI’splan includesamulti-stageprogramwith threedifferent setsofactivities. Theoverallgoal is tostrengthenelectoral accountability and the responsivenessof theNiger government toprioritypublicneeds. This evaluation will focus on the second of these activities, which involve conductinggovernment systems mapping to inform collective action initiatives (activity 2.1); building a set ofmaster dialogue facilitators (activity 2.2); brokering commitments around targeted citizen prioritiesthroughlocalpartnerdialogues(activity2.3);supportingmediaproductionofreliableinformationthatsupports collective action (activity 2.4); initiate threenational-levelworking groupswith government,business,academic,andcivilsocietyrepresentativesfocusedonhealth,education,andsecurity(activity2.6);and traingovernmentandnon-government leaderson theService ImprovementActionPlanning(SIAP)tool(activity2.9).2CPIplans toaccomplishactivity2.1by identifying individualswhocan influencegovernmentprioritiesandchampionandcreateadvocacycampaigns. These individualswillbepulledtogether inasystemsmapthatwillimprovetheunderstandingofthedifferentnetworksofinfluencewithinthegovernment.Themapswillbecreatedbasedontopic,typeofreform,keyindividualsandinstitutions,policydecision 2Asmallnumberofothersubactivitieswerenotevaluablebecausetheirrolloutwouldtakeplaceacrossmuchofthesampledcommunes,makingtreatment-controlcomparisonsinfeasible.

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points, and changes in the system over time. This mapping exercise seeks to increase the overallunderstandingofhowtoandwhotonegotiatewithingovernmentsystems,especiallythosewhomightseem like unlikely allies. Theywill be used as points of reference as CPI and partners develop theircollectionactionplans.Underactivity2.1,CPIwillalsobecreatingmapsofmediaorganizationsthatspecifyincommunicationson security-related topics. Alongwith themapping exercise, CPIwill also run a perception survey inAgadez,Diffa,Niamey,andZindertounderstandcitizenviewsofthesecuritysectorinNiger.Thesurveyresults will highlight priorities for the planned activities, specifically focusing on improvingcommunicationbetweencommunitiesandgovernmentactorsonsecurityissues.As part of Activity 2.2, CPI will train up to six sub-grantees from civil society groups and the privatesector to runmulti-stakeholderdialogs thatwill cover topics thatemerge from local electiondebatesand conversations. This will include topics such as service delivery problems and gaps in education,health, and security. Two individuals (oneman and onewoman) fromeach selected sub-granteewillreceive training on “asset-based community mobilization; cross-cultural communication; sociallyinclusive, participatory facilitation methods and dialogues for social, political, and policy change.”3These “Master Dialogue Facilitators” will then, over time, be expected to train additional facilitatorsfromtheirorganization.The trainedMaster Dialogue Facilitatorswill then lead local partner dialogues as part of activity 2.3.Thesedialogues are intended to create a forumwheredifferent communitymemberswill be able tobuild partnerships, utilize resources, and identify common goals. Thedialogueswill includemunicipalleaders and regional councilors, community groups, private sector actors (such as business based inregions),fadas,CadresdeConcertation(CDC),women’scooperatives,andother localgroups. Activity2.3will also include10 townhallmeetings in specific regions. These townhallmeetingswill includemunicipalleaders,themedia,CSOsandothercommunitygroups,religiousandtraditionalleaders,andprivatesectorrepresentatives.Thesemeetingswilladdresshealth,education,andotherissuesrelatedtosecurityinordertoidentifyissuesthatcollectiveactioninitiativescantarget.CPIalso intendstotrainmediapartnerstocovertheseeventsaspartofactivity2.4. Thiswill includeholding workshops for media actors to train them on effective interviewing techniques and how todiscussimportantpriorityissueswithstakeholdersandcitizens.Thesemediaactors,whichwillincluderadio stations, televisions, and print partners (local and national magazines), will then cover thedialoguestoinsurepublictransparencyandencourageactionarounddialogueoutcomes.Activity 2.6 will work on creating three national–level working groups that will be made up ofgovernment, business, academic, and civil society members. These groups will focus on discussinghealth,education,andsecurityissues.Thememberswillmeettoreviewcurrenteducationandhealthservicedelivery issuesandcommunicationproblemsinthesecuritysector. Thesegroupswillproduce

3CounterpartInternational,“ParticipatoryResponsiveGovernance–PrincipalActivity(PRG-PA)AnnualWorkPlan”,June8th,2016.

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recommendedpolicyandlegislationaswellastheactorsthatshouldbeinvolvedinimplementingthosemeasures.The last activity is activity 2.9, which will introduce monitoring tools for citizens and governmentofficials. One of these tools is the Service Improvement Action Planning (SIAP) tool. CPI will traincitizens and government officials to use the SIAP tool to record the priorities that come from thedialogues.Theywillthenseektousethistooltoachievethedialogueidentifiedserviceimprovementsidentifiedbymonitoringprogressonaregularscheduleandreportingresultsandoutcomes.Monitoringtoolswillalsoincludecitizensurveysresultsandotherquantitativemeasurements.Inadditiontotheseactivities,CPIaddedasecurity-specificmodificationinlateSeptember2016.AsofearlyOctober,theNigeriengovernmentdelayedelectionsby2.5years.Giventhisdelay,CPIhasbeeninstructed to not run their election related activities. Formore information on CPIs work, see CPI’s“PRG-PA–Y1AnnualWorkplan(Feb2016–Feb2017)”.

TheoryofChange

One of the core objectives of the PRG-PA is to improve collective (government and citizen)responsivenesstoprioritypublicneedsbyincreasingthecapacityofNigerienstoundertakeandsustaincollectiveaction thatholds their representativesaccountable. Few institutionsarepurported tobeascritical for responsivegovernmentaspolitical accountability, inwhichcitizenspossess thecapabilitiesandcapacitytoholdthegovernmentanswerableforitspolicies.4Extensiveresearchsuggestsastrong,positiveassociationbetweenbroad-basedpolitical accountabilityand theeffectiveprovisionofpublicservices;5evenlimitedaccountabilityinauthoritarianregimesisfoundtoimprovehumandevelopment.6There are two key limitations of existing literature on this subject, however. First, most rely onobservational data (cross-national datasets that analyze associations between indicators ofaccountability and provision of public services) to draw inferences about the effect of politicalinstitutions on government responsiveness. The problemwith such an approach is isolating preciselyhowmuchinstitutionsofaccountabilitymatterfortheprovisionofpublicservices.Itcouldbethatthisassociationarisesduetoreversecausality:theprovisionofpublicservices(whichthemselvescouldbesupplied for exogenous reasons—for example the threat of external war) leads to politicalaccountability.7Oritcouldbethecasethattheassociationbetweenaccountabilityandpublicservicesis

4Besley,Timothy.2006.PrincipledAgents?:ThePoliticalEconomyofGoodgovernment.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.5BuenodeMesquita,B.,etal.2003.TheLogicofPoliticalSurvival.Cambridge,MA,MITPress.Adsera,A.,etal.(2003)."AreyouBeingServed?PoliticalAccountabilityandQualityofGovernment."JournalofLaw,Economics,andorganization19(2):445-490.6Miller,M.K.2015."ElectoralAuthoritarianismandHumanDevelopment."ComparativePoliticalStudies48(12).7Fukuyama,Francis.2011.TheOriginsofPoliticalOrder:FromPrehumanTimestotheFrenchRevolution.NewYorkFarrar,StrausandGiroux.

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spurious; both are a function of a third unobserved variable. Thus, accountability does not have aspowerfulaneffectonresponsivegovernmentaswewouldexpect.Asecondlimitationisexistingcross-nationalstudiestendtofocusprimarilyontheroleofstructuralorhistoricalfactorsinaccountingfortheemergenceoftheaccountability-responsivenessnexus—suchasthe structure of the economy (the degree to which it is dependent on natural resources), forms ofcolonialism, history of state centralization or societal fractionalization, a culture of meritocracy, orgeography.Whileitiscriticaltounderstandthelong-runprocessesunderpinninginstitutionalvariation,these studies are less valuable for understanding what policy interventions in the short-term areeffectiveatbringingaboutmoreaccountableandresponsivegovernments.This impact evaluation aims tohelp fill this gap in the literature. Itwill rigorously test theeffect of aparticipatory and governance program on improving political accountability and governmentresponsivenesstocitizenpriorities.Oneofthecentralcomponentsoftheprogramisaseriesofmulti-stakeholderdialoguesthatbringtogethercommunityleaders,municipalandregionalcouncilors,privatesectoractors,professionalsandcitizenstoconferupon,designandinitiateRegionalDevelopmentPlans(PDRs) and Communal Development Plans (PCDs). The expectation is themulti-stakeholder dialogueswillcatalyzedevelopmentandgovernmentresponsivenessbothintermsofprocessandoutcomes:thedialoguesareintendedtoserveasfocalpoints,orcoordinationmechanisms,foradiversesetofactorstocometogethertobringmultipleperspectivestobearonthechallengeofcommunitydevelopmentaswell as marshaling the resources and forging the strategic partnerships necessary to ensure thedevelopmentplanisimplemented.Beyonditseffectsoncoordinationandresourcemobilization,multi-stakeholderdialoguesaretheorizedto have important governance benefits, which are seen as critical for sustainable development.8 Inelicitingtheparticipationandcontributionsofadiversesetofactorsthedialoguesenableaninclusivedecision-makingprocess,which is seenasa key sourceof legitimacy.9Moreover, the formalizationofcollective decision-making procedures and a plan of action facilitates common knowledge amongstparticipants and the constituencies they represent, which not only improves transparency but alsoaccountability as the stakeholders are seen to commit to implement the plan. Though there are nosanctioningmechanismsbuiltintothePRG,thereisastrongmediacomponenttotheprogramthatwillpublicize the dialogues and the commitments coming out of them, which are intended to increaseawarenessandraisethecostsforthestakeholdersiftheyfailtofollowthrough.Multi-stakeholder dialogues have strong potential to impact relations between Nigerien leaders andcitizens because of the historical context in which they will take place. Dialogue is a major pillar ofNigeriendemocracydatingbacktothetransitiontomultipartycompetitionin1992,whichoccurredataNational Conference involving stakeholders fromdiverse sectors of society (politics, labor, education,

8Bäckstrand,Karin."Multi-stakeholderPartnershipsforSustainableDevelopment:RethinkingLegitimacy,AccountabilityandEffectiveness."EuropeanEnvironment16.5(2006):290-306.Hemmati,Minu.2002.Multi-stakeholderProcessesforGovernanceandSustainability:BeyondDeadlockandConflict.NewYork:Routledge.9Hemmati,Minu.2002.Multi-stakeholderProcessesforGovernanceandSustainability:BeyondDeadlockandConflict.NewYork:Routledge.

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religion, etc.). Subsequently, the National Commission for Social Dialogue (CNDS) and the NationalCouncil for Political Dialogue (CNDP) were founded in 2000 and 2003 with the express purpose offacilitatingdebateandcompromisebetweenpoliticalpartiesandcivilsocietyorganizationsofdifferentpartisanleanings.However,theseinstitutionshavenotfulfilledtheirmission:Asof2017,thespaceforopendialogueisshrinkingamidgovernmentcrackdownsonthepressandcivilsociety;politicalpartiesareincreasinglypolarizedintopro-governmentandoppositioncamps.Giventhishistoricalbackgroundand contemporary situation, multi-stakeholder dialogues in the PRG-PA framework have two mainadvantages as experimental treatments: First, they are familiar and salient institutions in Nigeriensociety, which enhances external validity (i.e. the applicability of findings outside the experiment).Second,theyaddressseveralflawsintheCNDSandCNDP.Namely,theyarelocalinsteadoftop-downand they include an innovativemedia component, reducing concerns that the treatmentswillmerelyreplicatemistakesofthepast.Taken together, the use of multi-stakeholder dialogues is expected to improve local governmentresponsivenessthroughmultiplechannels—improvingthecapabilitiesofcommunityelitestocraftandimplementadevelopmentplanthataddressescitizenpublicprioritieswhileensuringthisplanofactionisseenaslegitimateandthatitactuallygetsimplemented.Mostexisting social science researchon theefficacyofmulti-stakeholderdialogues tends to focusoninternationalgovernanceandrelyprimarilyonqualitativeevidence.10Asfarwecantell,therehavebeennoexperimental studieson theeffectofmulti-stakeholderdialogueson local development. Thus thisimpactevaluationhasthepotential tomakeabroadercontributiontodevelopmentstrategies in low-incomecountries.A second innovation of the impact evaluation is it will also evaluate the efficacy of follow-oninformational interventions to sustain public discussion and facilitate collective action. There is anemerging literatureon theeffectivenessof informationalcampaignsongovernmentperformanceandthequality of services.While someof these interventionshavebeen found tobequite effective andcost-efficient—for example, the provision of information on the quality of healthcare in one’scommunityrelativetoothercommunitiesandthenationalaverage ledtosignificant improvements inhealthserviceprovisioninUganda11—othershavefoundthatinformationalinterventionsdonotalwaystranslateintoincreasedcivicandpoliticalengagement,improvedaccountability,andbetterservices.12

10Seeforexample,Bäckstrand,Karin."DemocratizingGlobalEnvironmentalGovernance?StakeholderDemocracyaftertheWorldSummitonSustainableDevelopment."EuropeanJournalofInternationalRelations12.4(2006):467-498.11Björrkman,Martina,andJakobSvensson.2009.PowertothePeople:EvidencefromaRandomizedFieldExperimentonCommunity-BasedMonitoringinUganda.TheQuarterlyJournalofEconomics124(2):735-69.12Olken,B.A.2007."MonitoringCorruption:EvidencefromaFieldExperimentinIndonesia."JournalofPoliticalEconomy115(2).Banerjee,AbhijitV.,etal."PitfallsofParticipatoryPrograms:EvidencefromarandomizedevaluationineducationinIndia."AmericanEconomicJournal:EconomicPolicy(2010):1-30.Humphreys,Macartan,andJeremyWeinstein."Policingpoliticians:citizenempowermentandpoliticalaccountabilityinUgandapreliminaryanalysis."ColumbiaUniversity.Unpublishedmanuscript(2012).Lieberman,EvanS.,DanielN.Posner,andLilyL.Tsai."DoesInformationLeadtoMoreActiveCitizenship?EvidencefromanEducationInterventioninRuralKenya."WorldDevelopment60(2014):69-83.

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In this study, we will analyze the additive effect of messaging citizens to remind them of thecommitmentelitesintheircommunitiesmadeinthemulti-stakeholderdialoguesandtoprovideastatusreport on the degree to which the stakeholders are making good on their promise to initiate andimplementadevelopmentplan.Todoso,thePIsmayplantouseSMStomessagearandomlyselectedsubsetofcitizenstheprogress(orlackthereof)thatthelocalgovernmenthasmadeinaddressingcitizenpublicprioritiesandtoemphasizethecitizens’responsibilitytocontinuetomonitorprogresstoensureitsfutureimplementation.Weproposethatthismessagingshouldnotonlybespecialized—directedatindividual citizens to increase their personal sense of responsibility13—but also provides concreteexamplesas tohowtheir fellowcitizensareactingon the information theyhave received to improvegovernmentperformance.

SummaryofMonitoringandEvaluationStrategy

ImpactEvaluationDesignandImplementation

As noted, the impact evaluation (IE)will focus on the second project outcomeof the PRG: improvedcollectiveresponsiveness through increasedmulti-stakeholdercontributions topublicgoodsprovision.In particular, the IE will assess the degree to which increased multi-stakeholder coordination andcollectiveaction leads to change inperceivedgovernment legitimacyand thecoverageandqualityofpublicgoodsthatmeetcitizenpriorityneeds.WerefertothesubsetofPRG-PAactivitiescoveredbyourevaluationaspublicgoodsreform(PGreform).TheotherprojectoutcomesofthePRG—responsivenessofpoliticalpartiesand localcapacity-buildingtopromoteparticipatorygovernance—willnotbedirectlyevaluated in this impactevaluation, thoughthe interactive effects of party responsiveness and capacity-building with PG reform implementationmaybeassessed.The IE employs a randomizeddesign that entailed randomly selecting the24 communesoutof 48 toreceivethePGreformprogram.Thisrandomizeddesignwillallowustocausallyestimatetheeffectofthe project intervention using panel surveys and changes in objective measures of public goodsprovisionandaccess.Theoveralldatacollectionplanfortheevaluationisasfollows:

1. Baselinesurveyathousehold-andcluster-levelonsocio-economicandsocio-culturalindicators;political attitudes and engagement; strength of informal and formal institutions; multistakeholder coordination and contributions; public goods provision and access; citizenpreferences for public goods. This includes surveys with randomly selected households in

13 Grossman,G.,etal.(2015).CanSMS-MobilizationIncreaseCitizenReportingofPublicServiceDeficienciestoPoliticians?,WorkingPaper.

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treatment and control communes as well as interviews with commune level officials andgovernmentofficials.

2. Midpoint checks for compliance (e.g., were the multi-stakeholder dialogues held in theappropriatelocations)andchangeacrosskeyindicatorsforadminandcommunity-leveldata.

3. Endlinesurveyandqualitativeanalysisatcommune/governmentlevel,household,andcluster-levelindicatorsandadministrativelymeasuredbehavioraldata.

Below,wediscusstherandomizationdesign,samplingdesignandpower,anddatacollectionefforts.We include the complete Household Survey Questionnaire and Commune-level Questionnaireadministeredatbaselineintheannexfolder.

RandomizationDesign

Thegoalof the randomizeddesignof theevaluation is toensure that the treatmentand comparisongroupsofcommunesareotherwisesimilarinthecharacteristicstargetedbythePRGprogram.Innon-randomizedsettings,differencesbetweentreatedareasandcomparisongroupsmaybiasestimatesofthe program’s effects. The randomization therefore aims to form groupings of communes whoseaveragecharacteristicsareassimilaraspossiblepriortoprogramimplementation.AidData completed the randomization of communes in September 2016. The sample frame for therandomization includedonlycommunesthatwereselectedbyCPIbasedoncriteria thatreflectedthesecurity conditions and existing organizational connections by CPI’s sub-awardees. CPI identified 48communesthatfitthesecriteria.Importantly,CPIhasprojectfundingandcapacitytoadministerthePGreformactivities in24ofthese48eligiblecommunes. Giventhisconstraint, inordertodistributetheactivities’ benefits fairly among these 48 communes and to better evaluate their impacts, AidDatarandomlyselectedthe24“treatment”communes.Out of the communes provided by CPI, AidData stratified the randomization based on three factors:region,urban/ruralstatus,andwhetherornottheyweretargetedforCPI’sinitialPRG-PAActivity1(tomakeelectionsmoreresponsivetoprioritypublicneeds). Thiscreated10setsofcommunes,eachofwhich shared identical values for these factors (i.e. belonged to the same region, were similarlyurban/rural,andslatedforActivity1/not).Thenumbersofcommuneswithineachsetvaried:somesetscontainedasfewasthreecommunes,whileotherscontainedasmanyasnine. Theaimwastoselectapproximatelyhalfofthecommuneswithineachsettobeinthetreatmentgroup(incaseswherethenumberofcommuneswithineachsetwasodd,thenumberofcommunestobeselectedfortreatmentwasrandomlyroundedup/down).14ThisprocedureensuredthatequalnumberofActivityIcommuneswererandomlyselectedintothePGreformtreatmentandcontrolgroups,andthatapproximatelyhalfofeachregion’surbancommunesandapproximatelyhalfofeachregion’sruralcommunes. 14Itisimportanttonotethatthereneednotbeexactlyequalnumbersofcommunesinthetreatmentgroupandcontrolgroupswithineachset.Whatisimportantisthattheassignmentofacommunetothegroupisrandom.

14

ThefinalrandomizedassignmentwasconductedusingtheSTATAstatisticalsoftwareonSeptember16,2016.Figure2belowmapsthetreatmentandcontrolcommuneassignments.

Figure1:TreatmentandControlAssignments

AkeyaspectoftherandomizeddesignisthatonlythecommunesassignedtothetreatmentgroupwillbethetargetsforthePGreformprogramforthedurationoftheevaluation,currentlyexpectedtolastapproximatelytwoyears.CPI’songoingpartnershipintheevaluationhasbeenandwillcontinuetobecrucialfortheevaluation’ssuccess.

SamplingDesignandPower

Householdsurveysampledesign

The household survey target sample consisted of 1,200 households selected using stratified randomsampling. Within each of the 48 communes in our randomization frame, we randomly sampled 3enumerationareas(Villages),withinwhicheither8or9householdsweretobesampled.This sample size was targeted to allow us to detect treatment effects of 0.1 standard deviations orgreater inourprimaryoutcomes. Thesearequitepreciseminimumdetectableeffects. Wewilluseanumberoftechniquestomaximizeprecisionavailablefromoursample.First,wewilluserandomizationinference approaches to determine exact p-values under the sharp null hypothesis of no treatment

TreatmentControl

NigerPRGImpactEvaluationRandomly Assigned Treatment andControlCommunes

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effectsforanyunit(asspecifiedGerberandGreen2015).Second,wewilluserepeatedmeasuresacrossrounds. Third, we will aggregate multiple measures of common concepts into standardized indices,therebyguardingagainstmultiplecomparisonswhilemaximizingtheprecisionwithwhicheachconceptismeasured(Kling,LiebmanandKatz2007).

Weusedsimulationstoconfirmthatoursampledesignwillallowustodetecttreatmenteffectsof0.1standard deviationswith 95.4% confidence (and 0.2 deviationswith >99% confidence). WeobtainedsurveyresponsesfromtheAfrobarometerRound6carriedoutinNigerin2015andestimatedtheintra-clustercorrelationandmeansofthesevenoutcomesmostcloselyrelatedtoourevaluation(limitingthesampletothoseregionscoveredbytheproject).Wethensimulated10,000samplesthatmatchthesecorrelations andmeans. For each of these samples, we next simulated 10,000 random assignmentsunder the sharp null hypothesis of no treatment effects and measure how many of these yieldtreatmenteffectsofeachsize. Theresultsofthissimulation(showninthefigurebelow)indicatethatonly4.6%ofplaceboassignmentsgeneratetreatmenteffectsas largeas0.1standarddeviations. Wethusconcludethatourdesigniswellpoweredtodetectevenmoderatelysizedtreatmenteffects.

The household survey collected information on basic household indicators such as occupation,educationlevel,poverty,religion,andconnectivity(suchasaccesstophones,internet,radio,andothernewssources).Surveyquestionsalsomeasuredhousehold’spoliticalviewsbyincludingquestionsaboutpoliticalviewsandparties,thesecuritysituationintheircommunity,elections,governmentofficials,andtrustandrelationshipstolocalandnationalleaders.Inordertomeasurelocalviewsonpriorityneeds,the survey measured local individual’s thoughts on how effective local and national governance hasbeen,howaccessiblecivilservicesare, importantlocalandnationalissues,andhowlocalandnationalgovernmentprioritiesmatchlocalhousehold’sneeds[seeindexforfullsurvey].

Figure2:SimulationResults

02

46

8

Per

cent

p=.322 p=.046 p=.002 p=0

-.25 -.2 -.15 -.1 -.05 0 .05 .1 .15 .2 .25Treatment effect (SD)

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CommuneLevelOfficialSampleDesign

CPIoutlined intheirworkplanthegoalofbuildingaccountabilityandgovernmentcapacity.Dialoguesare designed to advance that goal by inviting commune-level officials to share their perspectives onhealth, education, and security in the contextof thepostponed2017 local elections. Tomeasure theimpact of these interventions, enumerators interviewed commune-level officials at baseline and willconduct follow up interviews at endline on their knowledge in the following areas: leadership andstrategicmanagement,informationaboutthecitizensandprogramsofthecommune,politicalopinions,levelofcommunicationwithcitizens,andexternalrelationsandcommunications.Theleadersurveytargetwas144surveysacrossthe48communes(3interviewspercommune)butonly118 surveys were completed due to availability and logistical challenges. The field team sought tointerview a communemayor, an administrator in the health or education field, and a traditional orreligiousleader.Theinterviewtargetedtotowardsthecommunemayorcouldalsobedirectedtowardsthe highest-level official in the commune that is available to complete the survey. Themayor couldbring in officials thatwork for him/her to completemore of the specific statistical questions. Theseadditional people were listed on the survey and it should be clear whether or not these additionalpeoplewereinthesurveyfortheentiretimeoriftheywerejustpartoftheinterviewforthenecessaryfactbasedinformation.Thesurveytargetedatthecommunehealthoreducationadministratorincludedindividualsoutsidethecommunemayorofficeattheschoolorhealthcenter.Thiswasnotnecessarilyadoctororateacherbuttheindividualwhorunsthehealthcenterorschools,etc.Thefinalsurveyreservedforatraditionalorreligiousleadersurveywastargetedatvillageelders,villageleaders,Imams,orotherreligiousleaders.

DataCollection

HouseholdandLeaderSurveyFieldworkDetails

The survey work was contracted out to NORC, who in turn contracted Kantar Public to conduct thefieldwork.EnumeratortraininghappenedinNiameyfrom16thto20thofJanuary2017withateamof45enumerators, 12 supervisors and 15Quality Control staff. Enumeratorswere recruited and hired byKantarpartnersinNigerandmostrecruitedenumeratorshadanaverageexperienceof2yearsinsurveyadministration.Thelocalteamhiredenumeratorsfromthevariousprojectregionsandthereforetheyhadexperiencewith thearea, local politics, andwere very fluent in the local dialectsneeded for thesurvey.Eachsurveyteamwascomprisedoffourenumeratorsandoneteamsupervisor.Thetargetforeachcommunewas25householdinterviewsineachofthe48communesacross6regionsinNiger.Thetargetedsamplewas1,200interviews,andKantarconductedadditionalinterviewsinorderto account for potential replacement of any poor quality surveys. In total, Kantar achieved 1,314

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interviews. Backchecks includedre-visitingtherespondenttoconfirmtheenumeratorvisitedandre-askaseriesofquestionstoconfirmtheinterviewtookplacecorrectly.Thesurveyfirmalsoconductedspot checks on surveys, telephone check, audio checks, GPS checks, and forensic checks. Aftercompleting theback checkprocess, the survey firmdiscarded56 surveys delivering a final dataset of1,258surveys.The leader survey target was 144 surveys across the 48 communes (3 interviews per commune).However,duetoavarietyofreasonsincludingthenon-availabilityofcommunemayorsandinconsistentwork by the enumerators, only 118 surveys were completed. The baseline leader survey sought tosurveythree leaders fromeachcommune. Theenumeratorswere instructedtosurveythecommunemayor,ahealthoreducationadministrator,andareligious leader. Thesurveyselectionprotocolandthe leader survey are located in the annex. Given the aforementioned security concerns, somecommuneswerenotsurveyedleavingthetotalnumberofsurveysat118.110menand8womenwereinterviewedbetweentheagesof25and95withthemeanageof49.Thesurveydataproveddifficulttocollectduetothelackofknowledgeofcommuneleadersoncommunelevelstatisticssuchashealthandeducationindicators.Thesurvey firmdivided theirenumeratorsbetween the regionsofZinder,Agadez,Niamey,andDiffa.Theteamswereassignedthreerandomlyselectedvillagesfromeachcommune inthoseregions. Theassignedvillageswerepre-selectedbyAidDataviaarandomlotteryfromvillagelistsobtainedfromtheNational Statistics Office. Three replacement villages were also pre-selected in case there were anyproblems surveying the originally chosen village. These three additional villageswere comparable inhouseholdsizetotheoriginalvillagetoensureoverallsurveybalance.

SelectionandReplacementProtocolsforHouseholds

Toselecthouseholds, thesurvey firmuseda randomroutewalkapproach.Kantar,NORC’s in-countrypartner,hasused thismethodsuccessfully in severalprojects. In the training, theenumeratorsweretaught how to canvass the community, identify an entry point, and calculate intervals for selectinghouseholds. For every selected household, only one eligible respondent was interviewed perhousehold.Eachenumeratorwasassignedanareaofthevillagetoselectrespondentsfromviarandomwalk.Oncethehouseholdwasselected,theenumeratoraskedahouseholdmember(oftentheheadofhouseholdifs/hewaspresent)forinformationoneachmemberofthehousehold.Thesurveysoftwarewouldthenrandomlyselectonerespondentfromthathouseholdlist.Respondentswhohad travelledoutof thevillagewere replacedwithan individualwith samegenderandwithinthesameagegroupinthesamehousehold.Otherwise,thehouseholdwasreplacedentirely.Enumerators would move on from that household and follow selection criteria to find their nexthousehold.Ifrespondentswerestillintheareabutwerenotcurrentlyathometheenumeratorwouldrevisitthehouseholdatalatertime. Interviewsusuallytookapproximately45minto1hour.Overallthehouseholdsurveywentsmoothlyandthedatacollectedwasofhighquality.

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QualityControlandDataProcessing

Thequalitycontrolchecks included in-fieldchecksanddatavalidationchecks. Physical in-fieldchecksincluded a trained quality control teamwho followed the enumerators andwere present during thedatacollection.Theirworkincludedperformingback-checks,whichinvolvedre-visitingtherespondentafter the interview was completed to confirm whether the interview took place, screening therespondenttoascertainifhe/sheisqualifiedandre-askingsomeofthequestionstoseeiftheresponsesmatchwhatwascapturedduringtheoriginalinterview.Qualitycontrolpersonnelalsoperformedspotchecks,which involveda followupon interviewswhilethey were being conducted to check if they had been conducted in accordance with the surveyguidelines. Finally, the quality control team also accompanied an enumerator throughout the entireprocess(findingarespondent,selectingthecorrectinterviewee,andtheinterviewprocess).Theywereresponsibleforensuringtherightmethodologieswereappliedandtherightquestionswereasked.The survey firm also conducted telephone checks, which included follow-up calls made from KantarPublic’s Ghanaian office on completed interviews to ascertain whether the respondents had beeninterviewed and whether they were qualified or not. The last quality control check included audiochecks. Thesewere silent recordings that were programmed on questions of interest. When thesequestionswereasked,ittriggeredanaudiorecordingofthequestion.Theserecordingswerevalidatedin the office to ascertainwhether the questionswere asked correctly andwhether or not responsesmatchedwhatisinthedata.Kantar’shomeofficedatateamcheckedthecollecteddataonceitwasuploadedtothehomedatabase.Thisisadetailedcheckperformedonextracteddatatolookforthefollowing:

• Duplicateinterviewsorentries;• Omissions;• Peculiarinterviewdurations(eitherfarbeloworabovetheaverageduration);• Datesandtimeofinterviews;• Straightliningandotherinconsistencies.

The data team also performed GPS checks. The team extracted coordinates and plotted them todeterminewhetherornottheinterviewswereconductedintherightlocationsandwhetherornottheywerecorrectlyspaced.The survey firm reported that all the questions seemed to have been well understood both by theinterviewers and respondents, and the questionnaires were properly completed. The logic betweeneachquestionwascheckedmorethantwicebeforeandafterthefieldwork.

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HypothesesandMeasures

HouseholdSurveyFindings

SummaryStatistics:HouseholdSurvey

Atotalof677menand581womenweresurveyedwiththehouseholdquestionnaire.Themeanageofrespondentswas36,theyoungestrespondentwas18andtheoldestrespondentwas90.Thesampledrespondents have an overall low level of education, with the majority of respondents having noeducation (40%), followed by 23% having some sort of informal education, 12% completing somesecondary,andjustasmallminoritycompletingmoreeducation.Mostofthesampleislivingwiththeirnon-polygamousspouse(68%)with17%beingsingleandtherestofthesamplesplitbetweennotlivingwiththeirnon-polygamousspouse,beinginapolygamousmarriage,divorced,separated,widowed,andrefusedtotell.Forty-fourpercentoftherespondentsweretheheadofhousehold,with33%beingthespouse, 14% a child, and remaining being additional family members or friends. The majority ofrespondentsneverhada job (22%),arehomemakers (15%),are ineither farming, fishing,or forestry(25%),orarevendors/traders(9%).ThemostcommonpreferredlanguageforsurveyrespondentswasHausa(37%),followedbyTamasheq(19%), Fulfulde (15%), and Kanuri (15%). 89% of respondents are Muslim, with only a handful ofrespondents identifying specifically as Sunni (2%), Tijaniya Brotherhood (2%), or Shia (3%). MostrespondentswereHausa(34%),Tuareg(21%),Peulh(16%),orKanuriManga(16%).SummarystatisticsforbothtreatmentandcontrolgroupscanbeseeninTable1.

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Table1:SummaryStatistics

Variable Control Treatment P-valueAge 36.41 36.37 0.97 Gender Male 0.53 0.55 0.46 Female 0.47 0.45 0.46 EducationLevel None 0.36 0.43 0.07 Informal 0.26 0.20 0.18 SomePrimary 0.09 0.08 0.78 CompletedPrimary 0.06 0.06 0.88 SomeSecondary 0.13 0.11 0.18 CompletedSecondary 0.05 0.05 0.92 PostSecondary 0.01 0.02 0.38 SomeUniversity 0.01 0.02 0.53 CompletedUniversity 0.01 0.01 0.97 PostGraduate 0.01 0.01 0.99 Don’tKnow 0.00 0.01 0.14 MaritalStatus Single 0.17 0.17 0.82 Married,LivingWith 0.68 0.68 0.97 Married,NotLivingWith 0.03 0.05 0.15 PolygamousMarriage,LivingWith 0.03 0.02 0.45 PolygamousMarriage,NotLiving

With0.01 0.00 0.06

Divorced 0.02 0.03 0.30 Separated 0.01 0.00 0.25 Widowed 0.04 0.05 0.64 Refused 0.00 0.00 0.10 Religion None 0.00 0.00 0.17 Christian 0.00 0.00 0.32 Muslim 0.90 0.89 0.96 Sunni 0.02 0.02 0.96 Ismaeli 0.00 0.00 0.35 TijaniyaBrotherhood 0.02 0.02 0.69 OadiriyaBrotherhood 0.01 0.00 0.22 Shia 0.02 0.03 0.42 Izala 0.00 0.02 0.00 TraditionalEthnicReligion 0.00 0.00 0.99 Hindu 0.00 0.00 0.24 Bahai 0.00 0.00 0.33 Agnostic 0.00 0.00 0.16 Athesist 0.00 0.00 0.24 Refused 0.00 0.00 0.99

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Balance:HouseholdSurvey

Agoalof thebaseline survey is toensure that the control and treatment groupshaveno statisticallysignificant differences between them (tested at 5% sig). The household survey was fairly balancedbetween treatment and control characteristics. Becausemost of our questions of interest asked forresponsesincategoricallevels(i.e.,“alot”,“somewhat”,etc.),weconductbalancetestsoneachofthecategories for each of the questions. It is important to note that such tests incur more frequentdifferencesacrosstreatmentandcontrolgroupsthanforcontinuouslymeasuredvariables.Weincludethecompletebalancetablesintheannexanddiscussthemainfindingsbelow.Outof43variablesexamined,7had2-3answerchoicesthatwereunbalancedbetweenthetreatmentandcontrolgroup.Outof226answerchoices,only31wereunbalanced.Thisrateissomewhathigherthanwouldbeexpectedbyrandomchance. Manybutnotalloftheseanswerchoices indicateworseinitial perceptions and conditions in the treatment group than in the control group (though somevariables do indicate better perceptions/conditions in the treatment group). The imbalances suggestthat the treatment group is slightly more ethnically diverse than the control group and morerespondentsinthetreatmentgroupfeellessfreetojoinpoliticalgroupsorvoteforwhoevertheywantwithout feeling pressured. In the same vein, a statistically significant number of respondents in thetreatment groupalsodidn’t vote compared to the control. The research teamplans toaddress theseresidual imbalances by including these imbalanced baseline conditions as covariates in the statisticalanalysis when evaluating the impact of the PG reform on perceived state legitimacy and otheroutcomes.

Baselineconditions:HouseholdSurvey

Securityandthemilitary

Overall, the survey reflects high levels of trust in security institutions in Niger. Consistent with priorestimates from the most recent round of the Afrobarometer survey (Round 6 in 2014/2015),respondentsindicatethattheyaremorewillingtotrustandrespecttheroleofthemilitaryandpolicethanpoliticiansandpoliticalparties.Amajorityofthesampleeitheragree(57.5%)orstronglyagree(15%)thatthepolicealwayshavetherighttomakepeopleobeythelaw.Fewerpeopledisagreed(9%)orstronglydisagreed(5%),while5%neitheragreednordisagreedand7%respondedthattheydon’tknow(Q41).Whenasked,amajorityofsampledindividualsrespondedthattheytrustthepolice(70%)andthearmy(78%) a lot. The trust in the army and police was higher than respondent’s trust in politicians andgovernment officials, specifically the president, the national assembly, the independent National

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ElectoralCommission,thenationaltaxauthority,the localgovernmentcouncil,andtherulingparty. Itwasalsosignificantlyhigherthantrustinoppositionpoliticalpartiesandtherulingparty(Q46).Inthatsamevein,56%ofrespondentsthinkthelocalgovernmenthasbeenfairlyorveryresponsivetocitizens’ needs and security issues, while approximately 26% believe they have been very or fairlyunresponsive. Overall, respondents indicated that they thought the local government was moreresponsive todemands for security and less responsive todemands forpublic services andeconomicdevelopment(Q49).

MediaandConnectivity

A majority of respondents get their news from the radio (60%) and far less get their news fromtelevision,newspapers,theinternet,orsocialmediawithnewspapersbeingthemostneverusedmediasource.Atthesametimeamajorityofrespondentsdon’tnecessarilybelievewhatthemediaprintsorsaythingsitknowsareuntrue.Thesurveypopulationwassplitbetweenthinkingthemediaoften(28%)abusesitsfreedomsbyprintingorsayingthingsitknowsarenottrueand26%believingthattheyrarelydo. 12% say they never do with a small minority (5%) saying they always do. The remainingrespondents(28%)didn’tknow(Q43).

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TaxAuthoritiesandCourts

Thesurveyreflectsgeneral respect in theauthorityand legalityof thecourtsandtaxauthorities. Fortaxes ingeneral,amajorityofrespondentsagreethatpeopleshouldpaytheir taxesbecausetheyareimportantforthecountrytodevelop.53%agreeand11%stronglyagree that taxauthoritieshavetheright tomakepeoplepaytaxeswhileonlywhile 9% don’t know and 9% neither agree nor disagree. (41) This view coincideswith 20% ofrespondentsagreeingand44%ofrespondentsagreeingverystronglythatcitizensmustpaytheirtaxestothegovernmentinorderforourcountrytodevelop.Ontheflipside,10%agreeand17%agreeverystronglythatthegovernmentcanfindenoughresources fordevelopment fromothersourceswithouthavingtotaxthepeople(Q41)62%of respondentsagreeor stronglyagree that courtshave the right tomakedecisions thatpeoplealwayshavetoabideby.Aminority(15%)disagreeswiththisstatementandanevensmallernumberofrespondents (6%) stronglydisagree.A further11.5% responded that theydon’t knowand7%neitheragreednordisagreed(Q41).

PoliticalParties

Respondents indicatethatpoliticalparties (bothoppositionandparties inpower)are lesstrustworthythanthemilitaryorpoliceandthatcompetitionbetweenthemcanleadtoconflict.Thisconflictcouldbetheresultofpartiesbeingsilencedbythegovernmentasrespondentsindicateinthesurvey.35% of respondents believe that competition between political parties often leads to violent conflictwhile26%believeitrarelydoes. Another13%believes itnevercausesconflict,9%believes italwaysdoesand18%don’tknow(Q43).32.5% of respondents believe that opposition parties (or their supporters) are often or are alwayssilenced by the government while 32.5% don’t know. 25.5% of interviewees think the governmenteitherrarelyorneversilencesopposition(Q44).

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ViewsontheNationalGovernmentandthePresident

Overall, respondentswere less favorablewhen asked about politicians and the national government.Responsesindicatethatthesamplebelievesthepresidentoftenignoresthecourts,doesn’tspendtimelistening to local people, and that political leaders aremore interested in serving their own intereststhantheinterestsofthepeople.Itwasnotablethoughthatrespondentsoftenrespondedwith“don’tknow”whenaskedquestionsaboutthepresident.When asked if they believed the president ignores the courts and laws of Niger, a large margin ofrespondents(30%)saidthey“don’tknow”.26%saidheoftendoesfollowedby19%ofpeoplesayingheneverdoesand18.5%respondingthatherarelydoes.Onlyahandfulofpeoplesaidhealwaysdoes(5.5%).The majority of respondents agree that members of the national assembly (52%) never spend timetryingtheirbesttolistentowhatlocalpeoplehavetosay.Approximately20%ofrespondentsbelievethatmembersofthenationalassemblyoftenlistenand13%saythatthisgrouponlysometimeslistensto localpeople. The remainderof respondentseither thinks theyalwaysdo (4%)or theydon’t know(10%)(Q47).

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Whenaskedwhetherornotthepresident ignoresthenationalassemblyandjustdoeswhathewants32%answered“don’tknow”while24%saysheneverdoes.18%saidherarelydoesand21%respondedthatheoftendoes.Only5%saidhealwaysdoes(Q43).

Approximately 40% of respondents agree and 26% strongly agree that leaders of political parties inNiger are more concerned with serving their own interests than the interests of the people. Theremainingrespondentseitherneitheragreenordisagree(9%),agree(9.5%)orstronglyagree(10%)thattheyaremoreinterestedinservingthepeoplethatthemselves(Q45).Themajorityofrespondentshavethehighestlevelinreligiousleaders,traditionalleaders,thearmy,andthepolicewhilerespondentsexhibitslightlylowerlevelsoftrustinthepresident,thenationalassembly,the Independent National Electoral Commission, the national tax authority, the local governmentcouncil,andtherulingparty. Thelowest leveloftrustwasseeninoppositionpoliticalpartiesandtherulingparty(Q46).

ViewsonLocalGovernment

Overall respondents are generally displeasedwith their local government’s ability tomaintain roads,marketplaces,andcreateeconomicdevelopment. Thisgoesalongwithrespondentssayingthattheyfelttheirlocalgovernmentdidnotspendtimelisteningtotheirconstituents.Despitethis,theydoseemto feel somewhat positive about their local governments ability to respond to security concernsappropriately.Respondents were fairly evenly split between thinking the local government was very or fairlyresponsive(40%)andveryorfairlyunresponsive(39%)toaddressingcitizensdemands.Thisissimilartohowresponsiverespondentsthinklocalgovernmenthasbeentoneedsanddemandsoflocalcitizensforpublic services such as healthcare and education. More respondents (around 56%) think the localgovernmenthasbeenfairlyorveryresponsivetocitizensneedsandsecurityversesapproximately26%whobelievetheyhavebeenveryorfairlyunresponsive.Overallrespondentsindicatedthattheythoughtthelocalgovernmentwasmoreresponsivetodemandsforsecurityandlessresponsivetodemandsforpublicservicesandeconomicdevelopment(Q49).Overallmorerespondentsfelttheirlocalgovernmentmaintainedlocalroadsfairlybadly(34.5%)orverybadly(32%). Approximately20%felttheyweremaintainedfairlywellbutveryfew(4%)thoughttheyweremaintainedverywell. Respondents answeredmore favorably (31.5%answeredwith fairlywell,4.5%answeredwithverywell)withhow localgovernmentsweremaintaining localmarketplacesbuttheconsensusstillleanedtowardsfairly(30%)orverybadly(24%)(Q53).Themajorityofrespondentsagreethatthelocalgovernmentcouncilors(45%)neverspendtimetryingtheirbesttolistentowhatlocalpeoplehavetosay.Approximately20-24%ofrespondentsbelievethatthesegroupsoftenlistenand13-15%saythatthosetwogroupsonlysometimeslistentolocalpeople.Theremainderofrespondentseitherthinktheyalwaysdo(4%)ordon’tknow(10%)(Q47).

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Democracy,Freedoms,andVoting

Overallrespondents indicatethattheyfeelmostlyfreetovotehowtheywantorsaywhattheythink.They also indicate that they feel able to join political anypolitical organization they identifywith. Intermsofdemocracy,amajorityofthesamplebelievesthatwhiletheyconsiderNigerafulldemocracyorademocracywithminorproblems,theyaretornbetweenbeingsatisfiedornothappywithhowthedemocracyiscurrentlyworking.

Mostrespondentsansweredthattheyfeelsomewhatfree(42%)orcompletelyfree(24%)tosaywhatthey think. The same applies to joining any political organization and choosing whom to vote forwithout feeling pressured. 43% of respondents feel somewhat free to join any political organizationwhile39%feelcompletelyfree. 47%ofrespondentsfeelcompletelyfreetochoosewhomtovoteforwithout feelingpressuredwhile39% feel somewhat free. Overall respondents indicate that they feelthemostfreetochoosewhotovotefor(Q31).

ThesurveyrespondentswereevenlysplitbetweenthinkingNigerisafulldemocracy(28%)andthinkingit is ademocracywithminorproblems (27.5%). 24%of respondents thinkNiger is ademocracywithmajorproblemswhileonly6%thinkitisnotademocracy.Afinal11%don’tknowand4%donotknowwhatademocracyis(Q39).

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Respondentsarefairlyevenlysplitbetweenbeingveryorfairlysatisfied(41%)andnotatallornotverysatisfied (42.5%)with thewaydemocracyworks inNiger.2% thoughtNiger isnotademocracywhile14%respondedwith“don’tknow”(Q40).

Elections

A veryhighnumberof respondents said they voted in the last election andamajority of the samplethought theelectionwas fairly freeand fair. Despite this, respondents indicate that theydon’t thinkelectionsactuallyhelpput representatives inpower thatwillaccurately reflect theirviews. Theyalsodon’tthinkelectionscanhelpremoverepresentativesthatarenotdoingwhatlocalpeoplewant.75%ofintervieweesrespondedthattheyhadvotedinthelastelectionwithonlyaminorityrespondingthattheydidn’tvote.5%werenotregisteredwhile4%didn’tvoteandanother4%didn’thavethetimetovote(Q32).

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Overallrespondentsthoughtthe2016electionwascompletelyfreeandfair(44%)whileapproximately18%thoughttherewereminorproblemsand15%thoughtthereweremajorproblems.13%respondedwith“don’tknow”and8%thoughttheelectionswerenotfreeatall(Q33).Approximately30%of respondentsdonot think thatelectionsensure that the representatives to thenational assembly reflect their views very well while approximately 25% think their representativesreflecttheirviewswell.Around18%ofrespondentsfelttheydidn’treflecttheirviewsatallwellwhileveryfew(approximately7%)thinktherepresentativesrepresentthemverywell.21%ofthetreatmentandcontrolgrouprespondentsrepliedwith“don’tknow”(Q44)Thesamefollowsforrespondents’opinionsonhowwellelectionsenablevoterstoremovefromofficeleaderswho do not dowhat the peoplewant. Approximately 30% of respondents feel this does notenable voters to remove leaders fromofficewhodonot dowhat the peoplewant verywell and 9%thinkitdoesnotdoitverywellatall.Around25%thinkselectionsdothiswellwith15%sayingitdoesitverywell.22%respondedthattheydon’tknow(Q44).

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CommunityandIndividualPoliticalActions

Themajorityofrespondentshavetakenveryfewpoliticalactionswhentheyhavebeendissatisfiedwiththeir government’s performance (Q37). Respondents did indicate that they would perform certainactionsgiventhechanceincludingmeetingorcontactingcandidates,attendingacampaignrally,requestactionfromlocalpoliticians,orcontactingthemedia. Atthesametime,actionsthattherespondentswouldnottakeincludedrefusingtopaytaxesorparticipatinginademonstration.Approximately75%ofrespondentsdidnottrytopersuadeotherstovoteinacertainwayorworkforacandidate or partywhile just over 55%of respondents did not attend ameetingwith a candidate orcampaignstafforattendacampaignrally(Q34).Most respondents said they had never contacted a local leader with more respondents contactingreligious leaders and traditional leaders than political party officials, government agency officials,membersofthenationalassembly,andlocalgovernmentcouncilors(Q35).Ifrespondentshadvisitedalocalleaderthemajorityofthemwentwithagroup(34%)whileonly13%went alone. 36.5%went for a community problem as opposed to 10% going for a personal problem(Q36).33%joinedothersintheircommunitytorequestactionfromtheirgovernmentwhile63%didnot.Forthosethatdidn’t,approximately40%wouldiftheyhadthechancewhile26%wouldnever. Forthosethatrequestedaction,15%diditseveraltimes,16%diditoften,and3%contactedthemonlyonceortwice(Q37).

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Ahighermajorityofrespondentsdidnotcontactthemedia(likearadioprogramorwritingalettertoanewspaper) or contact a government official to ask for help or make a complaint. 45-50% ofrespondentswould contact themediaor a governmentofficial given the chancewhile approximately40%wouldnevertakethoseactions(Q37).Closeto90%ofrespondentshavenotparticipatedinademonstrationorrefusedtopaytaxeswithonlyaround12%ofrespondentssayingtheywouldiftheyhadthechance.Closeto87%ofrespondentssaytheywouldneveractinthatway(Q37).

CommuneLeaderSurveyFindings

SummaryStatistics:LeaderSurvey

118individualswereinterviewedduringtheleadersurvey. Theyoungestrespondentwas25andtheoldestwas95withthemeanagearound50.Thesurveyrespondentsweremainlymenwithonly8outof 118 being women. The majority of respondents were Haoussa (43%) with the rest mainly splitbetween Kanouri (18%), Touareg (17%), and Foulani (13%). The remaining respondents were Zarma(7%),Toubou(1%),andArabe(1%). Theprimary languageforeachrespondentmirrorsrespondent’sethnicity with 48% of respondent’s preferred language is Hausa, 19% prefer Kanouri, 13% preferTamasheq, and 10% speaking Fulfuide. The remaining respondents speak either Zarma (7%) or Tubu(2%).Thesample issplitbetweenrespondentsbeing Imamorreligious leader(15),themayor(14),thefirstdeputymayor (10), theSG(11),andadecentralizedserviceagent for thestate (12). Therewerealsohealth agents (4), village oracles (6), School director/teacher (9), CSI chief (6), pedagogic advisor (1),Inspector (1), Quarter Head (7), Village chief (7), technical service agent (6), municipal S (3), boardmember(3),seconddeputymayor(1),andaDDES(1).The highest level of education reached by these respondentswas post-graduate (2 individuals). Themajority of respondents finished high school (39%) or finished college (30%). 22% did not completeelementaryschool,7%completedelementaryschoolbutnothingfurther,and2%completedvocationalortechnicalschool.

BaselineConditions:LeaderSurvey

Connectivity

Accordingtorespondentsresidentscommunicatewithgovernmentofficialsmainlythroughphonecallsand meetings including individual meetings, small group meetings, community meetings. Very few

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residents communicate via community radio, delegation, a petition, a letter, email, and textmessage(GV4).Respondents indicate that26%of residents communicatewith governmentofficials somewhatinfrequently, somewhat infrequently (22%), or infrequently (24.5%). Only 11% responded that theycommunicatefrequently(GV4A).Thesampleresponsesshowthatwhengovernmentofficialswanttocommunicatewithresidentstheyuseradio,meetings(community,smallgroup,andindividual),andphonecalls.Theyrarelyorneverusetextmessages, email, letters, petition, TV programsor commercials, visits, via the press, through thetown hall, and sending of courtiers/posters (GV5). The majority of respondents indicate thatgovernment officials communicate somewhat frequently (36%). 29% say they communicateinfrequentlywhile14%sayitissomewhatinfrequently.Only10%saytheycommunicatefrequentlyand11%respondedwith“don’tknow”(GV5A).

When they do communicate, respondents indicate that residents talk about problems with a healthcenter, issueswithaschool,reportdiseasesorothermedicalproblems,reportingviolence,conflict,ormilitary, complaints about community services (including water, electricity, trash services, etc.), andreporting crimes. Theymore infrequently reach out about complaints about neighbors, complaintsabout voting issues, reporting corruption, questions about government services, questions aboutpolitical parties, property issues, and issues with farm animal breeders (GV6). Governmentrepresentativescommunicatethesame informationon issuesasresidentsbutalsocommunicatewithmore frequency information about farm animal breeders, property issues, reporting on communityprojects,andcomplaintsaboutvotingissuesthanresidents(GV7).

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61% of respondents had participated in a multi-stakeholder dialog during the past year while 35%reportedthattheyhadnotparticipatedinone(GV8).RespondentsreportedthatdialogswereorganizedbytheUnitedNations(10),thetownhallcouncil (7),HydraulicsLandlords(4),governmentauthorities(10),technicalpartners(14),themayor(9),theCARE3NInitiative(8),andNGOs(9)(GV9).

ResponsivenessandAccountabilityofGovernmentOfficials

63.5% of leader respondents answered that the President of Niger is either very good or somewhatgood at carrying out his duties and almost 30% thought hewas either somewhat bador very bad atcompletinghisduties.TheCommuneMayorhadoverallpositivereviewsbutlesspositivethanthepresident. Approximately45%saidheiseitherverygood(19.5%)orsomewhatgood(25.5%)whilearound33%saidheiseithersomewhatbad(23%)orverybad(10%).Respondentsratedboththepresidentofthecommunecounciland the president of the regional council president lower than the CommuneMayor or President ofNigerindicatingthattheythinktheyarelessgoodatcarryingouttheirduties(GV1).Respondentsweaskediftheyhadheardofanycorruptioninvolvingthecurrentmayor,thepresidentofNiger,thepresidentofthecommune,andtheregionalcouncilpresident.Overallthesamplerespondedthat they had mainly not heard of corruption with any of the four government officials. MorerespondentsansweredthattheyhadheardofsomecorruptionwiththecurrentmayorandlesswiththePresidentofNiger.“Havenotheard”wasapopularoptionforcorruptioninvolvingthecurrentmayor(19.5%),thepresidentofthecommune(30%),andtheregionalcouncilpresident(16%)(GV2).

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Communeleaders leantowardsverycommitted(30.5%)orsomewhatcommitted(24.5%)whenaskedhowcommittedotherelitesinthecommuneareinaddressingcitizenpriorities.19%answerednotverycommittedwhile14%answerednotcommittedand12%don’tknow(PD9).Respondentsarealsoverysplitwhenaskedhowreliableotherelites inthecommuneare infollowingthroughonpromisestoaddressingcitizenprioritiesbuttheyleantowardsansweringthattheyarevery(27%) or somewhat (29%) committed. 10% answered not very committed while 20% answered notcommittedand13.5%don’tknow(PD10).

InteractingwithResidents

The leaderssurveyedarefairlysplitonhowoftenofficials interfacewithresidents. Respondents leanmore towards “frequently” for how often themayor’s office connectswith commune residentswith22%sayingtheydoveryfrequentlyandapproximately30%sayingtheydosomewhatfrequently.29%saysomewhatinfrequentlyand9%sayveryinfrequentlyand8.5%respondedwith“don’tknow”.Officialsofthecustomaryauthoritywerelistedasinterfacingevenmorefrequentlywithresidentsthananyotherofficial. 30.5%saidthey interactveryfrequentlyand38%saysomewhatfrequently. 19.5%saidsomewhat infrequentlyand4%respondthatthey interfacevery infrequently. Ontheotherhandcommunecouncilofficials interfacedwithconstituents less frequently than themayorsofficeand thecustomaryauthorityandthepolicewerelistedastheleastlikelytointerfacewithresidents(GV3).

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NecessaryLocalActorsforDevelopmentProjects:

Inthinkingaboutthedevelopmentoftheircommune,thetoppersonthattherespondentbelievestheyshouldengageorcoordinatewiththemosttoaddressdevelopmentissuesinyourcommunityarechiefs(19%) and the deputy mayor/Governor Commissioner (23%). Teachers and presidents of the youthgroup,Secretarygeneral,taxcollector,retailertrader,andtheSDOwerealsomentionedasnecessaryindividualstocoordinatewithtoaddresscommunedevelopmentissues.76%ofrespondentssaidtheyinteractedwiththeseindividualsalotwiththemajoritysayingtheycoordinatewiththemeveryoneto7days(PD11).The type of people that respondents believe are necessary for the implementation and adoption ofdevelopment projects is different than the individuals that respondents think are necessary tocoordinatewiththeaddressdevelopment issues. Housewives,chiefs, thecouncilorsecretarygeneral,theFCC,andteacherswerethetoppeoplethatrespondentsbelievedwerethemostimportantactorswhoarenecessarytoengagewithorcoordinatewithtoensuredevelopmentprojectsareadoptedandimplemented. 75%of respondents say they interactwith the top individuals a lot and 43% say theyinteractedwiththeminthelast2days(PD12).

CommunityMeetingDynamics

The survey asked a variety of questions to understand meeting dynamics in communes from acommunity leader’spointofview. Whenaskedabouthowdecisionsweremadeinthelastcommuneassembly, amajority of leaders (64%) thought that every person decidedwhen a decision had to bemade on problems or issues in the commune while 18% thought the village leader, other councilmembers,andsomeothernon-councilmembersdecided. 11%thoughtthecommunemayordecidedandtheremaining7%thoughtjustthevillageleaderandothercouncilmembersdecided(PD2).

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Most respondents (65%) think that they could organize a meeting of important actors to discussdevelopmentissuesinthecommunewhile9%saidmaybe,6%saidtheydidnotthinkso,6%refusedtoanswer, and14%answered that theydidn’t know (PD13). Outof the respondentswho thought theyeithercouldormaybecouldputtogetherameeting,theythoughtameanofapproximately46peoplewouldshowupwithaminimumof2andamaximumof1000attendees(PD14).The surveyaskedanumberofquestionsabout the communityassembly sessions tohelpunderstandthedynamicsduringthemeetings. Overallover50%ofrespondentsthoughttherewasnoonegroupamongpoor,middle,andrichresidentsdominatedecisionsaboutproblemsorissuesinthecommune.28%responded that they“don’tknow”and18%thought therewasonegroup thatdominated (PD3).Outofthat18%,morethoughtrichresidentsdominatethediscussionwhileremainingrespondentsaresplit between poor andmiddle class residents. While respondents were split between which groupdominates,theyagreethatthepoorhavetheleastamountofinfluenceincommunediscussions(PD5).

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When asked how the dynamicswork between ethnic groups, the respondents are split evenly. 48%believe there is anethnicgroup thatdominateswhileanequalnumber thinks there isn’t adominantgroup (PD6).Of those that believe there is a dominant group, amajority believe thatHaoussa (70%)dominates themost in communeassembliesduringdecision-makingprocesswhileKanouri (20%)andFoulani(10%)werealsomentioned(PD7).Whenaskedwhichgrouphastheleastinfluenceincommunediscussions,respondentsrespondedwiththeFoulani(30%),theHaoussa(20%),and“Others”(20%).

Balance:LeaderSurvey

Overall, the Leader Survey hypothesis variables were fairly balanced between treatment and controlgroups.Outof420possibleanswerchoicesacrossthe46questions,11werestatisticallydifferent.Theremainingresponsecategorieswerebalancedacrossbothtreatmentandcontrolgroups. Overall, thegroupsarewellbalanced.Balancetablesareincludedintheannex.Field challenges

Administration,Accesstocommunities,Logistics,andMilitaryincidence

Theissuesencounteredduringthesurveyprocessmainlycenteredonsecurityconcernsgiventheunrestin regions likeDiffa. Anumberof safetyprecautionswere takenbefore theenumerators left for thefieldtoavoidanysecurityissues.SomeoftheselectedvillagesandcommunesweredeterminedtobeunsafebyKantarPublicstandardsandduetotheseconcerns,theenumeratorswerenotsenttothoseareas. This included two full communes inDiffa (ToumourandBosso),whereenumeratorswerenot

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allowed toenter. Sevencommunes inDiffaand6 communes inAgadezweredetermined toonlybesafeinthecommunecentersandenumeratorswerenotallowedtosurveyinthesurroundingselectedvillages.Additionallythereweresomeselectedvillagesthatweredeemedunsafe.Thesevillageswerereplacedwiththepreviouslyrandomlyselectedvillages.Somecommunesonlyhadalimitednumberofsafevillagesavailabletoconductsurveysin,sothosevillagesreplacedtheoriginallyselectedones.Oneoftheteamsdidunknowinglytrespass intoaconflictzone,which ledtoapromptresponsefromthearmy.Whiletherewassomepropertydamage,noonewashurt.Furthervillagesinthisareawerenotvisitedduetothisincidentandtheenumerationteamonlyworkedinthiscommune’scapital.Thesurveyfirmalsostruggledtogainaccesstosignificantamountsofthe localmayor’stime. Duetothis, the leader surveywas broken up into the subjective questions,whichwere administered to themayor,anda‘factbased’section,whichwasadministeredtodepartmentswithinthecommunedistrictofficethatcouldprovidethemostaccurateinformation.

Pre-AnalysisPlan

The peer review of the evaluation design was facilitated formally through the Experiments inGovernance andPolitics (EGAP) groupat ColumbiaUniversity, ofwhichUSAID/DRG is an institutionalmember.MembersofEGAPhavesignedfullnon-disclosureagreementstoallowthemtocommentonin-designevaluationplans.Thepeerreviewwillfocusbothonthetechnicalsoundnessoftheevaluationdesign as well as addressing USAID/DRG’s own strategic criteria regarding impact evaluations. Thecomments from EGAP should be incorporated into or addressed in the final evaluation designdocument,andwillbeusedbyUSAID/DRGtomakefinaldeterminationsregardingco-funding.Thispeerreview is in addition to the review and commenting period by HESN, USAID/DRG, and USAID/Nigerdescribedabove.

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Timeline

Y2 Y3 Y4

Task Fall16

Winter16-17

Spring17

Summer17

Fall17

Winter17-18

Spring18

Summer18

Fall18 Winter18

Deliverables

ImpactEvaluationPlanFinalized

FinalizedEvaluationPlan

Pre-analysisplanfinalizedandregistered

Finalizedhouseholdsurveyfirm

Baselinesurvey

Baselinesurveys(household,leadersurvey)

Baselinereport

Baselinereport

Endlinesurvey

Endlinesurveys

Endlinereport

Endlinereport

RolesandResponsibilities

ResearchTeam:

ArielBenYishay, LisaMueller, andPhilRoesslerwill serveas co-principal investigators for theproject.BenYishay,MuellerandRoesslerwillberesponsiblefortheplanningandexecutionofallphasesoftheimpactevaluation.Theywilldeveloptheevaluationdesignandcoordinatewithasurvey firmtocarryoutthebaselineandendlineevaluations.

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AidData:

AidDatawill be responsible for the reporting requirementsofHESN,USAID/DRG,andUSAID/Niger. InregardstotheHESNaward,AidDatawillberequiredtomeetallobligationsaspreviouslyoutlinedinitsaward, including but not limited to: financial reporting, HESNM&E indicators, annual reports, etc. InregardstoUSAID/Niger,AidData is responsible forcoordinatingwithBenYishay,Roessler,andMuellerontheevaluationdesignreportandanalysisreportatthecompletionofeachphaseoftheevaluation,aswellasforsharingwiththeMissionthereportsrequiredbyHESN.AidDatawillreviewanyreportingdocumentsoranymodificationstothescopeofworkpriortoapproval.

ImplementingPartner(CounterpartInternational):

AidDatawillworkcloselywithCounterpartInternational(CPI)toensurethesuccessoftheevaluation.Atleast one of the PIs will meet with CPI to ensure the roll out of the programwill coincide with theevaluation design. AidDatawill also holdweekly callswith CPI to ensure close coordination betweentreatment,AidData’sevaluation,andCPIsprogramevaluation.Astheevaluationdesigniscarriedout,thePIswillkeeptheimplementingpartnerinformedoftheprogress.

Surveypartner(NORC):

NORC has been contracted by USAID to perform the baseline and endline survey for this project.AidDataworkedcloselywithNORConthedevelopmentandimplementationofthebaselinesurveyaswellasonthereviewofthecollectionmethodologyandthebaselinedata.AidDatastaffwillcontinuetoworkcloselywithNORCduringtheimplementationoftheendlinesurveytomaintainahighlevelofdatacollection.

USAID/Niger:

Theprimarypointofcontact(POC)forAidDataandforUSAID/HESNwillbeGarretHarries.AsecondaryPOCforAidDatawillbeAbdourahamaneHassane,primarilyforproject-relatedtechnicalconcerns.TheprimaryPOCwillbe responsible forensuring thatcommunication ismaintainedbetweentheMission,HESN,DRG, andAidData, including through the required reporting listed above. Regarding reportingrequirements,theprimaryPOCwillhavefinalapprovalofthethreerequiredevaluationreports,andwillreviewfor informationpurposes, thereportsrequiredbyHESN.ThetechnicalPOCwillbeavailabletoserveasliaisonwiththeimplementingpartnerandwithanytechnical/field-basedissuesthatmayarise.The technical POCwill be included in theMission’s approvalof the threeevaluation reports, andwillalsoview the interimreports requiredbyHESN. TheprimaryPOC,however,has the responsibilityof

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sharingthesedocumentsandsolicitingthefeedbackandapprovalofothersintheMission,includingthetechnicalPOC,aswellassolicitingfeedbackfromtheprimaryPOCinUSAID/DRG.

USAID/DRG:

The primary POC for AidData and for USAID/HESN will be Morgan Holmes, Evaluation Specialist forUSAID/DRG. Theprimary POCwill be responsible for ensuring communication ismaintainedbetweentheMission,DRG,HESN,andAidData.ThePOCwillalsofacilitatethepeerreviewofthedraftevaluationplan.ThePOCwillbe included in theMission’sapprovalof the threeevaluationreports,andwillalsoview the interim reports required byHESN.NORCwill also have the opportunity to review the threeevaluationreports.FinalapprovalofallreportsisheldbytheprimaryPOCforUSAID/DRG.TheprimaryPOC will also be responsible for liaising through NORC that will provide the sub-contracting andmanagementfordatacollectionactivities.

USAID/HESN:

USAID/HESNwillberesponsible for theday-to-dayprojectmanagement for this researchprojectuntiltheendoftheHESNcooperativeagreementtoAidData.ThismeansthattheAORfortheHESNawardtoAidDatawill complywith reporting requirements under the award. He/shewill also conduct periodicM&EontheprogressofAidData’sPRGworktoensurethatAidDataismeetingitsdeliverytimeframeonschedule.Asnecessary, theAORwillperiodicallycommunicatetoUSAID/NigerthestatusofAidData’sprogress,aswellasimmediatelynotifytheMissionifanyproblemsariseduringthecourseofthisimpactevaluationproject.

AidDataStaffingandManagementPlan

PrincipalInvestigators

Dr.ArielBenYishay—Dr.BenYishayisAidData’sChiefEconomistandAssistantProfessorofEconomicsattheCollegeofWilliamandMary. Hepreviously served as Lecturer in Economics at theUniversity ofNewSouthWalesinSydney.HealsoservedasAssociateDirectorofEconomicAnalysisandEvaluationat theMillenniumChallengeCorporation. He has served as the principal investigator on a variety oflarge-scale experiments in developing countries, including Malawi, the Philippines, and the SolomonIslands.Dr. Lisa Mueller—Dr. Mueller is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and African Studies atMacalesterCollege.Herresearchfocusesoncivicengagementandpoliticaleconomyofdevelopmentin

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Niger.ShehasdirectedsurveysinNigeronprotestparticipationandcitizen-politicianlinkagesandhasconductedadditionalfieldworkinGuinea,Mali,andSenegal.Duringsummer2015shewillbeaVisitingScholarattheWestAfricanResearchCenterinDakar.Dr. Philip Roessler—Dr. Roessler is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Government and Co-DirectoroftheCenterforAfricanDevelopmentattheCollegeofWilliamandMary.HeisanexpertonAfrican politics and has conducted qualitative, quantitative and experimental studies in a range ofAfricancountries,includingSudan,Chad,DemocraticRepublicofCongo,Rwanda,Liberia,Tanzania,andZimbabwe.

AdditionalPersonnel

BachirouAyoubaTinni,FieldCoordinator—Full-timestaffmemberbasedinNiameyduringbaselinedatacollection, initial program roll-out, and potentially endline data collection. Staff member will beresponsibleforcoordinatingtrainingofdatacollectionteam,monitoringduringcollection,andtrackingprogram status and randomization compliance during initial roll-out. The coordinatorwould also beresponsible for obtaining administrative data from relevant national sources. Depending on funding,coordinatormayreturntocompleteendlinedatacollection. This individualwill likelyhaveagraduatedegreeorstudiesandhavepreviousresearchexperienceinasimilarsetting.KatherineNolan,AidDataProjectManager-AidDatastaffmemberwhowillassistwithcompliancewithUSAID/HESNandUSAID/Nigerreportingrequirementsandcoordinatingamongteammembers.GIS Analyst—AidData staff member who will assist in merging existing georeferenced datasets onpopulation,economy,agriculture,ecologyandotherfactorstoensurematchedpairsaremostpreciselyformedfortherandomization.Policy&CommunicationsAnalyst—AidDatastaffmemberwhowillassistwithdraftingpolicybriefsandcommunicationsmaterialstopromotelearningfromtheevaluation.