immunity from prosecution versus privilege against self ... · af\d the star chamber proceedings in...
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FOR RELEASE ON DELlv~RY
I~n~~rrTY FROM PROSECUTION
VERSUS
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
ADDRESS
BY
HONORABLE HERBERT BOOylNELL JR
ATTORNEY Gr~rmRAL OF THE UIaTED STATES
Prepared for Delivery
Before
The Law Club of Chicago
Law Club
Chicago I1l1nois
Friday Evening November 6 1953
730 PM CST
The Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitut10n provides that no
person shall be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against
himself t1 The courts have construed this provision to mean that a
person may remain mute before a Congressional COmmittee a grand jury
or trial court if a criminal charge I no matter how remote may
possibly be asserted against him with respect to any matters as to
which he is questioned Subversives and criminals have been quick to
rely upon this provision which was uritten into our Constitution to
protect law-abiding citizens against tyranny and despotism
Many tormer federal employees and members of the armed services
holding key jobs have also refused to answer the $64 question about
their Communist affiliations The problem is a live one too before
universities and other private and public schools where professors
and teachers have claimed their privilege in refuSing to testify as to
their previous and present 83sociat1ons The abuses to which the conshy
stitutional privilege has been put by the long parade of witnesses sugshy
gests the desirability of reviewng the subject to determine whetller it
is possible to strike a fair balance between the Governments right to
obtain vital information and th0 1~diidualts right not to incriminate
himself
In discussing this important problem with you I plan first to
deal with the history of constitutional privilege and the exchange of
1umnlnity for it second the function of Congressional investigations
and how they as well as courts and grand juries have been thwarted by
resort to the privilege third pending proposals before Congress for
an exchange of immunity for privilege and my suggestions for improvement
of these proposals
First a few words about the history of the privle~e
The prlvilege aga~ft self-ircrimilation has deep roots ir earl~f
21g11sh historl The tyranny of Charles I dur1~G the ~ealS 1629 to
l61~O middot~n dealing with no~-middotmiddotconformists afd the Star Chamber proceedings
in which innocent persons were tortured into ronfession of crimes
whch they did not commit) engendered such hosttlity amo~G the people
that strong demands were made to er-d compulsot1 testimony as far back
~ 11 as
L lal~7 By early lc50 the privilege against self-i1criminat1oll was
so well established in the common law of ~~gland that it was rever
even thought necessary by an Erglish ParI tament to pass s act touch 51
ing the ma~ter
With this heritage it was ~ot surprising that the early settlers
in America fiercely r~s1sted attempts of the Governors af the Royal 3
provinces to resort to compulsory testimony for coerci~g confessions
By the time of the formation of the Union the principle that no
person could be compelled to be a witress against himself had become
fixed in the common law II It was regaxoded then 8S ow l as a protection
to the innocelt BS well as to the guilty ad an essential safeguard4
against unfourded nnd tyrannical prosecution
The privilege was not ircluded ir the Federal Constftut1ol as
originally adopted 3ubsequently it was placed in one of the group
of ten Amendments recommended to the States by the First COl1gress and
by them adopted Since then) all the States of the U~ton have included
the privileGe in their Constitutions except New Jersey and Iowa where 5
the principle prevails as ~~rt of tru~ commor law
During the development of the privilege against self-incrimination
there was experimentation with statutes granting immunity in exchange for
compulsory testimony In 1857 an act was passed by Congress granting a
complete legislative pardon for any fact or act as to which the witness 6
was required to testify- This provision of the bfll was amended five
years later when it was fOlmd to have worked greater evil than good
It was a Senator from Illinois Senator Turnbull by name who was
largely responsible for its amenrunent In debate Senator Turnbull
graphically demonstrated that the Act offered inducement for the worst
criminals to appear before an investigating committee to obtain immunity
from their crimes As an example he pointed to lie man who stole two
millions in bonds if you please out of the Interior Department What
does he do He gets himself called as a itness before one of the in
vestigating committees and testifies something in relation to that matter
and then he cannot be indicted u Senator Turnbull then went on to show how
the clerk who purloined two millions in bonds from the Interior Department
was discharged and the indictment against him quashed merely because of
some statement in reference to the matter before an investigating committee
Shortly thereafter the legislative pardon was withdrawn and an imshy
munlty statute was enacted which provided in part that no evidence
obtained from a party or witness shall be used against him 7
in Bfy criminal proceeding u- Under this statute it was merely
the testimony itself which could lomiddott later be used in any criminal proshy
ceeding against the witness but the immunity did not extend to other
matters to which this testimony might indirectly lead This partial
immunity statute was soon challenged in the case of Counselman v 8
Hitchcock - and the Supreme Court agreed that it was invalid for fnil shy
ing to provide the same complete protection as the constitutional privilege
which the witness was required to surrender
To meet the objection raised in the Supreme Courts decision in the
Hitchcock case a clause was thereafter included in the Act relating to
proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission in terms broad
enough to furnish absolute immunity from prosecution in the Federal V
Courts
Sustaining the validity of this immunity statute the Supreme Court W
in ~ v Walker in the year 1896 ruled that it fully accomplished
the object of the privilege J and therefore it was adequate to prevent the
witness from asserting his right to claim immunity
Theleaftel the Immunity Act relating to the Interstate Commerce
Commission was incorporated in temporary wartime measures and in
virtually all of the major regulatory enactments of the Federal III
Government - To guard against unwise use ot their authority these
regulatory agencieshave followed the practice of consulting the Attorney
General and getting his approval before granting immunity to witnesses
From what has been said you can readily see that there 1s notbing
novel about immunity legislation Indeed many States have also enacted
laws which provide immunity from prosecution where a witness is compelled
to testify
This shift from privilege to immunity statutes reflected in part the
view of some attorneys and legal scholars that privilege against selt shyY
incrimination was somewhat outmoded and should be strictly limited
As great a guardian ot individual rights and liberty as
Mr Justice Cardozo observed in speaking ot the privilege ot
immunity from compulsory self-incrimination This too might
be lost and justice still be done Indeed today as 1n the past
there are students of our penal system who look upon the immunity
as a Ddschief rather than a benefit and who would limit its scope
or destroy 1t altogether No doubt tpere would remain the need to
gjve protection against torture phys1cal or mental Justice
however would not perish it the accused were subject to a duty to 111
respond to orderly inquiry 1 Thele are other jurists and legal
commentators of distinction who feel that it would be abhorrent to
prinCiples of a tree government to compel a person to testify even j
upon an exchange of full immunity
Witb this background before us I come now to the need for
exchanging immunity for compulsory testimony in light of our
recent experience w1th Congressional investigations into subshy
version crime and corruption The history of Congressional
investigatory powers Just like the privileGe against selfshy121
incrimination goes back to the earlist days of our history
Unlike the privilege however the Constitution does not exshy
pressly provide for any COlBressional Ilower to investigate
It 16 considered as an implied power essential to carry out 16
the general legislative funct1on shy
Congressional investigation commdttees have traditionally 17
been regarded as having these principal fUllctons - to
secure information by which Congress may exercise an informed
judgment in legislating wisely and to check administrative
agencies for determining whether they are properly enforcing
the law and ju11c1ollsly spending the public flnds For these
purpcses Congressional Committees may summon witnesses and 18
require their testimo~ under penalty of contempt proceedings -shy
But a Congressional hearing is not a trial Its function is
primarily to ascertain facta and not to decide on the guilt
or innocence of the witness
In recent years many of these investigating commdttees have been
particula~ly concerned in alerting the American people to the nature
of subversive and other criminal activities the many forms that
these activities take and how they threaten the democratiC processes
Some persons have been critical of these investigations claiming
that th~y restrict freedom of speech by stigmatizing expressions of 19
unpopular views -- Freedom of speech they say implies freedom not to
speult ot all even undel legal compulsion Since wide publicity is
given to these proceedings by newspapers radio and television the
complaint is also that these perSOIlS investigated are exposed to
poscible insult oatruciom und loss of employment It is urged that
mere mention of a persons nome in c0110ection with an inveJtigation
that has wide-spred news vclue may create a distorted and unfair public 20
implession - Another point made is that proof of innocence may never 21
catch up with public It assertions of guilt It It is also said that if
these persons decline to profans any stutement of belief before a comshy22
mittee they iovite pUIiislIDl~lJt for contempt
Unquestionably every effort should be exerted to protect the right
of our people to speak and think freely As Chief Justice Hughes has
Hell said
The greater the importance of safeguarding the community
from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force
and violence the mOI~ imperative is the ne~d to preserve inviolate
the constitutioual lights of free speech free press and free
assembly in order to muintain the CJpportunity for free political
discussion l to the end that government may be responsive to the
will of the people and that changes if deSired may be obtained g)j
by peaceful means
~Je shOL1ld dread the dvy middotrhen the people could justifiably become
wary of explessing 1l110zthotLoJ or unpopular opinions or where rumor and
gossip are accepted as subotitutes for evidence
As egainst these threats to our precious liberties we must also
weigh the possible harm to the public scfety and lelfare without llhich
there can be no liberty for anyone yJhile the rights guaranteed by the
Firat Amendment may not be curtailed abuse of these rights may 24
properly be curbed
In his time Abraham Lincoln expressed the problem in these
distressed words ItMust CI government of necessity be too strong
for the libel~ies of its own people or too weak to maintain its own 25
eXistencel The same problem is with us today Obviously if Congress
is to legislate Vlisely with respect to subversion and other crime and
corruption it must not be obstructed from learning ~ho are its
leaders organizers and members the nature and scope of their activishy
ties the character and number of their adherents
I knmv of no constitutional right of privacy which immunizes a
person from giving evidence where an 1nquil~ is conducted by a legally
constituted Congressional committee Tbe person owes this duty as a
citizen just as he m~es the duty to furnish relevant and truthful
testimony in a court of law or gl~nd jury He violates his duty as a
citizen Then he suppresses the facts concerning criminal activity known
to him So long as the questions are pertinent and gel~ne to a lawful
inquiry of Congress the individual is not relieved from answering
because they delve into his private affairs his previous utterances 26
or his affiliations political or otherwise -- The constitutional
guarantee of freedom to epreS8 ones views does not include immunity
from Congressional inquiry as to hat one has said subject to ones
privilege against self-incrimination
Reference to several cases within the last few years demonstrate
how effectively Congressional Committees courts and grand juries have
been blocked in their efforts to uncover subversion as Hell as other
criminal activities because of reliance by 1middotritneases upon their
privilege
In one case the 1-1itness upon ground of privilege refused to anSler
questions before a grand jur7 as to whether she knew the names of the
State officers of the Communist Party of the State what its table of
organization waD vThether she was employed by it whethel she ever had
possession of Communist books and whether she turned the books over
to any particular person At the time the Smith Act was in effect
making it s crime for any person knowing its purposes to be a member
of any group uhich advocates the overthrow of the GovelDmellt Upon the
refusal of the itness to testify she as found to be 1n contempt of
court and sentenced to imprisonment for one year The COU1~ of Appeals
affirmed
Hm-1eve the Supreme Cou~t felt that her answers might furnish
a link in the chain of evidence necessary in a piosecution under the
Smith Act and that the witness was privileged to refuse to furnish any
such link Accordingly it unanimously reversed upon the ground that
prior decisions of this Court have clearly established that under such
circWl16tances the Constitution gives a -1itness the privilege of gy
remaining silent II
In the same way a Federal grand jury was prevented from obtaining
information in its investigation of narcotic and Hhite Slave traffic as
well as bribery perjury and other serious Federal violations 1111e
witness stood upon his privilege against self~incrimination in refusing
to respond to questions as to what he did for a living and whether he
knemiddot certain named pemiddot~son6 Hele again judgment of imprisonment
fo~ contempt was upbeld by the Court of Appeals but reversed by the 28
Supreme Couct with one judge dissenting - upon the ground that tiny
other conclu~ion Would seriously compromise an important constitutional
libecty In this cnse the court held that the defendant could refuse
to anSI-Tel questions innocent on their face since it appeared from the
climate of the investigation and the publicity given defendants
alleged criminal activity that his answers might implicate him in
some federal crime
In anothel cese a COl1gr~ssional Committee attempted in vain to
obtain information from a ~1tl1ess relating to the names of persona enmiddotmiddot
~ged in the manufacture and sale of gambling equipment and other
mutters Finally exaspeeted chief counsel fOl the Committee said
IlLet the record show that the witness just sits there mute Che1Ting
gum saying nothing 1I
The witness Has found guilty of contempt of court and sentenced
to six months in jail but judgment was reversed on appeal The Court
of Appeals declared that the methods used by the Committee for examinashy
tioD of witnesses constituted a triple th~ceat answer truly and you
have given evidence leading to your conviction for a violation of
federal lav anSler falsely and you will be convicted of perjury refuse
to aWn-Tel and you will be found guilty of criminal contempt and punished 29
by fine and imprisonment - In the opinion of the court the predicamiddot
ment in which the ltncss -Tas placed flaS contrary to fair play and in
direct violation of the Fifth Amendment
These decisions could be multiplied and undoubtedly represent
prevailing law Almo3t every heinous crime on the law books comshy
roitted by Inlt1ividuals or by groups J remains uncove ced because of the
privilege against self-incrimination But it is in the area of subshy
version and disloyalty particularly that the privelege has a field
day 11 It is haIe that legislatiye connnittees and grand juries are
held at bay for years from learning vlhich leaders are plotting the
countrys destruction merely because witnesses are relieved of giving
essential information upon the ground of privilege
It is little Vlonder that lat-l-ebiding citizens frequently are heard
to say that sub-rersives and other lrongdoers are unduly coddled by
existing law They express anlDzement that the Congress and the Courts
should conttnue to put up ith subterfuge and concealment 1 n place of
truth at a time 1vhen the peril from Communiam is 60 great and -1hen
crime 1s so rrunpa1t They earnestly ucge upon us the vital need for
modernizing the legal ~eapons for fighting subversion and crime
These pleas of the people for more dcastic action against subshy
version and other misconduct have not gone unheeded Some States and
cities provide fer the dismissal of public employees ho refuse to
testify on grounds of self-incrimination or Tho refuse to t-aive imshy30
munity from prosecution
Some States prescribe loyalty oaths for admission to the Bar -1hich
go beyond the traditional promise to uphold the State and National 31
Constitutions shy
Some States and municipalities have passed statutes requiring
affidavits of puhlic employees that they are not and have never 32
been Communists Some States make ineligible to teach in any public
school a person vTho was a memher of an organization which advocates the
~ overthimiddotow of the Government by force Some of these statutes have been
JY upheld us valid by the Supreme Cou~~ including the provision of the
New York State law which provides that mecbership by a person in an
organization listed as subve~sive by the Dcard of Regents shall constitute
prima facie evidence of disqualification for employment 1n the public 12
schools This was the so-called Feinberg Law aimed at protecting the school
children of lew York against teachels who were spreading communist propaganda
~e poisonous propaganda was Bufficiently subtle to escape detection in the
class room The New York Legislature recognized that while the schools must
attract and protect the critical minds the schools vlere not sanctuaries for
those who were committed to follot-l in the footsteps of Klaus Fuchs It sought
the next best solution by e4cluding froIij teaching those affiliated with certain
orgn1zations listed by the Board of Regents vlhich advocated the overthrow
of the government
One of the main constitutional objections to the law was that it vishy
alated the First Amendment by creating an atmosphere of fear which would
inevitably stifle freedom of speech The Court in an opinion by Judge
Minton formerly of the COUl~ of Appeals for this Circuit r~jected the conshy
tention that the la interfered Vlith free speech since persons uhave no right
to ork for the smiddottate in the school system on their own terms They may york
for the school system upon the reasonable terms laid d01n by the proper
authorities of Neu York If they do not choose to work on such terms they 36
are at libelty to ~etain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere 1
The Supreme Court -las also lholly unimpressed by the contention that
the law condoned guilt by association contrary to democratic concepts of
justice On this point the Court sald ilL teacher lOrks in a sensitive area
in a school room There he shapes the attitude of young minds toward the
society in which they live In this the state has a vital concern It must
preserve the integcity of the schools That the school authorities haVe
the right and duty to aceen the officials teachers and their employees as
to their fitness to majnjail1 the integrity of the schools as a part of an
ordered society cannot be doubtecl One I s associates past and present as
vell os one t a conduct moy proIJerly be considered in determining fitness
and loyalty From time immemoljal one t a reputation ha3 been determined by
the company he keeps In the employment of officials and teachers of the
school systeil the state may very properly inquire into the company they 37
keep n
The Fedel~al GOyernrlent (llso has taken effective measures to protect
the interests of netional cecu1ity One long step forward in that direction
was to enact legislation requiring non middotmiddotCommul1ist affidavits from trade
union leaders vihose unions rBnted to resort to the advantages of the Taftshy38
Hartley Act - Tl1e Ptllpose of thiu requirement vas to prevent disruption of 39
industry in obedience to Communist Party orders If the union leaderls
affidavit us false be CQuId be sent to jail
The Federal Government has also tried its best to clean its Gvln
house fI On April 27 1953 the President by Executive oXde~ established
his security requirements for employment so that pelsons employed by the
Federal Government will be reliable trustworthy of sood character and 40
loyal to the United States On October 13 1953 the President amended
his Executive order so as to provide that imiddotlbe~~e a government employee refuses
to testify before a Congressional Coramittee regarding charges of his diashy
loyalty or misconduct an agency may take this factor into consideration
in determining hethe~ the person I s continued employment is inconsistent ~_f 41
with the national securtty This emendment to the Presidents Executive
order is in accord i th my opinion that a government employee oTho claims
privilege in a Congressional investigation may be too much of a risk to be
retained in Federal Service
A recent Senate Report entitled tlInterlocldng Subversion in
WGovernment fl fully documents how former government employees were
able to spin their web of intrigue in positions of influ6nce The
Report states
1tlJ~e subcommittee exumined in public session 36 pershy
sons about whom it had substantial evidence of membership
in the Communist undergrolld 10 Government All of them
invoked tha fifth amenmnen~ ~~d refused to answer questions
regardicg COnrIranist membership on the grounds of self-in
crinlination Many reused even to eomowledge their own
sigl1attles on official Govelnment doclllllents in which they
haG SViorn to nonmernbership in the past
All)st all of he persons exposed by the evidence had
Bome connection which could be documented vith at least one-shy
a~d generally several--other e~o6ed persons Tney used eaoh
other s names for referenoe on ~licationa for Federal em-
p10~lOOnt They hire eaoh other They pomot~d eampQh other
hAY raised each others sal~ries They transfer~ampd eaah
otlwr from bureau to bureau from depariment to department
from congressional committee to congressional committee
They assigned each other to international missions They
vouched for each others loyalty end prctected each other
when exposure threaten~d ~ley often had common living
qUaters tI
Suppression i truth in any case is bad enough In no event
can it be justified by a Government employee or applicant for Govern
ment empl~Jment in the face of a Congressional inquiry where the
interests of the national Bect~lty are at stake No one denies that
the Government employee or applicant for such employment may conshy
stitutionally claim his privilege against self-incrimination On
the other hand no one has a constitutional right to a Government
job W True the Supreme Court ha held that the constitutional
protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant
to a statute Is patently arbitrary or discriminatory II W But in
my opinion there is nothing e1ther arbtrary or discriminatry about
diSDdssing a federal employee where he refuses to waive the privilege
against self-incrimination guaranteed him by tho Const tution We
find an analogous situation presented in the recent decision of the
~reme Court in Orloff v WilloughbY ~ In that case the peti shy
tioner a physician was denied a commission in the Army principally
tor the reason that when asked hether he was a member in any Communist JY
organizations he replied) Federal Constitutional privilege is claimed
In its opinion through Mr Justice Jackson the Supreme Court said
It ia argued that Orlorf 1s being punished for havshy
ing claimed a privilege which the Constitution guarantees
No one at least no ane on this Court which has repeatedly
sustained assertion by Communists of the privilege against
selfMincr~inatian questions or doubts Orloffs right to
withhold facts about himself on this ground No one beshy
l1evee he can be punished for doing so But the question
is whether be can at the same time take the position that
to tell the truth about himself Vlould incriminate him and
that even so the President must appofnt him to a post of
honor and trust le have no hesitation in answering that
question No II There is no law which requires the Gove~~ent to sit supinely by
until the suspeoted eIlIployee has been convicted of disloyalty or other
similar misoonduct inconsistent with the interests of the national
security before it can sCPal~ate him from the Government service There
is no law which requires the Government to assume or endure such a risk
As was pointed out in an apt csae by the Supreme Court in American
Commtlnications v Douds speaking through the beloved late Chief
Justice Vinson
IfThat (first) amendment requires that one be permitted to
believe what he will It requires that one be permitted
to advocate what he will unless there is a clear and
present danger that a substantial public evil will result
therefrom It does not require that he be permitted to be
the keeper of the arsenal
I have not overlooked the fact that the loyalty and honesty of
the ovel~vhelming majority of all Government employeesmiddot is beyond quesshy
tion But their good reputations and character are far better proshy
tected from un1tfarranted criticism when we root out the few who are
unreliable and disloyal
What the critical situation of om time calls for is a lavr com
pt)lling testimony within the fr~neuro1Torl of the Constitution The tmshy
swer to this need is immuni-ty legislaiion which will be as broad as
the privilege W11ich is stJpplanted tV Then if a person is adjudged
ill cOlte~Pt for refusing to te3tify before a Cotgressional committee
he will know tZat t-le ~udgrnerJt of OOllt-empt will more likely stand up
on appeal free from oonstitutional ohal1enge
At the same time the l~w will also provide more adequate proshy
tection for the wit~ss
At presnt the witne31l is in a rtboxtl so to slJeGk The witness
is not exc~ed from an3werL~g merely because he believes his answers
Vlil1 incriminate him His slly-ao does not of its(gt~r establish the
1amphazeId of ilcriIltination II ~~ere he olaims his privil~ge it is
the ftL1ction of the jcge to dets-rmme whether the siJence of t1e
witness is justified or wha~1er the danger to be apprebenced is too
remote to be sl1bstattial To save himself from being held in conshy
tempt tl1e witness may oftcn be cOJIpEtled to disclos3 til0ne very
facts whtrh he claims are privileged iQ
Witnesses are alao aided by a b~oad immunity statute in still
another way Under our la unlike that of England t a disclosure of
any incriminating fact constitutes a wailer of the privilege as to deshy
tails con~erning that fact 211 Having made a partial disclosure of
faots the witness loses the rig~t to cease answering intel~ogat1ons
and rely upon his privilege at a 1ater point in his testimony
In one oase the detendant rree~ disclosed that she was Treasshy
urer of the Communist Pariy in COlorado and testified that she had
given the books ot the party to another person When asked to dishy
wlge the name ot the lamiddottter she refused upon the ground that the
answer might incriminate her mder the Sm1tb Act Atfirming her
conviction for contempt the Supreme Court speaking through Chief
Justice Vinson said
Since the privilege agatnlt salf-inorimination
presupposes a real danger ot legal detriment arising
from the disolosure petitioner cannot invoke the
privilege where response to the specific question in
issue here would not ftUtther inoriminate her O1aolo
sure of e tact waives the privilege as to details pound
This deoision leaves the law in a rather anomolous position tor the
vlitness A witness who refuses to answer aU questions and fails to Wcooperate to any extent may be protected by the claim of privilege
But there is no equal protection atforded by the decisions to the
witness who commences to eooperate but stops at a point where further
disclosure may tncrim1~ate him
Moreover it the witness refuses to answer on the ground that
Congress has exceeded its powers or that the inQuiry in lacking in
pertinency he construas the law at his peril If mistake8 his good 55
faith error of law constitutes no defense to fine and imprisonment
Then again it is claimed DY some that a persons election to
remain silent upon the ground of privilege does not necessarily mean
he has anything sinister to hide There are undoubtedly some people of
sincere principle who refl1se to disclose 1flformat1oft to authorized
1nvestigating authorities because of their feeling that ao one has any
right to 1~quire about their beliefs even if germane to the inquiry at 56
bsnd- There are other persons who refuse to answer because they feel
their recollections of events lons past are fee~le and that falsehood
even on trivial or irrelevant matters may subject them to a charge of
perjury There are still others less innocent vho say that coercing
them to testify under pain of contempt resembles the Soviet tactic of
requiring those SUilty not only to pay for but also to prcclatD their 57
guilt shy
~he use of broad tmmunity statutes serves to remove the dansers
mentioned for the iDPocent a~d operates aa an incentive for the guilty
to tell the truth
There are already two proposals pendin8 in Congress which seek to
compel the answer by witnesses at questioDs put to them before Conshy
gressiOl1al Committees grand juries or courts In exchange tor this
compulsory testimony the Witnesses will obtain complete immunity froa
prosecution
58 One Bill is s~ 565 This proposal grants immunity to ~itnesses
before a grand Jury or court of the United States when in the disshy
cretion of th~ Attorney General it is necessary to do so in the public
interest In exchange for this immunity the witness is compelled to
testify and to produce his books papers or recoIds s 565 uses
broad immunity lengtase in stating that the witness shall not be
prosecuted on account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he 1s compelled after ela~ing his privilege to testify or
produce evidence
In this respect s 565 is almost ident1cal to the immunity proshy59
vision sustained 8S valid by the Supreme Court e~ far back as 1896-
This Bill does not extend the immunity to witnesses before Congressional
Committees 601 61
There are other Bills pend-ing S 16- middot and H R 27371 with equally
broad immunity authority The Senate has passed its Bill but the House
Bill still awaits action Both these Bills grunt immunity to witnesses
before Congressional Committees but not to witnesses before grand
juries or courts
The proposed Bills are worded so that the witness will not get an
immunity bathU merely by testifying He must first raise specifically
his claim for privilege and thus put the Committee on notice whether
for the greater good the witness should be required to testify and 62
given immunity or whether he should be excused from testlfying-
However the discretionary power to grant the immunity is not vested
in the Attorney General bumiddott lies with the body conducting the investigation
If the proceeding is one before one of the Houses of Congress then
a majority vote of the members present is necessary Under S 16
if it is a proceeding before a committee two thirds of the members
must vote to grant the tmmunity In that event the tvothirds vote
must include at least two members of each of the two political parties
having the largest representation on such committee The House Bill
does not provide for notice to the Attorney General of the proposed
grant of immunity The Senate Bill provides for one weeks notice to
the Attorney General of the proposal but if the latter fails or reshy
fuses to assent to grant of immunity it may be conferred by majority
vote of either House It is hoped that this legislation will only be
resorted to where full diseloaure by witnesses is deemed of greater
tmportance than the possibility of punishing them for past offenses
By permitting one or several criminals to escape prosecution the
larger public peril contained in a gang of criminals or in their
leaders may be uncovered and the guilty brought to justice
The legislative proposals mentioned have much to commend them
In my opinion these bills would better achieve their purposes it they
required the concurrence of the Attorney General 1n the granting of any
immunity to a witness by a Joint Congressional Committee or either Heuse
committee or by Congress The Attorney General 1s the chief legal
officer of the Government of the United States As Buch it 1s his
responsibility to prosecute persons who offend the criminal laws of the
United states This responsibility must be coupled w1th adequate
authority to permit its discharge It would seem to be more advisable
for the Attorney General who has immediate knowledge of a criminals
background and propensities to decide whether immunity should be
granted for such a person To allow the Attorney General to participate
in the ultimate decision aa to whether immunity should be granted would
not impair Congressional investigatIons in the fields of internal
security crime and corruption Nor would it discourage witnesses
from providing information of importance to the investigation if the
Attorney Generals permission vas required before immunity was granted
On the other hand if these Bills were enacted in their present
form they might subject members of Congress to undue pressures for
granting immunity to criminals who are ineligible to receive it Also
they cuuld very easily cause embarrassment to Congress by tmped1ng or
blocking prosecutions planned by the Department of Justice on any matter 63
even incidentally testified to upon these 1nvestigations
The unfortunate experience which Congress had as far back as 1857 64
in granting immunity without concurrence of the Attorney General - should
~each that a similar course of action may be marked by eveD greater
failure today_ The witness might readily turn this division of authority
between Congress and the Department of Justice to his advantage by
obtaining an ~unity from the legislative committee or from Congress
over the objection of the Attorney General Thereafter he would be
free to testify concerning a broad area Of activities without fear that
he could be held to account criminally for other violations however
unrelated to the matter under investigation
Thus for example a Congreas1onal Committee or Congress might
furnish immunity to a person to obtain his testimony about his illicit
traffic in slot machine opercltlons between states This person may also
be guilty either of espionage or subversion or of selling narcotics to
youngs cers as to which an indictment is soon to be obtained To foreshy
close prosecution on these more serious crimes the witness would be
glad to volunteer information on his other activities if he knew in
advance that immunity would fallow for all of them Therefore greatest
care must be exercioed in granting immunity and then only upon a fully
informed judgment of all tle facts The Departlnent of Justice would
of course through the Fe~eral Bureau of Investigation the Crtmlnal
and Tax Divisions and the United states Attorneyo I offices be mosmiddott
likely to know the facts and the plans for prosecution Concurrence
by the Attorney General in conferring the immunity would also enable
the Department of Justice to maintuin its responsibility for the proper
administration of the crlminal law
The provision in S 10 for one weeks notice to the Attorney General
of the proposed grant of immunity does not fully cure this Bill of its
weakness in failing to require his affirmative concurrence in every
case Experience indicates that at times the views of the person who
1s charged with prooecut1ng criminals are disregarded by Congressional
Committees For example the successful criminal conviction obtained
by the Department of Justice ot the internal revenue collector in one of
the largest cities was recently nullified because of the action of a
House Committee in holding 1middotr1dely publicized hearings in the district in
65 which the trial subsequently took place These hearings took place
over the strong objection of the Department of Justice thut the pro
posed hearing would be of prejudice to the defendant on the trial
which was about to be initiated and would injure the Governments case
in disclosing its evidence In reversing the convlct1on l Chief Judge
Magruder observed that the character of the defendant was blackened
and discredited as the day of trial approached because of the publicity
invited and stimulated by the Committee over the radio and television
Thu6 1 mere advance notIfication to the Attorney General of a proposed
grant of tmmunity would never be a guarantee that the Committee would
be guided by the views of the Attorney General
S 16 and H R 2737 would also more readily carry out the aim of
obtaining evidence against leaders of subversion and criminal entershy
prisesj if provision for twmunity were granted to obtain testimony
not only before Congressional Committees but likewise before courts
and grand juries
For these reasons it is my opinion that if any measure is to be
enacted~~rmitting the granting of immunity to witnesses before either
House of Congress or its committees it should vest the Attorney General
or the Attorney General acting with the concurren~e of appropriate members
of Congress with the authority to grant such tmmunity and if the test shy
mony is sought for a court or grand jury that the Attorney General alone
be authorized to grant the ilmnunity
There remain for discussion two principal objections to this proshy
posed legislation which may be briefly considered here One objection
1s that when a witneAS is compelled to testify even under the protecshy
tion of immunity from criminal punihment) he is not relieved from
personal disgrace ~~lhich attach~8 to the exposure of his crime The
answer to this objection ia contained in II land mark decision of the 66
Supreme Court in Brown v Wrtlker
The design of tbe constitutional plivilege is not to aid the
witness in vindicating his character but to protect him
against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict him
of a criminal charge If he secure legal jnmllnity from prose-
cution the possible impairment of his good name is a penalty
which it is reasonable b0 should be compelled to pay for the
common good
The reasoning of this decision has never been qU~Gtioned and has 67
only recently been approved by the Sllpreme Court
The other chief objection to the proposed legislation is that while
a witness may receive itmlunity from federal prosecution) he may still
be subject to IJrosecution under ~tate lavl The Supreme Court has held
that this is not a valid objection to federal immunity laws~ since the
self-incrimination clause ln the Fifth Amendment operates ao a l1mitashy68
tion on the federal government only In United states v Murdock the
defendant was indicted for refUSing to answer questions of a revenue
agent relating to ctrt8 in income tax returns The refusal was ba sed on
the plea that hiD answers might 1ncrim1nate him in a state court The
Court said on this point
This court ha~ held that immunity against state prosecution is
not essential to the validity of federal statutes declaring that
a witnes3 shall not be excllpoundied from gtring evidence on the
ground that it vTill incriminate him and also that the ladt of
state power to give witnesses protection against federal
prosecution does not defeat a state immunity statute
Similarly a witness befo~e a state tribunal CBnnot refuse to 69
answer because of the threat of federal prosecution - However the
Federal District Court in Ohio recently held i1 Unted States v 70
Di Carlo that the defendant had the right to assert his privilege
because of possible prosecution under state law since the Senate
committee was authorized to investigate violations not only of the lawe 71
of the United States but also of the states M_ The Murdock case was
dtstingJished urlon the ground that the danger of state posecution 1n
that case was remote and uncertain thile in the Di Carlo case the
danger of state proaecutjon WilS imminent and real 72
The ---Di Carlo case has been received -lith mixed commelt It has73
not been followed so far as we k~ow- It appears to be contrary to deshy
cis10ns of co~~rts of appeals which have consistently adhered to the prinshy74
ciples of the Murdock case- In my opinion this decision of a district
court aoes not detract from the binding effect ofthe Supreme Courts deshy
eision in the Murdock case
The Department of Justice will recommend to the Congress in Jlouary
an immunity bill of the type I have descri-ced which protects the const1shy
tutional privileges ot witnesses before Congressional Committees courts
and juries but will at the some time aid materially in stamping out
criminal and subversive activities
Footnote Referet~es to Ad~res El~ited ~------ ___bull
Immunity From Prcsecuticn
Versus
Privilege Agaiust Self-Incrimination
Pittman liThe Colonial and Constitutional History of the
Privilege Against Sel-Incrimiootion 1n Amcicaff 21 Va
L R 763 764 770-773 (1935) Corwin The Supreme
Court I S Corctl~ction of the Self Incrirnination C1ause lf
29 lId~h L R 1 512 (1930) Ap~licability of
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to Legjslative
y Pittmenf2 at 774
~ ~ining v ~~8ey 211 U S 78 92 (1908)
L Id at 91
~ 34th Ceng 3d sess Globe PI 427 433 1-45 See
Eberling Constitutional Investigations pp 304-315shy
7 Eberling d at 320-323
~I 142 U s 547 (1892) This Act of 1862 revised an old
statute into two new sections by an amendment which
sought to insure that a witness who testified before
a federal grand jt~ or court (R s I 860 (1875raquo or
a Congressional Committee (R S B 859 (1875raquo would
not be later subjected to the use of his testimony in
any criminal proceeding aGainst him Section ~ 860 of
the amendment dealing with grand jurtes and courts came
under attack in Counselman v Hitchcock J supra and was
held to be invalid Since this part of the immunity proshy
vision tailed to accomplish ita purpose Congress repealed
it in 1910 (36 Stat 352 (19l0raquo) Congress apparently felt
that S 859 applying to Congressional Committees was still
of value and left it 1n force to this date (a s I 859
(1875) as amended 52 Stat 943 (1938) 18 usc e3486
(Supp V 1952)j see liThe Privilege Against Self
Incrimination versus Immunity Proposed Statutes 41
Georgetown L J 511 514 (1953) United States v ~
339 U s 323 335-337 (1950)
21 It read in patt as follows
No person shall be prosecuted for or on
account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he may testify or produce evidence
Act of Feb 11 1893 c 83 27 stat 443 49 USCA
I 46 See too ~ v United States 337 u S 137 146shy
147 (1949)middot Notet Denying -the Privilege against Self
Incrimination to Public Officers 64 Barv L R 987
988 (1951)
- 101 161 U s 591 (1896)
Shapiro v United St~~ 335 U S 1 6-7 (1948) where various
statutes are collated in the footnote The customary provision
in these statutes provides as follows No person shall be
excused from complying with any requirements ot this section
because of his privilege aga1nst self-incriminationgt but the
immunity provisions of the COmptuBory Testimony Act of
February 11 1893 shall apply with respect to allY 1nd1shy
vidual who specifically claims such pr1Y11ege tt
12 Rapacz ULimiting the Plea of Self-Incr1m1nat1ontl 20 Georgetown
L J 329 353 (1932) see footnote 3 of ~ v Connect~
302 U s 319 326 (1937) NPte liThe Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination the Doctr1ne of Waiver 61 Yale L J 104 110
(1952) middot
~f Palko v Connecticut 302 U s 319 326 (1937)
~ See dissents of Mr Justices Shiras Gray and White in ~ V4
Walker supra 161 U s 630638 Cf dissent of Mr Justice
Black in Ro~ers v United States 340 U s 367 376 (1950)
15 Potts Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for ContemptU I
74 U of Pa L R 691 780 (1926) L1acos uRights of Witnesses
Before Congressional Committees 33 Boston U L R 337 340
(1953) middot
t6 Liacos Id at 31tl
17 McGeary rlThe DeTelopmen-cs of Congressional Investigative Power ll
p 23 (1940) McGrain v Daughel~l 273 u s 135 (1927)
18 Sinclair v Unfted States~ 279 U s 263 (1929) ~arsba11 v
Unit~~State~ 176 F 2d 473 (nc Cir 1949) 2 Usc ~ 192
(Supp 1950)
19 Ne York City Bar Ass t n Committee on the Bill of Rights Report
on Congressional Committees presented December 14 1948 p 1
gQi Galloway PCong18ss1onal Investigations Proposed Reforms lt
18 U of Chi L R 478 479-481 (1951)
21 Dilliard lICongress1onal Investigations The Role of the Press
18 U of ChL L R 585 J 587 (1951)
22 Edgerton J dissenting in Barsky v United States 167 F 2d
241 252 (nc eir 1948) cert denied 334 U s 843 (1948)
petition for rehearing denied 339 U S 971 (1951)
~3 De Jonge v Oregon 299 U s 353 364 365 (1937)
24 Id
25 6 Richardson lIMes sOges and Papers of the Pres idents t 1 p 23
July 4 1861
26 See United St~~ v ~~phson 165 F 2d 82 (2 Cir 1947)
cert denied 333 u S 838 (1948) Lawson v United states
176 F 2d 49 (nc Cir 1949) cel~ denied 339 u s 934
(1950) Barsty Y ~ited S~ 167 F 2d 241 (DC eir
1948) cert denied 334 u s 843 (1948) MCGrain v Daugherty
273 u s 135 (1927) and cf Rumely v United States J 197
F 2d 166 (DC eir 1952) affd 73 s ct 543 (1953)
JJ B1a~ v ~~ted Sttlt~s 340 u s 159 (1950-)
gsectJ ~~ v United States 31~1 U s 479 (1951) See too
sectingleton v United States 343 U s 944 (1952) Note Recent
Extensions of the Witness Privilege Against Self-Incrim1nationll
53 Col L R 275 (1953)
29 Aiuppa v Un1tc~ states 201 F 2d 287 300 (6 eir 1952)
_I30 Note nMandatory Dismissal of Public Persol1nel and The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination 101 U ot Pa L R 1190 1191
fn 8 (1953)
31 Brown Be Fassett Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar
20 u or Chi L R 480 483 (1953)
32 Garner v Los Angeles Board) 341 u s 716 (1951) Gerende v
Board of Supervisors 341 U s 56 (1951) but com~are Wieman v
Updegraff 341~ U s 83 (1953)
34 See footnote 32
35 PG~ v Boa-roo of Education 31~2 U s 435 (1951)
ID Id at 493
38 Sec 9(h of lihe LalJor Management Rlations Act of 1947 29 USCA
St1Pp III Sec 141 Sec 159(b)
39 ft~rican C~~catons Association v ~uda 339 u S 382 (1950)
sustaining the validity of Sec 9(h) against the challenge that it
violated the First c-lT~nc1tlCiltl Ex Post FtiCto Lals and other iul1dashy
mental rights
40 Executive Order No 10450 issued Aporil zr 1953 (18 F R 2lt89)
41 Executive Orrler No 10491 issued Ocmiddottober 13 1953 (18 F R 6583)
~ Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary Interlocking Subshy
vcrs ion in Covernmcnt De~rtments II 83d Cong 1st ses5 Juy 30 J
1953 p 21 Being a cOImllunist is not a crime under federal law J
although it is in some states (see Liacos supra note 15 at
375) The Smith Act (18 USC Sec 2385 et seq) mkes advoshy
eating or teaching the violent overthrOf of any goverrment of the
United States or being a member of such a group and kno7ing its
purpose~a federal crime
43 See EaSley v F~cbardsonJ 182 F 2d 46 (DC 1950)J affd by an
evenly diiied court 341 TJ s 918 (1951) 1Etshingto v McGrath
182 F 2d 375 (DC 1950) aff1d 341 U s 923 (1951)j Or~~ v
vIil1ougbby 345 U s 83 91 (1953) Mr Justice Douglas concurring
i~ ~tiFascist Commi~~ v ~~EJ 341 U s 123 -182-183 (1951)
United Public W0rkers v --~1itcbell 330 U s 75 (1947)j Angilly - v
United States 199 F 2d 642) 644 (1950) cf NcAuliffe v rlew
Bedford 155 Mass 216 29 NE 517 (le9~) per Holmes J liThe
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but
he h(=l~s no constitltioi1al right to be a policezranu (Id at 220
29 NE at 5J7)
44 v1ie~sn _
v UpGegaff middot111 ~
3~middot4 u s 83 (1953) The Court ruleri as
contrry to due process the Cklahoma loyalty oath statute forshy
bidding IJ1l11ic emplo~rment of Persons who belonzea to certain
organizations regarciless of their knowledge of the character of
those oreenizations because of the indiscriminate classification
of lnnocent with kno~vilg activityll (d at 91)
~1 345 u S 83 (1953)middot
46 Id at 90
47 339 u s 3827 412 (1950) sustaininG the non-corJlIlunist affidavit
requirernelt of union leaders under the Taft -Hartley Act
~ Hoffman v United States 341 U s 179 (1951) suggests such
legislation if Congres3 concludes the lleed is great enough
See too Comment The Privilege Against Se1f-Llcriminetion Versus
Lmnurdty Z Proposed Statutes P 41 Gt~orgetom L J 511 (1953)
S Rept 153 on S 16 83d Cone 1st sess ~ 1 ald 2
April 17 1953 Report of Sel1a~~e Commttee on the JudiciaJ J
Interlocking S-lbversion in GOYf11llent Departments tl July 30
1953 83d Cong 1st sess p 50
~ HcfI1nan v Unitet States 341 u s 479 486 (1951)
50 Id U1ited States v ~isman 111 F 2d 260 262 (2 Cir 1950)
51 Note 61 Yale L J 105 109 (1952)
52 Rogers v United States 340 u s 367 375 (1951)
211 See e g Blau v Unjted StaIe~ 340 u s 159 (1950)
-shy54 Note J Co1t3resnic1al Inv estigat1ons--Self-Illcrimimtion Condemneshy
tiOll and Fair Hcar1ngll 22 U of Cinn L R 193 199-200 (1953)
55 See ~ovTn8end v ~~it~~ta~~3 95 F 2d 352 351 (DC Cir 1938)
cert denied 303 u S 664 (1938)
56 Byse TfA Report on the Pennsylvana Loyalty Act 101 U of Fa
L R 480 481-1~84 (1953) Wright Should Teachers Testify
Saturday Review Sept 2o 1953 p 23
57 See Meltzer Required Records The McCarran Act and The Privilege
Against Selfmiddotmiddot Incriminat ion ll 19 U of Chi L R 687 722 (1951)
y 83d Cong 1st Seas 1953 Also known as the Kefauver BUl
59 ~ v ltlalker 161 U S 591 (1896)
sect21 S 16 83d Cong 1st sess 1953 passed the Senate July 9 1953
after extensive debate Cong Ree 8646-8663 July 9 1953shy
S 16 amends B 3486 of Title 18 Sec 3486 presently furnishes
witnesses immunity from prosecution tor testimony before either
House or their Committees It appears to suffer from the same
deficiency present in a similar statute condemned in Counse~an v
Hitchcock 142 u s 547 (1892) S 16 is intended to StWP1y the
omission in the Hitchcock ease by providing not only that a
witness testimony may not be used against him but that such
witness shall be iImnune with respect to lIany transaction mtter
or thing concerning which he has been compelled to testIfy
sect 83d Congo 1st sess 1953
~ S Rept 153 83d Congo 1st sess p 2 (1953)
63 See Comment The Privi1ege Against Self-Incrimination Versus
Immunity Proposed statutes 41 Georgetown L J 511 523 (1953)
64 Supra footnote 7shy
sectif Delanel v ~ed States 199 F 2d 107 (1 Ci~ 1952)
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
The Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitut10n provides that no
person shall be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against
himself t1 The courts have construed this provision to mean that a
person may remain mute before a Congressional COmmittee a grand jury
or trial court if a criminal charge I no matter how remote may
possibly be asserted against him with respect to any matters as to
which he is questioned Subversives and criminals have been quick to
rely upon this provision which was uritten into our Constitution to
protect law-abiding citizens against tyranny and despotism
Many tormer federal employees and members of the armed services
holding key jobs have also refused to answer the $64 question about
their Communist affiliations The problem is a live one too before
universities and other private and public schools where professors
and teachers have claimed their privilege in refuSing to testify as to
their previous and present 83sociat1ons The abuses to which the conshy
stitutional privilege has been put by the long parade of witnesses sugshy
gests the desirability of reviewng the subject to determine whetller it
is possible to strike a fair balance between the Governments right to
obtain vital information and th0 1~diidualts right not to incriminate
himself
In discussing this important problem with you I plan first to
deal with the history of constitutional privilege and the exchange of
1umnlnity for it second the function of Congressional investigations
and how they as well as courts and grand juries have been thwarted by
resort to the privilege third pending proposals before Congress for
an exchange of immunity for privilege and my suggestions for improvement
of these proposals
First a few words about the history of the privle~e
The prlvilege aga~ft self-ircrimilation has deep roots ir earl~f
21g11sh historl The tyranny of Charles I dur1~G the ~ealS 1629 to
l61~O middot~n dealing with no~-middotmiddotconformists afd the Star Chamber proceedings
in which innocent persons were tortured into ronfession of crimes
whch they did not commit) engendered such hosttlity amo~G the people
that strong demands were made to er-d compulsot1 testimony as far back
~ 11 as
L lal~7 By early lc50 the privilege against self-i1criminat1oll was
so well established in the common law of ~~gland that it was rever
even thought necessary by an Erglish ParI tament to pass s act touch 51
ing the ma~ter
With this heritage it was ~ot surprising that the early settlers
in America fiercely r~s1sted attempts of the Governors af the Royal 3
provinces to resort to compulsory testimony for coerci~g confessions
By the time of the formation of the Union the principle that no
person could be compelled to be a witress against himself had become
fixed in the common law II It was regaxoded then 8S ow l as a protection
to the innocelt BS well as to the guilty ad an essential safeguard4
against unfourded nnd tyrannical prosecution
The privilege was not ircluded ir the Federal Constftut1ol as
originally adopted 3ubsequently it was placed in one of the group
of ten Amendments recommended to the States by the First COl1gress and
by them adopted Since then) all the States of the U~ton have included
the privileGe in their Constitutions except New Jersey and Iowa where 5
the principle prevails as ~~rt of tru~ commor law
During the development of the privilege against self-incrimination
there was experimentation with statutes granting immunity in exchange for
compulsory testimony In 1857 an act was passed by Congress granting a
complete legislative pardon for any fact or act as to which the witness 6
was required to testify- This provision of the bfll was amended five
years later when it was fOlmd to have worked greater evil than good
It was a Senator from Illinois Senator Turnbull by name who was
largely responsible for its amenrunent In debate Senator Turnbull
graphically demonstrated that the Act offered inducement for the worst
criminals to appear before an investigating committee to obtain immunity
from their crimes As an example he pointed to lie man who stole two
millions in bonds if you please out of the Interior Department What
does he do He gets himself called as a itness before one of the in
vestigating committees and testifies something in relation to that matter
and then he cannot be indicted u Senator Turnbull then went on to show how
the clerk who purloined two millions in bonds from the Interior Department
was discharged and the indictment against him quashed merely because of
some statement in reference to the matter before an investigating committee
Shortly thereafter the legislative pardon was withdrawn and an imshy
munlty statute was enacted which provided in part that no evidence
obtained from a party or witness shall be used against him 7
in Bfy criminal proceeding u- Under this statute it was merely
the testimony itself which could lomiddott later be used in any criminal proshy
ceeding against the witness but the immunity did not extend to other
matters to which this testimony might indirectly lead This partial
immunity statute was soon challenged in the case of Counselman v 8
Hitchcock - and the Supreme Court agreed that it was invalid for fnil shy
ing to provide the same complete protection as the constitutional privilege
which the witness was required to surrender
To meet the objection raised in the Supreme Courts decision in the
Hitchcock case a clause was thereafter included in the Act relating to
proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission in terms broad
enough to furnish absolute immunity from prosecution in the Federal V
Courts
Sustaining the validity of this immunity statute the Supreme Court W
in ~ v Walker in the year 1896 ruled that it fully accomplished
the object of the privilege J and therefore it was adequate to prevent the
witness from asserting his right to claim immunity
Theleaftel the Immunity Act relating to the Interstate Commerce
Commission was incorporated in temporary wartime measures and in
virtually all of the major regulatory enactments of the Federal III
Government - To guard against unwise use ot their authority these
regulatory agencieshave followed the practice of consulting the Attorney
General and getting his approval before granting immunity to witnesses
From what has been said you can readily see that there 1s notbing
novel about immunity legislation Indeed many States have also enacted
laws which provide immunity from prosecution where a witness is compelled
to testify
This shift from privilege to immunity statutes reflected in part the
view of some attorneys and legal scholars that privilege against selt shyY
incrimination was somewhat outmoded and should be strictly limited
As great a guardian ot individual rights and liberty as
Mr Justice Cardozo observed in speaking ot the privilege ot
immunity from compulsory self-incrimination This too might
be lost and justice still be done Indeed today as 1n the past
there are students of our penal system who look upon the immunity
as a Ddschief rather than a benefit and who would limit its scope
or destroy 1t altogether No doubt tpere would remain the need to
gjve protection against torture phys1cal or mental Justice
however would not perish it the accused were subject to a duty to 111
respond to orderly inquiry 1 Thele are other jurists and legal
commentators of distinction who feel that it would be abhorrent to
prinCiples of a tree government to compel a person to testify even j
upon an exchange of full immunity
Witb this background before us I come now to the need for
exchanging immunity for compulsory testimony in light of our
recent experience w1th Congressional investigations into subshy
version crime and corruption The history of Congressional
investigatory powers Just like the privileGe against selfshy121
incrimination goes back to the earlist days of our history
Unlike the privilege however the Constitution does not exshy
pressly provide for any COlBressional Ilower to investigate
It 16 considered as an implied power essential to carry out 16
the general legislative funct1on shy
Congressional investigation commdttees have traditionally 17
been regarded as having these principal fUllctons - to
secure information by which Congress may exercise an informed
judgment in legislating wisely and to check administrative
agencies for determining whether they are properly enforcing
the law and ju11c1ollsly spending the public flnds For these
purpcses Congressional Committees may summon witnesses and 18
require their testimo~ under penalty of contempt proceedings -shy
But a Congressional hearing is not a trial Its function is
primarily to ascertain facta and not to decide on the guilt
or innocence of the witness
In recent years many of these investigating commdttees have been
particula~ly concerned in alerting the American people to the nature
of subversive and other criminal activities the many forms that
these activities take and how they threaten the democratiC processes
Some persons have been critical of these investigations claiming
that th~y restrict freedom of speech by stigmatizing expressions of 19
unpopular views -- Freedom of speech they say implies freedom not to
speult ot all even undel legal compulsion Since wide publicity is
given to these proceedings by newspapers radio and television the
complaint is also that these perSOIlS investigated are exposed to
poscible insult oatruciom und loss of employment It is urged that
mere mention of a persons nome in c0110ection with an inveJtigation
that has wide-spred news vclue may create a distorted and unfair public 20
implession - Another point made is that proof of innocence may never 21
catch up with public It assertions of guilt It It is also said that if
these persons decline to profans any stutement of belief before a comshy22
mittee they iovite pUIiislIDl~lJt for contempt
Unquestionably every effort should be exerted to protect the right
of our people to speak and think freely As Chief Justice Hughes has
Hell said
The greater the importance of safeguarding the community
from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force
and violence the mOI~ imperative is the ne~d to preserve inviolate
the constitutioual lights of free speech free press and free
assembly in order to muintain the CJpportunity for free political
discussion l to the end that government may be responsive to the
will of the people and that changes if deSired may be obtained g)j
by peaceful means
~Je shOL1ld dread the dvy middotrhen the people could justifiably become
wary of explessing 1l110zthotLoJ or unpopular opinions or where rumor and
gossip are accepted as subotitutes for evidence
As egainst these threats to our precious liberties we must also
weigh the possible harm to the public scfety and lelfare without llhich
there can be no liberty for anyone yJhile the rights guaranteed by the
Firat Amendment may not be curtailed abuse of these rights may 24
properly be curbed
In his time Abraham Lincoln expressed the problem in these
distressed words ItMust CI government of necessity be too strong
for the libel~ies of its own people or too weak to maintain its own 25
eXistencel The same problem is with us today Obviously if Congress
is to legislate Vlisely with respect to subversion and other crime and
corruption it must not be obstructed from learning ~ho are its
leaders organizers and members the nature and scope of their activishy
ties the character and number of their adherents
I knmv of no constitutional right of privacy which immunizes a
person from giving evidence where an 1nquil~ is conducted by a legally
constituted Congressional committee Tbe person owes this duty as a
citizen just as he m~es the duty to furnish relevant and truthful
testimony in a court of law or gl~nd jury He violates his duty as a
citizen Then he suppresses the facts concerning criminal activity known
to him So long as the questions are pertinent and gel~ne to a lawful
inquiry of Congress the individual is not relieved from answering
because they delve into his private affairs his previous utterances 26
or his affiliations political or otherwise -- The constitutional
guarantee of freedom to epreS8 ones views does not include immunity
from Congressional inquiry as to hat one has said subject to ones
privilege against self-incrimination
Reference to several cases within the last few years demonstrate
how effectively Congressional Committees courts and grand juries have
been blocked in their efforts to uncover subversion as Hell as other
criminal activities because of reliance by 1middotritneases upon their
privilege
In one case the 1-1itness upon ground of privilege refused to anSler
questions before a grand jur7 as to whether she knew the names of the
State officers of the Communist Party of the State what its table of
organization waD vThether she was employed by it whethel she ever had
possession of Communist books and whether she turned the books over
to any particular person At the time the Smith Act was in effect
making it s crime for any person knowing its purposes to be a member
of any group uhich advocates the overthrow of the GovelDmellt Upon the
refusal of the itness to testify she as found to be 1n contempt of
court and sentenced to imprisonment for one year The COU1~ of Appeals
affirmed
Hm-1eve the Supreme Cou~t felt that her answers might furnish
a link in the chain of evidence necessary in a piosecution under the
Smith Act and that the witness was privileged to refuse to furnish any
such link Accordingly it unanimously reversed upon the ground that
prior decisions of this Court have clearly established that under such
circWl16tances the Constitution gives a -1itness the privilege of gy
remaining silent II
In the same way a Federal grand jury was prevented from obtaining
information in its investigation of narcotic and Hhite Slave traffic as
well as bribery perjury and other serious Federal violations 1111e
witness stood upon his privilege against self~incrimination in refusing
to respond to questions as to what he did for a living and whether he
knemiddot certain named pemiddot~son6 Hele again judgment of imprisonment
fo~ contempt was upbeld by the Court of Appeals but reversed by the 28
Supreme Couct with one judge dissenting - upon the ground that tiny
other conclu~ion Would seriously compromise an important constitutional
libecty In this cnse the court held that the defendant could refuse
to anSI-Tel questions innocent on their face since it appeared from the
climate of the investigation and the publicity given defendants
alleged criminal activity that his answers might implicate him in
some federal crime
In anothel cese a COl1gr~ssional Committee attempted in vain to
obtain information from a ~1tl1ess relating to the names of persona enmiddotmiddot
~ged in the manufacture and sale of gambling equipment and other
mutters Finally exaspeeted chief counsel fOl the Committee said
IlLet the record show that the witness just sits there mute Che1Ting
gum saying nothing 1I
The witness Has found guilty of contempt of court and sentenced
to six months in jail but judgment was reversed on appeal The Court
of Appeals declared that the methods used by the Committee for examinashy
tioD of witnesses constituted a triple th~ceat answer truly and you
have given evidence leading to your conviction for a violation of
federal lav anSler falsely and you will be convicted of perjury refuse
to aWn-Tel and you will be found guilty of criminal contempt and punished 29
by fine and imprisonment - In the opinion of the court the predicamiddot
ment in which the ltncss -Tas placed flaS contrary to fair play and in
direct violation of the Fifth Amendment
These decisions could be multiplied and undoubtedly represent
prevailing law Almo3t every heinous crime on the law books comshy
roitted by Inlt1ividuals or by groups J remains uncove ced because of the
privilege against self-incrimination But it is in the area of subshy
version and disloyalty particularly that the privelege has a field
day 11 It is haIe that legislatiye connnittees and grand juries are
held at bay for years from learning vlhich leaders are plotting the
countrys destruction merely because witnesses are relieved of giving
essential information upon the ground of privilege
It is little Vlonder that lat-l-ebiding citizens frequently are heard
to say that sub-rersives and other lrongdoers are unduly coddled by
existing law They express anlDzement that the Congress and the Courts
should conttnue to put up ith subterfuge and concealment 1 n place of
truth at a time 1vhen the peril from Communiam is 60 great and -1hen
crime 1s so rrunpa1t They earnestly ucge upon us the vital need for
modernizing the legal ~eapons for fighting subversion and crime
These pleas of the people for more dcastic action against subshy
version and other misconduct have not gone unheeded Some States and
cities provide fer the dismissal of public employees ho refuse to
testify on grounds of self-incrimination or Tho refuse to t-aive imshy30
munity from prosecution
Some States prescribe loyalty oaths for admission to the Bar -1hich
go beyond the traditional promise to uphold the State and National 31
Constitutions shy
Some States and municipalities have passed statutes requiring
affidavits of puhlic employees that they are not and have never 32
been Communists Some States make ineligible to teach in any public
school a person vTho was a memher of an organization which advocates the
~ overthimiddotow of the Government by force Some of these statutes have been
JY upheld us valid by the Supreme Cou~~ including the provision of the
New York State law which provides that mecbership by a person in an
organization listed as subve~sive by the Dcard of Regents shall constitute
prima facie evidence of disqualification for employment 1n the public 12
schools This was the so-called Feinberg Law aimed at protecting the school
children of lew York against teachels who were spreading communist propaganda
~e poisonous propaganda was Bufficiently subtle to escape detection in the
class room The New York Legislature recognized that while the schools must
attract and protect the critical minds the schools vlere not sanctuaries for
those who were committed to follot-l in the footsteps of Klaus Fuchs It sought
the next best solution by e4cluding froIij teaching those affiliated with certain
orgn1zations listed by the Board of Regents vlhich advocated the overthrow
of the government
One of the main constitutional objections to the law was that it vishy
alated the First Amendment by creating an atmosphere of fear which would
inevitably stifle freedom of speech The Court in an opinion by Judge
Minton formerly of the COUl~ of Appeals for this Circuit r~jected the conshy
tention that the la interfered Vlith free speech since persons uhave no right
to ork for the smiddottate in the school system on their own terms They may york
for the school system upon the reasonable terms laid d01n by the proper
authorities of Neu York If they do not choose to work on such terms they 36
are at libelty to ~etain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere 1
The Supreme Court -las also lholly unimpressed by the contention that
the law condoned guilt by association contrary to democratic concepts of
justice On this point the Court sald ilL teacher lOrks in a sensitive area
in a school room There he shapes the attitude of young minds toward the
society in which they live In this the state has a vital concern It must
preserve the integcity of the schools That the school authorities haVe
the right and duty to aceen the officials teachers and their employees as
to their fitness to majnjail1 the integrity of the schools as a part of an
ordered society cannot be doubtecl One I s associates past and present as
vell os one t a conduct moy proIJerly be considered in determining fitness
and loyalty From time immemoljal one t a reputation ha3 been determined by
the company he keeps In the employment of officials and teachers of the
school systeil the state may very properly inquire into the company they 37
keep n
The Fedel~al GOyernrlent (llso has taken effective measures to protect
the interests of netional cecu1ity One long step forward in that direction
was to enact legislation requiring non middotmiddotCommul1ist affidavits from trade
union leaders vihose unions rBnted to resort to the advantages of the Taftshy38
Hartley Act - Tl1e Ptllpose of thiu requirement vas to prevent disruption of 39
industry in obedience to Communist Party orders If the union leaderls
affidavit us false be CQuId be sent to jail
The Federal Government has also tried its best to clean its Gvln
house fI On April 27 1953 the President by Executive oXde~ established
his security requirements for employment so that pelsons employed by the
Federal Government will be reliable trustworthy of sood character and 40
loyal to the United States On October 13 1953 the President amended
his Executive order so as to provide that imiddotlbe~~e a government employee refuses
to testify before a Congressional Coramittee regarding charges of his diashy
loyalty or misconduct an agency may take this factor into consideration
in determining hethe~ the person I s continued employment is inconsistent ~_f 41
with the national securtty This emendment to the Presidents Executive
order is in accord i th my opinion that a government employee oTho claims
privilege in a Congressional investigation may be too much of a risk to be
retained in Federal Service
A recent Senate Report entitled tlInterlocldng Subversion in
WGovernment fl fully documents how former government employees were
able to spin their web of intrigue in positions of influ6nce The
Report states
1tlJ~e subcommittee exumined in public session 36 pershy
sons about whom it had substantial evidence of membership
in the Communist undergrolld 10 Government All of them
invoked tha fifth amenmnen~ ~~d refused to answer questions
regardicg COnrIranist membership on the grounds of self-in
crinlination Many reused even to eomowledge their own
sigl1attles on official Govelnment doclllllents in which they
haG SViorn to nonmernbership in the past
All)st all of he persons exposed by the evidence had
Bome connection which could be documented vith at least one-shy
a~d generally several--other e~o6ed persons Tney used eaoh
other s names for referenoe on ~licationa for Federal em-
p10~lOOnt They hire eaoh other They pomot~d eampQh other
hAY raised each others sal~ries They transfer~ampd eaah
otlwr from bureau to bureau from depariment to department
from congressional committee to congressional committee
They assigned each other to international missions They
vouched for each others loyalty end prctected each other
when exposure threaten~d ~ley often had common living
qUaters tI
Suppression i truth in any case is bad enough In no event
can it be justified by a Government employee or applicant for Govern
ment empl~Jment in the face of a Congressional inquiry where the
interests of the national Bect~lty are at stake No one denies that
the Government employee or applicant for such employment may conshy
stitutionally claim his privilege against self-incrimination On
the other hand no one has a constitutional right to a Government
job W True the Supreme Court ha held that the constitutional
protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant
to a statute Is patently arbitrary or discriminatory II W But in
my opinion there is nothing e1ther arbtrary or discriminatry about
diSDdssing a federal employee where he refuses to waive the privilege
against self-incrimination guaranteed him by tho Const tution We
find an analogous situation presented in the recent decision of the
~reme Court in Orloff v WilloughbY ~ In that case the peti shy
tioner a physician was denied a commission in the Army principally
tor the reason that when asked hether he was a member in any Communist JY
organizations he replied) Federal Constitutional privilege is claimed
In its opinion through Mr Justice Jackson the Supreme Court said
It ia argued that Orlorf 1s being punished for havshy
ing claimed a privilege which the Constitution guarantees
No one at least no ane on this Court which has repeatedly
sustained assertion by Communists of the privilege against
selfMincr~inatian questions or doubts Orloffs right to
withhold facts about himself on this ground No one beshy
l1evee he can be punished for doing so But the question
is whether be can at the same time take the position that
to tell the truth about himself Vlould incriminate him and
that even so the President must appofnt him to a post of
honor and trust le have no hesitation in answering that
question No II There is no law which requires the Gove~~ent to sit supinely by
until the suspeoted eIlIployee has been convicted of disloyalty or other
similar misoonduct inconsistent with the interests of the national
security before it can sCPal~ate him from the Government service There
is no law which requires the Government to assume or endure such a risk
As was pointed out in an apt csae by the Supreme Court in American
Commtlnications v Douds speaking through the beloved late Chief
Justice Vinson
IfThat (first) amendment requires that one be permitted to
believe what he will It requires that one be permitted
to advocate what he will unless there is a clear and
present danger that a substantial public evil will result
therefrom It does not require that he be permitted to be
the keeper of the arsenal
I have not overlooked the fact that the loyalty and honesty of
the ovel~vhelming majority of all Government employeesmiddot is beyond quesshy
tion But their good reputations and character are far better proshy
tected from un1tfarranted criticism when we root out the few who are
unreliable and disloyal
What the critical situation of om time calls for is a lavr com
pt)lling testimony within the fr~neuro1Torl of the Constitution The tmshy
swer to this need is immuni-ty legislaiion which will be as broad as
the privilege W11ich is stJpplanted tV Then if a person is adjudged
ill cOlte~Pt for refusing to te3tify before a Cotgressional committee
he will know tZat t-le ~udgrnerJt of OOllt-empt will more likely stand up
on appeal free from oonstitutional ohal1enge
At the same time the l~w will also provide more adequate proshy
tection for the wit~ss
At presnt the witne31l is in a rtboxtl so to slJeGk The witness
is not exc~ed from an3werL~g merely because he believes his answers
Vlil1 incriminate him His slly-ao does not of its(gt~r establish the
1amphazeId of ilcriIltination II ~~ere he olaims his privil~ge it is
the ftL1ction of the jcge to dets-rmme whether the siJence of t1e
witness is justified or wha~1er the danger to be apprebenced is too
remote to be sl1bstattial To save himself from being held in conshy
tempt tl1e witness may oftcn be cOJIpEtled to disclos3 til0ne very
facts whtrh he claims are privileged iQ
Witnesses are alao aided by a b~oad immunity statute in still
another way Under our la unlike that of England t a disclosure of
any incriminating fact constitutes a wailer of the privilege as to deshy
tails con~erning that fact 211 Having made a partial disclosure of
faots the witness loses the rig~t to cease answering intel~ogat1ons
and rely upon his privilege at a 1ater point in his testimony
In one oase the detendant rree~ disclosed that she was Treasshy
urer of the Communist Pariy in COlorado and testified that she had
given the books ot the party to another person When asked to dishy
wlge the name ot the lamiddottter she refused upon the ground that the
answer might incriminate her mder the Sm1tb Act Atfirming her
conviction for contempt the Supreme Court speaking through Chief
Justice Vinson said
Since the privilege agatnlt salf-inorimination
presupposes a real danger ot legal detriment arising
from the disolosure petitioner cannot invoke the
privilege where response to the specific question in
issue here would not ftUtther inoriminate her O1aolo
sure of e tact waives the privilege as to details pound
This deoision leaves the law in a rather anomolous position tor the
vlitness A witness who refuses to answer aU questions and fails to Wcooperate to any extent may be protected by the claim of privilege
But there is no equal protection atforded by the decisions to the
witness who commences to eooperate but stops at a point where further
disclosure may tncrim1~ate him
Moreover it the witness refuses to answer on the ground that
Congress has exceeded its powers or that the inQuiry in lacking in
pertinency he construas the law at his peril If mistake8 his good 55
faith error of law constitutes no defense to fine and imprisonment
Then again it is claimed DY some that a persons election to
remain silent upon the ground of privilege does not necessarily mean
he has anything sinister to hide There are undoubtedly some people of
sincere principle who refl1se to disclose 1flformat1oft to authorized
1nvestigating authorities because of their feeling that ao one has any
right to 1~quire about their beliefs even if germane to the inquiry at 56
bsnd- There are other persons who refuse to answer because they feel
their recollections of events lons past are fee~le and that falsehood
even on trivial or irrelevant matters may subject them to a charge of
perjury There are still others less innocent vho say that coercing
them to testify under pain of contempt resembles the Soviet tactic of
requiring those SUilty not only to pay for but also to prcclatD their 57
guilt shy
~he use of broad tmmunity statutes serves to remove the dansers
mentioned for the iDPocent a~d operates aa an incentive for the guilty
to tell the truth
There are already two proposals pendin8 in Congress which seek to
compel the answer by witnesses at questioDs put to them before Conshy
gressiOl1al Committees grand juries or courts In exchange tor this
compulsory testimony the Witnesses will obtain complete immunity froa
prosecution
58 One Bill is s~ 565 This proposal grants immunity to ~itnesses
before a grand Jury or court of the United States when in the disshy
cretion of th~ Attorney General it is necessary to do so in the public
interest In exchange for this immunity the witness is compelled to
testify and to produce his books papers or recoIds s 565 uses
broad immunity lengtase in stating that the witness shall not be
prosecuted on account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he 1s compelled after ela~ing his privilege to testify or
produce evidence
In this respect s 565 is almost ident1cal to the immunity proshy59
vision sustained 8S valid by the Supreme Court e~ far back as 1896-
This Bill does not extend the immunity to witnesses before Congressional
Committees 601 61
There are other Bills pend-ing S 16- middot and H R 27371 with equally
broad immunity authority The Senate has passed its Bill but the House
Bill still awaits action Both these Bills grunt immunity to witnesses
before Congressional Committees but not to witnesses before grand
juries or courts
The proposed Bills are worded so that the witness will not get an
immunity bathU merely by testifying He must first raise specifically
his claim for privilege and thus put the Committee on notice whether
for the greater good the witness should be required to testify and 62
given immunity or whether he should be excused from testlfying-
However the discretionary power to grant the immunity is not vested
in the Attorney General bumiddott lies with the body conducting the investigation
If the proceeding is one before one of the Houses of Congress then
a majority vote of the members present is necessary Under S 16
if it is a proceeding before a committee two thirds of the members
must vote to grant the tmmunity In that event the tvothirds vote
must include at least two members of each of the two political parties
having the largest representation on such committee The House Bill
does not provide for notice to the Attorney General of the proposed
grant of immunity The Senate Bill provides for one weeks notice to
the Attorney General of the proposal but if the latter fails or reshy
fuses to assent to grant of immunity it may be conferred by majority
vote of either House It is hoped that this legislation will only be
resorted to where full diseloaure by witnesses is deemed of greater
tmportance than the possibility of punishing them for past offenses
By permitting one or several criminals to escape prosecution the
larger public peril contained in a gang of criminals or in their
leaders may be uncovered and the guilty brought to justice
The legislative proposals mentioned have much to commend them
In my opinion these bills would better achieve their purposes it they
required the concurrence of the Attorney General 1n the granting of any
immunity to a witness by a Joint Congressional Committee or either Heuse
committee or by Congress The Attorney General 1s the chief legal
officer of the Government of the United States As Buch it 1s his
responsibility to prosecute persons who offend the criminal laws of the
United states This responsibility must be coupled w1th adequate
authority to permit its discharge It would seem to be more advisable
for the Attorney General who has immediate knowledge of a criminals
background and propensities to decide whether immunity should be
granted for such a person To allow the Attorney General to participate
in the ultimate decision aa to whether immunity should be granted would
not impair Congressional investigatIons in the fields of internal
security crime and corruption Nor would it discourage witnesses
from providing information of importance to the investigation if the
Attorney Generals permission vas required before immunity was granted
On the other hand if these Bills were enacted in their present
form they might subject members of Congress to undue pressures for
granting immunity to criminals who are ineligible to receive it Also
they cuuld very easily cause embarrassment to Congress by tmped1ng or
blocking prosecutions planned by the Department of Justice on any matter 63
even incidentally testified to upon these 1nvestigations
The unfortunate experience which Congress had as far back as 1857 64
in granting immunity without concurrence of the Attorney General - should
~each that a similar course of action may be marked by eveD greater
failure today_ The witness might readily turn this division of authority
between Congress and the Department of Justice to his advantage by
obtaining an ~unity from the legislative committee or from Congress
over the objection of the Attorney General Thereafter he would be
free to testify concerning a broad area Of activities without fear that
he could be held to account criminally for other violations however
unrelated to the matter under investigation
Thus for example a Congreas1onal Committee or Congress might
furnish immunity to a person to obtain his testimony about his illicit
traffic in slot machine opercltlons between states This person may also
be guilty either of espionage or subversion or of selling narcotics to
youngs cers as to which an indictment is soon to be obtained To foreshy
close prosecution on these more serious crimes the witness would be
glad to volunteer information on his other activities if he knew in
advance that immunity would fallow for all of them Therefore greatest
care must be exercioed in granting immunity and then only upon a fully
informed judgment of all tle facts The Departlnent of Justice would
of course through the Fe~eral Bureau of Investigation the Crtmlnal
and Tax Divisions and the United states Attorneyo I offices be mosmiddott
likely to know the facts and the plans for prosecution Concurrence
by the Attorney General in conferring the immunity would also enable
the Department of Justice to maintuin its responsibility for the proper
administration of the crlminal law
The provision in S 10 for one weeks notice to the Attorney General
of the proposed grant of immunity does not fully cure this Bill of its
weakness in failing to require his affirmative concurrence in every
case Experience indicates that at times the views of the person who
1s charged with prooecut1ng criminals are disregarded by Congressional
Committees For example the successful criminal conviction obtained
by the Department of Justice ot the internal revenue collector in one of
the largest cities was recently nullified because of the action of a
House Committee in holding 1middotr1dely publicized hearings in the district in
65 which the trial subsequently took place These hearings took place
over the strong objection of the Department of Justice thut the pro
posed hearing would be of prejudice to the defendant on the trial
which was about to be initiated and would injure the Governments case
in disclosing its evidence In reversing the convlct1on l Chief Judge
Magruder observed that the character of the defendant was blackened
and discredited as the day of trial approached because of the publicity
invited and stimulated by the Committee over the radio and television
Thu6 1 mere advance notIfication to the Attorney General of a proposed
grant of tmmunity would never be a guarantee that the Committee would
be guided by the views of the Attorney General
S 16 and H R 2737 would also more readily carry out the aim of
obtaining evidence against leaders of subversion and criminal entershy
prisesj if provision for twmunity were granted to obtain testimony
not only before Congressional Committees but likewise before courts
and grand juries
For these reasons it is my opinion that if any measure is to be
enacted~~rmitting the granting of immunity to witnesses before either
House of Congress or its committees it should vest the Attorney General
or the Attorney General acting with the concurren~e of appropriate members
of Congress with the authority to grant such tmmunity and if the test shy
mony is sought for a court or grand jury that the Attorney General alone
be authorized to grant the ilmnunity
There remain for discussion two principal objections to this proshy
posed legislation which may be briefly considered here One objection
1s that when a witneAS is compelled to testify even under the protecshy
tion of immunity from criminal punihment) he is not relieved from
personal disgrace ~~lhich attach~8 to the exposure of his crime The
answer to this objection ia contained in II land mark decision of the 66
Supreme Court in Brown v Wrtlker
The design of tbe constitutional plivilege is not to aid the
witness in vindicating his character but to protect him
against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict him
of a criminal charge If he secure legal jnmllnity from prose-
cution the possible impairment of his good name is a penalty
which it is reasonable b0 should be compelled to pay for the
common good
The reasoning of this decision has never been qU~Gtioned and has 67
only recently been approved by the Sllpreme Court
The other chief objection to the proposed legislation is that while
a witness may receive itmlunity from federal prosecution) he may still
be subject to IJrosecution under ~tate lavl The Supreme Court has held
that this is not a valid objection to federal immunity laws~ since the
self-incrimination clause ln the Fifth Amendment operates ao a l1mitashy68
tion on the federal government only In United states v Murdock the
defendant was indicted for refUSing to answer questions of a revenue
agent relating to ctrt8 in income tax returns The refusal was ba sed on
the plea that hiD answers might 1ncrim1nate him in a state court The
Court said on this point
This court ha~ held that immunity against state prosecution is
not essential to the validity of federal statutes declaring that
a witnes3 shall not be excllpoundied from gtring evidence on the
ground that it vTill incriminate him and also that the ladt of
state power to give witnesses protection against federal
prosecution does not defeat a state immunity statute
Similarly a witness befo~e a state tribunal CBnnot refuse to 69
answer because of the threat of federal prosecution - However the
Federal District Court in Ohio recently held i1 Unted States v 70
Di Carlo that the defendant had the right to assert his privilege
because of possible prosecution under state law since the Senate
committee was authorized to investigate violations not only of the lawe 71
of the United States but also of the states M_ The Murdock case was
dtstingJished urlon the ground that the danger of state posecution 1n
that case was remote and uncertain thile in the Di Carlo case the
danger of state proaecutjon WilS imminent and real 72
The ---Di Carlo case has been received -lith mixed commelt It has73
not been followed so far as we k~ow- It appears to be contrary to deshy
cis10ns of co~~rts of appeals which have consistently adhered to the prinshy74
ciples of the Murdock case- In my opinion this decision of a district
court aoes not detract from the binding effect ofthe Supreme Courts deshy
eision in the Murdock case
The Department of Justice will recommend to the Congress in Jlouary
an immunity bill of the type I have descri-ced which protects the const1shy
tutional privileges ot witnesses before Congressional Committees courts
and juries but will at the some time aid materially in stamping out
criminal and subversive activities
Footnote Referet~es to Ad~res El~ited ~------ ___bull
Immunity From Prcsecuticn
Versus
Privilege Agaiust Self-Incrimination
Pittman liThe Colonial and Constitutional History of the
Privilege Against Sel-Incrimiootion 1n Amcicaff 21 Va
L R 763 764 770-773 (1935) Corwin The Supreme
Court I S Corctl~ction of the Self Incrirnination C1ause lf
29 lId~h L R 1 512 (1930) Ap~licability of
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to Legjslative
y Pittmenf2 at 774
~ ~ining v ~~8ey 211 U S 78 92 (1908)
L Id at 91
~ 34th Ceng 3d sess Globe PI 427 433 1-45 See
Eberling Constitutional Investigations pp 304-315shy
7 Eberling d at 320-323
~I 142 U s 547 (1892) This Act of 1862 revised an old
statute into two new sections by an amendment which
sought to insure that a witness who testified before
a federal grand jt~ or court (R s I 860 (1875raquo or
a Congressional Committee (R S B 859 (1875raquo would
not be later subjected to the use of his testimony in
any criminal proceeding aGainst him Section ~ 860 of
the amendment dealing with grand jurtes and courts came
under attack in Counselman v Hitchcock J supra and was
held to be invalid Since this part of the immunity proshy
vision tailed to accomplish ita purpose Congress repealed
it in 1910 (36 Stat 352 (19l0raquo) Congress apparently felt
that S 859 applying to Congressional Committees was still
of value and left it 1n force to this date (a s I 859
(1875) as amended 52 Stat 943 (1938) 18 usc e3486
(Supp V 1952)j see liThe Privilege Against Self
Incrimination versus Immunity Proposed Statutes 41
Georgetown L J 511 514 (1953) United States v ~
339 U s 323 335-337 (1950)
21 It read in patt as follows
No person shall be prosecuted for or on
account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he may testify or produce evidence
Act of Feb 11 1893 c 83 27 stat 443 49 USCA
I 46 See too ~ v United States 337 u S 137 146shy
147 (1949)middot Notet Denying -the Privilege against Self
Incrimination to Public Officers 64 Barv L R 987
988 (1951)
- 101 161 U s 591 (1896)
Shapiro v United St~~ 335 U S 1 6-7 (1948) where various
statutes are collated in the footnote The customary provision
in these statutes provides as follows No person shall be
excused from complying with any requirements ot this section
because of his privilege aga1nst self-incriminationgt but the
immunity provisions of the COmptuBory Testimony Act of
February 11 1893 shall apply with respect to allY 1nd1shy
vidual who specifically claims such pr1Y11ege tt
12 Rapacz ULimiting the Plea of Self-Incr1m1nat1ontl 20 Georgetown
L J 329 353 (1932) see footnote 3 of ~ v Connect~
302 U s 319 326 (1937) NPte liThe Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination the Doctr1ne of Waiver 61 Yale L J 104 110
(1952) middot
~f Palko v Connecticut 302 U s 319 326 (1937)
~ See dissents of Mr Justices Shiras Gray and White in ~ V4
Walker supra 161 U s 630638 Cf dissent of Mr Justice
Black in Ro~ers v United States 340 U s 367 376 (1950)
15 Potts Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for ContemptU I
74 U of Pa L R 691 780 (1926) L1acos uRights of Witnesses
Before Congressional Committees 33 Boston U L R 337 340
(1953) middot
t6 Liacos Id at 31tl
17 McGeary rlThe DeTelopmen-cs of Congressional Investigative Power ll
p 23 (1940) McGrain v Daughel~l 273 u s 135 (1927)
18 Sinclair v Unfted States~ 279 U s 263 (1929) ~arsba11 v
Unit~~State~ 176 F 2d 473 (nc Cir 1949) 2 Usc ~ 192
(Supp 1950)
19 Ne York City Bar Ass t n Committee on the Bill of Rights Report
on Congressional Committees presented December 14 1948 p 1
gQi Galloway PCong18ss1onal Investigations Proposed Reforms lt
18 U of Chi L R 478 479-481 (1951)
21 Dilliard lICongress1onal Investigations The Role of the Press
18 U of ChL L R 585 J 587 (1951)
22 Edgerton J dissenting in Barsky v United States 167 F 2d
241 252 (nc eir 1948) cert denied 334 U s 843 (1948)
petition for rehearing denied 339 U S 971 (1951)
~3 De Jonge v Oregon 299 U s 353 364 365 (1937)
24 Id
25 6 Richardson lIMes sOges and Papers of the Pres idents t 1 p 23
July 4 1861
26 See United St~~ v ~~phson 165 F 2d 82 (2 Cir 1947)
cert denied 333 u S 838 (1948) Lawson v United states
176 F 2d 49 (nc Cir 1949) cel~ denied 339 u s 934
(1950) Barsty Y ~ited S~ 167 F 2d 241 (DC eir
1948) cert denied 334 u s 843 (1948) MCGrain v Daugherty
273 u s 135 (1927) and cf Rumely v United States J 197
F 2d 166 (DC eir 1952) affd 73 s ct 543 (1953)
JJ B1a~ v ~~ted Sttlt~s 340 u s 159 (1950-)
gsectJ ~~ v United States 31~1 U s 479 (1951) See too
sectingleton v United States 343 U s 944 (1952) Note Recent
Extensions of the Witness Privilege Against Self-Incrim1nationll
53 Col L R 275 (1953)
29 Aiuppa v Un1tc~ states 201 F 2d 287 300 (6 eir 1952)
_I30 Note nMandatory Dismissal of Public Persol1nel and The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination 101 U ot Pa L R 1190 1191
fn 8 (1953)
31 Brown Be Fassett Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar
20 u or Chi L R 480 483 (1953)
32 Garner v Los Angeles Board) 341 u s 716 (1951) Gerende v
Board of Supervisors 341 U s 56 (1951) but com~are Wieman v
Updegraff 341~ U s 83 (1953)
34 See footnote 32
35 PG~ v Boa-roo of Education 31~2 U s 435 (1951)
ID Id at 493
38 Sec 9(h of lihe LalJor Management Rlations Act of 1947 29 USCA
St1Pp III Sec 141 Sec 159(b)
39 ft~rican C~~catons Association v ~uda 339 u S 382 (1950)
sustaining the validity of Sec 9(h) against the challenge that it
violated the First c-lT~nc1tlCiltl Ex Post FtiCto Lals and other iul1dashy
mental rights
40 Executive Order No 10450 issued Aporil zr 1953 (18 F R 2lt89)
41 Executive Orrler No 10491 issued Ocmiddottober 13 1953 (18 F R 6583)
~ Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary Interlocking Subshy
vcrs ion in Covernmcnt De~rtments II 83d Cong 1st ses5 Juy 30 J
1953 p 21 Being a cOImllunist is not a crime under federal law J
although it is in some states (see Liacos supra note 15 at
375) The Smith Act (18 USC Sec 2385 et seq) mkes advoshy
eating or teaching the violent overthrOf of any goverrment of the
United States or being a member of such a group and kno7ing its
purpose~a federal crime
43 See EaSley v F~cbardsonJ 182 F 2d 46 (DC 1950)J affd by an
evenly diiied court 341 TJ s 918 (1951) 1Etshingto v McGrath
182 F 2d 375 (DC 1950) aff1d 341 U s 923 (1951)j Or~~ v
vIil1ougbby 345 U s 83 91 (1953) Mr Justice Douglas concurring
i~ ~tiFascist Commi~~ v ~~EJ 341 U s 123 -182-183 (1951)
United Public W0rkers v --~1itcbell 330 U s 75 (1947)j Angilly - v
United States 199 F 2d 642) 644 (1950) cf NcAuliffe v rlew
Bedford 155 Mass 216 29 NE 517 (le9~) per Holmes J liThe
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but
he h(=l~s no constitltioi1al right to be a policezranu (Id at 220
29 NE at 5J7)
44 v1ie~sn _
v UpGegaff middot111 ~
3~middot4 u s 83 (1953) The Court ruleri as
contrry to due process the Cklahoma loyalty oath statute forshy
bidding IJ1l11ic emplo~rment of Persons who belonzea to certain
organizations regarciless of their knowledge of the character of
those oreenizations because of the indiscriminate classification
of lnnocent with kno~vilg activityll (d at 91)
~1 345 u S 83 (1953)middot
46 Id at 90
47 339 u s 3827 412 (1950) sustaininG the non-corJlIlunist affidavit
requirernelt of union leaders under the Taft -Hartley Act
~ Hoffman v United States 341 U s 179 (1951) suggests such
legislation if Congres3 concludes the lleed is great enough
See too Comment The Privilege Against Se1f-Llcriminetion Versus
Lmnurdty Z Proposed Statutes P 41 Gt~orgetom L J 511 (1953)
S Rept 153 on S 16 83d Cone 1st sess ~ 1 ald 2
April 17 1953 Report of Sel1a~~e Commttee on the JudiciaJ J
Interlocking S-lbversion in GOYf11llent Departments tl July 30
1953 83d Cong 1st sess p 50
~ HcfI1nan v Unitet States 341 u s 479 486 (1951)
50 Id U1ited States v ~isman 111 F 2d 260 262 (2 Cir 1950)
51 Note 61 Yale L J 105 109 (1952)
52 Rogers v United States 340 u s 367 375 (1951)
211 See e g Blau v Unjted StaIe~ 340 u s 159 (1950)
-shy54 Note J Co1t3resnic1al Inv estigat1ons--Self-Illcrimimtion Condemneshy
tiOll and Fair Hcar1ngll 22 U of Cinn L R 193 199-200 (1953)
55 See ~ovTn8end v ~~it~~ta~~3 95 F 2d 352 351 (DC Cir 1938)
cert denied 303 u S 664 (1938)
56 Byse TfA Report on the Pennsylvana Loyalty Act 101 U of Fa
L R 480 481-1~84 (1953) Wright Should Teachers Testify
Saturday Review Sept 2o 1953 p 23
57 See Meltzer Required Records The McCarran Act and The Privilege
Against Selfmiddotmiddot Incriminat ion ll 19 U of Chi L R 687 722 (1951)
y 83d Cong 1st Seas 1953 Also known as the Kefauver BUl
59 ~ v ltlalker 161 U S 591 (1896)
sect21 S 16 83d Cong 1st sess 1953 passed the Senate July 9 1953
after extensive debate Cong Ree 8646-8663 July 9 1953shy
S 16 amends B 3486 of Title 18 Sec 3486 presently furnishes
witnesses immunity from prosecution tor testimony before either
House or their Committees It appears to suffer from the same
deficiency present in a similar statute condemned in Counse~an v
Hitchcock 142 u s 547 (1892) S 16 is intended to StWP1y the
omission in the Hitchcock ease by providing not only that a
witness testimony may not be used against him but that such
witness shall be iImnune with respect to lIany transaction mtter
or thing concerning which he has been compelled to testIfy
sect 83d Congo 1st sess 1953
~ S Rept 153 83d Congo 1st sess p 2 (1953)
63 See Comment The Privi1ege Against Self-Incrimination Versus
Immunity Proposed statutes 41 Georgetown L J 511 523 (1953)
64 Supra footnote 7shy
sectif Delanel v ~ed States 199 F 2d 107 (1 Ci~ 1952)
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
First a few words about the history of the privle~e
The prlvilege aga~ft self-ircrimilation has deep roots ir earl~f
21g11sh historl The tyranny of Charles I dur1~G the ~ealS 1629 to
l61~O middot~n dealing with no~-middotmiddotconformists afd the Star Chamber proceedings
in which innocent persons were tortured into ronfession of crimes
whch they did not commit) engendered such hosttlity amo~G the people
that strong demands were made to er-d compulsot1 testimony as far back
~ 11 as
L lal~7 By early lc50 the privilege against self-i1criminat1oll was
so well established in the common law of ~~gland that it was rever
even thought necessary by an Erglish ParI tament to pass s act touch 51
ing the ma~ter
With this heritage it was ~ot surprising that the early settlers
in America fiercely r~s1sted attempts of the Governors af the Royal 3
provinces to resort to compulsory testimony for coerci~g confessions
By the time of the formation of the Union the principle that no
person could be compelled to be a witress against himself had become
fixed in the common law II It was regaxoded then 8S ow l as a protection
to the innocelt BS well as to the guilty ad an essential safeguard4
against unfourded nnd tyrannical prosecution
The privilege was not ircluded ir the Federal Constftut1ol as
originally adopted 3ubsequently it was placed in one of the group
of ten Amendments recommended to the States by the First COl1gress and
by them adopted Since then) all the States of the U~ton have included
the privileGe in their Constitutions except New Jersey and Iowa where 5
the principle prevails as ~~rt of tru~ commor law
During the development of the privilege against self-incrimination
there was experimentation with statutes granting immunity in exchange for
compulsory testimony In 1857 an act was passed by Congress granting a
complete legislative pardon for any fact or act as to which the witness 6
was required to testify- This provision of the bfll was amended five
years later when it was fOlmd to have worked greater evil than good
It was a Senator from Illinois Senator Turnbull by name who was
largely responsible for its amenrunent In debate Senator Turnbull
graphically demonstrated that the Act offered inducement for the worst
criminals to appear before an investigating committee to obtain immunity
from their crimes As an example he pointed to lie man who stole two
millions in bonds if you please out of the Interior Department What
does he do He gets himself called as a itness before one of the in
vestigating committees and testifies something in relation to that matter
and then he cannot be indicted u Senator Turnbull then went on to show how
the clerk who purloined two millions in bonds from the Interior Department
was discharged and the indictment against him quashed merely because of
some statement in reference to the matter before an investigating committee
Shortly thereafter the legislative pardon was withdrawn and an imshy
munlty statute was enacted which provided in part that no evidence
obtained from a party or witness shall be used against him 7
in Bfy criminal proceeding u- Under this statute it was merely
the testimony itself which could lomiddott later be used in any criminal proshy
ceeding against the witness but the immunity did not extend to other
matters to which this testimony might indirectly lead This partial
immunity statute was soon challenged in the case of Counselman v 8
Hitchcock - and the Supreme Court agreed that it was invalid for fnil shy
ing to provide the same complete protection as the constitutional privilege
which the witness was required to surrender
To meet the objection raised in the Supreme Courts decision in the
Hitchcock case a clause was thereafter included in the Act relating to
proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission in terms broad
enough to furnish absolute immunity from prosecution in the Federal V
Courts
Sustaining the validity of this immunity statute the Supreme Court W
in ~ v Walker in the year 1896 ruled that it fully accomplished
the object of the privilege J and therefore it was adequate to prevent the
witness from asserting his right to claim immunity
Theleaftel the Immunity Act relating to the Interstate Commerce
Commission was incorporated in temporary wartime measures and in
virtually all of the major regulatory enactments of the Federal III
Government - To guard against unwise use ot their authority these
regulatory agencieshave followed the practice of consulting the Attorney
General and getting his approval before granting immunity to witnesses
From what has been said you can readily see that there 1s notbing
novel about immunity legislation Indeed many States have also enacted
laws which provide immunity from prosecution where a witness is compelled
to testify
This shift from privilege to immunity statutes reflected in part the
view of some attorneys and legal scholars that privilege against selt shyY
incrimination was somewhat outmoded and should be strictly limited
As great a guardian ot individual rights and liberty as
Mr Justice Cardozo observed in speaking ot the privilege ot
immunity from compulsory self-incrimination This too might
be lost and justice still be done Indeed today as 1n the past
there are students of our penal system who look upon the immunity
as a Ddschief rather than a benefit and who would limit its scope
or destroy 1t altogether No doubt tpere would remain the need to
gjve protection against torture phys1cal or mental Justice
however would not perish it the accused were subject to a duty to 111
respond to orderly inquiry 1 Thele are other jurists and legal
commentators of distinction who feel that it would be abhorrent to
prinCiples of a tree government to compel a person to testify even j
upon an exchange of full immunity
Witb this background before us I come now to the need for
exchanging immunity for compulsory testimony in light of our
recent experience w1th Congressional investigations into subshy
version crime and corruption The history of Congressional
investigatory powers Just like the privileGe against selfshy121
incrimination goes back to the earlist days of our history
Unlike the privilege however the Constitution does not exshy
pressly provide for any COlBressional Ilower to investigate
It 16 considered as an implied power essential to carry out 16
the general legislative funct1on shy
Congressional investigation commdttees have traditionally 17
been regarded as having these principal fUllctons - to
secure information by which Congress may exercise an informed
judgment in legislating wisely and to check administrative
agencies for determining whether they are properly enforcing
the law and ju11c1ollsly spending the public flnds For these
purpcses Congressional Committees may summon witnesses and 18
require their testimo~ under penalty of contempt proceedings -shy
But a Congressional hearing is not a trial Its function is
primarily to ascertain facta and not to decide on the guilt
or innocence of the witness
In recent years many of these investigating commdttees have been
particula~ly concerned in alerting the American people to the nature
of subversive and other criminal activities the many forms that
these activities take and how they threaten the democratiC processes
Some persons have been critical of these investigations claiming
that th~y restrict freedom of speech by stigmatizing expressions of 19
unpopular views -- Freedom of speech they say implies freedom not to
speult ot all even undel legal compulsion Since wide publicity is
given to these proceedings by newspapers radio and television the
complaint is also that these perSOIlS investigated are exposed to
poscible insult oatruciom und loss of employment It is urged that
mere mention of a persons nome in c0110ection with an inveJtigation
that has wide-spred news vclue may create a distorted and unfair public 20
implession - Another point made is that proof of innocence may never 21
catch up with public It assertions of guilt It It is also said that if
these persons decline to profans any stutement of belief before a comshy22
mittee they iovite pUIiislIDl~lJt for contempt
Unquestionably every effort should be exerted to protect the right
of our people to speak and think freely As Chief Justice Hughes has
Hell said
The greater the importance of safeguarding the community
from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force
and violence the mOI~ imperative is the ne~d to preserve inviolate
the constitutioual lights of free speech free press and free
assembly in order to muintain the CJpportunity for free political
discussion l to the end that government may be responsive to the
will of the people and that changes if deSired may be obtained g)j
by peaceful means
~Je shOL1ld dread the dvy middotrhen the people could justifiably become
wary of explessing 1l110zthotLoJ or unpopular opinions or where rumor and
gossip are accepted as subotitutes for evidence
As egainst these threats to our precious liberties we must also
weigh the possible harm to the public scfety and lelfare without llhich
there can be no liberty for anyone yJhile the rights guaranteed by the
Firat Amendment may not be curtailed abuse of these rights may 24
properly be curbed
In his time Abraham Lincoln expressed the problem in these
distressed words ItMust CI government of necessity be too strong
for the libel~ies of its own people or too weak to maintain its own 25
eXistencel The same problem is with us today Obviously if Congress
is to legislate Vlisely with respect to subversion and other crime and
corruption it must not be obstructed from learning ~ho are its
leaders organizers and members the nature and scope of their activishy
ties the character and number of their adherents
I knmv of no constitutional right of privacy which immunizes a
person from giving evidence where an 1nquil~ is conducted by a legally
constituted Congressional committee Tbe person owes this duty as a
citizen just as he m~es the duty to furnish relevant and truthful
testimony in a court of law or gl~nd jury He violates his duty as a
citizen Then he suppresses the facts concerning criminal activity known
to him So long as the questions are pertinent and gel~ne to a lawful
inquiry of Congress the individual is not relieved from answering
because they delve into his private affairs his previous utterances 26
or his affiliations political or otherwise -- The constitutional
guarantee of freedom to epreS8 ones views does not include immunity
from Congressional inquiry as to hat one has said subject to ones
privilege against self-incrimination
Reference to several cases within the last few years demonstrate
how effectively Congressional Committees courts and grand juries have
been blocked in their efforts to uncover subversion as Hell as other
criminal activities because of reliance by 1middotritneases upon their
privilege
In one case the 1-1itness upon ground of privilege refused to anSler
questions before a grand jur7 as to whether she knew the names of the
State officers of the Communist Party of the State what its table of
organization waD vThether she was employed by it whethel she ever had
possession of Communist books and whether she turned the books over
to any particular person At the time the Smith Act was in effect
making it s crime for any person knowing its purposes to be a member
of any group uhich advocates the overthrow of the GovelDmellt Upon the
refusal of the itness to testify she as found to be 1n contempt of
court and sentenced to imprisonment for one year The COU1~ of Appeals
affirmed
Hm-1eve the Supreme Cou~t felt that her answers might furnish
a link in the chain of evidence necessary in a piosecution under the
Smith Act and that the witness was privileged to refuse to furnish any
such link Accordingly it unanimously reversed upon the ground that
prior decisions of this Court have clearly established that under such
circWl16tances the Constitution gives a -1itness the privilege of gy
remaining silent II
In the same way a Federal grand jury was prevented from obtaining
information in its investigation of narcotic and Hhite Slave traffic as
well as bribery perjury and other serious Federal violations 1111e
witness stood upon his privilege against self~incrimination in refusing
to respond to questions as to what he did for a living and whether he
knemiddot certain named pemiddot~son6 Hele again judgment of imprisonment
fo~ contempt was upbeld by the Court of Appeals but reversed by the 28
Supreme Couct with one judge dissenting - upon the ground that tiny
other conclu~ion Would seriously compromise an important constitutional
libecty In this cnse the court held that the defendant could refuse
to anSI-Tel questions innocent on their face since it appeared from the
climate of the investigation and the publicity given defendants
alleged criminal activity that his answers might implicate him in
some federal crime
In anothel cese a COl1gr~ssional Committee attempted in vain to
obtain information from a ~1tl1ess relating to the names of persona enmiddotmiddot
~ged in the manufacture and sale of gambling equipment and other
mutters Finally exaspeeted chief counsel fOl the Committee said
IlLet the record show that the witness just sits there mute Che1Ting
gum saying nothing 1I
The witness Has found guilty of contempt of court and sentenced
to six months in jail but judgment was reversed on appeal The Court
of Appeals declared that the methods used by the Committee for examinashy
tioD of witnesses constituted a triple th~ceat answer truly and you
have given evidence leading to your conviction for a violation of
federal lav anSler falsely and you will be convicted of perjury refuse
to aWn-Tel and you will be found guilty of criminal contempt and punished 29
by fine and imprisonment - In the opinion of the court the predicamiddot
ment in which the ltncss -Tas placed flaS contrary to fair play and in
direct violation of the Fifth Amendment
These decisions could be multiplied and undoubtedly represent
prevailing law Almo3t every heinous crime on the law books comshy
roitted by Inlt1ividuals or by groups J remains uncove ced because of the
privilege against self-incrimination But it is in the area of subshy
version and disloyalty particularly that the privelege has a field
day 11 It is haIe that legislatiye connnittees and grand juries are
held at bay for years from learning vlhich leaders are plotting the
countrys destruction merely because witnesses are relieved of giving
essential information upon the ground of privilege
It is little Vlonder that lat-l-ebiding citizens frequently are heard
to say that sub-rersives and other lrongdoers are unduly coddled by
existing law They express anlDzement that the Congress and the Courts
should conttnue to put up ith subterfuge and concealment 1 n place of
truth at a time 1vhen the peril from Communiam is 60 great and -1hen
crime 1s so rrunpa1t They earnestly ucge upon us the vital need for
modernizing the legal ~eapons for fighting subversion and crime
These pleas of the people for more dcastic action against subshy
version and other misconduct have not gone unheeded Some States and
cities provide fer the dismissal of public employees ho refuse to
testify on grounds of self-incrimination or Tho refuse to t-aive imshy30
munity from prosecution
Some States prescribe loyalty oaths for admission to the Bar -1hich
go beyond the traditional promise to uphold the State and National 31
Constitutions shy
Some States and municipalities have passed statutes requiring
affidavits of puhlic employees that they are not and have never 32
been Communists Some States make ineligible to teach in any public
school a person vTho was a memher of an organization which advocates the
~ overthimiddotow of the Government by force Some of these statutes have been
JY upheld us valid by the Supreme Cou~~ including the provision of the
New York State law which provides that mecbership by a person in an
organization listed as subve~sive by the Dcard of Regents shall constitute
prima facie evidence of disqualification for employment 1n the public 12
schools This was the so-called Feinberg Law aimed at protecting the school
children of lew York against teachels who were spreading communist propaganda
~e poisonous propaganda was Bufficiently subtle to escape detection in the
class room The New York Legislature recognized that while the schools must
attract and protect the critical minds the schools vlere not sanctuaries for
those who were committed to follot-l in the footsteps of Klaus Fuchs It sought
the next best solution by e4cluding froIij teaching those affiliated with certain
orgn1zations listed by the Board of Regents vlhich advocated the overthrow
of the government
One of the main constitutional objections to the law was that it vishy
alated the First Amendment by creating an atmosphere of fear which would
inevitably stifle freedom of speech The Court in an opinion by Judge
Minton formerly of the COUl~ of Appeals for this Circuit r~jected the conshy
tention that the la interfered Vlith free speech since persons uhave no right
to ork for the smiddottate in the school system on their own terms They may york
for the school system upon the reasonable terms laid d01n by the proper
authorities of Neu York If they do not choose to work on such terms they 36
are at libelty to ~etain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere 1
The Supreme Court -las also lholly unimpressed by the contention that
the law condoned guilt by association contrary to democratic concepts of
justice On this point the Court sald ilL teacher lOrks in a sensitive area
in a school room There he shapes the attitude of young minds toward the
society in which they live In this the state has a vital concern It must
preserve the integcity of the schools That the school authorities haVe
the right and duty to aceen the officials teachers and their employees as
to their fitness to majnjail1 the integrity of the schools as a part of an
ordered society cannot be doubtecl One I s associates past and present as
vell os one t a conduct moy proIJerly be considered in determining fitness
and loyalty From time immemoljal one t a reputation ha3 been determined by
the company he keeps In the employment of officials and teachers of the
school systeil the state may very properly inquire into the company they 37
keep n
The Fedel~al GOyernrlent (llso has taken effective measures to protect
the interests of netional cecu1ity One long step forward in that direction
was to enact legislation requiring non middotmiddotCommul1ist affidavits from trade
union leaders vihose unions rBnted to resort to the advantages of the Taftshy38
Hartley Act - Tl1e Ptllpose of thiu requirement vas to prevent disruption of 39
industry in obedience to Communist Party orders If the union leaderls
affidavit us false be CQuId be sent to jail
The Federal Government has also tried its best to clean its Gvln
house fI On April 27 1953 the President by Executive oXde~ established
his security requirements for employment so that pelsons employed by the
Federal Government will be reliable trustworthy of sood character and 40
loyal to the United States On October 13 1953 the President amended
his Executive order so as to provide that imiddotlbe~~e a government employee refuses
to testify before a Congressional Coramittee regarding charges of his diashy
loyalty or misconduct an agency may take this factor into consideration
in determining hethe~ the person I s continued employment is inconsistent ~_f 41
with the national securtty This emendment to the Presidents Executive
order is in accord i th my opinion that a government employee oTho claims
privilege in a Congressional investigation may be too much of a risk to be
retained in Federal Service
A recent Senate Report entitled tlInterlocldng Subversion in
WGovernment fl fully documents how former government employees were
able to spin their web of intrigue in positions of influ6nce The
Report states
1tlJ~e subcommittee exumined in public session 36 pershy
sons about whom it had substantial evidence of membership
in the Communist undergrolld 10 Government All of them
invoked tha fifth amenmnen~ ~~d refused to answer questions
regardicg COnrIranist membership on the grounds of self-in
crinlination Many reused even to eomowledge their own
sigl1attles on official Govelnment doclllllents in which they
haG SViorn to nonmernbership in the past
All)st all of he persons exposed by the evidence had
Bome connection which could be documented vith at least one-shy
a~d generally several--other e~o6ed persons Tney used eaoh
other s names for referenoe on ~licationa for Federal em-
p10~lOOnt They hire eaoh other They pomot~d eampQh other
hAY raised each others sal~ries They transfer~ampd eaah
otlwr from bureau to bureau from depariment to department
from congressional committee to congressional committee
They assigned each other to international missions They
vouched for each others loyalty end prctected each other
when exposure threaten~d ~ley often had common living
qUaters tI
Suppression i truth in any case is bad enough In no event
can it be justified by a Government employee or applicant for Govern
ment empl~Jment in the face of a Congressional inquiry where the
interests of the national Bect~lty are at stake No one denies that
the Government employee or applicant for such employment may conshy
stitutionally claim his privilege against self-incrimination On
the other hand no one has a constitutional right to a Government
job W True the Supreme Court ha held that the constitutional
protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant
to a statute Is patently arbitrary or discriminatory II W But in
my opinion there is nothing e1ther arbtrary or discriminatry about
diSDdssing a federal employee where he refuses to waive the privilege
against self-incrimination guaranteed him by tho Const tution We
find an analogous situation presented in the recent decision of the
~reme Court in Orloff v WilloughbY ~ In that case the peti shy
tioner a physician was denied a commission in the Army principally
tor the reason that when asked hether he was a member in any Communist JY
organizations he replied) Federal Constitutional privilege is claimed
In its opinion through Mr Justice Jackson the Supreme Court said
It ia argued that Orlorf 1s being punished for havshy
ing claimed a privilege which the Constitution guarantees
No one at least no ane on this Court which has repeatedly
sustained assertion by Communists of the privilege against
selfMincr~inatian questions or doubts Orloffs right to
withhold facts about himself on this ground No one beshy
l1evee he can be punished for doing so But the question
is whether be can at the same time take the position that
to tell the truth about himself Vlould incriminate him and
that even so the President must appofnt him to a post of
honor and trust le have no hesitation in answering that
question No II There is no law which requires the Gove~~ent to sit supinely by
until the suspeoted eIlIployee has been convicted of disloyalty or other
similar misoonduct inconsistent with the interests of the national
security before it can sCPal~ate him from the Government service There
is no law which requires the Government to assume or endure such a risk
As was pointed out in an apt csae by the Supreme Court in American
Commtlnications v Douds speaking through the beloved late Chief
Justice Vinson
IfThat (first) amendment requires that one be permitted to
believe what he will It requires that one be permitted
to advocate what he will unless there is a clear and
present danger that a substantial public evil will result
therefrom It does not require that he be permitted to be
the keeper of the arsenal
I have not overlooked the fact that the loyalty and honesty of
the ovel~vhelming majority of all Government employeesmiddot is beyond quesshy
tion But their good reputations and character are far better proshy
tected from un1tfarranted criticism when we root out the few who are
unreliable and disloyal
What the critical situation of om time calls for is a lavr com
pt)lling testimony within the fr~neuro1Torl of the Constitution The tmshy
swer to this need is immuni-ty legislaiion which will be as broad as
the privilege W11ich is stJpplanted tV Then if a person is adjudged
ill cOlte~Pt for refusing to te3tify before a Cotgressional committee
he will know tZat t-le ~udgrnerJt of OOllt-empt will more likely stand up
on appeal free from oonstitutional ohal1enge
At the same time the l~w will also provide more adequate proshy
tection for the wit~ss
At presnt the witne31l is in a rtboxtl so to slJeGk The witness
is not exc~ed from an3werL~g merely because he believes his answers
Vlil1 incriminate him His slly-ao does not of its(gt~r establish the
1amphazeId of ilcriIltination II ~~ere he olaims his privil~ge it is
the ftL1ction of the jcge to dets-rmme whether the siJence of t1e
witness is justified or wha~1er the danger to be apprebenced is too
remote to be sl1bstattial To save himself from being held in conshy
tempt tl1e witness may oftcn be cOJIpEtled to disclos3 til0ne very
facts whtrh he claims are privileged iQ
Witnesses are alao aided by a b~oad immunity statute in still
another way Under our la unlike that of England t a disclosure of
any incriminating fact constitutes a wailer of the privilege as to deshy
tails con~erning that fact 211 Having made a partial disclosure of
faots the witness loses the rig~t to cease answering intel~ogat1ons
and rely upon his privilege at a 1ater point in his testimony
In one oase the detendant rree~ disclosed that she was Treasshy
urer of the Communist Pariy in COlorado and testified that she had
given the books ot the party to another person When asked to dishy
wlge the name ot the lamiddottter she refused upon the ground that the
answer might incriminate her mder the Sm1tb Act Atfirming her
conviction for contempt the Supreme Court speaking through Chief
Justice Vinson said
Since the privilege agatnlt salf-inorimination
presupposes a real danger ot legal detriment arising
from the disolosure petitioner cannot invoke the
privilege where response to the specific question in
issue here would not ftUtther inoriminate her O1aolo
sure of e tact waives the privilege as to details pound
This deoision leaves the law in a rather anomolous position tor the
vlitness A witness who refuses to answer aU questions and fails to Wcooperate to any extent may be protected by the claim of privilege
But there is no equal protection atforded by the decisions to the
witness who commences to eooperate but stops at a point where further
disclosure may tncrim1~ate him
Moreover it the witness refuses to answer on the ground that
Congress has exceeded its powers or that the inQuiry in lacking in
pertinency he construas the law at his peril If mistake8 his good 55
faith error of law constitutes no defense to fine and imprisonment
Then again it is claimed DY some that a persons election to
remain silent upon the ground of privilege does not necessarily mean
he has anything sinister to hide There are undoubtedly some people of
sincere principle who refl1se to disclose 1flformat1oft to authorized
1nvestigating authorities because of their feeling that ao one has any
right to 1~quire about their beliefs even if germane to the inquiry at 56
bsnd- There are other persons who refuse to answer because they feel
their recollections of events lons past are fee~le and that falsehood
even on trivial or irrelevant matters may subject them to a charge of
perjury There are still others less innocent vho say that coercing
them to testify under pain of contempt resembles the Soviet tactic of
requiring those SUilty not only to pay for but also to prcclatD their 57
guilt shy
~he use of broad tmmunity statutes serves to remove the dansers
mentioned for the iDPocent a~d operates aa an incentive for the guilty
to tell the truth
There are already two proposals pendin8 in Congress which seek to
compel the answer by witnesses at questioDs put to them before Conshy
gressiOl1al Committees grand juries or courts In exchange tor this
compulsory testimony the Witnesses will obtain complete immunity froa
prosecution
58 One Bill is s~ 565 This proposal grants immunity to ~itnesses
before a grand Jury or court of the United States when in the disshy
cretion of th~ Attorney General it is necessary to do so in the public
interest In exchange for this immunity the witness is compelled to
testify and to produce his books papers or recoIds s 565 uses
broad immunity lengtase in stating that the witness shall not be
prosecuted on account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he 1s compelled after ela~ing his privilege to testify or
produce evidence
In this respect s 565 is almost ident1cal to the immunity proshy59
vision sustained 8S valid by the Supreme Court e~ far back as 1896-
This Bill does not extend the immunity to witnesses before Congressional
Committees 601 61
There are other Bills pend-ing S 16- middot and H R 27371 with equally
broad immunity authority The Senate has passed its Bill but the House
Bill still awaits action Both these Bills grunt immunity to witnesses
before Congressional Committees but not to witnesses before grand
juries or courts
The proposed Bills are worded so that the witness will not get an
immunity bathU merely by testifying He must first raise specifically
his claim for privilege and thus put the Committee on notice whether
for the greater good the witness should be required to testify and 62
given immunity or whether he should be excused from testlfying-
However the discretionary power to grant the immunity is not vested
in the Attorney General bumiddott lies with the body conducting the investigation
If the proceeding is one before one of the Houses of Congress then
a majority vote of the members present is necessary Under S 16
if it is a proceeding before a committee two thirds of the members
must vote to grant the tmmunity In that event the tvothirds vote
must include at least two members of each of the two political parties
having the largest representation on such committee The House Bill
does not provide for notice to the Attorney General of the proposed
grant of immunity The Senate Bill provides for one weeks notice to
the Attorney General of the proposal but if the latter fails or reshy
fuses to assent to grant of immunity it may be conferred by majority
vote of either House It is hoped that this legislation will only be
resorted to where full diseloaure by witnesses is deemed of greater
tmportance than the possibility of punishing them for past offenses
By permitting one or several criminals to escape prosecution the
larger public peril contained in a gang of criminals or in their
leaders may be uncovered and the guilty brought to justice
The legislative proposals mentioned have much to commend them
In my opinion these bills would better achieve their purposes it they
required the concurrence of the Attorney General 1n the granting of any
immunity to a witness by a Joint Congressional Committee or either Heuse
committee or by Congress The Attorney General 1s the chief legal
officer of the Government of the United States As Buch it 1s his
responsibility to prosecute persons who offend the criminal laws of the
United states This responsibility must be coupled w1th adequate
authority to permit its discharge It would seem to be more advisable
for the Attorney General who has immediate knowledge of a criminals
background and propensities to decide whether immunity should be
granted for such a person To allow the Attorney General to participate
in the ultimate decision aa to whether immunity should be granted would
not impair Congressional investigatIons in the fields of internal
security crime and corruption Nor would it discourage witnesses
from providing information of importance to the investigation if the
Attorney Generals permission vas required before immunity was granted
On the other hand if these Bills were enacted in their present
form they might subject members of Congress to undue pressures for
granting immunity to criminals who are ineligible to receive it Also
they cuuld very easily cause embarrassment to Congress by tmped1ng or
blocking prosecutions planned by the Department of Justice on any matter 63
even incidentally testified to upon these 1nvestigations
The unfortunate experience which Congress had as far back as 1857 64
in granting immunity without concurrence of the Attorney General - should
~each that a similar course of action may be marked by eveD greater
failure today_ The witness might readily turn this division of authority
between Congress and the Department of Justice to his advantage by
obtaining an ~unity from the legislative committee or from Congress
over the objection of the Attorney General Thereafter he would be
free to testify concerning a broad area Of activities without fear that
he could be held to account criminally for other violations however
unrelated to the matter under investigation
Thus for example a Congreas1onal Committee or Congress might
furnish immunity to a person to obtain his testimony about his illicit
traffic in slot machine opercltlons between states This person may also
be guilty either of espionage or subversion or of selling narcotics to
youngs cers as to which an indictment is soon to be obtained To foreshy
close prosecution on these more serious crimes the witness would be
glad to volunteer information on his other activities if he knew in
advance that immunity would fallow for all of them Therefore greatest
care must be exercioed in granting immunity and then only upon a fully
informed judgment of all tle facts The Departlnent of Justice would
of course through the Fe~eral Bureau of Investigation the Crtmlnal
and Tax Divisions and the United states Attorneyo I offices be mosmiddott
likely to know the facts and the plans for prosecution Concurrence
by the Attorney General in conferring the immunity would also enable
the Department of Justice to maintuin its responsibility for the proper
administration of the crlminal law
The provision in S 10 for one weeks notice to the Attorney General
of the proposed grant of immunity does not fully cure this Bill of its
weakness in failing to require his affirmative concurrence in every
case Experience indicates that at times the views of the person who
1s charged with prooecut1ng criminals are disregarded by Congressional
Committees For example the successful criminal conviction obtained
by the Department of Justice ot the internal revenue collector in one of
the largest cities was recently nullified because of the action of a
House Committee in holding 1middotr1dely publicized hearings in the district in
65 which the trial subsequently took place These hearings took place
over the strong objection of the Department of Justice thut the pro
posed hearing would be of prejudice to the defendant on the trial
which was about to be initiated and would injure the Governments case
in disclosing its evidence In reversing the convlct1on l Chief Judge
Magruder observed that the character of the defendant was blackened
and discredited as the day of trial approached because of the publicity
invited and stimulated by the Committee over the radio and television
Thu6 1 mere advance notIfication to the Attorney General of a proposed
grant of tmmunity would never be a guarantee that the Committee would
be guided by the views of the Attorney General
S 16 and H R 2737 would also more readily carry out the aim of
obtaining evidence against leaders of subversion and criminal entershy
prisesj if provision for twmunity were granted to obtain testimony
not only before Congressional Committees but likewise before courts
and grand juries
For these reasons it is my opinion that if any measure is to be
enacted~~rmitting the granting of immunity to witnesses before either
House of Congress or its committees it should vest the Attorney General
or the Attorney General acting with the concurren~e of appropriate members
of Congress with the authority to grant such tmmunity and if the test shy
mony is sought for a court or grand jury that the Attorney General alone
be authorized to grant the ilmnunity
There remain for discussion two principal objections to this proshy
posed legislation which may be briefly considered here One objection
1s that when a witneAS is compelled to testify even under the protecshy
tion of immunity from criminal punihment) he is not relieved from
personal disgrace ~~lhich attach~8 to the exposure of his crime The
answer to this objection ia contained in II land mark decision of the 66
Supreme Court in Brown v Wrtlker
The design of tbe constitutional plivilege is not to aid the
witness in vindicating his character but to protect him
against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict him
of a criminal charge If he secure legal jnmllnity from prose-
cution the possible impairment of his good name is a penalty
which it is reasonable b0 should be compelled to pay for the
common good
The reasoning of this decision has never been qU~Gtioned and has 67
only recently been approved by the Sllpreme Court
The other chief objection to the proposed legislation is that while
a witness may receive itmlunity from federal prosecution) he may still
be subject to IJrosecution under ~tate lavl The Supreme Court has held
that this is not a valid objection to federal immunity laws~ since the
self-incrimination clause ln the Fifth Amendment operates ao a l1mitashy68
tion on the federal government only In United states v Murdock the
defendant was indicted for refUSing to answer questions of a revenue
agent relating to ctrt8 in income tax returns The refusal was ba sed on
the plea that hiD answers might 1ncrim1nate him in a state court The
Court said on this point
This court ha~ held that immunity against state prosecution is
not essential to the validity of federal statutes declaring that
a witnes3 shall not be excllpoundied from gtring evidence on the
ground that it vTill incriminate him and also that the ladt of
state power to give witnesses protection against federal
prosecution does not defeat a state immunity statute
Similarly a witness befo~e a state tribunal CBnnot refuse to 69
answer because of the threat of federal prosecution - However the
Federal District Court in Ohio recently held i1 Unted States v 70
Di Carlo that the defendant had the right to assert his privilege
because of possible prosecution under state law since the Senate
committee was authorized to investigate violations not only of the lawe 71
of the United States but also of the states M_ The Murdock case was
dtstingJished urlon the ground that the danger of state posecution 1n
that case was remote and uncertain thile in the Di Carlo case the
danger of state proaecutjon WilS imminent and real 72
The ---Di Carlo case has been received -lith mixed commelt It has73
not been followed so far as we k~ow- It appears to be contrary to deshy
cis10ns of co~~rts of appeals which have consistently adhered to the prinshy74
ciples of the Murdock case- In my opinion this decision of a district
court aoes not detract from the binding effect ofthe Supreme Courts deshy
eision in the Murdock case
The Department of Justice will recommend to the Congress in Jlouary
an immunity bill of the type I have descri-ced which protects the const1shy
tutional privileges ot witnesses before Congressional Committees courts
and juries but will at the some time aid materially in stamping out
criminal and subversive activities
Footnote Referet~es to Ad~res El~ited ~------ ___bull
Immunity From Prcsecuticn
Versus
Privilege Agaiust Self-Incrimination
Pittman liThe Colonial and Constitutional History of the
Privilege Against Sel-Incrimiootion 1n Amcicaff 21 Va
L R 763 764 770-773 (1935) Corwin The Supreme
Court I S Corctl~ction of the Self Incrirnination C1ause lf
29 lId~h L R 1 512 (1930) Ap~licability of
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to Legjslative
y Pittmenf2 at 774
~ ~ining v ~~8ey 211 U S 78 92 (1908)
L Id at 91
~ 34th Ceng 3d sess Globe PI 427 433 1-45 See
Eberling Constitutional Investigations pp 304-315shy
7 Eberling d at 320-323
~I 142 U s 547 (1892) This Act of 1862 revised an old
statute into two new sections by an amendment which
sought to insure that a witness who testified before
a federal grand jt~ or court (R s I 860 (1875raquo or
a Congressional Committee (R S B 859 (1875raquo would
not be later subjected to the use of his testimony in
any criminal proceeding aGainst him Section ~ 860 of
the amendment dealing with grand jurtes and courts came
under attack in Counselman v Hitchcock J supra and was
held to be invalid Since this part of the immunity proshy
vision tailed to accomplish ita purpose Congress repealed
it in 1910 (36 Stat 352 (19l0raquo) Congress apparently felt
that S 859 applying to Congressional Committees was still
of value and left it 1n force to this date (a s I 859
(1875) as amended 52 Stat 943 (1938) 18 usc e3486
(Supp V 1952)j see liThe Privilege Against Self
Incrimination versus Immunity Proposed Statutes 41
Georgetown L J 511 514 (1953) United States v ~
339 U s 323 335-337 (1950)
21 It read in patt as follows
No person shall be prosecuted for or on
account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he may testify or produce evidence
Act of Feb 11 1893 c 83 27 stat 443 49 USCA
I 46 See too ~ v United States 337 u S 137 146shy
147 (1949)middot Notet Denying -the Privilege against Self
Incrimination to Public Officers 64 Barv L R 987
988 (1951)
- 101 161 U s 591 (1896)
Shapiro v United St~~ 335 U S 1 6-7 (1948) where various
statutes are collated in the footnote The customary provision
in these statutes provides as follows No person shall be
excused from complying with any requirements ot this section
because of his privilege aga1nst self-incriminationgt but the
immunity provisions of the COmptuBory Testimony Act of
February 11 1893 shall apply with respect to allY 1nd1shy
vidual who specifically claims such pr1Y11ege tt
12 Rapacz ULimiting the Plea of Self-Incr1m1nat1ontl 20 Georgetown
L J 329 353 (1932) see footnote 3 of ~ v Connect~
302 U s 319 326 (1937) NPte liThe Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination the Doctr1ne of Waiver 61 Yale L J 104 110
(1952) middot
~f Palko v Connecticut 302 U s 319 326 (1937)
~ See dissents of Mr Justices Shiras Gray and White in ~ V4
Walker supra 161 U s 630638 Cf dissent of Mr Justice
Black in Ro~ers v United States 340 U s 367 376 (1950)
15 Potts Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for ContemptU I
74 U of Pa L R 691 780 (1926) L1acos uRights of Witnesses
Before Congressional Committees 33 Boston U L R 337 340
(1953) middot
t6 Liacos Id at 31tl
17 McGeary rlThe DeTelopmen-cs of Congressional Investigative Power ll
p 23 (1940) McGrain v Daughel~l 273 u s 135 (1927)
18 Sinclair v Unfted States~ 279 U s 263 (1929) ~arsba11 v
Unit~~State~ 176 F 2d 473 (nc Cir 1949) 2 Usc ~ 192
(Supp 1950)
19 Ne York City Bar Ass t n Committee on the Bill of Rights Report
on Congressional Committees presented December 14 1948 p 1
gQi Galloway PCong18ss1onal Investigations Proposed Reforms lt
18 U of Chi L R 478 479-481 (1951)
21 Dilliard lICongress1onal Investigations The Role of the Press
18 U of ChL L R 585 J 587 (1951)
22 Edgerton J dissenting in Barsky v United States 167 F 2d
241 252 (nc eir 1948) cert denied 334 U s 843 (1948)
petition for rehearing denied 339 U S 971 (1951)
~3 De Jonge v Oregon 299 U s 353 364 365 (1937)
24 Id
25 6 Richardson lIMes sOges and Papers of the Pres idents t 1 p 23
July 4 1861
26 See United St~~ v ~~phson 165 F 2d 82 (2 Cir 1947)
cert denied 333 u S 838 (1948) Lawson v United states
176 F 2d 49 (nc Cir 1949) cel~ denied 339 u s 934
(1950) Barsty Y ~ited S~ 167 F 2d 241 (DC eir
1948) cert denied 334 u s 843 (1948) MCGrain v Daugherty
273 u s 135 (1927) and cf Rumely v United States J 197
F 2d 166 (DC eir 1952) affd 73 s ct 543 (1953)
JJ B1a~ v ~~ted Sttlt~s 340 u s 159 (1950-)
gsectJ ~~ v United States 31~1 U s 479 (1951) See too
sectingleton v United States 343 U s 944 (1952) Note Recent
Extensions of the Witness Privilege Against Self-Incrim1nationll
53 Col L R 275 (1953)
29 Aiuppa v Un1tc~ states 201 F 2d 287 300 (6 eir 1952)
_I30 Note nMandatory Dismissal of Public Persol1nel and The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination 101 U ot Pa L R 1190 1191
fn 8 (1953)
31 Brown Be Fassett Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar
20 u or Chi L R 480 483 (1953)
32 Garner v Los Angeles Board) 341 u s 716 (1951) Gerende v
Board of Supervisors 341 U s 56 (1951) but com~are Wieman v
Updegraff 341~ U s 83 (1953)
34 See footnote 32
35 PG~ v Boa-roo of Education 31~2 U s 435 (1951)
ID Id at 493
38 Sec 9(h of lihe LalJor Management Rlations Act of 1947 29 USCA
St1Pp III Sec 141 Sec 159(b)
39 ft~rican C~~catons Association v ~uda 339 u S 382 (1950)
sustaining the validity of Sec 9(h) against the challenge that it
violated the First c-lT~nc1tlCiltl Ex Post FtiCto Lals and other iul1dashy
mental rights
40 Executive Order No 10450 issued Aporil zr 1953 (18 F R 2lt89)
41 Executive Orrler No 10491 issued Ocmiddottober 13 1953 (18 F R 6583)
~ Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary Interlocking Subshy
vcrs ion in Covernmcnt De~rtments II 83d Cong 1st ses5 Juy 30 J
1953 p 21 Being a cOImllunist is not a crime under federal law J
although it is in some states (see Liacos supra note 15 at
375) The Smith Act (18 USC Sec 2385 et seq) mkes advoshy
eating or teaching the violent overthrOf of any goverrment of the
United States or being a member of such a group and kno7ing its
purpose~a federal crime
43 See EaSley v F~cbardsonJ 182 F 2d 46 (DC 1950)J affd by an
evenly diiied court 341 TJ s 918 (1951) 1Etshingto v McGrath
182 F 2d 375 (DC 1950) aff1d 341 U s 923 (1951)j Or~~ v
vIil1ougbby 345 U s 83 91 (1953) Mr Justice Douglas concurring
i~ ~tiFascist Commi~~ v ~~EJ 341 U s 123 -182-183 (1951)
United Public W0rkers v --~1itcbell 330 U s 75 (1947)j Angilly - v
United States 199 F 2d 642) 644 (1950) cf NcAuliffe v rlew
Bedford 155 Mass 216 29 NE 517 (le9~) per Holmes J liThe
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but
he h(=l~s no constitltioi1al right to be a policezranu (Id at 220
29 NE at 5J7)
44 v1ie~sn _
v UpGegaff middot111 ~
3~middot4 u s 83 (1953) The Court ruleri as
contrry to due process the Cklahoma loyalty oath statute forshy
bidding IJ1l11ic emplo~rment of Persons who belonzea to certain
organizations regarciless of their knowledge of the character of
those oreenizations because of the indiscriminate classification
of lnnocent with kno~vilg activityll (d at 91)
~1 345 u S 83 (1953)middot
46 Id at 90
47 339 u s 3827 412 (1950) sustaininG the non-corJlIlunist affidavit
requirernelt of union leaders under the Taft -Hartley Act
~ Hoffman v United States 341 U s 179 (1951) suggests such
legislation if Congres3 concludes the lleed is great enough
See too Comment The Privilege Against Se1f-Llcriminetion Versus
Lmnurdty Z Proposed Statutes P 41 Gt~orgetom L J 511 (1953)
S Rept 153 on S 16 83d Cone 1st sess ~ 1 ald 2
April 17 1953 Report of Sel1a~~e Commttee on the JudiciaJ J
Interlocking S-lbversion in GOYf11llent Departments tl July 30
1953 83d Cong 1st sess p 50
~ HcfI1nan v Unitet States 341 u s 479 486 (1951)
50 Id U1ited States v ~isman 111 F 2d 260 262 (2 Cir 1950)
51 Note 61 Yale L J 105 109 (1952)
52 Rogers v United States 340 u s 367 375 (1951)
211 See e g Blau v Unjted StaIe~ 340 u s 159 (1950)
-shy54 Note J Co1t3resnic1al Inv estigat1ons--Self-Illcrimimtion Condemneshy
tiOll and Fair Hcar1ngll 22 U of Cinn L R 193 199-200 (1953)
55 See ~ovTn8end v ~~it~~ta~~3 95 F 2d 352 351 (DC Cir 1938)
cert denied 303 u S 664 (1938)
56 Byse TfA Report on the Pennsylvana Loyalty Act 101 U of Fa
L R 480 481-1~84 (1953) Wright Should Teachers Testify
Saturday Review Sept 2o 1953 p 23
57 See Meltzer Required Records The McCarran Act and The Privilege
Against Selfmiddotmiddot Incriminat ion ll 19 U of Chi L R 687 722 (1951)
y 83d Cong 1st Seas 1953 Also known as the Kefauver BUl
59 ~ v ltlalker 161 U S 591 (1896)
sect21 S 16 83d Cong 1st sess 1953 passed the Senate July 9 1953
after extensive debate Cong Ree 8646-8663 July 9 1953shy
S 16 amends B 3486 of Title 18 Sec 3486 presently furnishes
witnesses immunity from prosecution tor testimony before either
House or their Committees It appears to suffer from the same
deficiency present in a similar statute condemned in Counse~an v
Hitchcock 142 u s 547 (1892) S 16 is intended to StWP1y the
omission in the Hitchcock ease by providing not only that a
witness testimony may not be used against him but that such
witness shall be iImnune with respect to lIany transaction mtter
or thing concerning which he has been compelled to testIfy
sect 83d Congo 1st sess 1953
~ S Rept 153 83d Congo 1st sess p 2 (1953)
63 See Comment The Privi1ege Against Self-Incrimination Versus
Immunity Proposed statutes 41 Georgetown L J 511 523 (1953)
64 Supra footnote 7shy
sectif Delanel v ~ed States 199 F 2d 107 (1 Ci~ 1952)
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
During the development of the privilege against self-incrimination
there was experimentation with statutes granting immunity in exchange for
compulsory testimony In 1857 an act was passed by Congress granting a
complete legislative pardon for any fact or act as to which the witness 6
was required to testify- This provision of the bfll was amended five
years later when it was fOlmd to have worked greater evil than good
It was a Senator from Illinois Senator Turnbull by name who was
largely responsible for its amenrunent In debate Senator Turnbull
graphically demonstrated that the Act offered inducement for the worst
criminals to appear before an investigating committee to obtain immunity
from their crimes As an example he pointed to lie man who stole two
millions in bonds if you please out of the Interior Department What
does he do He gets himself called as a itness before one of the in
vestigating committees and testifies something in relation to that matter
and then he cannot be indicted u Senator Turnbull then went on to show how
the clerk who purloined two millions in bonds from the Interior Department
was discharged and the indictment against him quashed merely because of
some statement in reference to the matter before an investigating committee
Shortly thereafter the legislative pardon was withdrawn and an imshy
munlty statute was enacted which provided in part that no evidence
obtained from a party or witness shall be used against him 7
in Bfy criminal proceeding u- Under this statute it was merely
the testimony itself which could lomiddott later be used in any criminal proshy
ceeding against the witness but the immunity did not extend to other
matters to which this testimony might indirectly lead This partial
immunity statute was soon challenged in the case of Counselman v 8
Hitchcock - and the Supreme Court agreed that it was invalid for fnil shy
ing to provide the same complete protection as the constitutional privilege
which the witness was required to surrender
To meet the objection raised in the Supreme Courts decision in the
Hitchcock case a clause was thereafter included in the Act relating to
proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission in terms broad
enough to furnish absolute immunity from prosecution in the Federal V
Courts
Sustaining the validity of this immunity statute the Supreme Court W
in ~ v Walker in the year 1896 ruled that it fully accomplished
the object of the privilege J and therefore it was adequate to prevent the
witness from asserting his right to claim immunity
Theleaftel the Immunity Act relating to the Interstate Commerce
Commission was incorporated in temporary wartime measures and in
virtually all of the major regulatory enactments of the Federal III
Government - To guard against unwise use ot their authority these
regulatory agencieshave followed the practice of consulting the Attorney
General and getting his approval before granting immunity to witnesses
From what has been said you can readily see that there 1s notbing
novel about immunity legislation Indeed many States have also enacted
laws which provide immunity from prosecution where a witness is compelled
to testify
This shift from privilege to immunity statutes reflected in part the
view of some attorneys and legal scholars that privilege against selt shyY
incrimination was somewhat outmoded and should be strictly limited
As great a guardian ot individual rights and liberty as
Mr Justice Cardozo observed in speaking ot the privilege ot
immunity from compulsory self-incrimination This too might
be lost and justice still be done Indeed today as 1n the past
there are students of our penal system who look upon the immunity
as a Ddschief rather than a benefit and who would limit its scope
or destroy 1t altogether No doubt tpere would remain the need to
gjve protection against torture phys1cal or mental Justice
however would not perish it the accused were subject to a duty to 111
respond to orderly inquiry 1 Thele are other jurists and legal
commentators of distinction who feel that it would be abhorrent to
prinCiples of a tree government to compel a person to testify even j
upon an exchange of full immunity
Witb this background before us I come now to the need for
exchanging immunity for compulsory testimony in light of our
recent experience w1th Congressional investigations into subshy
version crime and corruption The history of Congressional
investigatory powers Just like the privileGe against selfshy121
incrimination goes back to the earlist days of our history
Unlike the privilege however the Constitution does not exshy
pressly provide for any COlBressional Ilower to investigate
It 16 considered as an implied power essential to carry out 16
the general legislative funct1on shy
Congressional investigation commdttees have traditionally 17
been regarded as having these principal fUllctons - to
secure information by which Congress may exercise an informed
judgment in legislating wisely and to check administrative
agencies for determining whether they are properly enforcing
the law and ju11c1ollsly spending the public flnds For these
purpcses Congressional Committees may summon witnesses and 18
require their testimo~ under penalty of contempt proceedings -shy
But a Congressional hearing is not a trial Its function is
primarily to ascertain facta and not to decide on the guilt
or innocence of the witness
In recent years many of these investigating commdttees have been
particula~ly concerned in alerting the American people to the nature
of subversive and other criminal activities the many forms that
these activities take and how they threaten the democratiC processes
Some persons have been critical of these investigations claiming
that th~y restrict freedom of speech by stigmatizing expressions of 19
unpopular views -- Freedom of speech they say implies freedom not to
speult ot all even undel legal compulsion Since wide publicity is
given to these proceedings by newspapers radio and television the
complaint is also that these perSOIlS investigated are exposed to
poscible insult oatruciom und loss of employment It is urged that
mere mention of a persons nome in c0110ection with an inveJtigation
that has wide-spred news vclue may create a distorted and unfair public 20
implession - Another point made is that proof of innocence may never 21
catch up with public It assertions of guilt It It is also said that if
these persons decline to profans any stutement of belief before a comshy22
mittee they iovite pUIiislIDl~lJt for contempt
Unquestionably every effort should be exerted to protect the right
of our people to speak and think freely As Chief Justice Hughes has
Hell said
The greater the importance of safeguarding the community
from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force
and violence the mOI~ imperative is the ne~d to preserve inviolate
the constitutioual lights of free speech free press and free
assembly in order to muintain the CJpportunity for free political
discussion l to the end that government may be responsive to the
will of the people and that changes if deSired may be obtained g)j
by peaceful means
~Je shOL1ld dread the dvy middotrhen the people could justifiably become
wary of explessing 1l110zthotLoJ or unpopular opinions or where rumor and
gossip are accepted as subotitutes for evidence
As egainst these threats to our precious liberties we must also
weigh the possible harm to the public scfety and lelfare without llhich
there can be no liberty for anyone yJhile the rights guaranteed by the
Firat Amendment may not be curtailed abuse of these rights may 24
properly be curbed
In his time Abraham Lincoln expressed the problem in these
distressed words ItMust CI government of necessity be too strong
for the libel~ies of its own people or too weak to maintain its own 25
eXistencel The same problem is with us today Obviously if Congress
is to legislate Vlisely with respect to subversion and other crime and
corruption it must not be obstructed from learning ~ho are its
leaders organizers and members the nature and scope of their activishy
ties the character and number of their adherents
I knmv of no constitutional right of privacy which immunizes a
person from giving evidence where an 1nquil~ is conducted by a legally
constituted Congressional committee Tbe person owes this duty as a
citizen just as he m~es the duty to furnish relevant and truthful
testimony in a court of law or gl~nd jury He violates his duty as a
citizen Then he suppresses the facts concerning criminal activity known
to him So long as the questions are pertinent and gel~ne to a lawful
inquiry of Congress the individual is not relieved from answering
because they delve into his private affairs his previous utterances 26
or his affiliations political or otherwise -- The constitutional
guarantee of freedom to epreS8 ones views does not include immunity
from Congressional inquiry as to hat one has said subject to ones
privilege against self-incrimination
Reference to several cases within the last few years demonstrate
how effectively Congressional Committees courts and grand juries have
been blocked in their efforts to uncover subversion as Hell as other
criminal activities because of reliance by 1middotritneases upon their
privilege
In one case the 1-1itness upon ground of privilege refused to anSler
questions before a grand jur7 as to whether she knew the names of the
State officers of the Communist Party of the State what its table of
organization waD vThether she was employed by it whethel she ever had
possession of Communist books and whether she turned the books over
to any particular person At the time the Smith Act was in effect
making it s crime for any person knowing its purposes to be a member
of any group uhich advocates the overthrow of the GovelDmellt Upon the
refusal of the itness to testify she as found to be 1n contempt of
court and sentenced to imprisonment for one year The COU1~ of Appeals
affirmed
Hm-1eve the Supreme Cou~t felt that her answers might furnish
a link in the chain of evidence necessary in a piosecution under the
Smith Act and that the witness was privileged to refuse to furnish any
such link Accordingly it unanimously reversed upon the ground that
prior decisions of this Court have clearly established that under such
circWl16tances the Constitution gives a -1itness the privilege of gy
remaining silent II
In the same way a Federal grand jury was prevented from obtaining
information in its investigation of narcotic and Hhite Slave traffic as
well as bribery perjury and other serious Federal violations 1111e
witness stood upon his privilege against self~incrimination in refusing
to respond to questions as to what he did for a living and whether he
knemiddot certain named pemiddot~son6 Hele again judgment of imprisonment
fo~ contempt was upbeld by the Court of Appeals but reversed by the 28
Supreme Couct with one judge dissenting - upon the ground that tiny
other conclu~ion Would seriously compromise an important constitutional
libecty In this cnse the court held that the defendant could refuse
to anSI-Tel questions innocent on their face since it appeared from the
climate of the investigation and the publicity given defendants
alleged criminal activity that his answers might implicate him in
some federal crime
In anothel cese a COl1gr~ssional Committee attempted in vain to
obtain information from a ~1tl1ess relating to the names of persona enmiddotmiddot
~ged in the manufacture and sale of gambling equipment and other
mutters Finally exaspeeted chief counsel fOl the Committee said
IlLet the record show that the witness just sits there mute Che1Ting
gum saying nothing 1I
The witness Has found guilty of contempt of court and sentenced
to six months in jail but judgment was reversed on appeal The Court
of Appeals declared that the methods used by the Committee for examinashy
tioD of witnesses constituted a triple th~ceat answer truly and you
have given evidence leading to your conviction for a violation of
federal lav anSler falsely and you will be convicted of perjury refuse
to aWn-Tel and you will be found guilty of criminal contempt and punished 29
by fine and imprisonment - In the opinion of the court the predicamiddot
ment in which the ltncss -Tas placed flaS contrary to fair play and in
direct violation of the Fifth Amendment
These decisions could be multiplied and undoubtedly represent
prevailing law Almo3t every heinous crime on the law books comshy
roitted by Inlt1ividuals or by groups J remains uncove ced because of the
privilege against self-incrimination But it is in the area of subshy
version and disloyalty particularly that the privelege has a field
day 11 It is haIe that legislatiye connnittees and grand juries are
held at bay for years from learning vlhich leaders are plotting the
countrys destruction merely because witnesses are relieved of giving
essential information upon the ground of privilege
It is little Vlonder that lat-l-ebiding citizens frequently are heard
to say that sub-rersives and other lrongdoers are unduly coddled by
existing law They express anlDzement that the Congress and the Courts
should conttnue to put up ith subterfuge and concealment 1 n place of
truth at a time 1vhen the peril from Communiam is 60 great and -1hen
crime 1s so rrunpa1t They earnestly ucge upon us the vital need for
modernizing the legal ~eapons for fighting subversion and crime
These pleas of the people for more dcastic action against subshy
version and other misconduct have not gone unheeded Some States and
cities provide fer the dismissal of public employees ho refuse to
testify on grounds of self-incrimination or Tho refuse to t-aive imshy30
munity from prosecution
Some States prescribe loyalty oaths for admission to the Bar -1hich
go beyond the traditional promise to uphold the State and National 31
Constitutions shy
Some States and municipalities have passed statutes requiring
affidavits of puhlic employees that they are not and have never 32
been Communists Some States make ineligible to teach in any public
school a person vTho was a memher of an organization which advocates the
~ overthimiddotow of the Government by force Some of these statutes have been
JY upheld us valid by the Supreme Cou~~ including the provision of the
New York State law which provides that mecbership by a person in an
organization listed as subve~sive by the Dcard of Regents shall constitute
prima facie evidence of disqualification for employment 1n the public 12
schools This was the so-called Feinberg Law aimed at protecting the school
children of lew York against teachels who were spreading communist propaganda
~e poisonous propaganda was Bufficiently subtle to escape detection in the
class room The New York Legislature recognized that while the schools must
attract and protect the critical minds the schools vlere not sanctuaries for
those who were committed to follot-l in the footsteps of Klaus Fuchs It sought
the next best solution by e4cluding froIij teaching those affiliated with certain
orgn1zations listed by the Board of Regents vlhich advocated the overthrow
of the government
One of the main constitutional objections to the law was that it vishy
alated the First Amendment by creating an atmosphere of fear which would
inevitably stifle freedom of speech The Court in an opinion by Judge
Minton formerly of the COUl~ of Appeals for this Circuit r~jected the conshy
tention that the la interfered Vlith free speech since persons uhave no right
to ork for the smiddottate in the school system on their own terms They may york
for the school system upon the reasonable terms laid d01n by the proper
authorities of Neu York If they do not choose to work on such terms they 36
are at libelty to ~etain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere 1
The Supreme Court -las also lholly unimpressed by the contention that
the law condoned guilt by association contrary to democratic concepts of
justice On this point the Court sald ilL teacher lOrks in a sensitive area
in a school room There he shapes the attitude of young minds toward the
society in which they live In this the state has a vital concern It must
preserve the integcity of the schools That the school authorities haVe
the right and duty to aceen the officials teachers and their employees as
to their fitness to majnjail1 the integrity of the schools as a part of an
ordered society cannot be doubtecl One I s associates past and present as
vell os one t a conduct moy proIJerly be considered in determining fitness
and loyalty From time immemoljal one t a reputation ha3 been determined by
the company he keeps In the employment of officials and teachers of the
school systeil the state may very properly inquire into the company they 37
keep n
The Fedel~al GOyernrlent (llso has taken effective measures to protect
the interests of netional cecu1ity One long step forward in that direction
was to enact legislation requiring non middotmiddotCommul1ist affidavits from trade
union leaders vihose unions rBnted to resort to the advantages of the Taftshy38
Hartley Act - Tl1e Ptllpose of thiu requirement vas to prevent disruption of 39
industry in obedience to Communist Party orders If the union leaderls
affidavit us false be CQuId be sent to jail
The Federal Government has also tried its best to clean its Gvln
house fI On April 27 1953 the President by Executive oXde~ established
his security requirements for employment so that pelsons employed by the
Federal Government will be reliable trustworthy of sood character and 40
loyal to the United States On October 13 1953 the President amended
his Executive order so as to provide that imiddotlbe~~e a government employee refuses
to testify before a Congressional Coramittee regarding charges of his diashy
loyalty or misconduct an agency may take this factor into consideration
in determining hethe~ the person I s continued employment is inconsistent ~_f 41
with the national securtty This emendment to the Presidents Executive
order is in accord i th my opinion that a government employee oTho claims
privilege in a Congressional investigation may be too much of a risk to be
retained in Federal Service
A recent Senate Report entitled tlInterlocldng Subversion in
WGovernment fl fully documents how former government employees were
able to spin their web of intrigue in positions of influ6nce The
Report states
1tlJ~e subcommittee exumined in public session 36 pershy
sons about whom it had substantial evidence of membership
in the Communist undergrolld 10 Government All of them
invoked tha fifth amenmnen~ ~~d refused to answer questions
regardicg COnrIranist membership on the grounds of self-in
crinlination Many reused even to eomowledge their own
sigl1attles on official Govelnment doclllllents in which they
haG SViorn to nonmernbership in the past
All)st all of he persons exposed by the evidence had
Bome connection which could be documented vith at least one-shy
a~d generally several--other e~o6ed persons Tney used eaoh
other s names for referenoe on ~licationa for Federal em-
p10~lOOnt They hire eaoh other They pomot~d eampQh other
hAY raised each others sal~ries They transfer~ampd eaah
otlwr from bureau to bureau from depariment to department
from congressional committee to congressional committee
They assigned each other to international missions They
vouched for each others loyalty end prctected each other
when exposure threaten~d ~ley often had common living
qUaters tI
Suppression i truth in any case is bad enough In no event
can it be justified by a Government employee or applicant for Govern
ment empl~Jment in the face of a Congressional inquiry where the
interests of the national Bect~lty are at stake No one denies that
the Government employee or applicant for such employment may conshy
stitutionally claim his privilege against self-incrimination On
the other hand no one has a constitutional right to a Government
job W True the Supreme Court ha held that the constitutional
protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant
to a statute Is patently arbitrary or discriminatory II W But in
my opinion there is nothing e1ther arbtrary or discriminatry about
diSDdssing a federal employee where he refuses to waive the privilege
against self-incrimination guaranteed him by tho Const tution We
find an analogous situation presented in the recent decision of the
~reme Court in Orloff v WilloughbY ~ In that case the peti shy
tioner a physician was denied a commission in the Army principally
tor the reason that when asked hether he was a member in any Communist JY
organizations he replied) Federal Constitutional privilege is claimed
In its opinion through Mr Justice Jackson the Supreme Court said
It ia argued that Orlorf 1s being punished for havshy
ing claimed a privilege which the Constitution guarantees
No one at least no ane on this Court which has repeatedly
sustained assertion by Communists of the privilege against
selfMincr~inatian questions or doubts Orloffs right to
withhold facts about himself on this ground No one beshy
l1evee he can be punished for doing so But the question
is whether be can at the same time take the position that
to tell the truth about himself Vlould incriminate him and
that even so the President must appofnt him to a post of
honor and trust le have no hesitation in answering that
question No II There is no law which requires the Gove~~ent to sit supinely by
until the suspeoted eIlIployee has been convicted of disloyalty or other
similar misoonduct inconsistent with the interests of the national
security before it can sCPal~ate him from the Government service There
is no law which requires the Government to assume or endure such a risk
As was pointed out in an apt csae by the Supreme Court in American
Commtlnications v Douds speaking through the beloved late Chief
Justice Vinson
IfThat (first) amendment requires that one be permitted to
believe what he will It requires that one be permitted
to advocate what he will unless there is a clear and
present danger that a substantial public evil will result
therefrom It does not require that he be permitted to be
the keeper of the arsenal
I have not overlooked the fact that the loyalty and honesty of
the ovel~vhelming majority of all Government employeesmiddot is beyond quesshy
tion But their good reputations and character are far better proshy
tected from un1tfarranted criticism when we root out the few who are
unreliable and disloyal
What the critical situation of om time calls for is a lavr com
pt)lling testimony within the fr~neuro1Torl of the Constitution The tmshy
swer to this need is immuni-ty legislaiion which will be as broad as
the privilege W11ich is stJpplanted tV Then if a person is adjudged
ill cOlte~Pt for refusing to te3tify before a Cotgressional committee
he will know tZat t-le ~udgrnerJt of OOllt-empt will more likely stand up
on appeal free from oonstitutional ohal1enge
At the same time the l~w will also provide more adequate proshy
tection for the wit~ss
At presnt the witne31l is in a rtboxtl so to slJeGk The witness
is not exc~ed from an3werL~g merely because he believes his answers
Vlil1 incriminate him His slly-ao does not of its(gt~r establish the
1amphazeId of ilcriIltination II ~~ere he olaims his privil~ge it is
the ftL1ction of the jcge to dets-rmme whether the siJence of t1e
witness is justified or wha~1er the danger to be apprebenced is too
remote to be sl1bstattial To save himself from being held in conshy
tempt tl1e witness may oftcn be cOJIpEtled to disclos3 til0ne very
facts whtrh he claims are privileged iQ
Witnesses are alao aided by a b~oad immunity statute in still
another way Under our la unlike that of England t a disclosure of
any incriminating fact constitutes a wailer of the privilege as to deshy
tails con~erning that fact 211 Having made a partial disclosure of
faots the witness loses the rig~t to cease answering intel~ogat1ons
and rely upon his privilege at a 1ater point in his testimony
In one oase the detendant rree~ disclosed that she was Treasshy
urer of the Communist Pariy in COlorado and testified that she had
given the books ot the party to another person When asked to dishy
wlge the name ot the lamiddottter she refused upon the ground that the
answer might incriminate her mder the Sm1tb Act Atfirming her
conviction for contempt the Supreme Court speaking through Chief
Justice Vinson said
Since the privilege agatnlt salf-inorimination
presupposes a real danger ot legal detriment arising
from the disolosure petitioner cannot invoke the
privilege where response to the specific question in
issue here would not ftUtther inoriminate her O1aolo
sure of e tact waives the privilege as to details pound
This deoision leaves the law in a rather anomolous position tor the
vlitness A witness who refuses to answer aU questions and fails to Wcooperate to any extent may be protected by the claim of privilege
But there is no equal protection atforded by the decisions to the
witness who commences to eooperate but stops at a point where further
disclosure may tncrim1~ate him
Moreover it the witness refuses to answer on the ground that
Congress has exceeded its powers or that the inQuiry in lacking in
pertinency he construas the law at his peril If mistake8 his good 55
faith error of law constitutes no defense to fine and imprisonment
Then again it is claimed DY some that a persons election to
remain silent upon the ground of privilege does not necessarily mean
he has anything sinister to hide There are undoubtedly some people of
sincere principle who refl1se to disclose 1flformat1oft to authorized
1nvestigating authorities because of their feeling that ao one has any
right to 1~quire about their beliefs even if germane to the inquiry at 56
bsnd- There are other persons who refuse to answer because they feel
their recollections of events lons past are fee~le and that falsehood
even on trivial or irrelevant matters may subject them to a charge of
perjury There are still others less innocent vho say that coercing
them to testify under pain of contempt resembles the Soviet tactic of
requiring those SUilty not only to pay for but also to prcclatD their 57
guilt shy
~he use of broad tmmunity statutes serves to remove the dansers
mentioned for the iDPocent a~d operates aa an incentive for the guilty
to tell the truth
There are already two proposals pendin8 in Congress which seek to
compel the answer by witnesses at questioDs put to them before Conshy
gressiOl1al Committees grand juries or courts In exchange tor this
compulsory testimony the Witnesses will obtain complete immunity froa
prosecution
58 One Bill is s~ 565 This proposal grants immunity to ~itnesses
before a grand Jury or court of the United States when in the disshy
cretion of th~ Attorney General it is necessary to do so in the public
interest In exchange for this immunity the witness is compelled to
testify and to produce his books papers or recoIds s 565 uses
broad immunity lengtase in stating that the witness shall not be
prosecuted on account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he 1s compelled after ela~ing his privilege to testify or
produce evidence
In this respect s 565 is almost ident1cal to the immunity proshy59
vision sustained 8S valid by the Supreme Court e~ far back as 1896-
This Bill does not extend the immunity to witnesses before Congressional
Committees 601 61
There are other Bills pend-ing S 16- middot and H R 27371 with equally
broad immunity authority The Senate has passed its Bill but the House
Bill still awaits action Both these Bills grunt immunity to witnesses
before Congressional Committees but not to witnesses before grand
juries or courts
The proposed Bills are worded so that the witness will not get an
immunity bathU merely by testifying He must first raise specifically
his claim for privilege and thus put the Committee on notice whether
for the greater good the witness should be required to testify and 62
given immunity or whether he should be excused from testlfying-
However the discretionary power to grant the immunity is not vested
in the Attorney General bumiddott lies with the body conducting the investigation
If the proceeding is one before one of the Houses of Congress then
a majority vote of the members present is necessary Under S 16
if it is a proceeding before a committee two thirds of the members
must vote to grant the tmmunity In that event the tvothirds vote
must include at least two members of each of the two political parties
having the largest representation on such committee The House Bill
does not provide for notice to the Attorney General of the proposed
grant of immunity The Senate Bill provides for one weeks notice to
the Attorney General of the proposal but if the latter fails or reshy
fuses to assent to grant of immunity it may be conferred by majority
vote of either House It is hoped that this legislation will only be
resorted to where full diseloaure by witnesses is deemed of greater
tmportance than the possibility of punishing them for past offenses
By permitting one or several criminals to escape prosecution the
larger public peril contained in a gang of criminals or in their
leaders may be uncovered and the guilty brought to justice
The legislative proposals mentioned have much to commend them
In my opinion these bills would better achieve their purposes it they
required the concurrence of the Attorney General 1n the granting of any
immunity to a witness by a Joint Congressional Committee or either Heuse
committee or by Congress The Attorney General 1s the chief legal
officer of the Government of the United States As Buch it 1s his
responsibility to prosecute persons who offend the criminal laws of the
United states This responsibility must be coupled w1th adequate
authority to permit its discharge It would seem to be more advisable
for the Attorney General who has immediate knowledge of a criminals
background and propensities to decide whether immunity should be
granted for such a person To allow the Attorney General to participate
in the ultimate decision aa to whether immunity should be granted would
not impair Congressional investigatIons in the fields of internal
security crime and corruption Nor would it discourage witnesses
from providing information of importance to the investigation if the
Attorney Generals permission vas required before immunity was granted
On the other hand if these Bills were enacted in their present
form they might subject members of Congress to undue pressures for
granting immunity to criminals who are ineligible to receive it Also
they cuuld very easily cause embarrassment to Congress by tmped1ng or
blocking prosecutions planned by the Department of Justice on any matter 63
even incidentally testified to upon these 1nvestigations
The unfortunate experience which Congress had as far back as 1857 64
in granting immunity without concurrence of the Attorney General - should
~each that a similar course of action may be marked by eveD greater
failure today_ The witness might readily turn this division of authority
between Congress and the Department of Justice to his advantage by
obtaining an ~unity from the legislative committee or from Congress
over the objection of the Attorney General Thereafter he would be
free to testify concerning a broad area Of activities without fear that
he could be held to account criminally for other violations however
unrelated to the matter under investigation
Thus for example a Congreas1onal Committee or Congress might
furnish immunity to a person to obtain his testimony about his illicit
traffic in slot machine opercltlons between states This person may also
be guilty either of espionage or subversion or of selling narcotics to
youngs cers as to which an indictment is soon to be obtained To foreshy
close prosecution on these more serious crimes the witness would be
glad to volunteer information on his other activities if he knew in
advance that immunity would fallow for all of them Therefore greatest
care must be exercioed in granting immunity and then only upon a fully
informed judgment of all tle facts The Departlnent of Justice would
of course through the Fe~eral Bureau of Investigation the Crtmlnal
and Tax Divisions and the United states Attorneyo I offices be mosmiddott
likely to know the facts and the plans for prosecution Concurrence
by the Attorney General in conferring the immunity would also enable
the Department of Justice to maintuin its responsibility for the proper
administration of the crlminal law
The provision in S 10 for one weeks notice to the Attorney General
of the proposed grant of immunity does not fully cure this Bill of its
weakness in failing to require his affirmative concurrence in every
case Experience indicates that at times the views of the person who
1s charged with prooecut1ng criminals are disregarded by Congressional
Committees For example the successful criminal conviction obtained
by the Department of Justice ot the internal revenue collector in one of
the largest cities was recently nullified because of the action of a
House Committee in holding 1middotr1dely publicized hearings in the district in
65 which the trial subsequently took place These hearings took place
over the strong objection of the Department of Justice thut the pro
posed hearing would be of prejudice to the defendant on the trial
which was about to be initiated and would injure the Governments case
in disclosing its evidence In reversing the convlct1on l Chief Judge
Magruder observed that the character of the defendant was blackened
and discredited as the day of trial approached because of the publicity
invited and stimulated by the Committee over the radio and television
Thu6 1 mere advance notIfication to the Attorney General of a proposed
grant of tmmunity would never be a guarantee that the Committee would
be guided by the views of the Attorney General
S 16 and H R 2737 would also more readily carry out the aim of
obtaining evidence against leaders of subversion and criminal entershy
prisesj if provision for twmunity were granted to obtain testimony
not only before Congressional Committees but likewise before courts
and grand juries
For these reasons it is my opinion that if any measure is to be
enacted~~rmitting the granting of immunity to witnesses before either
House of Congress or its committees it should vest the Attorney General
or the Attorney General acting with the concurren~e of appropriate members
of Congress with the authority to grant such tmmunity and if the test shy
mony is sought for a court or grand jury that the Attorney General alone
be authorized to grant the ilmnunity
There remain for discussion two principal objections to this proshy
posed legislation which may be briefly considered here One objection
1s that when a witneAS is compelled to testify even under the protecshy
tion of immunity from criminal punihment) he is not relieved from
personal disgrace ~~lhich attach~8 to the exposure of his crime The
answer to this objection ia contained in II land mark decision of the 66
Supreme Court in Brown v Wrtlker
The design of tbe constitutional plivilege is not to aid the
witness in vindicating his character but to protect him
against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict him
of a criminal charge If he secure legal jnmllnity from prose-
cution the possible impairment of his good name is a penalty
which it is reasonable b0 should be compelled to pay for the
common good
The reasoning of this decision has never been qU~Gtioned and has 67
only recently been approved by the Sllpreme Court
The other chief objection to the proposed legislation is that while
a witness may receive itmlunity from federal prosecution) he may still
be subject to IJrosecution under ~tate lavl The Supreme Court has held
that this is not a valid objection to federal immunity laws~ since the
self-incrimination clause ln the Fifth Amendment operates ao a l1mitashy68
tion on the federal government only In United states v Murdock the
defendant was indicted for refUSing to answer questions of a revenue
agent relating to ctrt8 in income tax returns The refusal was ba sed on
the plea that hiD answers might 1ncrim1nate him in a state court The
Court said on this point
This court ha~ held that immunity against state prosecution is
not essential to the validity of federal statutes declaring that
a witnes3 shall not be excllpoundied from gtring evidence on the
ground that it vTill incriminate him and also that the ladt of
state power to give witnesses protection against federal
prosecution does not defeat a state immunity statute
Similarly a witness befo~e a state tribunal CBnnot refuse to 69
answer because of the threat of federal prosecution - However the
Federal District Court in Ohio recently held i1 Unted States v 70
Di Carlo that the defendant had the right to assert his privilege
because of possible prosecution under state law since the Senate
committee was authorized to investigate violations not only of the lawe 71
of the United States but also of the states M_ The Murdock case was
dtstingJished urlon the ground that the danger of state posecution 1n
that case was remote and uncertain thile in the Di Carlo case the
danger of state proaecutjon WilS imminent and real 72
The ---Di Carlo case has been received -lith mixed commelt It has73
not been followed so far as we k~ow- It appears to be contrary to deshy
cis10ns of co~~rts of appeals which have consistently adhered to the prinshy74
ciples of the Murdock case- In my opinion this decision of a district
court aoes not detract from the binding effect ofthe Supreme Courts deshy
eision in the Murdock case
The Department of Justice will recommend to the Congress in Jlouary
an immunity bill of the type I have descri-ced which protects the const1shy
tutional privileges ot witnesses before Congressional Committees courts
and juries but will at the some time aid materially in stamping out
criminal and subversive activities
Footnote Referet~es to Ad~res El~ited ~------ ___bull
Immunity From Prcsecuticn
Versus
Privilege Agaiust Self-Incrimination
Pittman liThe Colonial and Constitutional History of the
Privilege Against Sel-Incrimiootion 1n Amcicaff 21 Va
L R 763 764 770-773 (1935) Corwin The Supreme
Court I S Corctl~ction of the Self Incrirnination C1ause lf
29 lId~h L R 1 512 (1930) Ap~licability of
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to Legjslative
y Pittmenf2 at 774
~ ~ining v ~~8ey 211 U S 78 92 (1908)
L Id at 91
~ 34th Ceng 3d sess Globe PI 427 433 1-45 See
Eberling Constitutional Investigations pp 304-315shy
7 Eberling d at 320-323
~I 142 U s 547 (1892) This Act of 1862 revised an old
statute into two new sections by an amendment which
sought to insure that a witness who testified before
a federal grand jt~ or court (R s I 860 (1875raquo or
a Congressional Committee (R S B 859 (1875raquo would
not be later subjected to the use of his testimony in
any criminal proceeding aGainst him Section ~ 860 of
the amendment dealing with grand jurtes and courts came
under attack in Counselman v Hitchcock J supra and was
held to be invalid Since this part of the immunity proshy
vision tailed to accomplish ita purpose Congress repealed
it in 1910 (36 Stat 352 (19l0raquo) Congress apparently felt
that S 859 applying to Congressional Committees was still
of value and left it 1n force to this date (a s I 859
(1875) as amended 52 Stat 943 (1938) 18 usc e3486
(Supp V 1952)j see liThe Privilege Against Self
Incrimination versus Immunity Proposed Statutes 41
Georgetown L J 511 514 (1953) United States v ~
339 U s 323 335-337 (1950)
21 It read in patt as follows
No person shall be prosecuted for or on
account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he may testify or produce evidence
Act of Feb 11 1893 c 83 27 stat 443 49 USCA
I 46 See too ~ v United States 337 u S 137 146shy
147 (1949)middot Notet Denying -the Privilege against Self
Incrimination to Public Officers 64 Barv L R 987
988 (1951)
- 101 161 U s 591 (1896)
Shapiro v United St~~ 335 U S 1 6-7 (1948) where various
statutes are collated in the footnote The customary provision
in these statutes provides as follows No person shall be
excused from complying with any requirements ot this section
because of his privilege aga1nst self-incriminationgt but the
immunity provisions of the COmptuBory Testimony Act of
February 11 1893 shall apply with respect to allY 1nd1shy
vidual who specifically claims such pr1Y11ege tt
12 Rapacz ULimiting the Plea of Self-Incr1m1nat1ontl 20 Georgetown
L J 329 353 (1932) see footnote 3 of ~ v Connect~
302 U s 319 326 (1937) NPte liThe Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination the Doctr1ne of Waiver 61 Yale L J 104 110
(1952) middot
~f Palko v Connecticut 302 U s 319 326 (1937)
~ See dissents of Mr Justices Shiras Gray and White in ~ V4
Walker supra 161 U s 630638 Cf dissent of Mr Justice
Black in Ro~ers v United States 340 U s 367 376 (1950)
15 Potts Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for ContemptU I
74 U of Pa L R 691 780 (1926) L1acos uRights of Witnesses
Before Congressional Committees 33 Boston U L R 337 340
(1953) middot
t6 Liacos Id at 31tl
17 McGeary rlThe DeTelopmen-cs of Congressional Investigative Power ll
p 23 (1940) McGrain v Daughel~l 273 u s 135 (1927)
18 Sinclair v Unfted States~ 279 U s 263 (1929) ~arsba11 v
Unit~~State~ 176 F 2d 473 (nc Cir 1949) 2 Usc ~ 192
(Supp 1950)
19 Ne York City Bar Ass t n Committee on the Bill of Rights Report
on Congressional Committees presented December 14 1948 p 1
gQi Galloway PCong18ss1onal Investigations Proposed Reforms lt
18 U of Chi L R 478 479-481 (1951)
21 Dilliard lICongress1onal Investigations The Role of the Press
18 U of ChL L R 585 J 587 (1951)
22 Edgerton J dissenting in Barsky v United States 167 F 2d
241 252 (nc eir 1948) cert denied 334 U s 843 (1948)
petition for rehearing denied 339 U S 971 (1951)
~3 De Jonge v Oregon 299 U s 353 364 365 (1937)
24 Id
25 6 Richardson lIMes sOges and Papers of the Pres idents t 1 p 23
July 4 1861
26 See United St~~ v ~~phson 165 F 2d 82 (2 Cir 1947)
cert denied 333 u S 838 (1948) Lawson v United states
176 F 2d 49 (nc Cir 1949) cel~ denied 339 u s 934
(1950) Barsty Y ~ited S~ 167 F 2d 241 (DC eir
1948) cert denied 334 u s 843 (1948) MCGrain v Daugherty
273 u s 135 (1927) and cf Rumely v United States J 197
F 2d 166 (DC eir 1952) affd 73 s ct 543 (1953)
JJ B1a~ v ~~ted Sttlt~s 340 u s 159 (1950-)
gsectJ ~~ v United States 31~1 U s 479 (1951) See too
sectingleton v United States 343 U s 944 (1952) Note Recent
Extensions of the Witness Privilege Against Self-Incrim1nationll
53 Col L R 275 (1953)
29 Aiuppa v Un1tc~ states 201 F 2d 287 300 (6 eir 1952)
_I30 Note nMandatory Dismissal of Public Persol1nel and The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination 101 U ot Pa L R 1190 1191
fn 8 (1953)
31 Brown Be Fassett Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar
20 u or Chi L R 480 483 (1953)
32 Garner v Los Angeles Board) 341 u s 716 (1951) Gerende v
Board of Supervisors 341 U s 56 (1951) but com~are Wieman v
Updegraff 341~ U s 83 (1953)
34 See footnote 32
35 PG~ v Boa-roo of Education 31~2 U s 435 (1951)
ID Id at 493
38 Sec 9(h of lihe LalJor Management Rlations Act of 1947 29 USCA
St1Pp III Sec 141 Sec 159(b)
39 ft~rican C~~catons Association v ~uda 339 u S 382 (1950)
sustaining the validity of Sec 9(h) against the challenge that it
violated the First c-lT~nc1tlCiltl Ex Post FtiCto Lals and other iul1dashy
mental rights
40 Executive Order No 10450 issued Aporil zr 1953 (18 F R 2lt89)
41 Executive Orrler No 10491 issued Ocmiddottober 13 1953 (18 F R 6583)
~ Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary Interlocking Subshy
vcrs ion in Covernmcnt De~rtments II 83d Cong 1st ses5 Juy 30 J
1953 p 21 Being a cOImllunist is not a crime under federal law J
although it is in some states (see Liacos supra note 15 at
375) The Smith Act (18 USC Sec 2385 et seq) mkes advoshy
eating or teaching the violent overthrOf of any goverrment of the
United States or being a member of such a group and kno7ing its
purpose~a federal crime
43 See EaSley v F~cbardsonJ 182 F 2d 46 (DC 1950)J affd by an
evenly diiied court 341 TJ s 918 (1951) 1Etshingto v McGrath
182 F 2d 375 (DC 1950) aff1d 341 U s 923 (1951)j Or~~ v
vIil1ougbby 345 U s 83 91 (1953) Mr Justice Douglas concurring
i~ ~tiFascist Commi~~ v ~~EJ 341 U s 123 -182-183 (1951)
United Public W0rkers v --~1itcbell 330 U s 75 (1947)j Angilly - v
United States 199 F 2d 642) 644 (1950) cf NcAuliffe v rlew
Bedford 155 Mass 216 29 NE 517 (le9~) per Holmes J liThe
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but
he h(=l~s no constitltioi1al right to be a policezranu (Id at 220
29 NE at 5J7)
44 v1ie~sn _
v UpGegaff middot111 ~
3~middot4 u s 83 (1953) The Court ruleri as
contrry to due process the Cklahoma loyalty oath statute forshy
bidding IJ1l11ic emplo~rment of Persons who belonzea to certain
organizations regarciless of their knowledge of the character of
those oreenizations because of the indiscriminate classification
of lnnocent with kno~vilg activityll (d at 91)
~1 345 u S 83 (1953)middot
46 Id at 90
47 339 u s 3827 412 (1950) sustaininG the non-corJlIlunist affidavit
requirernelt of union leaders under the Taft -Hartley Act
~ Hoffman v United States 341 U s 179 (1951) suggests such
legislation if Congres3 concludes the lleed is great enough
See too Comment The Privilege Against Se1f-Llcriminetion Versus
Lmnurdty Z Proposed Statutes P 41 Gt~orgetom L J 511 (1953)
S Rept 153 on S 16 83d Cone 1st sess ~ 1 ald 2
April 17 1953 Report of Sel1a~~e Commttee on the JudiciaJ J
Interlocking S-lbversion in GOYf11llent Departments tl July 30
1953 83d Cong 1st sess p 50
~ HcfI1nan v Unitet States 341 u s 479 486 (1951)
50 Id U1ited States v ~isman 111 F 2d 260 262 (2 Cir 1950)
51 Note 61 Yale L J 105 109 (1952)
52 Rogers v United States 340 u s 367 375 (1951)
211 See e g Blau v Unjted StaIe~ 340 u s 159 (1950)
-shy54 Note J Co1t3resnic1al Inv estigat1ons--Self-Illcrimimtion Condemneshy
tiOll and Fair Hcar1ngll 22 U of Cinn L R 193 199-200 (1953)
55 See ~ovTn8end v ~~it~~ta~~3 95 F 2d 352 351 (DC Cir 1938)
cert denied 303 u S 664 (1938)
56 Byse TfA Report on the Pennsylvana Loyalty Act 101 U of Fa
L R 480 481-1~84 (1953) Wright Should Teachers Testify
Saturday Review Sept 2o 1953 p 23
57 See Meltzer Required Records The McCarran Act and The Privilege
Against Selfmiddotmiddot Incriminat ion ll 19 U of Chi L R 687 722 (1951)
y 83d Cong 1st Seas 1953 Also known as the Kefauver BUl
59 ~ v ltlalker 161 U S 591 (1896)
sect21 S 16 83d Cong 1st sess 1953 passed the Senate July 9 1953
after extensive debate Cong Ree 8646-8663 July 9 1953shy
S 16 amends B 3486 of Title 18 Sec 3486 presently furnishes
witnesses immunity from prosecution tor testimony before either
House or their Committees It appears to suffer from the same
deficiency present in a similar statute condemned in Counse~an v
Hitchcock 142 u s 547 (1892) S 16 is intended to StWP1y the
omission in the Hitchcock ease by providing not only that a
witness testimony may not be used against him but that such
witness shall be iImnune with respect to lIany transaction mtter
or thing concerning which he has been compelled to testIfy
sect 83d Congo 1st sess 1953
~ S Rept 153 83d Congo 1st sess p 2 (1953)
63 See Comment The Privi1ege Against Self-Incrimination Versus
Immunity Proposed statutes 41 Georgetown L J 511 523 (1953)
64 Supra footnote 7shy
sectif Delanel v ~ed States 199 F 2d 107 (1 Ci~ 1952)
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
immunity statute was soon challenged in the case of Counselman v 8
Hitchcock - and the Supreme Court agreed that it was invalid for fnil shy
ing to provide the same complete protection as the constitutional privilege
which the witness was required to surrender
To meet the objection raised in the Supreme Courts decision in the
Hitchcock case a clause was thereafter included in the Act relating to
proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission in terms broad
enough to furnish absolute immunity from prosecution in the Federal V
Courts
Sustaining the validity of this immunity statute the Supreme Court W
in ~ v Walker in the year 1896 ruled that it fully accomplished
the object of the privilege J and therefore it was adequate to prevent the
witness from asserting his right to claim immunity
Theleaftel the Immunity Act relating to the Interstate Commerce
Commission was incorporated in temporary wartime measures and in
virtually all of the major regulatory enactments of the Federal III
Government - To guard against unwise use ot their authority these
regulatory agencieshave followed the practice of consulting the Attorney
General and getting his approval before granting immunity to witnesses
From what has been said you can readily see that there 1s notbing
novel about immunity legislation Indeed many States have also enacted
laws which provide immunity from prosecution where a witness is compelled
to testify
This shift from privilege to immunity statutes reflected in part the
view of some attorneys and legal scholars that privilege against selt shyY
incrimination was somewhat outmoded and should be strictly limited
As great a guardian ot individual rights and liberty as
Mr Justice Cardozo observed in speaking ot the privilege ot
immunity from compulsory self-incrimination This too might
be lost and justice still be done Indeed today as 1n the past
there are students of our penal system who look upon the immunity
as a Ddschief rather than a benefit and who would limit its scope
or destroy 1t altogether No doubt tpere would remain the need to
gjve protection against torture phys1cal or mental Justice
however would not perish it the accused were subject to a duty to 111
respond to orderly inquiry 1 Thele are other jurists and legal
commentators of distinction who feel that it would be abhorrent to
prinCiples of a tree government to compel a person to testify even j
upon an exchange of full immunity
Witb this background before us I come now to the need for
exchanging immunity for compulsory testimony in light of our
recent experience w1th Congressional investigations into subshy
version crime and corruption The history of Congressional
investigatory powers Just like the privileGe against selfshy121
incrimination goes back to the earlist days of our history
Unlike the privilege however the Constitution does not exshy
pressly provide for any COlBressional Ilower to investigate
It 16 considered as an implied power essential to carry out 16
the general legislative funct1on shy
Congressional investigation commdttees have traditionally 17
been regarded as having these principal fUllctons - to
secure information by which Congress may exercise an informed
judgment in legislating wisely and to check administrative
agencies for determining whether they are properly enforcing
the law and ju11c1ollsly spending the public flnds For these
purpcses Congressional Committees may summon witnesses and 18
require their testimo~ under penalty of contempt proceedings -shy
But a Congressional hearing is not a trial Its function is
primarily to ascertain facta and not to decide on the guilt
or innocence of the witness
In recent years many of these investigating commdttees have been
particula~ly concerned in alerting the American people to the nature
of subversive and other criminal activities the many forms that
these activities take and how they threaten the democratiC processes
Some persons have been critical of these investigations claiming
that th~y restrict freedom of speech by stigmatizing expressions of 19
unpopular views -- Freedom of speech they say implies freedom not to
speult ot all even undel legal compulsion Since wide publicity is
given to these proceedings by newspapers radio and television the
complaint is also that these perSOIlS investigated are exposed to
poscible insult oatruciom und loss of employment It is urged that
mere mention of a persons nome in c0110ection with an inveJtigation
that has wide-spred news vclue may create a distorted and unfair public 20
implession - Another point made is that proof of innocence may never 21
catch up with public It assertions of guilt It It is also said that if
these persons decline to profans any stutement of belief before a comshy22
mittee they iovite pUIiislIDl~lJt for contempt
Unquestionably every effort should be exerted to protect the right
of our people to speak and think freely As Chief Justice Hughes has
Hell said
The greater the importance of safeguarding the community
from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force
and violence the mOI~ imperative is the ne~d to preserve inviolate
the constitutioual lights of free speech free press and free
assembly in order to muintain the CJpportunity for free political
discussion l to the end that government may be responsive to the
will of the people and that changes if deSired may be obtained g)j
by peaceful means
~Je shOL1ld dread the dvy middotrhen the people could justifiably become
wary of explessing 1l110zthotLoJ or unpopular opinions or where rumor and
gossip are accepted as subotitutes for evidence
As egainst these threats to our precious liberties we must also
weigh the possible harm to the public scfety and lelfare without llhich
there can be no liberty for anyone yJhile the rights guaranteed by the
Firat Amendment may not be curtailed abuse of these rights may 24
properly be curbed
In his time Abraham Lincoln expressed the problem in these
distressed words ItMust CI government of necessity be too strong
for the libel~ies of its own people or too weak to maintain its own 25
eXistencel The same problem is with us today Obviously if Congress
is to legislate Vlisely with respect to subversion and other crime and
corruption it must not be obstructed from learning ~ho are its
leaders organizers and members the nature and scope of their activishy
ties the character and number of their adherents
I knmv of no constitutional right of privacy which immunizes a
person from giving evidence where an 1nquil~ is conducted by a legally
constituted Congressional committee Tbe person owes this duty as a
citizen just as he m~es the duty to furnish relevant and truthful
testimony in a court of law or gl~nd jury He violates his duty as a
citizen Then he suppresses the facts concerning criminal activity known
to him So long as the questions are pertinent and gel~ne to a lawful
inquiry of Congress the individual is not relieved from answering
because they delve into his private affairs his previous utterances 26
or his affiliations political or otherwise -- The constitutional
guarantee of freedom to epreS8 ones views does not include immunity
from Congressional inquiry as to hat one has said subject to ones
privilege against self-incrimination
Reference to several cases within the last few years demonstrate
how effectively Congressional Committees courts and grand juries have
been blocked in their efforts to uncover subversion as Hell as other
criminal activities because of reliance by 1middotritneases upon their
privilege
In one case the 1-1itness upon ground of privilege refused to anSler
questions before a grand jur7 as to whether she knew the names of the
State officers of the Communist Party of the State what its table of
organization waD vThether she was employed by it whethel she ever had
possession of Communist books and whether she turned the books over
to any particular person At the time the Smith Act was in effect
making it s crime for any person knowing its purposes to be a member
of any group uhich advocates the overthrow of the GovelDmellt Upon the
refusal of the itness to testify she as found to be 1n contempt of
court and sentenced to imprisonment for one year The COU1~ of Appeals
affirmed
Hm-1eve the Supreme Cou~t felt that her answers might furnish
a link in the chain of evidence necessary in a piosecution under the
Smith Act and that the witness was privileged to refuse to furnish any
such link Accordingly it unanimously reversed upon the ground that
prior decisions of this Court have clearly established that under such
circWl16tances the Constitution gives a -1itness the privilege of gy
remaining silent II
In the same way a Federal grand jury was prevented from obtaining
information in its investigation of narcotic and Hhite Slave traffic as
well as bribery perjury and other serious Federal violations 1111e
witness stood upon his privilege against self~incrimination in refusing
to respond to questions as to what he did for a living and whether he
knemiddot certain named pemiddot~son6 Hele again judgment of imprisonment
fo~ contempt was upbeld by the Court of Appeals but reversed by the 28
Supreme Couct with one judge dissenting - upon the ground that tiny
other conclu~ion Would seriously compromise an important constitutional
libecty In this cnse the court held that the defendant could refuse
to anSI-Tel questions innocent on their face since it appeared from the
climate of the investigation and the publicity given defendants
alleged criminal activity that his answers might implicate him in
some federal crime
In anothel cese a COl1gr~ssional Committee attempted in vain to
obtain information from a ~1tl1ess relating to the names of persona enmiddotmiddot
~ged in the manufacture and sale of gambling equipment and other
mutters Finally exaspeeted chief counsel fOl the Committee said
IlLet the record show that the witness just sits there mute Che1Ting
gum saying nothing 1I
The witness Has found guilty of contempt of court and sentenced
to six months in jail but judgment was reversed on appeal The Court
of Appeals declared that the methods used by the Committee for examinashy
tioD of witnesses constituted a triple th~ceat answer truly and you
have given evidence leading to your conviction for a violation of
federal lav anSler falsely and you will be convicted of perjury refuse
to aWn-Tel and you will be found guilty of criminal contempt and punished 29
by fine and imprisonment - In the opinion of the court the predicamiddot
ment in which the ltncss -Tas placed flaS contrary to fair play and in
direct violation of the Fifth Amendment
These decisions could be multiplied and undoubtedly represent
prevailing law Almo3t every heinous crime on the law books comshy
roitted by Inlt1ividuals or by groups J remains uncove ced because of the
privilege against self-incrimination But it is in the area of subshy
version and disloyalty particularly that the privelege has a field
day 11 It is haIe that legislatiye connnittees and grand juries are
held at bay for years from learning vlhich leaders are plotting the
countrys destruction merely because witnesses are relieved of giving
essential information upon the ground of privilege
It is little Vlonder that lat-l-ebiding citizens frequently are heard
to say that sub-rersives and other lrongdoers are unduly coddled by
existing law They express anlDzement that the Congress and the Courts
should conttnue to put up ith subterfuge and concealment 1 n place of
truth at a time 1vhen the peril from Communiam is 60 great and -1hen
crime 1s so rrunpa1t They earnestly ucge upon us the vital need for
modernizing the legal ~eapons for fighting subversion and crime
These pleas of the people for more dcastic action against subshy
version and other misconduct have not gone unheeded Some States and
cities provide fer the dismissal of public employees ho refuse to
testify on grounds of self-incrimination or Tho refuse to t-aive imshy30
munity from prosecution
Some States prescribe loyalty oaths for admission to the Bar -1hich
go beyond the traditional promise to uphold the State and National 31
Constitutions shy
Some States and municipalities have passed statutes requiring
affidavits of puhlic employees that they are not and have never 32
been Communists Some States make ineligible to teach in any public
school a person vTho was a memher of an organization which advocates the
~ overthimiddotow of the Government by force Some of these statutes have been
JY upheld us valid by the Supreme Cou~~ including the provision of the
New York State law which provides that mecbership by a person in an
organization listed as subve~sive by the Dcard of Regents shall constitute
prima facie evidence of disqualification for employment 1n the public 12
schools This was the so-called Feinberg Law aimed at protecting the school
children of lew York against teachels who were spreading communist propaganda
~e poisonous propaganda was Bufficiently subtle to escape detection in the
class room The New York Legislature recognized that while the schools must
attract and protect the critical minds the schools vlere not sanctuaries for
those who were committed to follot-l in the footsteps of Klaus Fuchs It sought
the next best solution by e4cluding froIij teaching those affiliated with certain
orgn1zations listed by the Board of Regents vlhich advocated the overthrow
of the government
One of the main constitutional objections to the law was that it vishy
alated the First Amendment by creating an atmosphere of fear which would
inevitably stifle freedom of speech The Court in an opinion by Judge
Minton formerly of the COUl~ of Appeals for this Circuit r~jected the conshy
tention that the la interfered Vlith free speech since persons uhave no right
to ork for the smiddottate in the school system on their own terms They may york
for the school system upon the reasonable terms laid d01n by the proper
authorities of Neu York If they do not choose to work on such terms they 36
are at libelty to ~etain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere 1
The Supreme Court -las also lholly unimpressed by the contention that
the law condoned guilt by association contrary to democratic concepts of
justice On this point the Court sald ilL teacher lOrks in a sensitive area
in a school room There he shapes the attitude of young minds toward the
society in which they live In this the state has a vital concern It must
preserve the integcity of the schools That the school authorities haVe
the right and duty to aceen the officials teachers and their employees as
to their fitness to majnjail1 the integrity of the schools as a part of an
ordered society cannot be doubtecl One I s associates past and present as
vell os one t a conduct moy proIJerly be considered in determining fitness
and loyalty From time immemoljal one t a reputation ha3 been determined by
the company he keeps In the employment of officials and teachers of the
school systeil the state may very properly inquire into the company they 37
keep n
The Fedel~al GOyernrlent (llso has taken effective measures to protect
the interests of netional cecu1ity One long step forward in that direction
was to enact legislation requiring non middotmiddotCommul1ist affidavits from trade
union leaders vihose unions rBnted to resort to the advantages of the Taftshy38
Hartley Act - Tl1e Ptllpose of thiu requirement vas to prevent disruption of 39
industry in obedience to Communist Party orders If the union leaderls
affidavit us false be CQuId be sent to jail
The Federal Government has also tried its best to clean its Gvln
house fI On April 27 1953 the President by Executive oXde~ established
his security requirements for employment so that pelsons employed by the
Federal Government will be reliable trustworthy of sood character and 40
loyal to the United States On October 13 1953 the President amended
his Executive order so as to provide that imiddotlbe~~e a government employee refuses
to testify before a Congressional Coramittee regarding charges of his diashy
loyalty or misconduct an agency may take this factor into consideration
in determining hethe~ the person I s continued employment is inconsistent ~_f 41
with the national securtty This emendment to the Presidents Executive
order is in accord i th my opinion that a government employee oTho claims
privilege in a Congressional investigation may be too much of a risk to be
retained in Federal Service
A recent Senate Report entitled tlInterlocldng Subversion in
WGovernment fl fully documents how former government employees were
able to spin their web of intrigue in positions of influ6nce The
Report states
1tlJ~e subcommittee exumined in public session 36 pershy
sons about whom it had substantial evidence of membership
in the Communist undergrolld 10 Government All of them
invoked tha fifth amenmnen~ ~~d refused to answer questions
regardicg COnrIranist membership on the grounds of self-in
crinlination Many reused even to eomowledge their own
sigl1attles on official Govelnment doclllllents in which they
haG SViorn to nonmernbership in the past
All)st all of he persons exposed by the evidence had
Bome connection which could be documented vith at least one-shy
a~d generally several--other e~o6ed persons Tney used eaoh
other s names for referenoe on ~licationa for Federal em-
p10~lOOnt They hire eaoh other They pomot~d eampQh other
hAY raised each others sal~ries They transfer~ampd eaah
otlwr from bureau to bureau from depariment to department
from congressional committee to congressional committee
They assigned each other to international missions They
vouched for each others loyalty end prctected each other
when exposure threaten~d ~ley often had common living
qUaters tI
Suppression i truth in any case is bad enough In no event
can it be justified by a Government employee or applicant for Govern
ment empl~Jment in the face of a Congressional inquiry where the
interests of the national Bect~lty are at stake No one denies that
the Government employee or applicant for such employment may conshy
stitutionally claim his privilege against self-incrimination On
the other hand no one has a constitutional right to a Government
job W True the Supreme Court ha held that the constitutional
protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant
to a statute Is patently arbitrary or discriminatory II W But in
my opinion there is nothing e1ther arbtrary or discriminatry about
diSDdssing a federal employee where he refuses to waive the privilege
against self-incrimination guaranteed him by tho Const tution We
find an analogous situation presented in the recent decision of the
~reme Court in Orloff v WilloughbY ~ In that case the peti shy
tioner a physician was denied a commission in the Army principally
tor the reason that when asked hether he was a member in any Communist JY
organizations he replied) Federal Constitutional privilege is claimed
In its opinion through Mr Justice Jackson the Supreme Court said
It ia argued that Orlorf 1s being punished for havshy
ing claimed a privilege which the Constitution guarantees
No one at least no ane on this Court which has repeatedly
sustained assertion by Communists of the privilege against
selfMincr~inatian questions or doubts Orloffs right to
withhold facts about himself on this ground No one beshy
l1evee he can be punished for doing so But the question
is whether be can at the same time take the position that
to tell the truth about himself Vlould incriminate him and
that even so the President must appofnt him to a post of
honor and trust le have no hesitation in answering that
question No II There is no law which requires the Gove~~ent to sit supinely by
until the suspeoted eIlIployee has been convicted of disloyalty or other
similar misoonduct inconsistent with the interests of the national
security before it can sCPal~ate him from the Government service There
is no law which requires the Government to assume or endure such a risk
As was pointed out in an apt csae by the Supreme Court in American
Commtlnications v Douds speaking through the beloved late Chief
Justice Vinson
IfThat (first) amendment requires that one be permitted to
believe what he will It requires that one be permitted
to advocate what he will unless there is a clear and
present danger that a substantial public evil will result
therefrom It does not require that he be permitted to be
the keeper of the arsenal
I have not overlooked the fact that the loyalty and honesty of
the ovel~vhelming majority of all Government employeesmiddot is beyond quesshy
tion But their good reputations and character are far better proshy
tected from un1tfarranted criticism when we root out the few who are
unreliable and disloyal
What the critical situation of om time calls for is a lavr com
pt)lling testimony within the fr~neuro1Torl of the Constitution The tmshy
swer to this need is immuni-ty legislaiion which will be as broad as
the privilege W11ich is stJpplanted tV Then if a person is adjudged
ill cOlte~Pt for refusing to te3tify before a Cotgressional committee
he will know tZat t-le ~udgrnerJt of OOllt-empt will more likely stand up
on appeal free from oonstitutional ohal1enge
At the same time the l~w will also provide more adequate proshy
tection for the wit~ss
At presnt the witne31l is in a rtboxtl so to slJeGk The witness
is not exc~ed from an3werL~g merely because he believes his answers
Vlil1 incriminate him His slly-ao does not of its(gt~r establish the
1amphazeId of ilcriIltination II ~~ere he olaims his privil~ge it is
the ftL1ction of the jcge to dets-rmme whether the siJence of t1e
witness is justified or wha~1er the danger to be apprebenced is too
remote to be sl1bstattial To save himself from being held in conshy
tempt tl1e witness may oftcn be cOJIpEtled to disclos3 til0ne very
facts whtrh he claims are privileged iQ
Witnesses are alao aided by a b~oad immunity statute in still
another way Under our la unlike that of England t a disclosure of
any incriminating fact constitutes a wailer of the privilege as to deshy
tails con~erning that fact 211 Having made a partial disclosure of
faots the witness loses the rig~t to cease answering intel~ogat1ons
and rely upon his privilege at a 1ater point in his testimony
In one oase the detendant rree~ disclosed that she was Treasshy
urer of the Communist Pariy in COlorado and testified that she had
given the books ot the party to another person When asked to dishy
wlge the name ot the lamiddottter she refused upon the ground that the
answer might incriminate her mder the Sm1tb Act Atfirming her
conviction for contempt the Supreme Court speaking through Chief
Justice Vinson said
Since the privilege agatnlt salf-inorimination
presupposes a real danger ot legal detriment arising
from the disolosure petitioner cannot invoke the
privilege where response to the specific question in
issue here would not ftUtther inoriminate her O1aolo
sure of e tact waives the privilege as to details pound
This deoision leaves the law in a rather anomolous position tor the
vlitness A witness who refuses to answer aU questions and fails to Wcooperate to any extent may be protected by the claim of privilege
But there is no equal protection atforded by the decisions to the
witness who commences to eooperate but stops at a point where further
disclosure may tncrim1~ate him
Moreover it the witness refuses to answer on the ground that
Congress has exceeded its powers or that the inQuiry in lacking in
pertinency he construas the law at his peril If mistake8 his good 55
faith error of law constitutes no defense to fine and imprisonment
Then again it is claimed DY some that a persons election to
remain silent upon the ground of privilege does not necessarily mean
he has anything sinister to hide There are undoubtedly some people of
sincere principle who refl1se to disclose 1flformat1oft to authorized
1nvestigating authorities because of their feeling that ao one has any
right to 1~quire about their beliefs even if germane to the inquiry at 56
bsnd- There are other persons who refuse to answer because they feel
their recollections of events lons past are fee~le and that falsehood
even on trivial or irrelevant matters may subject them to a charge of
perjury There are still others less innocent vho say that coercing
them to testify under pain of contempt resembles the Soviet tactic of
requiring those SUilty not only to pay for but also to prcclatD their 57
guilt shy
~he use of broad tmmunity statutes serves to remove the dansers
mentioned for the iDPocent a~d operates aa an incentive for the guilty
to tell the truth
There are already two proposals pendin8 in Congress which seek to
compel the answer by witnesses at questioDs put to them before Conshy
gressiOl1al Committees grand juries or courts In exchange tor this
compulsory testimony the Witnesses will obtain complete immunity froa
prosecution
58 One Bill is s~ 565 This proposal grants immunity to ~itnesses
before a grand Jury or court of the United States when in the disshy
cretion of th~ Attorney General it is necessary to do so in the public
interest In exchange for this immunity the witness is compelled to
testify and to produce his books papers or recoIds s 565 uses
broad immunity lengtase in stating that the witness shall not be
prosecuted on account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he 1s compelled after ela~ing his privilege to testify or
produce evidence
In this respect s 565 is almost ident1cal to the immunity proshy59
vision sustained 8S valid by the Supreme Court e~ far back as 1896-
This Bill does not extend the immunity to witnesses before Congressional
Committees 601 61
There are other Bills pend-ing S 16- middot and H R 27371 with equally
broad immunity authority The Senate has passed its Bill but the House
Bill still awaits action Both these Bills grunt immunity to witnesses
before Congressional Committees but not to witnesses before grand
juries or courts
The proposed Bills are worded so that the witness will not get an
immunity bathU merely by testifying He must first raise specifically
his claim for privilege and thus put the Committee on notice whether
for the greater good the witness should be required to testify and 62
given immunity or whether he should be excused from testlfying-
However the discretionary power to grant the immunity is not vested
in the Attorney General bumiddott lies with the body conducting the investigation
If the proceeding is one before one of the Houses of Congress then
a majority vote of the members present is necessary Under S 16
if it is a proceeding before a committee two thirds of the members
must vote to grant the tmmunity In that event the tvothirds vote
must include at least two members of each of the two political parties
having the largest representation on such committee The House Bill
does not provide for notice to the Attorney General of the proposed
grant of immunity The Senate Bill provides for one weeks notice to
the Attorney General of the proposal but if the latter fails or reshy
fuses to assent to grant of immunity it may be conferred by majority
vote of either House It is hoped that this legislation will only be
resorted to where full diseloaure by witnesses is deemed of greater
tmportance than the possibility of punishing them for past offenses
By permitting one or several criminals to escape prosecution the
larger public peril contained in a gang of criminals or in their
leaders may be uncovered and the guilty brought to justice
The legislative proposals mentioned have much to commend them
In my opinion these bills would better achieve their purposes it they
required the concurrence of the Attorney General 1n the granting of any
immunity to a witness by a Joint Congressional Committee or either Heuse
committee or by Congress The Attorney General 1s the chief legal
officer of the Government of the United States As Buch it 1s his
responsibility to prosecute persons who offend the criminal laws of the
United states This responsibility must be coupled w1th adequate
authority to permit its discharge It would seem to be more advisable
for the Attorney General who has immediate knowledge of a criminals
background and propensities to decide whether immunity should be
granted for such a person To allow the Attorney General to participate
in the ultimate decision aa to whether immunity should be granted would
not impair Congressional investigatIons in the fields of internal
security crime and corruption Nor would it discourage witnesses
from providing information of importance to the investigation if the
Attorney Generals permission vas required before immunity was granted
On the other hand if these Bills were enacted in their present
form they might subject members of Congress to undue pressures for
granting immunity to criminals who are ineligible to receive it Also
they cuuld very easily cause embarrassment to Congress by tmped1ng or
blocking prosecutions planned by the Department of Justice on any matter 63
even incidentally testified to upon these 1nvestigations
The unfortunate experience which Congress had as far back as 1857 64
in granting immunity without concurrence of the Attorney General - should
~each that a similar course of action may be marked by eveD greater
failure today_ The witness might readily turn this division of authority
between Congress and the Department of Justice to his advantage by
obtaining an ~unity from the legislative committee or from Congress
over the objection of the Attorney General Thereafter he would be
free to testify concerning a broad area Of activities without fear that
he could be held to account criminally for other violations however
unrelated to the matter under investigation
Thus for example a Congreas1onal Committee or Congress might
furnish immunity to a person to obtain his testimony about his illicit
traffic in slot machine opercltlons between states This person may also
be guilty either of espionage or subversion or of selling narcotics to
youngs cers as to which an indictment is soon to be obtained To foreshy
close prosecution on these more serious crimes the witness would be
glad to volunteer information on his other activities if he knew in
advance that immunity would fallow for all of them Therefore greatest
care must be exercioed in granting immunity and then only upon a fully
informed judgment of all tle facts The Departlnent of Justice would
of course through the Fe~eral Bureau of Investigation the Crtmlnal
and Tax Divisions and the United states Attorneyo I offices be mosmiddott
likely to know the facts and the plans for prosecution Concurrence
by the Attorney General in conferring the immunity would also enable
the Department of Justice to maintuin its responsibility for the proper
administration of the crlminal law
The provision in S 10 for one weeks notice to the Attorney General
of the proposed grant of immunity does not fully cure this Bill of its
weakness in failing to require his affirmative concurrence in every
case Experience indicates that at times the views of the person who
1s charged with prooecut1ng criminals are disregarded by Congressional
Committees For example the successful criminal conviction obtained
by the Department of Justice ot the internal revenue collector in one of
the largest cities was recently nullified because of the action of a
House Committee in holding 1middotr1dely publicized hearings in the district in
65 which the trial subsequently took place These hearings took place
over the strong objection of the Department of Justice thut the pro
posed hearing would be of prejudice to the defendant on the trial
which was about to be initiated and would injure the Governments case
in disclosing its evidence In reversing the convlct1on l Chief Judge
Magruder observed that the character of the defendant was blackened
and discredited as the day of trial approached because of the publicity
invited and stimulated by the Committee over the radio and television
Thu6 1 mere advance notIfication to the Attorney General of a proposed
grant of tmmunity would never be a guarantee that the Committee would
be guided by the views of the Attorney General
S 16 and H R 2737 would also more readily carry out the aim of
obtaining evidence against leaders of subversion and criminal entershy
prisesj if provision for twmunity were granted to obtain testimony
not only before Congressional Committees but likewise before courts
and grand juries
For these reasons it is my opinion that if any measure is to be
enacted~~rmitting the granting of immunity to witnesses before either
House of Congress or its committees it should vest the Attorney General
or the Attorney General acting with the concurren~e of appropriate members
of Congress with the authority to grant such tmmunity and if the test shy
mony is sought for a court or grand jury that the Attorney General alone
be authorized to grant the ilmnunity
There remain for discussion two principal objections to this proshy
posed legislation which may be briefly considered here One objection
1s that when a witneAS is compelled to testify even under the protecshy
tion of immunity from criminal punihment) he is not relieved from
personal disgrace ~~lhich attach~8 to the exposure of his crime The
answer to this objection ia contained in II land mark decision of the 66
Supreme Court in Brown v Wrtlker
The design of tbe constitutional plivilege is not to aid the
witness in vindicating his character but to protect him
against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict him
of a criminal charge If he secure legal jnmllnity from prose-
cution the possible impairment of his good name is a penalty
which it is reasonable b0 should be compelled to pay for the
common good
The reasoning of this decision has never been qU~Gtioned and has 67
only recently been approved by the Sllpreme Court
The other chief objection to the proposed legislation is that while
a witness may receive itmlunity from federal prosecution) he may still
be subject to IJrosecution under ~tate lavl The Supreme Court has held
that this is not a valid objection to federal immunity laws~ since the
self-incrimination clause ln the Fifth Amendment operates ao a l1mitashy68
tion on the federal government only In United states v Murdock the
defendant was indicted for refUSing to answer questions of a revenue
agent relating to ctrt8 in income tax returns The refusal was ba sed on
the plea that hiD answers might 1ncrim1nate him in a state court The
Court said on this point
This court ha~ held that immunity against state prosecution is
not essential to the validity of federal statutes declaring that
a witnes3 shall not be excllpoundied from gtring evidence on the
ground that it vTill incriminate him and also that the ladt of
state power to give witnesses protection against federal
prosecution does not defeat a state immunity statute
Similarly a witness befo~e a state tribunal CBnnot refuse to 69
answer because of the threat of federal prosecution - However the
Federal District Court in Ohio recently held i1 Unted States v 70
Di Carlo that the defendant had the right to assert his privilege
because of possible prosecution under state law since the Senate
committee was authorized to investigate violations not only of the lawe 71
of the United States but also of the states M_ The Murdock case was
dtstingJished urlon the ground that the danger of state posecution 1n
that case was remote and uncertain thile in the Di Carlo case the
danger of state proaecutjon WilS imminent and real 72
The ---Di Carlo case has been received -lith mixed commelt It has73
not been followed so far as we k~ow- It appears to be contrary to deshy
cis10ns of co~~rts of appeals which have consistently adhered to the prinshy74
ciples of the Murdock case- In my opinion this decision of a district
court aoes not detract from the binding effect ofthe Supreme Courts deshy
eision in the Murdock case
The Department of Justice will recommend to the Congress in Jlouary
an immunity bill of the type I have descri-ced which protects the const1shy
tutional privileges ot witnesses before Congressional Committees courts
and juries but will at the some time aid materially in stamping out
criminal and subversive activities
Footnote Referet~es to Ad~res El~ited ~------ ___bull
Immunity From Prcsecuticn
Versus
Privilege Agaiust Self-Incrimination
Pittman liThe Colonial and Constitutional History of the
Privilege Against Sel-Incrimiootion 1n Amcicaff 21 Va
L R 763 764 770-773 (1935) Corwin The Supreme
Court I S Corctl~ction of the Self Incrirnination C1ause lf
29 lId~h L R 1 512 (1930) Ap~licability of
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to Legjslative
y Pittmenf2 at 774
~ ~ining v ~~8ey 211 U S 78 92 (1908)
L Id at 91
~ 34th Ceng 3d sess Globe PI 427 433 1-45 See
Eberling Constitutional Investigations pp 304-315shy
7 Eberling d at 320-323
~I 142 U s 547 (1892) This Act of 1862 revised an old
statute into two new sections by an amendment which
sought to insure that a witness who testified before
a federal grand jt~ or court (R s I 860 (1875raquo or
a Congressional Committee (R S B 859 (1875raquo would
not be later subjected to the use of his testimony in
any criminal proceeding aGainst him Section ~ 860 of
the amendment dealing with grand jurtes and courts came
under attack in Counselman v Hitchcock J supra and was
held to be invalid Since this part of the immunity proshy
vision tailed to accomplish ita purpose Congress repealed
it in 1910 (36 Stat 352 (19l0raquo) Congress apparently felt
that S 859 applying to Congressional Committees was still
of value and left it 1n force to this date (a s I 859
(1875) as amended 52 Stat 943 (1938) 18 usc e3486
(Supp V 1952)j see liThe Privilege Against Self
Incrimination versus Immunity Proposed Statutes 41
Georgetown L J 511 514 (1953) United States v ~
339 U s 323 335-337 (1950)
21 It read in patt as follows
No person shall be prosecuted for or on
account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he may testify or produce evidence
Act of Feb 11 1893 c 83 27 stat 443 49 USCA
I 46 See too ~ v United States 337 u S 137 146shy
147 (1949)middot Notet Denying -the Privilege against Self
Incrimination to Public Officers 64 Barv L R 987
988 (1951)
- 101 161 U s 591 (1896)
Shapiro v United St~~ 335 U S 1 6-7 (1948) where various
statutes are collated in the footnote The customary provision
in these statutes provides as follows No person shall be
excused from complying with any requirements ot this section
because of his privilege aga1nst self-incriminationgt but the
immunity provisions of the COmptuBory Testimony Act of
February 11 1893 shall apply with respect to allY 1nd1shy
vidual who specifically claims such pr1Y11ege tt
12 Rapacz ULimiting the Plea of Self-Incr1m1nat1ontl 20 Georgetown
L J 329 353 (1932) see footnote 3 of ~ v Connect~
302 U s 319 326 (1937) NPte liThe Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination the Doctr1ne of Waiver 61 Yale L J 104 110
(1952) middot
~f Palko v Connecticut 302 U s 319 326 (1937)
~ See dissents of Mr Justices Shiras Gray and White in ~ V4
Walker supra 161 U s 630638 Cf dissent of Mr Justice
Black in Ro~ers v United States 340 U s 367 376 (1950)
15 Potts Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for ContemptU I
74 U of Pa L R 691 780 (1926) L1acos uRights of Witnesses
Before Congressional Committees 33 Boston U L R 337 340
(1953) middot
t6 Liacos Id at 31tl
17 McGeary rlThe DeTelopmen-cs of Congressional Investigative Power ll
p 23 (1940) McGrain v Daughel~l 273 u s 135 (1927)
18 Sinclair v Unfted States~ 279 U s 263 (1929) ~arsba11 v
Unit~~State~ 176 F 2d 473 (nc Cir 1949) 2 Usc ~ 192
(Supp 1950)
19 Ne York City Bar Ass t n Committee on the Bill of Rights Report
on Congressional Committees presented December 14 1948 p 1
gQi Galloway PCong18ss1onal Investigations Proposed Reforms lt
18 U of Chi L R 478 479-481 (1951)
21 Dilliard lICongress1onal Investigations The Role of the Press
18 U of ChL L R 585 J 587 (1951)
22 Edgerton J dissenting in Barsky v United States 167 F 2d
241 252 (nc eir 1948) cert denied 334 U s 843 (1948)
petition for rehearing denied 339 U S 971 (1951)
~3 De Jonge v Oregon 299 U s 353 364 365 (1937)
24 Id
25 6 Richardson lIMes sOges and Papers of the Pres idents t 1 p 23
July 4 1861
26 See United St~~ v ~~phson 165 F 2d 82 (2 Cir 1947)
cert denied 333 u S 838 (1948) Lawson v United states
176 F 2d 49 (nc Cir 1949) cel~ denied 339 u s 934
(1950) Barsty Y ~ited S~ 167 F 2d 241 (DC eir
1948) cert denied 334 u s 843 (1948) MCGrain v Daugherty
273 u s 135 (1927) and cf Rumely v United States J 197
F 2d 166 (DC eir 1952) affd 73 s ct 543 (1953)
JJ B1a~ v ~~ted Sttlt~s 340 u s 159 (1950-)
gsectJ ~~ v United States 31~1 U s 479 (1951) See too
sectingleton v United States 343 U s 944 (1952) Note Recent
Extensions of the Witness Privilege Against Self-Incrim1nationll
53 Col L R 275 (1953)
29 Aiuppa v Un1tc~ states 201 F 2d 287 300 (6 eir 1952)
_I30 Note nMandatory Dismissal of Public Persol1nel and The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination 101 U ot Pa L R 1190 1191
fn 8 (1953)
31 Brown Be Fassett Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar
20 u or Chi L R 480 483 (1953)
32 Garner v Los Angeles Board) 341 u s 716 (1951) Gerende v
Board of Supervisors 341 U s 56 (1951) but com~are Wieman v
Updegraff 341~ U s 83 (1953)
34 See footnote 32
35 PG~ v Boa-roo of Education 31~2 U s 435 (1951)
ID Id at 493
38 Sec 9(h of lihe LalJor Management Rlations Act of 1947 29 USCA
St1Pp III Sec 141 Sec 159(b)
39 ft~rican C~~catons Association v ~uda 339 u S 382 (1950)
sustaining the validity of Sec 9(h) against the challenge that it
violated the First c-lT~nc1tlCiltl Ex Post FtiCto Lals and other iul1dashy
mental rights
40 Executive Order No 10450 issued Aporil zr 1953 (18 F R 2lt89)
41 Executive Orrler No 10491 issued Ocmiddottober 13 1953 (18 F R 6583)
~ Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary Interlocking Subshy
vcrs ion in Covernmcnt De~rtments II 83d Cong 1st ses5 Juy 30 J
1953 p 21 Being a cOImllunist is not a crime under federal law J
although it is in some states (see Liacos supra note 15 at
375) The Smith Act (18 USC Sec 2385 et seq) mkes advoshy
eating or teaching the violent overthrOf of any goverrment of the
United States or being a member of such a group and kno7ing its
purpose~a federal crime
43 See EaSley v F~cbardsonJ 182 F 2d 46 (DC 1950)J affd by an
evenly diiied court 341 TJ s 918 (1951) 1Etshingto v McGrath
182 F 2d 375 (DC 1950) aff1d 341 U s 923 (1951)j Or~~ v
vIil1ougbby 345 U s 83 91 (1953) Mr Justice Douglas concurring
i~ ~tiFascist Commi~~ v ~~EJ 341 U s 123 -182-183 (1951)
United Public W0rkers v --~1itcbell 330 U s 75 (1947)j Angilly - v
United States 199 F 2d 642) 644 (1950) cf NcAuliffe v rlew
Bedford 155 Mass 216 29 NE 517 (le9~) per Holmes J liThe
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but
he h(=l~s no constitltioi1al right to be a policezranu (Id at 220
29 NE at 5J7)
44 v1ie~sn _
v UpGegaff middot111 ~
3~middot4 u s 83 (1953) The Court ruleri as
contrry to due process the Cklahoma loyalty oath statute forshy
bidding IJ1l11ic emplo~rment of Persons who belonzea to certain
organizations regarciless of their knowledge of the character of
those oreenizations because of the indiscriminate classification
of lnnocent with kno~vilg activityll (d at 91)
~1 345 u S 83 (1953)middot
46 Id at 90
47 339 u s 3827 412 (1950) sustaininG the non-corJlIlunist affidavit
requirernelt of union leaders under the Taft -Hartley Act
~ Hoffman v United States 341 U s 179 (1951) suggests such
legislation if Congres3 concludes the lleed is great enough
See too Comment The Privilege Against Se1f-Llcriminetion Versus
Lmnurdty Z Proposed Statutes P 41 Gt~orgetom L J 511 (1953)
S Rept 153 on S 16 83d Cone 1st sess ~ 1 ald 2
April 17 1953 Report of Sel1a~~e Commttee on the JudiciaJ J
Interlocking S-lbversion in GOYf11llent Departments tl July 30
1953 83d Cong 1st sess p 50
~ HcfI1nan v Unitet States 341 u s 479 486 (1951)
50 Id U1ited States v ~isman 111 F 2d 260 262 (2 Cir 1950)
51 Note 61 Yale L J 105 109 (1952)
52 Rogers v United States 340 u s 367 375 (1951)
211 See e g Blau v Unjted StaIe~ 340 u s 159 (1950)
-shy54 Note J Co1t3resnic1al Inv estigat1ons--Self-Illcrimimtion Condemneshy
tiOll and Fair Hcar1ngll 22 U of Cinn L R 193 199-200 (1953)
55 See ~ovTn8end v ~~it~~ta~~3 95 F 2d 352 351 (DC Cir 1938)
cert denied 303 u S 664 (1938)
56 Byse TfA Report on the Pennsylvana Loyalty Act 101 U of Fa
L R 480 481-1~84 (1953) Wright Should Teachers Testify
Saturday Review Sept 2o 1953 p 23
57 See Meltzer Required Records The McCarran Act and The Privilege
Against Selfmiddotmiddot Incriminat ion ll 19 U of Chi L R 687 722 (1951)
y 83d Cong 1st Seas 1953 Also known as the Kefauver BUl
59 ~ v ltlalker 161 U S 591 (1896)
sect21 S 16 83d Cong 1st sess 1953 passed the Senate July 9 1953
after extensive debate Cong Ree 8646-8663 July 9 1953shy
S 16 amends B 3486 of Title 18 Sec 3486 presently furnishes
witnesses immunity from prosecution tor testimony before either
House or their Committees It appears to suffer from the same
deficiency present in a similar statute condemned in Counse~an v
Hitchcock 142 u s 547 (1892) S 16 is intended to StWP1y the
omission in the Hitchcock ease by providing not only that a
witness testimony may not be used against him but that such
witness shall be iImnune with respect to lIany transaction mtter
or thing concerning which he has been compelled to testIfy
sect 83d Congo 1st sess 1953
~ S Rept 153 83d Congo 1st sess p 2 (1953)
63 See Comment The Privi1ege Against Self-Incrimination Versus
Immunity Proposed statutes 41 Georgetown L J 511 523 (1953)
64 Supra footnote 7shy
sectif Delanel v ~ed States 199 F 2d 107 (1 Ci~ 1952)
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
As great a guardian ot individual rights and liberty as
Mr Justice Cardozo observed in speaking ot the privilege ot
immunity from compulsory self-incrimination This too might
be lost and justice still be done Indeed today as 1n the past
there are students of our penal system who look upon the immunity
as a Ddschief rather than a benefit and who would limit its scope
or destroy 1t altogether No doubt tpere would remain the need to
gjve protection against torture phys1cal or mental Justice
however would not perish it the accused were subject to a duty to 111
respond to orderly inquiry 1 Thele are other jurists and legal
commentators of distinction who feel that it would be abhorrent to
prinCiples of a tree government to compel a person to testify even j
upon an exchange of full immunity
Witb this background before us I come now to the need for
exchanging immunity for compulsory testimony in light of our
recent experience w1th Congressional investigations into subshy
version crime and corruption The history of Congressional
investigatory powers Just like the privileGe against selfshy121
incrimination goes back to the earlist days of our history
Unlike the privilege however the Constitution does not exshy
pressly provide for any COlBressional Ilower to investigate
It 16 considered as an implied power essential to carry out 16
the general legislative funct1on shy
Congressional investigation commdttees have traditionally 17
been regarded as having these principal fUllctons - to
secure information by which Congress may exercise an informed
judgment in legislating wisely and to check administrative
agencies for determining whether they are properly enforcing
the law and ju11c1ollsly spending the public flnds For these
purpcses Congressional Committees may summon witnesses and 18
require their testimo~ under penalty of contempt proceedings -shy
But a Congressional hearing is not a trial Its function is
primarily to ascertain facta and not to decide on the guilt
or innocence of the witness
In recent years many of these investigating commdttees have been
particula~ly concerned in alerting the American people to the nature
of subversive and other criminal activities the many forms that
these activities take and how they threaten the democratiC processes
Some persons have been critical of these investigations claiming
that th~y restrict freedom of speech by stigmatizing expressions of 19
unpopular views -- Freedom of speech they say implies freedom not to
speult ot all even undel legal compulsion Since wide publicity is
given to these proceedings by newspapers radio and television the
complaint is also that these perSOIlS investigated are exposed to
poscible insult oatruciom und loss of employment It is urged that
mere mention of a persons nome in c0110ection with an inveJtigation
that has wide-spred news vclue may create a distorted and unfair public 20
implession - Another point made is that proof of innocence may never 21
catch up with public It assertions of guilt It It is also said that if
these persons decline to profans any stutement of belief before a comshy22
mittee they iovite pUIiislIDl~lJt for contempt
Unquestionably every effort should be exerted to protect the right
of our people to speak and think freely As Chief Justice Hughes has
Hell said
The greater the importance of safeguarding the community
from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force
and violence the mOI~ imperative is the ne~d to preserve inviolate
the constitutioual lights of free speech free press and free
assembly in order to muintain the CJpportunity for free political
discussion l to the end that government may be responsive to the
will of the people and that changes if deSired may be obtained g)j
by peaceful means
~Je shOL1ld dread the dvy middotrhen the people could justifiably become
wary of explessing 1l110zthotLoJ or unpopular opinions or where rumor and
gossip are accepted as subotitutes for evidence
As egainst these threats to our precious liberties we must also
weigh the possible harm to the public scfety and lelfare without llhich
there can be no liberty for anyone yJhile the rights guaranteed by the
Firat Amendment may not be curtailed abuse of these rights may 24
properly be curbed
In his time Abraham Lincoln expressed the problem in these
distressed words ItMust CI government of necessity be too strong
for the libel~ies of its own people or too weak to maintain its own 25
eXistencel The same problem is with us today Obviously if Congress
is to legislate Vlisely with respect to subversion and other crime and
corruption it must not be obstructed from learning ~ho are its
leaders organizers and members the nature and scope of their activishy
ties the character and number of their adherents
I knmv of no constitutional right of privacy which immunizes a
person from giving evidence where an 1nquil~ is conducted by a legally
constituted Congressional committee Tbe person owes this duty as a
citizen just as he m~es the duty to furnish relevant and truthful
testimony in a court of law or gl~nd jury He violates his duty as a
citizen Then he suppresses the facts concerning criminal activity known
to him So long as the questions are pertinent and gel~ne to a lawful
inquiry of Congress the individual is not relieved from answering
because they delve into his private affairs his previous utterances 26
or his affiliations political or otherwise -- The constitutional
guarantee of freedom to epreS8 ones views does not include immunity
from Congressional inquiry as to hat one has said subject to ones
privilege against self-incrimination
Reference to several cases within the last few years demonstrate
how effectively Congressional Committees courts and grand juries have
been blocked in their efforts to uncover subversion as Hell as other
criminal activities because of reliance by 1middotritneases upon their
privilege
In one case the 1-1itness upon ground of privilege refused to anSler
questions before a grand jur7 as to whether she knew the names of the
State officers of the Communist Party of the State what its table of
organization waD vThether she was employed by it whethel she ever had
possession of Communist books and whether she turned the books over
to any particular person At the time the Smith Act was in effect
making it s crime for any person knowing its purposes to be a member
of any group uhich advocates the overthrow of the GovelDmellt Upon the
refusal of the itness to testify she as found to be 1n contempt of
court and sentenced to imprisonment for one year The COU1~ of Appeals
affirmed
Hm-1eve the Supreme Cou~t felt that her answers might furnish
a link in the chain of evidence necessary in a piosecution under the
Smith Act and that the witness was privileged to refuse to furnish any
such link Accordingly it unanimously reversed upon the ground that
prior decisions of this Court have clearly established that under such
circWl16tances the Constitution gives a -1itness the privilege of gy
remaining silent II
In the same way a Federal grand jury was prevented from obtaining
information in its investigation of narcotic and Hhite Slave traffic as
well as bribery perjury and other serious Federal violations 1111e
witness stood upon his privilege against self~incrimination in refusing
to respond to questions as to what he did for a living and whether he
knemiddot certain named pemiddot~son6 Hele again judgment of imprisonment
fo~ contempt was upbeld by the Court of Appeals but reversed by the 28
Supreme Couct with one judge dissenting - upon the ground that tiny
other conclu~ion Would seriously compromise an important constitutional
libecty In this cnse the court held that the defendant could refuse
to anSI-Tel questions innocent on their face since it appeared from the
climate of the investigation and the publicity given defendants
alleged criminal activity that his answers might implicate him in
some federal crime
In anothel cese a COl1gr~ssional Committee attempted in vain to
obtain information from a ~1tl1ess relating to the names of persona enmiddotmiddot
~ged in the manufacture and sale of gambling equipment and other
mutters Finally exaspeeted chief counsel fOl the Committee said
IlLet the record show that the witness just sits there mute Che1Ting
gum saying nothing 1I
The witness Has found guilty of contempt of court and sentenced
to six months in jail but judgment was reversed on appeal The Court
of Appeals declared that the methods used by the Committee for examinashy
tioD of witnesses constituted a triple th~ceat answer truly and you
have given evidence leading to your conviction for a violation of
federal lav anSler falsely and you will be convicted of perjury refuse
to aWn-Tel and you will be found guilty of criminal contempt and punished 29
by fine and imprisonment - In the opinion of the court the predicamiddot
ment in which the ltncss -Tas placed flaS contrary to fair play and in
direct violation of the Fifth Amendment
These decisions could be multiplied and undoubtedly represent
prevailing law Almo3t every heinous crime on the law books comshy
roitted by Inlt1ividuals or by groups J remains uncove ced because of the
privilege against self-incrimination But it is in the area of subshy
version and disloyalty particularly that the privelege has a field
day 11 It is haIe that legislatiye connnittees and grand juries are
held at bay for years from learning vlhich leaders are plotting the
countrys destruction merely because witnesses are relieved of giving
essential information upon the ground of privilege
It is little Vlonder that lat-l-ebiding citizens frequently are heard
to say that sub-rersives and other lrongdoers are unduly coddled by
existing law They express anlDzement that the Congress and the Courts
should conttnue to put up ith subterfuge and concealment 1 n place of
truth at a time 1vhen the peril from Communiam is 60 great and -1hen
crime 1s so rrunpa1t They earnestly ucge upon us the vital need for
modernizing the legal ~eapons for fighting subversion and crime
These pleas of the people for more dcastic action against subshy
version and other misconduct have not gone unheeded Some States and
cities provide fer the dismissal of public employees ho refuse to
testify on grounds of self-incrimination or Tho refuse to t-aive imshy30
munity from prosecution
Some States prescribe loyalty oaths for admission to the Bar -1hich
go beyond the traditional promise to uphold the State and National 31
Constitutions shy
Some States and municipalities have passed statutes requiring
affidavits of puhlic employees that they are not and have never 32
been Communists Some States make ineligible to teach in any public
school a person vTho was a memher of an organization which advocates the
~ overthimiddotow of the Government by force Some of these statutes have been
JY upheld us valid by the Supreme Cou~~ including the provision of the
New York State law which provides that mecbership by a person in an
organization listed as subve~sive by the Dcard of Regents shall constitute
prima facie evidence of disqualification for employment 1n the public 12
schools This was the so-called Feinberg Law aimed at protecting the school
children of lew York against teachels who were spreading communist propaganda
~e poisonous propaganda was Bufficiently subtle to escape detection in the
class room The New York Legislature recognized that while the schools must
attract and protect the critical minds the schools vlere not sanctuaries for
those who were committed to follot-l in the footsteps of Klaus Fuchs It sought
the next best solution by e4cluding froIij teaching those affiliated with certain
orgn1zations listed by the Board of Regents vlhich advocated the overthrow
of the government
One of the main constitutional objections to the law was that it vishy
alated the First Amendment by creating an atmosphere of fear which would
inevitably stifle freedom of speech The Court in an opinion by Judge
Minton formerly of the COUl~ of Appeals for this Circuit r~jected the conshy
tention that the la interfered Vlith free speech since persons uhave no right
to ork for the smiddottate in the school system on their own terms They may york
for the school system upon the reasonable terms laid d01n by the proper
authorities of Neu York If they do not choose to work on such terms they 36
are at libelty to ~etain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere 1
The Supreme Court -las also lholly unimpressed by the contention that
the law condoned guilt by association contrary to democratic concepts of
justice On this point the Court sald ilL teacher lOrks in a sensitive area
in a school room There he shapes the attitude of young minds toward the
society in which they live In this the state has a vital concern It must
preserve the integcity of the schools That the school authorities haVe
the right and duty to aceen the officials teachers and their employees as
to their fitness to majnjail1 the integrity of the schools as a part of an
ordered society cannot be doubtecl One I s associates past and present as
vell os one t a conduct moy proIJerly be considered in determining fitness
and loyalty From time immemoljal one t a reputation ha3 been determined by
the company he keeps In the employment of officials and teachers of the
school systeil the state may very properly inquire into the company they 37
keep n
The Fedel~al GOyernrlent (llso has taken effective measures to protect
the interests of netional cecu1ity One long step forward in that direction
was to enact legislation requiring non middotmiddotCommul1ist affidavits from trade
union leaders vihose unions rBnted to resort to the advantages of the Taftshy38
Hartley Act - Tl1e Ptllpose of thiu requirement vas to prevent disruption of 39
industry in obedience to Communist Party orders If the union leaderls
affidavit us false be CQuId be sent to jail
The Federal Government has also tried its best to clean its Gvln
house fI On April 27 1953 the President by Executive oXde~ established
his security requirements for employment so that pelsons employed by the
Federal Government will be reliable trustworthy of sood character and 40
loyal to the United States On October 13 1953 the President amended
his Executive order so as to provide that imiddotlbe~~e a government employee refuses
to testify before a Congressional Coramittee regarding charges of his diashy
loyalty or misconduct an agency may take this factor into consideration
in determining hethe~ the person I s continued employment is inconsistent ~_f 41
with the national securtty This emendment to the Presidents Executive
order is in accord i th my opinion that a government employee oTho claims
privilege in a Congressional investigation may be too much of a risk to be
retained in Federal Service
A recent Senate Report entitled tlInterlocldng Subversion in
WGovernment fl fully documents how former government employees were
able to spin their web of intrigue in positions of influ6nce The
Report states
1tlJ~e subcommittee exumined in public session 36 pershy
sons about whom it had substantial evidence of membership
in the Communist undergrolld 10 Government All of them
invoked tha fifth amenmnen~ ~~d refused to answer questions
regardicg COnrIranist membership on the grounds of self-in
crinlination Many reused even to eomowledge their own
sigl1attles on official Govelnment doclllllents in which they
haG SViorn to nonmernbership in the past
All)st all of he persons exposed by the evidence had
Bome connection which could be documented vith at least one-shy
a~d generally several--other e~o6ed persons Tney used eaoh
other s names for referenoe on ~licationa for Federal em-
p10~lOOnt They hire eaoh other They pomot~d eampQh other
hAY raised each others sal~ries They transfer~ampd eaah
otlwr from bureau to bureau from depariment to department
from congressional committee to congressional committee
They assigned each other to international missions They
vouched for each others loyalty end prctected each other
when exposure threaten~d ~ley often had common living
qUaters tI
Suppression i truth in any case is bad enough In no event
can it be justified by a Government employee or applicant for Govern
ment empl~Jment in the face of a Congressional inquiry where the
interests of the national Bect~lty are at stake No one denies that
the Government employee or applicant for such employment may conshy
stitutionally claim his privilege against self-incrimination On
the other hand no one has a constitutional right to a Government
job W True the Supreme Court ha held that the constitutional
protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant
to a statute Is patently arbitrary or discriminatory II W But in
my opinion there is nothing e1ther arbtrary or discriminatry about
diSDdssing a federal employee where he refuses to waive the privilege
against self-incrimination guaranteed him by tho Const tution We
find an analogous situation presented in the recent decision of the
~reme Court in Orloff v WilloughbY ~ In that case the peti shy
tioner a physician was denied a commission in the Army principally
tor the reason that when asked hether he was a member in any Communist JY
organizations he replied) Federal Constitutional privilege is claimed
In its opinion through Mr Justice Jackson the Supreme Court said
It ia argued that Orlorf 1s being punished for havshy
ing claimed a privilege which the Constitution guarantees
No one at least no ane on this Court which has repeatedly
sustained assertion by Communists of the privilege against
selfMincr~inatian questions or doubts Orloffs right to
withhold facts about himself on this ground No one beshy
l1evee he can be punished for doing so But the question
is whether be can at the same time take the position that
to tell the truth about himself Vlould incriminate him and
that even so the President must appofnt him to a post of
honor and trust le have no hesitation in answering that
question No II There is no law which requires the Gove~~ent to sit supinely by
until the suspeoted eIlIployee has been convicted of disloyalty or other
similar misoonduct inconsistent with the interests of the national
security before it can sCPal~ate him from the Government service There
is no law which requires the Government to assume or endure such a risk
As was pointed out in an apt csae by the Supreme Court in American
Commtlnications v Douds speaking through the beloved late Chief
Justice Vinson
IfThat (first) amendment requires that one be permitted to
believe what he will It requires that one be permitted
to advocate what he will unless there is a clear and
present danger that a substantial public evil will result
therefrom It does not require that he be permitted to be
the keeper of the arsenal
I have not overlooked the fact that the loyalty and honesty of
the ovel~vhelming majority of all Government employeesmiddot is beyond quesshy
tion But their good reputations and character are far better proshy
tected from un1tfarranted criticism when we root out the few who are
unreliable and disloyal
What the critical situation of om time calls for is a lavr com
pt)lling testimony within the fr~neuro1Torl of the Constitution The tmshy
swer to this need is immuni-ty legislaiion which will be as broad as
the privilege W11ich is stJpplanted tV Then if a person is adjudged
ill cOlte~Pt for refusing to te3tify before a Cotgressional committee
he will know tZat t-le ~udgrnerJt of OOllt-empt will more likely stand up
on appeal free from oonstitutional ohal1enge
At the same time the l~w will also provide more adequate proshy
tection for the wit~ss
At presnt the witne31l is in a rtboxtl so to slJeGk The witness
is not exc~ed from an3werL~g merely because he believes his answers
Vlil1 incriminate him His slly-ao does not of its(gt~r establish the
1amphazeId of ilcriIltination II ~~ere he olaims his privil~ge it is
the ftL1ction of the jcge to dets-rmme whether the siJence of t1e
witness is justified or wha~1er the danger to be apprebenced is too
remote to be sl1bstattial To save himself from being held in conshy
tempt tl1e witness may oftcn be cOJIpEtled to disclos3 til0ne very
facts whtrh he claims are privileged iQ
Witnesses are alao aided by a b~oad immunity statute in still
another way Under our la unlike that of England t a disclosure of
any incriminating fact constitutes a wailer of the privilege as to deshy
tails con~erning that fact 211 Having made a partial disclosure of
faots the witness loses the rig~t to cease answering intel~ogat1ons
and rely upon his privilege at a 1ater point in his testimony
In one oase the detendant rree~ disclosed that she was Treasshy
urer of the Communist Pariy in COlorado and testified that she had
given the books ot the party to another person When asked to dishy
wlge the name ot the lamiddottter she refused upon the ground that the
answer might incriminate her mder the Sm1tb Act Atfirming her
conviction for contempt the Supreme Court speaking through Chief
Justice Vinson said
Since the privilege agatnlt salf-inorimination
presupposes a real danger ot legal detriment arising
from the disolosure petitioner cannot invoke the
privilege where response to the specific question in
issue here would not ftUtther inoriminate her O1aolo
sure of e tact waives the privilege as to details pound
This deoision leaves the law in a rather anomolous position tor the
vlitness A witness who refuses to answer aU questions and fails to Wcooperate to any extent may be protected by the claim of privilege
But there is no equal protection atforded by the decisions to the
witness who commences to eooperate but stops at a point where further
disclosure may tncrim1~ate him
Moreover it the witness refuses to answer on the ground that
Congress has exceeded its powers or that the inQuiry in lacking in
pertinency he construas the law at his peril If mistake8 his good 55
faith error of law constitutes no defense to fine and imprisonment
Then again it is claimed DY some that a persons election to
remain silent upon the ground of privilege does not necessarily mean
he has anything sinister to hide There are undoubtedly some people of
sincere principle who refl1se to disclose 1flformat1oft to authorized
1nvestigating authorities because of their feeling that ao one has any
right to 1~quire about their beliefs even if germane to the inquiry at 56
bsnd- There are other persons who refuse to answer because they feel
their recollections of events lons past are fee~le and that falsehood
even on trivial or irrelevant matters may subject them to a charge of
perjury There are still others less innocent vho say that coercing
them to testify under pain of contempt resembles the Soviet tactic of
requiring those SUilty not only to pay for but also to prcclatD their 57
guilt shy
~he use of broad tmmunity statutes serves to remove the dansers
mentioned for the iDPocent a~d operates aa an incentive for the guilty
to tell the truth
There are already two proposals pendin8 in Congress which seek to
compel the answer by witnesses at questioDs put to them before Conshy
gressiOl1al Committees grand juries or courts In exchange tor this
compulsory testimony the Witnesses will obtain complete immunity froa
prosecution
58 One Bill is s~ 565 This proposal grants immunity to ~itnesses
before a grand Jury or court of the United States when in the disshy
cretion of th~ Attorney General it is necessary to do so in the public
interest In exchange for this immunity the witness is compelled to
testify and to produce his books papers or recoIds s 565 uses
broad immunity lengtase in stating that the witness shall not be
prosecuted on account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he 1s compelled after ela~ing his privilege to testify or
produce evidence
In this respect s 565 is almost ident1cal to the immunity proshy59
vision sustained 8S valid by the Supreme Court e~ far back as 1896-
This Bill does not extend the immunity to witnesses before Congressional
Committees 601 61
There are other Bills pend-ing S 16- middot and H R 27371 with equally
broad immunity authority The Senate has passed its Bill but the House
Bill still awaits action Both these Bills grunt immunity to witnesses
before Congressional Committees but not to witnesses before grand
juries or courts
The proposed Bills are worded so that the witness will not get an
immunity bathU merely by testifying He must first raise specifically
his claim for privilege and thus put the Committee on notice whether
for the greater good the witness should be required to testify and 62
given immunity or whether he should be excused from testlfying-
However the discretionary power to grant the immunity is not vested
in the Attorney General bumiddott lies with the body conducting the investigation
If the proceeding is one before one of the Houses of Congress then
a majority vote of the members present is necessary Under S 16
if it is a proceeding before a committee two thirds of the members
must vote to grant the tmmunity In that event the tvothirds vote
must include at least two members of each of the two political parties
having the largest representation on such committee The House Bill
does not provide for notice to the Attorney General of the proposed
grant of immunity The Senate Bill provides for one weeks notice to
the Attorney General of the proposal but if the latter fails or reshy
fuses to assent to grant of immunity it may be conferred by majority
vote of either House It is hoped that this legislation will only be
resorted to where full diseloaure by witnesses is deemed of greater
tmportance than the possibility of punishing them for past offenses
By permitting one or several criminals to escape prosecution the
larger public peril contained in a gang of criminals or in their
leaders may be uncovered and the guilty brought to justice
The legislative proposals mentioned have much to commend them
In my opinion these bills would better achieve their purposes it they
required the concurrence of the Attorney General 1n the granting of any
immunity to a witness by a Joint Congressional Committee or either Heuse
committee or by Congress The Attorney General 1s the chief legal
officer of the Government of the United States As Buch it 1s his
responsibility to prosecute persons who offend the criminal laws of the
United states This responsibility must be coupled w1th adequate
authority to permit its discharge It would seem to be more advisable
for the Attorney General who has immediate knowledge of a criminals
background and propensities to decide whether immunity should be
granted for such a person To allow the Attorney General to participate
in the ultimate decision aa to whether immunity should be granted would
not impair Congressional investigatIons in the fields of internal
security crime and corruption Nor would it discourage witnesses
from providing information of importance to the investigation if the
Attorney Generals permission vas required before immunity was granted
On the other hand if these Bills were enacted in their present
form they might subject members of Congress to undue pressures for
granting immunity to criminals who are ineligible to receive it Also
they cuuld very easily cause embarrassment to Congress by tmped1ng or
blocking prosecutions planned by the Department of Justice on any matter 63
even incidentally testified to upon these 1nvestigations
The unfortunate experience which Congress had as far back as 1857 64
in granting immunity without concurrence of the Attorney General - should
~each that a similar course of action may be marked by eveD greater
failure today_ The witness might readily turn this division of authority
between Congress and the Department of Justice to his advantage by
obtaining an ~unity from the legislative committee or from Congress
over the objection of the Attorney General Thereafter he would be
free to testify concerning a broad area Of activities without fear that
he could be held to account criminally for other violations however
unrelated to the matter under investigation
Thus for example a Congreas1onal Committee or Congress might
furnish immunity to a person to obtain his testimony about his illicit
traffic in slot machine opercltlons between states This person may also
be guilty either of espionage or subversion or of selling narcotics to
youngs cers as to which an indictment is soon to be obtained To foreshy
close prosecution on these more serious crimes the witness would be
glad to volunteer information on his other activities if he knew in
advance that immunity would fallow for all of them Therefore greatest
care must be exercioed in granting immunity and then only upon a fully
informed judgment of all tle facts The Departlnent of Justice would
of course through the Fe~eral Bureau of Investigation the Crtmlnal
and Tax Divisions and the United states Attorneyo I offices be mosmiddott
likely to know the facts and the plans for prosecution Concurrence
by the Attorney General in conferring the immunity would also enable
the Department of Justice to maintuin its responsibility for the proper
administration of the crlminal law
The provision in S 10 for one weeks notice to the Attorney General
of the proposed grant of immunity does not fully cure this Bill of its
weakness in failing to require his affirmative concurrence in every
case Experience indicates that at times the views of the person who
1s charged with prooecut1ng criminals are disregarded by Congressional
Committees For example the successful criminal conviction obtained
by the Department of Justice ot the internal revenue collector in one of
the largest cities was recently nullified because of the action of a
House Committee in holding 1middotr1dely publicized hearings in the district in
65 which the trial subsequently took place These hearings took place
over the strong objection of the Department of Justice thut the pro
posed hearing would be of prejudice to the defendant on the trial
which was about to be initiated and would injure the Governments case
in disclosing its evidence In reversing the convlct1on l Chief Judge
Magruder observed that the character of the defendant was blackened
and discredited as the day of trial approached because of the publicity
invited and stimulated by the Committee over the radio and television
Thu6 1 mere advance notIfication to the Attorney General of a proposed
grant of tmmunity would never be a guarantee that the Committee would
be guided by the views of the Attorney General
S 16 and H R 2737 would also more readily carry out the aim of
obtaining evidence against leaders of subversion and criminal entershy
prisesj if provision for twmunity were granted to obtain testimony
not only before Congressional Committees but likewise before courts
and grand juries
For these reasons it is my opinion that if any measure is to be
enacted~~rmitting the granting of immunity to witnesses before either
House of Congress or its committees it should vest the Attorney General
or the Attorney General acting with the concurren~e of appropriate members
of Congress with the authority to grant such tmmunity and if the test shy
mony is sought for a court or grand jury that the Attorney General alone
be authorized to grant the ilmnunity
There remain for discussion two principal objections to this proshy
posed legislation which may be briefly considered here One objection
1s that when a witneAS is compelled to testify even under the protecshy
tion of immunity from criminal punihment) he is not relieved from
personal disgrace ~~lhich attach~8 to the exposure of his crime The
answer to this objection ia contained in II land mark decision of the 66
Supreme Court in Brown v Wrtlker
The design of tbe constitutional plivilege is not to aid the
witness in vindicating his character but to protect him
against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict him
of a criminal charge If he secure legal jnmllnity from prose-
cution the possible impairment of his good name is a penalty
which it is reasonable b0 should be compelled to pay for the
common good
The reasoning of this decision has never been qU~Gtioned and has 67
only recently been approved by the Sllpreme Court
The other chief objection to the proposed legislation is that while
a witness may receive itmlunity from federal prosecution) he may still
be subject to IJrosecution under ~tate lavl The Supreme Court has held
that this is not a valid objection to federal immunity laws~ since the
self-incrimination clause ln the Fifth Amendment operates ao a l1mitashy68
tion on the federal government only In United states v Murdock the
defendant was indicted for refUSing to answer questions of a revenue
agent relating to ctrt8 in income tax returns The refusal was ba sed on
the plea that hiD answers might 1ncrim1nate him in a state court The
Court said on this point
This court ha~ held that immunity against state prosecution is
not essential to the validity of federal statutes declaring that
a witnes3 shall not be excllpoundied from gtring evidence on the
ground that it vTill incriminate him and also that the ladt of
state power to give witnesses protection against federal
prosecution does not defeat a state immunity statute
Similarly a witness befo~e a state tribunal CBnnot refuse to 69
answer because of the threat of federal prosecution - However the
Federal District Court in Ohio recently held i1 Unted States v 70
Di Carlo that the defendant had the right to assert his privilege
because of possible prosecution under state law since the Senate
committee was authorized to investigate violations not only of the lawe 71
of the United States but also of the states M_ The Murdock case was
dtstingJished urlon the ground that the danger of state posecution 1n
that case was remote and uncertain thile in the Di Carlo case the
danger of state proaecutjon WilS imminent and real 72
The ---Di Carlo case has been received -lith mixed commelt It has73
not been followed so far as we k~ow- It appears to be contrary to deshy
cis10ns of co~~rts of appeals which have consistently adhered to the prinshy74
ciples of the Murdock case- In my opinion this decision of a district
court aoes not detract from the binding effect ofthe Supreme Courts deshy
eision in the Murdock case
The Department of Justice will recommend to the Congress in Jlouary
an immunity bill of the type I have descri-ced which protects the const1shy
tutional privileges ot witnesses before Congressional Committees courts
and juries but will at the some time aid materially in stamping out
criminal and subversive activities
Footnote Referet~es to Ad~res El~ited ~------ ___bull
Immunity From Prcsecuticn
Versus
Privilege Agaiust Self-Incrimination
Pittman liThe Colonial and Constitutional History of the
Privilege Against Sel-Incrimiootion 1n Amcicaff 21 Va
L R 763 764 770-773 (1935) Corwin The Supreme
Court I S Corctl~ction of the Self Incrirnination C1ause lf
29 lId~h L R 1 512 (1930) Ap~licability of
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to Legjslative
y Pittmenf2 at 774
~ ~ining v ~~8ey 211 U S 78 92 (1908)
L Id at 91
~ 34th Ceng 3d sess Globe PI 427 433 1-45 See
Eberling Constitutional Investigations pp 304-315shy
7 Eberling d at 320-323
~I 142 U s 547 (1892) This Act of 1862 revised an old
statute into two new sections by an amendment which
sought to insure that a witness who testified before
a federal grand jt~ or court (R s I 860 (1875raquo or
a Congressional Committee (R S B 859 (1875raquo would
not be later subjected to the use of his testimony in
any criminal proceeding aGainst him Section ~ 860 of
the amendment dealing with grand jurtes and courts came
under attack in Counselman v Hitchcock J supra and was
held to be invalid Since this part of the immunity proshy
vision tailed to accomplish ita purpose Congress repealed
it in 1910 (36 Stat 352 (19l0raquo) Congress apparently felt
that S 859 applying to Congressional Committees was still
of value and left it 1n force to this date (a s I 859
(1875) as amended 52 Stat 943 (1938) 18 usc e3486
(Supp V 1952)j see liThe Privilege Against Self
Incrimination versus Immunity Proposed Statutes 41
Georgetown L J 511 514 (1953) United States v ~
339 U s 323 335-337 (1950)
21 It read in patt as follows
No person shall be prosecuted for or on
account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he may testify or produce evidence
Act of Feb 11 1893 c 83 27 stat 443 49 USCA
I 46 See too ~ v United States 337 u S 137 146shy
147 (1949)middot Notet Denying -the Privilege against Self
Incrimination to Public Officers 64 Barv L R 987
988 (1951)
- 101 161 U s 591 (1896)
Shapiro v United St~~ 335 U S 1 6-7 (1948) where various
statutes are collated in the footnote The customary provision
in these statutes provides as follows No person shall be
excused from complying with any requirements ot this section
because of his privilege aga1nst self-incriminationgt but the
immunity provisions of the COmptuBory Testimony Act of
February 11 1893 shall apply with respect to allY 1nd1shy
vidual who specifically claims such pr1Y11ege tt
12 Rapacz ULimiting the Plea of Self-Incr1m1nat1ontl 20 Georgetown
L J 329 353 (1932) see footnote 3 of ~ v Connect~
302 U s 319 326 (1937) NPte liThe Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination the Doctr1ne of Waiver 61 Yale L J 104 110
(1952) middot
~f Palko v Connecticut 302 U s 319 326 (1937)
~ See dissents of Mr Justices Shiras Gray and White in ~ V4
Walker supra 161 U s 630638 Cf dissent of Mr Justice
Black in Ro~ers v United States 340 U s 367 376 (1950)
15 Potts Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for ContemptU I
74 U of Pa L R 691 780 (1926) L1acos uRights of Witnesses
Before Congressional Committees 33 Boston U L R 337 340
(1953) middot
t6 Liacos Id at 31tl
17 McGeary rlThe DeTelopmen-cs of Congressional Investigative Power ll
p 23 (1940) McGrain v Daughel~l 273 u s 135 (1927)
18 Sinclair v Unfted States~ 279 U s 263 (1929) ~arsba11 v
Unit~~State~ 176 F 2d 473 (nc Cir 1949) 2 Usc ~ 192
(Supp 1950)
19 Ne York City Bar Ass t n Committee on the Bill of Rights Report
on Congressional Committees presented December 14 1948 p 1
gQi Galloway PCong18ss1onal Investigations Proposed Reforms lt
18 U of Chi L R 478 479-481 (1951)
21 Dilliard lICongress1onal Investigations The Role of the Press
18 U of ChL L R 585 J 587 (1951)
22 Edgerton J dissenting in Barsky v United States 167 F 2d
241 252 (nc eir 1948) cert denied 334 U s 843 (1948)
petition for rehearing denied 339 U S 971 (1951)
~3 De Jonge v Oregon 299 U s 353 364 365 (1937)
24 Id
25 6 Richardson lIMes sOges and Papers of the Pres idents t 1 p 23
July 4 1861
26 See United St~~ v ~~phson 165 F 2d 82 (2 Cir 1947)
cert denied 333 u S 838 (1948) Lawson v United states
176 F 2d 49 (nc Cir 1949) cel~ denied 339 u s 934
(1950) Barsty Y ~ited S~ 167 F 2d 241 (DC eir
1948) cert denied 334 u s 843 (1948) MCGrain v Daugherty
273 u s 135 (1927) and cf Rumely v United States J 197
F 2d 166 (DC eir 1952) affd 73 s ct 543 (1953)
JJ B1a~ v ~~ted Sttlt~s 340 u s 159 (1950-)
gsectJ ~~ v United States 31~1 U s 479 (1951) See too
sectingleton v United States 343 U s 944 (1952) Note Recent
Extensions of the Witness Privilege Against Self-Incrim1nationll
53 Col L R 275 (1953)
29 Aiuppa v Un1tc~ states 201 F 2d 287 300 (6 eir 1952)
_I30 Note nMandatory Dismissal of Public Persol1nel and The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination 101 U ot Pa L R 1190 1191
fn 8 (1953)
31 Brown Be Fassett Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar
20 u or Chi L R 480 483 (1953)
32 Garner v Los Angeles Board) 341 u s 716 (1951) Gerende v
Board of Supervisors 341 U s 56 (1951) but com~are Wieman v
Updegraff 341~ U s 83 (1953)
34 See footnote 32
35 PG~ v Boa-roo of Education 31~2 U s 435 (1951)
ID Id at 493
38 Sec 9(h of lihe LalJor Management Rlations Act of 1947 29 USCA
St1Pp III Sec 141 Sec 159(b)
39 ft~rican C~~catons Association v ~uda 339 u S 382 (1950)
sustaining the validity of Sec 9(h) against the challenge that it
violated the First c-lT~nc1tlCiltl Ex Post FtiCto Lals and other iul1dashy
mental rights
40 Executive Order No 10450 issued Aporil zr 1953 (18 F R 2lt89)
41 Executive Orrler No 10491 issued Ocmiddottober 13 1953 (18 F R 6583)
~ Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary Interlocking Subshy
vcrs ion in Covernmcnt De~rtments II 83d Cong 1st ses5 Juy 30 J
1953 p 21 Being a cOImllunist is not a crime under federal law J
although it is in some states (see Liacos supra note 15 at
375) The Smith Act (18 USC Sec 2385 et seq) mkes advoshy
eating or teaching the violent overthrOf of any goverrment of the
United States or being a member of such a group and kno7ing its
purpose~a federal crime
43 See EaSley v F~cbardsonJ 182 F 2d 46 (DC 1950)J affd by an
evenly diiied court 341 TJ s 918 (1951) 1Etshingto v McGrath
182 F 2d 375 (DC 1950) aff1d 341 U s 923 (1951)j Or~~ v
vIil1ougbby 345 U s 83 91 (1953) Mr Justice Douglas concurring
i~ ~tiFascist Commi~~ v ~~EJ 341 U s 123 -182-183 (1951)
United Public W0rkers v --~1itcbell 330 U s 75 (1947)j Angilly - v
United States 199 F 2d 642) 644 (1950) cf NcAuliffe v rlew
Bedford 155 Mass 216 29 NE 517 (le9~) per Holmes J liThe
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but
he h(=l~s no constitltioi1al right to be a policezranu (Id at 220
29 NE at 5J7)
44 v1ie~sn _
v UpGegaff middot111 ~
3~middot4 u s 83 (1953) The Court ruleri as
contrry to due process the Cklahoma loyalty oath statute forshy
bidding IJ1l11ic emplo~rment of Persons who belonzea to certain
organizations regarciless of their knowledge of the character of
those oreenizations because of the indiscriminate classification
of lnnocent with kno~vilg activityll (d at 91)
~1 345 u S 83 (1953)middot
46 Id at 90
47 339 u s 3827 412 (1950) sustaininG the non-corJlIlunist affidavit
requirernelt of union leaders under the Taft -Hartley Act
~ Hoffman v United States 341 U s 179 (1951) suggests such
legislation if Congres3 concludes the lleed is great enough
See too Comment The Privilege Against Se1f-Llcriminetion Versus
Lmnurdty Z Proposed Statutes P 41 Gt~orgetom L J 511 (1953)
S Rept 153 on S 16 83d Cone 1st sess ~ 1 ald 2
April 17 1953 Report of Sel1a~~e Commttee on the JudiciaJ J
Interlocking S-lbversion in GOYf11llent Departments tl July 30
1953 83d Cong 1st sess p 50
~ HcfI1nan v Unitet States 341 u s 479 486 (1951)
50 Id U1ited States v ~isman 111 F 2d 260 262 (2 Cir 1950)
51 Note 61 Yale L J 105 109 (1952)
52 Rogers v United States 340 u s 367 375 (1951)
211 See e g Blau v Unjted StaIe~ 340 u s 159 (1950)
-shy54 Note J Co1t3resnic1al Inv estigat1ons--Self-Illcrimimtion Condemneshy
tiOll and Fair Hcar1ngll 22 U of Cinn L R 193 199-200 (1953)
55 See ~ovTn8end v ~~it~~ta~~3 95 F 2d 352 351 (DC Cir 1938)
cert denied 303 u S 664 (1938)
56 Byse TfA Report on the Pennsylvana Loyalty Act 101 U of Fa
L R 480 481-1~84 (1953) Wright Should Teachers Testify
Saturday Review Sept 2o 1953 p 23
57 See Meltzer Required Records The McCarran Act and The Privilege
Against Selfmiddotmiddot Incriminat ion ll 19 U of Chi L R 687 722 (1951)
y 83d Cong 1st Seas 1953 Also known as the Kefauver BUl
59 ~ v ltlalker 161 U S 591 (1896)
sect21 S 16 83d Cong 1st sess 1953 passed the Senate July 9 1953
after extensive debate Cong Ree 8646-8663 July 9 1953shy
S 16 amends B 3486 of Title 18 Sec 3486 presently furnishes
witnesses immunity from prosecution tor testimony before either
House or their Committees It appears to suffer from the same
deficiency present in a similar statute condemned in Counse~an v
Hitchcock 142 u s 547 (1892) S 16 is intended to StWP1y the
omission in the Hitchcock ease by providing not only that a
witness testimony may not be used against him but that such
witness shall be iImnune with respect to lIany transaction mtter
or thing concerning which he has been compelled to testIfy
sect 83d Congo 1st sess 1953
~ S Rept 153 83d Congo 1st sess p 2 (1953)
63 See Comment The Privi1ege Against Self-Incrimination Versus
Immunity Proposed statutes 41 Georgetown L J 511 523 (1953)
64 Supra footnote 7shy
sectif Delanel v ~ed States 199 F 2d 107 (1 Ci~ 1952)
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
Unlike the privilege however the Constitution does not exshy
pressly provide for any COlBressional Ilower to investigate
It 16 considered as an implied power essential to carry out 16
the general legislative funct1on shy
Congressional investigation commdttees have traditionally 17
been regarded as having these principal fUllctons - to
secure information by which Congress may exercise an informed
judgment in legislating wisely and to check administrative
agencies for determining whether they are properly enforcing
the law and ju11c1ollsly spending the public flnds For these
purpcses Congressional Committees may summon witnesses and 18
require their testimo~ under penalty of contempt proceedings -shy
But a Congressional hearing is not a trial Its function is
primarily to ascertain facta and not to decide on the guilt
or innocence of the witness
In recent years many of these investigating commdttees have been
particula~ly concerned in alerting the American people to the nature
of subversive and other criminal activities the many forms that
these activities take and how they threaten the democratiC processes
Some persons have been critical of these investigations claiming
that th~y restrict freedom of speech by stigmatizing expressions of 19
unpopular views -- Freedom of speech they say implies freedom not to
speult ot all even undel legal compulsion Since wide publicity is
given to these proceedings by newspapers radio and television the
complaint is also that these perSOIlS investigated are exposed to
poscible insult oatruciom und loss of employment It is urged that
mere mention of a persons nome in c0110ection with an inveJtigation
that has wide-spred news vclue may create a distorted and unfair public 20
implession - Another point made is that proof of innocence may never 21
catch up with public It assertions of guilt It It is also said that if
these persons decline to profans any stutement of belief before a comshy22
mittee they iovite pUIiislIDl~lJt for contempt
Unquestionably every effort should be exerted to protect the right
of our people to speak and think freely As Chief Justice Hughes has
Hell said
The greater the importance of safeguarding the community
from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force
and violence the mOI~ imperative is the ne~d to preserve inviolate
the constitutioual lights of free speech free press and free
assembly in order to muintain the CJpportunity for free political
discussion l to the end that government may be responsive to the
will of the people and that changes if deSired may be obtained g)j
by peaceful means
~Je shOL1ld dread the dvy middotrhen the people could justifiably become
wary of explessing 1l110zthotLoJ or unpopular opinions or where rumor and
gossip are accepted as subotitutes for evidence
As egainst these threats to our precious liberties we must also
weigh the possible harm to the public scfety and lelfare without llhich
there can be no liberty for anyone yJhile the rights guaranteed by the
Firat Amendment may not be curtailed abuse of these rights may 24
properly be curbed
In his time Abraham Lincoln expressed the problem in these
distressed words ItMust CI government of necessity be too strong
for the libel~ies of its own people or too weak to maintain its own 25
eXistencel The same problem is with us today Obviously if Congress
is to legislate Vlisely with respect to subversion and other crime and
corruption it must not be obstructed from learning ~ho are its
leaders organizers and members the nature and scope of their activishy
ties the character and number of their adherents
I knmv of no constitutional right of privacy which immunizes a
person from giving evidence where an 1nquil~ is conducted by a legally
constituted Congressional committee Tbe person owes this duty as a
citizen just as he m~es the duty to furnish relevant and truthful
testimony in a court of law or gl~nd jury He violates his duty as a
citizen Then he suppresses the facts concerning criminal activity known
to him So long as the questions are pertinent and gel~ne to a lawful
inquiry of Congress the individual is not relieved from answering
because they delve into his private affairs his previous utterances 26
or his affiliations political or otherwise -- The constitutional
guarantee of freedom to epreS8 ones views does not include immunity
from Congressional inquiry as to hat one has said subject to ones
privilege against self-incrimination
Reference to several cases within the last few years demonstrate
how effectively Congressional Committees courts and grand juries have
been blocked in their efforts to uncover subversion as Hell as other
criminal activities because of reliance by 1middotritneases upon their
privilege
In one case the 1-1itness upon ground of privilege refused to anSler
questions before a grand jur7 as to whether she knew the names of the
State officers of the Communist Party of the State what its table of
organization waD vThether she was employed by it whethel she ever had
possession of Communist books and whether she turned the books over
to any particular person At the time the Smith Act was in effect
making it s crime for any person knowing its purposes to be a member
of any group uhich advocates the overthrow of the GovelDmellt Upon the
refusal of the itness to testify she as found to be 1n contempt of
court and sentenced to imprisonment for one year The COU1~ of Appeals
affirmed
Hm-1eve the Supreme Cou~t felt that her answers might furnish
a link in the chain of evidence necessary in a piosecution under the
Smith Act and that the witness was privileged to refuse to furnish any
such link Accordingly it unanimously reversed upon the ground that
prior decisions of this Court have clearly established that under such
circWl16tances the Constitution gives a -1itness the privilege of gy
remaining silent II
In the same way a Federal grand jury was prevented from obtaining
information in its investigation of narcotic and Hhite Slave traffic as
well as bribery perjury and other serious Federal violations 1111e
witness stood upon his privilege against self~incrimination in refusing
to respond to questions as to what he did for a living and whether he
knemiddot certain named pemiddot~son6 Hele again judgment of imprisonment
fo~ contempt was upbeld by the Court of Appeals but reversed by the 28
Supreme Couct with one judge dissenting - upon the ground that tiny
other conclu~ion Would seriously compromise an important constitutional
libecty In this cnse the court held that the defendant could refuse
to anSI-Tel questions innocent on their face since it appeared from the
climate of the investigation and the publicity given defendants
alleged criminal activity that his answers might implicate him in
some federal crime
In anothel cese a COl1gr~ssional Committee attempted in vain to
obtain information from a ~1tl1ess relating to the names of persona enmiddotmiddot
~ged in the manufacture and sale of gambling equipment and other
mutters Finally exaspeeted chief counsel fOl the Committee said
IlLet the record show that the witness just sits there mute Che1Ting
gum saying nothing 1I
The witness Has found guilty of contempt of court and sentenced
to six months in jail but judgment was reversed on appeal The Court
of Appeals declared that the methods used by the Committee for examinashy
tioD of witnesses constituted a triple th~ceat answer truly and you
have given evidence leading to your conviction for a violation of
federal lav anSler falsely and you will be convicted of perjury refuse
to aWn-Tel and you will be found guilty of criminal contempt and punished 29
by fine and imprisonment - In the opinion of the court the predicamiddot
ment in which the ltncss -Tas placed flaS contrary to fair play and in
direct violation of the Fifth Amendment
These decisions could be multiplied and undoubtedly represent
prevailing law Almo3t every heinous crime on the law books comshy
roitted by Inlt1ividuals or by groups J remains uncove ced because of the
privilege against self-incrimination But it is in the area of subshy
version and disloyalty particularly that the privelege has a field
day 11 It is haIe that legislatiye connnittees and grand juries are
held at bay for years from learning vlhich leaders are plotting the
countrys destruction merely because witnesses are relieved of giving
essential information upon the ground of privilege
It is little Vlonder that lat-l-ebiding citizens frequently are heard
to say that sub-rersives and other lrongdoers are unduly coddled by
existing law They express anlDzement that the Congress and the Courts
should conttnue to put up ith subterfuge and concealment 1 n place of
truth at a time 1vhen the peril from Communiam is 60 great and -1hen
crime 1s so rrunpa1t They earnestly ucge upon us the vital need for
modernizing the legal ~eapons for fighting subversion and crime
These pleas of the people for more dcastic action against subshy
version and other misconduct have not gone unheeded Some States and
cities provide fer the dismissal of public employees ho refuse to
testify on grounds of self-incrimination or Tho refuse to t-aive imshy30
munity from prosecution
Some States prescribe loyalty oaths for admission to the Bar -1hich
go beyond the traditional promise to uphold the State and National 31
Constitutions shy
Some States and municipalities have passed statutes requiring
affidavits of puhlic employees that they are not and have never 32
been Communists Some States make ineligible to teach in any public
school a person vTho was a memher of an organization which advocates the
~ overthimiddotow of the Government by force Some of these statutes have been
JY upheld us valid by the Supreme Cou~~ including the provision of the
New York State law which provides that mecbership by a person in an
organization listed as subve~sive by the Dcard of Regents shall constitute
prima facie evidence of disqualification for employment 1n the public 12
schools This was the so-called Feinberg Law aimed at protecting the school
children of lew York against teachels who were spreading communist propaganda
~e poisonous propaganda was Bufficiently subtle to escape detection in the
class room The New York Legislature recognized that while the schools must
attract and protect the critical minds the schools vlere not sanctuaries for
those who were committed to follot-l in the footsteps of Klaus Fuchs It sought
the next best solution by e4cluding froIij teaching those affiliated with certain
orgn1zations listed by the Board of Regents vlhich advocated the overthrow
of the government
One of the main constitutional objections to the law was that it vishy
alated the First Amendment by creating an atmosphere of fear which would
inevitably stifle freedom of speech The Court in an opinion by Judge
Minton formerly of the COUl~ of Appeals for this Circuit r~jected the conshy
tention that the la interfered Vlith free speech since persons uhave no right
to ork for the smiddottate in the school system on their own terms They may york
for the school system upon the reasonable terms laid d01n by the proper
authorities of Neu York If they do not choose to work on such terms they 36
are at libelty to ~etain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere 1
The Supreme Court -las also lholly unimpressed by the contention that
the law condoned guilt by association contrary to democratic concepts of
justice On this point the Court sald ilL teacher lOrks in a sensitive area
in a school room There he shapes the attitude of young minds toward the
society in which they live In this the state has a vital concern It must
preserve the integcity of the schools That the school authorities haVe
the right and duty to aceen the officials teachers and their employees as
to their fitness to majnjail1 the integrity of the schools as a part of an
ordered society cannot be doubtecl One I s associates past and present as
vell os one t a conduct moy proIJerly be considered in determining fitness
and loyalty From time immemoljal one t a reputation ha3 been determined by
the company he keeps In the employment of officials and teachers of the
school systeil the state may very properly inquire into the company they 37
keep n
The Fedel~al GOyernrlent (llso has taken effective measures to protect
the interests of netional cecu1ity One long step forward in that direction
was to enact legislation requiring non middotmiddotCommul1ist affidavits from trade
union leaders vihose unions rBnted to resort to the advantages of the Taftshy38
Hartley Act - Tl1e Ptllpose of thiu requirement vas to prevent disruption of 39
industry in obedience to Communist Party orders If the union leaderls
affidavit us false be CQuId be sent to jail
The Federal Government has also tried its best to clean its Gvln
house fI On April 27 1953 the President by Executive oXde~ established
his security requirements for employment so that pelsons employed by the
Federal Government will be reliable trustworthy of sood character and 40
loyal to the United States On October 13 1953 the President amended
his Executive order so as to provide that imiddotlbe~~e a government employee refuses
to testify before a Congressional Coramittee regarding charges of his diashy
loyalty or misconduct an agency may take this factor into consideration
in determining hethe~ the person I s continued employment is inconsistent ~_f 41
with the national securtty This emendment to the Presidents Executive
order is in accord i th my opinion that a government employee oTho claims
privilege in a Congressional investigation may be too much of a risk to be
retained in Federal Service
A recent Senate Report entitled tlInterlocldng Subversion in
WGovernment fl fully documents how former government employees were
able to spin their web of intrigue in positions of influ6nce The
Report states
1tlJ~e subcommittee exumined in public session 36 pershy
sons about whom it had substantial evidence of membership
in the Communist undergrolld 10 Government All of them
invoked tha fifth amenmnen~ ~~d refused to answer questions
regardicg COnrIranist membership on the grounds of self-in
crinlination Many reused even to eomowledge their own
sigl1attles on official Govelnment doclllllents in which they
haG SViorn to nonmernbership in the past
All)st all of he persons exposed by the evidence had
Bome connection which could be documented vith at least one-shy
a~d generally several--other e~o6ed persons Tney used eaoh
other s names for referenoe on ~licationa for Federal em-
p10~lOOnt They hire eaoh other They pomot~d eampQh other
hAY raised each others sal~ries They transfer~ampd eaah
otlwr from bureau to bureau from depariment to department
from congressional committee to congressional committee
They assigned each other to international missions They
vouched for each others loyalty end prctected each other
when exposure threaten~d ~ley often had common living
qUaters tI
Suppression i truth in any case is bad enough In no event
can it be justified by a Government employee or applicant for Govern
ment empl~Jment in the face of a Congressional inquiry where the
interests of the national Bect~lty are at stake No one denies that
the Government employee or applicant for such employment may conshy
stitutionally claim his privilege against self-incrimination On
the other hand no one has a constitutional right to a Government
job W True the Supreme Court ha held that the constitutional
protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant
to a statute Is patently arbitrary or discriminatory II W But in
my opinion there is nothing e1ther arbtrary or discriminatry about
diSDdssing a federal employee where he refuses to waive the privilege
against self-incrimination guaranteed him by tho Const tution We
find an analogous situation presented in the recent decision of the
~reme Court in Orloff v WilloughbY ~ In that case the peti shy
tioner a physician was denied a commission in the Army principally
tor the reason that when asked hether he was a member in any Communist JY
organizations he replied) Federal Constitutional privilege is claimed
In its opinion through Mr Justice Jackson the Supreme Court said
It ia argued that Orlorf 1s being punished for havshy
ing claimed a privilege which the Constitution guarantees
No one at least no ane on this Court which has repeatedly
sustained assertion by Communists of the privilege against
selfMincr~inatian questions or doubts Orloffs right to
withhold facts about himself on this ground No one beshy
l1evee he can be punished for doing so But the question
is whether be can at the same time take the position that
to tell the truth about himself Vlould incriminate him and
that even so the President must appofnt him to a post of
honor and trust le have no hesitation in answering that
question No II There is no law which requires the Gove~~ent to sit supinely by
until the suspeoted eIlIployee has been convicted of disloyalty or other
similar misoonduct inconsistent with the interests of the national
security before it can sCPal~ate him from the Government service There
is no law which requires the Government to assume or endure such a risk
As was pointed out in an apt csae by the Supreme Court in American
Commtlnications v Douds speaking through the beloved late Chief
Justice Vinson
IfThat (first) amendment requires that one be permitted to
believe what he will It requires that one be permitted
to advocate what he will unless there is a clear and
present danger that a substantial public evil will result
therefrom It does not require that he be permitted to be
the keeper of the arsenal
I have not overlooked the fact that the loyalty and honesty of
the ovel~vhelming majority of all Government employeesmiddot is beyond quesshy
tion But their good reputations and character are far better proshy
tected from un1tfarranted criticism when we root out the few who are
unreliable and disloyal
What the critical situation of om time calls for is a lavr com
pt)lling testimony within the fr~neuro1Torl of the Constitution The tmshy
swer to this need is immuni-ty legislaiion which will be as broad as
the privilege W11ich is stJpplanted tV Then if a person is adjudged
ill cOlte~Pt for refusing to te3tify before a Cotgressional committee
he will know tZat t-le ~udgrnerJt of OOllt-empt will more likely stand up
on appeal free from oonstitutional ohal1enge
At the same time the l~w will also provide more adequate proshy
tection for the wit~ss
At presnt the witne31l is in a rtboxtl so to slJeGk The witness
is not exc~ed from an3werL~g merely because he believes his answers
Vlil1 incriminate him His slly-ao does not of its(gt~r establish the
1amphazeId of ilcriIltination II ~~ere he olaims his privil~ge it is
the ftL1ction of the jcge to dets-rmme whether the siJence of t1e
witness is justified or wha~1er the danger to be apprebenced is too
remote to be sl1bstattial To save himself from being held in conshy
tempt tl1e witness may oftcn be cOJIpEtled to disclos3 til0ne very
facts whtrh he claims are privileged iQ
Witnesses are alao aided by a b~oad immunity statute in still
another way Under our la unlike that of England t a disclosure of
any incriminating fact constitutes a wailer of the privilege as to deshy
tails con~erning that fact 211 Having made a partial disclosure of
faots the witness loses the rig~t to cease answering intel~ogat1ons
and rely upon his privilege at a 1ater point in his testimony
In one oase the detendant rree~ disclosed that she was Treasshy
urer of the Communist Pariy in COlorado and testified that she had
given the books ot the party to another person When asked to dishy
wlge the name ot the lamiddottter she refused upon the ground that the
answer might incriminate her mder the Sm1tb Act Atfirming her
conviction for contempt the Supreme Court speaking through Chief
Justice Vinson said
Since the privilege agatnlt salf-inorimination
presupposes a real danger ot legal detriment arising
from the disolosure petitioner cannot invoke the
privilege where response to the specific question in
issue here would not ftUtther inoriminate her O1aolo
sure of e tact waives the privilege as to details pound
This deoision leaves the law in a rather anomolous position tor the
vlitness A witness who refuses to answer aU questions and fails to Wcooperate to any extent may be protected by the claim of privilege
But there is no equal protection atforded by the decisions to the
witness who commences to eooperate but stops at a point where further
disclosure may tncrim1~ate him
Moreover it the witness refuses to answer on the ground that
Congress has exceeded its powers or that the inQuiry in lacking in
pertinency he construas the law at his peril If mistake8 his good 55
faith error of law constitutes no defense to fine and imprisonment
Then again it is claimed DY some that a persons election to
remain silent upon the ground of privilege does not necessarily mean
he has anything sinister to hide There are undoubtedly some people of
sincere principle who refl1se to disclose 1flformat1oft to authorized
1nvestigating authorities because of their feeling that ao one has any
right to 1~quire about their beliefs even if germane to the inquiry at 56
bsnd- There are other persons who refuse to answer because they feel
their recollections of events lons past are fee~le and that falsehood
even on trivial or irrelevant matters may subject them to a charge of
perjury There are still others less innocent vho say that coercing
them to testify under pain of contempt resembles the Soviet tactic of
requiring those SUilty not only to pay for but also to prcclatD their 57
guilt shy
~he use of broad tmmunity statutes serves to remove the dansers
mentioned for the iDPocent a~d operates aa an incentive for the guilty
to tell the truth
There are already two proposals pendin8 in Congress which seek to
compel the answer by witnesses at questioDs put to them before Conshy
gressiOl1al Committees grand juries or courts In exchange tor this
compulsory testimony the Witnesses will obtain complete immunity froa
prosecution
58 One Bill is s~ 565 This proposal grants immunity to ~itnesses
before a grand Jury or court of the United States when in the disshy
cretion of th~ Attorney General it is necessary to do so in the public
interest In exchange for this immunity the witness is compelled to
testify and to produce his books papers or recoIds s 565 uses
broad immunity lengtase in stating that the witness shall not be
prosecuted on account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he 1s compelled after ela~ing his privilege to testify or
produce evidence
In this respect s 565 is almost ident1cal to the immunity proshy59
vision sustained 8S valid by the Supreme Court e~ far back as 1896-
This Bill does not extend the immunity to witnesses before Congressional
Committees 601 61
There are other Bills pend-ing S 16- middot and H R 27371 with equally
broad immunity authority The Senate has passed its Bill but the House
Bill still awaits action Both these Bills grunt immunity to witnesses
before Congressional Committees but not to witnesses before grand
juries or courts
The proposed Bills are worded so that the witness will not get an
immunity bathU merely by testifying He must first raise specifically
his claim for privilege and thus put the Committee on notice whether
for the greater good the witness should be required to testify and 62
given immunity or whether he should be excused from testlfying-
However the discretionary power to grant the immunity is not vested
in the Attorney General bumiddott lies with the body conducting the investigation
If the proceeding is one before one of the Houses of Congress then
a majority vote of the members present is necessary Under S 16
if it is a proceeding before a committee two thirds of the members
must vote to grant the tmmunity In that event the tvothirds vote
must include at least two members of each of the two political parties
having the largest representation on such committee The House Bill
does not provide for notice to the Attorney General of the proposed
grant of immunity The Senate Bill provides for one weeks notice to
the Attorney General of the proposal but if the latter fails or reshy
fuses to assent to grant of immunity it may be conferred by majority
vote of either House It is hoped that this legislation will only be
resorted to where full diseloaure by witnesses is deemed of greater
tmportance than the possibility of punishing them for past offenses
By permitting one or several criminals to escape prosecution the
larger public peril contained in a gang of criminals or in their
leaders may be uncovered and the guilty brought to justice
The legislative proposals mentioned have much to commend them
In my opinion these bills would better achieve their purposes it they
required the concurrence of the Attorney General 1n the granting of any
immunity to a witness by a Joint Congressional Committee or either Heuse
committee or by Congress The Attorney General 1s the chief legal
officer of the Government of the United States As Buch it 1s his
responsibility to prosecute persons who offend the criminal laws of the
United states This responsibility must be coupled w1th adequate
authority to permit its discharge It would seem to be more advisable
for the Attorney General who has immediate knowledge of a criminals
background and propensities to decide whether immunity should be
granted for such a person To allow the Attorney General to participate
in the ultimate decision aa to whether immunity should be granted would
not impair Congressional investigatIons in the fields of internal
security crime and corruption Nor would it discourage witnesses
from providing information of importance to the investigation if the
Attorney Generals permission vas required before immunity was granted
On the other hand if these Bills were enacted in their present
form they might subject members of Congress to undue pressures for
granting immunity to criminals who are ineligible to receive it Also
they cuuld very easily cause embarrassment to Congress by tmped1ng or
blocking prosecutions planned by the Department of Justice on any matter 63
even incidentally testified to upon these 1nvestigations
The unfortunate experience which Congress had as far back as 1857 64
in granting immunity without concurrence of the Attorney General - should
~each that a similar course of action may be marked by eveD greater
failure today_ The witness might readily turn this division of authority
between Congress and the Department of Justice to his advantage by
obtaining an ~unity from the legislative committee or from Congress
over the objection of the Attorney General Thereafter he would be
free to testify concerning a broad area Of activities without fear that
he could be held to account criminally for other violations however
unrelated to the matter under investigation
Thus for example a Congreas1onal Committee or Congress might
furnish immunity to a person to obtain his testimony about his illicit
traffic in slot machine opercltlons between states This person may also
be guilty either of espionage or subversion or of selling narcotics to
youngs cers as to which an indictment is soon to be obtained To foreshy
close prosecution on these more serious crimes the witness would be
glad to volunteer information on his other activities if he knew in
advance that immunity would fallow for all of them Therefore greatest
care must be exercioed in granting immunity and then only upon a fully
informed judgment of all tle facts The Departlnent of Justice would
of course through the Fe~eral Bureau of Investigation the Crtmlnal
and Tax Divisions and the United states Attorneyo I offices be mosmiddott
likely to know the facts and the plans for prosecution Concurrence
by the Attorney General in conferring the immunity would also enable
the Department of Justice to maintuin its responsibility for the proper
administration of the crlminal law
The provision in S 10 for one weeks notice to the Attorney General
of the proposed grant of immunity does not fully cure this Bill of its
weakness in failing to require his affirmative concurrence in every
case Experience indicates that at times the views of the person who
1s charged with prooecut1ng criminals are disregarded by Congressional
Committees For example the successful criminal conviction obtained
by the Department of Justice ot the internal revenue collector in one of
the largest cities was recently nullified because of the action of a
House Committee in holding 1middotr1dely publicized hearings in the district in
65 which the trial subsequently took place These hearings took place
over the strong objection of the Department of Justice thut the pro
posed hearing would be of prejudice to the defendant on the trial
which was about to be initiated and would injure the Governments case
in disclosing its evidence In reversing the convlct1on l Chief Judge
Magruder observed that the character of the defendant was blackened
and discredited as the day of trial approached because of the publicity
invited and stimulated by the Committee over the radio and television
Thu6 1 mere advance notIfication to the Attorney General of a proposed
grant of tmmunity would never be a guarantee that the Committee would
be guided by the views of the Attorney General
S 16 and H R 2737 would also more readily carry out the aim of
obtaining evidence against leaders of subversion and criminal entershy
prisesj if provision for twmunity were granted to obtain testimony
not only before Congressional Committees but likewise before courts
and grand juries
For these reasons it is my opinion that if any measure is to be
enacted~~rmitting the granting of immunity to witnesses before either
House of Congress or its committees it should vest the Attorney General
or the Attorney General acting with the concurren~e of appropriate members
of Congress with the authority to grant such tmmunity and if the test shy
mony is sought for a court or grand jury that the Attorney General alone
be authorized to grant the ilmnunity
There remain for discussion two principal objections to this proshy
posed legislation which may be briefly considered here One objection
1s that when a witneAS is compelled to testify even under the protecshy
tion of immunity from criminal punihment) he is not relieved from
personal disgrace ~~lhich attach~8 to the exposure of his crime The
answer to this objection ia contained in II land mark decision of the 66
Supreme Court in Brown v Wrtlker
The design of tbe constitutional plivilege is not to aid the
witness in vindicating his character but to protect him
against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict him
of a criminal charge If he secure legal jnmllnity from prose-
cution the possible impairment of his good name is a penalty
which it is reasonable b0 should be compelled to pay for the
common good
The reasoning of this decision has never been qU~Gtioned and has 67
only recently been approved by the Sllpreme Court
The other chief objection to the proposed legislation is that while
a witness may receive itmlunity from federal prosecution) he may still
be subject to IJrosecution under ~tate lavl The Supreme Court has held
that this is not a valid objection to federal immunity laws~ since the
self-incrimination clause ln the Fifth Amendment operates ao a l1mitashy68
tion on the federal government only In United states v Murdock the
defendant was indicted for refUSing to answer questions of a revenue
agent relating to ctrt8 in income tax returns The refusal was ba sed on
the plea that hiD answers might 1ncrim1nate him in a state court The
Court said on this point
This court ha~ held that immunity against state prosecution is
not essential to the validity of federal statutes declaring that
a witnes3 shall not be excllpoundied from gtring evidence on the
ground that it vTill incriminate him and also that the ladt of
state power to give witnesses protection against federal
prosecution does not defeat a state immunity statute
Similarly a witness befo~e a state tribunal CBnnot refuse to 69
answer because of the threat of federal prosecution - However the
Federal District Court in Ohio recently held i1 Unted States v 70
Di Carlo that the defendant had the right to assert his privilege
because of possible prosecution under state law since the Senate
committee was authorized to investigate violations not only of the lawe 71
of the United States but also of the states M_ The Murdock case was
dtstingJished urlon the ground that the danger of state posecution 1n
that case was remote and uncertain thile in the Di Carlo case the
danger of state proaecutjon WilS imminent and real 72
The ---Di Carlo case has been received -lith mixed commelt It has73
not been followed so far as we k~ow- It appears to be contrary to deshy
cis10ns of co~~rts of appeals which have consistently adhered to the prinshy74
ciples of the Murdock case- In my opinion this decision of a district
court aoes not detract from the binding effect ofthe Supreme Courts deshy
eision in the Murdock case
The Department of Justice will recommend to the Congress in Jlouary
an immunity bill of the type I have descri-ced which protects the const1shy
tutional privileges ot witnesses before Congressional Committees courts
and juries but will at the some time aid materially in stamping out
criminal and subversive activities
Footnote Referet~es to Ad~res El~ited ~------ ___bull
Immunity From Prcsecuticn
Versus
Privilege Agaiust Self-Incrimination
Pittman liThe Colonial and Constitutional History of the
Privilege Against Sel-Incrimiootion 1n Amcicaff 21 Va
L R 763 764 770-773 (1935) Corwin The Supreme
Court I S Corctl~ction of the Self Incrirnination C1ause lf
29 lId~h L R 1 512 (1930) Ap~licability of
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to Legjslative
y Pittmenf2 at 774
~ ~ining v ~~8ey 211 U S 78 92 (1908)
L Id at 91
~ 34th Ceng 3d sess Globe PI 427 433 1-45 See
Eberling Constitutional Investigations pp 304-315shy
7 Eberling d at 320-323
~I 142 U s 547 (1892) This Act of 1862 revised an old
statute into two new sections by an amendment which
sought to insure that a witness who testified before
a federal grand jt~ or court (R s I 860 (1875raquo or
a Congressional Committee (R S B 859 (1875raquo would
not be later subjected to the use of his testimony in
any criminal proceeding aGainst him Section ~ 860 of
the amendment dealing with grand jurtes and courts came
under attack in Counselman v Hitchcock J supra and was
held to be invalid Since this part of the immunity proshy
vision tailed to accomplish ita purpose Congress repealed
it in 1910 (36 Stat 352 (19l0raquo) Congress apparently felt
that S 859 applying to Congressional Committees was still
of value and left it 1n force to this date (a s I 859
(1875) as amended 52 Stat 943 (1938) 18 usc e3486
(Supp V 1952)j see liThe Privilege Against Self
Incrimination versus Immunity Proposed Statutes 41
Georgetown L J 511 514 (1953) United States v ~
339 U s 323 335-337 (1950)
21 It read in patt as follows
No person shall be prosecuted for or on
account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he may testify or produce evidence
Act of Feb 11 1893 c 83 27 stat 443 49 USCA
I 46 See too ~ v United States 337 u S 137 146shy
147 (1949)middot Notet Denying -the Privilege against Self
Incrimination to Public Officers 64 Barv L R 987
988 (1951)
- 101 161 U s 591 (1896)
Shapiro v United St~~ 335 U S 1 6-7 (1948) where various
statutes are collated in the footnote The customary provision
in these statutes provides as follows No person shall be
excused from complying with any requirements ot this section
because of his privilege aga1nst self-incriminationgt but the
immunity provisions of the COmptuBory Testimony Act of
February 11 1893 shall apply with respect to allY 1nd1shy
vidual who specifically claims such pr1Y11ege tt
12 Rapacz ULimiting the Plea of Self-Incr1m1nat1ontl 20 Georgetown
L J 329 353 (1932) see footnote 3 of ~ v Connect~
302 U s 319 326 (1937) NPte liThe Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination the Doctr1ne of Waiver 61 Yale L J 104 110
(1952) middot
~f Palko v Connecticut 302 U s 319 326 (1937)
~ See dissents of Mr Justices Shiras Gray and White in ~ V4
Walker supra 161 U s 630638 Cf dissent of Mr Justice
Black in Ro~ers v United States 340 U s 367 376 (1950)
15 Potts Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for ContemptU I
74 U of Pa L R 691 780 (1926) L1acos uRights of Witnesses
Before Congressional Committees 33 Boston U L R 337 340
(1953) middot
t6 Liacos Id at 31tl
17 McGeary rlThe DeTelopmen-cs of Congressional Investigative Power ll
p 23 (1940) McGrain v Daughel~l 273 u s 135 (1927)
18 Sinclair v Unfted States~ 279 U s 263 (1929) ~arsba11 v
Unit~~State~ 176 F 2d 473 (nc Cir 1949) 2 Usc ~ 192
(Supp 1950)
19 Ne York City Bar Ass t n Committee on the Bill of Rights Report
on Congressional Committees presented December 14 1948 p 1
gQi Galloway PCong18ss1onal Investigations Proposed Reforms lt
18 U of Chi L R 478 479-481 (1951)
21 Dilliard lICongress1onal Investigations The Role of the Press
18 U of ChL L R 585 J 587 (1951)
22 Edgerton J dissenting in Barsky v United States 167 F 2d
241 252 (nc eir 1948) cert denied 334 U s 843 (1948)
petition for rehearing denied 339 U S 971 (1951)
~3 De Jonge v Oregon 299 U s 353 364 365 (1937)
24 Id
25 6 Richardson lIMes sOges and Papers of the Pres idents t 1 p 23
July 4 1861
26 See United St~~ v ~~phson 165 F 2d 82 (2 Cir 1947)
cert denied 333 u S 838 (1948) Lawson v United states
176 F 2d 49 (nc Cir 1949) cel~ denied 339 u s 934
(1950) Barsty Y ~ited S~ 167 F 2d 241 (DC eir
1948) cert denied 334 u s 843 (1948) MCGrain v Daugherty
273 u s 135 (1927) and cf Rumely v United States J 197
F 2d 166 (DC eir 1952) affd 73 s ct 543 (1953)
JJ B1a~ v ~~ted Sttlt~s 340 u s 159 (1950-)
gsectJ ~~ v United States 31~1 U s 479 (1951) See too
sectingleton v United States 343 U s 944 (1952) Note Recent
Extensions of the Witness Privilege Against Self-Incrim1nationll
53 Col L R 275 (1953)
29 Aiuppa v Un1tc~ states 201 F 2d 287 300 (6 eir 1952)
_I30 Note nMandatory Dismissal of Public Persol1nel and The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination 101 U ot Pa L R 1190 1191
fn 8 (1953)
31 Brown Be Fassett Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar
20 u or Chi L R 480 483 (1953)
32 Garner v Los Angeles Board) 341 u s 716 (1951) Gerende v
Board of Supervisors 341 U s 56 (1951) but com~are Wieman v
Updegraff 341~ U s 83 (1953)
34 See footnote 32
35 PG~ v Boa-roo of Education 31~2 U s 435 (1951)
ID Id at 493
38 Sec 9(h of lihe LalJor Management Rlations Act of 1947 29 USCA
St1Pp III Sec 141 Sec 159(b)
39 ft~rican C~~catons Association v ~uda 339 u S 382 (1950)
sustaining the validity of Sec 9(h) against the challenge that it
violated the First c-lT~nc1tlCiltl Ex Post FtiCto Lals and other iul1dashy
mental rights
40 Executive Order No 10450 issued Aporil zr 1953 (18 F R 2lt89)
41 Executive Orrler No 10491 issued Ocmiddottober 13 1953 (18 F R 6583)
~ Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary Interlocking Subshy
vcrs ion in Covernmcnt De~rtments II 83d Cong 1st ses5 Juy 30 J
1953 p 21 Being a cOImllunist is not a crime under federal law J
although it is in some states (see Liacos supra note 15 at
375) The Smith Act (18 USC Sec 2385 et seq) mkes advoshy
eating or teaching the violent overthrOf of any goverrment of the
United States or being a member of such a group and kno7ing its
purpose~a federal crime
43 See EaSley v F~cbardsonJ 182 F 2d 46 (DC 1950)J affd by an
evenly diiied court 341 TJ s 918 (1951) 1Etshingto v McGrath
182 F 2d 375 (DC 1950) aff1d 341 U s 923 (1951)j Or~~ v
vIil1ougbby 345 U s 83 91 (1953) Mr Justice Douglas concurring
i~ ~tiFascist Commi~~ v ~~EJ 341 U s 123 -182-183 (1951)
United Public W0rkers v --~1itcbell 330 U s 75 (1947)j Angilly - v
United States 199 F 2d 642) 644 (1950) cf NcAuliffe v rlew
Bedford 155 Mass 216 29 NE 517 (le9~) per Holmes J liThe
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but
he h(=l~s no constitltioi1al right to be a policezranu (Id at 220
29 NE at 5J7)
44 v1ie~sn _
v UpGegaff middot111 ~
3~middot4 u s 83 (1953) The Court ruleri as
contrry to due process the Cklahoma loyalty oath statute forshy
bidding IJ1l11ic emplo~rment of Persons who belonzea to certain
organizations regarciless of their knowledge of the character of
those oreenizations because of the indiscriminate classification
of lnnocent with kno~vilg activityll (d at 91)
~1 345 u S 83 (1953)middot
46 Id at 90
47 339 u s 3827 412 (1950) sustaininG the non-corJlIlunist affidavit
requirernelt of union leaders under the Taft -Hartley Act
~ Hoffman v United States 341 U s 179 (1951) suggests such
legislation if Congres3 concludes the lleed is great enough
See too Comment The Privilege Against Se1f-Llcriminetion Versus
Lmnurdty Z Proposed Statutes P 41 Gt~orgetom L J 511 (1953)
S Rept 153 on S 16 83d Cone 1st sess ~ 1 ald 2
April 17 1953 Report of Sel1a~~e Commttee on the JudiciaJ J
Interlocking S-lbversion in GOYf11llent Departments tl July 30
1953 83d Cong 1st sess p 50
~ HcfI1nan v Unitet States 341 u s 479 486 (1951)
50 Id U1ited States v ~isman 111 F 2d 260 262 (2 Cir 1950)
51 Note 61 Yale L J 105 109 (1952)
52 Rogers v United States 340 u s 367 375 (1951)
211 See e g Blau v Unjted StaIe~ 340 u s 159 (1950)
-shy54 Note J Co1t3resnic1al Inv estigat1ons--Self-Illcrimimtion Condemneshy
tiOll and Fair Hcar1ngll 22 U of Cinn L R 193 199-200 (1953)
55 See ~ovTn8end v ~~it~~ta~~3 95 F 2d 352 351 (DC Cir 1938)
cert denied 303 u S 664 (1938)
56 Byse TfA Report on the Pennsylvana Loyalty Act 101 U of Fa
L R 480 481-1~84 (1953) Wright Should Teachers Testify
Saturday Review Sept 2o 1953 p 23
57 See Meltzer Required Records The McCarran Act and The Privilege
Against Selfmiddotmiddot Incriminat ion ll 19 U of Chi L R 687 722 (1951)
y 83d Cong 1st Seas 1953 Also known as the Kefauver BUl
59 ~ v ltlalker 161 U S 591 (1896)
sect21 S 16 83d Cong 1st sess 1953 passed the Senate July 9 1953
after extensive debate Cong Ree 8646-8663 July 9 1953shy
S 16 amends B 3486 of Title 18 Sec 3486 presently furnishes
witnesses immunity from prosecution tor testimony before either
House or their Committees It appears to suffer from the same
deficiency present in a similar statute condemned in Counse~an v
Hitchcock 142 u s 547 (1892) S 16 is intended to StWP1y the
omission in the Hitchcock ease by providing not only that a
witness testimony may not be used against him but that such
witness shall be iImnune with respect to lIany transaction mtter
or thing concerning which he has been compelled to testIfy
sect 83d Congo 1st sess 1953
~ S Rept 153 83d Congo 1st sess p 2 (1953)
63 See Comment The Privi1ege Against Self-Incrimination Versus
Immunity Proposed statutes 41 Georgetown L J 511 523 (1953)
64 Supra footnote 7shy
sectif Delanel v ~ed States 199 F 2d 107 (1 Ci~ 1952)
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
speult ot all even undel legal compulsion Since wide publicity is
given to these proceedings by newspapers radio and television the
complaint is also that these perSOIlS investigated are exposed to
poscible insult oatruciom und loss of employment It is urged that
mere mention of a persons nome in c0110ection with an inveJtigation
that has wide-spred news vclue may create a distorted and unfair public 20
implession - Another point made is that proof of innocence may never 21
catch up with public It assertions of guilt It It is also said that if
these persons decline to profans any stutement of belief before a comshy22
mittee they iovite pUIiislIDl~lJt for contempt
Unquestionably every effort should be exerted to protect the right
of our people to speak and think freely As Chief Justice Hughes has
Hell said
The greater the importance of safeguarding the community
from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force
and violence the mOI~ imperative is the ne~d to preserve inviolate
the constitutioual lights of free speech free press and free
assembly in order to muintain the CJpportunity for free political
discussion l to the end that government may be responsive to the
will of the people and that changes if deSired may be obtained g)j
by peaceful means
~Je shOL1ld dread the dvy middotrhen the people could justifiably become
wary of explessing 1l110zthotLoJ or unpopular opinions or where rumor and
gossip are accepted as subotitutes for evidence
As egainst these threats to our precious liberties we must also
weigh the possible harm to the public scfety and lelfare without llhich
there can be no liberty for anyone yJhile the rights guaranteed by the
Firat Amendment may not be curtailed abuse of these rights may 24
properly be curbed
In his time Abraham Lincoln expressed the problem in these
distressed words ItMust CI government of necessity be too strong
for the libel~ies of its own people or too weak to maintain its own 25
eXistencel The same problem is with us today Obviously if Congress
is to legislate Vlisely with respect to subversion and other crime and
corruption it must not be obstructed from learning ~ho are its
leaders organizers and members the nature and scope of their activishy
ties the character and number of their adherents
I knmv of no constitutional right of privacy which immunizes a
person from giving evidence where an 1nquil~ is conducted by a legally
constituted Congressional committee Tbe person owes this duty as a
citizen just as he m~es the duty to furnish relevant and truthful
testimony in a court of law or gl~nd jury He violates his duty as a
citizen Then he suppresses the facts concerning criminal activity known
to him So long as the questions are pertinent and gel~ne to a lawful
inquiry of Congress the individual is not relieved from answering
because they delve into his private affairs his previous utterances 26
or his affiliations political or otherwise -- The constitutional
guarantee of freedom to epreS8 ones views does not include immunity
from Congressional inquiry as to hat one has said subject to ones
privilege against self-incrimination
Reference to several cases within the last few years demonstrate
how effectively Congressional Committees courts and grand juries have
been blocked in their efforts to uncover subversion as Hell as other
criminal activities because of reliance by 1middotritneases upon their
privilege
In one case the 1-1itness upon ground of privilege refused to anSler
questions before a grand jur7 as to whether she knew the names of the
State officers of the Communist Party of the State what its table of
organization waD vThether she was employed by it whethel she ever had
possession of Communist books and whether she turned the books over
to any particular person At the time the Smith Act was in effect
making it s crime for any person knowing its purposes to be a member
of any group uhich advocates the overthrow of the GovelDmellt Upon the
refusal of the itness to testify she as found to be 1n contempt of
court and sentenced to imprisonment for one year The COU1~ of Appeals
affirmed
Hm-1eve the Supreme Cou~t felt that her answers might furnish
a link in the chain of evidence necessary in a piosecution under the
Smith Act and that the witness was privileged to refuse to furnish any
such link Accordingly it unanimously reversed upon the ground that
prior decisions of this Court have clearly established that under such
circWl16tances the Constitution gives a -1itness the privilege of gy
remaining silent II
In the same way a Federal grand jury was prevented from obtaining
information in its investigation of narcotic and Hhite Slave traffic as
well as bribery perjury and other serious Federal violations 1111e
witness stood upon his privilege against self~incrimination in refusing
to respond to questions as to what he did for a living and whether he
knemiddot certain named pemiddot~son6 Hele again judgment of imprisonment
fo~ contempt was upbeld by the Court of Appeals but reversed by the 28
Supreme Couct with one judge dissenting - upon the ground that tiny
other conclu~ion Would seriously compromise an important constitutional
libecty In this cnse the court held that the defendant could refuse
to anSI-Tel questions innocent on their face since it appeared from the
climate of the investigation and the publicity given defendants
alleged criminal activity that his answers might implicate him in
some federal crime
In anothel cese a COl1gr~ssional Committee attempted in vain to
obtain information from a ~1tl1ess relating to the names of persona enmiddotmiddot
~ged in the manufacture and sale of gambling equipment and other
mutters Finally exaspeeted chief counsel fOl the Committee said
IlLet the record show that the witness just sits there mute Che1Ting
gum saying nothing 1I
The witness Has found guilty of contempt of court and sentenced
to six months in jail but judgment was reversed on appeal The Court
of Appeals declared that the methods used by the Committee for examinashy
tioD of witnesses constituted a triple th~ceat answer truly and you
have given evidence leading to your conviction for a violation of
federal lav anSler falsely and you will be convicted of perjury refuse
to aWn-Tel and you will be found guilty of criminal contempt and punished 29
by fine and imprisonment - In the opinion of the court the predicamiddot
ment in which the ltncss -Tas placed flaS contrary to fair play and in
direct violation of the Fifth Amendment
These decisions could be multiplied and undoubtedly represent
prevailing law Almo3t every heinous crime on the law books comshy
roitted by Inlt1ividuals or by groups J remains uncove ced because of the
privilege against self-incrimination But it is in the area of subshy
version and disloyalty particularly that the privelege has a field
day 11 It is haIe that legislatiye connnittees and grand juries are
held at bay for years from learning vlhich leaders are plotting the
countrys destruction merely because witnesses are relieved of giving
essential information upon the ground of privilege
It is little Vlonder that lat-l-ebiding citizens frequently are heard
to say that sub-rersives and other lrongdoers are unduly coddled by
existing law They express anlDzement that the Congress and the Courts
should conttnue to put up ith subterfuge and concealment 1 n place of
truth at a time 1vhen the peril from Communiam is 60 great and -1hen
crime 1s so rrunpa1t They earnestly ucge upon us the vital need for
modernizing the legal ~eapons for fighting subversion and crime
These pleas of the people for more dcastic action against subshy
version and other misconduct have not gone unheeded Some States and
cities provide fer the dismissal of public employees ho refuse to
testify on grounds of self-incrimination or Tho refuse to t-aive imshy30
munity from prosecution
Some States prescribe loyalty oaths for admission to the Bar -1hich
go beyond the traditional promise to uphold the State and National 31
Constitutions shy
Some States and municipalities have passed statutes requiring
affidavits of puhlic employees that they are not and have never 32
been Communists Some States make ineligible to teach in any public
school a person vTho was a memher of an organization which advocates the
~ overthimiddotow of the Government by force Some of these statutes have been
JY upheld us valid by the Supreme Cou~~ including the provision of the
New York State law which provides that mecbership by a person in an
organization listed as subve~sive by the Dcard of Regents shall constitute
prima facie evidence of disqualification for employment 1n the public 12
schools This was the so-called Feinberg Law aimed at protecting the school
children of lew York against teachels who were spreading communist propaganda
~e poisonous propaganda was Bufficiently subtle to escape detection in the
class room The New York Legislature recognized that while the schools must
attract and protect the critical minds the schools vlere not sanctuaries for
those who were committed to follot-l in the footsteps of Klaus Fuchs It sought
the next best solution by e4cluding froIij teaching those affiliated with certain
orgn1zations listed by the Board of Regents vlhich advocated the overthrow
of the government
One of the main constitutional objections to the law was that it vishy
alated the First Amendment by creating an atmosphere of fear which would
inevitably stifle freedom of speech The Court in an opinion by Judge
Minton formerly of the COUl~ of Appeals for this Circuit r~jected the conshy
tention that the la interfered Vlith free speech since persons uhave no right
to ork for the smiddottate in the school system on their own terms They may york
for the school system upon the reasonable terms laid d01n by the proper
authorities of Neu York If they do not choose to work on such terms they 36
are at libelty to ~etain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere 1
The Supreme Court -las also lholly unimpressed by the contention that
the law condoned guilt by association contrary to democratic concepts of
justice On this point the Court sald ilL teacher lOrks in a sensitive area
in a school room There he shapes the attitude of young minds toward the
society in which they live In this the state has a vital concern It must
preserve the integcity of the schools That the school authorities haVe
the right and duty to aceen the officials teachers and their employees as
to their fitness to majnjail1 the integrity of the schools as a part of an
ordered society cannot be doubtecl One I s associates past and present as
vell os one t a conduct moy proIJerly be considered in determining fitness
and loyalty From time immemoljal one t a reputation ha3 been determined by
the company he keeps In the employment of officials and teachers of the
school systeil the state may very properly inquire into the company they 37
keep n
The Fedel~al GOyernrlent (llso has taken effective measures to protect
the interests of netional cecu1ity One long step forward in that direction
was to enact legislation requiring non middotmiddotCommul1ist affidavits from trade
union leaders vihose unions rBnted to resort to the advantages of the Taftshy38
Hartley Act - Tl1e Ptllpose of thiu requirement vas to prevent disruption of 39
industry in obedience to Communist Party orders If the union leaderls
affidavit us false be CQuId be sent to jail
The Federal Government has also tried its best to clean its Gvln
house fI On April 27 1953 the President by Executive oXde~ established
his security requirements for employment so that pelsons employed by the
Federal Government will be reliable trustworthy of sood character and 40
loyal to the United States On October 13 1953 the President amended
his Executive order so as to provide that imiddotlbe~~e a government employee refuses
to testify before a Congressional Coramittee regarding charges of his diashy
loyalty or misconduct an agency may take this factor into consideration
in determining hethe~ the person I s continued employment is inconsistent ~_f 41
with the national securtty This emendment to the Presidents Executive
order is in accord i th my opinion that a government employee oTho claims
privilege in a Congressional investigation may be too much of a risk to be
retained in Federal Service
A recent Senate Report entitled tlInterlocldng Subversion in
WGovernment fl fully documents how former government employees were
able to spin their web of intrigue in positions of influ6nce The
Report states
1tlJ~e subcommittee exumined in public session 36 pershy
sons about whom it had substantial evidence of membership
in the Communist undergrolld 10 Government All of them
invoked tha fifth amenmnen~ ~~d refused to answer questions
regardicg COnrIranist membership on the grounds of self-in
crinlination Many reused even to eomowledge their own
sigl1attles on official Govelnment doclllllents in which they
haG SViorn to nonmernbership in the past
All)st all of he persons exposed by the evidence had
Bome connection which could be documented vith at least one-shy
a~d generally several--other e~o6ed persons Tney used eaoh
other s names for referenoe on ~licationa for Federal em-
p10~lOOnt They hire eaoh other They pomot~d eampQh other
hAY raised each others sal~ries They transfer~ampd eaah
otlwr from bureau to bureau from depariment to department
from congressional committee to congressional committee
They assigned each other to international missions They
vouched for each others loyalty end prctected each other
when exposure threaten~d ~ley often had common living
qUaters tI
Suppression i truth in any case is bad enough In no event
can it be justified by a Government employee or applicant for Govern
ment empl~Jment in the face of a Congressional inquiry where the
interests of the national Bect~lty are at stake No one denies that
the Government employee or applicant for such employment may conshy
stitutionally claim his privilege against self-incrimination On
the other hand no one has a constitutional right to a Government
job W True the Supreme Court ha held that the constitutional
protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant
to a statute Is patently arbitrary or discriminatory II W But in
my opinion there is nothing e1ther arbtrary or discriminatry about
diSDdssing a federal employee where he refuses to waive the privilege
against self-incrimination guaranteed him by tho Const tution We
find an analogous situation presented in the recent decision of the
~reme Court in Orloff v WilloughbY ~ In that case the peti shy
tioner a physician was denied a commission in the Army principally
tor the reason that when asked hether he was a member in any Communist JY
organizations he replied) Federal Constitutional privilege is claimed
In its opinion through Mr Justice Jackson the Supreme Court said
It ia argued that Orlorf 1s being punished for havshy
ing claimed a privilege which the Constitution guarantees
No one at least no ane on this Court which has repeatedly
sustained assertion by Communists of the privilege against
selfMincr~inatian questions or doubts Orloffs right to
withhold facts about himself on this ground No one beshy
l1evee he can be punished for doing so But the question
is whether be can at the same time take the position that
to tell the truth about himself Vlould incriminate him and
that even so the President must appofnt him to a post of
honor and trust le have no hesitation in answering that
question No II There is no law which requires the Gove~~ent to sit supinely by
until the suspeoted eIlIployee has been convicted of disloyalty or other
similar misoonduct inconsistent with the interests of the national
security before it can sCPal~ate him from the Government service There
is no law which requires the Government to assume or endure such a risk
As was pointed out in an apt csae by the Supreme Court in American
Commtlnications v Douds speaking through the beloved late Chief
Justice Vinson
IfThat (first) amendment requires that one be permitted to
believe what he will It requires that one be permitted
to advocate what he will unless there is a clear and
present danger that a substantial public evil will result
therefrom It does not require that he be permitted to be
the keeper of the arsenal
I have not overlooked the fact that the loyalty and honesty of
the ovel~vhelming majority of all Government employeesmiddot is beyond quesshy
tion But their good reputations and character are far better proshy
tected from un1tfarranted criticism when we root out the few who are
unreliable and disloyal
What the critical situation of om time calls for is a lavr com
pt)lling testimony within the fr~neuro1Torl of the Constitution The tmshy
swer to this need is immuni-ty legislaiion which will be as broad as
the privilege W11ich is stJpplanted tV Then if a person is adjudged
ill cOlte~Pt for refusing to te3tify before a Cotgressional committee
he will know tZat t-le ~udgrnerJt of OOllt-empt will more likely stand up
on appeal free from oonstitutional ohal1enge
At the same time the l~w will also provide more adequate proshy
tection for the wit~ss
At presnt the witne31l is in a rtboxtl so to slJeGk The witness
is not exc~ed from an3werL~g merely because he believes his answers
Vlil1 incriminate him His slly-ao does not of its(gt~r establish the
1amphazeId of ilcriIltination II ~~ere he olaims his privil~ge it is
the ftL1ction of the jcge to dets-rmme whether the siJence of t1e
witness is justified or wha~1er the danger to be apprebenced is too
remote to be sl1bstattial To save himself from being held in conshy
tempt tl1e witness may oftcn be cOJIpEtled to disclos3 til0ne very
facts whtrh he claims are privileged iQ
Witnesses are alao aided by a b~oad immunity statute in still
another way Under our la unlike that of England t a disclosure of
any incriminating fact constitutes a wailer of the privilege as to deshy
tails con~erning that fact 211 Having made a partial disclosure of
faots the witness loses the rig~t to cease answering intel~ogat1ons
and rely upon his privilege at a 1ater point in his testimony
In one oase the detendant rree~ disclosed that she was Treasshy
urer of the Communist Pariy in COlorado and testified that she had
given the books ot the party to another person When asked to dishy
wlge the name ot the lamiddottter she refused upon the ground that the
answer might incriminate her mder the Sm1tb Act Atfirming her
conviction for contempt the Supreme Court speaking through Chief
Justice Vinson said
Since the privilege agatnlt salf-inorimination
presupposes a real danger ot legal detriment arising
from the disolosure petitioner cannot invoke the
privilege where response to the specific question in
issue here would not ftUtther inoriminate her O1aolo
sure of e tact waives the privilege as to details pound
This deoision leaves the law in a rather anomolous position tor the
vlitness A witness who refuses to answer aU questions and fails to Wcooperate to any extent may be protected by the claim of privilege
But there is no equal protection atforded by the decisions to the
witness who commences to eooperate but stops at a point where further
disclosure may tncrim1~ate him
Moreover it the witness refuses to answer on the ground that
Congress has exceeded its powers or that the inQuiry in lacking in
pertinency he construas the law at his peril If mistake8 his good 55
faith error of law constitutes no defense to fine and imprisonment
Then again it is claimed DY some that a persons election to
remain silent upon the ground of privilege does not necessarily mean
he has anything sinister to hide There are undoubtedly some people of
sincere principle who refl1se to disclose 1flformat1oft to authorized
1nvestigating authorities because of their feeling that ao one has any
right to 1~quire about their beliefs even if germane to the inquiry at 56
bsnd- There are other persons who refuse to answer because they feel
their recollections of events lons past are fee~le and that falsehood
even on trivial or irrelevant matters may subject them to a charge of
perjury There are still others less innocent vho say that coercing
them to testify under pain of contempt resembles the Soviet tactic of
requiring those SUilty not only to pay for but also to prcclatD their 57
guilt shy
~he use of broad tmmunity statutes serves to remove the dansers
mentioned for the iDPocent a~d operates aa an incentive for the guilty
to tell the truth
There are already two proposals pendin8 in Congress which seek to
compel the answer by witnesses at questioDs put to them before Conshy
gressiOl1al Committees grand juries or courts In exchange tor this
compulsory testimony the Witnesses will obtain complete immunity froa
prosecution
58 One Bill is s~ 565 This proposal grants immunity to ~itnesses
before a grand Jury or court of the United States when in the disshy
cretion of th~ Attorney General it is necessary to do so in the public
interest In exchange for this immunity the witness is compelled to
testify and to produce his books papers or recoIds s 565 uses
broad immunity lengtase in stating that the witness shall not be
prosecuted on account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he 1s compelled after ela~ing his privilege to testify or
produce evidence
In this respect s 565 is almost ident1cal to the immunity proshy59
vision sustained 8S valid by the Supreme Court e~ far back as 1896-
This Bill does not extend the immunity to witnesses before Congressional
Committees 601 61
There are other Bills pend-ing S 16- middot and H R 27371 with equally
broad immunity authority The Senate has passed its Bill but the House
Bill still awaits action Both these Bills grunt immunity to witnesses
before Congressional Committees but not to witnesses before grand
juries or courts
The proposed Bills are worded so that the witness will not get an
immunity bathU merely by testifying He must first raise specifically
his claim for privilege and thus put the Committee on notice whether
for the greater good the witness should be required to testify and 62
given immunity or whether he should be excused from testlfying-
However the discretionary power to grant the immunity is not vested
in the Attorney General bumiddott lies with the body conducting the investigation
If the proceeding is one before one of the Houses of Congress then
a majority vote of the members present is necessary Under S 16
if it is a proceeding before a committee two thirds of the members
must vote to grant the tmmunity In that event the tvothirds vote
must include at least two members of each of the two political parties
having the largest representation on such committee The House Bill
does not provide for notice to the Attorney General of the proposed
grant of immunity The Senate Bill provides for one weeks notice to
the Attorney General of the proposal but if the latter fails or reshy
fuses to assent to grant of immunity it may be conferred by majority
vote of either House It is hoped that this legislation will only be
resorted to where full diseloaure by witnesses is deemed of greater
tmportance than the possibility of punishing them for past offenses
By permitting one or several criminals to escape prosecution the
larger public peril contained in a gang of criminals or in their
leaders may be uncovered and the guilty brought to justice
The legislative proposals mentioned have much to commend them
In my opinion these bills would better achieve their purposes it they
required the concurrence of the Attorney General 1n the granting of any
immunity to a witness by a Joint Congressional Committee or either Heuse
committee or by Congress The Attorney General 1s the chief legal
officer of the Government of the United States As Buch it 1s his
responsibility to prosecute persons who offend the criminal laws of the
United states This responsibility must be coupled w1th adequate
authority to permit its discharge It would seem to be more advisable
for the Attorney General who has immediate knowledge of a criminals
background and propensities to decide whether immunity should be
granted for such a person To allow the Attorney General to participate
in the ultimate decision aa to whether immunity should be granted would
not impair Congressional investigatIons in the fields of internal
security crime and corruption Nor would it discourage witnesses
from providing information of importance to the investigation if the
Attorney Generals permission vas required before immunity was granted
On the other hand if these Bills were enacted in their present
form they might subject members of Congress to undue pressures for
granting immunity to criminals who are ineligible to receive it Also
they cuuld very easily cause embarrassment to Congress by tmped1ng or
blocking prosecutions planned by the Department of Justice on any matter 63
even incidentally testified to upon these 1nvestigations
The unfortunate experience which Congress had as far back as 1857 64
in granting immunity without concurrence of the Attorney General - should
~each that a similar course of action may be marked by eveD greater
failure today_ The witness might readily turn this division of authority
between Congress and the Department of Justice to his advantage by
obtaining an ~unity from the legislative committee or from Congress
over the objection of the Attorney General Thereafter he would be
free to testify concerning a broad area Of activities without fear that
he could be held to account criminally for other violations however
unrelated to the matter under investigation
Thus for example a Congreas1onal Committee or Congress might
furnish immunity to a person to obtain his testimony about his illicit
traffic in slot machine opercltlons between states This person may also
be guilty either of espionage or subversion or of selling narcotics to
youngs cers as to which an indictment is soon to be obtained To foreshy
close prosecution on these more serious crimes the witness would be
glad to volunteer information on his other activities if he knew in
advance that immunity would fallow for all of them Therefore greatest
care must be exercioed in granting immunity and then only upon a fully
informed judgment of all tle facts The Departlnent of Justice would
of course through the Fe~eral Bureau of Investigation the Crtmlnal
and Tax Divisions and the United states Attorneyo I offices be mosmiddott
likely to know the facts and the plans for prosecution Concurrence
by the Attorney General in conferring the immunity would also enable
the Department of Justice to maintuin its responsibility for the proper
administration of the crlminal law
The provision in S 10 for one weeks notice to the Attorney General
of the proposed grant of immunity does not fully cure this Bill of its
weakness in failing to require his affirmative concurrence in every
case Experience indicates that at times the views of the person who
1s charged with prooecut1ng criminals are disregarded by Congressional
Committees For example the successful criminal conviction obtained
by the Department of Justice ot the internal revenue collector in one of
the largest cities was recently nullified because of the action of a
House Committee in holding 1middotr1dely publicized hearings in the district in
65 which the trial subsequently took place These hearings took place
over the strong objection of the Department of Justice thut the pro
posed hearing would be of prejudice to the defendant on the trial
which was about to be initiated and would injure the Governments case
in disclosing its evidence In reversing the convlct1on l Chief Judge
Magruder observed that the character of the defendant was blackened
and discredited as the day of trial approached because of the publicity
invited and stimulated by the Committee over the radio and television
Thu6 1 mere advance notIfication to the Attorney General of a proposed
grant of tmmunity would never be a guarantee that the Committee would
be guided by the views of the Attorney General
S 16 and H R 2737 would also more readily carry out the aim of
obtaining evidence against leaders of subversion and criminal entershy
prisesj if provision for twmunity were granted to obtain testimony
not only before Congressional Committees but likewise before courts
and grand juries
For these reasons it is my opinion that if any measure is to be
enacted~~rmitting the granting of immunity to witnesses before either
House of Congress or its committees it should vest the Attorney General
or the Attorney General acting with the concurren~e of appropriate members
of Congress with the authority to grant such tmmunity and if the test shy
mony is sought for a court or grand jury that the Attorney General alone
be authorized to grant the ilmnunity
There remain for discussion two principal objections to this proshy
posed legislation which may be briefly considered here One objection
1s that when a witneAS is compelled to testify even under the protecshy
tion of immunity from criminal punihment) he is not relieved from
personal disgrace ~~lhich attach~8 to the exposure of his crime The
answer to this objection ia contained in II land mark decision of the 66
Supreme Court in Brown v Wrtlker
The design of tbe constitutional plivilege is not to aid the
witness in vindicating his character but to protect him
against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict him
of a criminal charge If he secure legal jnmllnity from prose-
cution the possible impairment of his good name is a penalty
which it is reasonable b0 should be compelled to pay for the
common good
The reasoning of this decision has never been qU~Gtioned and has 67
only recently been approved by the Sllpreme Court
The other chief objection to the proposed legislation is that while
a witness may receive itmlunity from federal prosecution) he may still
be subject to IJrosecution under ~tate lavl The Supreme Court has held
that this is not a valid objection to federal immunity laws~ since the
self-incrimination clause ln the Fifth Amendment operates ao a l1mitashy68
tion on the federal government only In United states v Murdock the
defendant was indicted for refUSing to answer questions of a revenue
agent relating to ctrt8 in income tax returns The refusal was ba sed on
the plea that hiD answers might 1ncrim1nate him in a state court The
Court said on this point
This court ha~ held that immunity against state prosecution is
not essential to the validity of federal statutes declaring that
a witnes3 shall not be excllpoundied from gtring evidence on the
ground that it vTill incriminate him and also that the ladt of
state power to give witnesses protection against federal
prosecution does not defeat a state immunity statute
Similarly a witness befo~e a state tribunal CBnnot refuse to 69
answer because of the threat of federal prosecution - However the
Federal District Court in Ohio recently held i1 Unted States v 70
Di Carlo that the defendant had the right to assert his privilege
because of possible prosecution under state law since the Senate
committee was authorized to investigate violations not only of the lawe 71
of the United States but also of the states M_ The Murdock case was
dtstingJished urlon the ground that the danger of state posecution 1n
that case was remote and uncertain thile in the Di Carlo case the
danger of state proaecutjon WilS imminent and real 72
The ---Di Carlo case has been received -lith mixed commelt It has73
not been followed so far as we k~ow- It appears to be contrary to deshy
cis10ns of co~~rts of appeals which have consistently adhered to the prinshy74
ciples of the Murdock case- In my opinion this decision of a district
court aoes not detract from the binding effect ofthe Supreme Courts deshy
eision in the Murdock case
The Department of Justice will recommend to the Congress in Jlouary
an immunity bill of the type I have descri-ced which protects the const1shy
tutional privileges ot witnesses before Congressional Committees courts
and juries but will at the some time aid materially in stamping out
criminal and subversive activities
Footnote Referet~es to Ad~res El~ited ~------ ___bull
Immunity From Prcsecuticn
Versus
Privilege Agaiust Self-Incrimination
Pittman liThe Colonial and Constitutional History of the
Privilege Against Sel-Incrimiootion 1n Amcicaff 21 Va
L R 763 764 770-773 (1935) Corwin The Supreme
Court I S Corctl~ction of the Self Incrirnination C1ause lf
29 lId~h L R 1 512 (1930) Ap~licability of
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to Legjslative
y Pittmenf2 at 774
~ ~ining v ~~8ey 211 U S 78 92 (1908)
L Id at 91
~ 34th Ceng 3d sess Globe PI 427 433 1-45 See
Eberling Constitutional Investigations pp 304-315shy
7 Eberling d at 320-323
~I 142 U s 547 (1892) This Act of 1862 revised an old
statute into two new sections by an amendment which
sought to insure that a witness who testified before
a federal grand jt~ or court (R s I 860 (1875raquo or
a Congressional Committee (R S B 859 (1875raquo would
not be later subjected to the use of his testimony in
any criminal proceeding aGainst him Section ~ 860 of
the amendment dealing with grand jurtes and courts came
under attack in Counselman v Hitchcock J supra and was
held to be invalid Since this part of the immunity proshy
vision tailed to accomplish ita purpose Congress repealed
it in 1910 (36 Stat 352 (19l0raquo) Congress apparently felt
that S 859 applying to Congressional Committees was still
of value and left it 1n force to this date (a s I 859
(1875) as amended 52 Stat 943 (1938) 18 usc e3486
(Supp V 1952)j see liThe Privilege Against Self
Incrimination versus Immunity Proposed Statutes 41
Georgetown L J 511 514 (1953) United States v ~
339 U s 323 335-337 (1950)
21 It read in patt as follows
No person shall be prosecuted for or on
account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he may testify or produce evidence
Act of Feb 11 1893 c 83 27 stat 443 49 USCA
I 46 See too ~ v United States 337 u S 137 146shy
147 (1949)middot Notet Denying -the Privilege against Self
Incrimination to Public Officers 64 Barv L R 987
988 (1951)
- 101 161 U s 591 (1896)
Shapiro v United St~~ 335 U S 1 6-7 (1948) where various
statutes are collated in the footnote The customary provision
in these statutes provides as follows No person shall be
excused from complying with any requirements ot this section
because of his privilege aga1nst self-incriminationgt but the
immunity provisions of the COmptuBory Testimony Act of
February 11 1893 shall apply with respect to allY 1nd1shy
vidual who specifically claims such pr1Y11ege tt
12 Rapacz ULimiting the Plea of Self-Incr1m1nat1ontl 20 Georgetown
L J 329 353 (1932) see footnote 3 of ~ v Connect~
302 U s 319 326 (1937) NPte liThe Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination the Doctr1ne of Waiver 61 Yale L J 104 110
(1952) middot
~f Palko v Connecticut 302 U s 319 326 (1937)
~ See dissents of Mr Justices Shiras Gray and White in ~ V4
Walker supra 161 U s 630638 Cf dissent of Mr Justice
Black in Ro~ers v United States 340 U s 367 376 (1950)
15 Potts Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for ContemptU I
74 U of Pa L R 691 780 (1926) L1acos uRights of Witnesses
Before Congressional Committees 33 Boston U L R 337 340
(1953) middot
t6 Liacos Id at 31tl
17 McGeary rlThe DeTelopmen-cs of Congressional Investigative Power ll
p 23 (1940) McGrain v Daughel~l 273 u s 135 (1927)
18 Sinclair v Unfted States~ 279 U s 263 (1929) ~arsba11 v
Unit~~State~ 176 F 2d 473 (nc Cir 1949) 2 Usc ~ 192
(Supp 1950)
19 Ne York City Bar Ass t n Committee on the Bill of Rights Report
on Congressional Committees presented December 14 1948 p 1
gQi Galloway PCong18ss1onal Investigations Proposed Reforms lt
18 U of Chi L R 478 479-481 (1951)
21 Dilliard lICongress1onal Investigations The Role of the Press
18 U of ChL L R 585 J 587 (1951)
22 Edgerton J dissenting in Barsky v United States 167 F 2d
241 252 (nc eir 1948) cert denied 334 U s 843 (1948)
petition for rehearing denied 339 U S 971 (1951)
~3 De Jonge v Oregon 299 U s 353 364 365 (1937)
24 Id
25 6 Richardson lIMes sOges and Papers of the Pres idents t 1 p 23
July 4 1861
26 See United St~~ v ~~phson 165 F 2d 82 (2 Cir 1947)
cert denied 333 u S 838 (1948) Lawson v United states
176 F 2d 49 (nc Cir 1949) cel~ denied 339 u s 934
(1950) Barsty Y ~ited S~ 167 F 2d 241 (DC eir
1948) cert denied 334 u s 843 (1948) MCGrain v Daugherty
273 u s 135 (1927) and cf Rumely v United States J 197
F 2d 166 (DC eir 1952) affd 73 s ct 543 (1953)
JJ B1a~ v ~~ted Sttlt~s 340 u s 159 (1950-)
gsectJ ~~ v United States 31~1 U s 479 (1951) See too
sectingleton v United States 343 U s 944 (1952) Note Recent
Extensions of the Witness Privilege Against Self-Incrim1nationll
53 Col L R 275 (1953)
29 Aiuppa v Un1tc~ states 201 F 2d 287 300 (6 eir 1952)
_I30 Note nMandatory Dismissal of Public Persol1nel and The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination 101 U ot Pa L R 1190 1191
fn 8 (1953)
31 Brown Be Fassett Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar
20 u or Chi L R 480 483 (1953)
32 Garner v Los Angeles Board) 341 u s 716 (1951) Gerende v
Board of Supervisors 341 U s 56 (1951) but com~are Wieman v
Updegraff 341~ U s 83 (1953)
34 See footnote 32
35 PG~ v Boa-roo of Education 31~2 U s 435 (1951)
ID Id at 493
38 Sec 9(h of lihe LalJor Management Rlations Act of 1947 29 USCA
St1Pp III Sec 141 Sec 159(b)
39 ft~rican C~~catons Association v ~uda 339 u S 382 (1950)
sustaining the validity of Sec 9(h) against the challenge that it
violated the First c-lT~nc1tlCiltl Ex Post FtiCto Lals and other iul1dashy
mental rights
40 Executive Order No 10450 issued Aporil zr 1953 (18 F R 2lt89)
41 Executive Orrler No 10491 issued Ocmiddottober 13 1953 (18 F R 6583)
~ Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary Interlocking Subshy
vcrs ion in Covernmcnt De~rtments II 83d Cong 1st ses5 Juy 30 J
1953 p 21 Being a cOImllunist is not a crime under federal law J
although it is in some states (see Liacos supra note 15 at
375) The Smith Act (18 USC Sec 2385 et seq) mkes advoshy
eating or teaching the violent overthrOf of any goverrment of the
United States or being a member of such a group and kno7ing its
purpose~a federal crime
43 See EaSley v F~cbardsonJ 182 F 2d 46 (DC 1950)J affd by an
evenly diiied court 341 TJ s 918 (1951) 1Etshingto v McGrath
182 F 2d 375 (DC 1950) aff1d 341 U s 923 (1951)j Or~~ v
vIil1ougbby 345 U s 83 91 (1953) Mr Justice Douglas concurring
i~ ~tiFascist Commi~~ v ~~EJ 341 U s 123 -182-183 (1951)
United Public W0rkers v --~1itcbell 330 U s 75 (1947)j Angilly - v
United States 199 F 2d 642) 644 (1950) cf NcAuliffe v rlew
Bedford 155 Mass 216 29 NE 517 (le9~) per Holmes J liThe
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but
he h(=l~s no constitltioi1al right to be a policezranu (Id at 220
29 NE at 5J7)
44 v1ie~sn _
v UpGegaff middot111 ~
3~middot4 u s 83 (1953) The Court ruleri as
contrry to due process the Cklahoma loyalty oath statute forshy
bidding IJ1l11ic emplo~rment of Persons who belonzea to certain
organizations regarciless of their knowledge of the character of
those oreenizations because of the indiscriminate classification
of lnnocent with kno~vilg activityll (d at 91)
~1 345 u S 83 (1953)middot
46 Id at 90
47 339 u s 3827 412 (1950) sustaininG the non-corJlIlunist affidavit
requirernelt of union leaders under the Taft -Hartley Act
~ Hoffman v United States 341 U s 179 (1951) suggests such
legislation if Congres3 concludes the lleed is great enough
See too Comment The Privilege Against Se1f-Llcriminetion Versus
Lmnurdty Z Proposed Statutes P 41 Gt~orgetom L J 511 (1953)
S Rept 153 on S 16 83d Cone 1st sess ~ 1 ald 2
April 17 1953 Report of Sel1a~~e Commttee on the JudiciaJ J
Interlocking S-lbversion in GOYf11llent Departments tl July 30
1953 83d Cong 1st sess p 50
~ HcfI1nan v Unitet States 341 u s 479 486 (1951)
50 Id U1ited States v ~isman 111 F 2d 260 262 (2 Cir 1950)
51 Note 61 Yale L J 105 109 (1952)
52 Rogers v United States 340 u s 367 375 (1951)
211 See e g Blau v Unjted StaIe~ 340 u s 159 (1950)
-shy54 Note J Co1t3resnic1al Inv estigat1ons--Self-Illcrimimtion Condemneshy
tiOll and Fair Hcar1ngll 22 U of Cinn L R 193 199-200 (1953)
55 See ~ovTn8end v ~~it~~ta~~3 95 F 2d 352 351 (DC Cir 1938)
cert denied 303 u S 664 (1938)
56 Byse TfA Report on the Pennsylvana Loyalty Act 101 U of Fa
L R 480 481-1~84 (1953) Wright Should Teachers Testify
Saturday Review Sept 2o 1953 p 23
57 See Meltzer Required Records The McCarran Act and The Privilege
Against Selfmiddotmiddot Incriminat ion ll 19 U of Chi L R 687 722 (1951)
y 83d Cong 1st Seas 1953 Also known as the Kefauver BUl
59 ~ v ltlalker 161 U S 591 (1896)
sect21 S 16 83d Cong 1st sess 1953 passed the Senate July 9 1953
after extensive debate Cong Ree 8646-8663 July 9 1953shy
S 16 amends B 3486 of Title 18 Sec 3486 presently furnishes
witnesses immunity from prosecution tor testimony before either
House or their Committees It appears to suffer from the same
deficiency present in a similar statute condemned in Counse~an v
Hitchcock 142 u s 547 (1892) S 16 is intended to StWP1y the
omission in the Hitchcock ease by providing not only that a
witness testimony may not be used against him but that such
witness shall be iImnune with respect to lIany transaction mtter
or thing concerning which he has been compelled to testIfy
sect 83d Congo 1st sess 1953
~ S Rept 153 83d Congo 1st sess p 2 (1953)
63 See Comment The Privi1ege Against Self-Incrimination Versus
Immunity Proposed statutes 41 Georgetown L J 511 523 (1953)
64 Supra footnote 7shy
sectif Delanel v ~ed States 199 F 2d 107 (1 Ci~ 1952)
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
Firat Amendment may not be curtailed abuse of these rights may 24
properly be curbed
In his time Abraham Lincoln expressed the problem in these
distressed words ItMust CI government of necessity be too strong
for the libel~ies of its own people or too weak to maintain its own 25
eXistencel The same problem is with us today Obviously if Congress
is to legislate Vlisely with respect to subversion and other crime and
corruption it must not be obstructed from learning ~ho are its
leaders organizers and members the nature and scope of their activishy
ties the character and number of their adherents
I knmv of no constitutional right of privacy which immunizes a
person from giving evidence where an 1nquil~ is conducted by a legally
constituted Congressional committee Tbe person owes this duty as a
citizen just as he m~es the duty to furnish relevant and truthful
testimony in a court of law or gl~nd jury He violates his duty as a
citizen Then he suppresses the facts concerning criminal activity known
to him So long as the questions are pertinent and gel~ne to a lawful
inquiry of Congress the individual is not relieved from answering
because they delve into his private affairs his previous utterances 26
or his affiliations political or otherwise -- The constitutional
guarantee of freedom to epreS8 ones views does not include immunity
from Congressional inquiry as to hat one has said subject to ones
privilege against self-incrimination
Reference to several cases within the last few years demonstrate
how effectively Congressional Committees courts and grand juries have
been blocked in their efforts to uncover subversion as Hell as other
criminal activities because of reliance by 1middotritneases upon their
privilege
In one case the 1-1itness upon ground of privilege refused to anSler
questions before a grand jur7 as to whether she knew the names of the
State officers of the Communist Party of the State what its table of
organization waD vThether she was employed by it whethel she ever had
possession of Communist books and whether she turned the books over
to any particular person At the time the Smith Act was in effect
making it s crime for any person knowing its purposes to be a member
of any group uhich advocates the overthrow of the GovelDmellt Upon the
refusal of the itness to testify she as found to be 1n contempt of
court and sentenced to imprisonment for one year The COU1~ of Appeals
affirmed
Hm-1eve the Supreme Cou~t felt that her answers might furnish
a link in the chain of evidence necessary in a piosecution under the
Smith Act and that the witness was privileged to refuse to furnish any
such link Accordingly it unanimously reversed upon the ground that
prior decisions of this Court have clearly established that under such
circWl16tances the Constitution gives a -1itness the privilege of gy
remaining silent II
In the same way a Federal grand jury was prevented from obtaining
information in its investigation of narcotic and Hhite Slave traffic as
well as bribery perjury and other serious Federal violations 1111e
witness stood upon his privilege against self~incrimination in refusing
to respond to questions as to what he did for a living and whether he
knemiddot certain named pemiddot~son6 Hele again judgment of imprisonment
fo~ contempt was upbeld by the Court of Appeals but reversed by the 28
Supreme Couct with one judge dissenting - upon the ground that tiny
other conclu~ion Would seriously compromise an important constitutional
libecty In this cnse the court held that the defendant could refuse
to anSI-Tel questions innocent on their face since it appeared from the
climate of the investigation and the publicity given defendants
alleged criminal activity that his answers might implicate him in
some federal crime
In anothel cese a COl1gr~ssional Committee attempted in vain to
obtain information from a ~1tl1ess relating to the names of persona enmiddotmiddot
~ged in the manufacture and sale of gambling equipment and other
mutters Finally exaspeeted chief counsel fOl the Committee said
IlLet the record show that the witness just sits there mute Che1Ting
gum saying nothing 1I
The witness Has found guilty of contempt of court and sentenced
to six months in jail but judgment was reversed on appeal The Court
of Appeals declared that the methods used by the Committee for examinashy
tioD of witnesses constituted a triple th~ceat answer truly and you
have given evidence leading to your conviction for a violation of
federal lav anSler falsely and you will be convicted of perjury refuse
to aWn-Tel and you will be found guilty of criminal contempt and punished 29
by fine and imprisonment - In the opinion of the court the predicamiddot
ment in which the ltncss -Tas placed flaS contrary to fair play and in
direct violation of the Fifth Amendment
These decisions could be multiplied and undoubtedly represent
prevailing law Almo3t every heinous crime on the law books comshy
roitted by Inlt1ividuals or by groups J remains uncove ced because of the
privilege against self-incrimination But it is in the area of subshy
version and disloyalty particularly that the privelege has a field
day 11 It is haIe that legislatiye connnittees and grand juries are
held at bay for years from learning vlhich leaders are plotting the
countrys destruction merely because witnesses are relieved of giving
essential information upon the ground of privilege
It is little Vlonder that lat-l-ebiding citizens frequently are heard
to say that sub-rersives and other lrongdoers are unduly coddled by
existing law They express anlDzement that the Congress and the Courts
should conttnue to put up ith subterfuge and concealment 1 n place of
truth at a time 1vhen the peril from Communiam is 60 great and -1hen
crime 1s so rrunpa1t They earnestly ucge upon us the vital need for
modernizing the legal ~eapons for fighting subversion and crime
These pleas of the people for more dcastic action against subshy
version and other misconduct have not gone unheeded Some States and
cities provide fer the dismissal of public employees ho refuse to
testify on grounds of self-incrimination or Tho refuse to t-aive imshy30
munity from prosecution
Some States prescribe loyalty oaths for admission to the Bar -1hich
go beyond the traditional promise to uphold the State and National 31
Constitutions shy
Some States and municipalities have passed statutes requiring
affidavits of puhlic employees that they are not and have never 32
been Communists Some States make ineligible to teach in any public
school a person vTho was a memher of an organization which advocates the
~ overthimiddotow of the Government by force Some of these statutes have been
JY upheld us valid by the Supreme Cou~~ including the provision of the
New York State law which provides that mecbership by a person in an
organization listed as subve~sive by the Dcard of Regents shall constitute
prima facie evidence of disqualification for employment 1n the public 12
schools This was the so-called Feinberg Law aimed at protecting the school
children of lew York against teachels who were spreading communist propaganda
~e poisonous propaganda was Bufficiently subtle to escape detection in the
class room The New York Legislature recognized that while the schools must
attract and protect the critical minds the schools vlere not sanctuaries for
those who were committed to follot-l in the footsteps of Klaus Fuchs It sought
the next best solution by e4cluding froIij teaching those affiliated with certain
orgn1zations listed by the Board of Regents vlhich advocated the overthrow
of the government
One of the main constitutional objections to the law was that it vishy
alated the First Amendment by creating an atmosphere of fear which would
inevitably stifle freedom of speech The Court in an opinion by Judge
Minton formerly of the COUl~ of Appeals for this Circuit r~jected the conshy
tention that the la interfered Vlith free speech since persons uhave no right
to ork for the smiddottate in the school system on their own terms They may york
for the school system upon the reasonable terms laid d01n by the proper
authorities of Neu York If they do not choose to work on such terms they 36
are at libelty to ~etain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere 1
The Supreme Court -las also lholly unimpressed by the contention that
the law condoned guilt by association contrary to democratic concepts of
justice On this point the Court sald ilL teacher lOrks in a sensitive area
in a school room There he shapes the attitude of young minds toward the
society in which they live In this the state has a vital concern It must
preserve the integcity of the schools That the school authorities haVe
the right and duty to aceen the officials teachers and their employees as
to their fitness to majnjail1 the integrity of the schools as a part of an
ordered society cannot be doubtecl One I s associates past and present as
vell os one t a conduct moy proIJerly be considered in determining fitness
and loyalty From time immemoljal one t a reputation ha3 been determined by
the company he keeps In the employment of officials and teachers of the
school systeil the state may very properly inquire into the company they 37
keep n
The Fedel~al GOyernrlent (llso has taken effective measures to protect
the interests of netional cecu1ity One long step forward in that direction
was to enact legislation requiring non middotmiddotCommul1ist affidavits from trade
union leaders vihose unions rBnted to resort to the advantages of the Taftshy38
Hartley Act - Tl1e Ptllpose of thiu requirement vas to prevent disruption of 39
industry in obedience to Communist Party orders If the union leaderls
affidavit us false be CQuId be sent to jail
The Federal Government has also tried its best to clean its Gvln
house fI On April 27 1953 the President by Executive oXde~ established
his security requirements for employment so that pelsons employed by the
Federal Government will be reliable trustworthy of sood character and 40
loyal to the United States On October 13 1953 the President amended
his Executive order so as to provide that imiddotlbe~~e a government employee refuses
to testify before a Congressional Coramittee regarding charges of his diashy
loyalty or misconduct an agency may take this factor into consideration
in determining hethe~ the person I s continued employment is inconsistent ~_f 41
with the national securtty This emendment to the Presidents Executive
order is in accord i th my opinion that a government employee oTho claims
privilege in a Congressional investigation may be too much of a risk to be
retained in Federal Service
A recent Senate Report entitled tlInterlocldng Subversion in
WGovernment fl fully documents how former government employees were
able to spin their web of intrigue in positions of influ6nce The
Report states
1tlJ~e subcommittee exumined in public session 36 pershy
sons about whom it had substantial evidence of membership
in the Communist undergrolld 10 Government All of them
invoked tha fifth amenmnen~ ~~d refused to answer questions
regardicg COnrIranist membership on the grounds of self-in
crinlination Many reused even to eomowledge their own
sigl1attles on official Govelnment doclllllents in which they
haG SViorn to nonmernbership in the past
All)st all of he persons exposed by the evidence had
Bome connection which could be documented vith at least one-shy
a~d generally several--other e~o6ed persons Tney used eaoh
other s names for referenoe on ~licationa for Federal em-
p10~lOOnt They hire eaoh other They pomot~d eampQh other
hAY raised each others sal~ries They transfer~ampd eaah
otlwr from bureau to bureau from depariment to department
from congressional committee to congressional committee
They assigned each other to international missions They
vouched for each others loyalty end prctected each other
when exposure threaten~d ~ley often had common living
qUaters tI
Suppression i truth in any case is bad enough In no event
can it be justified by a Government employee or applicant for Govern
ment empl~Jment in the face of a Congressional inquiry where the
interests of the national Bect~lty are at stake No one denies that
the Government employee or applicant for such employment may conshy
stitutionally claim his privilege against self-incrimination On
the other hand no one has a constitutional right to a Government
job W True the Supreme Court ha held that the constitutional
protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant
to a statute Is patently arbitrary or discriminatory II W But in
my opinion there is nothing e1ther arbtrary or discriminatry about
diSDdssing a federal employee where he refuses to waive the privilege
against self-incrimination guaranteed him by tho Const tution We
find an analogous situation presented in the recent decision of the
~reme Court in Orloff v WilloughbY ~ In that case the peti shy
tioner a physician was denied a commission in the Army principally
tor the reason that when asked hether he was a member in any Communist JY
organizations he replied) Federal Constitutional privilege is claimed
In its opinion through Mr Justice Jackson the Supreme Court said
It ia argued that Orlorf 1s being punished for havshy
ing claimed a privilege which the Constitution guarantees
No one at least no ane on this Court which has repeatedly
sustained assertion by Communists of the privilege against
selfMincr~inatian questions or doubts Orloffs right to
withhold facts about himself on this ground No one beshy
l1evee he can be punished for doing so But the question
is whether be can at the same time take the position that
to tell the truth about himself Vlould incriminate him and
that even so the President must appofnt him to a post of
honor and trust le have no hesitation in answering that
question No II There is no law which requires the Gove~~ent to sit supinely by
until the suspeoted eIlIployee has been convicted of disloyalty or other
similar misoonduct inconsistent with the interests of the national
security before it can sCPal~ate him from the Government service There
is no law which requires the Government to assume or endure such a risk
As was pointed out in an apt csae by the Supreme Court in American
Commtlnications v Douds speaking through the beloved late Chief
Justice Vinson
IfThat (first) amendment requires that one be permitted to
believe what he will It requires that one be permitted
to advocate what he will unless there is a clear and
present danger that a substantial public evil will result
therefrom It does not require that he be permitted to be
the keeper of the arsenal
I have not overlooked the fact that the loyalty and honesty of
the ovel~vhelming majority of all Government employeesmiddot is beyond quesshy
tion But their good reputations and character are far better proshy
tected from un1tfarranted criticism when we root out the few who are
unreliable and disloyal
What the critical situation of om time calls for is a lavr com
pt)lling testimony within the fr~neuro1Torl of the Constitution The tmshy
swer to this need is immuni-ty legislaiion which will be as broad as
the privilege W11ich is stJpplanted tV Then if a person is adjudged
ill cOlte~Pt for refusing to te3tify before a Cotgressional committee
he will know tZat t-le ~udgrnerJt of OOllt-empt will more likely stand up
on appeal free from oonstitutional ohal1enge
At the same time the l~w will also provide more adequate proshy
tection for the wit~ss
At presnt the witne31l is in a rtboxtl so to slJeGk The witness
is not exc~ed from an3werL~g merely because he believes his answers
Vlil1 incriminate him His slly-ao does not of its(gt~r establish the
1amphazeId of ilcriIltination II ~~ere he olaims his privil~ge it is
the ftL1ction of the jcge to dets-rmme whether the siJence of t1e
witness is justified or wha~1er the danger to be apprebenced is too
remote to be sl1bstattial To save himself from being held in conshy
tempt tl1e witness may oftcn be cOJIpEtled to disclos3 til0ne very
facts whtrh he claims are privileged iQ
Witnesses are alao aided by a b~oad immunity statute in still
another way Under our la unlike that of England t a disclosure of
any incriminating fact constitutes a wailer of the privilege as to deshy
tails con~erning that fact 211 Having made a partial disclosure of
faots the witness loses the rig~t to cease answering intel~ogat1ons
and rely upon his privilege at a 1ater point in his testimony
In one oase the detendant rree~ disclosed that she was Treasshy
urer of the Communist Pariy in COlorado and testified that she had
given the books ot the party to another person When asked to dishy
wlge the name ot the lamiddottter she refused upon the ground that the
answer might incriminate her mder the Sm1tb Act Atfirming her
conviction for contempt the Supreme Court speaking through Chief
Justice Vinson said
Since the privilege agatnlt salf-inorimination
presupposes a real danger ot legal detriment arising
from the disolosure petitioner cannot invoke the
privilege where response to the specific question in
issue here would not ftUtther inoriminate her O1aolo
sure of e tact waives the privilege as to details pound
This deoision leaves the law in a rather anomolous position tor the
vlitness A witness who refuses to answer aU questions and fails to Wcooperate to any extent may be protected by the claim of privilege
But there is no equal protection atforded by the decisions to the
witness who commences to eooperate but stops at a point where further
disclosure may tncrim1~ate him
Moreover it the witness refuses to answer on the ground that
Congress has exceeded its powers or that the inQuiry in lacking in
pertinency he construas the law at his peril If mistake8 his good 55
faith error of law constitutes no defense to fine and imprisonment
Then again it is claimed DY some that a persons election to
remain silent upon the ground of privilege does not necessarily mean
he has anything sinister to hide There are undoubtedly some people of
sincere principle who refl1se to disclose 1flformat1oft to authorized
1nvestigating authorities because of their feeling that ao one has any
right to 1~quire about their beliefs even if germane to the inquiry at 56
bsnd- There are other persons who refuse to answer because they feel
their recollections of events lons past are fee~le and that falsehood
even on trivial or irrelevant matters may subject them to a charge of
perjury There are still others less innocent vho say that coercing
them to testify under pain of contempt resembles the Soviet tactic of
requiring those SUilty not only to pay for but also to prcclatD their 57
guilt shy
~he use of broad tmmunity statutes serves to remove the dansers
mentioned for the iDPocent a~d operates aa an incentive for the guilty
to tell the truth
There are already two proposals pendin8 in Congress which seek to
compel the answer by witnesses at questioDs put to them before Conshy
gressiOl1al Committees grand juries or courts In exchange tor this
compulsory testimony the Witnesses will obtain complete immunity froa
prosecution
58 One Bill is s~ 565 This proposal grants immunity to ~itnesses
before a grand Jury or court of the United States when in the disshy
cretion of th~ Attorney General it is necessary to do so in the public
interest In exchange for this immunity the witness is compelled to
testify and to produce his books papers or recoIds s 565 uses
broad immunity lengtase in stating that the witness shall not be
prosecuted on account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he 1s compelled after ela~ing his privilege to testify or
produce evidence
In this respect s 565 is almost ident1cal to the immunity proshy59
vision sustained 8S valid by the Supreme Court e~ far back as 1896-
This Bill does not extend the immunity to witnesses before Congressional
Committees 601 61
There are other Bills pend-ing S 16- middot and H R 27371 with equally
broad immunity authority The Senate has passed its Bill but the House
Bill still awaits action Both these Bills grunt immunity to witnesses
before Congressional Committees but not to witnesses before grand
juries or courts
The proposed Bills are worded so that the witness will not get an
immunity bathU merely by testifying He must first raise specifically
his claim for privilege and thus put the Committee on notice whether
for the greater good the witness should be required to testify and 62
given immunity or whether he should be excused from testlfying-
However the discretionary power to grant the immunity is not vested
in the Attorney General bumiddott lies with the body conducting the investigation
If the proceeding is one before one of the Houses of Congress then
a majority vote of the members present is necessary Under S 16
if it is a proceeding before a committee two thirds of the members
must vote to grant the tmmunity In that event the tvothirds vote
must include at least two members of each of the two political parties
having the largest representation on such committee The House Bill
does not provide for notice to the Attorney General of the proposed
grant of immunity The Senate Bill provides for one weeks notice to
the Attorney General of the proposal but if the latter fails or reshy
fuses to assent to grant of immunity it may be conferred by majority
vote of either House It is hoped that this legislation will only be
resorted to where full diseloaure by witnesses is deemed of greater
tmportance than the possibility of punishing them for past offenses
By permitting one or several criminals to escape prosecution the
larger public peril contained in a gang of criminals or in their
leaders may be uncovered and the guilty brought to justice
The legislative proposals mentioned have much to commend them
In my opinion these bills would better achieve their purposes it they
required the concurrence of the Attorney General 1n the granting of any
immunity to a witness by a Joint Congressional Committee or either Heuse
committee or by Congress The Attorney General 1s the chief legal
officer of the Government of the United States As Buch it 1s his
responsibility to prosecute persons who offend the criminal laws of the
United states This responsibility must be coupled w1th adequate
authority to permit its discharge It would seem to be more advisable
for the Attorney General who has immediate knowledge of a criminals
background and propensities to decide whether immunity should be
granted for such a person To allow the Attorney General to participate
in the ultimate decision aa to whether immunity should be granted would
not impair Congressional investigatIons in the fields of internal
security crime and corruption Nor would it discourage witnesses
from providing information of importance to the investigation if the
Attorney Generals permission vas required before immunity was granted
On the other hand if these Bills were enacted in their present
form they might subject members of Congress to undue pressures for
granting immunity to criminals who are ineligible to receive it Also
they cuuld very easily cause embarrassment to Congress by tmped1ng or
blocking prosecutions planned by the Department of Justice on any matter 63
even incidentally testified to upon these 1nvestigations
The unfortunate experience which Congress had as far back as 1857 64
in granting immunity without concurrence of the Attorney General - should
~each that a similar course of action may be marked by eveD greater
failure today_ The witness might readily turn this division of authority
between Congress and the Department of Justice to his advantage by
obtaining an ~unity from the legislative committee or from Congress
over the objection of the Attorney General Thereafter he would be
free to testify concerning a broad area Of activities without fear that
he could be held to account criminally for other violations however
unrelated to the matter under investigation
Thus for example a Congreas1onal Committee or Congress might
furnish immunity to a person to obtain his testimony about his illicit
traffic in slot machine opercltlons between states This person may also
be guilty either of espionage or subversion or of selling narcotics to
youngs cers as to which an indictment is soon to be obtained To foreshy
close prosecution on these more serious crimes the witness would be
glad to volunteer information on his other activities if he knew in
advance that immunity would fallow for all of them Therefore greatest
care must be exercioed in granting immunity and then only upon a fully
informed judgment of all tle facts The Departlnent of Justice would
of course through the Fe~eral Bureau of Investigation the Crtmlnal
and Tax Divisions and the United states Attorneyo I offices be mosmiddott
likely to know the facts and the plans for prosecution Concurrence
by the Attorney General in conferring the immunity would also enable
the Department of Justice to maintuin its responsibility for the proper
administration of the crlminal law
The provision in S 10 for one weeks notice to the Attorney General
of the proposed grant of immunity does not fully cure this Bill of its
weakness in failing to require his affirmative concurrence in every
case Experience indicates that at times the views of the person who
1s charged with prooecut1ng criminals are disregarded by Congressional
Committees For example the successful criminal conviction obtained
by the Department of Justice ot the internal revenue collector in one of
the largest cities was recently nullified because of the action of a
House Committee in holding 1middotr1dely publicized hearings in the district in
65 which the trial subsequently took place These hearings took place
over the strong objection of the Department of Justice thut the pro
posed hearing would be of prejudice to the defendant on the trial
which was about to be initiated and would injure the Governments case
in disclosing its evidence In reversing the convlct1on l Chief Judge
Magruder observed that the character of the defendant was blackened
and discredited as the day of trial approached because of the publicity
invited and stimulated by the Committee over the radio and television
Thu6 1 mere advance notIfication to the Attorney General of a proposed
grant of tmmunity would never be a guarantee that the Committee would
be guided by the views of the Attorney General
S 16 and H R 2737 would also more readily carry out the aim of
obtaining evidence against leaders of subversion and criminal entershy
prisesj if provision for twmunity were granted to obtain testimony
not only before Congressional Committees but likewise before courts
and grand juries
For these reasons it is my opinion that if any measure is to be
enacted~~rmitting the granting of immunity to witnesses before either
House of Congress or its committees it should vest the Attorney General
or the Attorney General acting with the concurren~e of appropriate members
of Congress with the authority to grant such tmmunity and if the test shy
mony is sought for a court or grand jury that the Attorney General alone
be authorized to grant the ilmnunity
There remain for discussion two principal objections to this proshy
posed legislation which may be briefly considered here One objection
1s that when a witneAS is compelled to testify even under the protecshy
tion of immunity from criminal punihment) he is not relieved from
personal disgrace ~~lhich attach~8 to the exposure of his crime The
answer to this objection ia contained in II land mark decision of the 66
Supreme Court in Brown v Wrtlker
The design of tbe constitutional plivilege is not to aid the
witness in vindicating his character but to protect him
against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict him
of a criminal charge If he secure legal jnmllnity from prose-
cution the possible impairment of his good name is a penalty
which it is reasonable b0 should be compelled to pay for the
common good
The reasoning of this decision has never been qU~Gtioned and has 67
only recently been approved by the Sllpreme Court
The other chief objection to the proposed legislation is that while
a witness may receive itmlunity from federal prosecution) he may still
be subject to IJrosecution under ~tate lavl The Supreme Court has held
that this is not a valid objection to federal immunity laws~ since the
self-incrimination clause ln the Fifth Amendment operates ao a l1mitashy68
tion on the federal government only In United states v Murdock the
defendant was indicted for refUSing to answer questions of a revenue
agent relating to ctrt8 in income tax returns The refusal was ba sed on
the plea that hiD answers might 1ncrim1nate him in a state court The
Court said on this point
This court ha~ held that immunity against state prosecution is
not essential to the validity of federal statutes declaring that
a witnes3 shall not be excllpoundied from gtring evidence on the
ground that it vTill incriminate him and also that the ladt of
state power to give witnesses protection against federal
prosecution does not defeat a state immunity statute
Similarly a witness befo~e a state tribunal CBnnot refuse to 69
answer because of the threat of federal prosecution - However the
Federal District Court in Ohio recently held i1 Unted States v 70
Di Carlo that the defendant had the right to assert his privilege
because of possible prosecution under state law since the Senate
committee was authorized to investigate violations not only of the lawe 71
of the United States but also of the states M_ The Murdock case was
dtstingJished urlon the ground that the danger of state posecution 1n
that case was remote and uncertain thile in the Di Carlo case the
danger of state proaecutjon WilS imminent and real 72
The ---Di Carlo case has been received -lith mixed commelt It has73
not been followed so far as we k~ow- It appears to be contrary to deshy
cis10ns of co~~rts of appeals which have consistently adhered to the prinshy74
ciples of the Murdock case- In my opinion this decision of a district
court aoes not detract from the binding effect ofthe Supreme Courts deshy
eision in the Murdock case
The Department of Justice will recommend to the Congress in Jlouary
an immunity bill of the type I have descri-ced which protects the const1shy
tutional privileges ot witnesses before Congressional Committees courts
and juries but will at the some time aid materially in stamping out
criminal and subversive activities
Footnote Referet~es to Ad~res El~ited ~------ ___bull
Immunity From Prcsecuticn
Versus
Privilege Agaiust Self-Incrimination
Pittman liThe Colonial and Constitutional History of the
Privilege Against Sel-Incrimiootion 1n Amcicaff 21 Va
L R 763 764 770-773 (1935) Corwin The Supreme
Court I S Corctl~ction of the Self Incrirnination C1ause lf
29 lId~h L R 1 512 (1930) Ap~licability of
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to Legjslative
y Pittmenf2 at 774
~ ~ining v ~~8ey 211 U S 78 92 (1908)
L Id at 91
~ 34th Ceng 3d sess Globe PI 427 433 1-45 See
Eberling Constitutional Investigations pp 304-315shy
7 Eberling d at 320-323
~I 142 U s 547 (1892) This Act of 1862 revised an old
statute into two new sections by an amendment which
sought to insure that a witness who testified before
a federal grand jt~ or court (R s I 860 (1875raquo or
a Congressional Committee (R S B 859 (1875raquo would
not be later subjected to the use of his testimony in
any criminal proceeding aGainst him Section ~ 860 of
the amendment dealing with grand jurtes and courts came
under attack in Counselman v Hitchcock J supra and was
held to be invalid Since this part of the immunity proshy
vision tailed to accomplish ita purpose Congress repealed
it in 1910 (36 Stat 352 (19l0raquo) Congress apparently felt
that S 859 applying to Congressional Committees was still
of value and left it 1n force to this date (a s I 859
(1875) as amended 52 Stat 943 (1938) 18 usc e3486
(Supp V 1952)j see liThe Privilege Against Self
Incrimination versus Immunity Proposed Statutes 41
Georgetown L J 511 514 (1953) United States v ~
339 U s 323 335-337 (1950)
21 It read in patt as follows
No person shall be prosecuted for or on
account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he may testify or produce evidence
Act of Feb 11 1893 c 83 27 stat 443 49 USCA
I 46 See too ~ v United States 337 u S 137 146shy
147 (1949)middot Notet Denying -the Privilege against Self
Incrimination to Public Officers 64 Barv L R 987
988 (1951)
- 101 161 U s 591 (1896)
Shapiro v United St~~ 335 U S 1 6-7 (1948) where various
statutes are collated in the footnote The customary provision
in these statutes provides as follows No person shall be
excused from complying with any requirements ot this section
because of his privilege aga1nst self-incriminationgt but the
immunity provisions of the COmptuBory Testimony Act of
February 11 1893 shall apply with respect to allY 1nd1shy
vidual who specifically claims such pr1Y11ege tt
12 Rapacz ULimiting the Plea of Self-Incr1m1nat1ontl 20 Georgetown
L J 329 353 (1932) see footnote 3 of ~ v Connect~
302 U s 319 326 (1937) NPte liThe Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination the Doctr1ne of Waiver 61 Yale L J 104 110
(1952) middot
~f Palko v Connecticut 302 U s 319 326 (1937)
~ See dissents of Mr Justices Shiras Gray and White in ~ V4
Walker supra 161 U s 630638 Cf dissent of Mr Justice
Black in Ro~ers v United States 340 U s 367 376 (1950)
15 Potts Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for ContemptU I
74 U of Pa L R 691 780 (1926) L1acos uRights of Witnesses
Before Congressional Committees 33 Boston U L R 337 340
(1953) middot
t6 Liacos Id at 31tl
17 McGeary rlThe DeTelopmen-cs of Congressional Investigative Power ll
p 23 (1940) McGrain v Daughel~l 273 u s 135 (1927)
18 Sinclair v Unfted States~ 279 U s 263 (1929) ~arsba11 v
Unit~~State~ 176 F 2d 473 (nc Cir 1949) 2 Usc ~ 192
(Supp 1950)
19 Ne York City Bar Ass t n Committee on the Bill of Rights Report
on Congressional Committees presented December 14 1948 p 1
gQi Galloway PCong18ss1onal Investigations Proposed Reforms lt
18 U of Chi L R 478 479-481 (1951)
21 Dilliard lICongress1onal Investigations The Role of the Press
18 U of ChL L R 585 J 587 (1951)
22 Edgerton J dissenting in Barsky v United States 167 F 2d
241 252 (nc eir 1948) cert denied 334 U s 843 (1948)
petition for rehearing denied 339 U S 971 (1951)
~3 De Jonge v Oregon 299 U s 353 364 365 (1937)
24 Id
25 6 Richardson lIMes sOges and Papers of the Pres idents t 1 p 23
July 4 1861
26 See United St~~ v ~~phson 165 F 2d 82 (2 Cir 1947)
cert denied 333 u S 838 (1948) Lawson v United states
176 F 2d 49 (nc Cir 1949) cel~ denied 339 u s 934
(1950) Barsty Y ~ited S~ 167 F 2d 241 (DC eir
1948) cert denied 334 u s 843 (1948) MCGrain v Daugherty
273 u s 135 (1927) and cf Rumely v United States J 197
F 2d 166 (DC eir 1952) affd 73 s ct 543 (1953)
JJ B1a~ v ~~ted Sttlt~s 340 u s 159 (1950-)
gsectJ ~~ v United States 31~1 U s 479 (1951) See too
sectingleton v United States 343 U s 944 (1952) Note Recent
Extensions of the Witness Privilege Against Self-Incrim1nationll
53 Col L R 275 (1953)
29 Aiuppa v Un1tc~ states 201 F 2d 287 300 (6 eir 1952)
_I30 Note nMandatory Dismissal of Public Persol1nel and The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination 101 U ot Pa L R 1190 1191
fn 8 (1953)
31 Brown Be Fassett Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar
20 u or Chi L R 480 483 (1953)
32 Garner v Los Angeles Board) 341 u s 716 (1951) Gerende v
Board of Supervisors 341 U s 56 (1951) but com~are Wieman v
Updegraff 341~ U s 83 (1953)
34 See footnote 32
35 PG~ v Boa-roo of Education 31~2 U s 435 (1951)
ID Id at 493
38 Sec 9(h of lihe LalJor Management Rlations Act of 1947 29 USCA
St1Pp III Sec 141 Sec 159(b)
39 ft~rican C~~catons Association v ~uda 339 u S 382 (1950)
sustaining the validity of Sec 9(h) against the challenge that it
violated the First c-lT~nc1tlCiltl Ex Post FtiCto Lals and other iul1dashy
mental rights
40 Executive Order No 10450 issued Aporil zr 1953 (18 F R 2lt89)
41 Executive Orrler No 10491 issued Ocmiddottober 13 1953 (18 F R 6583)
~ Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary Interlocking Subshy
vcrs ion in Covernmcnt De~rtments II 83d Cong 1st ses5 Juy 30 J
1953 p 21 Being a cOImllunist is not a crime under federal law J
although it is in some states (see Liacos supra note 15 at
375) The Smith Act (18 USC Sec 2385 et seq) mkes advoshy
eating or teaching the violent overthrOf of any goverrment of the
United States or being a member of such a group and kno7ing its
purpose~a federal crime
43 See EaSley v F~cbardsonJ 182 F 2d 46 (DC 1950)J affd by an
evenly diiied court 341 TJ s 918 (1951) 1Etshingto v McGrath
182 F 2d 375 (DC 1950) aff1d 341 U s 923 (1951)j Or~~ v
vIil1ougbby 345 U s 83 91 (1953) Mr Justice Douglas concurring
i~ ~tiFascist Commi~~ v ~~EJ 341 U s 123 -182-183 (1951)
United Public W0rkers v --~1itcbell 330 U s 75 (1947)j Angilly - v
United States 199 F 2d 642) 644 (1950) cf NcAuliffe v rlew
Bedford 155 Mass 216 29 NE 517 (le9~) per Holmes J liThe
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but
he h(=l~s no constitltioi1al right to be a policezranu (Id at 220
29 NE at 5J7)
44 v1ie~sn _
v UpGegaff middot111 ~
3~middot4 u s 83 (1953) The Court ruleri as
contrry to due process the Cklahoma loyalty oath statute forshy
bidding IJ1l11ic emplo~rment of Persons who belonzea to certain
organizations regarciless of their knowledge of the character of
those oreenizations because of the indiscriminate classification
of lnnocent with kno~vilg activityll (d at 91)
~1 345 u S 83 (1953)middot
46 Id at 90
47 339 u s 3827 412 (1950) sustaininG the non-corJlIlunist affidavit
requirernelt of union leaders under the Taft -Hartley Act
~ Hoffman v United States 341 U s 179 (1951) suggests such
legislation if Congres3 concludes the lleed is great enough
See too Comment The Privilege Against Se1f-Llcriminetion Versus
Lmnurdty Z Proposed Statutes P 41 Gt~orgetom L J 511 (1953)
S Rept 153 on S 16 83d Cone 1st sess ~ 1 ald 2
April 17 1953 Report of Sel1a~~e Commttee on the JudiciaJ J
Interlocking S-lbversion in GOYf11llent Departments tl July 30
1953 83d Cong 1st sess p 50
~ HcfI1nan v Unitet States 341 u s 479 486 (1951)
50 Id U1ited States v ~isman 111 F 2d 260 262 (2 Cir 1950)
51 Note 61 Yale L J 105 109 (1952)
52 Rogers v United States 340 u s 367 375 (1951)
211 See e g Blau v Unjted StaIe~ 340 u s 159 (1950)
-shy54 Note J Co1t3resnic1al Inv estigat1ons--Self-Illcrimimtion Condemneshy
tiOll and Fair Hcar1ngll 22 U of Cinn L R 193 199-200 (1953)
55 See ~ovTn8end v ~~it~~ta~~3 95 F 2d 352 351 (DC Cir 1938)
cert denied 303 u S 664 (1938)
56 Byse TfA Report on the Pennsylvana Loyalty Act 101 U of Fa
L R 480 481-1~84 (1953) Wright Should Teachers Testify
Saturday Review Sept 2o 1953 p 23
57 See Meltzer Required Records The McCarran Act and The Privilege
Against Selfmiddotmiddot Incriminat ion ll 19 U of Chi L R 687 722 (1951)
y 83d Cong 1st Seas 1953 Also known as the Kefauver BUl
59 ~ v ltlalker 161 U S 591 (1896)
sect21 S 16 83d Cong 1st sess 1953 passed the Senate July 9 1953
after extensive debate Cong Ree 8646-8663 July 9 1953shy
S 16 amends B 3486 of Title 18 Sec 3486 presently furnishes
witnesses immunity from prosecution tor testimony before either
House or their Committees It appears to suffer from the same
deficiency present in a similar statute condemned in Counse~an v
Hitchcock 142 u s 547 (1892) S 16 is intended to StWP1y the
omission in the Hitchcock ease by providing not only that a
witness testimony may not be used against him but that such
witness shall be iImnune with respect to lIany transaction mtter
or thing concerning which he has been compelled to testIfy
sect 83d Congo 1st sess 1953
~ S Rept 153 83d Congo 1st sess p 2 (1953)
63 See Comment The Privi1ege Against Self-Incrimination Versus
Immunity Proposed statutes 41 Georgetown L J 511 523 (1953)
64 Supra footnote 7shy
sectif Delanel v ~ed States 199 F 2d 107 (1 Ci~ 1952)
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
been blocked in their efforts to uncover subversion as Hell as other
criminal activities because of reliance by 1middotritneases upon their
privilege
In one case the 1-1itness upon ground of privilege refused to anSler
questions before a grand jur7 as to whether she knew the names of the
State officers of the Communist Party of the State what its table of
organization waD vThether she was employed by it whethel she ever had
possession of Communist books and whether she turned the books over
to any particular person At the time the Smith Act was in effect
making it s crime for any person knowing its purposes to be a member
of any group uhich advocates the overthrow of the GovelDmellt Upon the
refusal of the itness to testify she as found to be 1n contempt of
court and sentenced to imprisonment for one year The COU1~ of Appeals
affirmed
Hm-1eve the Supreme Cou~t felt that her answers might furnish
a link in the chain of evidence necessary in a piosecution under the
Smith Act and that the witness was privileged to refuse to furnish any
such link Accordingly it unanimously reversed upon the ground that
prior decisions of this Court have clearly established that under such
circWl16tances the Constitution gives a -1itness the privilege of gy
remaining silent II
In the same way a Federal grand jury was prevented from obtaining
information in its investigation of narcotic and Hhite Slave traffic as
well as bribery perjury and other serious Federal violations 1111e
witness stood upon his privilege against self~incrimination in refusing
to respond to questions as to what he did for a living and whether he
knemiddot certain named pemiddot~son6 Hele again judgment of imprisonment
fo~ contempt was upbeld by the Court of Appeals but reversed by the 28
Supreme Couct with one judge dissenting - upon the ground that tiny
other conclu~ion Would seriously compromise an important constitutional
libecty In this cnse the court held that the defendant could refuse
to anSI-Tel questions innocent on their face since it appeared from the
climate of the investigation and the publicity given defendants
alleged criminal activity that his answers might implicate him in
some federal crime
In anothel cese a COl1gr~ssional Committee attempted in vain to
obtain information from a ~1tl1ess relating to the names of persona enmiddotmiddot
~ged in the manufacture and sale of gambling equipment and other
mutters Finally exaspeeted chief counsel fOl the Committee said
IlLet the record show that the witness just sits there mute Che1Ting
gum saying nothing 1I
The witness Has found guilty of contempt of court and sentenced
to six months in jail but judgment was reversed on appeal The Court
of Appeals declared that the methods used by the Committee for examinashy
tioD of witnesses constituted a triple th~ceat answer truly and you
have given evidence leading to your conviction for a violation of
federal lav anSler falsely and you will be convicted of perjury refuse
to aWn-Tel and you will be found guilty of criminal contempt and punished 29
by fine and imprisonment - In the opinion of the court the predicamiddot
ment in which the ltncss -Tas placed flaS contrary to fair play and in
direct violation of the Fifth Amendment
These decisions could be multiplied and undoubtedly represent
prevailing law Almo3t every heinous crime on the law books comshy
roitted by Inlt1ividuals or by groups J remains uncove ced because of the
privilege against self-incrimination But it is in the area of subshy
version and disloyalty particularly that the privelege has a field
day 11 It is haIe that legislatiye connnittees and grand juries are
held at bay for years from learning vlhich leaders are plotting the
countrys destruction merely because witnesses are relieved of giving
essential information upon the ground of privilege
It is little Vlonder that lat-l-ebiding citizens frequently are heard
to say that sub-rersives and other lrongdoers are unduly coddled by
existing law They express anlDzement that the Congress and the Courts
should conttnue to put up ith subterfuge and concealment 1 n place of
truth at a time 1vhen the peril from Communiam is 60 great and -1hen
crime 1s so rrunpa1t They earnestly ucge upon us the vital need for
modernizing the legal ~eapons for fighting subversion and crime
These pleas of the people for more dcastic action against subshy
version and other misconduct have not gone unheeded Some States and
cities provide fer the dismissal of public employees ho refuse to
testify on grounds of self-incrimination or Tho refuse to t-aive imshy30
munity from prosecution
Some States prescribe loyalty oaths for admission to the Bar -1hich
go beyond the traditional promise to uphold the State and National 31
Constitutions shy
Some States and municipalities have passed statutes requiring
affidavits of puhlic employees that they are not and have never 32
been Communists Some States make ineligible to teach in any public
school a person vTho was a memher of an organization which advocates the
~ overthimiddotow of the Government by force Some of these statutes have been
JY upheld us valid by the Supreme Cou~~ including the provision of the
New York State law which provides that mecbership by a person in an
organization listed as subve~sive by the Dcard of Regents shall constitute
prima facie evidence of disqualification for employment 1n the public 12
schools This was the so-called Feinberg Law aimed at protecting the school
children of lew York against teachels who were spreading communist propaganda
~e poisonous propaganda was Bufficiently subtle to escape detection in the
class room The New York Legislature recognized that while the schools must
attract and protect the critical minds the schools vlere not sanctuaries for
those who were committed to follot-l in the footsteps of Klaus Fuchs It sought
the next best solution by e4cluding froIij teaching those affiliated with certain
orgn1zations listed by the Board of Regents vlhich advocated the overthrow
of the government
One of the main constitutional objections to the law was that it vishy
alated the First Amendment by creating an atmosphere of fear which would
inevitably stifle freedom of speech The Court in an opinion by Judge
Minton formerly of the COUl~ of Appeals for this Circuit r~jected the conshy
tention that the la interfered Vlith free speech since persons uhave no right
to ork for the smiddottate in the school system on their own terms They may york
for the school system upon the reasonable terms laid d01n by the proper
authorities of Neu York If they do not choose to work on such terms they 36
are at libelty to ~etain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere 1
The Supreme Court -las also lholly unimpressed by the contention that
the law condoned guilt by association contrary to democratic concepts of
justice On this point the Court sald ilL teacher lOrks in a sensitive area
in a school room There he shapes the attitude of young minds toward the
society in which they live In this the state has a vital concern It must
preserve the integcity of the schools That the school authorities haVe
the right and duty to aceen the officials teachers and their employees as
to their fitness to majnjail1 the integrity of the schools as a part of an
ordered society cannot be doubtecl One I s associates past and present as
vell os one t a conduct moy proIJerly be considered in determining fitness
and loyalty From time immemoljal one t a reputation ha3 been determined by
the company he keeps In the employment of officials and teachers of the
school systeil the state may very properly inquire into the company they 37
keep n
The Fedel~al GOyernrlent (llso has taken effective measures to protect
the interests of netional cecu1ity One long step forward in that direction
was to enact legislation requiring non middotmiddotCommul1ist affidavits from trade
union leaders vihose unions rBnted to resort to the advantages of the Taftshy38
Hartley Act - Tl1e Ptllpose of thiu requirement vas to prevent disruption of 39
industry in obedience to Communist Party orders If the union leaderls
affidavit us false be CQuId be sent to jail
The Federal Government has also tried its best to clean its Gvln
house fI On April 27 1953 the President by Executive oXde~ established
his security requirements for employment so that pelsons employed by the
Federal Government will be reliable trustworthy of sood character and 40
loyal to the United States On October 13 1953 the President amended
his Executive order so as to provide that imiddotlbe~~e a government employee refuses
to testify before a Congressional Coramittee regarding charges of his diashy
loyalty or misconduct an agency may take this factor into consideration
in determining hethe~ the person I s continued employment is inconsistent ~_f 41
with the national securtty This emendment to the Presidents Executive
order is in accord i th my opinion that a government employee oTho claims
privilege in a Congressional investigation may be too much of a risk to be
retained in Federal Service
A recent Senate Report entitled tlInterlocldng Subversion in
WGovernment fl fully documents how former government employees were
able to spin their web of intrigue in positions of influ6nce The
Report states
1tlJ~e subcommittee exumined in public session 36 pershy
sons about whom it had substantial evidence of membership
in the Communist undergrolld 10 Government All of them
invoked tha fifth amenmnen~ ~~d refused to answer questions
regardicg COnrIranist membership on the grounds of self-in
crinlination Many reused even to eomowledge their own
sigl1attles on official Govelnment doclllllents in which they
haG SViorn to nonmernbership in the past
All)st all of he persons exposed by the evidence had
Bome connection which could be documented vith at least one-shy
a~d generally several--other e~o6ed persons Tney used eaoh
other s names for referenoe on ~licationa for Federal em-
p10~lOOnt They hire eaoh other They pomot~d eampQh other
hAY raised each others sal~ries They transfer~ampd eaah
otlwr from bureau to bureau from depariment to department
from congressional committee to congressional committee
They assigned each other to international missions They
vouched for each others loyalty end prctected each other
when exposure threaten~d ~ley often had common living
qUaters tI
Suppression i truth in any case is bad enough In no event
can it be justified by a Government employee or applicant for Govern
ment empl~Jment in the face of a Congressional inquiry where the
interests of the national Bect~lty are at stake No one denies that
the Government employee or applicant for such employment may conshy
stitutionally claim his privilege against self-incrimination On
the other hand no one has a constitutional right to a Government
job W True the Supreme Court ha held that the constitutional
protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant
to a statute Is patently arbitrary or discriminatory II W But in
my opinion there is nothing e1ther arbtrary or discriminatry about
diSDdssing a federal employee where he refuses to waive the privilege
against self-incrimination guaranteed him by tho Const tution We
find an analogous situation presented in the recent decision of the
~reme Court in Orloff v WilloughbY ~ In that case the peti shy
tioner a physician was denied a commission in the Army principally
tor the reason that when asked hether he was a member in any Communist JY
organizations he replied) Federal Constitutional privilege is claimed
In its opinion through Mr Justice Jackson the Supreme Court said
It ia argued that Orlorf 1s being punished for havshy
ing claimed a privilege which the Constitution guarantees
No one at least no ane on this Court which has repeatedly
sustained assertion by Communists of the privilege against
selfMincr~inatian questions or doubts Orloffs right to
withhold facts about himself on this ground No one beshy
l1evee he can be punished for doing so But the question
is whether be can at the same time take the position that
to tell the truth about himself Vlould incriminate him and
that even so the President must appofnt him to a post of
honor and trust le have no hesitation in answering that
question No II There is no law which requires the Gove~~ent to sit supinely by
until the suspeoted eIlIployee has been convicted of disloyalty or other
similar misoonduct inconsistent with the interests of the national
security before it can sCPal~ate him from the Government service There
is no law which requires the Government to assume or endure such a risk
As was pointed out in an apt csae by the Supreme Court in American
Commtlnications v Douds speaking through the beloved late Chief
Justice Vinson
IfThat (first) amendment requires that one be permitted to
believe what he will It requires that one be permitted
to advocate what he will unless there is a clear and
present danger that a substantial public evil will result
therefrom It does not require that he be permitted to be
the keeper of the arsenal
I have not overlooked the fact that the loyalty and honesty of
the ovel~vhelming majority of all Government employeesmiddot is beyond quesshy
tion But their good reputations and character are far better proshy
tected from un1tfarranted criticism when we root out the few who are
unreliable and disloyal
What the critical situation of om time calls for is a lavr com
pt)lling testimony within the fr~neuro1Torl of the Constitution The tmshy
swer to this need is immuni-ty legislaiion which will be as broad as
the privilege W11ich is stJpplanted tV Then if a person is adjudged
ill cOlte~Pt for refusing to te3tify before a Cotgressional committee
he will know tZat t-le ~udgrnerJt of OOllt-empt will more likely stand up
on appeal free from oonstitutional ohal1enge
At the same time the l~w will also provide more adequate proshy
tection for the wit~ss
At presnt the witne31l is in a rtboxtl so to slJeGk The witness
is not exc~ed from an3werL~g merely because he believes his answers
Vlil1 incriminate him His slly-ao does not of its(gt~r establish the
1amphazeId of ilcriIltination II ~~ere he olaims his privil~ge it is
the ftL1ction of the jcge to dets-rmme whether the siJence of t1e
witness is justified or wha~1er the danger to be apprebenced is too
remote to be sl1bstattial To save himself from being held in conshy
tempt tl1e witness may oftcn be cOJIpEtled to disclos3 til0ne very
facts whtrh he claims are privileged iQ
Witnesses are alao aided by a b~oad immunity statute in still
another way Under our la unlike that of England t a disclosure of
any incriminating fact constitutes a wailer of the privilege as to deshy
tails con~erning that fact 211 Having made a partial disclosure of
faots the witness loses the rig~t to cease answering intel~ogat1ons
and rely upon his privilege at a 1ater point in his testimony
In one oase the detendant rree~ disclosed that she was Treasshy
urer of the Communist Pariy in COlorado and testified that she had
given the books ot the party to another person When asked to dishy
wlge the name ot the lamiddottter she refused upon the ground that the
answer might incriminate her mder the Sm1tb Act Atfirming her
conviction for contempt the Supreme Court speaking through Chief
Justice Vinson said
Since the privilege agatnlt salf-inorimination
presupposes a real danger ot legal detriment arising
from the disolosure petitioner cannot invoke the
privilege where response to the specific question in
issue here would not ftUtther inoriminate her O1aolo
sure of e tact waives the privilege as to details pound
This deoision leaves the law in a rather anomolous position tor the
vlitness A witness who refuses to answer aU questions and fails to Wcooperate to any extent may be protected by the claim of privilege
But there is no equal protection atforded by the decisions to the
witness who commences to eooperate but stops at a point where further
disclosure may tncrim1~ate him
Moreover it the witness refuses to answer on the ground that
Congress has exceeded its powers or that the inQuiry in lacking in
pertinency he construas the law at his peril If mistake8 his good 55
faith error of law constitutes no defense to fine and imprisonment
Then again it is claimed DY some that a persons election to
remain silent upon the ground of privilege does not necessarily mean
he has anything sinister to hide There are undoubtedly some people of
sincere principle who refl1se to disclose 1flformat1oft to authorized
1nvestigating authorities because of their feeling that ao one has any
right to 1~quire about their beliefs even if germane to the inquiry at 56
bsnd- There are other persons who refuse to answer because they feel
their recollections of events lons past are fee~le and that falsehood
even on trivial or irrelevant matters may subject them to a charge of
perjury There are still others less innocent vho say that coercing
them to testify under pain of contempt resembles the Soviet tactic of
requiring those SUilty not only to pay for but also to prcclatD their 57
guilt shy
~he use of broad tmmunity statutes serves to remove the dansers
mentioned for the iDPocent a~d operates aa an incentive for the guilty
to tell the truth
There are already two proposals pendin8 in Congress which seek to
compel the answer by witnesses at questioDs put to them before Conshy
gressiOl1al Committees grand juries or courts In exchange tor this
compulsory testimony the Witnesses will obtain complete immunity froa
prosecution
58 One Bill is s~ 565 This proposal grants immunity to ~itnesses
before a grand Jury or court of the United States when in the disshy
cretion of th~ Attorney General it is necessary to do so in the public
interest In exchange for this immunity the witness is compelled to
testify and to produce his books papers or recoIds s 565 uses
broad immunity lengtase in stating that the witness shall not be
prosecuted on account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he 1s compelled after ela~ing his privilege to testify or
produce evidence
In this respect s 565 is almost ident1cal to the immunity proshy59
vision sustained 8S valid by the Supreme Court e~ far back as 1896-
This Bill does not extend the immunity to witnesses before Congressional
Committees 601 61
There are other Bills pend-ing S 16- middot and H R 27371 with equally
broad immunity authority The Senate has passed its Bill but the House
Bill still awaits action Both these Bills grunt immunity to witnesses
before Congressional Committees but not to witnesses before grand
juries or courts
The proposed Bills are worded so that the witness will not get an
immunity bathU merely by testifying He must first raise specifically
his claim for privilege and thus put the Committee on notice whether
for the greater good the witness should be required to testify and 62
given immunity or whether he should be excused from testlfying-
However the discretionary power to grant the immunity is not vested
in the Attorney General bumiddott lies with the body conducting the investigation
If the proceeding is one before one of the Houses of Congress then
a majority vote of the members present is necessary Under S 16
if it is a proceeding before a committee two thirds of the members
must vote to grant the tmmunity In that event the tvothirds vote
must include at least two members of each of the two political parties
having the largest representation on such committee The House Bill
does not provide for notice to the Attorney General of the proposed
grant of immunity The Senate Bill provides for one weeks notice to
the Attorney General of the proposal but if the latter fails or reshy
fuses to assent to grant of immunity it may be conferred by majority
vote of either House It is hoped that this legislation will only be
resorted to where full diseloaure by witnesses is deemed of greater
tmportance than the possibility of punishing them for past offenses
By permitting one or several criminals to escape prosecution the
larger public peril contained in a gang of criminals or in their
leaders may be uncovered and the guilty brought to justice
The legislative proposals mentioned have much to commend them
In my opinion these bills would better achieve their purposes it they
required the concurrence of the Attorney General 1n the granting of any
immunity to a witness by a Joint Congressional Committee or either Heuse
committee or by Congress The Attorney General 1s the chief legal
officer of the Government of the United States As Buch it 1s his
responsibility to prosecute persons who offend the criminal laws of the
United states This responsibility must be coupled w1th adequate
authority to permit its discharge It would seem to be more advisable
for the Attorney General who has immediate knowledge of a criminals
background and propensities to decide whether immunity should be
granted for such a person To allow the Attorney General to participate
in the ultimate decision aa to whether immunity should be granted would
not impair Congressional investigatIons in the fields of internal
security crime and corruption Nor would it discourage witnesses
from providing information of importance to the investigation if the
Attorney Generals permission vas required before immunity was granted
On the other hand if these Bills were enacted in their present
form they might subject members of Congress to undue pressures for
granting immunity to criminals who are ineligible to receive it Also
they cuuld very easily cause embarrassment to Congress by tmped1ng or
blocking prosecutions planned by the Department of Justice on any matter 63
even incidentally testified to upon these 1nvestigations
The unfortunate experience which Congress had as far back as 1857 64
in granting immunity without concurrence of the Attorney General - should
~each that a similar course of action may be marked by eveD greater
failure today_ The witness might readily turn this division of authority
between Congress and the Department of Justice to his advantage by
obtaining an ~unity from the legislative committee or from Congress
over the objection of the Attorney General Thereafter he would be
free to testify concerning a broad area Of activities without fear that
he could be held to account criminally for other violations however
unrelated to the matter under investigation
Thus for example a Congreas1onal Committee or Congress might
furnish immunity to a person to obtain his testimony about his illicit
traffic in slot machine opercltlons between states This person may also
be guilty either of espionage or subversion or of selling narcotics to
youngs cers as to which an indictment is soon to be obtained To foreshy
close prosecution on these more serious crimes the witness would be
glad to volunteer information on his other activities if he knew in
advance that immunity would fallow for all of them Therefore greatest
care must be exercioed in granting immunity and then only upon a fully
informed judgment of all tle facts The Departlnent of Justice would
of course through the Fe~eral Bureau of Investigation the Crtmlnal
and Tax Divisions and the United states Attorneyo I offices be mosmiddott
likely to know the facts and the plans for prosecution Concurrence
by the Attorney General in conferring the immunity would also enable
the Department of Justice to maintuin its responsibility for the proper
administration of the crlminal law
The provision in S 10 for one weeks notice to the Attorney General
of the proposed grant of immunity does not fully cure this Bill of its
weakness in failing to require his affirmative concurrence in every
case Experience indicates that at times the views of the person who
1s charged with prooecut1ng criminals are disregarded by Congressional
Committees For example the successful criminal conviction obtained
by the Department of Justice ot the internal revenue collector in one of
the largest cities was recently nullified because of the action of a
House Committee in holding 1middotr1dely publicized hearings in the district in
65 which the trial subsequently took place These hearings took place
over the strong objection of the Department of Justice thut the pro
posed hearing would be of prejudice to the defendant on the trial
which was about to be initiated and would injure the Governments case
in disclosing its evidence In reversing the convlct1on l Chief Judge
Magruder observed that the character of the defendant was blackened
and discredited as the day of trial approached because of the publicity
invited and stimulated by the Committee over the radio and television
Thu6 1 mere advance notIfication to the Attorney General of a proposed
grant of tmmunity would never be a guarantee that the Committee would
be guided by the views of the Attorney General
S 16 and H R 2737 would also more readily carry out the aim of
obtaining evidence against leaders of subversion and criminal entershy
prisesj if provision for twmunity were granted to obtain testimony
not only before Congressional Committees but likewise before courts
and grand juries
For these reasons it is my opinion that if any measure is to be
enacted~~rmitting the granting of immunity to witnesses before either
House of Congress or its committees it should vest the Attorney General
or the Attorney General acting with the concurren~e of appropriate members
of Congress with the authority to grant such tmmunity and if the test shy
mony is sought for a court or grand jury that the Attorney General alone
be authorized to grant the ilmnunity
There remain for discussion two principal objections to this proshy
posed legislation which may be briefly considered here One objection
1s that when a witneAS is compelled to testify even under the protecshy
tion of immunity from criminal punihment) he is not relieved from
personal disgrace ~~lhich attach~8 to the exposure of his crime The
answer to this objection ia contained in II land mark decision of the 66
Supreme Court in Brown v Wrtlker
The design of tbe constitutional plivilege is not to aid the
witness in vindicating his character but to protect him
against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict him
of a criminal charge If he secure legal jnmllnity from prose-
cution the possible impairment of his good name is a penalty
which it is reasonable b0 should be compelled to pay for the
common good
The reasoning of this decision has never been qU~Gtioned and has 67
only recently been approved by the Sllpreme Court
The other chief objection to the proposed legislation is that while
a witness may receive itmlunity from federal prosecution) he may still
be subject to IJrosecution under ~tate lavl The Supreme Court has held
that this is not a valid objection to federal immunity laws~ since the
self-incrimination clause ln the Fifth Amendment operates ao a l1mitashy68
tion on the federal government only In United states v Murdock the
defendant was indicted for refUSing to answer questions of a revenue
agent relating to ctrt8 in income tax returns The refusal was ba sed on
the plea that hiD answers might 1ncrim1nate him in a state court The
Court said on this point
This court ha~ held that immunity against state prosecution is
not essential to the validity of federal statutes declaring that
a witnes3 shall not be excllpoundied from gtring evidence on the
ground that it vTill incriminate him and also that the ladt of
state power to give witnesses protection against federal
prosecution does not defeat a state immunity statute
Similarly a witness befo~e a state tribunal CBnnot refuse to 69
answer because of the threat of federal prosecution - However the
Federal District Court in Ohio recently held i1 Unted States v 70
Di Carlo that the defendant had the right to assert his privilege
because of possible prosecution under state law since the Senate
committee was authorized to investigate violations not only of the lawe 71
of the United States but also of the states M_ The Murdock case was
dtstingJished urlon the ground that the danger of state posecution 1n
that case was remote and uncertain thile in the Di Carlo case the
danger of state proaecutjon WilS imminent and real 72
The ---Di Carlo case has been received -lith mixed commelt It has73
not been followed so far as we k~ow- It appears to be contrary to deshy
cis10ns of co~~rts of appeals which have consistently adhered to the prinshy74
ciples of the Murdock case- In my opinion this decision of a district
court aoes not detract from the binding effect ofthe Supreme Courts deshy
eision in the Murdock case
The Department of Justice will recommend to the Congress in Jlouary
an immunity bill of the type I have descri-ced which protects the const1shy
tutional privileges ot witnesses before Congressional Committees courts
and juries but will at the some time aid materially in stamping out
criminal and subversive activities
Footnote Referet~es to Ad~res El~ited ~------ ___bull
Immunity From Prcsecuticn
Versus
Privilege Agaiust Self-Incrimination
Pittman liThe Colonial and Constitutional History of the
Privilege Against Sel-Incrimiootion 1n Amcicaff 21 Va
L R 763 764 770-773 (1935) Corwin The Supreme
Court I S Corctl~ction of the Self Incrirnination C1ause lf
29 lId~h L R 1 512 (1930) Ap~licability of
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to Legjslative
y Pittmenf2 at 774
~ ~ining v ~~8ey 211 U S 78 92 (1908)
L Id at 91
~ 34th Ceng 3d sess Globe PI 427 433 1-45 See
Eberling Constitutional Investigations pp 304-315shy
7 Eberling d at 320-323
~I 142 U s 547 (1892) This Act of 1862 revised an old
statute into two new sections by an amendment which
sought to insure that a witness who testified before
a federal grand jt~ or court (R s I 860 (1875raquo or
a Congressional Committee (R S B 859 (1875raquo would
not be later subjected to the use of his testimony in
any criminal proceeding aGainst him Section ~ 860 of
the amendment dealing with grand jurtes and courts came
under attack in Counselman v Hitchcock J supra and was
held to be invalid Since this part of the immunity proshy
vision tailed to accomplish ita purpose Congress repealed
it in 1910 (36 Stat 352 (19l0raquo) Congress apparently felt
that S 859 applying to Congressional Committees was still
of value and left it 1n force to this date (a s I 859
(1875) as amended 52 Stat 943 (1938) 18 usc e3486
(Supp V 1952)j see liThe Privilege Against Self
Incrimination versus Immunity Proposed Statutes 41
Georgetown L J 511 514 (1953) United States v ~
339 U s 323 335-337 (1950)
21 It read in patt as follows
No person shall be prosecuted for or on
account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he may testify or produce evidence
Act of Feb 11 1893 c 83 27 stat 443 49 USCA
I 46 See too ~ v United States 337 u S 137 146shy
147 (1949)middot Notet Denying -the Privilege against Self
Incrimination to Public Officers 64 Barv L R 987
988 (1951)
- 101 161 U s 591 (1896)
Shapiro v United St~~ 335 U S 1 6-7 (1948) where various
statutes are collated in the footnote The customary provision
in these statutes provides as follows No person shall be
excused from complying with any requirements ot this section
because of his privilege aga1nst self-incriminationgt but the
immunity provisions of the COmptuBory Testimony Act of
February 11 1893 shall apply with respect to allY 1nd1shy
vidual who specifically claims such pr1Y11ege tt
12 Rapacz ULimiting the Plea of Self-Incr1m1nat1ontl 20 Georgetown
L J 329 353 (1932) see footnote 3 of ~ v Connect~
302 U s 319 326 (1937) NPte liThe Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination the Doctr1ne of Waiver 61 Yale L J 104 110
(1952) middot
~f Palko v Connecticut 302 U s 319 326 (1937)
~ See dissents of Mr Justices Shiras Gray and White in ~ V4
Walker supra 161 U s 630638 Cf dissent of Mr Justice
Black in Ro~ers v United States 340 U s 367 376 (1950)
15 Potts Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for ContemptU I
74 U of Pa L R 691 780 (1926) L1acos uRights of Witnesses
Before Congressional Committees 33 Boston U L R 337 340
(1953) middot
t6 Liacos Id at 31tl
17 McGeary rlThe DeTelopmen-cs of Congressional Investigative Power ll
p 23 (1940) McGrain v Daughel~l 273 u s 135 (1927)
18 Sinclair v Unfted States~ 279 U s 263 (1929) ~arsba11 v
Unit~~State~ 176 F 2d 473 (nc Cir 1949) 2 Usc ~ 192
(Supp 1950)
19 Ne York City Bar Ass t n Committee on the Bill of Rights Report
on Congressional Committees presented December 14 1948 p 1
gQi Galloway PCong18ss1onal Investigations Proposed Reforms lt
18 U of Chi L R 478 479-481 (1951)
21 Dilliard lICongress1onal Investigations The Role of the Press
18 U of ChL L R 585 J 587 (1951)
22 Edgerton J dissenting in Barsky v United States 167 F 2d
241 252 (nc eir 1948) cert denied 334 U s 843 (1948)
petition for rehearing denied 339 U S 971 (1951)
~3 De Jonge v Oregon 299 U s 353 364 365 (1937)
24 Id
25 6 Richardson lIMes sOges and Papers of the Pres idents t 1 p 23
July 4 1861
26 See United St~~ v ~~phson 165 F 2d 82 (2 Cir 1947)
cert denied 333 u S 838 (1948) Lawson v United states
176 F 2d 49 (nc Cir 1949) cel~ denied 339 u s 934
(1950) Barsty Y ~ited S~ 167 F 2d 241 (DC eir
1948) cert denied 334 u s 843 (1948) MCGrain v Daugherty
273 u s 135 (1927) and cf Rumely v United States J 197
F 2d 166 (DC eir 1952) affd 73 s ct 543 (1953)
JJ B1a~ v ~~ted Sttlt~s 340 u s 159 (1950-)
gsectJ ~~ v United States 31~1 U s 479 (1951) See too
sectingleton v United States 343 U s 944 (1952) Note Recent
Extensions of the Witness Privilege Against Self-Incrim1nationll
53 Col L R 275 (1953)
29 Aiuppa v Un1tc~ states 201 F 2d 287 300 (6 eir 1952)
_I30 Note nMandatory Dismissal of Public Persol1nel and The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination 101 U ot Pa L R 1190 1191
fn 8 (1953)
31 Brown Be Fassett Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar
20 u or Chi L R 480 483 (1953)
32 Garner v Los Angeles Board) 341 u s 716 (1951) Gerende v
Board of Supervisors 341 U s 56 (1951) but com~are Wieman v
Updegraff 341~ U s 83 (1953)
34 See footnote 32
35 PG~ v Boa-roo of Education 31~2 U s 435 (1951)
ID Id at 493
38 Sec 9(h of lihe LalJor Management Rlations Act of 1947 29 USCA
St1Pp III Sec 141 Sec 159(b)
39 ft~rican C~~catons Association v ~uda 339 u S 382 (1950)
sustaining the validity of Sec 9(h) against the challenge that it
violated the First c-lT~nc1tlCiltl Ex Post FtiCto Lals and other iul1dashy
mental rights
40 Executive Order No 10450 issued Aporil zr 1953 (18 F R 2lt89)
41 Executive Orrler No 10491 issued Ocmiddottober 13 1953 (18 F R 6583)
~ Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary Interlocking Subshy
vcrs ion in Covernmcnt De~rtments II 83d Cong 1st ses5 Juy 30 J
1953 p 21 Being a cOImllunist is not a crime under federal law J
although it is in some states (see Liacos supra note 15 at
375) The Smith Act (18 USC Sec 2385 et seq) mkes advoshy
eating or teaching the violent overthrOf of any goverrment of the
United States or being a member of such a group and kno7ing its
purpose~a federal crime
43 See EaSley v F~cbardsonJ 182 F 2d 46 (DC 1950)J affd by an
evenly diiied court 341 TJ s 918 (1951) 1Etshingto v McGrath
182 F 2d 375 (DC 1950) aff1d 341 U s 923 (1951)j Or~~ v
vIil1ougbby 345 U s 83 91 (1953) Mr Justice Douglas concurring
i~ ~tiFascist Commi~~ v ~~EJ 341 U s 123 -182-183 (1951)
United Public W0rkers v --~1itcbell 330 U s 75 (1947)j Angilly - v
United States 199 F 2d 642) 644 (1950) cf NcAuliffe v rlew
Bedford 155 Mass 216 29 NE 517 (le9~) per Holmes J liThe
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but
he h(=l~s no constitltioi1al right to be a policezranu (Id at 220
29 NE at 5J7)
44 v1ie~sn _
v UpGegaff middot111 ~
3~middot4 u s 83 (1953) The Court ruleri as
contrry to due process the Cklahoma loyalty oath statute forshy
bidding IJ1l11ic emplo~rment of Persons who belonzea to certain
organizations regarciless of their knowledge of the character of
those oreenizations because of the indiscriminate classification
of lnnocent with kno~vilg activityll (d at 91)
~1 345 u S 83 (1953)middot
46 Id at 90
47 339 u s 3827 412 (1950) sustaininG the non-corJlIlunist affidavit
requirernelt of union leaders under the Taft -Hartley Act
~ Hoffman v United States 341 U s 179 (1951) suggests such
legislation if Congres3 concludes the lleed is great enough
See too Comment The Privilege Against Se1f-Llcriminetion Versus
Lmnurdty Z Proposed Statutes P 41 Gt~orgetom L J 511 (1953)
S Rept 153 on S 16 83d Cone 1st sess ~ 1 ald 2
April 17 1953 Report of Sel1a~~e Commttee on the JudiciaJ J
Interlocking S-lbversion in GOYf11llent Departments tl July 30
1953 83d Cong 1st sess p 50
~ HcfI1nan v Unitet States 341 u s 479 486 (1951)
50 Id U1ited States v ~isman 111 F 2d 260 262 (2 Cir 1950)
51 Note 61 Yale L J 105 109 (1952)
52 Rogers v United States 340 u s 367 375 (1951)
211 See e g Blau v Unjted StaIe~ 340 u s 159 (1950)
-shy54 Note J Co1t3resnic1al Inv estigat1ons--Self-Illcrimimtion Condemneshy
tiOll and Fair Hcar1ngll 22 U of Cinn L R 193 199-200 (1953)
55 See ~ovTn8end v ~~it~~ta~~3 95 F 2d 352 351 (DC Cir 1938)
cert denied 303 u S 664 (1938)
56 Byse TfA Report on the Pennsylvana Loyalty Act 101 U of Fa
L R 480 481-1~84 (1953) Wright Should Teachers Testify
Saturday Review Sept 2o 1953 p 23
57 See Meltzer Required Records The McCarran Act and The Privilege
Against Selfmiddotmiddot Incriminat ion ll 19 U of Chi L R 687 722 (1951)
y 83d Cong 1st Seas 1953 Also known as the Kefauver BUl
59 ~ v ltlalker 161 U S 591 (1896)
sect21 S 16 83d Cong 1st sess 1953 passed the Senate July 9 1953
after extensive debate Cong Ree 8646-8663 July 9 1953shy
S 16 amends B 3486 of Title 18 Sec 3486 presently furnishes
witnesses immunity from prosecution tor testimony before either
House or their Committees It appears to suffer from the same
deficiency present in a similar statute condemned in Counse~an v
Hitchcock 142 u s 547 (1892) S 16 is intended to StWP1y the
omission in the Hitchcock ease by providing not only that a
witness testimony may not be used against him but that such
witness shall be iImnune with respect to lIany transaction mtter
or thing concerning which he has been compelled to testIfy
sect 83d Congo 1st sess 1953
~ S Rept 153 83d Congo 1st sess p 2 (1953)
63 See Comment The Privi1ege Against Self-Incrimination Versus
Immunity Proposed statutes 41 Georgetown L J 511 523 (1953)
64 Supra footnote 7shy
sectif Delanel v ~ed States 199 F 2d 107 (1 Ci~ 1952)
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
knemiddot certain named pemiddot~son6 Hele again judgment of imprisonment
fo~ contempt was upbeld by the Court of Appeals but reversed by the 28
Supreme Couct with one judge dissenting - upon the ground that tiny
other conclu~ion Would seriously compromise an important constitutional
libecty In this cnse the court held that the defendant could refuse
to anSI-Tel questions innocent on their face since it appeared from the
climate of the investigation and the publicity given defendants
alleged criminal activity that his answers might implicate him in
some federal crime
In anothel cese a COl1gr~ssional Committee attempted in vain to
obtain information from a ~1tl1ess relating to the names of persona enmiddotmiddot
~ged in the manufacture and sale of gambling equipment and other
mutters Finally exaspeeted chief counsel fOl the Committee said
IlLet the record show that the witness just sits there mute Che1Ting
gum saying nothing 1I
The witness Has found guilty of contempt of court and sentenced
to six months in jail but judgment was reversed on appeal The Court
of Appeals declared that the methods used by the Committee for examinashy
tioD of witnesses constituted a triple th~ceat answer truly and you
have given evidence leading to your conviction for a violation of
federal lav anSler falsely and you will be convicted of perjury refuse
to aWn-Tel and you will be found guilty of criminal contempt and punished 29
by fine and imprisonment - In the opinion of the court the predicamiddot
ment in which the ltncss -Tas placed flaS contrary to fair play and in
direct violation of the Fifth Amendment
These decisions could be multiplied and undoubtedly represent
prevailing law Almo3t every heinous crime on the law books comshy
roitted by Inlt1ividuals or by groups J remains uncove ced because of the
privilege against self-incrimination But it is in the area of subshy
version and disloyalty particularly that the privelege has a field
day 11 It is haIe that legislatiye connnittees and grand juries are
held at bay for years from learning vlhich leaders are plotting the
countrys destruction merely because witnesses are relieved of giving
essential information upon the ground of privilege
It is little Vlonder that lat-l-ebiding citizens frequently are heard
to say that sub-rersives and other lrongdoers are unduly coddled by
existing law They express anlDzement that the Congress and the Courts
should conttnue to put up ith subterfuge and concealment 1 n place of
truth at a time 1vhen the peril from Communiam is 60 great and -1hen
crime 1s so rrunpa1t They earnestly ucge upon us the vital need for
modernizing the legal ~eapons for fighting subversion and crime
These pleas of the people for more dcastic action against subshy
version and other misconduct have not gone unheeded Some States and
cities provide fer the dismissal of public employees ho refuse to
testify on grounds of self-incrimination or Tho refuse to t-aive imshy30
munity from prosecution
Some States prescribe loyalty oaths for admission to the Bar -1hich
go beyond the traditional promise to uphold the State and National 31
Constitutions shy
Some States and municipalities have passed statutes requiring
affidavits of puhlic employees that they are not and have never 32
been Communists Some States make ineligible to teach in any public
school a person vTho was a memher of an organization which advocates the
~ overthimiddotow of the Government by force Some of these statutes have been
JY upheld us valid by the Supreme Cou~~ including the provision of the
New York State law which provides that mecbership by a person in an
organization listed as subve~sive by the Dcard of Regents shall constitute
prima facie evidence of disqualification for employment 1n the public 12
schools This was the so-called Feinberg Law aimed at protecting the school
children of lew York against teachels who were spreading communist propaganda
~e poisonous propaganda was Bufficiently subtle to escape detection in the
class room The New York Legislature recognized that while the schools must
attract and protect the critical minds the schools vlere not sanctuaries for
those who were committed to follot-l in the footsteps of Klaus Fuchs It sought
the next best solution by e4cluding froIij teaching those affiliated with certain
orgn1zations listed by the Board of Regents vlhich advocated the overthrow
of the government
One of the main constitutional objections to the law was that it vishy
alated the First Amendment by creating an atmosphere of fear which would
inevitably stifle freedom of speech The Court in an opinion by Judge
Minton formerly of the COUl~ of Appeals for this Circuit r~jected the conshy
tention that the la interfered Vlith free speech since persons uhave no right
to ork for the smiddottate in the school system on their own terms They may york
for the school system upon the reasonable terms laid d01n by the proper
authorities of Neu York If they do not choose to work on such terms they 36
are at libelty to ~etain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere 1
The Supreme Court -las also lholly unimpressed by the contention that
the law condoned guilt by association contrary to democratic concepts of
justice On this point the Court sald ilL teacher lOrks in a sensitive area
in a school room There he shapes the attitude of young minds toward the
society in which they live In this the state has a vital concern It must
preserve the integcity of the schools That the school authorities haVe
the right and duty to aceen the officials teachers and their employees as
to their fitness to majnjail1 the integrity of the schools as a part of an
ordered society cannot be doubtecl One I s associates past and present as
vell os one t a conduct moy proIJerly be considered in determining fitness
and loyalty From time immemoljal one t a reputation ha3 been determined by
the company he keeps In the employment of officials and teachers of the
school systeil the state may very properly inquire into the company they 37
keep n
The Fedel~al GOyernrlent (llso has taken effective measures to protect
the interests of netional cecu1ity One long step forward in that direction
was to enact legislation requiring non middotmiddotCommul1ist affidavits from trade
union leaders vihose unions rBnted to resort to the advantages of the Taftshy38
Hartley Act - Tl1e Ptllpose of thiu requirement vas to prevent disruption of 39
industry in obedience to Communist Party orders If the union leaderls
affidavit us false be CQuId be sent to jail
The Federal Government has also tried its best to clean its Gvln
house fI On April 27 1953 the President by Executive oXde~ established
his security requirements for employment so that pelsons employed by the
Federal Government will be reliable trustworthy of sood character and 40
loyal to the United States On October 13 1953 the President amended
his Executive order so as to provide that imiddotlbe~~e a government employee refuses
to testify before a Congressional Coramittee regarding charges of his diashy
loyalty or misconduct an agency may take this factor into consideration
in determining hethe~ the person I s continued employment is inconsistent ~_f 41
with the national securtty This emendment to the Presidents Executive
order is in accord i th my opinion that a government employee oTho claims
privilege in a Congressional investigation may be too much of a risk to be
retained in Federal Service
A recent Senate Report entitled tlInterlocldng Subversion in
WGovernment fl fully documents how former government employees were
able to spin their web of intrigue in positions of influ6nce The
Report states
1tlJ~e subcommittee exumined in public session 36 pershy
sons about whom it had substantial evidence of membership
in the Communist undergrolld 10 Government All of them
invoked tha fifth amenmnen~ ~~d refused to answer questions
regardicg COnrIranist membership on the grounds of self-in
crinlination Many reused even to eomowledge their own
sigl1attles on official Govelnment doclllllents in which they
haG SViorn to nonmernbership in the past
All)st all of he persons exposed by the evidence had
Bome connection which could be documented vith at least one-shy
a~d generally several--other e~o6ed persons Tney used eaoh
other s names for referenoe on ~licationa for Federal em-
p10~lOOnt They hire eaoh other They pomot~d eampQh other
hAY raised each others sal~ries They transfer~ampd eaah
otlwr from bureau to bureau from depariment to department
from congressional committee to congressional committee
They assigned each other to international missions They
vouched for each others loyalty end prctected each other
when exposure threaten~d ~ley often had common living
qUaters tI
Suppression i truth in any case is bad enough In no event
can it be justified by a Government employee or applicant for Govern
ment empl~Jment in the face of a Congressional inquiry where the
interests of the national Bect~lty are at stake No one denies that
the Government employee or applicant for such employment may conshy
stitutionally claim his privilege against self-incrimination On
the other hand no one has a constitutional right to a Government
job W True the Supreme Court ha held that the constitutional
protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant
to a statute Is patently arbitrary or discriminatory II W But in
my opinion there is nothing e1ther arbtrary or discriminatry about
diSDdssing a federal employee where he refuses to waive the privilege
against self-incrimination guaranteed him by tho Const tution We
find an analogous situation presented in the recent decision of the
~reme Court in Orloff v WilloughbY ~ In that case the peti shy
tioner a physician was denied a commission in the Army principally
tor the reason that when asked hether he was a member in any Communist JY
organizations he replied) Federal Constitutional privilege is claimed
In its opinion through Mr Justice Jackson the Supreme Court said
It ia argued that Orlorf 1s being punished for havshy
ing claimed a privilege which the Constitution guarantees
No one at least no ane on this Court which has repeatedly
sustained assertion by Communists of the privilege against
selfMincr~inatian questions or doubts Orloffs right to
withhold facts about himself on this ground No one beshy
l1evee he can be punished for doing so But the question
is whether be can at the same time take the position that
to tell the truth about himself Vlould incriminate him and
that even so the President must appofnt him to a post of
honor and trust le have no hesitation in answering that
question No II There is no law which requires the Gove~~ent to sit supinely by
until the suspeoted eIlIployee has been convicted of disloyalty or other
similar misoonduct inconsistent with the interests of the national
security before it can sCPal~ate him from the Government service There
is no law which requires the Government to assume or endure such a risk
As was pointed out in an apt csae by the Supreme Court in American
Commtlnications v Douds speaking through the beloved late Chief
Justice Vinson
IfThat (first) amendment requires that one be permitted to
believe what he will It requires that one be permitted
to advocate what he will unless there is a clear and
present danger that a substantial public evil will result
therefrom It does not require that he be permitted to be
the keeper of the arsenal
I have not overlooked the fact that the loyalty and honesty of
the ovel~vhelming majority of all Government employeesmiddot is beyond quesshy
tion But their good reputations and character are far better proshy
tected from un1tfarranted criticism when we root out the few who are
unreliable and disloyal
What the critical situation of om time calls for is a lavr com
pt)lling testimony within the fr~neuro1Torl of the Constitution The tmshy
swer to this need is immuni-ty legislaiion which will be as broad as
the privilege W11ich is stJpplanted tV Then if a person is adjudged
ill cOlte~Pt for refusing to te3tify before a Cotgressional committee
he will know tZat t-le ~udgrnerJt of OOllt-empt will more likely stand up
on appeal free from oonstitutional ohal1enge
At the same time the l~w will also provide more adequate proshy
tection for the wit~ss
At presnt the witne31l is in a rtboxtl so to slJeGk The witness
is not exc~ed from an3werL~g merely because he believes his answers
Vlil1 incriminate him His slly-ao does not of its(gt~r establish the
1amphazeId of ilcriIltination II ~~ere he olaims his privil~ge it is
the ftL1ction of the jcge to dets-rmme whether the siJence of t1e
witness is justified or wha~1er the danger to be apprebenced is too
remote to be sl1bstattial To save himself from being held in conshy
tempt tl1e witness may oftcn be cOJIpEtled to disclos3 til0ne very
facts whtrh he claims are privileged iQ
Witnesses are alao aided by a b~oad immunity statute in still
another way Under our la unlike that of England t a disclosure of
any incriminating fact constitutes a wailer of the privilege as to deshy
tails con~erning that fact 211 Having made a partial disclosure of
faots the witness loses the rig~t to cease answering intel~ogat1ons
and rely upon his privilege at a 1ater point in his testimony
In one oase the detendant rree~ disclosed that she was Treasshy
urer of the Communist Pariy in COlorado and testified that she had
given the books ot the party to another person When asked to dishy
wlge the name ot the lamiddottter she refused upon the ground that the
answer might incriminate her mder the Sm1tb Act Atfirming her
conviction for contempt the Supreme Court speaking through Chief
Justice Vinson said
Since the privilege agatnlt salf-inorimination
presupposes a real danger ot legal detriment arising
from the disolosure petitioner cannot invoke the
privilege where response to the specific question in
issue here would not ftUtther inoriminate her O1aolo
sure of e tact waives the privilege as to details pound
This deoision leaves the law in a rather anomolous position tor the
vlitness A witness who refuses to answer aU questions and fails to Wcooperate to any extent may be protected by the claim of privilege
But there is no equal protection atforded by the decisions to the
witness who commences to eooperate but stops at a point where further
disclosure may tncrim1~ate him
Moreover it the witness refuses to answer on the ground that
Congress has exceeded its powers or that the inQuiry in lacking in
pertinency he construas the law at his peril If mistake8 his good 55
faith error of law constitutes no defense to fine and imprisonment
Then again it is claimed DY some that a persons election to
remain silent upon the ground of privilege does not necessarily mean
he has anything sinister to hide There are undoubtedly some people of
sincere principle who refl1se to disclose 1flformat1oft to authorized
1nvestigating authorities because of their feeling that ao one has any
right to 1~quire about their beliefs even if germane to the inquiry at 56
bsnd- There are other persons who refuse to answer because they feel
their recollections of events lons past are fee~le and that falsehood
even on trivial or irrelevant matters may subject them to a charge of
perjury There are still others less innocent vho say that coercing
them to testify under pain of contempt resembles the Soviet tactic of
requiring those SUilty not only to pay for but also to prcclatD their 57
guilt shy
~he use of broad tmmunity statutes serves to remove the dansers
mentioned for the iDPocent a~d operates aa an incentive for the guilty
to tell the truth
There are already two proposals pendin8 in Congress which seek to
compel the answer by witnesses at questioDs put to them before Conshy
gressiOl1al Committees grand juries or courts In exchange tor this
compulsory testimony the Witnesses will obtain complete immunity froa
prosecution
58 One Bill is s~ 565 This proposal grants immunity to ~itnesses
before a grand Jury or court of the United States when in the disshy
cretion of th~ Attorney General it is necessary to do so in the public
interest In exchange for this immunity the witness is compelled to
testify and to produce his books papers or recoIds s 565 uses
broad immunity lengtase in stating that the witness shall not be
prosecuted on account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he 1s compelled after ela~ing his privilege to testify or
produce evidence
In this respect s 565 is almost ident1cal to the immunity proshy59
vision sustained 8S valid by the Supreme Court e~ far back as 1896-
This Bill does not extend the immunity to witnesses before Congressional
Committees 601 61
There are other Bills pend-ing S 16- middot and H R 27371 with equally
broad immunity authority The Senate has passed its Bill but the House
Bill still awaits action Both these Bills grunt immunity to witnesses
before Congressional Committees but not to witnesses before grand
juries or courts
The proposed Bills are worded so that the witness will not get an
immunity bathU merely by testifying He must first raise specifically
his claim for privilege and thus put the Committee on notice whether
for the greater good the witness should be required to testify and 62
given immunity or whether he should be excused from testlfying-
However the discretionary power to grant the immunity is not vested
in the Attorney General bumiddott lies with the body conducting the investigation
If the proceeding is one before one of the Houses of Congress then
a majority vote of the members present is necessary Under S 16
if it is a proceeding before a committee two thirds of the members
must vote to grant the tmmunity In that event the tvothirds vote
must include at least two members of each of the two political parties
having the largest representation on such committee The House Bill
does not provide for notice to the Attorney General of the proposed
grant of immunity The Senate Bill provides for one weeks notice to
the Attorney General of the proposal but if the latter fails or reshy
fuses to assent to grant of immunity it may be conferred by majority
vote of either House It is hoped that this legislation will only be
resorted to where full diseloaure by witnesses is deemed of greater
tmportance than the possibility of punishing them for past offenses
By permitting one or several criminals to escape prosecution the
larger public peril contained in a gang of criminals or in their
leaders may be uncovered and the guilty brought to justice
The legislative proposals mentioned have much to commend them
In my opinion these bills would better achieve their purposes it they
required the concurrence of the Attorney General 1n the granting of any
immunity to a witness by a Joint Congressional Committee or either Heuse
committee or by Congress The Attorney General 1s the chief legal
officer of the Government of the United States As Buch it 1s his
responsibility to prosecute persons who offend the criminal laws of the
United states This responsibility must be coupled w1th adequate
authority to permit its discharge It would seem to be more advisable
for the Attorney General who has immediate knowledge of a criminals
background and propensities to decide whether immunity should be
granted for such a person To allow the Attorney General to participate
in the ultimate decision aa to whether immunity should be granted would
not impair Congressional investigatIons in the fields of internal
security crime and corruption Nor would it discourage witnesses
from providing information of importance to the investigation if the
Attorney Generals permission vas required before immunity was granted
On the other hand if these Bills were enacted in their present
form they might subject members of Congress to undue pressures for
granting immunity to criminals who are ineligible to receive it Also
they cuuld very easily cause embarrassment to Congress by tmped1ng or
blocking prosecutions planned by the Department of Justice on any matter 63
even incidentally testified to upon these 1nvestigations
The unfortunate experience which Congress had as far back as 1857 64
in granting immunity without concurrence of the Attorney General - should
~each that a similar course of action may be marked by eveD greater
failure today_ The witness might readily turn this division of authority
between Congress and the Department of Justice to his advantage by
obtaining an ~unity from the legislative committee or from Congress
over the objection of the Attorney General Thereafter he would be
free to testify concerning a broad area Of activities without fear that
he could be held to account criminally for other violations however
unrelated to the matter under investigation
Thus for example a Congreas1onal Committee or Congress might
furnish immunity to a person to obtain his testimony about his illicit
traffic in slot machine opercltlons between states This person may also
be guilty either of espionage or subversion or of selling narcotics to
youngs cers as to which an indictment is soon to be obtained To foreshy
close prosecution on these more serious crimes the witness would be
glad to volunteer information on his other activities if he knew in
advance that immunity would fallow for all of them Therefore greatest
care must be exercioed in granting immunity and then only upon a fully
informed judgment of all tle facts The Departlnent of Justice would
of course through the Fe~eral Bureau of Investigation the Crtmlnal
and Tax Divisions and the United states Attorneyo I offices be mosmiddott
likely to know the facts and the plans for prosecution Concurrence
by the Attorney General in conferring the immunity would also enable
the Department of Justice to maintuin its responsibility for the proper
administration of the crlminal law
The provision in S 10 for one weeks notice to the Attorney General
of the proposed grant of immunity does not fully cure this Bill of its
weakness in failing to require his affirmative concurrence in every
case Experience indicates that at times the views of the person who
1s charged with prooecut1ng criminals are disregarded by Congressional
Committees For example the successful criminal conviction obtained
by the Department of Justice ot the internal revenue collector in one of
the largest cities was recently nullified because of the action of a
House Committee in holding 1middotr1dely publicized hearings in the district in
65 which the trial subsequently took place These hearings took place
over the strong objection of the Department of Justice thut the pro
posed hearing would be of prejudice to the defendant on the trial
which was about to be initiated and would injure the Governments case
in disclosing its evidence In reversing the convlct1on l Chief Judge
Magruder observed that the character of the defendant was blackened
and discredited as the day of trial approached because of the publicity
invited and stimulated by the Committee over the radio and television
Thu6 1 mere advance notIfication to the Attorney General of a proposed
grant of tmmunity would never be a guarantee that the Committee would
be guided by the views of the Attorney General
S 16 and H R 2737 would also more readily carry out the aim of
obtaining evidence against leaders of subversion and criminal entershy
prisesj if provision for twmunity were granted to obtain testimony
not only before Congressional Committees but likewise before courts
and grand juries
For these reasons it is my opinion that if any measure is to be
enacted~~rmitting the granting of immunity to witnesses before either
House of Congress or its committees it should vest the Attorney General
or the Attorney General acting with the concurren~e of appropriate members
of Congress with the authority to grant such tmmunity and if the test shy
mony is sought for a court or grand jury that the Attorney General alone
be authorized to grant the ilmnunity
There remain for discussion two principal objections to this proshy
posed legislation which may be briefly considered here One objection
1s that when a witneAS is compelled to testify even under the protecshy
tion of immunity from criminal punihment) he is not relieved from
personal disgrace ~~lhich attach~8 to the exposure of his crime The
answer to this objection ia contained in II land mark decision of the 66
Supreme Court in Brown v Wrtlker
The design of tbe constitutional plivilege is not to aid the
witness in vindicating his character but to protect him
against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict him
of a criminal charge If he secure legal jnmllnity from prose-
cution the possible impairment of his good name is a penalty
which it is reasonable b0 should be compelled to pay for the
common good
The reasoning of this decision has never been qU~Gtioned and has 67
only recently been approved by the Sllpreme Court
The other chief objection to the proposed legislation is that while
a witness may receive itmlunity from federal prosecution) he may still
be subject to IJrosecution under ~tate lavl The Supreme Court has held
that this is not a valid objection to federal immunity laws~ since the
self-incrimination clause ln the Fifth Amendment operates ao a l1mitashy68
tion on the federal government only In United states v Murdock the
defendant was indicted for refUSing to answer questions of a revenue
agent relating to ctrt8 in income tax returns The refusal was ba sed on
the plea that hiD answers might 1ncrim1nate him in a state court The
Court said on this point
This court ha~ held that immunity against state prosecution is
not essential to the validity of federal statutes declaring that
a witnes3 shall not be excllpoundied from gtring evidence on the
ground that it vTill incriminate him and also that the ladt of
state power to give witnesses protection against federal
prosecution does not defeat a state immunity statute
Similarly a witness befo~e a state tribunal CBnnot refuse to 69
answer because of the threat of federal prosecution - However the
Federal District Court in Ohio recently held i1 Unted States v 70
Di Carlo that the defendant had the right to assert his privilege
because of possible prosecution under state law since the Senate
committee was authorized to investigate violations not only of the lawe 71
of the United States but also of the states M_ The Murdock case was
dtstingJished urlon the ground that the danger of state posecution 1n
that case was remote and uncertain thile in the Di Carlo case the
danger of state proaecutjon WilS imminent and real 72
The ---Di Carlo case has been received -lith mixed commelt It has73
not been followed so far as we k~ow- It appears to be contrary to deshy
cis10ns of co~~rts of appeals which have consistently adhered to the prinshy74
ciples of the Murdock case- In my opinion this decision of a district
court aoes not detract from the binding effect ofthe Supreme Courts deshy
eision in the Murdock case
The Department of Justice will recommend to the Congress in Jlouary
an immunity bill of the type I have descri-ced which protects the const1shy
tutional privileges ot witnesses before Congressional Committees courts
and juries but will at the some time aid materially in stamping out
criminal and subversive activities
Footnote Referet~es to Ad~res El~ited ~------ ___bull
Immunity From Prcsecuticn
Versus
Privilege Agaiust Self-Incrimination
Pittman liThe Colonial and Constitutional History of the
Privilege Against Sel-Incrimiootion 1n Amcicaff 21 Va
L R 763 764 770-773 (1935) Corwin The Supreme
Court I S Corctl~ction of the Self Incrirnination C1ause lf
29 lId~h L R 1 512 (1930) Ap~licability of
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to Legjslative
y Pittmenf2 at 774
~ ~ining v ~~8ey 211 U S 78 92 (1908)
L Id at 91
~ 34th Ceng 3d sess Globe PI 427 433 1-45 See
Eberling Constitutional Investigations pp 304-315shy
7 Eberling d at 320-323
~I 142 U s 547 (1892) This Act of 1862 revised an old
statute into two new sections by an amendment which
sought to insure that a witness who testified before
a federal grand jt~ or court (R s I 860 (1875raquo or
a Congressional Committee (R S B 859 (1875raquo would
not be later subjected to the use of his testimony in
any criminal proceeding aGainst him Section ~ 860 of
the amendment dealing with grand jurtes and courts came
under attack in Counselman v Hitchcock J supra and was
held to be invalid Since this part of the immunity proshy
vision tailed to accomplish ita purpose Congress repealed
it in 1910 (36 Stat 352 (19l0raquo) Congress apparently felt
that S 859 applying to Congressional Committees was still
of value and left it 1n force to this date (a s I 859
(1875) as amended 52 Stat 943 (1938) 18 usc e3486
(Supp V 1952)j see liThe Privilege Against Self
Incrimination versus Immunity Proposed Statutes 41
Georgetown L J 511 514 (1953) United States v ~
339 U s 323 335-337 (1950)
21 It read in patt as follows
No person shall be prosecuted for or on
account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he may testify or produce evidence
Act of Feb 11 1893 c 83 27 stat 443 49 USCA
I 46 See too ~ v United States 337 u S 137 146shy
147 (1949)middot Notet Denying -the Privilege against Self
Incrimination to Public Officers 64 Barv L R 987
988 (1951)
- 101 161 U s 591 (1896)
Shapiro v United St~~ 335 U S 1 6-7 (1948) where various
statutes are collated in the footnote The customary provision
in these statutes provides as follows No person shall be
excused from complying with any requirements ot this section
because of his privilege aga1nst self-incriminationgt but the
immunity provisions of the COmptuBory Testimony Act of
February 11 1893 shall apply with respect to allY 1nd1shy
vidual who specifically claims such pr1Y11ege tt
12 Rapacz ULimiting the Plea of Self-Incr1m1nat1ontl 20 Georgetown
L J 329 353 (1932) see footnote 3 of ~ v Connect~
302 U s 319 326 (1937) NPte liThe Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination the Doctr1ne of Waiver 61 Yale L J 104 110
(1952) middot
~f Palko v Connecticut 302 U s 319 326 (1937)
~ See dissents of Mr Justices Shiras Gray and White in ~ V4
Walker supra 161 U s 630638 Cf dissent of Mr Justice
Black in Ro~ers v United States 340 U s 367 376 (1950)
15 Potts Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for ContemptU I
74 U of Pa L R 691 780 (1926) L1acos uRights of Witnesses
Before Congressional Committees 33 Boston U L R 337 340
(1953) middot
t6 Liacos Id at 31tl
17 McGeary rlThe DeTelopmen-cs of Congressional Investigative Power ll
p 23 (1940) McGrain v Daughel~l 273 u s 135 (1927)
18 Sinclair v Unfted States~ 279 U s 263 (1929) ~arsba11 v
Unit~~State~ 176 F 2d 473 (nc Cir 1949) 2 Usc ~ 192
(Supp 1950)
19 Ne York City Bar Ass t n Committee on the Bill of Rights Report
on Congressional Committees presented December 14 1948 p 1
gQi Galloway PCong18ss1onal Investigations Proposed Reforms lt
18 U of Chi L R 478 479-481 (1951)
21 Dilliard lICongress1onal Investigations The Role of the Press
18 U of ChL L R 585 J 587 (1951)
22 Edgerton J dissenting in Barsky v United States 167 F 2d
241 252 (nc eir 1948) cert denied 334 U s 843 (1948)
petition for rehearing denied 339 U S 971 (1951)
~3 De Jonge v Oregon 299 U s 353 364 365 (1937)
24 Id
25 6 Richardson lIMes sOges and Papers of the Pres idents t 1 p 23
July 4 1861
26 See United St~~ v ~~phson 165 F 2d 82 (2 Cir 1947)
cert denied 333 u S 838 (1948) Lawson v United states
176 F 2d 49 (nc Cir 1949) cel~ denied 339 u s 934
(1950) Barsty Y ~ited S~ 167 F 2d 241 (DC eir
1948) cert denied 334 u s 843 (1948) MCGrain v Daugherty
273 u s 135 (1927) and cf Rumely v United States J 197
F 2d 166 (DC eir 1952) affd 73 s ct 543 (1953)
JJ B1a~ v ~~ted Sttlt~s 340 u s 159 (1950-)
gsectJ ~~ v United States 31~1 U s 479 (1951) See too
sectingleton v United States 343 U s 944 (1952) Note Recent
Extensions of the Witness Privilege Against Self-Incrim1nationll
53 Col L R 275 (1953)
29 Aiuppa v Un1tc~ states 201 F 2d 287 300 (6 eir 1952)
_I30 Note nMandatory Dismissal of Public Persol1nel and The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination 101 U ot Pa L R 1190 1191
fn 8 (1953)
31 Brown Be Fassett Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar
20 u or Chi L R 480 483 (1953)
32 Garner v Los Angeles Board) 341 u s 716 (1951) Gerende v
Board of Supervisors 341 U s 56 (1951) but com~are Wieman v
Updegraff 341~ U s 83 (1953)
34 See footnote 32
35 PG~ v Boa-roo of Education 31~2 U s 435 (1951)
ID Id at 493
38 Sec 9(h of lihe LalJor Management Rlations Act of 1947 29 USCA
St1Pp III Sec 141 Sec 159(b)
39 ft~rican C~~catons Association v ~uda 339 u S 382 (1950)
sustaining the validity of Sec 9(h) against the challenge that it
violated the First c-lT~nc1tlCiltl Ex Post FtiCto Lals and other iul1dashy
mental rights
40 Executive Order No 10450 issued Aporil zr 1953 (18 F R 2lt89)
41 Executive Orrler No 10491 issued Ocmiddottober 13 1953 (18 F R 6583)
~ Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary Interlocking Subshy
vcrs ion in Covernmcnt De~rtments II 83d Cong 1st ses5 Juy 30 J
1953 p 21 Being a cOImllunist is not a crime under federal law J
although it is in some states (see Liacos supra note 15 at
375) The Smith Act (18 USC Sec 2385 et seq) mkes advoshy
eating or teaching the violent overthrOf of any goverrment of the
United States or being a member of such a group and kno7ing its
purpose~a federal crime
43 See EaSley v F~cbardsonJ 182 F 2d 46 (DC 1950)J affd by an
evenly diiied court 341 TJ s 918 (1951) 1Etshingto v McGrath
182 F 2d 375 (DC 1950) aff1d 341 U s 923 (1951)j Or~~ v
vIil1ougbby 345 U s 83 91 (1953) Mr Justice Douglas concurring
i~ ~tiFascist Commi~~ v ~~EJ 341 U s 123 -182-183 (1951)
United Public W0rkers v --~1itcbell 330 U s 75 (1947)j Angilly - v
United States 199 F 2d 642) 644 (1950) cf NcAuliffe v rlew
Bedford 155 Mass 216 29 NE 517 (le9~) per Holmes J liThe
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but
he h(=l~s no constitltioi1al right to be a policezranu (Id at 220
29 NE at 5J7)
44 v1ie~sn _
v UpGegaff middot111 ~
3~middot4 u s 83 (1953) The Court ruleri as
contrry to due process the Cklahoma loyalty oath statute forshy
bidding IJ1l11ic emplo~rment of Persons who belonzea to certain
organizations regarciless of their knowledge of the character of
those oreenizations because of the indiscriminate classification
of lnnocent with kno~vilg activityll (d at 91)
~1 345 u S 83 (1953)middot
46 Id at 90
47 339 u s 3827 412 (1950) sustaininG the non-corJlIlunist affidavit
requirernelt of union leaders under the Taft -Hartley Act
~ Hoffman v United States 341 U s 179 (1951) suggests such
legislation if Congres3 concludes the lleed is great enough
See too Comment The Privilege Against Se1f-Llcriminetion Versus
Lmnurdty Z Proposed Statutes P 41 Gt~orgetom L J 511 (1953)
S Rept 153 on S 16 83d Cone 1st sess ~ 1 ald 2
April 17 1953 Report of Sel1a~~e Commttee on the JudiciaJ J
Interlocking S-lbversion in GOYf11llent Departments tl July 30
1953 83d Cong 1st sess p 50
~ HcfI1nan v Unitet States 341 u s 479 486 (1951)
50 Id U1ited States v ~isman 111 F 2d 260 262 (2 Cir 1950)
51 Note 61 Yale L J 105 109 (1952)
52 Rogers v United States 340 u s 367 375 (1951)
211 See e g Blau v Unjted StaIe~ 340 u s 159 (1950)
-shy54 Note J Co1t3resnic1al Inv estigat1ons--Self-Illcrimimtion Condemneshy
tiOll and Fair Hcar1ngll 22 U of Cinn L R 193 199-200 (1953)
55 See ~ovTn8end v ~~it~~ta~~3 95 F 2d 352 351 (DC Cir 1938)
cert denied 303 u S 664 (1938)
56 Byse TfA Report on the Pennsylvana Loyalty Act 101 U of Fa
L R 480 481-1~84 (1953) Wright Should Teachers Testify
Saturday Review Sept 2o 1953 p 23
57 See Meltzer Required Records The McCarran Act and The Privilege
Against Selfmiddotmiddot Incriminat ion ll 19 U of Chi L R 687 722 (1951)
y 83d Cong 1st Seas 1953 Also known as the Kefauver BUl
59 ~ v ltlalker 161 U S 591 (1896)
sect21 S 16 83d Cong 1st sess 1953 passed the Senate July 9 1953
after extensive debate Cong Ree 8646-8663 July 9 1953shy
S 16 amends B 3486 of Title 18 Sec 3486 presently furnishes
witnesses immunity from prosecution tor testimony before either
House or their Committees It appears to suffer from the same
deficiency present in a similar statute condemned in Counse~an v
Hitchcock 142 u s 547 (1892) S 16 is intended to StWP1y the
omission in the Hitchcock ease by providing not only that a
witness testimony may not be used against him but that such
witness shall be iImnune with respect to lIany transaction mtter
or thing concerning which he has been compelled to testIfy
sect 83d Congo 1st sess 1953
~ S Rept 153 83d Congo 1st sess p 2 (1953)
63 See Comment The Privi1ege Against Self-Incrimination Versus
Immunity Proposed statutes 41 Georgetown L J 511 523 (1953)
64 Supra footnote 7shy
sectif Delanel v ~ed States 199 F 2d 107 (1 Ci~ 1952)
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
These decisions could be multiplied and undoubtedly represent
prevailing law Almo3t every heinous crime on the law books comshy
roitted by Inlt1ividuals or by groups J remains uncove ced because of the
privilege against self-incrimination But it is in the area of subshy
version and disloyalty particularly that the privelege has a field
day 11 It is haIe that legislatiye connnittees and grand juries are
held at bay for years from learning vlhich leaders are plotting the
countrys destruction merely because witnesses are relieved of giving
essential information upon the ground of privilege
It is little Vlonder that lat-l-ebiding citizens frequently are heard
to say that sub-rersives and other lrongdoers are unduly coddled by
existing law They express anlDzement that the Congress and the Courts
should conttnue to put up ith subterfuge and concealment 1 n place of
truth at a time 1vhen the peril from Communiam is 60 great and -1hen
crime 1s so rrunpa1t They earnestly ucge upon us the vital need for
modernizing the legal ~eapons for fighting subversion and crime
These pleas of the people for more dcastic action against subshy
version and other misconduct have not gone unheeded Some States and
cities provide fer the dismissal of public employees ho refuse to
testify on grounds of self-incrimination or Tho refuse to t-aive imshy30
munity from prosecution
Some States prescribe loyalty oaths for admission to the Bar -1hich
go beyond the traditional promise to uphold the State and National 31
Constitutions shy
Some States and municipalities have passed statutes requiring
affidavits of puhlic employees that they are not and have never 32
been Communists Some States make ineligible to teach in any public
school a person vTho was a memher of an organization which advocates the
~ overthimiddotow of the Government by force Some of these statutes have been
JY upheld us valid by the Supreme Cou~~ including the provision of the
New York State law which provides that mecbership by a person in an
organization listed as subve~sive by the Dcard of Regents shall constitute
prima facie evidence of disqualification for employment 1n the public 12
schools This was the so-called Feinberg Law aimed at protecting the school
children of lew York against teachels who were spreading communist propaganda
~e poisonous propaganda was Bufficiently subtle to escape detection in the
class room The New York Legislature recognized that while the schools must
attract and protect the critical minds the schools vlere not sanctuaries for
those who were committed to follot-l in the footsteps of Klaus Fuchs It sought
the next best solution by e4cluding froIij teaching those affiliated with certain
orgn1zations listed by the Board of Regents vlhich advocated the overthrow
of the government
One of the main constitutional objections to the law was that it vishy
alated the First Amendment by creating an atmosphere of fear which would
inevitably stifle freedom of speech The Court in an opinion by Judge
Minton formerly of the COUl~ of Appeals for this Circuit r~jected the conshy
tention that the la interfered Vlith free speech since persons uhave no right
to ork for the smiddottate in the school system on their own terms They may york
for the school system upon the reasonable terms laid d01n by the proper
authorities of Neu York If they do not choose to work on such terms they 36
are at libelty to ~etain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere 1
The Supreme Court -las also lholly unimpressed by the contention that
the law condoned guilt by association contrary to democratic concepts of
justice On this point the Court sald ilL teacher lOrks in a sensitive area
in a school room There he shapes the attitude of young minds toward the
society in which they live In this the state has a vital concern It must
preserve the integcity of the schools That the school authorities haVe
the right and duty to aceen the officials teachers and their employees as
to their fitness to majnjail1 the integrity of the schools as a part of an
ordered society cannot be doubtecl One I s associates past and present as
vell os one t a conduct moy proIJerly be considered in determining fitness
and loyalty From time immemoljal one t a reputation ha3 been determined by
the company he keeps In the employment of officials and teachers of the
school systeil the state may very properly inquire into the company they 37
keep n
The Fedel~al GOyernrlent (llso has taken effective measures to protect
the interests of netional cecu1ity One long step forward in that direction
was to enact legislation requiring non middotmiddotCommul1ist affidavits from trade
union leaders vihose unions rBnted to resort to the advantages of the Taftshy38
Hartley Act - Tl1e Ptllpose of thiu requirement vas to prevent disruption of 39
industry in obedience to Communist Party orders If the union leaderls
affidavit us false be CQuId be sent to jail
The Federal Government has also tried its best to clean its Gvln
house fI On April 27 1953 the President by Executive oXde~ established
his security requirements for employment so that pelsons employed by the
Federal Government will be reliable trustworthy of sood character and 40
loyal to the United States On October 13 1953 the President amended
his Executive order so as to provide that imiddotlbe~~e a government employee refuses
to testify before a Congressional Coramittee regarding charges of his diashy
loyalty or misconduct an agency may take this factor into consideration
in determining hethe~ the person I s continued employment is inconsistent ~_f 41
with the national securtty This emendment to the Presidents Executive
order is in accord i th my opinion that a government employee oTho claims
privilege in a Congressional investigation may be too much of a risk to be
retained in Federal Service
A recent Senate Report entitled tlInterlocldng Subversion in
WGovernment fl fully documents how former government employees were
able to spin their web of intrigue in positions of influ6nce The
Report states
1tlJ~e subcommittee exumined in public session 36 pershy
sons about whom it had substantial evidence of membership
in the Communist undergrolld 10 Government All of them
invoked tha fifth amenmnen~ ~~d refused to answer questions
regardicg COnrIranist membership on the grounds of self-in
crinlination Many reused even to eomowledge their own
sigl1attles on official Govelnment doclllllents in which they
haG SViorn to nonmernbership in the past
All)st all of he persons exposed by the evidence had
Bome connection which could be documented vith at least one-shy
a~d generally several--other e~o6ed persons Tney used eaoh
other s names for referenoe on ~licationa for Federal em-
p10~lOOnt They hire eaoh other They pomot~d eampQh other
hAY raised each others sal~ries They transfer~ampd eaah
otlwr from bureau to bureau from depariment to department
from congressional committee to congressional committee
They assigned each other to international missions They
vouched for each others loyalty end prctected each other
when exposure threaten~d ~ley often had common living
qUaters tI
Suppression i truth in any case is bad enough In no event
can it be justified by a Government employee or applicant for Govern
ment empl~Jment in the face of a Congressional inquiry where the
interests of the national Bect~lty are at stake No one denies that
the Government employee or applicant for such employment may conshy
stitutionally claim his privilege against self-incrimination On
the other hand no one has a constitutional right to a Government
job W True the Supreme Court ha held that the constitutional
protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant
to a statute Is patently arbitrary or discriminatory II W But in
my opinion there is nothing e1ther arbtrary or discriminatry about
diSDdssing a federal employee where he refuses to waive the privilege
against self-incrimination guaranteed him by tho Const tution We
find an analogous situation presented in the recent decision of the
~reme Court in Orloff v WilloughbY ~ In that case the peti shy
tioner a physician was denied a commission in the Army principally
tor the reason that when asked hether he was a member in any Communist JY
organizations he replied) Federal Constitutional privilege is claimed
In its opinion through Mr Justice Jackson the Supreme Court said
It ia argued that Orlorf 1s being punished for havshy
ing claimed a privilege which the Constitution guarantees
No one at least no ane on this Court which has repeatedly
sustained assertion by Communists of the privilege against
selfMincr~inatian questions or doubts Orloffs right to
withhold facts about himself on this ground No one beshy
l1evee he can be punished for doing so But the question
is whether be can at the same time take the position that
to tell the truth about himself Vlould incriminate him and
that even so the President must appofnt him to a post of
honor and trust le have no hesitation in answering that
question No II There is no law which requires the Gove~~ent to sit supinely by
until the suspeoted eIlIployee has been convicted of disloyalty or other
similar misoonduct inconsistent with the interests of the national
security before it can sCPal~ate him from the Government service There
is no law which requires the Government to assume or endure such a risk
As was pointed out in an apt csae by the Supreme Court in American
Commtlnications v Douds speaking through the beloved late Chief
Justice Vinson
IfThat (first) amendment requires that one be permitted to
believe what he will It requires that one be permitted
to advocate what he will unless there is a clear and
present danger that a substantial public evil will result
therefrom It does not require that he be permitted to be
the keeper of the arsenal
I have not overlooked the fact that the loyalty and honesty of
the ovel~vhelming majority of all Government employeesmiddot is beyond quesshy
tion But their good reputations and character are far better proshy
tected from un1tfarranted criticism when we root out the few who are
unreliable and disloyal
What the critical situation of om time calls for is a lavr com
pt)lling testimony within the fr~neuro1Torl of the Constitution The tmshy
swer to this need is immuni-ty legislaiion which will be as broad as
the privilege W11ich is stJpplanted tV Then if a person is adjudged
ill cOlte~Pt for refusing to te3tify before a Cotgressional committee
he will know tZat t-le ~udgrnerJt of OOllt-empt will more likely stand up
on appeal free from oonstitutional ohal1enge
At the same time the l~w will also provide more adequate proshy
tection for the wit~ss
At presnt the witne31l is in a rtboxtl so to slJeGk The witness
is not exc~ed from an3werL~g merely because he believes his answers
Vlil1 incriminate him His slly-ao does not of its(gt~r establish the
1amphazeId of ilcriIltination II ~~ere he olaims his privil~ge it is
the ftL1ction of the jcge to dets-rmme whether the siJence of t1e
witness is justified or wha~1er the danger to be apprebenced is too
remote to be sl1bstattial To save himself from being held in conshy
tempt tl1e witness may oftcn be cOJIpEtled to disclos3 til0ne very
facts whtrh he claims are privileged iQ
Witnesses are alao aided by a b~oad immunity statute in still
another way Under our la unlike that of England t a disclosure of
any incriminating fact constitutes a wailer of the privilege as to deshy
tails con~erning that fact 211 Having made a partial disclosure of
faots the witness loses the rig~t to cease answering intel~ogat1ons
and rely upon his privilege at a 1ater point in his testimony
In one oase the detendant rree~ disclosed that she was Treasshy
urer of the Communist Pariy in COlorado and testified that she had
given the books ot the party to another person When asked to dishy
wlge the name ot the lamiddottter she refused upon the ground that the
answer might incriminate her mder the Sm1tb Act Atfirming her
conviction for contempt the Supreme Court speaking through Chief
Justice Vinson said
Since the privilege agatnlt salf-inorimination
presupposes a real danger ot legal detriment arising
from the disolosure petitioner cannot invoke the
privilege where response to the specific question in
issue here would not ftUtther inoriminate her O1aolo
sure of e tact waives the privilege as to details pound
This deoision leaves the law in a rather anomolous position tor the
vlitness A witness who refuses to answer aU questions and fails to Wcooperate to any extent may be protected by the claim of privilege
But there is no equal protection atforded by the decisions to the
witness who commences to eooperate but stops at a point where further
disclosure may tncrim1~ate him
Moreover it the witness refuses to answer on the ground that
Congress has exceeded its powers or that the inQuiry in lacking in
pertinency he construas the law at his peril If mistake8 his good 55
faith error of law constitutes no defense to fine and imprisonment
Then again it is claimed DY some that a persons election to
remain silent upon the ground of privilege does not necessarily mean
he has anything sinister to hide There are undoubtedly some people of
sincere principle who refl1se to disclose 1flformat1oft to authorized
1nvestigating authorities because of their feeling that ao one has any
right to 1~quire about their beliefs even if germane to the inquiry at 56
bsnd- There are other persons who refuse to answer because they feel
their recollections of events lons past are fee~le and that falsehood
even on trivial or irrelevant matters may subject them to a charge of
perjury There are still others less innocent vho say that coercing
them to testify under pain of contempt resembles the Soviet tactic of
requiring those SUilty not only to pay for but also to prcclatD their 57
guilt shy
~he use of broad tmmunity statutes serves to remove the dansers
mentioned for the iDPocent a~d operates aa an incentive for the guilty
to tell the truth
There are already two proposals pendin8 in Congress which seek to
compel the answer by witnesses at questioDs put to them before Conshy
gressiOl1al Committees grand juries or courts In exchange tor this
compulsory testimony the Witnesses will obtain complete immunity froa
prosecution
58 One Bill is s~ 565 This proposal grants immunity to ~itnesses
before a grand Jury or court of the United States when in the disshy
cretion of th~ Attorney General it is necessary to do so in the public
interest In exchange for this immunity the witness is compelled to
testify and to produce his books papers or recoIds s 565 uses
broad immunity lengtase in stating that the witness shall not be
prosecuted on account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he 1s compelled after ela~ing his privilege to testify or
produce evidence
In this respect s 565 is almost ident1cal to the immunity proshy59
vision sustained 8S valid by the Supreme Court e~ far back as 1896-
This Bill does not extend the immunity to witnesses before Congressional
Committees 601 61
There are other Bills pend-ing S 16- middot and H R 27371 with equally
broad immunity authority The Senate has passed its Bill but the House
Bill still awaits action Both these Bills grunt immunity to witnesses
before Congressional Committees but not to witnesses before grand
juries or courts
The proposed Bills are worded so that the witness will not get an
immunity bathU merely by testifying He must first raise specifically
his claim for privilege and thus put the Committee on notice whether
for the greater good the witness should be required to testify and 62
given immunity or whether he should be excused from testlfying-
However the discretionary power to grant the immunity is not vested
in the Attorney General bumiddott lies with the body conducting the investigation
If the proceeding is one before one of the Houses of Congress then
a majority vote of the members present is necessary Under S 16
if it is a proceeding before a committee two thirds of the members
must vote to grant the tmmunity In that event the tvothirds vote
must include at least two members of each of the two political parties
having the largest representation on such committee The House Bill
does not provide for notice to the Attorney General of the proposed
grant of immunity The Senate Bill provides for one weeks notice to
the Attorney General of the proposal but if the latter fails or reshy
fuses to assent to grant of immunity it may be conferred by majority
vote of either House It is hoped that this legislation will only be
resorted to where full diseloaure by witnesses is deemed of greater
tmportance than the possibility of punishing them for past offenses
By permitting one or several criminals to escape prosecution the
larger public peril contained in a gang of criminals or in their
leaders may be uncovered and the guilty brought to justice
The legislative proposals mentioned have much to commend them
In my opinion these bills would better achieve their purposes it they
required the concurrence of the Attorney General 1n the granting of any
immunity to a witness by a Joint Congressional Committee or either Heuse
committee or by Congress The Attorney General 1s the chief legal
officer of the Government of the United States As Buch it 1s his
responsibility to prosecute persons who offend the criminal laws of the
United states This responsibility must be coupled w1th adequate
authority to permit its discharge It would seem to be more advisable
for the Attorney General who has immediate knowledge of a criminals
background and propensities to decide whether immunity should be
granted for such a person To allow the Attorney General to participate
in the ultimate decision aa to whether immunity should be granted would
not impair Congressional investigatIons in the fields of internal
security crime and corruption Nor would it discourage witnesses
from providing information of importance to the investigation if the
Attorney Generals permission vas required before immunity was granted
On the other hand if these Bills were enacted in their present
form they might subject members of Congress to undue pressures for
granting immunity to criminals who are ineligible to receive it Also
they cuuld very easily cause embarrassment to Congress by tmped1ng or
blocking prosecutions planned by the Department of Justice on any matter 63
even incidentally testified to upon these 1nvestigations
The unfortunate experience which Congress had as far back as 1857 64
in granting immunity without concurrence of the Attorney General - should
~each that a similar course of action may be marked by eveD greater
failure today_ The witness might readily turn this division of authority
between Congress and the Department of Justice to his advantage by
obtaining an ~unity from the legislative committee or from Congress
over the objection of the Attorney General Thereafter he would be
free to testify concerning a broad area Of activities without fear that
he could be held to account criminally for other violations however
unrelated to the matter under investigation
Thus for example a Congreas1onal Committee or Congress might
furnish immunity to a person to obtain his testimony about his illicit
traffic in slot machine opercltlons between states This person may also
be guilty either of espionage or subversion or of selling narcotics to
youngs cers as to which an indictment is soon to be obtained To foreshy
close prosecution on these more serious crimes the witness would be
glad to volunteer information on his other activities if he knew in
advance that immunity would fallow for all of them Therefore greatest
care must be exercioed in granting immunity and then only upon a fully
informed judgment of all tle facts The Departlnent of Justice would
of course through the Fe~eral Bureau of Investigation the Crtmlnal
and Tax Divisions and the United states Attorneyo I offices be mosmiddott
likely to know the facts and the plans for prosecution Concurrence
by the Attorney General in conferring the immunity would also enable
the Department of Justice to maintuin its responsibility for the proper
administration of the crlminal law
The provision in S 10 for one weeks notice to the Attorney General
of the proposed grant of immunity does not fully cure this Bill of its
weakness in failing to require his affirmative concurrence in every
case Experience indicates that at times the views of the person who
1s charged with prooecut1ng criminals are disregarded by Congressional
Committees For example the successful criminal conviction obtained
by the Department of Justice ot the internal revenue collector in one of
the largest cities was recently nullified because of the action of a
House Committee in holding 1middotr1dely publicized hearings in the district in
65 which the trial subsequently took place These hearings took place
over the strong objection of the Department of Justice thut the pro
posed hearing would be of prejudice to the defendant on the trial
which was about to be initiated and would injure the Governments case
in disclosing its evidence In reversing the convlct1on l Chief Judge
Magruder observed that the character of the defendant was blackened
and discredited as the day of trial approached because of the publicity
invited and stimulated by the Committee over the radio and television
Thu6 1 mere advance notIfication to the Attorney General of a proposed
grant of tmmunity would never be a guarantee that the Committee would
be guided by the views of the Attorney General
S 16 and H R 2737 would also more readily carry out the aim of
obtaining evidence against leaders of subversion and criminal entershy
prisesj if provision for twmunity were granted to obtain testimony
not only before Congressional Committees but likewise before courts
and grand juries
For these reasons it is my opinion that if any measure is to be
enacted~~rmitting the granting of immunity to witnesses before either
House of Congress or its committees it should vest the Attorney General
or the Attorney General acting with the concurren~e of appropriate members
of Congress with the authority to grant such tmmunity and if the test shy
mony is sought for a court or grand jury that the Attorney General alone
be authorized to grant the ilmnunity
There remain for discussion two principal objections to this proshy
posed legislation which may be briefly considered here One objection
1s that when a witneAS is compelled to testify even under the protecshy
tion of immunity from criminal punihment) he is not relieved from
personal disgrace ~~lhich attach~8 to the exposure of his crime The
answer to this objection ia contained in II land mark decision of the 66
Supreme Court in Brown v Wrtlker
The design of tbe constitutional plivilege is not to aid the
witness in vindicating his character but to protect him
against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict him
of a criminal charge If he secure legal jnmllnity from prose-
cution the possible impairment of his good name is a penalty
which it is reasonable b0 should be compelled to pay for the
common good
The reasoning of this decision has never been qU~Gtioned and has 67
only recently been approved by the Sllpreme Court
The other chief objection to the proposed legislation is that while
a witness may receive itmlunity from federal prosecution) he may still
be subject to IJrosecution under ~tate lavl The Supreme Court has held
that this is not a valid objection to federal immunity laws~ since the
self-incrimination clause ln the Fifth Amendment operates ao a l1mitashy68
tion on the federal government only In United states v Murdock the
defendant was indicted for refUSing to answer questions of a revenue
agent relating to ctrt8 in income tax returns The refusal was ba sed on
the plea that hiD answers might 1ncrim1nate him in a state court The
Court said on this point
This court ha~ held that immunity against state prosecution is
not essential to the validity of federal statutes declaring that
a witnes3 shall not be excllpoundied from gtring evidence on the
ground that it vTill incriminate him and also that the ladt of
state power to give witnesses protection against federal
prosecution does not defeat a state immunity statute
Similarly a witness befo~e a state tribunal CBnnot refuse to 69
answer because of the threat of federal prosecution - However the
Federal District Court in Ohio recently held i1 Unted States v 70
Di Carlo that the defendant had the right to assert his privilege
because of possible prosecution under state law since the Senate
committee was authorized to investigate violations not only of the lawe 71
of the United States but also of the states M_ The Murdock case was
dtstingJished urlon the ground that the danger of state posecution 1n
that case was remote and uncertain thile in the Di Carlo case the
danger of state proaecutjon WilS imminent and real 72
The ---Di Carlo case has been received -lith mixed commelt It has73
not been followed so far as we k~ow- It appears to be contrary to deshy
cis10ns of co~~rts of appeals which have consistently adhered to the prinshy74
ciples of the Murdock case- In my opinion this decision of a district
court aoes not detract from the binding effect ofthe Supreme Courts deshy
eision in the Murdock case
The Department of Justice will recommend to the Congress in Jlouary
an immunity bill of the type I have descri-ced which protects the const1shy
tutional privileges ot witnesses before Congressional Committees courts
and juries but will at the some time aid materially in stamping out
criminal and subversive activities
Footnote Referet~es to Ad~res El~ited ~------ ___bull
Immunity From Prcsecuticn
Versus
Privilege Agaiust Self-Incrimination
Pittman liThe Colonial and Constitutional History of the
Privilege Against Sel-Incrimiootion 1n Amcicaff 21 Va
L R 763 764 770-773 (1935) Corwin The Supreme
Court I S Corctl~ction of the Self Incrirnination C1ause lf
29 lId~h L R 1 512 (1930) Ap~licability of
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to Legjslative
y Pittmenf2 at 774
~ ~ining v ~~8ey 211 U S 78 92 (1908)
L Id at 91
~ 34th Ceng 3d sess Globe PI 427 433 1-45 See
Eberling Constitutional Investigations pp 304-315shy
7 Eberling d at 320-323
~I 142 U s 547 (1892) This Act of 1862 revised an old
statute into two new sections by an amendment which
sought to insure that a witness who testified before
a federal grand jt~ or court (R s I 860 (1875raquo or
a Congressional Committee (R S B 859 (1875raquo would
not be later subjected to the use of his testimony in
any criminal proceeding aGainst him Section ~ 860 of
the amendment dealing with grand jurtes and courts came
under attack in Counselman v Hitchcock J supra and was
held to be invalid Since this part of the immunity proshy
vision tailed to accomplish ita purpose Congress repealed
it in 1910 (36 Stat 352 (19l0raquo) Congress apparently felt
that S 859 applying to Congressional Committees was still
of value and left it 1n force to this date (a s I 859
(1875) as amended 52 Stat 943 (1938) 18 usc e3486
(Supp V 1952)j see liThe Privilege Against Self
Incrimination versus Immunity Proposed Statutes 41
Georgetown L J 511 514 (1953) United States v ~
339 U s 323 335-337 (1950)
21 It read in patt as follows
No person shall be prosecuted for or on
account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he may testify or produce evidence
Act of Feb 11 1893 c 83 27 stat 443 49 USCA
I 46 See too ~ v United States 337 u S 137 146shy
147 (1949)middot Notet Denying -the Privilege against Self
Incrimination to Public Officers 64 Barv L R 987
988 (1951)
- 101 161 U s 591 (1896)
Shapiro v United St~~ 335 U S 1 6-7 (1948) where various
statutes are collated in the footnote The customary provision
in these statutes provides as follows No person shall be
excused from complying with any requirements ot this section
because of his privilege aga1nst self-incriminationgt but the
immunity provisions of the COmptuBory Testimony Act of
February 11 1893 shall apply with respect to allY 1nd1shy
vidual who specifically claims such pr1Y11ege tt
12 Rapacz ULimiting the Plea of Self-Incr1m1nat1ontl 20 Georgetown
L J 329 353 (1932) see footnote 3 of ~ v Connect~
302 U s 319 326 (1937) NPte liThe Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination the Doctr1ne of Waiver 61 Yale L J 104 110
(1952) middot
~f Palko v Connecticut 302 U s 319 326 (1937)
~ See dissents of Mr Justices Shiras Gray and White in ~ V4
Walker supra 161 U s 630638 Cf dissent of Mr Justice
Black in Ro~ers v United States 340 U s 367 376 (1950)
15 Potts Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for ContemptU I
74 U of Pa L R 691 780 (1926) L1acos uRights of Witnesses
Before Congressional Committees 33 Boston U L R 337 340
(1953) middot
t6 Liacos Id at 31tl
17 McGeary rlThe DeTelopmen-cs of Congressional Investigative Power ll
p 23 (1940) McGrain v Daughel~l 273 u s 135 (1927)
18 Sinclair v Unfted States~ 279 U s 263 (1929) ~arsba11 v
Unit~~State~ 176 F 2d 473 (nc Cir 1949) 2 Usc ~ 192
(Supp 1950)
19 Ne York City Bar Ass t n Committee on the Bill of Rights Report
on Congressional Committees presented December 14 1948 p 1
gQi Galloway PCong18ss1onal Investigations Proposed Reforms lt
18 U of Chi L R 478 479-481 (1951)
21 Dilliard lICongress1onal Investigations The Role of the Press
18 U of ChL L R 585 J 587 (1951)
22 Edgerton J dissenting in Barsky v United States 167 F 2d
241 252 (nc eir 1948) cert denied 334 U s 843 (1948)
petition for rehearing denied 339 U S 971 (1951)
~3 De Jonge v Oregon 299 U s 353 364 365 (1937)
24 Id
25 6 Richardson lIMes sOges and Papers of the Pres idents t 1 p 23
July 4 1861
26 See United St~~ v ~~phson 165 F 2d 82 (2 Cir 1947)
cert denied 333 u S 838 (1948) Lawson v United states
176 F 2d 49 (nc Cir 1949) cel~ denied 339 u s 934
(1950) Barsty Y ~ited S~ 167 F 2d 241 (DC eir
1948) cert denied 334 u s 843 (1948) MCGrain v Daugherty
273 u s 135 (1927) and cf Rumely v United States J 197
F 2d 166 (DC eir 1952) affd 73 s ct 543 (1953)
JJ B1a~ v ~~ted Sttlt~s 340 u s 159 (1950-)
gsectJ ~~ v United States 31~1 U s 479 (1951) See too
sectingleton v United States 343 U s 944 (1952) Note Recent
Extensions of the Witness Privilege Against Self-Incrim1nationll
53 Col L R 275 (1953)
29 Aiuppa v Un1tc~ states 201 F 2d 287 300 (6 eir 1952)
_I30 Note nMandatory Dismissal of Public Persol1nel and The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination 101 U ot Pa L R 1190 1191
fn 8 (1953)
31 Brown Be Fassett Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar
20 u or Chi L R 480 483 (1953)
32 Garner v Los Angeles Board) 341 u s 716 (1951) Gerende v
Board of Supervisors 341 U s 56 (1951) but com~are Wieman v
Updegraff 341~ U s 83 (1953)
34 See footnote 32
35 PG~ v Boa-roo of Education 31~2 U s 435 (1951)
ID Id at 493
38 Sec 9(h of lihe LalJor Management Rlations Act of 1947 29 USCA
St1Pp III Sec 141 Sec 159(b)
39 ft~rican C~~catons Association v ~uda 339 u S 382 (1950)
sustaining the validity of Sec 9(h) against the challenge that it
violated the First c-lT~nc1tlCiltl Ex Post FtiCto Lals and other iul1dashy
mental rights
40 Executive Order No 10450 issued Aporil zr 1953 (18 F R 2lt89)
41 Executive Orrler No 10491 issued Ocmiddottober 13 1953 (18 F R 6583)
~ Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary Interlocking Subshy
vcrs ion in Covernmcnt De~rtments II 83d Cong 1st ses5 Juy 30 J
1953 p 21 Being a cOImllunist is not a crime under federal law J
although it is in some states (see Liacos supra note 15 at
375) The Smith Act (18 USC Sec 2385 et seq) mkes advoshy
eating or teaching the violent overthrOf of any goverrment of the
United States or being a member of such a group and kno7ing its
purpose~a federal crime
43 See EaSley v F~cbardsonJ 182 F 2d 46 (DC 1950)J affd by an
evenly diiied court 341 TJ s 918 (1951) 1Etshingto v McGrath
182 F 2d 375 (DC 1950) aff1d 341 U s 923 (1951)j Or~~ v
vIil1ougbby 345 U s 83 91 (1953) Mr Justice Douglas concurring
i~ ~tiFascist Commi~~ v ~~EJ 341 U s 123 -182-183 (1951)
United Public W0rkers v --~1itcbell 330 U s 75 (1947)j Angilly - v
United States 199 F 2d 642) 644 (1950) cf NcAuliffe v rlew
Bedford 155 Mass 216 29 NE 517 (le9~) per Holmes J liThe
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but
he h(=l~s no constitltioi1al right to be a policezranu (Id at 220
29 NE at 5J7)
44 v1ie~sn _
v UpGegaff middot111 ~
3~middot4 u s 83 (1953) The Court ruleri as
contrry to due process the Cklahoma loyalty oath statute forshy
bidding IJ1l11ic emplo~rment of Persons who belonzea to certain
organizations regarciless of their knowledge of the character of
those oreenizations because of the indiscriminate classification
of lnnocent with kno~vilg activityll (d at 91)
~1 345 u S 83 (1953)middot
46 Id at 90
47 339 u s 3827 412 (1950) sustaininG the non-corJlIlunist affidavit
requirernelt of union leaders under the Taft -Hartley Act
~ Hoffman v United States 341 U s 179 (1951) suggests such
legislation if Congres3 concludes the lleed is great enough
See too Comment The Privilege Against Se1f-Llcriminetion Versus
Lmnurdty Z Proposed Statutes P 41 Gt~orgetom L J 511 (1953)
S Rept 153 on S 16 83d Cone 1st sess ~ 1 ald 2
April 17 1953 Report of Sel1a~~e Commttee on the JudiciaJ J
Interlocking S-lbversion in GOYf11llent Departments tl July 30
1953 83d Cong 1st sess p 50
~ HcfI1nan v Unitet States 341 u s 479 486 (1951)
50 Id U1ited States v ~isman 111 F 2d 260 262 (2 Cir 1950)
51 Note 61 Yale L J 105 109 (1952)
52 Rogers v United States 340 u s 367 375 (1951)
211 See e g Blau v Unjted StaIe~ 340 u s 159 (1950)
-shy54 Note J Co1t3resnic1al Inv estigat1ons--Self-Illcrimimtion Condemneshy
tiOll and Fair Hcar1ngll 22 U of Cinn L R 193 199-200 (1953)
55 See ~ovTn8end v ~~it~~ta~~3 95 F 2d 352 351 (DC Cir 1938)
cert denied 303 u S 664 (1938)
56 Byse TfA Report on the Pennsylvana Loyalty Act 101 U of Fa
L R 480 481-1~84 (1953) Wright Should Teachers Testify
Saturday Review Sept 2o 1953 p 23
57 See Meltzer Required Records The McCarran Act and The Privilege
Against Selfmiddotmiddot Incriminat ion ll 19 U of Chi L R 687 722 (1951)
y 83d Cong 1st Seas 1953 Also known as the Kefauver BUl
59 ~ v ltlalker 161 U S 591 (1896)
sect21 S 16 83d Cong 1st sess 1953 passed the Senate July 9 1953
after extensive debate Cong Ree 8646-8663 July 9 1953shy
S 16 amends B 3486 of Title 18 Sec 3486 presently furnishes
witnesses immunity from prosecution tor testimony before either
House or their Committees It appears to suffer from the same
deficiency present in a similar statute condemned in Counse~an v
Hitchcock 142 u s 547 (1892) S 16 is intended to StWP1y the
omission in the Hitchcock ease by providing not only that a
witness testimony may not be used against him but that such
witness shall be iImnune with respect to lIany transaction mtter
or thing concerning which he has been compelled to testIfy
sect 83d Congo 1st sess 1953
~ S Rept 153 83d Congo 1st sess p 2 (1953)
63 See Comment The Privi1ege Against Self-Incrimination Versus
Immunity Proposed statutes 41 Georgetown L J 511 523 (1953)
64 Supra footnote 7shy
sectif Delanel v ~ed States 199 F 2d 107 (1 Ci~ 1952)
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
~ overthimiddotow of the Government by force Some of these statutes have been
JY upheld us valid by the Supreme Cou~~ including the provision of the
New York State law which provides that mecbership by a person in an
organization listed as subve~sive by the Dcard of Regents shall constitute
prima facie evidence of disqualification for employment 1n the public 12
schools This was the so-called Feinberg Law aimed at protecting the school
children of lew York against teachels who were spreading communist propaganda
~e poisonous propaganda was Bufficiently subtle to escape detection in the
class room The New York Legislature recognized that while the schools must
attract and protect the critical minds the schools vlere not sanctuaries for
those who were committed to follot-l in the footsteps of Klaus Fuchs It sought
the next best solution by e4cluding froIij teaching those affiliated with certain
orgn1zations listed by the Board of Regents vlhich advocated the overthrow
of the government
One of the main constitutional objections to the law was that it vishy
alated the First Amendment by creating an atmosphere of fear which would
inevitably stifle freedom of speech The Court in an opinion by Judge
Minton formerly of the COUl~ of Appeals for this Circuit r~jected the conshy
tention that the la interfered Vlith free speech since persons uhave no right
to ork for the smiddottate in the school system on their own terms They may york
for the school system upon the reasonable terms laid d01n by the proper
authorities of Neu York If they do not choose to work on such terms they 36
are at libelty to ~etain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere 1
The Supreme Court -las also lholly unimpressed by the contention that
the law condoned guilt by association contrary to democratic concepts of
justice On this point the Court sald ilL teacher lOrks in a sensitive area
in a school room There he shapes the attitude of young minds toward the
society in which they live In this the state has a vital concern It must
preserve the integcity of the schools That the school authorities haVe
the right and duty to aceen the officials teachers and their employees as
to their fitness to majnjail1 the integrity of the schools as a part of an
ordered society cannot be doubtecl One I s associates past and present as
vell os one t a conduct moy proIJerly be considered in determining fitness
and loyalty From time immemoljal one t a reputation ha3 been determined by
the company he keeps In the employment of officials and teachers of the
school systeil the state may very properly inquire into the company they 37
keep n
The Fedel~al GOyernrlent (llso has taken effective measures to protect
the interests of netional cecu1ity One long step forward in that direction
was to enact legislation requiring non middotmiddotCommul1ist affidavits from trade
union leaders vihose unions rBnted to resort to the advantages of the Taftshy38
Hartley Act - Tl1e Ptllpose of thiu requirement vas to prevent disruption of 39
industry in obedience to Communist Party orders If the union leaderls
affidavit us false be CQuId be sent to jail
The Federal Government has also tried its best to clean its Gvln
house fI On April 27 1953 the President by Executive oXde~ established
his security requirements for employment so that pelsons employed by the
Federal Government will be reliable trustworthy of sood character and 40
loyal to the United States On October 13 1953 the President amended
his Executive order so as to provide that imiddotlbe~~e a government employee refuses
to testify before a Congressional Coramittee regarding charges of his diashy
loyalty or misconduct an agency may take this factor into consideration
in determining hethe~ the person I s continued employment is inconsistent ~_f 41
with the national securtty This emendment to the Presidents Executive
order is in accord i th my opinion that a government employee oTho claims
privilege in a Congressional investigation may be too much of a risk to be
retained in Federal Service
A recent Senate Report entitled tlInterlocldng Subversion in
WGovernment fl fully documents how former government employees were
able to spin their web of intrigue in positions of influ6nce The
Report states
1tlJ~e subcommittee exumined in public session 36 pershy
sons about whom it had substantial evidence of membership
in the Communist undergrolld 10 Government All of them
invoked tha fifth amenmnen~ ~~d refused to answer questions
regardicg COnrIranist membership on the grounds of self-in
crinlination Many reused even to eomowledge their own
sigl1attles on official Govelnment doclllllents in which they
haG SViorn to nonmernbership in the past
All)st all of he persons exposed by the evidence had
Bome connection which could be documented vith at least one-shy
a~d generally several--other e~o6ed persons Tney used eaoh
other s names for referenoe on ~licationa for Federal em-
p10~lOOnt They hire eaoh other They pomot~d eampQh other
hAY raised each others sal~ries They transfer~ampd eaah
otlwr from bureau to bureau from depariment to department
from congressional committee to congressional committee
They assigned each other to international missions They
vouched for each others loyalty end prctected each other
when exposure threaten~d ~ley often had common living
qUaters tI
Suppression i truth in any case is bad enough In no event
can it be justified by a Government employee or applicant for Govern
ment empl~Jment in the face of a Congressional inquiry where the
interests of the national Bect~lty are at stake No one denies that
the Government employee or applicant for such employment may conshy
stitutionally claim his privilege against self-incrimination On
the other hand no one has a constitutional right to a Government
job W True the Supreme Court ha held that the constitutional
protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant
to a statute Is patently arbitrary or discriminatory II W But in
my opinion there is nothing e1ther arbtrary or discriminatry about
diSDdssing a federal employee where he refuses to waive the privilege
against self-incrimination guaranteed him by tho Const tution We
find an analogous situation presented in the recent decision of the
~reme Court in Orloff v WilloughbY ~ In that case the peti shy
tioner a physician was denied a commission in the Army principally
tor the reason that when asked hether he was a member in any Communist JY
organizations he replied) Federal Constitutional privilege is claimed
In its opinion through Mr Justice Jackson the Supreme Court said
It ia argued that Orlorf 1s being punished for havshy
ing claimed a privilege which the Constitution guarantees
No one at least no ane on this Court which has repeatedly
sustained assertion by Communists of the privilege against
selfMincr~inatian questions or doubts Orloffs right to
withhold facts about himself on this ground No one beshy
l1evee he can be punished for doing so But the question
is whether be can at the same time take the position that
to tell the truth about himself Vlould incriminate him and
that even so the President must appofnt him to a post of
honor and trust le have no hesitation in answering that
question No II There is no law which requires the Gove~~ent to sit supinely by
until the suspeoted eIlIployee has been convicted of disloyalty or other
similar misoonduct inconsistent with the interests of the national
security before it can sCPal~ate him from the Government service There
is no law which requires the Government to assume or endure such a risk
As was pointed out in an apt csae by the Supreme Court in American
Commtlnications v Douds speaking through the beloved late Chief
Justice Vinson
IfThat (first) amendment requires that one be permitted to
believe what he will It requires that one be permitted
to advocate what he will unless there is a clear and
present danger that a substantial public evil will result
therefrom It does not require that he be permitted to be
the keeper of the arsenal
I have not overlooked the fact that the loyalty and honesty of
the ovel~vhelming majority of all Government employeesmiddot is beyond quesshy
tion But their good reputations and character are far better proshy
tected from un1tfarranted criticism when we root out the few who are
unreliable and disloyal
What the critical situation of om time calls for is a lavr com
pt)lling testimony within the fr~neuro1Torl of the Constitution The tmshy
swer to this need is immuni-ty legislaiion which will be as broad as
the privilege W11ich is stJpplanted tV Then if a person is adjudged
ill cOlte~Pt for refusing to te3tify before a Cotgressional committee
he will know tZat t-le ~udgrnerJt of OOllt-empt will more likely stand up
on appeal free from oonstitutional ohal1enge
At the same time the l~w will also provide more adequate proshy
tection for the wit~ss
At presnt the witne31l is in a rtboxtl so to slJeGk The witness
is not exc~ed from an3werL~g merely because he believes his answers
Vlil1 incriminate him His slly-ao does not of its(gt~r establish the
1amphazeId of ilcriIltination II ~~ere he olaims his privil~ge it is
the ftL1ction of the jcge to dets-rmme whether the siJence of t1e
witness is justified or wha~1er the danger to be apprebenced is too
remote to be sl1bstattial To save himself from being held in conshy
tempt tl1e witness may oftcn be cOJIpEtled to disclos3 til0ne very
facts whtrh he claims are privileged iQ
Witnesses are alao aided by a b~oad immunity statute in still
another way Under our la unlike that of England t a disclosure of
any incriminating fact constitutes a wailer of the privilege as to deshy
tails con~erning that fact 211 Having made a partial disclosure of
faots the witness loses the rig~t to cease answering intel~ogat1ons
and rely upon his privilege at a 1ater point in his testimony
In one oase the detendant rree~ disclosed that she was Treasshy
urer of the Communist Pariy in COlorado and testified that she had
given the books ot the party to another person When asked to dishy
wlge the name ot the lamiddottter she refused upon the ground that the
answer might incriminate her mder the Sm1tb Act Atfirming her
conviction for contempt the Supreme Court speaking through Chief
Justice Vinson said
Since the privilege agatnlt salf-inorimination
presupposes a real danger ot legal detriment arising
from the disolosure petitioner cannot invoke the
privilege where response to the specific question in
issue here would not ftUtther inoriminate her O1aolo
sure of e tact waives the privilege as to details pound
This deoision leaves the law in a rather anomolous position tor the
vlitness A witness who refuses to answer aU questions and fails to Wcooperate to any extent may be protected by the claim of privilege
But there is no equal protection atforded by the decisions to the
witness who commences to eooperate but stops at a point where further
disclosure may tncrim1~ate him
Moreover it the witness refuses to answer on the ground that
Congress has exceeded its powers or that the inQuiry in lacking in
pertinency he construas the law at his peril If mistake8 his good 55
faith error of law constitutes no defense to fine and imprisonment
Then again it is claimed DY some that a persons election to
remain silent upon the ground of privilege does not necessarily mean
he has anything sinister to hide There are undoubtedly some people of
sincere principle who refl1se to disclose 1flformat1oft to authorized
1nvestigating authorities because of their feeling that ao one has any
right to 1~quire about their beliefs even if germane to the inquiry at 56
bsnd- There are other persons who refuse to answer because they feel
their recollections of events lons past are fee~le and that falsehood
even on trivial or irrelevant matters may subject them to a charge of
perjury There are still others less innocent vho say that coercing
them to testify under pain of contempt resembles the Soviet tactic of
requiring those SUilty not only to pay for but also to prcclatD their 57
guilt shy
~he use of broad tmmunity statutes serves to remove the dansers
mentioned for the iDPocent a~d operates aa an incentive for the guilty
to tell the truth
There are already two proposals pendin8 in Congress which seek to
compel the answer by witnesses at questioDs put to them before Conshy
gressiOl1al Committees grand juries or courts In exchange tor this
compulsory testimony the Witnesses will obtain complete immunity froa
prosecution
58 One Bill is s~ 565 This proposal grants immunity to ~itnesses
before a grand Jury or court of the United States when in the disshy
cretion of th~ Attorney General it is necessary to do so in the public
interest In exchange for this immunity the witness is compelled to
testify and to produce his books papers or recoIds s 565 uses
broad immunity lengtase in stating that the witness shall not be
prosecuted on account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he 1s compelled after ela~ing his privilege to testify or
produce evidence
In this respect s 565 is almost ident1cal to the immunity proshy59
vision sustained 8S valid by the Supreme Court e~ far back as 1896-
This Bill does not extend the immunity to witnesses before Congressional
Committees 601 61
There are other Bills pend-ing S 16- middot and H R 27371 with equally
broad immunity authority The Senate has passed its Bill but the House
Bill still awaits action Both these Bills grunt immunity to witnesses
before Congressional Committees but not to witnesses before grand
juries or courts
The proposed Bills are worded so that the witness will not get an
immunity bathU merely by testifying He must first raise specifically
his claim for privilege and thus put the Committee on notice whether
for the greater good the witness should be required to testify and 62
given immunity or whether he should be excused from testlfying-
However the discretionary power to grant the immunity is not vested
in the Attorney General bumiddott lies with the body conducting the investigation
If the proceeding is one before one of the Houses of Congress then
a majority vote of the members present is necessary Under S 16
if it is a proceeding before a committee two thirds of the members
must vote to grant the tmmunity In that event the tvothirds vote
must include at least two members of each of the two political parties
having the largest representation on such committee The House Bill
does not provide for notice to the Attorney General of the proposed
grant of immunity The Senate Bill provides for one weeks notice to
the Attorney General of the proposal but if the latter fails or reshy
fuses to assent to grant of immunity it may be conferred by majority
vote of either House It is hoped that this legislation will only be
resorted to where full diseloaure by witnesses is deemed of greater
tmportance than the possibility of punishing them for past offenses
By permitting one or several criminals to escape prosecution the
larger public peril contained in a gang of criminals or in their
leaders may be uncovered and the guilty brought to justice
The legislative proposals mentioned have much to commend them
In my opinion these bills would better achieve their purposes it they
required the concurrence of the Attorney General 1n the granting of any
immunity to a witness by a Joint Congressional Committee or either Heuse
committee or by Congress The Attorney General 1s the chief legal
officer of the Government of the United States As Buch it 1s his
responsibility to prosecute persons who offend the criminal laws of the
United states This responsibility must be coupled w1th adequate
authority to permit its discharge It would seem to be more advisable
for the Attorney General who has immediate knowledge of a criminals
background and propensities to decide whether immunity should be
granted for such a person To allow the Attorney General to participate
in the ultimate decision aa to whether immunity should be granted would
not impair Congressional investigatIons in the fields of internal
security crime and corruption Nor would it discourage witnesses
from providing information of importance to the investigation if the
Attorney Generals permission vas required before immunity was granted
On the other hand if these Bills were enacted in their present
form they might subject members of Congress to undue pressures for
granting immunity to criminals who are ineligible to receive it Also
they cuuld very easily cause embarrassment to Congress by tmped1ng or
blocking prosecutions planned by the Department of Justice on any matter 63
even incidentally testified to upon these 1nvestigations
The unfortunate experience which Congress had as far back as 1857 64
in granting immunity without concurrence of the Attorney General - should
~each that a similar course of action may be marked by eveD greater
failure today_ The witness might readily turn this division of authority
between Congress and the Department of Justice to his advantage by
obtaining an ~unity from the legislative committee or from Congress
over the objection of the Attorney General Thereafter he would be
free to testify concerning a broad area Of activities without fear that
he could be held to account criminally for other violations however
unrelated to the matter under investigation
Thus for example a Congreas1onal Committee or Congress might
furnish immunity to a person to obtain his testimony about his illicit
traffic in slot machine opercltlons between states This person may also
be guilty either of espionage or subversion or of selling narcotics to
youngs cers as to which an indictment is soon to be obtained To foreshy
close prosecution on these more serious crimes the witness would be
glad to volunteer information on his other activities if he knew in
advance that immunity would fallow for all of them Therefore greatest
care must be exercioed in granting immunity and then only upon a fully
informed judgment of all tle facts The Departlnent of Justice would
of course through the Fe~eral Bureau of Investigation the Crtmlnal
and Tax Divisions and the United states Attorneyo I offices be mosmiddott
likely to know the facts and the plans for prosecution Concurrence
by the Attorney General in conferring the immunity would also enable
the Department of Justice to maintuin its responsibility for the proper
administration of the crlminal law
The provision in S 10 for one weeks notice to the Attorney General
of the proposed grant of immunity does not fully cure this Bill of its
weakness in failing to require his affirmative concurrence in every
case Experience indicates that at times the views of the person who
1s charged with prooecut1ng criminals are disregarded by Congressional
Committees For example the successful criminal conviction obtained
by the Department of Justice ot the internal revenue collector in one of
the largest cities was recently nullified because of the action of a
House Committee in holding 1middotr1dely publicized hearings in the district in
65 which the trial subsequently took place These hearings took place
over the strong objection of the Department of Justice thut the pro
posed hearing would be of prejudice to the defendant on the trial
which was about to be initiated and would injure the Governments case
in disclosing its evidence In reversing the convlct1on l Chief Judge
Magruder observed that the character of the defendant was blackened
and discredited as the day of trial approached because of the publicity
invited and stimulated by the Committee over the radio and television
Thu6 1 mere advance notIfication to the Attorney General of a proposed
grant of tmmunity would never be a guarantee that the Committee would
be guided by the views of the Attorney General
S 16 and H R 2737 would also more readily carry out the aim of
obtaining evidence against leaders of subversion and criminal entershy
prisesj if provision for twmunity were granted to obtain testimony
not only before Congressional Committees but likewise before courts
and grand juries
For these reasons it is my opinion that if any measure is to be
enacted~~rmitting the granting of immunity to witnesses before either
House of Congress or its committees it should vest the Attorney General
or the Attorney General acting with the concurren~e of appropriate members
of Congress with the authority to grant such tmmunity and if the test shy
mony is sought for a court or grand jury that the Attorney General alone
be authorized to grant the ilmnunity
There remain for discussion two principal objections to this proshy
posed legislation which may be briefly considered here One objection
1s that when a witneAS is compelled to testify even under the protecshy
tion of immunity from criminal punihment) he is not relieved from
personal disgrace ~~lhich attach~8 to the exposure of his crime The
answer to this objection ia contained in II land mark decision of the 66
Supreme Court in Brown v Wrtlker
The design of tbe constitutional plivilege is not to aid the
witness in vindicating his character but to protect him
against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict him
of a criminal charge If he secure legal jnmllnity from prose-
cution the possible impairment of his good name is a penalty
which it is reasonable b0 should be compelled to pay for the
common good
The reasoning of this decision has never been qU~Gtioned and has 67
only recently been approved by the Sllpreme Court
The other chief objection to the proposed legislation is that while
a witness may receive itmlunity from federal prosecution) he may still
be subject to IJrosecution under ~tate lavl The Supreme Court has held
that this is not a valid objection to federal immunity laws~ since the
self-incrimination clause ln the Fifth Amendment operates ao a l1mitashy68
tion on the federal government only In United states v Murdock the
defendant was indicted for refUSing to answer questions of a revenue
agent relating to ctrt8 in income tax returns The refusal was ba sed on
the plea that hiD answers might 1ncrim1nate him in a state court The
Court said on this point
This court ha~ held that immunity against state prosecution is
not essential to the validity of federal statutes declaring that
a witnes3 shall not be excllpoundied from gtring evidence on the
ground that it vTill incriminate him and also that the ladt of
state power to give witnesses protection against federal
prosecution does not defeat a state immunity statute
Similarly a witness befo~e a state tribunal CBnnot refuse to 69
answer because of the threat of federal prosecution - However the
Federal District Court in Ohio recently held i1 Unted States v 70
Di Carlo that the defendant had the right to assert his privilege
because of possible prosecution under state law since the Senate
committee was authorized to investigate violations not only of the lawe 71
of the United States but also of the states M_ The Murdock case was
dtstingJished urlon the ground that the danger of state posecution 1n
that case was remote and uncertain thile in the Di Carlo case the
danger of state proaecutjon WilS imminent and real 72
The ---Di Carlo case has been received -lith mixed commelt It has73
not been followed so far as we k~ow- It appears to be contrary to deshy
cis10ns of co~~rts of appeals which have consistently adhered to the prinshy74
ciples of the Murdock case- In my opinion this decision of a district
court aoes not detract from the binding effect ofthe Supreme Courts deshy
eision in the Murdock case
The Department of Justice will recommend to the Congress in Jlouary
an immunity bill of the type I have descri-ced which protects the const1shy
tutional privileges ot witnesses before Congressional Committees courts
and juries but will at the some time aid materially in stamping out
criminal and subversive activities
Footnote Referet~es to Ad~res El~ited ~------ ___bull
Immunity From Prcsecuticn
Versus
Privilege Agaiust Self-Incrimination
Pittman liThe Colonial and Constitutional History of the
Privilege Against Sel-Incrimiootion 1n Amcicaff 21 Va
L R 763 764 770-773 (1935) Corwin The Supreme
Court I S Corctl~ction of the Self Incrirnination C1ause lf
29 lId~h L R 1 512 (1930) Ap~licability of
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to Legjslative
y Pittmenf2 at 774
~ ~ining v ~~8ey 211 U S 78 92 (1908)
L Id at 91
~ 34th Ceng 3d sess Globe PI 427 433 1-45 See
Eberling Constitutional Investigations pp 304-315shy
7 Eberling d at 320-323
~I 142 U s 547 (1892) This Act of 1862 revised an old
statute into two new sections by an amendment which
sought to insure that a witness who testified before
a federal grand jt~ or court (R s I 860 (1875raquo or
a Congressional Committee (R S B 859 (1875raquo would
not be later subjected to the use of his testimony in
any criminal proceeding aGainst him Section ~ 860 of
the amendment dealing with grand jurtes and courts came
under attack in Counselman v Hitchcock J supra and was
held to be invalid Since this part of the immunity proshy
vision tailed to accomplish ita purpose Congress repealed
it in 1910 (36 Stat 352 (19l0raquo) Congress apparently felt
that S 859 applying to Congressional Committees was still
of value and left it 1n force to this date (a s I 859
(1875) as amended 52 Stat 943 (1938) 18 usc e3486
(Supp V 1952)j see liThe Privilege Against Self
Incrimination versus Immunity Proposed Statutes 41
Georgetown L J 511 514 (1953) United States v ~
339 U s 323 335-337 (1950)
21 It read in patt as follows
No person shall be prosecuted for or on
account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he may testify or produce evidence
Act of Feb 11 1893 c 83 27 stat 443 49 USCA
I 46 See too ~ v United States 337 u S 137 146shy
147 (1949)middot Notet Denying -the Privilege against Self
Incrimination to Public Officers 64 Barv L R 987
988 (1951)
- 101 161 U s 591 (1896)
Shapiro v United St~~ 335 U S 1 6-7 (1948) where various
statutes are collated in the footnote The customary provision
in these statutes provides as follows No person shall be
excused from complying with any requirements ot this section
because of his privilege aga1nst self-incriminationgt but the
immunity provisions of the COmptuBory Testimony Act of
February 11 1893 shall apply with respect to allY 1nd1shy
vidual who specifically claims such pr1Y11ege tt
12 Rapacz ULimiting the Plea of Self-Incr1m1nat1ontl 20 Georgetown
L J 329 353 (1932) see footnote 3 of ~ v Connect~
302 U s 319 326 (1937) NPte liThe Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination the Doctr1ne of Waiver 61 Yale L J 104 110
(1952) middot
~f Palko v Connecticut 302 U s 319 326 (1937)
~ See dissents of Mr Justices Shiras Gray and White in ~ V4
Walker supra 161 U s 630638 Cf dissent of Mr Justice
Black in Ro~ers v United States 340 U s 367 376 (1950)
15 Potts Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for ContemptU I
74 U of Pa L R 691 780 (1926) L1acos uRights of Witnesses
Before Congressional Committees 33 Boston U L R 337 340
(1953) middot
t6 Liacos Id at 31tl
17 McGeary rlThe DeTelopmen-cs of Congressional Investigative Power ll
p 23 (1940) McGrain v Daughel~l 273 u s 135 (1927)
18 Sinclair v Unfted States~ 279 U s 263 (1929) ~arsba11 v
Unit~~State~ 176 F 2d 473 (nc Cir 1949) 2 Usc ~ 192
(Supp 1950)
19 Ne York City Bar Ass t n Committee on the Bill of Rights Report
on Congressional Committees presented December 14 1948 p 1
gQi Galloway PCong18ss1onal Investigations Proposed Reforms lt
18 U of Chi L R 478 479-481 (1951)
21 Dilliard lICongress1onal Investigations The Role of the Press
18 U of ChL L R 585 J 587 (1951)
22 Edgerton J dissenting in Barsky v United States 167 F 2d
241 252 (nc eir 1948) cert denied 334 U s 843 (1948)
petition for rehearing denied 339 U S 971 (1951)
~3 De Jonge v Oregon 299 U s 353 364 365 (1937)
24 Id
25 6 Richardson lIMes sOges and Papers of the Pres idents t 1 p 23
July 4 1861
26 See United St~~ v ~~phson 165 F 2d 82 (2 Cir 1947)
cert denied 333 u S 838 (1948) Lawson v United states
176 F 2d 49 (nc Cir 1949) cel~ denied 339 u s 934
(1950) Barsty Y ~ited S~ 167 F 2d 241 (DC eir
1948) cert denied 334 u s 843 (1948) MCGrain v Daugherty
273 u s 135 (1927) and cf Rumely v United States J 197
F 2d 166 (DC eir 1952) affd 73 s ct 543 (1953)
JJ B1a~ v ~~ted Sttlt~s 340 u s 159 (1950-)
gsectJ ~~ v United States 31~1 U s 479 (1951) See too
sectingleton v United States 343 U s 944 (1952) Note Recent
Extensions of the Witness Privilege Against Self-Incrim1nationll
53 Col L R 275 (1953)
29 Aiuppa v Un1tc~ states 201 F 2d 287 300 (6 eir 1952)
_I30 Note nMandatory Dismissal of Public Persol1nel and The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination 101 U ot Pa L R 1190 1191
fn 8 (1953)
31 Brown Be Fassett Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar
20 u or Chi L R 480 483 (1953)
32 Garner v Los Angeles Board) 341 u s 716 (1951) Gerende v
Board of Supervisors 341 U s 56 (1951) but com~are Wieman v
Updegraff 341~ U s 83 (1953)
34 See footnote 32
35 PG~ v Boa-roo of Education 31~2 U s 435 (1951)
ID Id at 493
38 Sec 9(h of lihe LalJor Management Rlations Act of 1947 29 USCA
St1Pp III Sec 141 Sec 159(b)
39 ft~rican C~~catons Association v ~uda 339 u S 382 (1950)
sustaining the validity of Sec 9(h) against the challenge that it
violated the First c-lT~nc1tlCiltl Ex Post FtiCto Lals and other iul1dashy
mental rights
40 Executive Order No 10450 issued Aporil zr 1953 (18 F R 2lt89)
41 Executive Orrler No 10491 issued Ocmiddottober 13 1953 (18 F R 6583)
~ Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary Interlocking Subshy
vcrs ion in Covernmcnt De~rtments II 83d Cong 1st ses5 Juy 30 J
1953 p 21 Being a cOImllunist is not a crime under federal law J
although it is in some states (see Liacos supra note 15 at
375) The Smith Act (18 USC Sec 2385 et seq) mkes advoshy
eating or teaching the violent overthrOf of any goverrment of the
United States or being a member of such a group and kno7ing its
purpose~a federal crime
43 See EaSley v F~cbardsonJ 182 F 2d 46 (DC 1950)J affd by an
evenly diiied court 341 TJ s 918 (1951) 1Etshingto v McGrath
182 F 2d 375 (DC 1950) aff1d 341 U s 923 (1951)j Or~~ v
vIil1ougbby 345 U s 83 91 (1953) Mr Justice Douglas concurring
i~ ~tiFascist Commi~~ v ~~EJ 341 U s 123 -182-183 (1951)
United Public W0rkers v --~1itcbell 330 U s 75 (1947)j Angilly - v
United States 199 F 2d 642) 644 (1950) cf NcAuliffe v rlew
Bedford 155 Mass 216 29 NE 517 (le9~) per Holmes J liThe
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but
he h(=l~s no constitltioi1al right to be a policezranu (Id at 220
29 NE at 5J7)
44 v1ie~sn _
v UpGegaff middot111 ~
3~middot4 u s 83 (1953) The Court ruleri as
contrry to due process the Cklahoma loyalty oath statute forshy
bidding IJ1l11ic emplo~rment of Persons who belonzea to certain
organizations regarciless of their knowledge of the character of
those oreenizations because of the indiscriminate classification
of lnnocent with kno~vilg activityll (d at 91)
~1 345 u S 83 (1953)middot
46 Id at 90
47 339 u s 3827 412 (1950) sustaininG the non-corJlIlunist affidavit
requirernelt of union leaders under the Taft -Hartley Act
~ Hoffman v United States 341 U s 179 (1951) suggests such
legislation if Congres3 concludes the lleed is great enough
See too Comment The Privilege Against Se1f-Llcriminetion Versus
Lmnurdty Z Proposed Statutes P 41 Gt~orgetom L J 511 (1953)
S Rept 153 on S 16 83d Cone 1st sess ~ 1 ald 2
April 17 1953 Report of Sel1a~~e Commttee on the JudiciaJ J
Interlocking S-lbversion in GOYf11llent Departments tl July 30
1953 83d Cong 1st sess p 50
~ HcfI1nan v Unitet States 341 u s 479 486 (1951)
50 Id U1ited States v ~isman 111 F 2d 260 262 (2 Cir 1950)
51 Note 61 Yale L J 105 109 (1952)
52 Rogers v United States 340 u s 367 375 (1951)
211 See e g Blau v Unjted StaIe~ 340 u s 159 (1950)
-shy54 Note J Co1t3resnic1al Inv estigat1ons--Self-Illcrimimtion Condemneshy
tiOll and Fair Hcar1ngll 22 U of Cinn L R 193 199-200 (1953)
55 See ~ovTn8end v ~~it~~ta~~3 95 F 2d 352 351 (DC Cir 1938)
cert denied 303 u S 664 (1938)
56 Byse TfA Report on the Pennsylvana Loyalty Act 101 U of Fa
L R 480 481-1~84 (1953) Wright Should Teachers Testify
Saturday Review Sept 2o 1953 p 23
57 See Meltzer Required Records The McCarran Act and The Privilege
Against Selfmiddotmiddot Incriminat ion ll 19 U of Chi L R 687 722 (1951)
y 83d Cong 1st Seas 1953 Also known as the Kefauver BUl
59 ~ v ltlalker 161 U S 591 (1896)
sect21 S 16 83d Cong 1st sess 1953 passed the Senate July 9 1953
after extensive debate Cong Ree 8646-8663 July 9 1953shy
S 16 amends B 3486 of Title 18 Sec 3486 presently furnishes
witnesses immunity from prosecution tor testimony before either
House or their Committees It appears to suffer from the same
deficiency present in a similar statute condemned in Counse~an v
Hitchcock 142 u s 547 (1892) S 16 is intended to StWP1y the
omission in the Hitchcock ease by providing not only that a
witness testimony may not be used against him but that such
witness shall be iImnune with respect to lIany transaction mtter
or thing concerning which he has been compelled to testIfy
sect 83d Congo 1st sess 1953
~ S Rept 153 83d Congo 1st sess p 2 (1953)
63 See Comment The Privi1ege Against Self-Incrimination Versus
Immunity Proposed statutes 41 Georgetown L J 511 523 (1953)
64 Supra footnote 7shy
sectif Delanel v ~ed States 199 F 2d 107 (1 Ci~ 1952)
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
preserve the integcity of the schools That the school authorities haVe
the right and duty to aceen the officials teachers and their employees as
to their fitness to majnjail1 the integrity of the schools as a part of an
ordered society cannot be doubtecl One I s associates past and present as
vell os one t a conduct moy proIJerly be considered in determining fitness
and loyalty From time immemoljal one t a reputation ha3 been determined by
the company he keeps In the employment of officials and teachers of the
school systeil the state may very properly inquire into the company they 37
keep n
The Fedel~al GOyernrlent (llso has taken effective measures to protect
the interests of netional cecu1ity One long step forward in that direction
was to enact legislation requiring non middotmiddotCommul1ist affidavits from trade
union leaders vihose unions rBnted to resort to the advantages of the Taftshy38
Hartley Act - Tl1e Ptllpose of thiu requirement vas to prevent disruption of 39
industry in obedience to Communist Party orders If the union leaderls
affidavit us false be CQuId be sent to jail
The Federal Government has also tried its best to clean its Gvln
house fI On April 27 1953 the President by Executive oXde~ established
his security requirements for employment so that pelsons employed by the
Federal Government will be reliable trustworthy of sood character and 40
loyal to the United States On October 13 1953 the President amended
his Executive order so as to provide that imiddotlbe~~e a government employee refuses
to testify before a Congressional Coramittee regarding charges of his diashy
loyalty or misconduct an agency may take this factor into consideration
in determining hethe~ the person I s continued employment is inconsistent ~_f 41
with the national securtty This emendment to the Presidents Executive
order is in accord i th my opinion that a government employee oTho claims
privilege in a Congressional investigation may be too much of a risk to be
retained in Federal Service
A recent Senate Report entitled tlInterlocldng Subversion in
WGovernment fl fully documents how former government employees were
able to spin their web of intrigue in positions of influ6nce The
Report states
1tlJ~e subcommittee exumined in public session 36 pershy
sons about whom it had substantial evidence of membership
in the Communist undergrolld 10 Government All of them
invoked tha fifth amenmnen~ ~~d refused to answer questions
regardicg COnrIranist membership on the grounds of self-in
crinlination Many reused even to eomowledge their own
sigl1attles on official Govelnment doclllllents in which they
haG SViorn to nonmernbership in the past
All)st all of he persons exposed by the evidence had
Bome connection which could be documented vith at least one-shy
a~d generally several--other e~o6ed persons Tney used eaoh
other s names for referenoe on ~licationa for Federal em-
p10~lOOnt They hire eaoh other They pomot~d eampQh other
hAY raised each others sal~ries They transfer~ampd eaah
otlwr from bureau to bureau from depariment to department
from congressional committee to congressional committee
They assigned each other to international missions They
vouched for each others loyalty end prctected each other
when exposure threaten~d ~ley often had common living
qUaters tI
Suppression i truth in any case is bad enough In no event
can it be justified by a Government employee or applicant for Govern
ment empl~Jment in the face of a Congressional inquiry where the
interests of the national Bect~lty are at stake No one denies that
the Government employee or applicant for such employment may conshy
stitutionally claim his privilege against self-incrimination On
the other hand no one has a constitutional right to a Government
job W True the Supreme Court ha held that the constitutional
protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant
to a statute Is patently arbitrary or discriminatory II W But in
my opinion there is nothing e1ther arbtrary or discriminatry about
diSDdssing a federal employee where he refuses to waive the privilege
against self-incrimination guaranteed him by tho Const tution We
find an analogous situation presented in the recent decision of the
~reme Court in Orloff v WilloughbY ~ In that case the peti shy
tioner a physician was denied a commission in the Army principally
tor the reason that when asked hether he was a member in any Communist JY
organizations he replied) Federal Constitutional privilege is claimed
In its opinion through Mr Justice Jackson the Supreme Court said
It ia argued that Orlorf 1s being punished for havshy
ing claimed a privilege which the Constitution guarantees
No one at least no ane on this Court which has repeatedly
sustained assertion by Communists of the privilege against
selfMincr~inatian questions or doubts Orloffs right to
withhold facts about himself on this ground No one beshy
l1evee he can be punished for doing so But the question
is whether be can at the same time take the position that
to tell the truth about himself Vlould incriminate him and
that even so the President must appofnt him to a post of
honor and trust le have no hesitation in answering that
question No II There is no law which requires the Gove~~ent to sit supinely by
until the suspeoted eIlIployee has been convicted of disloyalty or other
similar misoonduct inconsistent with the interests of the national
security before it can sCPal~ate him from the Government service There
is no law which requires the Government to assume or endure such a risk
As was pointed out in an apt csae by the Supreme Court in American
Commtlnications v Douds speaking through the beloved late Chief
Justice Vinson
IfThat (first) amendment requires that one be permitted to
believe what he will It requires that one be permitted
to advocate what he will unless there is a clear and
present danger that a substantial public evil will result
therefrom It does not require that he be permitted to be
the keeper of the arsenal
I have not overlooked the fact that the loyalty and honesty of
the ovel~vhelming majority of all Government employeesmiddot is beyond quesshy
tion But their good reputations and character are far better proshy
tected from un1tfarranted criticism when we root out the few who are
unreliable and disloyal
What the critical situation of om time calls for is a lavr com
pt)lling testimony within the fr~neuro1Torl of the Constitution The tmshy
swer to this need is immuni-ty legislaiion which will be as broad as
the privilege W11ich is stJpplanted tV Then if a person is adjudged
ill cOlte~Pt for refusing to te3tify before a Cotgressional committee
he will know tZat t-le ~udgrnerJt of OOllt-empt will more likely stand up
on appeal free from oonstitutional ohal1enge
At the same time the l~w will also provide more adequate proshy
tection for the wit~ss
At presnt the witne31l is in a rtboxtl so to slJeGk The witness
is not exc~ed from an3werL~g merely because he believes his answers
Vlil1 incriminate him His slly-ao does not of its(gt~r establish the
1amphazeId of ilcriIltination II ~~ere he olaims his privil~ge it is
the ftL1ction of the jcge to dets-rmme whether the siJence of t1e
witness is justified or wha~1er the danger to be apprebenced is too
remote to be sl1bstattial To save himself from being held in conshy
tempt tl1e witness may oftcn be cOJIpEtled to disclos3 til0ne very
facts whtrh he claims are privileged iQ
Witnesses are alao aided by a b~oad immunity statute in still
another way Under our la unlike that of England t a disclosure of
any incriminating fact constitutes a wailer of the privilege as to deshy
tails con~erning that fact 211 Having made a partial disclosure of
faots the witness loses the rig~t to cease answering intel~ogat1ons
and rely upon his privilege at a 1ater point in his testimony
In one oase the detendant rree~ disclosed that she was Treasshy
urer of the Communist Pariy in COlorado and testified that she had
given the books ot the party to another person When asked to dishy
wlge the name ot the lamiddottter she refused upon the ground that the
answer might incriminate her mder the Sm1tb Act Atfirming her
conviction for contempt the Supreme Court speaking through Chief
Justice Vinson said
Since the privilege agatnlt salf-inorimination
presupposes a real danger ot legal detriment arising
from the disolosure petitioner cannot invoke the
privilege where response to the specific question in
issue here would not ftUtther inoriminate her O1aolo
sure of e tact waives the privilege as to details pound
This deoision leaves the law in a rather anomolous position tor the
vlitness A witness who refuses to answer aU questions and fails to Wcooperate to any extent may be protected by the claim of privilege
But there is no equal protection atforded by the decisions to the
witness who commences to eooperate but stops at a point where further
disclosure may tncrim1~ate him
Moreover it the witness refuses to answer on the ground that
Congress has exceeded its powers or that the inQuiry in lacking in
pertinency he construas the law at his peril If mistake8 his good 55
faith error of law constitutes no defense to fine and imprisonment
Then again it is claimed DY some that a persons election to
remain silent upon the ground of privilege does not necessarily mean
he has anything sinister to hide There are undoubtedly some people of
sincere principle who refl1se to disclose 1flformat1oft to authorized
1nvestigating authorities because of their feeling that ao one has any
right to 1~quire about their beliefs even if germane to the inquiry at 56
bsnd- There are other persons who refuse to answer because they feel
their recollections of events lons past are fee~le and that falsehood
even on trivial or irrelevant matters may subject them to a charge of
perjury There are still others less innocent vho say that coercing
them to testify under pain of contempt resembles the Soviet tactic of
requiring those SUilty not only to pay for but also to prcclatD their 57
guilt shy
~he use of broad tmmunity statutes serves to remove the dansers
mentioned for the iDPocent a~d operates aa an incentive for the guilty
to tell the truth
There are already two proposals pendin8 in Congress which seek to
compel the answer by witnesses at questioDs put to them before Conshy
gressiOl1al Committees grand juries or courts In exchange tor this
compulsory testimony the Witnesses will obtain complete immunity froa
prosecution
58 One Bill is s~ 565 This proposal grants immunity to ~itnesses
before a grand Jury or court of the United States when in the disshy
cretion of th~ Attorney General it is necessary to do so in the public
interest In exchange for this immunity the witness is compelled to
testify and to produce his books papers or recoIds s 565 uses
broad immunity lengtase in stating that the witness shall not be
prosecuted on account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he 1s compelled after ela~ing his privilege to testify or
produce evidence
In this respect s 565 is almost ident1cal to the immunity proshy59
vision sustained 8S valid by the Supreme Court e~ far back as 1896-
This Bill does not extend the immunity to witnesses before Congressional
Committees 601 61
There are other Bills pend-ing S 16- middot and H R 27371 with equally
broad immunity authority The Senate has passed its Bill but the House
Bill still awaits action Both these Bills grunt immunity to witnesses
before Congressional Committees but not to witnesses before grand
juries or courts
The proposed Bills are worded so that the witness will not get an
immunity bathU merely by testifying He must first raise specifically
his claim for privilege and thus put the Committee on notice whether
for the greater good the witness should be required to testify and 62
given immunity or whether he should be excused from testlfying-
However the discretionary power to grant the immunity is not vested
in the Attorney General bumiddott lies with the body conducting the investigation
If the proceeding is one before one of the Houses of Congress then
a majority vote of the members present is necessary Under S 16
if it is a proceeding before a committee two thirds of the members
must vote to grant the tmmunity In that event the tvothirds vote
must include at least two members of each of the two political parties
having the largest representation on such committee The House Bill
does not provide for notice to the Attorney General of the proposed
grant of immunity The Senate Bill provides for one weeks notice to
the Attorney General of the proposal but if the latter fails or reshy
fuses to assent to grant of immunity it may be conferred by majority
vote of either House It is hoped that this legislation will only be
resorted to where full diseloaure by witnesses is deemed of greater
tmportance than the possibility of punishing them for past offenses
By permitting one or several criminals to escape prosecution the
larger public peril contained in a gang of criminals or in their
leaders may be uncovered and the guilty brought to justice
The legislative proposals mentioned have much to commend them
In my opinion these bills would better achieve their purposes it they
required the concurrence of the Attorney General 1n the granting of any
immunity to a witness by a Joint Congressional Committee or either Heuse
committee or by Congress The Attorney General 1s the chief legal
officer of the Government of the United States As Buch it 1s his
responsibility to prosecute persons who offend the criminal laws of the
United states This responsibility must be coupled w1th adequate
authority to permit its discharge It would seem to be more advisable
for the Attorney General who has immediate knowledge of a criminals
background and propensities to decide whether immunity should be
granted for such a person To allow the Attorney General to participate
in the ultimate decision aa to whether immunity should be granted would
not impair Congressional investigatIons in the fields of internal
security crime and corruption Nor would it discourage witnesses
from providing information of importance to the investigation if the
Attorney Generals permission vas required before immunity was granted
On the other hand if these Bills were enacted in their present
form they might subject members of Congress to undue pressures for
granting immunity to criminals who are ineligible to receive it Also
they cuuld very easily cause embarrassment to Congress by tmped1ng or
blocking prosecutions planned by the Department of Justice on any matter 63
even incidentally testified to upon these 1nvestigations
The unfortunate experience which Congress had as far back as 1857 64
in granting immunity without concurrence of the Attorney General - should
~each that a similar course of action may be marked by eveD greater
failure today_ The witness might readily turn this division of authority
between Congress and the Department of Justice to his advantage by
obtaining an ~unity from the legislative committee or from Congress
over the objection of the Attorney General Thereafter he would be
free to testify concerning a broad area Of activities without fear that
he could be held to account criminally for other violations however
unrelated to the matter under investigation
Thus for example a Congreas1onal Committee or Congress might
furnish immunity to a person to obtain his testimony about his illicit
traffic in slot machine opercltlons between states This person may also
be guilty either of espionage or subversion or of selling narcotics to
youngs cers as to which an indictment is soon to be obtained To foreshy
close prosecution on these more serious crimes the witness would be
glad to volunteer information on his other activities if he knew in
advance that immunity would fallow for all of them Therefore greatest
care must be exercioed in granting immunity and then only upon a fully
informed judgment of all tle facts The Departlnent of Justice would
of course through the Fe~eral Bureau of Investigation the Crtmlnal
and Tax Divisions and the United states Attorneyo I offices be mosmiddott
likely to know the facts and the plans for prosecution Concurrence
by the Attorney General in conferring the immunity would also enable
the Department of Justice to maintuin its responsibility for the proper
administration of the crlminal law
The provision in S 10 for one weeks notice to the Attorney General
of the proposed grant of immunity does not fully cure this Bill of its
weakness in failing to require his affirmative concurrence in every
case Experience indicates that at times the views of the person who
1s charged with prooecut1ng criminals are disregarded by Congressional
Committees For example the successful criminal conviction obtained
by the Department of Justice ot the internal revenue collector in one of
the largest cities was recently nullified because of the action of a
House Committee in holding 1middotr1dely publicized hearings in the district in
65 which the trial subsequently took place These hearings took place
over the strong objection of the Department of Justice thut the pro
posed hearing would be of prejudice to the defendant on the trial
which was about to be initiated and would injure the Governments case
in disclosing its evidence In reversing the convlct1on l Chief Judge
Magruder observed that the character of the defendant was blackened
and discredited as the day of trial approached because of the publicity
invited and stimulated by the Committee over the radio and television
Thu6 1 mere advance notIfication to the Attorney General of a proposed
grant of tmmunity would never be a guarantee that the Committee would
be guided by the views of the Attorney General
S 16 and H R 2737 would also more readily carry out the aim of
obtaining evidence against leaders of subversion and criminal entershy
prisesj if provision for twmunity were granted to obtain testimony
not only before Congressional Committees but likewise before courts
and grand juries
For these reasons it is my opinion that if any measure is to be
enacted~~rmitting the granting of immunity to witnesses before either
House of Congress or its committees it should vest the Attorney General
or the Attorney General acting with the concurren~e of appropriate members
of Congress with the authority to grant such tmmunity and if the test shy
mony is sought for a court or grand jury that the Attorney General alone
be authorized to grant the ilmnunity
There remain for discussion two principal objections to this proshy
posed legislation which may be briefly considered here One objection
1s that when a witneAS is compelled to testify even under the protecshy
tion of immunity from criminal punihment) he is not relieved from
personal disgrace ~~lhich attach~8 to the exposure of his crime The
answer to this objection ia contained in II land mark decision of the 66
Supreme Court in Brown v Wrtlker
The design of tbe constitutional plivilege is not to aid the
witness in vindicating his character but to protect him
against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict him
of a criminal charge If he secure legal jnmllnity from prose-
cution the possible impairment of his good name is a penalty
which it is reasonable b0 should be compelled to pay for the
common good
The reasoning of this decision has never been qU~Gtioned and has 67
only recently been approved by the Sllpreme Court
The other chief objection to the proposed legislation is that while
a witness may receive itmlunity from federal prosecution) he may still
be subject to IJrosecution under ~tate lavl The Supreme Court has held
that this is not a valid objection to federal immunity laws~ since the
self-incrimination clause ln the Fifth Amendment operates ao a l1mitashy68
tion on the federal government only In United states v Murdock the
defendant was indicted for refUSing to answer questions of a revenue
agent relating to ctrt8 in income tax returns The refusal was ba sed on
the plea that hiD answers might 1ncrim1nate him in a state court The
Court said on this point
This court ha~ held that immunity against state prosecution is
not essential to the validity of federal statutes declaring that
a witnes3 shall not be excllpoundied from gtring evidence on the
ground that it vTill incriminate him and also that the ladt of
state power to give witnesses protection against federal
prosecution does not defeat a state immunity statute
Similarly a witness befo~e a state tribunal CBnnot refuse to 69
answer because of the threat of federal prosecution - However the
Federal District Court in Ohio recently held i1 Unted States v 70
Di Carlo that the defendant had the right to assert his privilege
because of possible prosecution under state law since the Senate
committee was authorized to investigate violations not only of the lawe 71
of the United States but also of the states M_ The Murdock case was
dtstingJished urlon the ground that the danger of state posecution 1n
that case was remote and uncertain thile in the Di Carlo case the
danger of state proaecutjon WilS imminent and real 72
The ---Di Carlo case has been received -lith mixed commelt It has73
not been followed so far as we k~ow- It appears to be contrary to deshy
cis10ns of co~~rts of appeals which have consistently adhered to the prinshy74
ciples of the Murdock case- In my opinion this decision of a district
court aoes not detract from the binding effect ofthe Supreme Courts deshy
eision in the Murdock case
The Department of Justice will recommend to the Congress in Jlouary
an immunity bill of the type I have descri-ced which protects the const1shy
tutional privileges ot witnesses before Congressional Committees courts
and juries but will at the some time aid materially in stamping out
criminal and subversive activities
Footnote Referet~es to Ad~res El~ited ~------ ___bull
Immunity From Prcsecuticn
Versus
Privilege Agaiust Self-Incrimination
Pittman liThe Colonial and Constitutional History of the
Privilege Against Sel-Incrimiootion 1n Amcicaff 21 Va
L R 763 764 770-773 (1935) Corwin The Supreme
Court I S Corctl~ction of the Self Incrirnination C1ause lf
29 lId~h L R 1 512 (1930) Ap~licability of
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to Legjslative
y Pittmenf2 at 774
~ ~ining v ~~8ey 211 U S 78 92 (1908)
L Id at 91
~ 34th Ceng 3d sess Globe PI 427 433 1-45 See
Eberling Constitutional Investigations pp 304-315shy
7 Eberling d at 320-323
~I 142 U s 547 (1892) This Act of 1862 revised an old
statute into two new sections by an amendment which
sought to insure that a witness who testified before
a federal grand jt~ or court (R s I 860 (1875raquo or
a Congressional Committee (R S B 859 (1875raquo would
not be later subjected to the use of his testimony in
any criminal proceeding aGainst him Section ~ 860 of
the amendment dealing with grand jurtes and courts came
under attack in Counselman v Hitchcock J supra and was
held to be invalid Since this part of the immunity proshy
vision tailed to accomplish ita purpose Congress repealed
it in 1910 (36 Stat 352 (19l0raquo) Congress apparently felt
that S 859 applying to Congressional Committees was still
of value and left it 1n force to this date (a s I 859
(1875) as amended 52 Stat 943 (1938) 18 usc e3486
(Supp V 1952)j see liThe Privilege Against Self
Incrimination versus Immunity Proposed Statutes 41
Georgetown L J 511 514 (1953) United States v ~
339 U s 323 335-337 (1950)
21 It read in patt as follows
No person shall be prosecuted for or on
account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he may testify or produce evidence
Act of Feb 11 1893 c 83 27 stat 443 49 USCA
I 46 See too ~ v United States 337 u S 137 146shy
147 (1949)middot Notet Denying -the Privilege against Self
Incrimination to Public Officers 64 Barv L R 987
988 (1951)
- 101 161 U s 591 (1896)
Shapiro v United St~~ 335 U S 1 6-7 (1948) where various
statutes are collated in the footnote The customary provision
in these statutes provides as follows No person shall be
excused from complying with any requirements ot this section
because of his privilege aga1nst self-incriminationgt but the
immunity provisions of the COmptuBory Testimony Act of
February 11 1893 shall apply with respect to allY 1nd1shy
vidual who specifically claims such pr1Y11ege tt
12 Rapacz ULimiting the Plea of Self-Incr1m1nat1ontl 20 Georgetown
L J 329 353 (1932) see footnote 3 of ~ v Connect~
302 U s 319 326 (1937) NPte liThe Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination the Doctr1ne of Waiver 61 Yale L J 104 110
(1952) middot
~f Palko v Connecticut 302 U s 319 326 (1937)
~ See dissents of Mr Justices Shiras Gray and White in ~ V4
Walker supra 161 U s 630638 Cf dissent of Mr Justice
Black in Ro~ers v United States 340 U s 367 376 (1950)
15 Potts Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for ContemptU I
74 U of Pa L R 691 780 (1926) L1acos uRights of Witnesses
Before Congressional Committees 33 Boston U L R 337 340
(1953) middot
t6 Liacos Id at 31tl
17 McGeary rlThe DeTelopmen-cs of Congressional Investigative Power ll
p 23 (1940) McGrain v Daughel~l 273 u s 135 (1927)
18 Sinclair v Unfted States~ 279 U s 263 (1929) ~arsba11 v
Unit~~State~ 176 F 2d 473 (nc Cir 1949) 2 Usc ~ 192
(Supp 1950)
19 Ne York City Bar Ass t n Committee on the Bill of Rights Report
on Congressional Committees presented December 14 1948 p 1
gQi Galloway PCong18ss1onal Investigations Proposed Reforms lt
18 U of Chi L R 478 479-481 (1951)
21 Dilliard lICongress1onal Investigations The Role of the Press
18 U of ChL L R 585 J 587 (1951)
22 Edgerton J dissenting in Barsky v United States 167 F 2d
241 252 (nc eir 1948) cert denied 334 U s 843 (1948)
petition for rehearing denied 339 U S 971 (1951)
~3 De Jonge v Oregon 299 U s 353 364 365 (1937)
24 Id
25 6 Richardson lIMes sOges and Papers of the Pres idents t 1 p 23
July 4 1861
26 See United St~~ v ~~phson 165 F 2d 82 (2 Cir 1947)
cert denied 333 u S 838 (1948) Lawson v United states
176 F 2d 49 (nc Cir 1949) cel~ denied 339 u s 934
(1950) Barsty Y ~ited S~ 167 F 2d 241 (DC eir
1948) cert denied 334 u s 843 (1948) MCGrain v Daugherty
273 u s 135 (1927) and cf Rumely v United States J 197
F 2d 166 (DC eir 1952) affd 73 s ct 543 (1953)
JJ B1a~ v ~~ted Sttlt~s 340 u s 159 (1950-)
gsectJ ~~ v United States 31~1 U s 479 (1951) See too
sectingleton v United States 343 U s 944 (1952) Note Recent
Extensions of the Witness Privilege Against Self-Incrim1nationll
53 Col L R 275 (1953)
29 Aiuppa v Un1tc~ states 201 F 2d 287 300 (6 eir 1952)
_I30 Note nMandatory Dismissal of Public Persol1nel and The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination 101 U ot Pa L R 1190 1191
fn 8 (1953)
31 Brown Be Fassett Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar
20 u or Chi L R 480 483 (1953)
32 Garner v Los Angeles Board) 341 u s 716 (1951) Gerende v
Board of Supervisors 341 U s 56 (1951) but com~are Wieman v
Updegraff 341~ U s 83 (1953)
34 See footnote 32
35 PG~ v Boa-roo of Education 31~2 U s 435 (1951)
ID Id at 493
38 Sec 9(h of lihe LalJor Management Rlations Act of 1947 29 USCA
St1Pp III Sec 141 Sec 159(b)
39 ft~rican C~~catons Association v ~uda 339 u S 382 (1950)
sustaining the validity of Sec 9(h) against the challenge that it
violated the First c-lT~nc1tlCiltl Ex Post FtiCto Lals and other iul1dashy
mental rights
40 Executive Order No 10450 issued Aporil zr 1953 (18 F R 2lt89)
41 Executive Orrler No 10491 issued Ocmiddottober 13 1953 (18 F R 6583)
~ Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary Interlocking Subshy
vcrs ion in Covernmcnt De~rtments II 83d Cong 1st ses5 Juy 30 J
1953 p 21 Being a cOImllunist is not a crime under federal law J
although it is in some states (see Liacos supra note 15 at
375) The Smith Act (18 USC Sec 2385 et seq) mkes advoshy
eating or teaching the violent overthrOf of any goverrment of the
United States or being a member of such a group and kno7ing its
purpose~a federal crime
43 See EaSley v F~cbardsonJ 182 F 2d 46 (DC 1950)J affd by an
evenly diiied court 341 TJ s 918 (1951) 1Etshingto v McGrath
182 F 2d 375 (DC 1950) aff1d 341 U s 923 (1951)j Or~~ v
vIil1ougbby 345 U s 83 91 (1953) Mr Justice Douglas concurring
i~ ~tiFascist Commi~~ v ~~EJ 341 U s 123 -182-183 (1951)
United Public W0rkers v --~1itcbell 330 U s 75 (1947)j Angilly - v
United States 199 F 2d 642) 644 (1950) cf NcAuliffe v rlew
Bedford 155 Mass 216 29 NE 517 (le9~) per Holmes J liThe
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but
he h(=l~s no constitltioi1al right to be a policezranu (Id at 220
29 NE at 5J7)
44 v1ie~sn _
v UpGegaff middot111 ~
3~middot4 u s 83 (1953) The Court ruleri as
contrry to due process the Cklahoma loyalty oath statute forshy
bidding IJ1l11ic emplo~rment of Persons who belonzea to certain
organizations regarciless of their knowledge of the character of
those oreenizations because of the indiscriminate classification
of lnnocent with kno~vilg activityll (d at 91)
~1 345 u S 83 (1953)middot
46 Id at 90
47 339 u s 3827 412 (1950) sustaininG the non-corJlIlunist affidavit
requirernelt of union leaders under the Taft -Hartley Act
~ Hoffman v United States 341 U s 179 (1951) suggests such
legislation if Congres3 concludes the lleed is great enough
See too Comment The Privilege Against Se1f-Llcriminetion Versus
Lmnurdty Z Proposed Statutes P 41 Gt~orgetom L J 511 (1953)
S Rept 153 on S 16 83d Cone 1st sess ~ 1 ald 2
April 17 1953 Report of Sel1a~~e Commttee on the JudiciaJ J
Interlocking S-lbversion in GOYf11llent Departments tl July 30
1953 83d Cong 1st sess p 50
~ HcfI1nan v Unitet States 341 u s 479 486 (1951)
50 Id U1ited States v ~isman 111 F 2d 260 262 (2 Cir 1950)
51 Note 61 Yale L J 105 109 (1952)
52 Rogers v United States 340 u s 367 375 (1951)
211 See e g Blau v Unjted StaIe~ 340 u s 159 (1950)
-shy54 Note J Co1t3resnic1al Inv estigat1ons--Self-Illcrimimtion Condemneshy
tiOll and Fair Hcar1ngll 22 U of Cinn L R 193 199-200 (1953)
55 See ~ovTn8end v ~~it~~ta~~3 95 F 2d 352 351 (DC Cir 1938)
cert denied 303 u S 664 (1938)
56 Byse TfA Report on the Pennsylvana Loyalty Act 101 U of Fa
L R 480 481-1~84 (1953) Wright Should Teachers Testify
Saturday Review Sept 2o 1953 p 23
57 See Meltzer Required Records The McCarran Act and The Privilege
Against Selfmiddotmiddot Incriminat ion ll 19 U of Chi L R 687 722 (1951)
y 83d Cong 1st Seas 1953 Also known as the Kefauver BUl
59 ~ v ltlalker 161 U S 591 (1896)
sect21 S 16 83d Cong 1st sess 1953 passed the Senate July 9 1953
after extensive debate Cong Ree 8646-8663 July 9 1953shy
S 16 amends B 3486 of Title 18 Sec 3486 presently furnishes
witnesses immunity from prosecution tor testimony before either
House or their Committees It appears to suffer from the same
deficiency present in a similar statute condemned in Counse~an v
Hitchcock 142 u s 547 (1892) S 16 is intended to StWP1y the
omission in the Hitchcock ease by providing not only that a
witness testimony may not be used against him but that such
witness shall be iImnune with respect to lIany transaction mtter
or thing concerning which he has been compelled to testIfy
sect 83d Congo 1st sess 1953
~ S Rept 153 83d Congo 1st sess p 2 (1953)
63 See Comment The Privi1ege Against Self-Incrimination Versus
Immunity Proposed statutes 41 Georgetown L J 511 523 (1953)
64 Supra footnote 7shy
sectif Delanel v ~ed States 199 F 2d 107 (1 Ci~ 1952)
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
A recent Senate Report entitled tlInterlocldng Subversion in
WGovernment fl fully documents how former government employees were
able to spin their web of intrigue in positions of influ6nce The
Report states
1tlJ~e subcommittee exumined in public session 36 pershy
sons about whom it had substantial evidence of membership
in the Communist undergrolld 10 Government All of them
invoked tha fifth amenmnen~ ~~d refused to answer questions
regardicg COnrIranist membership on the grounds of self-in
crinlination Many reused even to eomowledge their own
sigl1attles on official Govelnment doclllllents in which they
haG SViorn to nonmernbership in the past
All)st all of he persons exposed by the evidence had
Bome connection which could be documented vith at least one-shy
a~d generally several--other e~o6ed persons Tney used eaoh
other s names for referenoe on ~licationa for Federal em-
p10~lOOnt They hire eaoh other They pomot~d eampQh other
hAY raised each others sal~ries They transfer~ampd eaah
otlwr from bureau to bureau from depariment to department
from congressional committee to congressional committee
They assigned each other to international missions They
vouched for each others loyalty end prctected each other
when exposure threaten~d ~ley often had common living
qUaters tI
Suppression i truth in any case is bad enough In no event
can it be justified by a Government employee or applicant for Govern
ment empl~Jment in the face of a Congressional inquiry where the
interests of the national Bect~lty are at stake No one denies that
the Government employee or applicant for such employment may conshy
stitutionally claim his privilege against self-incrimination On
the other hand no one has a constitutional right to a Government
job W True the Supreme Court ha held that the constitutional
protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant
to a statute Is patently arbitrary or discriminatory II W But in
my opinion there is nothing e1ther arbtrary or discriminatry about
diSDdssing a federal employee where he refuses to waive the privilege
against self-incrimination guaranteed him by tho Const tution We
find an analogous situation presented in the recent decision of the
~reme Court in Orloff v WilloughbY ~ In that case the peti shy
tioner a physician was denied a commission in the Army principally
tor the reason that when asked hether he was a member in any Communist JY
organizations he replied) Federal Constitutional privilege is claimed
In its opinion through Mr Justice Jackson the Supreme Court said
It ia argued that Orlorf 1s being punished for havshy
ing claimed a privilege which the Constitution guarantees
No one at least no ane on this Court which has repeatedly
sustained assertion by Communists of the privilege against
selfMincr~inatian questions or doubts Orloffs right to
withhold facts about himself on this ground No one beshy
l1evee he can be punished for doing so But the question
is whether be can at the same time take the position that
to tell the truth about himself Vlould incriminate him and
that even so the President must appofnt him to a post of
honor and trust le have no hesitation in answering that
question No II There is no law which requires the Gove~~ent to sit supinely by
until the suspeoted eIlIployee has been convicted of disloyalty or other
similar misoonduct inconsistent with the interests of the national
security before it can sCPal~ate him from the Government service There
is no law which requires the Government to assume or endure such a risk
As was pointed out in an apt csae by the Supreme Court in American
Commtlnications v Douds speaking through the beloved late Chief
Justice Vinson
IfThat (first) amendment requires that one be permitted to
believe what he will It requires that one be permitted
to advocate what he will unless there is a clear and
present danger that a substantial public evil will result
therefrom It does not require that he be permitted to be
the keeper of the arsenal
I have not overlooked the fact that the loyalty and honesty of
the ovel~vhelming majority of all Government employeesmiddot is beyond quesshy
tion But their good reputations and character are far better proshy
tected from un1tfarranted criticism when we root out the few who are
unreliable and disloyal
What the critical situation of om time calls for is a lavr com
pt)lling testimony within the fr~neuro1Torl of the Constitution The tmshy
swer to this need is immuni-ty legislaiion which will be as broad as
the privilege W11ich is stJpplanted tV Then if a person is adjudged
ill cOlte~Pt for refusing to te3tify before a Cotgressional committee
he will know tZat t-le ~udgrnerJt of OOllt-empt will more likely stand up
on appeal free from oonstitutional ohal1enge
At the same time the l~w will also provide more adequate proshy
tection for the wit~ss
At presnt the witne31l is in a rtboxtl so to slJeGk The witness
is not exc~ed from an3werL~g merely because he believes his answers
Vlil1 incriminate him His slly-ao does not of its(gt~r establish the
1amphazeId of ilcriIltination II ~~ere he olaims his privil~ge it is
the ftL1ction of the jcge to dets-rmme whether the siJence of t1e
witness is justified or wha~1er the danger to be apprebenced is too
remote to be sl1bstattial To save himself from being held in conshy
tempt tl1e witness may oftcn be cOJIpEtled to disclos3 til0ne very
facts whtrh he claims are privileged iQ
Witnesses are alao aided by a b~oad immunity statute in still
another way Under our la unlike that of England t a disclosure of
any incriminating fact constitutes a wailer of the privilege as to deshy
tails con~erning that fact 211 Having made a partial disclosure of
faots the witness loses the rig~t to cease answering intel~ogat1ons
and rely upon his privilege at a 1ater point in his testimony
In one oase the detendant rree~ disclosed that she was Treasshy
urer of the Communist Pariy in COlorado and testified that she had
given the books ot the party to another person When asked to dishy
wlge the name ot the lamiddottter she refused upon the ground that the
answer might incriminate her mder the Sm1tb Act Atfirming her
conviction for contempt the Supreme Court speaking through Chief
Justice Vinson said
Since the privilege agatnlt salf-inorimination
presupposes a real danger ot legal detriment arising
from the disolosure petitioner cannot invoke the
privilege where response to the specific question in
issue here would not ftUtther inoriminate her O1aolo
sure of e tact waives the privilege as to details pound
This deoision leaves the law in a rather anomolous position tor the
vlitness A witness who refuses to answer aU questions and fails to Wcooperate to any extent may be protected by the claim of privilege
But there is no equal protection atforded by the decisions to the
witness who commences to eooperate but stops at a point where further
disclosure may tncrim1~ate him
Moreover it the witness refuses to answer on the ground that
Congress has exceeded its powers or that the inQuiry in lacking in
pertinency he construas the law at his peril If mistake8 his good 55
faith error of law constitutes no defense to fine and imprisonment
Then again it is claimed DY some that a persons election to
remain silent upon the ground of privilege does not necessarily mean
he has anything sinister to hide There are undoubtedly some people of
sincere principle who refl1se to disclose 1flformat1oft to authorized
1nvestigating authorities because of their feeling that ao one has any
right to 1~quire about their beliefs even if germane to the inquiry at 56
bsnd- There are other persons who refuse to answer because they feel
their recollections of events lons past are fee~le and that falsehood
even on trivial or irrelevant matters may subject them to a charge of
perjury There are still others less innocent vho say that coercing
them to testify under pain of contempt resembles the Soviet tactic of
requiring those SUilty not only to pay for but also to prcclatD their 57
guilt shy
~he use of broad tmmunity statutes serves to remove the dansers
mentioned for the iDPocent a~d operates aa an incentive for the guilty
to tell the truth
There are already two proposals pendin8 in Congress which seek to
compel the answer by witnesses at questioDs put to them before Conshy
gressiOl1al Committees grand juries or courts In exchange tor this
compulsory testimony the Witnesses will obtain complete immunity froa
prosecution
58 One Bill is s~ 565 This proposal grants immunity to ~itnesses
before a grand Jury or court of the United States when in the disshy
cretion of th~ Attorney General it is necessary to do so in the public
interest In exchange for this immunity the witness is compelled to
testify and to produce his books papers or recoIds s 565 uses
broad immunity lengtase in stating that the witness shall not be
prosecuted on account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he 1s compelled after ela~ing his privilege to testify or
produce evidence
In this respect s 565 is almost ident1cal to the immunity proshy59
vision sustained 8S valid by the Supreme Court e~ far back as 1896-
This Bill does not extend the immunity to witnesses before Congressional
Committees 601 61
There are other Bills pend-ing S 16- middot and H R 27371 with equally
broad immunity authority The Senate has passed its Bill but the House
Bill still awaits action Both these Bills grunt immunity to witnesses
before Congressional Committees but not to witnesses before grand
juries or courts
The proposed Bills are worded so that the witness will not get an
immunity bathU merely by testifying He must first raise specifically
his claim for privilege and thus put the Committee on notice whether
for the greater good the witness should be required to testify and 62
given immunity or whether he should be excused from testlfying-
However the discretionary power to grant the immunity is not vested
in the Attorney General bumiddott lies with the body conducting the investigation
If the proceeding is one before one of the Houses of Congress then
a majority vote of the members present is necessary Under S 16
if it is a proceeding before a committee two thirds of the members
must vote to grant the tmmunity In that event the tvothirds vote
must include at least two members of each of the two political parties
having the largest representation on such committee The House Bill
does not provide for notice to the Attorney General of the proposed
grant of immunity The Senate Bill provides for one weeks notice to
the Attorney General of the proposal but if the latter fails or reshy
fuses to assent to grant of immunity it may be conferred by majority
vote of either House It is hoped that this legislation will only be
resorted to where full diseloaure by witnesses is deemed of greater
tmportance than the possibility of punishing them for past offenses
By permitting one or several criminals to escape prosecution the
larger public peril contained in a gang of criminals or in their
leaders may be uncovered and the guilty brought to justice
The legislative proposals mentioned have much to commend them
In my opinion these bills would better achieve their purposes it they
required the concurrence of the Attorney General 1n the granting of any
immunity to a witness by a Joint Congressional Committee or either Heuse
committee or by Congress The Attorney General 1s the chief legal
officer of the Government of the United States As Buch it 1s his
responsibility to prosecute persons who offend the criminal laws of the
United states This responsibility must be coupled w1th adequate
authority to permit its discharge It would seem to be more advisable
for the Attorney General who has immediate knowledge of a criminals
background and propensities to decide whether immunity should be
granted for such a person To allow the Attorney General to participate
in the ultimate decision aa to whether immunity should be granted would
not impair Congressional investigatIons in the fields of internal
security crime and corruption Nor would it discourage witnesses
from providing information of importance to the investigation if the
Attorney Generals permission vas required before immunity was granted
On the other hand if these Bills were enacted in their present
form they might subject members of Congress to undue pressures for
granting immunity to criminals who are ineligible to receive it Also
they cuuld very easily cause embarrassment to Congress by tmped1ng or
blocking prosecutions planned by the Department of Justice on any matter 63
even incidentally testified to upon these 1nvestigations
The unfortunate experience which Congress had as far back as 1857 64
in granting immunity without concurrence of the Attorney General - should
~each that a similar course of action may be marked by eveD greater
failure today_ The witness might readily turn this division of authority
between Congress and the Department of Justice to his advantage by
obtaining an ~unity from the legislative committee or from Congress
over the objection of the Attorney General Thereafter he would be
free to testify concerning a broad area Of activities without fear that
he could be held to account criminally for other violations however
unrelated to the matter under investigation
Thus for example a Congreas1onal Committee or Congress might
furnish immunity to a person to obtain his testimony about his illicit
traffic in slot machine opercltlons between states This person may also
be guilty either of espionage or subversion or of selling narcotics to
youngs cers as to which an indictment is soon to be obtained To foreshy
close prosecution on these more serious crimes the witness would be
glad to volunteer information on his other activities if he knew in
advance that immunity would fallow for all of them Therefore greatest
care must be exercioed in granting immunity and then only upon a fully
informed judgment of all tle facts The Departlnent of Justice would
of course through the Fe~eral Bureau of Investigation the Crtmlnal
and Tax Divisions and the United states Attorneyo I offices be mosmiddott
likely to know the facts and the plans for prosecution Concurrence
by the Attorney General in conferring the immunity would also enable
the Department of Justice to maintuin its responsibility for the proper
administration of the crlminal law
The provision in S 10 for one weeks notice to the Attorney General
of the proposed grant of immunity does not fully cure this Bill of its
weakness in failing to require his affirmative concurrence in every
case Experience indicates that at times the views of the person who
1s charged with prooecut1ng criminals are disregarded by Congressional
Committees For example the successful criminal conviction obtained
by the Department of Justice ot the internal revenue collector in one of
the largest cities was recently nullified because of the action of a
House Committee in holding 1middotr1dely publicized hearings in the district in
65 which the trial subsequently took place These hearings took place
over the strong objection of the Department of Justice thut the pro
posed hearing would be of prejudice to the defendant on the trial
which was about to be initiated and would injure the Governments case
in disclosing its evidence In reversing the convlct1on l Chief Judge
Magruder observed that the character of the defendant was blackened
and discredited as the day of trial approached because of the publicity
invited and stimulated by the Committee over the radio and television
Thu6 1 mere advance notIfication to the Attorney General of a proposed
grant of tmmunity would never be a guarantee that the Committee would
be guided by the views of the Attorney General
S 16 and H R 2737 would also more readily carry out the aim of
obtaining evidence against leaders of subversion and criminal entershy
prisesj if provision for twmunity were granted to obtain testimony
not only before Congressional Committees but likewise before courts
and grand juries
For these reasons it is my opinion that if any measure is to be
enacted~~rmitting the granting of immunity to witnesses before either
House of Congress or its committees it should vest the Attorney General
or the Attorney General acting with the concurren~e of appropriate members
of Congress with the authority to grant such tmmunity and if the test shy
mony is sought for a court or grand jury that the Attorney General alone
be authorized to grant the ilmnunity
There remain for discussion two principal objections to this proshy
posed legislation which may be briefly considered here One objection
1s that when a witneAS is compelled to testify even under the protecshy
tion of immunity from criminal punihment) he is not relieved from
personal disgrace ~~lhich attach~8 to the exposure of his crime The
answer to this objection ia contained in II land mark decision of the 66
Supreme Court in Brown v Wrtlker
The design of tbe constitutional plivilege is not to aid the
witness in vindicating his character but to protect him
against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict him
of a criminal charge If he secure legal jnmllnity from prose-
cution the possible impairment of his good name is a penalty
which it is reasonable b0 should be compelled to pay for the
common good
The reasoning of this decision has never been qU~Gtioned and has 67
only recently been approved by the Sllpreme Court
The other chief objection to the proposed legislation is that while
a witness may receive itmlunity from federal prosecution) he may still
be subject to IJrosecution under ~tate lavl The Supreme Court has held
that this is not a valid objection to federal immunity laws~ since the
self-incrimination clause ln the Fifth Amendment operates ao a l1mitashy68
tion on the federal government only In United states v Murdock the
defendant was indicted for refUSing to answer questions of a revenue
agent relating to ctrt8 in income tax returns The refusal was ba sed on
the plea that hiD answers might 1ncrim1nate him in a state court The
Court said on this point
This court ha~ held that immunity against state prosecution is
not essential to the validity of federal statutes declaring that
a witnes3 shall not be excllpoundied from gtring evidence on the
ground that it vTill incriminate him and also that the ladt of
state power to give witnesses protection against federal
prosecution does not defeat a state immunity statute
Similarly a witness befo~e a state tribunal CBnnot refuse to 69
answer because of the threat of federal prosecution - However the
Federal District Court in Ohio recently held i1 Unted States v 70
Di Carlo that the defendant had the right to assert his privilege
because of possible prosecution under state law since the Senate
committee was authorized to investigate violations not only of the lawe 71
of the United States but also of the states M_ The Murdock case was
dtstingJished urlon the ground that the danger of state posecution 1n
that case was remote and uncertain thile in the Di Carlo case the
danger of state proaecutjon WilS imminent and real 72
The ---Di Carlo case has been received -lith mixed commelt It has73
not been followed so far as we k~ow- It appears to be contrary to deshy
cis10ns of co~~rts of appeals which have consistently adhered to the prinshy74
ciples of the Murdock case- In my opinion this decision of a district
court aoes not detract from the binding effect ofthe Supreme Courts deshy
eision in the Murdock case
The Department of Justice will recommend to the Congress in Jlouary
an immunity bill of the type I have descri-ced which protects the const1shy
tutional privileges ot witnesses before Congressional Committees courts
and juries but will at the some time aid materially in stamping out
criminal and subversive activities
Footnote Referet~es to Ad~res El~ited ~------ ___bull
Immunity From Prcsecuticn
Versus
Privilege Agaiust Self-Incrimination
Pittman liThe Colonial and Constitutional History of the
Privilege Against Sel-Incrimiootion 1n Amcicaff 21 Va
L R 763 764 770-773 (1935) Corwin The Supreme
Court I S Corctl~ction of the Self Incrirnination C1ause lf
29 lId~h L R 1 512 (1930) Ap~licability of
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to Legjslative
y Pittmenf2 at 774
~ ~ining v ~~8ey 211 U S 78 92 (1908)
L Id at 91
~ 34th Ceng 3d sess Globe PI 427 433 1-45 See
Eberling Constitutional Investigations pp 304-315shy
7 Eberling d at 320-323
~I 142 U s 547 (1892) This Act of 1862 revised an old
statute into two new sections by an amendment which
sought to insure that a witness who testified before
a federal grand jt~ or court (R s I 860 (1875raquo or
a Congressional Committee (R S B 859 (1875raquo would
not be later subjected to the use of his testimony in
any criminal proceeding aGainst him Section ~ 860 of
the amendment dealing with grand jurtes and courts came
under attack in Counselman v Hitchcock J supra and was
held to be invalid Since this part of the immunity proshy
vision tailed to accomplish ita purpose Congress repealed
it in 1910 (36 Stat 352 (19l0raquo) Congress apparently felt
that S 859 applying to Congressional Committees was still
of value and left it 1n force to this date (a s I 859
(1875) as amended 52 Stat 943 (1938) 18 usc e3486
(Supp V 1952)j see liThe Privilege Against Self
Incrimination versus Immunity Proposed Statutes 41
Georgetown L J 511 514 (1953) United States v ~
339 U s 323 335-337 (1950)
21 It read in patt as follows
No person shall be prosecuted for or on
account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he may testify or produce evidence
Act of Feb 11 1893 c 83 27 stat 443 49 USCA
I 46 See too ~ v United States 337 u S 137 146shy
147 (1949)middot Notet Denying -the Privilege against Self
Incrimination to Public Officers 64 Barv L R 987
988 (1951)
- 101 161 U s 591 (1896)
Shapiro v United St~~ 335 U S 1 6-7 (1948) where various
statutes are collated in the footnote The customary provision
in these statutes provides as follows No person shall be
excused from complying with any requirements ot this section
because of his privilege aga1nst self-incriminationgt but the
immunity provisions of the COmptuBory Testimony Act of
February 11 1893 shall apply with respect to allY 1nd1shy
vidual who specifically claims such pr1Y11ege tt
12 Rapacz ULimiting the Plea of Self-Incr1m1nat1ontl 20 Georgetown
L J 329 353 (1932) see footnote 3 of ~ v Connect~
302 U s 319 326 (1937) NPte liThe Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination the Doctr1ne of Waiver 61 Yale L J 104 110
(1952) middot
~f Palko v Connecticut 302 U s 319 326 (1937)
~ See dissents of Mr Justices Shiras Gray and White in ~ V4
Walker supra 161 U s 630638 Cf dissent of Mr Justice
Black in Ro~ers v United States 340 U s 367 376 (1950)
15 Potts Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for ContemptU I
74 U of Pa L R 691 780 (1926) L1acos uRights of Witnesses
Before Congressional Committees 33 Boston U L R 337 340
(1953) middot
t6 Liacos Id at 31tl
17 McGeary rlThe DeTelopmen-cs of Congressional Investigative Power ll
p 23 (1940) McGrain v Daughel~l 273 u s 135 (1927)
18 Sinclair v Unfted States~ 279 U s 263 (1929) ~arsba11 v
Unit~~State~ 176 F 2d 473 (nc Cir 1949) 2 Usc ~ 192
(Supp 1950)
19 Ne York City Bar Ass t n Committee on the Bill of Rights Report
on Congressional Committees presented December 14 1948 p 1
gQi Galloway PCong18ss1onal Investigations Proposed Reforms lt
18 U of Chi L R 478 479-481 (1951)
21 Dilliard lICongress1onal Investigations The Role of the Press
18 U of ChL L R 585 J 587 (1951)
22 Edgerton J dissenting in Barsky v United States 167 F 2d
241 252 (nc eir 1948) cert denied 334 U s 843 (1948)
petition for rehearing denied 339 U S 971 (1951)
~3 De Jonge v Oregon 299 U s 353 364 365 (1937)
24 Id
25 6 Richardson lIMes sOges and Papers of the Pres idents t 1 p 23
July 4 1861
26 See United St~~ v ~~phson 165 F 2d 82 (2 Cir 1947)
cert denied 333 u S 838 (1948) Lawson v United states
176 F 2d 49 (nc Cir 1949) cel~ denied 339 u s 934
(1950) Barsty Y ~ited S~ 167 F 2d 241 (DC eir
1948) cert denied 334 u s 843 (1948) MCGrain v Daugherty
273 u s 135 (1927) and cf Rumely v United States J 197
F 2d 166 (DC eir 1952) affd 73 s ct 543 (1953)
JJ B1a~ v ~~ted Sttlt~s 340 u s 159 (1950-)
gsectJ ~~ v United States 31~1 U s 479 (1951) See too
sectingleton v United States 343 U s 944 (1952) Note Recent
Extensions of the Witness Privilege Against Self-Incrim1nationll
53 Col L R 275 (1953)
29 Aiuppa v Un1tc~ states 201 F 2d 287 300 (6 eir 1952)
_I30 Note nMandatory Dismissal of Public Persol1nel and The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination 101 U ot Pa L R 1190 1191
fn 8 (1953)
31 Brown Be Fassett Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar
20 u or Chi L R 480 483 (1953)
32 Garner v Los Angeles Board) 341 u s 716 (1951) Gerende v
Board of Supervisors 341 U s 56 (1951) but com~are Wieman v
Updegraff 341~ U s 83 (1953)
34 See footnote 32
35 PG~ v Boa-roo of Education 31~2 U s 435 (1951)
ID Id at 493
38 Sec 9(h of lihe LalJor Management Rlations Act of 1947 29 USCA
St1Pp III Sec 141 Sec 159(b)
39 ft~rican C~~catons Association v ~uda 339 u S 382 (1950)
sustaining the validity of Sec 9(h) against the challenge that it
violated the First c-lT~nc1tlCiltl Ex Post FtiCto Lals and other iul1dashy
mental rights
40 Executive Order No 10450 issued Aporil zr 1953 (18 F R 2lt89)
41 Executive Orrler No 10491 issued Ocmiddottober 13 1953 (18 F R 6583)
~ Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary Interlocking Subshy
vcrs ion in Covernmcnt De~rtments II 83d Cong 1st ses5 Juy 30 J
1953 p 21 Being a cOImllunist is not a crime under federal law J
although it is in some states (see Liacos supra note 15 at
375) The Smith Act (18 USC Sec 2385 et seq) mkes advoshy
eating or teaching the violent overthrOf of any goverrment of the
United States or being a member of such a group and kno7ing its
purpose~a federal crime
43 See EaSley v F~cbardsonJ 182 F 2d 46 (DC 1950)J affd by an
evenly diiied court 341 TJ s 918 (1951) 1Etshingto v McGrath
182 F 2d 375 (DC 1950) aff1d 341 U s 923 (1951)j Or~~ v
vIil1ougbby 345 U s 83 91 (1953) Mr Justice Douglas concurring
i~ ~tiFascist Commi~~ v ~~EJ 341 U s 123 -182-183 (1951)
United Public W0rkers v --~1itcbell 330 U s 75 (1947)j Angilly - v
United States 199 F 2d 642) 644 (1950) cf NcAuliffe v rlew
Bedford 155 Mass 216 29 NE 517 (le9~) per Holmes J liThe
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but
he h(=l~s no constitltioi1al right to be a policezranu (Id at 220
29 NE at 5J7)
44 v1ie~sn _
v UpGegaff middot111 ~
3~middot4 u s 83 (1953) The Court ruleri as
contrry to due process the Cklahoma loyalty oath statute forshy
bidding IJ1l11ic emplo~rment of Persons who belonzea to certain
organizations regarciless of their knowledge of the character of
those oreenizations because of the indiscriminate classification
of lnnocent with kno~vilg activityll (d at 91)
~1 345 u S 83 (1953)middot
46 Id at 90
47 339 u s 3827 412 (1950) sustaininG the non-corJlIlunist affidavit
requirernelt of union leaders under the Taft -Hartley Act
~ Hoffman v United States 341 U s 179 (1951) suggests such
legislation if Congres3 concludes the lleed is great enough
See too Comment The Privilege Against Se1f-Llcriminetion Versus
Lmnurdty Z Proposed Statutes P 41 Gt~orgetom L J 511 (1953)
S Rept 153 on S 16 83d Cone 1st sess ~ 1 ald 2
April 17 1953 Report of Sel1a~~e Commttee on the JudiciaJ J
Interlocking S-lbversion in GOYf11llent Departments tl July 30
1953 83d Cong 1st sess p 50
~ HcfI1nan v Unitet States 341 u s 479 486 (1951)
50 Id U1ited States v ~isman 111 F 2d 260 262 (2 Cir 1950)
51 Note 61 Yale L J 105 109 (1952)
52 Rogers v United States 340 u s 367 375 (1951)
211 See e g Blau v Unjted StaIe~ 340 u s 159 (1950)
-shy54 Note J Co1t3resnic1al Inv estigat1ons--Self-Illcrimimtion Condemneshy
tiOll and Fair Hcar1ngll 22 U of Cinn L R 193 199-200 (1953)
55 See ~ovTn8end v ~~it~~ta~~3 95 F 2d 352 351 (DC Cir 1938)
cert denied 303 u S 664 (1938)
56 Byse TfA Report on the Pennsylvana Loyalty Act 101 U of Fa
L R 480 481-1~84 (1953) Wright Should Teachers Testify
Saturday Review Sept 2o 1953 p 23
57 See Meltzer Required Records The McCarran Act and The Privilege
Against Selfmiddotmiddot Incriminat ion ll 19 U of Chi L R 687 722 (1951)
y 83d Cong 1st Seas 1953 Also known as the Kefauver BUl
59 ~ v ltlalker 161 U S 591 (1896)
sect21 S 16 83d Cong 1st sess 1953 passed the Senate July 9 1953
after extensive debate Cong Ree 8646-8663 July 9 1953shy
S 16 amends B 3486 of Title 18 Sec 3486 presently furnishes
witnesses immunity from prosecution tor testimony before either
House or their Committees It appears to suffer from the same
deficiency present in a similar statute condemned in Counse~an v
Hitchcock 142 u s 547 (1892) S 16 is intended to StWP1y the
omission in the Hitchcock ease by providing not only that a
witness testimony may not be used against him but that such
witness shall be iImnune with respect to lIany transaction mtter
or thing concerning which he has been compelled to testIfy
sect 83d Congo 1st sess 1953
~ S Rept 153 83d Congo 1st sess p 2 (1953)
63 See Comment The Privi1ege Against Self-Incrimination Versus
Immunity Proposed statutes 41 Georgetown L J 511 523 (1953)
64 Supra footnote 7shy
sectif Delanel v ~ed States 199 F 2d 107 (1 Ci~ 1952)
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
Suppression i truth in any case is bad enough In no event
can it be justified by a Government employee or applicant for Govern
ment empl~Jment in the face of a Congressional inquiry where the
interests of the national Bect~lty are at stake No one denies that
the Government employee or applicant for such employment may conshy
stitutionally claim his privilege against self-incrimination On
the other hand no one has a constitutional right to a Government
job W True the Supreme Court ha held that the constitutional
protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant
to a statute Is patently arbitrary or discriminatory II W But in
my opinion there is nothing e1ther arbtrary or discriminatry about
diSDdssing a federal employee where he refuses to waive the privilege
against self-incrimination guaranteed him by tho Const tution We
find an analogous situation presented in the recent decision of the
~reme Court in Orloff v WilloughbY ~ In that case the peti shy
tioner a physician was denied a commission in the Army principally
tor the reason that when asked hether he was a member in any Communist JY
organizations he replied) Federal Constitutional privilege is claimed
In its opinion through Mr Justice Jackson the Supreme Court said
It ia argued that Orlorf 1s being punished for havshy
ing claimed a privilege which the Constitution guarantees
No one at least no ane on this Court which has repeatedly
sustained assertion by Communists of the privilege against
selfMincr~inatian questions or doubts Orloffs right to
withhold facts about himself on this ground No one beshy
l1evee he can be punished for doing so But the question
is whether be can at the same time take the position that
to tell the truth about himself Vlould incriminate him and
that even so the President must appofnt him to a post of
honor and trust le have no hesitation in answering that
question No II There is no law which requires the Gove~~ent to sit supinely by
until the suspeoted eIlIployee has been convicted of disloyalty or other
similar misoonduct inconsistent with the interests of the national
security before it can sCPal~ate him from the Government service There
is no law which requires the Government to assume or endure such a risk
As was pointed out in an apt csae by the Supreme Court in American
Commtlnications v Douds speaking through the beloved late Chief
Justice Vinson
IfThat (first) amendment requires that one be permitted to
believe what he will It requires that one be permitted
to advocate what he will unless there is a clear and
present danger that a substantial public evil will result
therefrom It does not require that he be permitted to be
the keeper of the arsenal
I have not overlooked the fact that the loyalty and honesty of
the ovel~vhelming majority of all Government employeesmiddot is beyond quesshy
tion But their good reputations and character are far better proshy
tected from un1tfarranted criticism when we root out the few who are
unreliable and disloyal
What the critical situation of om time calls for is a lavr com
pt)lling testimony within the fr~neuro1Torl of the Constitution The tmshy
swer to this need is immuni-ty legislaiion which will be as broad as
the privilege W11ich is stJpplanted tV Then if a person is adjudged
ill cOlte~Pt for refusing to te3tify before a Cotgressional committee
he will know tZat t-le ~udgrnerJt of OOllt-empt will more likely stand up
on appeal free from oonstitutional ohal1enge
At the same time the l~w will also provide more adequate proshy
tection for the wit~ss
At presnt the witne31l is in a rtboxtl so to slJeGk The witness
is not exc~ed from an3werL~g merely because he believes his answers
Vlil1 incriminate him His slly-ao does not of its(gt~r establish the
1amphazeId of ilcriIltination II ~~ere he olaims his privil~ge it is
the ftL1ction of the jcge to dets-rmme whether the siJence of t1e
witness is justified or wha~1er the danger to be apprebenced is too
remote to be sl1bstattial To save himself from being held in conshy
tempt tl1e witness may oftcn be cOJIpEtled to disclos3 til0ne very
facts whtrh he claims are privileged iQ
Witnesses are alao aided by a b~oad immunity statute in still
another way Under our la unlike that of England t a disclosure of
any incriminating fact constitutes a wailer of the privilege as to deshy
tails con~erning that fact 211 Having made a partial disclosure of
faots the witness loses the rig~t to cease answering intel~ogat1ons
and rely upon his privilege at a 1ater point in his testimony
In one oase the detendant rree~ disclosed that she was Treasshy
urer of the Communist Pariy in COlorado and testified that she had
given the books ot the party to another person When asked to dishy
wlge the name ot the lamiddottter she refused upon the ground that the
answer might incriminate her mder the Sm1tb Act Atfirming her
conviction for contempt the Supreme Court speaking through Chief
Justice Vinson said
Since the privilege agatnlt salf-inorimination
presupposes a real danger ot legal detriment arising
from the disolosure petitioner cannot invoke the
privilege where response to the specific question in
issue here would not ftUtther inoriminate her O1aolo
sure of e tact waives the privilege as to details pound
This deoision leaves the law in a rather anomolous position tor the
vlitness A witness who refuses to answer aU questions and fails to Wcooperate to any extent may be protected by the claim of privilege
But there is no equal protection atforded by the decisions to the
witness who commences to eooperate but stops at a point where further
disclosure may tncrim1~ate him
Moreover it the witness refuses to answer on the ground that
Congress has exceeded its powers or that the inQuiry in lacking in
pertinency he construas the law at his peril If mistake8 his good 55
faith error of law constitutes no defense to fine and imprisonment
Then again it is claimed DY some that a persons election to
remain silent upon the ground of privilege does not necessarily mean
he has anything sinister to hide There are undoubtedly some people of
sincere principle who refl1se to disclose 1flformat1oft to authorized
1nvestigating authorities because of their feeling that ao one has any
right to 1~quire about their beliefs even if germane to the inquiry at 56
bsnd- There are other persons who refuse to answer because they feel
their recollections of events lons past are fee~le and that falsehood
even on trivial or irrelevant matters may subject them to a charge of
perjury There are still others less innocent vho say that coercing
them to testify under pain of contempt resembles the Soviet tactic of
requiring those SUilty not only to pay for but also to prcclatD their 57
guilt shy
~he use of broad tmmunity statutes serves to remove the dansers
mentioned for the iDPocent a~d operates aa an incentive for the guilty
to tell the truth
There are already two proposals pendin8 in Congress which seek to
compel the answer by witnesses at questioDs put to them before Conshy
gressiOl1al Committees grand juries or courts In exchange tor this
compulsory testimony the Witnesses will obtain complete immunity froa
prosecution
58 One Bill is s~ 565 This proposal grants immunity to ~itnesses
before a grand Jury or court of the United States when in the disshy
cretion of th~ Attorney General it is necessary to do so in the public
interest In exchange for this immunity the witness is compelled to
testify and to produce his books papers or recoIds s 565 uses
broad immunity lengtase in stating that the witness shall not be
prosecuted on account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he 1s compelled after ela~ing his privilege to testify or
produce evidence
In this respect s 565 is almost ident1cal to the immunity proshy59
vision sustained 8S valid by the Supreme Court e~ far back as 1896-
This Bill does not extend the immunity to witnesses before Congressional
Committees 601 61
There are other Bills pend-ing S 16- middot and H R 27371 with equally
broad immunity authority The Senate has passed its Bill but the House
Bill still awaits action Both these Bills grunt immunity to witnesses
before Congressional Committees but not to witnesses before grand
juries or courts
The proposed Bills are worded so that the witness will not get an
immunity bathU merely by testifying He must first raise specifically
his claim for privilege and thus put the Committee on notice whether
for the greater good the witness should be required to testify and 62
given immunity or whether he should be excused from testlfying-
However the discretionary power to grant the immunity is not vested
in the Attorney General bumiddott lies with the body conducting the investigation
If the proceeding is one before one of the Houses of Congress then
a majority vote of the members present is necessary Under S 16
if it is a proceeding before a committee two thirds of the members
must vote to grant the tmmunity In that event the tvothirds vote
must include at least two members of each of the two political parties
having the largest representation on such committee The House Bill
does not provide for notice to the Attorney General of the proposed
grant of immunity The Senate Bill provides for one weeks notice to
the Attorney General of the proposal but if the latter fails or reshy
fuses to assent to grant of immunity it may be conferred by majority
vote of either House It is hoped that this legislation will only be
resorted to where full diseloaure by witnesses is deemed of greater
tmportance than the possibility of punishing them for past offenses
By permitting one or several criminals to escape prosecution the
larger public peril contained in a gang of criminals or in their
leaders may be uncovered and the guilty brought to justice
The legislative proposals mentioned have much to commend them
In my opinion these bills would better achieve their purposes it they
required the concurrence of the Attorney General 1n the granting of any
immunity to a witness by a Joint Congressional Committee or either Heuse
committee or by Congress The Attorney General 1s the chief legal
officer of the Government of the United States As Buch it 1s his
responsibility to prosecute persons who offend the criminal laws of the
United states This responsibility must be coupled w1th adequate
authority to permit its discharge It would seem to be more advisable
for the Attorney General who has immediate knowledge of a criminals
background and propensities to decide whether immunity should be
granted for such a person To allow the Attorney General to participate
in the ultimate decision aa to whether immunity should be granted would
not impair Congressional investigatIons in the fields of internal
security crime and corruption Nor would it discourage witnesses
from providing information of importance to the investigation if the
Attorney Generals permission vas required before immunity was granted
On the other hand if these Bills were enacted in their present
form they might subject members of Congress to undue pressures for
granting immunity to criminals who are ineligible to receive it Also
they cuuld very easily cause embarrassment to Congress by tmped1ng or
blocking prosecutions planned by the Department of Justice on any matter 63
even incidentally testified to upon these 1nvestigations
The unfortunate experience which Congress had as far back as 1857 64
in granting immunity without concurrence of the Attorney General - should
~each that a similar course of action may be marked by eveD greater
failure today_ The witness might readily turn this division of authority
between Congress and the Department of Justice to his advantage by
obtaining an ~unity from the legislative committee or from Congress
over the objection of the Attorney General Thereafter he would be
free to testify concerning a broad area Of activities without fear that
he could be held to account criminally for other violations however
unrelated to the matter under investigation
Thus for example a Congreas1onal Committee or Congress might
furnish immunity to a person to obtain his testimony about his illicit
traffic in slot machine opercltlons between states This person may also
be guilty either of espionage or subversion or of selling narcotics to
youngs cers as to which an indictment is soon to be obtained To foreshy
close prosecution on these more serious crimes the witness would be
glad to volunteer information on his other activities if he knew in
advance that immunity would fallow for all of them Therefore greatest
care must be exercioed in granting immunity and then only upon a fully
informed judgment of all tle facts The Departlnent of Justice would
of course through the Fe~eral Bureau of Investigation the Crtmlnal
and Tax Divisions and the United states Attorneyo I offices be mosmiddott
likely to know the facts and the plans for prosecution Concurrence
by the Attorney General in conferring the immunity would also enable
the Department of Justice to maintuin its responsibility for the proper
administration of the crlminal law
The provision in S 10 for one weeks notice to the Attorney General
of the proposed grant of immunity does not fully cure this Bill of its
weakness in failing to require his affirmative concurrence in every
case Experience indicates that at times the views of the person who
1s charged with prooecut1ng criminals are disregarded by Congressional
Committees For example the successful criminal conviction obtained
by the Department of Justice ot the internal revenue collector in one of
the largest cities was recently nullified because of the action of a
House Committee in holding 1middotr1dely publicized hearings in the district in
65 which the trial subsequently took place These hearings took place
over the strong objection of the Department of Justice thut the pro
posed hearing would be of prejudice to the defendant on the trial
which was about to be initiated and would injure the Governments case
in disclosing its evidence In reversing the convlct1on l Chief Judge
Magruder observed that the character of the defendant was blackened
and discredited as the day of trial approached because of the publicity
invited and stimulated by the Committee over the radio and television
Thu6 1 mere advance notIfication to the Attorney General of a proposed
grant of tmmunity would never be a guarantee that the Committee would
be guided by the views of the Attorney General
S 16 and H R 2737 would also more readily carry out the aim of
obtaining evidence against leaders of subversion and criminal entershy
prisesj if provision for twmunity were granted to obtain testimony
not only before Congressional Committees but likewise before courts
and grand juries
For these reasons it is my opinion that if any measure is to be
enacted~~rmitting the granting of immunity to witnesses before either
House of Congress or its committees it should vest the Attorney General
or the Attorney General acting with the concurren~e of appropriate members
of Congress with the authority to grant such tmmunity and if the test shy
mony is sought for a court or grand jury that the Attorney General alone
be authorized to grant the ilmnunity
There remain for discussion two principal objections to this proshy
posed legislation which may be briefly considered here One objection
1s that when a witneAS is compelled to testify even under the protecshy
tion of immunity from criminal punihment) he is not relieved from
personal disgrace ~~lhich attach~8 to the exposure of his crime The
answer to this objection ia contained in II land mark decision of the 66
Supreme Court in Brown v Wrtlker
The design of tbe constitutional plivilege is not to aid the
witness in vindicating his character but to protect him
against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict him
of a criminal charge If he secure legal jnmllnity from prose-
cution the possible impairment of his good name is a penalty
which it is reasonable b0 should be compelled to pay for the
common good
The reasoning of this decision has never been qU~Gtioned and has 67
only recently been approved by the Sllpreme Court
The other chief objection to the proposed legislation is that while
a witness may receive itmlunity from federal prosecution) he may still
be subject to IJrosecution under ~tate lavl The Supreme Court has held
that this is not a valid objection to federal immunity laws~ since the
self-incrimination clause ln the Fifth Amendment operates ao a l1mitashy68
tion on the federal government only In United states v Murdock the
defendant was indicted for refUSing to answer questions of a revenue
agent relating to ctrt8 in income tax returns The refusal was ba sed on
the plea that hiD answers might 1ncrim1nate him in a state court The
Court said on this point
This court ha~ held that immunity against state prosecution is
not essential to the validity of federal statutes declaring that
a witnes3 shall not be excllpoundied from gtring evidence on the
ground that it vTill incriminate him and also that the ladt of
state power to give witnesses protection against federal
prosecution does not defeat a state immunity statute
Similarly a witness befo~e a state tribunal CBnnot refuse to 69
answer because of the threat of federal prosecution - However the
Federal District Court in Ohio recently held i1 Unted States v 70
Di Carlo that the defendant had the right to assert his privilege
because of possible prosecution under state law since the Senate
committee was authorized to investigate violations not only of the lawe 71
of the United States but also of the states M_ The Murdock case was
dtstingJished urlon the ground that the danger of state posecution 1n
that case was remote and uncertain thile in the Di Carlo case the
danger of state proaecutjon WilS imminent and real 72
The ---Di Carlo case has been received -lith mixed commelt It has73
not been followed so far as we k~ow- It appears to be contrary to deshy
cis10ns of co~~rts of appeals which have consistently adhered to the prinshy74
ciples of the Murdock case- In my opinion this decision of a district
court aoes not detract from the binding effect ofthe Supreme Courts deshy
eision in the Murdock case
The Department of Justice will recommend to the Congress in Jlouary
an immunity bill of the type I have descri-ced which protects the const1shy
tutional privileges ot witnesses before Congressional Committees courts
and juries but will at the some time aid materially in stamping out
criminal and subversive activities
Footnote Referet~es to Ad~res El~ited ~------ ___bull
Immunity From Prcsecuticn
Versus
Privilege Agaiust Self-Incrimination
Pittman liThe Colonial and Constitutional History of the
Privilege Against Sel-Incrimiootion 1n Amcicaff 21 Va
L R 763 764 770-773 (1935) Corwin The Supreme
Court I S Corctl~ction of the Self Incrirnination C1ause lf
29 lId~h L R 1 512 (1930) Ap~licability of
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to Legjslative
y Pittmenf2 at 774
~ ~ining v ~~8ey 211 U S 78 92 (1908)
L Id at 91
~ 34th Ceng 3d sess Globe PI 427 433 1-45 See
Eberling Constitutional Investigations pp 304-315shy
7 Eberling d at 320-323
~I 142 U s 547 (1892) This Act of 1862 revised an old
statute into two new sections by an amendment which
sought to insure that a witness who testified before
a federal grand jt~ or court (R s I 860 (1875raquo or
a Congressional Committee (R S B 859 (1875raquo would
not be later subjected to the use of his testimony in
any criminal proceeding aGainst him Section ~ 860 of
the amendment dealing with grand jurtes and courts came
under attack in Counselman v Hitchcock J supra and was
held to be invalid Since this part of the immunity proshy
vision tailed to accomplish ita purpose Congress repealed
it in 1910 (36 Stat 352 (19l0raquo) Congress apparently felt
that S 859 applying to Congressional Committees was still
of value and left it 1n force to this date (a s I 859
(1875) as amended 52 Stat 943 (1938) 18 usc e3486
(Supp V 1952)j see liThe Privilege Against Self
Incrimination versus Immunity Proposed Statutes 41
Georgetown L J 511 514 (1953) United States v ~
339 U s 323 335-337 (1950)
21 It read in patt as follows
No person shall be prosecuted for or on
account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he may testify or produce evidence
Act of Feb 11 1893 c 83 27 stat 443 49 USCA
I 46 See too ~ v United States 337 u S 137 146shy
147 (1949)middot Notet Denying -the Privilege against Self
Incrimination to Public Officers 64 Barv L R 987
988 (1951)
- 101 161 U s 591 (1896)
Shapiro v United St~~ 335 U S 1 6-7 (1948) where various
statutes are collated in the footnote The customary provision
in these statutes provides as follows No person shall be
excused from complying with any requirements ot this section
because of his privilege aga1nst self-incriminationgt but the
immunity provisions of the COmptuBory Testimony Act of
February 11 1893 shall apply with respect to allY 1nd1shy
vidual who specifically claims such pr1Y11ege tt
12 Rapacz ULimiting the Plea of Self-Incr1m1nat1ontl 20 Georgetown
L J 329 353 (1932) see footnote 3 of ~ v Connect~
302 U s 319 326 (1937) NPte liThe Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination the Doctr1ne of Waiver 61 Yale L J 104 110
(1952) middot
~f Palko v Connecticut 302 U s 319 326 (1937)
~ See dissents of Mr Justices Shiras Gray and White in ~ V4
Walker supra 161 U s 630638 Cf dissent of Mr Justice
Black in Ro~ers v United States 340 U s 367 376 (1950)
15 Potts Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for ContemptU I
74 U of Pa L R 691 780 (1926) L1acos uRights of Witnesses
Before Congressional Committees 33 Boston U L R 337 340
(1953) middot
t6 Liacos Id at 31tl
17 McGeary rlThe DeTelopmen-cs of Congressional Investigative Power ll
p 23 (1940) McGrain v Daughel~l 273 u s 135 (1927)
18 Sinclair v Unfted States~ 279 U s 263 (1929) ~arsba11 v
Unit~~State~ 176 F 2d 473 (nc Cir 1949) 2 Usc ~ 192
(Supp 1950)
19 Ne York City Bar Ass t n Committee on the Bill of Rights Report
on Congressional Committees presented December 14 1948 p 1
gQi Galloway PCong18ss1onal Investigations Proposed Reforms lt
18 U of Chi L R 478 479-481 (1951)
21 Dilliard lICongress1onal Investigations The Role of the Press
18 U of ChL L R 585 J 587 (1951)
22 Edgerton J dissenting in Barsky v United States 167 F 2d
241 252 (nc eir 1948) cert denied 334 U s 843 (1948)
petition for rehearing denied 339 U S 971 (1951)
~3 De Jonge v Oregon 299 U s 353 364 365 (1937)
24 Id
25 6 Richardson lIMes sOges and Papers of the Pres idents t 1 p 23
July 4 1861
26 See United St~~ v ~~phson 165 F 2d 82 (2 Cir 1947)
cert denied 333 u S 838 (1948) Lawson v United states
176 F 2d 49 (nc Cir 1949) cel~ denied 339 u s 934
(1950) Barsty Y ~ited S~ 167 F 2d 241 (DC eir
1948) cert denied 334 u s 843 (1948) MCGrain v Daugherty
273 u s 135 (1927) and cf Rumely v United States J 197
F 2d 166 (DC eir 1952) affd 73 s ct 543 (1953)
JJ B1a~ v ~~ted Sttlt~s 340 u s 159 (1950-)
gsectJ ~~ v United States 31~1 U s 479 (1951) See too
sectingleton v United States 343 U s 944 (1952) Note Recent
Extensions of the Witness Privilege Against Self-Incrim1nationll
53 Col L R 275 (1953)
29 Aiuppa v Un1tc~ states 201 F 2d 287 300 (6 eir 1952)
_I30 Note nMandatory Dismissal of Public Persol1nel and The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination 101 U ot Pa L R 1190 1191
fn 8 (1953)
31 Brown Be Fassett Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar
20 u or Chi L R 480 483 (1953)
32 Garner v Los Angeles Board) 341 u s 716 (1951) Gerende v
Board of Supervisors 341 U s 56 (1951) but com~are Wieman v
Updegraff 341~ U s 83 (1953)
34 See footnote 32
35 PG~ v Boa-roo of Education 31~2 U s 435 (1951)
ID Id at 493
38 Sec 9(h of lihe LalJor Management Rlations Act of 1947 29 USCA
St1Pp III Sec 141 Sec 159(b)
39 ft~rican C~~catons Association v ~uda 339 u S 382 (1950)
sustaining the validity of Sec 9(h) against the challenge that it
violated the First c-lT~nc1tlCiltl Ex Post FtiCto Lals and other iul1dashy
mental rights
40 Executive Order No 10450 issued Aporil zr 1953 (18 F R 2lt89)
41 Executive Orrler No 10491 issued Ocmiddottober 13 1953 (18 F R 6583)
~ Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary Interlocking Subshy
vcrs ion in Covernmcnt De~rtments II 83d Cong 1st ses5 Juy 30 J
1953 p 21 Being a cOImllunist is not a crime under federal law J
although it is in some states (see Liacos supra note 15 at
375) The Smith Act (18 USC Sec 2385 et seq) mkes advoshy
eating or teaching the violent overthrOf of any goverrment of the
United States or being a member of such a group and kno7ing its
purpose~a federal crime
43 See EaSley v F~cbardsonJ 182 F 2d 46 (DC 1950)J affd by an
evenly diiied court 341 TJ s 918 (1951) 1Etshingto v McGrath
182 F 2d 375 (DC 1950) aff1d 341 U s 923 (1951)j Or~~ v
vIil1ougbby 345 U s 83 91 (1953) Mr Justice Douglas concurring
i~ ~tiFascist Commi~~ v ~~EJ 341 U s 123 -182-183 (1951)
United Public W0rkers v --~1itcbell 330 U s 75 (1947)j Angilly - v
United States 199 F 2d 642) 644 (1950) cf NcAuliffe v rlew
Bedford 155 Mass 216 29 NE 517 (le9~) per Holmes J liThe
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but
he h(=l~s no constitltioi1al right to be a policezranu (Id at 220
29 NE at 5J7)
44 v1ie~sn _
v UpGegaff middot111 ~
3~middot4 u s 83 (1953) The Court ruleri as
contrry to due process the Cklahoma loyalty oath statute forshy
bidding IJ1l11ic emplo~rment of Persons who belonzea to certain
organizations regarciless of their knowledge of the character of
those oreenizations because of the indiscriminate classification
of lnnocent with kno~vilg activityll (d at 91)
~1 345 u S 83 (1953)middot
46 Id at 90
47 339 u s 3827 412 (1950) sustaininG the non-corJlIlunist affidavit
requirernelt of union leaders under the Taft -Hartley Act
~ Hoffman v United States 341 U s 179 (1951) suggests such
legislation if Congres3 concludes the lleed is great enough
See too Comment The Privilege Against Se1f-Llcriminetion Versus
Lmnurdty Z Proposed Statutes P 41 Gt~orgetom L J 511 (1953)
S Rept 153 on S 16 83d Cone 1st sess ~ 1 ald 2
April 17 1953 Report of Sel1a~~e Commttee on the JudiciaJ J
Interlocking S-lbversion in GOYf11llent Departments tl July 30
1953 83d Cong 1st sess p 50
~ HcfI1nan v Unitet States 341 u s 479 486 (1951)
50 Id U1ited States v ~isman 111 F 2d 260 262 (2 Cir 1950)
51 Note 61 Yale L J 105 109 (1952)
52 Rogers v United States 340 u s 367 375 (1951)
211 See e g Blau v Unjted StaIe~ 340 u s 159 (1950)
-shy54 Note J Co1t3resnic1al Inv estigat1ons--Self-Illcrimimtion Condemneshy
tiOll and Fair Hcar1ngll 22 U of Cinn L R 193 199-200 (1953)
55 See ~ovTn8end v ~~it~~ta~~3 95 F 2d 352 351 (DC Cir 1938)
cert denied 303 u S 664 (1938)
56 Byse TfA Report on the Pennsylvana Loyalty Act 101 U of Fa
L R 480 481-1~84 (1953) Wright Should Teachers Testify
Saturday Review Sept 2o 1953 p 23
57 See Meltzer Required Records The McCarran Act and The Privilege
Against Selfmiddotmiddot Incriminat ion ll 19 U of Chi L R 687 722 (1951)
y 83d Cong 1st Seas 1953 Also known as the Kefauver BUl
59 ~ v ltlalker 161 U S 591 (1896)
sect21 S 16 83d Cong 1st sess 1953 passed the Senate July 9 1953
after extensive debate Cong Ree 8646-8663 July 9 1953shy
S 16 amends B 3486 of Title 18 Sec 3486 presently furnishes
witnesses immunity from prosecution tor testimony before either
House or their Committees It appears to suffer from the same
deficiency present in a similar statute condemned in Counse~an v
Hitchcock 142 u s 547 (1892) S 16 is intended to StWP1y the
omission in the Hitchcock ease by providing not only that a
witness testimony may not be used against him but that such
witness shall be iImnune with respect to lIany transaction mtter
or thing concerning which he has been compelled to testIfy
sect 83d Congo 1st sess 1953
~ S Rept 153 83d Congo 1st sess p 2 (1953)
63 See Comment The Privi1ege Against Self-Incrimination Versus
Immunity Proposed statutes 41 Georgetown L J 511 523 (1953)
64 Supra footnote 7shy
sectif Delanel v ~ed States 199 F 2d 107 (1 Ci~ 1952)
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
is whether be can at the same time take the position that
to tell the truth about himself Vlould incriminate him and
that even so the President must appofnt him to a post of
honor and trust le have no hesitation in answering that
question No II There is no law which requires the Gove~~ent to sit supinely by
until the suspeoted eIlIployee has been convicted of disloyalty or other
similar misoonduct inconsistent with the interests of the national
security before it can sCPal~ate him from the Government service There
is no law which requires the Government to assume or endure such a risk
As was pointed out in an apt csae by the Supreme Court in American
Commtlnications v Douds speaking through the beloved late Chief
Justice Vinson
IfThat (first) amendment requires that one be permitted to
believe what he will It requires that one be permitted
to advocate what he will unless there is a clear and
present danger that a substantial public evil will result
therefrom It does not require that he be permitted to be
the keeper of the arsenal
I have not overlooked the fact that the loyalty and honesty of
the ovel~vhelming majority of all Government employeesmiddot is beyond quesshy
tion But their good reputations and character are far better proshy
tected from un1tfarranted criticism when we root out the few who are
unreliable and disloyal
What the critical situation of om time calls for is a lavr com
pt)lling testimony within the fr~neuro1Torl of the Constitution The tmshy
swer to this need is immuni-ty legislaiion which will be as broad as
the privilege W11ich is stJpplanted tV Then if a person is adjudged
ill cOlte~Pt for refusing to te3tify before a Cotgressional committee
he will know tZat t-le ~udgrnerJt of OOllt-empt will more likely stand up
on appeal free from oonstitutional ohal1enge
At the same time the l~w will also provide more adequate proshy
tection for the wit~ss
At presnt the witne31l is in a rtboxtl so to slJeGk The witness
is not exc~ed from an3werL~g merely because he believes his answers
Vlil1 incriminate him His slly-ao does not of its(gt~r establish the
1amphazeId of ilcriIltination II ~~ere he olaims his privil~ge it is
the ftL1ction of the jcge to dets-rmme whether the siJence of t1e
witness is justified or wha~1er the danger to be apprebenced is too
remote to be sl1bstattial To save himself from being held in conshy
tempt tl1e witness may oftcn be cOJIpEtled to disclos3 til0ne very
facts whtrh he claims are privileged iQ
Witnesses are alao aided by a b~oad immunity statute in still
another way Under our la unlike that of England t a disclosure of
any incriminating fact constitutes a wailer of the privilege as to deshy
tails con~erning that fact 211 Having made a partial disclosure of
faots the witness loses the rig~t to cease answering intel~ogat1ons
and rely upon his privilege at a 1ater point in his testimony
In one oase the detendant rree~ disclosed that she was Treasshy
urer of the Communist Pariy in COlorado and testified that she had
given the books ot the party to another person When asked to dishy
wlge the name ot the lamiddottter she refused upon the ground that the
answer might incriminate her mder the Sm1tb Act Atfirming her
conviction for contempt the Supreme Court speaking through Chief
Justice Vinson said
Since the privilege agatnlt salf-inorimination
presupposes a real danger ot legal detriment arising
from the disolosure petitioner cannot invoke the
privilege where response to the specific question in
issue here would not ftUtther inoriminate her O1aolo
sure of e tact waives the privilege as to details pound
This deoision leaves the law in a rather anomolous position tor the
vlitness A witness who refuses to answer aU questions and fails to Wcooperate to any extent may be protected by the claim of privilege
But there is no equal protection atforded by the decisions to the
witness who commences to eooperate but stops at a point where further
disclosure may tncrim1~ate him
Moreover it the witness refuses to answer on the ground that
Congress has exceeded its powers or that the inQuiry in lacking in
pertinency he construas the law at his peril If mistake8 his good 55
faith error of law constitutes no defense to fine and imprisonment
Then again it is claimed DY some that a persons election to
remain silent upon the ground of privilege does not necessarily mean
he has anything sinister to hide There are undoubtedly some people of
sincere principle who refl1se to disclose 1flformat1oft to authorized
1nvestigating authorities because of their feeling that ao one has any
right to 1~quire about their beliefs even if germane to the inquiry at 56
bsnd- There are other persons who refuse to answer because they feel
their recollections of events lons past are fee~le and that falsehood
even on trivial or irrelevant matters may subject them to a charge of
perjury There are still others less innocent vho say that coercing
them to testify under pain of contempt resembles the Soviet tactic of
requiring those SUilty not only to pay for but also to prcclatD their 57
guilt shy
~he use of broad tmmunity statutes serves to remove the dansers
mentioned for the iDPocent a~d operates aa an incentive for the guilty
to tell the truth
There are already two proposals pendin8 in Congress which seek to
compel the answer by witnesses at questioDs put to them before Conshy
gressiOl1al Committees grand juries or courts In exchange tor this
compulsory testimony the Witnesses will obtain complete immunity froa
prosecution
58 One Bill is s~ 565 This proposal grants immunity to ~itnesses
before a grand Jury or court of the United States when in the disshy
cretion of th~ Attorney General it is necessary to do so in the public
interest In exchange for this immunity the witness is compelled to
testify and to produce his books papers or recoIds s 565 uses
broad immunity lengtase in stating that the witness shall not be
prosecuted on account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he 1s compelled after ela~ing his privilege to testify or
produce evidence
In this respect s 565 is almost ident1cal to the immunity proshy59
vision sustained 8S valid by the Supreme Court e~ far back as 1896-
This Bill does not extend the immunity to witnesses before Congressional
Committees 601 61
There are other Bills pend-ing S 16- middot and H R 27371 with equally
broad immunity authority The Senate has passed its Bill but the House
Bill still awaits action Both these Bills grunt immunity to witnesses
before Congressional Committees but not to witnesses before grand
juries or courts
The proposed Bills are worded so that the witness will not get an
immunity bathU merely by testifying He must first raise specifically
his claim for privilege and thus put the Committee on notice whether
for the greater good the witness should be required to testify and 62
given immunity or whether he should be excused from testlfying-
However the discretionary power to grant the immunity is not vested
in the Attorney General bumiddott lies with the body conducting the investigation
If the proceeding is one before one of the Houses of Congress then
a majority vote of the members present is necessary Under S 16
if it is a proceeding before a committee two thirds of the members
must vote to grant the tmmunity In that event the tvothirds vote
must include at least two members of each of the two political parties
having the largest representation on such committee The House Bill
does not provide for notice to the Attorney General of the proposed
grant of immunity The Senate Bill provides for one weeks notice to
the Attorney General of the proposal but if the latter fails or reshy
fuses to assent to grant of immunity it may be conferred by majority
vote of either House It is hoped that this legislation will only be
resorted to where full diseloaure by witnesses is deemed of greater
tmportance than the possibility of punishing them for past offenses
By permitting one or several criminals to escape prosecution the
larger public peril contained in a gang of criminals or in their
leaders may be uncovered and the guilty brought to justice
The legislative proposals mentioned have much to commend them
In my opinion these bills would better achieve their purposes it they
required the concurrence of the Attorney General 1n the granting of any
immunity to a witness by a Joint Congressional Committee or either Heuse
committee or by Congress The Attorney General 1s the chief legal
officer of the Government of the United States As Buch it 1s his
responsibility to prosecute persons who offend the criminal laws of the
United states This responsibility must be coupled w1th adequate
authority to permit its discharge It would seem to be more advisable
for the Attorney General who has immediate knowledge of a criminals
background and propensities to decide whether immunity should be
granted for such a person To allow the Attorney General to participate
in the ultimate decision aa to whether immunity should be granted would
not impair Congressional investigatIons in the fields of internal
security crime and corruption Nor would it discourage witnesses
from providing information of importance to the investigation if the
Attorney Generals permission vas required before immunity was granted
On the other hand if these Bills were enacted in their present
form they might subject members of Congress to undue pressures for
granting immunity to criminals who are ineligible to receive it Also
they cuuld very easily cause embarrassment to Congress by tmped1ng or
blocking prosecutions planned by the Department of Justice on any matter 63
even incidentally testified to upon these 1nvestigations
The unfortunate experience which Congress had as far back as 1857 64
in granting immunity without concurrence of the Attorney General - should
~each that a similar course of action may be marked by eveD greater
failure today_ The witness might readily turn this division of authority
between Congress and the Department of Justice to his advantage by
obtaining an ~unity from the legislative committee or from Congress
over the objection of the Attorney General Thereafter he would be
free to testify concerning a broad area Of activities without fear that
he could be held to account criminally for other violations however
unrelated to the matter under investigation
Thus for example a Congreas1onal Committee or Congress might
furnish immunity to a person to obtain his testimony about his illicit
traffic in slot machine opercltlons between states This person may also
be guilty either of espionage or subversion or of selling narcotics to
youngs cers as to which an indictment is soon to be obtained To foreshy
close prosecution on these more serious crimes the witness would be
glad to volunteer information on his other activities if he knew in
advance that immunity would fallow for all of them Therefore greatest
care must be exercioed in granting immunity and then only upon a fully
informed judgment of all tle facts The Departlnent of Justice would
of course through the Fe~eral Bureau of Investigation the Crtmlnal
and Tax Divisions and the United states Attorneyo I offices be mosmiddott
likely to know the facts and the plans for prosecution Concurrence
by the Attorney General in conferring the immunity would also enable
the Department of Justice to maintuin its responsibility for the proper
administration of the crlminal law
The provision in S 10 for one weeks notice to the Attorney General
of the proposed grant of immunity does not fully cure this Bill of its
weakness in failing to require his affirmative concurrence in every
case Experience indicates that at times the views of the person who
1s charged with prooecut1ng criminals are disregarded by Congressional
Committees For example the successful criminal conviction obtained
by the Department of Justice ot the internal revenue collector in one of
the largest cities was recently nullified because of the action of a
House Committee in holding 1middotr1dely publicized hearings in the district in
65 which the trial subsequently took place These hearings took place
over the strong objection of the Department of Justice thut the pro
posed hearing would be of prejudice to the defendant on the trial
which was about to be initiated and would injure the Governments case
in disclosing its evidence In reversing the convlct1on l Chief Judge
Magruder observed that the character of the defendant was blackened
and discredited as the day of trial approached because of the publicity
invited and stimulated by the Committee over the radio and television
Thu6 1 mere advance notIfication to the Attorney General of a proposed
grant of tmmunity would never be a guarantee that the Committee would
be guided by the views of the Attorney General
S 16 and H R 2737 would also more readily carry out the aim of
obtaining evidence against leaders of subversion and criminal entershy
prisesj if provision for twmunity were granted to obtain testimony
not only before Congressional Committees but likewise before courts
and grand juries
For these reasons it is my opinion that if any measure is to be
enacted~~rmitting the granting of immunity to witnesses before either
House of Congress or its committees it should vest the Attorney General
or the Attorney General acting with the concurren~e of appropriate members
of Congress with the authority to grant such tmmunity and if the test shy
mony is sought for a court or grand jury that the Attorney General alone
be authorized to grant the ilmnunity
There remain for discussion two principal objections to this proshy
posed legislation which may be briefly considered here One objection
1s that when a witneAS is compelled to testify even under the protecshy
tion of immunity from criminal punihment) he is not relieved from
personal disgrace ~~lhich attach~8 to the exposure of his crime The
answer to this objection ia contained in II land mark decision of the 66
Supreme Court in Brown v Wrtlker
The design of tbe constitutional plivilege is not to aid the
witness in vindicating his character but to protect him
against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict him
of a criminal charge If he secure legal jnmllnity from prose-
cution the possible impairment of his good name is a penalty
which it is reasonable b0 should be compelled to pay for the
common good
The reasoning of this decision has never been qU~Gtioned and has 67
only recently been approved by the Sllpreme Court
The other chief objection to the proposed legislation is that while
a witness may receive itmlunity from federal prosecution) he may still
be subject to IJrosecution under ~tate lavl The Supreme Court has held
that this is not a valid objection to federal immunity laws~ since the
self-incrimination clause ln the Fifth Amendment operates ao a l1mitashy68
tion on the federal government only In United states v Murdock the
defendant was indicted for refUSing to answer questions of a revenue
agent relating to ctrt8 in income tax returns The refusal was ba sed on
the plea that hiD answers might 1ncrim1nate him in a state court The
Court said on this point
This court ha~ held that immunity against state prosecution is
not essential to the validity of federal statutes declaring that
a witnes3 shall not be excllpoundied from gtring evidence on the
ground that it vTill incriminate him and also that the ladt of
state power to give witnesses protection against federal
prosecution does not defeat a state immunity statute
Similarly a witness befo~e a state tribunal CBnnot refuse to 69
answer because of the threat of federal prosecution - However the
Federal District Court in Ohio recently held i1 Unted States v 70
Di Carlo that the defendant had the right to assert his privilege
because of possible prosecution under state law since the Senate
committee was authorized to investigate violations not only of the lawe 71
of the United States but also of the states M_ The Murdock case was
dtstingJished urlon the ground that the danger of state posecution 1n
that case was remote and uncertain thile in the Di Carlo case the
danger of state proaecutjon WilS imminent and real 72
The ---Di Carlo case has been received -lith mixed commelt It has73
not been followed so far as we k~ow- It appears to be contrary to deshy
cis10ns of co~~rts of appeals which have consistently adhered to the prinshy74
ciples of the Murdock case- In my opinion this decision of a district
court aoes not detract from the binding effect ofthe Supreme Courts deshy
eision in the Murdock case
The Department of Justice will recommend to the Congress in Jlouary
an immunity bill of the type I have descri-ced which protects the const1shy
tutional privileges ot witnesses before Congressional Committees courts
and juries but will at the some time aid materially in stamping out
criminal and subversive activities
Footnote Referet~es to Ad~res El~ited ~------ ___bull
Immunity From Prcsecuticn
Versus
Privilege Agaiust Self-Incrimination
Pittman liThe Colonial and Constitutional History of the
Privilege Against Sel-Incrimiootion 1n Amcicaff 21 Va
L R 763 764 770-773 (1935) Corwin The Supreme
Court I S Corctl~ction of the Self Incrirnination C1ause lf
29 lId~h L R 1 512 (1930) Ap~licability of
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to Legjslative
y Pittmenf2 at 774
~ ~ining v ~~8ey 211 U S 78 92 (1908)
L Id at 91
~ 34th Ceng 3d sess Globe PI 427 433 1-45 See
Eberling Constitutional Investigations pp 304-315shy
7 Eberling d at 320-323
~I 142 U s 547 (1892) This Act of 1862 revised an old
statute into two new sections by an amendment which
sought to insure that a witness who testified before
a federal grand jt~ or court (R s I 860 (1875raquo or
a Congressional Committee (R S B 859 (1875raquo would
not be later subjected to the use of his testimony in
any criminal proceeding aGainst him Section ~ 860 of
the amendment dealing with grand jurtes and courts came
under attack in Counselman v Hitchcock J supra and was
held to be invalid Since this part of the immunity proshy
vision tailed to accomplish ita purpose Congress repealed
it in 1910 (36 Stat 352 (19l0raquo) Congress apparently felt
that S 859 applying to Congressional Committees was still
of value and left it 1n force to this date (a s I 859
(1875) as amended 52 Stat 943 (1938) 18 usc e3486
(Supp V 1952)j see liThe Privilege Against Self
Incrimination versus Immunity Proposed Statutes 41
Georgetown L J 511 514 (1953) United States v ~
339 U s 323 335-337 (1950)
21 It read in patt as follows
No person shall be prosecuted for or on
account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he may testify or produce evidence
Act of Feb 11 1893 c 83 27 stat 443 49 USCA
I 46 See too ~ v United States 337 u S 137 146shy
147 (1949)middot Notet Denying -the Privilege against Self
Incrimination to Public Officers 64 Barv L R 987
988 (1951)
- 101 161 U s 591 (1896)
Shapiro v United St~~ 335 U S 1 6-7 (1948) where various
statutes are collated in the footnote The customary provision
in these statutes provides as follows No person shall be
excused from complying with any requirements ot this section
because of his privilege aga1nst self-incriminationgt but the
immunity provisions of the COmptuBory Testimony Act of
February 11 1893 shall apply with respect to allY 1nd1shy
vidual who specifically claims such pr1Y11ege tt
12 Rapacz ULimiting the Plea of Self-Incr1m1nat1ontl 20 Georgetown
L J 329 353 (1932) see footnote 3 of ~ v Connect~
302 U s 319 326 (1937) NPte liThe Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination the Doctr1ne of Waiver 61 Yale L J 104 110
(1952) middot
~f Palko v Connecticut 302 U s 319 326 (1937)
~ See dissents of Mr Justices Shiras Gray and White in ~ V4
Walker supra 161 U s 630638 Cf dissent of Mr Justice
Black in Ro~ers v United States 340 U s 367 376 (1950)
15 Potts Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for ContemptU I
74 U of Pa L R 691 780 (1926) L1acos uRights of Witnesses
Before Congressional Committees 33 Boston U L R 337 340
(1953) middot
t6 Liacos Id at 31tl
17 McGeary rlThe DeTelopmen-cs of Congressional Investigative Power ll
p 23 (1940) McGrain v Daughel~l 273 u s 135 (1927)
18 Sinclair v Unfted States~ 279 U s 263 (1929) ~arsba11 v
Unit~~State~ 176 F 2d 473 (nc Cir 1949) 2 Usc ~ 192
(Supp 1950)
19 Ne York City Bar Ass t n Committee on the Bill of Rights Report
on Congressional Committees presented December 14 1948 p 1
gQi Galloway PCong18ss1onal Investigations Proposed Reforms lt
18 U of Chi L R 478 479-481 (1951)
21 Dilliard lICongress1onal Investigations The Role of the Press
18 U of ChL L R 585 J 587 (1951)
22 Edgerton J dissenting in Barsky v United States 167 F 2d
241 252 (nc eir 1948) cert denied 334 U s 843 (1948)
petition for rehearing denied 339 U S 971 (1951)
~3 De Jonge v Oregon 299 U s 353 364 365 (1937)
24 Id
25 6 Richardson lIMes sOges and Papers of the Pres idents t 1 p 23
July 4 1861
26 See United St~~ v ~~phson 165 F 2d 82 (2 Cir 1947)
cert denied 333 u S 838 (1948) Lawson v United states
176 F 2d 49 (nc Cir 1949) cel~ denied 339 u s 934
(1950) Barsty Y ~ited S~ 167 F 2d 241 (DC eir
1948) cert denied 334 u s 843 (1948) MCGrain v Daugherty
273 u s 135 (1927) and cf Rumely v United States J 197
F 2d 166 (DC eir 1952) affd 73 s ct 543 (1953)
JJ B1a~ v ~~ted Sttlt~s 340 u s 159 (1950-)
gsectJ ~~ v United States 31~1 U s 479 (1951) See too
sectingleton v United States 343 U s 944 (1952) Note Recent
Extensions of the Witness Privilege Against Self-Incrim1nationll
53 Col L R 275 (1953)
29 Aiuppa v Un1tc~ states 201 F 2d 287 300 (6 eir 1952)
_I30 Note nMandatory Dismissal of Public Persol1nel and The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination 101 U ot Pa L R 1190 1191
fn 8 (1953)
31 Brown Be Fassett Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar
20 u or Chi L R 480 483 (1953)
32 Garner v Los Angeles Board) 341 u s 716 (1951) Gerende v
Board of Supervisors 341 U s 56 (1951) but com~are Wieman v
Updegraff 341~ U s 83 (1953)
34 See footnote 32
35 PG~ v Boa-roo of Education 31~2 U s 435 (1951)
ID Id at 493
38 Sec 9(h of lihe LalJor Management Rlations Act of 1947 29 USCA
St1Pp III Sec 141 Sec 159(b)
39 ft~rican C~~catons Association v ~uda 339 u S 382 (1950)
sustaining the validity of Sec 9(h) against the challenge that it
violated the First c-lT~nc1tlCiltl Ex Post FtiCto Lals and other iul1dashy
mental rights
40 Executive Order No 10450 issued Aporil zr 1953 (18 F R 2lt89)
41 Executive Orrler No 10491 issued Ocmiddottober 13 1953 (18 F R 6583)
~ Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary Interlocking Subshy
vcrs ion in Covernmcnt De~rtments II 83d Cong 1st ses5 Juy 30 J
1953 p 21 Being a cOImllunist is not a crime under federal law J
although it is in some states (see Liacos supra note 15 at
375) The Smith Act (18 USC Sec 2385 et seq) mkes advoshy
eating or teaching the violent overthrOf of any goverrment of the
United States or being a member of such a group and kno7ing its
purpose~a federal crime
43 See EaSley v F~cbardsonJ 182 F 2d 46 (DC 1950)J affd by an
evenly diiied court 341 TJ s 918 (1951) 1Etshingto v McGrath
182 F 2d 375 (DC 1950) aff1d 341 U s 923 (1951)j Or~~ v
vIil1ougbby 345 U s 83 91 (1953) Mr Justice Douglas concurring
i~ ~tiFascist Commi~~ v ~~EJ 341 U s 123 -182-183 (1951)
United Public W0rkers v --~1itcbell 330 U s 75 (1947)j Angilly - v
United States 199 F 2d 642) 644 (1950) cf NcAuliffe v rlew
Bedford 155 Mass 216 29 NE 517 (le9~) per Holmes J liThe
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but
he h(=l~s no constitltioi1al right to be a policezranu (Id at 220
29 NE at 5J7)
44 v1ie~sn _
v UpGegaff middot111 ~
3~middot4 u s 83 (1953) The Court ruleri as
contrry to due process the Cklahoma loyalty oath statute forshy
bidding IJ1l11ic emplo~rment of Persons who belonzea to certain
organizations regarciless of their knowledge of the character of
those oreenizations because of the indiscriminate classification
of lnnocent with kno~vilg activityll (d at 91)
~1 345 u S 83 (1953)middot
46 Id at 90
47 339 u s 3827 412 (1950) sustaininG the non-corJlIlunist affidavit
requirernelt of union leaders under the Taft -Hartley Act
~ Hoffman v United States 341 U s 179 (1951) suggests such
legislation if Congres3 concludes the lleed is great enough
See too Comment The Privilege Against Se1f-Llcriminetion Versus
Lmnurdty Z Proposed Statutes P 41 Gt~orgetom L J 511 (1953)
S Rept 153 on S 16 83d Cone 1st sess ~ 1 ald 2
April 17 1953 Report of Sel1a~~e Commttee on the JudiciaJ J
Interlocking S-lbversion in GOYf11llent Departments tl July 30
1953 83d Cong 1st sess p 50
~ HcfI1nan v Unitet States 341 u s 479 486 (1951)
50 Id U1ited States v ~isman 111 F 2d 260 262 (2 Cir 1950)
51 Note 61 Yale L J 105 109 (1952)
52 Rogers v United States 340 u s 367 375 (1951)
211 See e g Blau v Unjted StaIe~ 340 u s 159 (1950)
-shy54 Note J Co1t3resnic1al Inv estigat1ons--Self-Illcrimimtion Condemneshy
tiOll and Fair Hcar1ngll 22 U of Cinn L R 193 199-200 (1953)
55 See ~ovTn8end v ~~it~~ta~~3 95 F 2d 352 351 (DC Cir 1938)
cert denied 303 u S 664 (1938)
56 Byse TfA Report on the Pennsylvana Loyalty Act 101 U of Fa
L R 480 481-1~84 (1953) Wright Should Teachers Testify
Saturday Review Sept 2o 1953 p 23
57 See Meltzer Required Records The McCarran Act and The Privilege
Against Selfmiddotmiddot Incriminat ion ll 19 U of Chi L R 687 722 (1951)
y 83d Cong 1st Seas 1953 Also known as the Kefauver BUl
59 ~ v ltlalker 161 U S 591 (1896)
sect21 S 16 83d Cong 1st sess 1953 passed the Senate July 9 1953
after extensive debate Cong Ree 8646-8663 July 9 1953shy
S 16 amends B 3486 of Title 18 Sec 3486 presently furnishes
witnesses immunity from prosecution tor testimony before either
House or their Committees It appears to suffer from the same
deficiency present in a similar statute condemned in Counse~an v
Hitchcock 142 u s 547 (1892) S 16 is intended to StWP1y the
omission in the Hitchcock ease by providing not only that a
witness testimony may not be used against him but that such
witness shall be iImnune with respect to lIany transaction mtter
or thing concerning which he has been compelled to testIfy
sect 83d Congo 1st sess 1953
~ S Rept 153 83d Congo 1st sess p 2 (1953)
63 See Comment The Privi1ege Against Self-Incrimination Versus
Immunity Proposed statutes 41 Georgetown L J 511 523 (1953)
64 Supra footnote 7shy
sectif Delanel v ~ed States 199 F 2d 107 (1 Ci~ 1952)
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
What the critical situation of om time calls for is a lavr com
pt)lling testimony within the fr~neuro1Torl of the Constitution The tmshy
swer to this need is immuni-ty legislaiion which will be as broad as
the privilege W11ich is stJpplanted tV Then if a person is adjudged
ill cOlte~Pt for refusing to te3tify before a Cotgressional committee
he will know tZat t-le ~udgrnerJt of OOllt-empt will more likely stand up
on appeal free from oonstitutional ohal1enge
At the same time the l~w will also provide more adequate proshy
tection for the wit~ss
At presnt the witne31l is in a rtboxtl so to slJeGk The witness
is not exc~ed from an3werL~g merely because he believes his answers
Vlil1 incriminate him His slly-ao does not of its(gt~r establish the
1amphazeId of ilcriIltination II ~~ere he olaims his privil~ge it is
the ftL1ction of the jcge to dets-rmme whether the siJence of t1e
witness is justified or wha~1er the danger to be apprebenced is too
remote to be sl1bstattial To save himself from being held in conshy
tempt tl1e witness may oftcn be cOJIpEtled to disclos3 til0ne very
facts whtrh he claims are privileged iQ
Witnesses are alao aided by a b~oad immunity statute in still
another way Under our la unlike that of England t a disclosure of
any incriminating fact constitutes a wailer of the privilege as to deshy
tails con~erning that fact 211 Having made a partial disclosure of
faots the witness loses the rig~t to cease answering intel~ogat1ons
and rely upon his privilege at a 1ater point in his testimony
In one oase the detendant rree~ disclosed that she was Treasshy
urer of the Communist Pariy in COlorado and testified that she had
given the books ot the party to another person When asked to dishy
wlge the name ot the lamiddottter she refused upon the ground that the
answer might incriminate her mder the Sm1tb Act Atfirming her
conviction for contempt the Supreme Court speaking through Chief
Justice Vinson said
Since the privilege agatnlt salf-inorimination
presupposes a real danger ot legal detriment arising
from the disolosure petitioner cannot invoke the
privilege where response to the specific question in
issue here would not ftUtther inoriminate her O1aolo
sure of e tact waives the privilege as to details pound
This deoision leaves the law in a rather anomolous position tor the
vlitness A witness who refuses to answer aU questions and fails to Wcooperate to any extent may be protected by the claim of privilege
But there is no equal protection atforded by the decisions to the
witness who commences to eooperate but stops at a point where further
disclosure may tncrim1~ate him
Moreover it the witness refuses to answer on the ground that
Congress has exceeded its powers or that the inQuiry in lacking in
pertinency he construas the law at his peril If mistake8 his good 55
faith error of law constitutes no defense to fine and imprisonment
Then again it is claimed DY some that a persons election to
remain silent upon the ground of privilege does not necessarily mean
he has anything sinister to hide There are undoubtedly some people of
sincere principle who refl1se to disclose 1flformat1oft to authorized
1nvestigating authorities because of their feeling that ao one has any
right to 1~quire about their beliefs even if germane to the inquiry at 56
bsnd- There are other persons who refuse to answer because they feel
their recollections of events lons past are fee~le and that falsehood
even on trivial or irrelevant matters may subject them to a charge of
perjury There are still others less innocent vho say that coercing
them to testify under pain of contempt resembles the Soviet tactic of
requiring those SUilty not only to pay for but also to prcclatD their 57
guilt shy
~he use of broad tmmunity statutes serves to remove the dansers
mentioned for the iDPocent a~d operates aa an incentive for the guilty
to tell the truth
There are already two proposals pendin8 in Congress which seek to
compel the answer by witnesses at questioDs put to them before Conshy
gressiOl1al Committees grand juries or courts In exchange tor this
compulsory testimony the Witnesses will obtain complete immunity froa
prosecution
58 One Bill is s~ 565 This proposal grants immunity to ~itnesses
before a grand Jury or court of the United States when in the disshy
cretion of th~ Attorney General it is necessary to do so in the public
interest In exchange for this immunity the witness is compelled to
testify and to produce his books papers or recoIds s 565 uses
broad immunity lengtase in stating that the witness shall not be
prosecuted on account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he 1s compelled after ela~ing his privilege to testify or
produce evidence
In this respect s 565 is almost ident1cal to the immunity proshy59
vision sustained 8S valid by the Supreme Court e~ far back as 1896-
This Bill does not extend the immunity to witnesses before Congressional
Committees 601 61
There are other Bills pend-ing S 16- middot and H R 27371 with equally
broad immunity authority The Senate has passed its Bill but the House
Bill still awaits action Both these Bills grunt immunity to witnesses
before Congressional Committees but not to witnesses before grand
juries or courts
The proposed Bills are worded so that the witness will not get an
immunity bathU merely by testifying He must first raise specifically
his claim for privilege and thus put the Committee on notice whether
for the greater good the witness should be required to testify and 62
given immunity or whether he should be excused from testlfying-
However the discretionary power to grant the immunity is not vested
in the Attorney General bumiddott lies with the body conducting the investigation
If the proceeding is one before one of the Houses of Congress then
a majority vote of the members present is necessary Under S 16
if it is a proceeding before a committee two thirds of the members
must vote to grant the tmmunity In that event the tvothirds vote
must include at least two members of each of the two political parties
having the largest representation on such committee The House Bill
does not provide for notice to the Attorney General of the proposed
grant of immunity The Senate Bill provides for one weeks notice to
the Attorney General of the proposal but if the latter fails or reshy
fuses to assent to grant of immunity it may be conferred by majority
vote of either House It is hoped that this legislation will only be
resorted to where full diseloaure by witnesses is deemed of greater
tmportance than the possibility of punishing them for past offenses
By permitting one or several criminals to escape prosecution the
larger public peril contained in a gang of criminals or in their
leaders may be uncovered and the guilty brought to justice
The legislative proposals mentioned have much to commend them
In my opinion these bills would better achieve their purposes it they
required the concurrence of the Attorney General 1n the granting of any
immunity to a witness by a Joint Congressional Committee or either Heuse
committee or by Congress The Attorney General 1s the chief legal
officer of the Government of the United States As Buch it 1s his
responsibility to prosecute persons who offend the criminal laws of the
United states This responsibility must be coupled w1th adequate
authority to permit its discharge It would seem to be more advisable
for the Attorney General who has immediate knowledge of a criminals
background and propensities to decide whether immunity should be
granted for such a person To allow the Attorney General to participate
in the ultimate decision aa to whether immunity should be granted would
not impair Congressional investigatIons in the fields of internal
security crime and corruption Nor would it discourage witnesses
from providing information of importance to the investigation if the
Attorney Generals permission vas required before immunity was granted
On the other hand if these Bills were enacted in their present
form they might subject members of Congress to undue pressures for
granting immunity to criminals who are ineligible to receive it Also
they cuuld very easily cause embarrassment to Congress by tmped1ng or
blocking prosecutions planned by the Department of Justice on any matter 63
even incidentally testified to upon these 1nvestigations
The unfortunate experience which Congress had as far back as 1857 64
in granting immunity without concurrence of the Attorney General - should
~each that a similar course of action may be marked by eveD greater
failure today_ The witness might readily turn this division of authority
between Congress and the Department of Justice to his advantage by
obtaining an ~unity from the legislative committee or from Congress
over the objection of the Attorney General Thereafter he would be
free to testify concerning a broad area Of activities without fear that
he could be held to account criminally for other violations however
unrelated to the matter under investigation
Thus for example a Congreas1onal Committee or Congress might
furnish immunity to a person to obtain his testimony about his illicit
traffic in slot machine opercltlons between states This person may also
be guilty either of espionage or subversion or of selling narcotics to
youngs cers as to which an indictment is soon to be obtained To foreshy
close prosecution on these more serious crimes the witness would be
glad to volunteer information on his other activities if he knew in
advance that immunity would fallow for all of them Therefore greatest
care must be exercioed in granting immunity and then only upon a fully
informed judgment of all tle facts The Departlnent of Justice would
of course through the Fe~eral Bureau of Investigation the Crtmlnal
and Tax Divisions and the United states Attorneyo I offices be mosmiddott
likely to know the facts and the plans for prosecution Concurrence
by the Attorney General in conferring the immunity would also enable
the Department of Justice to maintuin its responsibility for the proper
administration of the crlminal law
The provision in S 10 for one weeks notice to the Attorney General
of the proposed grant of immunity does not fully cure this Bill of its
weakness in failing to require his affirmative concurrence in every
case Experience indicates that at times the views of the person who
1s charged with prooecut1ng criminals are disregarded by Congressional
Committees For example the successful criminal conviction obtained
by the Department of Justice ot the internal revenue collector in one of
the largest cities was recently nullified because of the action of a
House Committee in holding 1middotr1dely publicized hearings in the district in
65 which the trial subsequently took place These hearings took place
over the strong objection of the Department of Justice thut the pro
posed hearing would be of prejudice to the defendant on the trial
which was about to be initiated and would injure the Governments case
in disclosing its evidence In reversing the convlct1on l Chief Judge
Magruder observed that the character of the defendant was blackened
and discredited as the day of trial approached because of the publicity
invited and stimulated by the Committee over the radio and television
Thu6 1 mere advance notIfication to the Attorney General of a proposed
grant of tmmunity would never be a guarantee that the Committee would
be guided by the views of the Attorney General
S 16 and H R 2737 would also more readily carry out the aim of
obtaining evidence against leaders of subversion and criminal entershy
prisesj if provision for twmunity were granted to obtain testimony
not only before Congressional Committees but likewise before courts
and grand juries
For these reasons it is my opinion that if any measure is to be
enacted~~rmitting the granting of immunity to witnesses before either
House of Congress or its committees it should vest the Attorney General
or the Attorney General acting with the concurren~e of appropriate members
of Congress with the authority to grant such tmmunity and if the test shy
mony is sought for a court or grand jury that the Attorney General alone
be authorized to grant the ilmnunity
There remain for discussion two principal objections to this proshy
posed legislation which may be briefly considered here One objection
1s that when a witneAS is compelled to testify even under the protecshy
tion of immunity from criminal punihment) he is not relieved from
personal disgrace ~~lhich attach~8 to the exposure of his crime The
answer to this objection ia contained in II land mark decision of the 66
Supreme Court in Brown v Wrtlker
The design of tbe constitutional plivilege is not to aid the
witness in vindicating his character but to protect him
against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict him
of a criminal charge If he secure legal jnmllnity from prose-
cution the possible impairment of his good name is a penalty
which it is reasonable b0 should be compelled to pay for the
common good
The reasoning of this decision has never been qU~Gtioned and has 67
only recently been approved by the Sllpreme Court
The other chief objection to the proposed legislation is that while
a witness may receive itmlunity from federal prosecution) he may still
be subject to IJrosecution under ~tate lavl The Supreme Court has held
that this is not a valid objection to federal immunity laws~ since the
self-incrimination clause ln the Fifth Amendment operates ao a l1mitashy68
tion on the federal government only In United states v Murdock the
defendant was indicted for refUSing to answer questions of a revenue
agent relating to ctrt8 in income tax returns The refusal was ba sed on
the plea that hiD answers might 1ncrim1nate him in a state court The
Court said on this point
This court ha~ held that immunity against state prosecution is
not essential to the validity of federal statutes declaring that
a witnes3 shall not be excllpoundied from gtring evidence on the
ground that it vTill incriminate him and also that the ladt of
state power to give witnesses protection against federal
prosecution does not defeat a state immunity statute
Similarly a witness befo~e a state tribunal CBnnot refuse to 69
answer because of the threat of federal prosecution - However the
Federal District Court in Ohio recently held i1 Unted States v 70
Di Carlo that the defendant had the right to assert his privilege
because of possible prosecution under state law since the Senate
committee was authorized to investigate violations not only of the lawe 71
of the United States but also of the states M_ The Murdock case was
dtstingJished urlon the ground that the danger of state posecution 1n
that case was remote and uncertain thile in the Di Carlo case the
danger of state proaecutjon WilS imminent and real 72
The ---Di Carlo case has been received -lith mixed commelt It has73
not been followed so far as we k~ow- It appears to be contrary to deshy
cis10ns of co~~rts of appeals which have consistently adhered to the prinshy74
ciples of the Murdock case- In my opinion this decision of a district
court aoes not detract from the binding effect ofthe Supreme Courts deshy
eision in the Murdock case
The Department of Justice will recommend to the Congress in Jlouary
an immunity bill of the type I have descri-ced which protects the const1shy
tutional privileges ot witnesses before Congressional Committees courts
and juries but will at the some time aid materially in stamping out
criminal and subversive activities
Footnote Referet~es to Ad~res El~ited ~------ ___bull
Immunity From Prcsecuticn
Versus
Privilege Agaiust Self-Incrimination
Pittman liThe Colonial and Constitutional History of the
Privilege Against Sel-Incrimiootion 1n Amcicaff 21 Va
L R 763 764 770-773 (1935) Corwin The Supreme
Court I S Corctl~ction of the Self Incrirnination C1ause lf
29 lId~h L R 1 512 (1930) Ap~licability of
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to Legjslative
y Pittmenf2 at 774
~ ~ining v ~~8ey 211 U S 78 92 (1908)
L Id at 91
~ 34th Ceng 3d sess Globe PI 427 433 1-45 See
Eberling Constitutional Investigations pp 304-315shy
7 Eberling d at 320-323
~I 142 U s 547 (1892) This Act of 1862 revised an old
statute into two new sections by an amendment which
sought to insure that a witness who testified before
a federal grand jt~ or court (R s I 860 (1875raquo or
a Congressional Committee (R S B 859 (1875raquo would
not be later subjected to the use of his testimony in
any criminal proceeding aGainst him Section ~ 860 of
the amendment dealing with grand jurtes and courts came
under attack in Counselman v Hitchcock J supra and was
held to be invalid Since this part of the immunity proshy
vision tailed to accomplish ita purpose Congress repealed
it in 1910 (36 Stat 352 (19l0raquo) Congress apparently felt
that S 859 applying to Congressional Committees was still
of value and left it 1n force to this date (a s I 859
(1875) as amended 52 Stat 943 (1938) 18 usc e3486
(Supp V 1952)j see liThe Privilege Against Self
Incrimination versus Immunity Proposed Statutes 41
Georgetown L J 511 514 (1953) United States v ~
339 U s 323 335-337 (1950)
21 It read in patt as follows
No person shall be prosecuted for or on
account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he may testify or produce evidence
Act of Feb 11 1893 c 83 27 stat 443 49 USCA
I 46 See too ~ v United States 337 u S 137 146shy
147 (1949)middot Notet Denying -the Privilege against Self
Incrimination to Public Officers 64 Barv L R 987
988 (1951)
- 101 161 U s 591 (1896)
Shapiro v United St~~ 335 U S 1 6-7 (1948) where various
statutes are collated in the footnote The customary provision
in these statutes provides as follows No person shall be
excused from complying with any requirements ot this section
because of his privilege aga1nst self-incriminationgt but the
immunity provisions of the COmptuBory Testimony Act of
February 11 1893 shall apply with respect to allY 1nd1shy
vidual who specifically claims such pr1Y11ege tt
12 Rapacz ULimiting the Plea of Self-Incr1m1nat1ontl 20 Georgetown
L J 329 353 (1932) see footnote 3 of ~ v Connect~
302 U s 319 326 (1937) NPte liThe Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination the Doctr1ne of Waiver 61 Yale L J 104 110
(1952) middot
~f Palko v Connecticut 302 U s 319 326 (1937)
~ See dissents of Mr Justices Shiras Gray and White in ~ V4
Walker supra 161 U s 630638 Cf dissent of Mr Justice
Black in Ro~ers v United States 340 U s 367 376 (1950)
15 Potts Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for ContemptU I
74 U of Pa L R 691 780 (1926) L1acos uRights of Witnesses
Before Congressional Committees 33 Boston U L R 337 340
(1953) middot
t6 Liacos Id at 31tl
17 McGeary rlThe DeTelopmen-cs of Congressional Investigative Power ll
p 23 (1940) McGrain v Daughel~l 273 u s 135 (1927)
18 Sinclair v Unfted States~ 279 U s 263 (1929) ~arsba11 v
Unit~~State~ 176 F 2d 473 (nc Cir 1949) 2 Usc ~ 192
(Supp 1950)
19 Ne York City Bar Ass t n Committee on the Bill of Rights Report
on Congressional Committees presented December 14 1948 p 1
gQi Galloway PCong18ss1onal Investigations Proposed Reforms lt
18 U of Chi L R 478 479-481 (1951)
21 Dilliard lICongress1onal Investigations The Role of the Press
18 U of ChL L R 585 J 587 (1951)
22 Edgerton J dissenting in Barsky v United States 167 F 2d
241 252 (nc eir 1948) cert denied 334 U s 843 (1948)
petition for rehearing denied 339 U S 971 (1951)
~3 De Jonge v Oregon 299 U s 353 364 365 (1937)
24 Id
25 6 Richardson lIMes sOges and Papers of the Pres idents t 1 p 23
July 4 1861
26 See United St~~ v ~~phson 165 F 2d 82 (2 Cir 1947)
cert denied 333 u S 838 (1948) Lawson v United states
176 F 2d 49 (nc Cir 1949) cel~ denied 339 u s 934
(1950) Barsty Y ~ited S~ 167 F 2d 241 (DC eir
1948) cert denied 334 u s 843 (1948) MCGrain v Daugherty
273 u s 135 (1927) and cf Rumely v United States J 197
F 2d 166 (DC eir 1952) affd 73 s ct 543 (1953)
JJ B1a~ v ~~ted Sttlt~s 340 u s 159 (1950-)
gsectJ ~~ v United States 31~1 U s 479 (1951) See too
sectingleton v United States 343 U s 944 (1952) Note Recent
Extensions of the Witness Privilege Against Self-Incrim1nationll
53 Col L R 275 (1953)
29 Aiuppa v Un1tc~ states 201 F 2d 287 300 (6 eir 1952)
_I30 Note nMandatory Dismissal of Public Persol1nel and The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination 101 U ot Pa L R 1190 1191
fn 8 (1953)
31 Brown Be Fassett Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar
20 u or Chi L R 480 483 (1953)
32 Garner v Los Angeles Board) 341 u s 716 (1951) Gerende v
Board of Supervisors 341 U s 56 (1951) but com~are Wieman v
Updegraff 341~ U s 83 (1953)
34 See footnote 32
35 PG~ v Boa-roo of Education 31~2 U s 435 (1951)
ID Id at 493
38 Sec 9(h of lihe LalJor Management Rlations Act of 1947 29 USCA
St1Pp III Sec 141 Sec 159(b)
39 ft~rican C~~catons Association v ~uda 339 u S 382 (1950)
sustaining the validity of Sec 9(h) against the challenge that it
violated the First c-lT~nc1tlCiltl Ex Post FtiCto Lals and other iul1dashy
mental rights
40 Executive Order No 10450 issued Aporil zr 1953 (18 F R 2lt89)
41 Executive Orrler No 10491 issued Ocmiddottober 13 1953 (18 F R 6583)
~ Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary Interlocking Subshy
vcrs ion in Covernmcnt De~rtments II 83d Cong 1st ses5 Juy 30 J
1953 p 21 Being a cOImllunist is not a crime under federal law J
although it is in some states (see Liacos supra note 15 at
375) The Smith Act (18 USC Sec 2385 et seq) mkes advoshy
eating or teaching the violent overthrOf of any goverrment of the
United States or being a member of such a group and kno7ing its
purpose~a federal crime
43 See EaSley v F~cbardsonJ 182 F 2d 46 (DC 1950)J affd by an
evenly diiied court 341 TJ s 918 (1951) 1Etshingto v McGrath
182 F 2d 375 (DC 1950) aff1d 341 U s 923 (1951)j Or~~ v
vIil1ougbby 345 U s 83 91 (1953) Mr Justice Douglas concurring
i~ ~tiFascist Commi~~ v ~~EJ 341 U s 123 -182-183 (1951)
United Public W0rkers v --~1itcbell 330 U s 75 (1947)j Angilly - v
United States 199 F 2d 642) 644 (1950) cf NcAuliffe v rlew
Bedford 155 Mass 216 29 NE 517 (le9~) per Holmes J liThe
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but
he h(=l~s no constitltioi1al right to be a policezranu (Id at 220
29 NE at 5J7)
44 v1ie~sn _
v UpGegaff middot111 ~
3~middot4 u s 83 (1953) The Court ruleri as
contrry to due process the Cklahoma loyalty oath statute forshy
bidding IJ1l11ic emplo~rment of Persons who belonzea to certain
organizations regarciless of their knowledge of the character of
those oreenizations because of the indiscriminate classification
of lnnocent with kno~vilg activityll (d at 91)
~1 345 u S 83 (1953)middot
46 Id at 90
47 339 u s 3827 412 (1950) sustaininG the non-corJlIlunist affidavit
requirernelt of union leaders under the Taft -Hartley Act
~ Hoffman v United States 341 U s 179 (1951) suggests such
legislation if Congres3 concludes the lleed is great enough
See too Comment The Privilege Against Se1f-Llcriminetion Versus
Lmnurdty Z Proposed Statutes P 41 Gt~orgetom L J 511 (1953)
S Rept 153 on S 16 83d Cone 1st sess ~ 1 ald 2
April 17 1953 Report of Sel1a~~e Commttee on the JudiciaJ J
Interlocking S-lbversion in GOYf11llent Departments tl July 30
1953 83d Cong 1st sess p 50
~ HcfI1nan v Unitet States 341 u s 479 486 (1951)
50 Id U1ited States v ~isman 111 F 2d 260 262 (2 Cir 1950)
51 Note 61 Yale L J 105 109 (1952)
52 Rogers v United States 340 u s 367 375 (1951)
211 See e g Blau v Unjted StaIe~ 340 u s 159 (1950)
-shy54 Note J Co1t3resnic1al Inv estigat1ons--Self-Illcrimimtion Condemneshy
tiOll and Fair Hcar1ngll 22 U of Cinn L R 193 199-200 (1953)
55 See ~ovTn8end v ~~it~~ta~~3 95 F 2d 352 351 (DC Cir 1938)
cert denied 303 u S 664 (1938)
56 Byse TfA Report on the Pennsylvana Loyalty Act 101 U of Fa
L R 480 481-1~84 (1953) Wright Should Teachers Testify
Saturday Review Sept 2o 1953 p 23
57 See Meltzer Required Records The McCarran Act and The Privilege
Against Selfmiddotmiddot Incriminat ion ll 19 U of Chi L R 687 722 (1951)
y 83d Cong 1st Seas 1953 Also known as the Kefauver BUl
59 ~ v ltlalker 161 U S 591 (1896)
sect21 S 16 83d Cong 1st sess 1953 passed the Senate July 9 1953
after extensive debate Cong Ree 8646-8663 July 9 1953shy
S 16 amends B 3486 of Title 18 Sec 3486 presently furnishes
witnesses immunity from prosecution tor testimony before either
House or their Committees It appears to suffer from the same
deficiency present in a similar statute condemned in Counse~an v
Hitchcock 142 u s 547 (1892) S 16 is intended to StWP1y the
omission in the Hitchcock ease by providing not only that a
witness testimony may not be used against him but that such
witness shall be iImnune with respect to lIany transaction mtter
or thing concerning which he has been compelled to testIfy
sect 83d Congo 1st sess 1953
~ S Rept 153 83d Congo 1st sess p 2 (1953)
63 See Comment The Privi1ege Against Self-Incrimination Versus
Immunity Proposed statutes 41 Georgetown L J 511 523 (1953)
64 Supra footnote 7shy
sectif Delanel v ~ed States 199 F 2d 107 (1 Ci~ 1952)
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
faots the witness loses the rig~t to cease answering intel~ogat1ons
and rely upon his privilege at a 1ater point in his testimony
In one oase the detendant rree~ disclosed that she was Treasshy
urer of the Communist Pariy in COlorado and testified that she had
given the books ot the party to another person When asked to dishy
wlge the name ot the lamiddottter she refused upon the ground that the
answer might incriminate her mder the Sm1tb Act Atfirming her
conviction for contempt the Supreme Court speaking through Chief
Justice Vinson said
Since the privilege agatnlt salf-inorimination
presupposes a real danger ot legal detriment arising
from the disolosure petitioner cannot invoke the
privilege where response to the specific question in
issue here would not ftUtther inoriminate her O1aolo
sure of e tact waives the privilege as to details pound
This deoision leaves the law in a rather anomolous position tor the
vlitness A witness who refuses to answer aU questions and fails to Wcooperate to any extent may be protected by the claim of privilege
But there is no equal protection atforded by the decisions to the
witness who commences to eooperate but stops at a point where further
disclosure may tncrim1~ate him
Moreover it the witness refuses to answer on the ground that
Congress has exceeded its powers or that the inQuiry in lacking in
pertinency he construas the law at his peril If mistake8 his good 55
faith error of law constitutes no defense to fine and imprisonment
Then again it is claimed DY some that a persons election to
remain silent upon the ground of privilege does not necessarily mean
he has anything sinister to hide There are undoubtedly some people of
sincere principle who refl1se to disclose 1flformat1oft to authorized
1nvestigating authorities because of their feeling that ao one has any
right to 1~quire about their beliefs even if germane to the inquiry at 56
bsnd- There are other persons who refuse to answer because they feel
their recollections of events lons past are fee~le and that falsehood
even on trivial or irrelevant matters may subject them to a charge of
perjury There are still others less innocent vho say that coercing
them to testify under pain of contempt resembles the Soviet tactic of
requiring those SUilty not only to pay for but also to prcclatD their 57
guilt shy
~he use of broad tmmunity statutes serves to remove the dansers
mentioned for the iDPocent a~d operates aa an incentive for the guilty
to tell the truth
There are already two proposals pendin8 in Congress which seek to
compel the answer by witnesses at questioDs put to them before Conshy
gressiOl1al Committees grand juries or courts In exchange tor this
compulsory testimony the Witnesses will obtain complete immunity froa
prosecution
58 One Bill is s~ 565 This proposal grants immunity to ~itnesses
before a grand Jury or court of the United States when in the disshy
cretion of th~ Attorney General it is necessary to do so in the public
interest In exchange for this immunity the witness is compelled to
testify and to produce his books papers or recoIds s 565 uses
broad immunity lengtase in stating that the witness shall not be
prosecuted on account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he 1s compelled after ela~ing his privilege to testify or
produce evidence
In this respect s 565 is almost ident1cal to the immunity proshy59
vision sustained 8S valid by the Supreme Court e~ far back as 1896-
This Bill does not extend the immunity to witnesses before Congressional
Committees 601 61
There are other Bills pend-ing S 16- middot and H R 27371 with equally
broad immunity authority The Senate has passed its Bill but the House
Bill still awaits action Both these Bills grunt immunity to witnesses
before Congressional Committees but not to witnesses before grand
juries or courts
The proposed Bills are worded so that the witness will not get an
immunity bathU merely by testifying He must first raise specifically
his claim for privilege and thus put the Committee on notice whether
for the greater good the witness should be required to testify and 62
given immunity or whether he should be excused from testlfying-
However the discretionary power to grant the immunity is not vested
in the Attorney General bumiddott lies with the body conducting the investigation
If the proceeding is one before one of the Houses of Congress then
a majority vote of the members present is necessary Under S 16
if it is a proceeding before a committee two thirds of the members
must vote to grant the tmmunity In that event the tvothirds vote
must include at least two members of each of the two political parties
having the largest representation on such committee The House Bill
does not provide for notice to the Attorney General of the proposed
grant of immunity The Senate Bill provides for one weeks notice to
the Attorney General of the proposal but if the latter fails or reshy
fuses to assent to grant of immunity it may be conferred by majority
vote of either House It is hoped that this legislation will only be
resorted to where full diseloaure by witnesses is deemed of greater
tmportance than the possibility of punishing them for past offenses
By permitting one or several criminals to escape prosecution the
larger public peril contained in a gang of criminals or in their
leaders may be uncovered and the guilty brought to justice
The legislative proposals mentioned have much to commend them
In my opinion these bills would better achieve their purposes it they
required the concurrence of the Attorney General 1n the granting of any
immunity to a witness by a Joint Congressional Committee or either Heuse
committee or by Congress The Attorney General 1s the chief legal
officer of the Government of the United States As Buch it 1s his
responsibility to prosecute persons who offend the criminal laws of the
United states This responsibility must be coupled w1th adequate
authority to permit its discharge It would seem to be more advisable
for the Attorney General who has immediate knowledge of a criminals
background and propensities to decide whether immunity should be
granted for such a person To allow the Attorney General to participate
in the ultimate decision aa to whether immunity should be granted would
not impair Congressional investigatIons in the fields of internal
security crime and corruption Nor would it discourage witnesses
from providing information of importance to the investigation if the
Attorney Generals permission vas required before immunity was granted
On the other hand if these Bills were enacted in their present
form they might subject members of Congress to undue pressures for
granting immunity to criminals who are ineligible to receive it Also
they cuuld very easily cause embarrassment to Congress by tmped1ng or
blocking prosecutions planned by the Department of Justice on any matter 63
even incidentally testified to upon these 1nvestigations
The unfortunate experience which Congress had as far back as 1857 64
in granting immunity without concurrence of the Attorney General - should
~each that a similar course of action may be marked by eveD greater
failure today_ The witness might readily turn this division of authority
between Congress and the Department of Justice to his advantage by
obtaining an ~unity from the legislative committee or from Congress
over the objection of the Attorney General Thereafter he would be
free to testify concerning a broad area Of activities without fear that
he could be held to account criminally for other violations however
unrelated to the matter under investigation
Thus for example a Congreas1onal Committee or Congress might
furnish immunity to a person to obtain his testimony about his illicit
traffic in slot machine opercltlons between states This person may also
be guilty either of espionage or subversion or of selling narcotics to
youngs cers as to which an indictment is soon to be obtained To foreshy
close prosecution on these more serious crimes the witness would be
glad to volunteer information on his other activities if he knew in
advance that immunity would fallow for all of them Therefore greatest
care must be exercioed in granting immunity and then only upon a fully
informed judgment of all tle facts The Departlnent of Justice would
of course through the Fe~eral Bureau of Investigation the Crtmlnal
and Tax Divisions and the United states Attorneyo I offices be mosmiddott
likely to know the facts and the plans for prosecution Concurrence
by the Attorney General in conferring the immunity would also enable
the Department of Justice to maintuin its responsibility for the proper
administration of the crlminal law
The provision in S 10 for one weeks notice to the Attorney General
of the proposed grant of immunity does not fully cure this Bill of its
weakness in failing to require his affirmative concurrence in every
case Experience indicates that at times the views of the person who
1s charged with prooecut1ng criminals are disregarded by Congressional
Committees For example the successful criminal conviction obtained
by the Department of Justice ot the internal revenue collector in one of
the largest cities was recently nullified because of the action of a
House Committee in holding 1middotr1dely publicized hearings in the district in
65 which the trial subsequently took place These hearings took place
over the strong objection of the Department of Justice thut the pro
posed hearing would be of prejudice to the defendant on the trial
which was about to be initiated and would injure the Governments case
in disclosing its evidence In reversing the convlct1on l Chief Judge
Magruder observed that the character of the defendant was blackened
and discredited as the day of trial approached because of the publicity
invited and stimulated by the Committee over the radio and television
Thu6 1 mere advance notIfication to the Attorney General of a proposed
grant of tmmunity would never be a guarantee that the Committee would
be guided by the views of the Attorney General
S 16 and H R 2737 would also more readily carry out the aim of
obtaining evidence against leaders of subversion and criminal entershy
prisesj if provision for twmunity were granted to obtain testimony
not only before Congressional Committees but likewise before courts
and grand juries
For these reasons it is my opinion that if any measure is to be
enacted~~rmitting the granting of immunity to witnesses before either
House of Congress or its committees it should vest the Attorney General
or the Attorney General acting with the concurren~e of appropriate members
of Congress with the authority to grant such tmmunity and if the test shy
mony is sought for a court or grand jury that the Attorney General alone
be authorized to grant the ilmnunity
There remain for discussion two principal objections to this proshy
posed legislation which may be briefly considered here One objection
1s that when a witneAS is compelled to testify even under the protecshy
tion of immunity from criminal punihment) he is not relieved from
personal disgrace ~~lhich attach~8 to the exposure of his crime The
answer to this objection ia contained in II land mark decision of the 66
Supreme Court in Brown v Wrtlker
The design of tbe constitutional plivilege is not to aid the
witness in vindicating his character but to protect him
against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict him
of a criminal charge If he secure legal jnmllnity from prose-
cution the possible impairment of his good name is a penalty
which it is reasonable b0 should be compelled to pay for the
common good
The reasoning of this decision has never been qU~Gtioned and has 67
only recently been approved by the Sllpreme Court
The other chief objection to the proposed legislation is that while
a witness may receive itmlunity from federal prosecution) he may still
be subject to IJrosecution under ~tate lavl The Supreme Court has held
that this is not a valid objection to federal immunity laws~ since the
self-incrimination clause ln the Fifth Amendment operates ao a l1mitashy68
tion on the federal government only In United states v Murdock the
defendant was indicted for refUSing to answer questions of a revenue
agent relating to ctrt8 in income tax returns The refusal was ba sed on
the plea that hiD answers might 1ncrim1nate him in a state court The
Court said on this point
This court ha~ held that immunity against state prosecution is
not essential to the validity of federal statutes declaring that
a witnes3 shall not be excllpoundied from gtring evidence on the
ground that it vTill incriminate him and also that the ladt of
state power to give witnesses protection against federal
prosecution does not defeat a state immunity statute
Similarly a witness befo~e a state tribunal CBnnot refuse to 69
answer because of the threat of federal prosecution - However the
Federal District Court in Ohio recently held i1 Unted States v 70
Di Carlo that the defendant had the right to assert his privilege
because of possible prosecution under state law since the Senate
committee was authorized to investigate violations not only of the lawe 71
of the United States but also of the states M_ The Murdock case was
dtstingJished urlon the ground that the danger of state posecution 1n
that case was remote and uncertain thile in the Di Carlo case the
danger of state proaecutjon WilS imminent and real 72
The ---Di Carlo case has been received -lith mixed commelt It has73
not been followed so far as we k~ow- It appears to be contrary to deshy
cis10ns of co~~rts of appeals which have consistently adhered to the prinshy74
ciples of the Murdock case- In my opinion this decision of a district
court aoes not detract from the binding effect ofthe Supreme Courts deshy
eision in the Murdock case
The Department of Justice will recommend to the Congress in Jlouary
an immunity bill of the type I have descri-ced which protects the const1shy
tutional privileges ot witnesses before Congressional Committees courts
and juries but will at the some time aid materially in stamping out
criminal and subversive activities
Footnote Referet~es to Ad~res El~ited ~------ ___bull
Immunity From Prcsecuticn
Versus
Privilege Agaiust Self-Incrimination
Pittman liThe Colonial and Constitutional History of the
Privilege Against Sel-Incrimiootion 1n Amcicaff 21 Va
L R 763 764 770-773 (1935) Corwin The Supreme
Court I S Corctl~ction of the Self Incrirnination C1ause lf
29 lId~h L R 1 512 (1930) Ap~licability of
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to Legjslative
y Pittmenf2 at 774
~ ~ining v ~~8ey 211 U S 78 92 (1908)
L Id at 91
~ 34th Ceng 3d sess Globe PI 427 433 1-45 See
Eberling Constitutional Investigations pp 304-315shy
7 Eberling d at 320-323
~I 142 U s 547 (1892) This Act of 1862 revised an old
statute into two new sections by an amendment which
sought to insure that a witness who testified before
a federal grand jt~ or court (R s I 860 (1875raquo or
a Congressional Committee (R S B 859 (1875raquo would
not be later subjected to the use of his testimony in
any criminal proceeding aGainst him Section ~ 860 of
the amendment dealing with grand jurtes and courts came
under attack in Counselman v Hitchcock J supra and was
held to be invalid Since this part of the immunity proshy
vision tailed to accomplish ita purpose Congress repealed
it in 1910 (36 Stat 352 (19l0raquo) Congress apparently felt
that S 859 applying to Congressional Committees was still
of value and left it 1n force to this date (a s I 859
(1875) as amended 52 Stat 943 (1938) 18 usc e3486
(Supp V 1952)j see liThe Privilege Against Self
Incrimination versus Immunity Proposed Statutes 41
Georgetown L J 511 514 (1953) United States v ~
339 U s 323 335-337 (1950)
21 It read in patt as follows
No person shall be prosecuted for or on
account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he may testify or produce evidence
Act of Feb 11 1893 c 83 27 stat 443 49 USCA
I 46 See too ~ v United States 337 u S 137 146shy
147 (1949)middot Notet Denying -the Privilege against Self
Incrimination to Public Officers 64 Barv L R 987
988 (1951)
- 101 161 U s 591 (1896)
Shapiro v United St~~ 335 U S 1 6-7 (1948) where various
statutes are collated in the footnote The customary provision
in these statutes provides as follows No person shall be
excused from complying with any requirements ot this section
because of his privilege aga1nst self-incriminationgt but the
immunity provisions of the COmptuBory Testimony Act of
February 11 1893 shall apply with respect to allY 1nd1shy
vidual who specifically claims such pr1Y11ege tt
12 Rapacz ULimiting the Plea of Self-Incr1m1nat1ontl 20 Georgetown
L J 329 353 (1932) see footnote 3 of ~ v Connect~
302 U s 319 326 (1937) NPte liThe Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination the Doctr1ne of Waiver 61 Yale L J 104 110
(1952) middot
~f Palko v Connecticut 302 U s 319 326 (1937)
~ See dissents of Mr Justices Shiras Gray and White in ~ V4
Walker supra 161 U s 630638 Cf dissent of Mr Justice
Black in Ro~ers v United States 340 U s 367 376 (1950)
15 Potts Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for ContemptU I
74 U of Pa L R 691 780 (1926) L1acos uRights of Witnesses
Before Congressional Committees 33 Boston U L R 337 340
(1953) middot
t6 Liacos Id at 31tl
17 McGeary rlThe DeTelopmen-cs of Congressional Investigative Power ll
p 23 (1940) McGrain v Daughel~l 273 u s 135 (1927)
18 Sinclair v Unfted States~ 279 U s 263 (1929) ~arsba11 v
Unit~~State~ 176 F 2d 473 (nc Cir 1949) 2 Usc ~ 192
(Supp 1950)
19 Ne York City Bar Ass t n Committee on the Bill of Rights Report
on Congressional Committees presented December 14 1948 p 1
gQi Galloway PCong18ss1onal Investigations Proposed Reforms lt
18 U of Chi L R 478 479-481 (1951)
21 Dilliard lICongress1onal Investigations The Role of the Press
18 U of ChL L R 585 J 587 (1951)
22 Edgerton J dissenting in Barsky v United States 167 F 2d
241 252 (nc eir 1948) cert denied 334 U s 843 (1948)
petition for rehearing denied 339 U S 971 (1951)
~3 De Jonge v Oregon 299 U s 353 364 365 (1937)
24 Id
25 6 Richardson lIMes sOges and Papers of the Pres idents t 1 p 23
July 4 1861
26 See United St~~ v ~~phson 165 F 2d 82 (2 Cir 1947)
cert denied 333 u S 838 (1948) Lawson v United states
176 F 2d 49 (nc Cir 1949) cel~ denied 339 u s 934
(1950) Barsty Y ~ited S~ 167 F 2d 241 (DC eir
1948) cert denied 334 u s 843 (1948) MCGrain v Daugherty
273 u s 135 (1927) and cf Rumely v United States J 197
F 2d 166 (DC eir 1952) affd 73 s ct 543 (1953)
JJ B1a~ v ~~ted Sttlt~s 340 u s 159 (1950-)
gsectJ ~~ v United States 31~1 U s 479 (1951) See too
sectingleton v United States 343 U s 944 (1952) Note Recent
Extensions of the Witness Privilege Against Self-Incrim1nationll
53 Col L R 275 (1953)
29 Aiuppa v Un1tc~ states 201 F 2d 287 300 (6 eir 1952)
_I30 Note nMandatory Dismissal of Public Persol1nel and The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination 101 U ot Pa L R 1190 1191
fn 8 (1953)
31 Brown Be Fassett Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar
20 u or Chi L R 480 483 (1953)
32 Garner v Los Angeles Board) 341 u s 716 (1951) Gerende v
Board of Supervisors 341 U s 56 (1951) but com~are Wieman v
Updegraff 341~ U s 83 (1953)
34 See footnote 32
35 PG~ v Boa-roo of Education 31~2 U s 435 (1951)
ID Id at 493
38 Sec 9(h of lihe LalJor Management Rlations Act of 1947 29 USCA
St1Pp III Sec 141 Sec 159(b)
39 ft~rican C~~catons Association v ~uda 339 u S 382 (1950)
sustaining the validity of Sec 9(h) against the challenge that it
violated the First c-lT~nc1tlCiltl Ex Post FtiCto Lals and other iul1dashy
mental rights
40 Executive Order No 10450 issued Aporil zr 1953 (18 F R 2lt89)
41 Executive Orrler No 10491 issued Ocmiddottober 13 1953 (18 F R 6583)
~ Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary Interlocking Subshy
vcrs ion in Covernmcnt De~rtments II 83d Cong 1st ses5 Juy 30 J
1953 p 21 Being a cOImllunist is not a crime under federal law J
although it is in some states (see Liacos supra note 15 at
375) The Smith Act (18 USC Sec 2385 et seq) mkes advoshy
eating or teaching the violent overthrOf of any goverrment of the
United States or being a member of such a group and kno7ing its
purpose~a federal crime
43 See EaSley v F~cbardsonJ 182 F 2d 46 (DC 1950)J affd by an
evenly diiied court 341 TJ s 918 (1951) 1Etshingto v McGrath
182 F 2d 375 (DC 1950) aff1d 341 U s 923 (1951)j Or~~ v
vIil1ougbby 345 U s 83 91 (1953) Mr Justice Douglas concurring
i~ ~tiFascist Commi~~ v ~~EJ 341 U s 123 -182-183 (1951)
United Public W0rkers v --~1itcbell 330 U s 75 (1947)j Angilly - v
United States 199 F 2d 642) 644 (1950) cf NcAuliffe v rlew
Bedford 155 Mass 216 29 NE 517 (le9~) per Holmes J liThe
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but
he h(=l~s no constitltioi1al right to be a policezranu (Id at 220
29 NE at 5J7)
44 v1ie~sn _
v UpGegaff middot111 ~
3~middot4 u s 83 (1953) The Court ruleri as
contrry to due process the Cklahoma loyalty oath statute forshy
bidding IJ1l11ic emplo~rment of Persons who belonzea to certain
organizations regarciless of their knowledge of the character of
those oreenizations because of the indiscriminate classification
of lnnocent with kno~vilg activityll (d at 91)
~1 345 u S 83 (1953)middot
46 Id at 90
47 339 u s 3827 412 (1950) sustaininG the non-corJlIlunist affidavit
requirernelt of union leaders under the Taft -Hartley Act
~ Hoffman v United States 341 U s 179 (1951) suggests such
legislation if Congres3 concludes the lleed is great enough
See too Comment The Privilege Against Se1f-Llcriminetion Versus
Lmnurdty Z Proposed Statutes P 41 Gt~orgetom L J 511 (1953)
S Rept 153 on S 16 83d Cone 1st sess ~ 1 ald 2
April 17 1953 Report of Sel1a~~e Commttee on the JudiciaJ J
Interlocking S-lbversion in GOYf11llent Departments tl July 30
1953 83d Cong 1st sess p 50
~ HcfI1nan v Unitet States 341 u s 479 486 (1951)
50 Id U1ited States v ~isman 111 F 2d 260 262 (2 Cir 1950)
51 Note 61 Yale L J 105 109 (1952)
52 Rogers v United States 340 u s 367 375 (1951)
211 See e g Blau v Unjted StaIe~ 340 u s 159 (1950)
-shy54 Note J Co1t3resnic1al Inv estigat1ons--Self-Illcrimimtion Condemneshy
tiOll and Fair Hcar1ngll 22 U of Cinn L R 193 199-200 (1953)
55 See ~ovTn8end v ~~it~~ta~~3 95 F 2d 352 351 (DC Cir 1938)
cert denied 303 u S 664 (1938)
56 Byse TfA Report on the Pennsylvana Loyalty Act 101 U of Fa
L R 480 481-1~84 (1953) Wright Should Teachers Testify
Saturday Review Sept 2o 1953 p 23
57 See Meltzer Required Records The McCarran Act and The Privilege
Against Selfmiddotmiddot Incriminat ion ll 19 U of Chi L R 687 722 (1951)
y 83d Cong 1st Seas 1953 Also known as the Kefauver BUl
59 ~ v ltlalker 161 U S 591 (1896)
sect21 S 16 83d Cong 1st sess 1953 passed the Senate July 9 1953
after extensive debate Cong Ree 8646-8663 July 9 1953shy
S 16 amends B 3486 of Title 18 Sec 3486 presently furnishes
witnesses immunity from prosecution tor testimony before either
House or their Committees It appears to suffer from the same
deficiency present in a similar statute condemned in Counse~an v
Hitchcock 142 u s 547 (1892) S 16 is intended to StWP1y the
omission in the Hitchcock ease by providing not only that a
witness testimony may not be used against him but that such
witness shall be iImnune with respect to lIany transaction mtter
or thing concerning which he has been compelled to testIfy
sect 83d Congo 1st sess 1953
~ S Rept 153 83d Congo 1st sess p 2 (1953)
63 See Comment The Privi1ege Against Self-Incrimination Versus
Immunity Proposed statutes 41 Georgetown L J 511 523 (1953)
64 Supra footnote 7shy
sectif Delanel v ~ed States 199 F 2d 107 (1 Ci~ 1952)
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
Moreover it the witness refuses to answer on the ground that
Congress has exceeded its powers or that the inQuiry in lacking in
pertinency he construas the law at his peril If mistake8 his good 55
faith error of law constitutes no defense to fine and imprisonment
Then again it is claimed DY some that a persons election to
remain silent upon the ground of privilege does not necessarily mean
he has anything sinister to hide There are undoubtedly some people of
sincere principle who refl1se to disclose 1flformat1oft to authorized
1nvestigating authorities because of their feeling that ao one has any
right to 1~quire about their beliefs even if germane to the inquiry at 56
bsnd- There are other persons who refuse to answer because they feel
their recollections of events lons past are fee~le and that falsehood
even on trivial or irrelevant matters may subject them to a charge of
perjury There are still others less innocent vho say that coercing
them to testify under pain of contempt resembles the Soviet tactic of
requiring those SUilty not only to pay for but also to prcclatD their 57
guilt shy
~he use of broad tmmunity statutes serves to remove the dansers
mentioned for the iDPocent a~d operates aa an incentive for the guilty
to tell the truth
There are already two proposals pendin8 in Congress which seek to
compel the answer by witnesses at questioDs put to them before Conshy
gressiOl1al Committees grand juries or courts In exchange tor this
compulsory testimony the Witnesses will obtain complete immunity froa
prosecution
58 One Bill is s~ 565 This proposal grants immunity to ~itnesses
before a grand Jury or court of the United States when in the disshy
cretion of th~ Attorney General it is necessary to do so in the public
interest In exchange for this immunity the witness is compelled to
testify and to produce his books papers or recoIds s 565 uses
broad immunity lengtase in stating that the witness shall not be
prosecuted on account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he 1s compelled after ela~ing his privilege to testify or
produce evidence
In this respect s 565 is almost ident1cal to the immunity proshy59
vision sustained 8S valid by the Supreme Court e~ far back as 1896-
This Bill does not extend the immunity to witnesses before Congressional
Committees 601 61
There are other Bills pend-ing S 16- middot and H R 27371 with equally
broad immunity authority The Senate has passed its Bill but the House
Bill still awaits action Both these Bills grunt immunity to witnesses
before Congressional Committees but not to witnesses before grand
juries or courts
The proposed Bills are worded so that the witness will not get an
immunity bathU merely by testifying He must first raise specifically
his claim for privilege and thus put the Committee on notice whether
for the greater good the witness should be required to testify and 62
given immunity or whether he should be excused from testlfying-
However the discretionary power to grant the immunity is not vested
in the Attorney General bumiddott lies with the body conducting the investigation
If the proceeding is one before one of the Houses of Congress then
a majority vote of the members present is necessary Under S 16
if it is a proceeding before a committee two thirds of the members
must vote to grant the tmmunity In that event the tvothirds vote
must include at least two members of each of the two political parties
having the largest representation on such committee The House Bill
does not provide for notice to the Attorney General of the proposed
grant of immunity The Senate Bill provides for one weeks notice to
the Attorney General of the proposal but if the latter fails or reshy
fuses to assent to grant of immunity it may be conferred by majority
vote of either House It is hoped that this legislation will only be
resorted to where full diseloaure by witnesses is deemed of greater
tmportance than the possibility of punishing them for past offenses
By permitting one or several criminals to escape prosecution the
larger public peril contained in a gang of criminals or in their
leaders may be uncovered and the guilty brought to justice
The legislative proposals mentioned have much to commend them
In my opinion these bills would better achieve their purposes it they
required the concurrence of the Attorney General 1n the granting of any
immunity to a witness by a Joint Congressional Committee or either Heuse
committee or by Congress The Attorney General 1s the chief legal
officer of the Government of the United States As Buch it 1s his
responsibility to prosecute persons who offend the criminal laws of the
United states This responsibility must be coupled w1th adequate
authority to permit its discharge It would seem to be more advisable
for the Attorney General who has immediate knowledge of a criminals
background and propensities to decide whether immunity should be
granted for such a person To allow the Attorney General to participate
in the ultimate decision aa to whether immunity should be granted would
not impair Congressional investigatIons in the fields of internal
security crime and corruption Nor would it discourage witnesses
from providing information of importance to the investigation if the
Attorney Generals permission vas required before immunity was granted
On the other hand if these Bills were enacted in their present
form they might subject members of Congress to undue pressures for
granting immunity to criminals who are ineligible to receive it Also
they cuuld very easily cause embarrassment to Congress by tmped1ng or
blocking prosecutions planned by the Department of Justice on any matter 63
even incidentally testified to upon these 1nvestigations
The unfortunate experience which Congress had as far back as 1857 64
in granting immunity without concurrence of the Attorney General - should
~each that a similar course of action may be marked by eveD greater
failure today_ The witness might readily turn this division of authority
between Congress and the Department of Justice to his advantage by
obtaining an ~unity from the legislative committee or from Congress
over the objection of the Attorney General Thereafter he would be
free to testify concerning a broad area Of activities without fear that
he could be held to account criminally for other violations however
unrelated to the matter under investigation
Thus for example a Congreas1onal Committee or Congress might
furnish immunity to a person to obtain his testimony about his illicit
traffic in slot machine opercltlons between states This person may also
be guilty either of espionage or subversion or of selling narcotics to
youngs cers as to which an indictment is soon to be obtained To foreshy
close prosecution on these more serious crimes the witness would be
glad to volunteer information on his other activities if he knew in
advance that immunity would fallow for all of them Therefore greatest
care must be exercioed in granting immunity and then only upon a fully
informed judgment of all tle facts The Departlnent of Justice would
of course through the Fe~eral Bureau of Investigation the Crtmlnal
and Tax Divisions and the United states Attorneyo I offices be mosmiddott
likely to know the facts and the plans for prosecution Concurrence
by the Attorney General in conferring the immunity would also enable
the Department of Justice to maintuin its responsibility for the proper
administration of the crlminal law
The provision in S 10 for one weeks notice to the Attorney General
of the proposed grant of immunity does not fully cure this Bill of its
weakness in failing to require his affirmative concurrence in every
case Experience indicates that at times the views of the person who
1s charged with prooecut1ng criminals are disregarded by Congressional
Committees For example the successful criminal conviction obtained
by the Department of Justice ot the internal revenue collector in one of
the largest cities was recently nullified because of the action of a
House Committee in holding 1middotr1dely publicized hearings in the district in
65 which the trial subsequently took place These hearings took place
over the strong objection of the Department of Justice thut the pro
posed hearing would be of prejudice to the defendant on the trial
which was about to be initiated and would injure the Governments case
in disclosing its evidence In reversing the convlct1on l Chief Judge
Magruder observed that the character of the defendant was blackened
and discredited as the day of trial approached because of the publicity
invited and stimulated by the Committee over the radio and television
Thu6 1 mere advance notIfication to the Attorney General of a proposed
grant of tmmunity would never be a guarantee that the Committee would
be guided by the views of the Attorney General
S 16 and H R 2737 would also more readily carry out the aim of
obtaining evidence against leaders of subversion and criminal entershy
prisesj if provision for twmunity were granted to obtain testimony
not only before Congressional Committees but likewise before courts
and grand juries
For these reasons it is my opinion that if any measure is to be
enacted~~rmitting the granting of immunity to witnesses before either
House of Congress or its committees it should vest the Attorney General
or the Attorney General acting with the concurren~e of appropriate members
of Congress with the authority to grant such tmmunity and if the test shy
mony is sought for a court or grand jury that the Attorney General alone
be authorized to grant the ilmnunity
There remain for discussion two principal objections to this proshy
posed legislation which may be briefly considered here One objection
1s that when a witneAS is compelled to testify even under the protecshy
tion of immunity from criminal punihment) he is not relieved from
personal disgrace ~~lhich attach~8 to the exposure of his crime The
answer to this objection ia contained in II land mark decision of the 66
Supreme Court in Brown v Wrtlker
The design of tbe constitutional plivilege is not to aid the
witness in vindicating his character but to protect him
against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict him
of a criminal charge If he secure legal jnmllnity from prose-
cution the possible impairment of his good name is a penalty
which it is reasonable b0 should be compelled to pay for the
common good
The reasoning of this decision has never been qU~Gtioned and has 67
only recently been approved by the Sllpreme Court
The other chief objection to the proposed legislation is that while
a witness may receive itmlunity from federal prosecution) he may still
be subject to IJrosecution under ~tate lavl The Supreme Court has held
that this is not a valid objection to federal immunity laws~ since the
self-incrimination clause ln the Fifth Amendment operates ao a l1mitashy68
tion on the federal government only In United states v Murdock the
defendant was indicted for refUSing to answer questions of a revenue
agent relating to ctrt8 in income tax returns The refusal was ba sed on
the plea that hiD answers might 1ncrim1nate him in a state court The
Court said on this point
This court ha~ held that immunity against state prosecution is
not essential to the validity of federal statutes declaring that
a witnes3 shall not be excllpoundied from gtring evidence on the
ground that it vTill incriminate him and also that the ladt of
state power to give witnesses protection against federal
prosecution does not defeat a state immunity statute
Similarly a witness befo~e a state tribunal CBnnot refuse to 69
answer because of the threat of federal prosecution - However the
Federal District Court in Ohio recently held i1 Unted States v 70
Di Carlo that the defendant had the right to assert his privilege
because of possible prosecution under state law since the Senate
committee was authorized to investigate violations not only of the lawe 71
of the United States but also of the states M_ The Murdock case was
dtstingJished urlon the ground that the danger of state posecution 1n
that case was remote and uncertain thile in the Di Carlo case the
danger of state proaecutjon WilS imminent and real 72
The ---Di Carlo case has been received -lith mixed commelt It has73
not been followed so far as we k~ow- It appears to be contrary to deshy
cis10ns of co~~rts of appeals which have consistently adhered to the prinshy74
ciples of the Murdock case- In my opinion this decision of a district
court aoes not detract from the binding effect ofthe Supreme Courts deshy
eision in the Murdock case
The Department of Justice will recommend to the Congress in Jlouary
an immunity bill of the type I have descri-ced which protects the const1shy
tutional privileges ot witnesses before Congressional Committees courts
and juries but will at the some time aid materially in stamping out
criminal and subversive activities
Footnote Referet~es to Ad~res El~ited ~------ ___bull
Immunity From Prcsecuticn
Versus
Privilege Agaiust Self-Incrimination
Pittman liThe Colonial and Constitutional History of the
Privilege Against Sel-Incrimiootion 1n Amcicaff 21 Va
L R 763 764 770-773 (1935) Corwin The Supreme
Court I S Corctl~ction of the Self Incrirnination C1ause lf
29 lId~h L R 1 512 (1930) Ap~licability of
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to Legjslative
y Pittmenf2 at 774
~ ~ining v ~~8ey 211 U S 78 92 (1908)
L Id at 91
~ 34th Ceng 3d sess Globe PI 427 433 1-45 See
Eberling Constitutional Investigations pp 304-315shy
7 Eberling d at 320-323
~I 142 U s 547 (1892) This Act of 1862 revised an old
statute into two new sections by an amendment which
sought to insure that a witness who testified before
a federal grand jt~ or court (R s I 860 (1875raquo or
a Congressional Committee (R S B 859 (1875raquo would
not be later subjected to the use of his testimony in
any criminal proceeding aGainst him Section ~ 860 of
the amendment dealing with grand jurtes and courts came
under attack in Counselman v Hitchcock J supra and was
held to be invalid Since this part of the immunity proshy
vision tailed to accomplish ita purpose Congress repealed
it in 1910 (36 Stat 352 (19l0raquo) Congress apparently felt
that S 859 applying to Congressional Committees was still
of value and left it 1n force to this date (a s I 859
(1875) as amended 52 Stat 943 (1938) 18 usc e3486
(Supp V 1952)j see liThe Privilege Against Self
Incrimination versus Immunity Proposed Statutes 41
Georgetown L J 511 514 (1953) United States v ~
339 U s 323 335-337 (1950)
21 It read in patt as follows
No person shall be prosecuted for or on
account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he may testify or produce evidence
Act of Feb 11 1893 c 83 27 stat 443 49 USCA
I 46 See too ~ v United States 337 u S 137 146shy
147 (1949)middot Notet Denying -the Privilege against Self
Incrimination to Public Officers 64 Barv L R 987
988 (1951)
- 101 161 U s 591 (1896)
Shapiro v United St~~ 335 U S 1 6-7 (1948) where various
statutes are collated in the footnote The customary provision
in these statutes provides as follows No person shall be
excused from complying with any requirements ot this section
because of his privilege aga1nst self-incriminationgt but the
immunity provisions of the COmptuBory Testimony Act of
February 11 1893 shall apply with respect to allY 1nd1shy
vidual who specifically claims such pr1Y11ege tt
12 Rapacz ULimiting the Plea of Self-Incr1m1nat1ontl 20 Georgetown
L J 329 353 (1932) see footnote 3 of ~ v Connect~
302 U s 319 326 (1937) NPte liThe Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination the Doctr1ne of Waiver 61 Yale L J 104 110
(1952) middot
~f Palko v Connecticut 302 U s 319 326 (1937)
~ See dissents of Mr Justices Shiras Gray and White in ~ V4
Walker supra 161 U s 630638 Cf dissent of Mr Justice
Black in Ro~ers v United States 340 U s 367 376 (1950)
15 Potts Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for ContemptU I
74 U of Pa L R 691 780 (1926) L1acos uRights of Witnesses
Before Congressional Committees 33 Boston U L R 337 340
(1953) middot
t6 Liacos Id at 31tl
17 McGeary rlThe DeTelopmen-cs of Congressional Investigative Power ll
p 23 (1940) McGrain v Daughel~l 273 u s 135 (1927)
18 Sinclair v Unfted States~ 279 U s 263 (1929) ~arsba11 v
Unit~~State~ 176 F 2d 473 (nc Cir 1949) 2 Usc ~ 192
(Supp 1950)
19 Ne York City Bar Ass t n Committee on the Bill of Rights Report
on Congressional Committees presented December 14 1948 p 1
gQi Galloway PCong18ss1onal Investigations Proposed Reforms lt
18 U of Chi L R 478 479-481 (1951)
21 Dilliard lICongress1onal Investigations The Role of the Press
18 U of ChL L R 585 J 587 (1951)
22 Edgerton J dissenting in Barsky v United States 167 F 2d
241 252 (nc eir 1948) cert denied 334 U s 843 (1948)
petition for rehearing denied 339 U S 971 (1951)
~3 De Jonge v Oregon 299 U s 353 364 365 (1937)
24 Id
25 6 Richardson lIMes sOges and Papers of the Pres idents t 1 p 23
July 4 1861
26 See United St~~ v ~~phson 165 F 2d 82 (2 Cir 1947)
cert denied 333 u S 838 (1948) Lawson v United states
176 F 2d 49 (nc Cir 1949) cel~ denied 339 u s 934
(1950) Barsty Y ~ited S~ 167 F 2d 241 (DC eir
1948) cert denied 334 u s 843 (1948) MCGrain v Daugherty
273 u s 135 (1927) and cf Rumely v United States J 197
F 2d 166 (DC eir 1952) affd 73 s ct 543 (1953)
JJ B1a~ v ~~ted Sttlt~s 340 u s 159 (1950-)
gsectJ ~~ v United States 31~1 U s 479 (1951) See too
sectingleton v United States 343 U s 944 (1952) Note Recent
Extensions of the Witness Privilege Against Self-Incrim1nationll
53 Col L R 275 (1953)
29 Aiuppa v Un1tc~ states 201 F 2d 287 300 (6 eir 1952)
_I30 Note nMandatory Dismissal of Public Persol1nel and The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination 101 U ot Pa L R 1190 1191
fn 8 (1953)
31 Brown Be Fassett Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar
20 u or Chi L R 480 483 (1953)
32 Garner v Los Angeles Board) 341 u s 716 (1951) Gerende v
Board of Supervisors 341 U s 56 (1951) but com~are Wieman v
Updegraff 341~ U s 83 (1953)
34 See footnote 32
35 PG~ v Boa-roo of Education 31~2 U s 435 (1951)
ID Id at 493
38 Sec 9(h of lihe LalJor Management Rlations Act of 1947 29 USCA
St1Pp III Sec 141 Sec 159(b)
39 ft~rican C~~catons Association v ~uda 339 u S 382 (1950)
sustaining the validity of Sec 9(h) against the challenge that it
violated the First c-lT~nc1tlCiltl Ex Post FtiCto Lals and other iul1dashy
mental rights
40 Executive Order No 10450 issued Aporil zr 1953 (18 F R 2lt89)
41 Executive Orrler No 10491 issued Ocmiddottober 13 1953 (18 F R 6583)
~ Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary Interlocking Subshy
vcrs ion in Covernmcnt De~rtments II 83d Cong 1st ses5 Juy 30 J
1953 p 21 Being a cOImllunist is not a crime under federal law J
although it is in some states (see Liacos supra note 15 at
375) The Smith Act (18 USC Sec 2385 et seq) mkes advoshy
eating or teaching the violent overthrOf of any goverrment of the
United States or being a member of such a group and kno7ing its
purpose~a federal crime
43 See EaSley v F~cbardsonJ 182 F 2d 46 (DC 1950)J affd by an
evenly diiied court 341 TJ s 918 (1951) 1Etshingto v McGrath
182 F 2d 375 (DC 1950) aff1d 341 U s 923 (1951)j Or~~ v
vIil1ougbby 345 U s 83 91 (1953) Mr Justice Douglas concurring
i~ ~tiFascist Commi~~ v ~~EJ 341 U s 123 -182-183 (1951)
United Public W0rkers v --~1itcbell 330 U s 75 (1947)j Angilly - v
United States 199 F 2d 642) 644 (1950) cf NcAuliffe v rlew
Bedford 155 Mass 216 29 NE 517 (le9~) per Holmes J liThe
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but
he h(=l~s no constitltioi1al right to be a policezranu (Id at 220
29 NE at 5J7)
44 v1ie~sn _
v UpGegaff middot111 ~
3~middot4 u s 83 (1953) The Court ruleri as
contrry to due process the Cklahoma loyalty oath statute forshy
bidding IJ1l11ic emplo~rment of Persons who belonzea to certain
organizations regarciless of their knowledge of the character of
those oreenizations because of the indiscriminate classification
of lnnocent with kno~vilg activityll (d at 91)
~1 345 u S 83 (1953)middot
46 Id at 90
47 339 u s 3827 412 (1950) sustaininG the non-corJlIlunist affidavit
requirernelt of union leaders under the Taft -Hartley Act
~ Hoffman v United States 341 U s 179 (1951) suggests such
legislation if Congres3 concludes the lleed is great enough
See too Comment The Privilege Against Se1f-Llcriminetion Versus
Lmnurdty Z Proposed Statutes P 41 Gt~orgetom L J 511 (1953)
S Rept 153 on S 16 83d Cone 1st sess ~ 1 ald 2
April 17 1953 Report of Sel1a~~e Commttee on the JudiciaJ J
Interlocking S-lbversion in GOYf11llent Departments tl July 30
1953 83d Cong 1st sess p 50
~ HcfI1nan v Unitet States 341 u s 479 486 (1951)
50 Id U1ited States v ~isman 111 F 2d 260 262 (2 Cir 1950)
51 Note 61 Yale L J 105 109 (1952)
52 Rogers v United States 340 u s 367 375 (1951)
211 See e g Blau v Unjted StaIe~ 340 u s 159 (1950)
-shy54 Note J Co1t3resnic1al Inv estigat1ons--Self-Illcrimimtion Condemneshy
tiOll and Fair Hcar1ngll 22 U of Cinn L R 193 199-200 (1953)
55 See ~ovTn8end v ~~it~~ta~~3 95 F 2d 352 351 (DC Cir 1938)
cert denied 303 u S 664 (1938)
56 Byse TfA Report on the Pennsylvana Loyalty Act 101 U of Fa
L R 480 481-1~84 (1953) Wright Should Teachers Testify
Saturday Review Sept 2o 1953 p 23
57 See Meltzer Required Records The McCarran Act and The Privilege
Against Selfmiddotmiddot Incriminat ion ll 19 U of Chi L R 687 722 (1951)
y 83d Cong 1st Seas 1953 Also known as the Kefauver BUl
59 ~ v ltlalker 161 U S 591 (1896)
sect21 S 16 83d Cong 1st sess 1953 passed the Senate July 9 1953
after extensive debate Cong Ree 8646-8663 July 9 1953shy
S 16 amends B 3486 of Title 18 Sec 3486 presently furnishes
witnesses immunity from prosecution tor testimony before either
House or their Committees It appears to suffer from the same
deficiency present in a similar statute condemned in Counse~an v
Hitchcock 142 u s 547 (1892) S 16 is intended to StWP1y the
omission in the Hitchcock ease by providing not only that a
witness testimony may not be used against him but that such
witness shall be iImnune with respect to lIany transaction mtter
or thing concerning which he has been compelled to testIfy
sect 83d Congo 1st sess 1953
~ S Rept 153 83d Congo 1st sess p 2 (1953)
63 See Comment The Privi1ege Against Self-Incrimination Versus
Immunity Proposed statutes 41 Georgetown L J 511 523 (1953)
64 Supra footnote 7shy
sectif Delanel v ~ed States 199 F 2d 107 (1 Ci~ 1952)
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
58 One Bill is s~ 565 This proposal grants immunity to ~itnesses
before a grand Jury or court of the United States when in the disshy
cretion of th~ Attorney General it is necessary to do so in the public
interest In exchange for this immunity the witness is compelled to
testify and to produce his books papers or recoIds s 565 uses
broad immunity lengtase in stating that the witness shall not be
prosecuted on account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he 1s compelled after ela~ing his privilege to testify or
produce evidence
In this respect s 565 is almost ident1cal to the immunity proshy59
vision sustained 8S valid by the Supreme Court e~ far back as 1896-
This Bill does not extend the immunity to witnesses before Congressional
Committees 601 61
There are other Bills pend-ing S 16- middot and H R 27371 with equally
broad immunity authority The Senate has passed its Bill but the House
Bill still awaits action Both these Bills grunt immunity to witnesses
before Congressional Committees but not to witnesses before grand
juries or courts
The proposed Bills are worded so that the witness will not get an
immunity bathU merely by testifying He must first raise specifically
his claim for privilege and thus put the Committee on notice whether
for the greater good the witness should be required to testify and 62
given immunity or whether he should be excused from testlfying-
However the discretionary power to grant the immunity is not vested
in the Attorney General bumiddott lies with the body conducting the investigation
If the proceeding is one before one of the Houses of Congress then
a majority vote of the members present is necessary Under S 16
if it is a proceeding before a committee two thirds of the members
must vote to grant the tmmunity In that event the tvothirds vote
must include at least two members of each of the two political parties
having the largest representation on such committee The House Bill
does not provide for notice to the Attorney General of the proposed
grant of immunity The Senate Bill provides for one weeks notice to
the Attorney General of the proposal but if the latter fails or reshy
fuses to assent to grant of immunity it may be conferred by majority
vote of either House It is hoped that this legislation will only be
resorted to where full diseloaure by witnesses is deemed of greater
tmportance than the possibility of punishing them for past offenses
By permitting one or several criminals to escape prosecution the
larger public peril contained in a gang of criminals or in their
leaders may be uncovered and the guilty brought to justice
The legislative proposals mentioned have much to commend them
In my opinion these bills would better achieve their purposes it they
required the concurrence of the Attorney General 1n the granting of any
immunity to a witness by a Joint Congressional Committee or either Heuse
committee or by Congress The Attorney General 1s the chief legal
officer of the Government of the United States As Buch it 1s his
responsibility to prosecute persons who offend the criminal laws of the
United states This responsibility must be coupled w1th adequate
authority to permit its discharge It would seem to be more advisable
for the Attorney General who has immediate knowledge of a criminals
background and propensities to decide whether immunity should be
granted for such a person To allow the Attorney General to participate
in the ultimate decision aa to whether immunity should be granted would
not impair Congressional investigatIons in the fields of internal
security crime and corruption Nor would it discourage witnesses
from providing information of importance to the investigation if the
Attorney Generals permission vas required before immunity was granted
On the other hand if these Bills were enacted in their present
form they might subject members of Congress to undue pressures for
granting immunity to criminals who are ineligible to receive it Also
they cuuld very easily cause embarrassment to Congress by tmped1ng or
blocking prosecutions planned by the Department of Justice on any matter 63
even incidentally testified to upon these 1nvestigations
The unfortunate experience which Congress had as far back as 1857 64
in granting immunity without concurrence of the Attorney General - should
~each that a similar course of action may be marked by eveD greater
failure today_ The witness might readily turn this division of authority
between Congress and the Department of Justice to his advantage by
obtaining an ~unity from the legislative committee or from Congress
over the objection of the Attorney General Thereafter he would be
free to testify concerning a broad area Of activities without fear that
he could be held to account criminally for other violations however
unrelated to the matter under investigation
Thus for example a Congreas1onal Committee or Congress might
furnish immunity to a person to obtain his testimony about his illicit
traffic in slot machine opercltlons between states This person may also
be guilty either of espionage or subversion or of selling narcotics to
youngs cers as to which an indictment is soon to be obtained To foreshy
close prosecution on these more serious crimes the witness would be
glad to volunteer information on his other activities if he knew in
advance that immunity would fallow for all of them Therefore greatest
care must be exercioed in granting immunity and then only upon a fully
informed judgment of all tle facts The Departlnent of Justice would
of course through the Fe~eral Bureau of Investigation the Crtmlnal
and Tax Divisions and the United states Attorneyo I offices be mosmiddott
likely to know the facts and the plans for prosecution Concurrence
by the Attorney General in conferring the immunity would also enable
the Department of Justice to maintuin its responsibility for the proper
administration of the crlminal law
The provision in S 10 for one weeks notice to the Attorney General
of the proposed grant of immunity does not fully cure this Bill of its
weakness in failing to require his affirmative concurrence in every
case Experience indicates that at times the views of the person who
1s charged with prooecut1ng criminals are disregarded by Congressional
Committees For example the successful criminal conviction obtained
by the Department of Justice ot the internal revenue collector in one of
the largest cities was recently nullified because of the action of a
House Committee in holding 1middotr1dely publicized hearings in the district in
65 which the trial subsequently took place These hearings took place
over the strong objection of the Department of Justice thut the pro
posed hearing would be of prejudice to the defendant on the trial
which was about to be initiated and would injure the Governments case
in disclosing its evidence In reversing the convlct1on l Chief Judge
Magruder observed that the character of the defendant was blackened
and discredited as the day of trial approached because of the publicity
invited and stimulated by the Committee over the radio and television
Thu6 1 mere advance notIfication to the Attorney General of a proposed
grant of tmmunity would never be a guarantee that the Committee would
be guided by the views of the Attorney General
S 16 and H R 2737 would also more readily carry out the aim of
obtaining evidence against leaders of subversion and criminal entershy
prisesj if provision for twmunity were granted to obtain testimony
not only before Congressional Committees but likewise before courts
and grand juries
For these reasons it is my opinion that if any measure is to be
enacted~~rmitting the granting of immunity to witnesses before either
House of Congress or its committees it should vest the Attorney General
or the Attorney General acting with the concurren~e of appropriate members
of Congress with the authority to grant such tmmunity and if the test shy
mony is sought for a court or grand jury that the Attorney General alone
be authorized to grant the ilmnunity
There remain for discussion two principal objections to this proshy
posed legislation which may be briefly considered here One objection
1s that when a witneAS is compelled to testify even under the protecshy
tion of immunity from criminal punihment) he is not relieved from
personal disgrace ~~lhich attach~8 to the exposure of his crime The
answer to this objection ia contained in II land mark decision of the 66
Supreme Court in Brown v Wrtlker
The design of tbe constitutional plivilege is not to aid the
witness in vindicating his character but to protect him
against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict him
of a criminal charge If he secure legal jnmllnity from prose-
cution the possible impairment of his good name is a penalty
which it is reasonable b0 should be compelled to pay for the
common good
The reasoning of this decision has never been qU~Gtioned and has 67
only recently been approved by the Sllpreme Court
The other chief objection to the proposed legislation is that while
a witness may receive itmlunity from federal prosecution) he may still
be subject to IJrosecution under ~tate lavl The Supreme Court has held
that this is not a valid objection to federal immunity laws~ since the
self-incrimination clause ln the Fifth Amendment operates ao a l1mitashy68
tion on the federal government only In United states v Murdock the
defendant was indicted for refUSing to answer questions of a revenue
agent relating to ctrt8 in income tax returns The refusal was ba sed on
the plea that hiD answers might 1ncrim1nate him in a state court The
Court said on this point
This court ha~ held that immunity against state prosecution is
not essential to the validity of federal statutes declaring that
a witnes3 shall not be excllpoundied from gtring evidence on the
ground that it vTill incriminate him and also that the ladt of
state power to give witnesses protection against federal
prosecution does not defeat a state immunity statute
Similarly a witness befo~e a state tribunal CBnnot refuse to 69
answer because of the threat of federal prosecution - However the
Federal District Court in Ohio recently held i1 Unted States v 70
Di Carlo that the defendant had the right to assert his privilege
because of possible prosecution under state law since the Senate
committee was authorized to investigate violations not only of the lawe 71
of the United States but also of the states M_ The Murdock case was
dtstingJished urlon the ground that the danger of state posecution 1n
that case was remote and uncertain thile in the Di Carlo case the
danger of state proaecutjon WilS imminent and real 72
The ---Di Carlo case has been received -lith mixed commelt It has73
not been followed so far as we k~ow- It appears to be contrary to deshy
cis10ns of co~~rts of appeals which have consistently adhered to the prinshy74
ciples of the Murdock case- In my opinion this decision of a district
court aoes not detract from the binding effect ofthe Supreme Courts deshy
eision in the Murdock case
The Department of Justice will recommend to the Congress in Jlouary
an immunity bill of the type I have descri-ced which protects the const1shy
tutional privileges ot witnesses before Congressional Committees courts
and juries but will at the some time aid materially in stamping out
criminal and subversive activities
Footnote Referet~es to Ad~res El~ited ~------ ___bull
Immunity From Prcsecuticn
Versus
Privilege Agaiust Self-Incrimination
Pittman liThe Colonial and Constitutional History of the
Privilege Against Sel-Incrimiootion 1n Amcicaff 21 Va
L R 763 764 770-773 (1935) Corwin The Supreme
Court I S Corctl~ction of the Self Incrirnination C1ause lf
29 lId~h L R 1 512 (1930) Ap~licability of
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to Legjslative
y Pittmenf2 at 774
~ ~ining v ~~8ey 211 U S 78 92 (1908)
L Id at 91
~ 34th Ceng 3d sess Globe PI 427 433 1-45 See
Eberling Constitutional Investigations pp 304-315shy
7 Eberling d at 320-323
~I 142 U s 547 (1892) This Act of 1862 revised an old
statute into two new sections by an amendment which
sought to insure that a witness who testified before
a federal grand jt~ or court (R s I 860 (1875raquo or
a Congressional Committee (R S B 859 (1875raquo would
not be later subjected to the use of his testimony in
any criminal proceeding aGainst him Section ~ 860 of
the amendment dealing with grand jurtes and courts came
under attack in Counselman v Hitchcock J supra and was
held to be invalid Since this part of the immunity proshy
vision tailed to accomplish ita purpose Congress repealed
it in 1910 (36 Stat 352 (19l0raquo) Congress apparently felt
that S 859 applying to Congressional Committees was still
of value and left it 1n force to this date (a s I 859
(1875) as amended 52 Stat 943 (1938) 18 usc e3486
(Supp V 1952)j see liThe Privilege Against Self
Incrimination versus Immunity Proposed Statutes 41
Georgetown L J 511 514 (1953) United States v ~
339 U s 323 335-337 (1950)
21 It read in patt as follows
No person shall be prosecuted for or on
account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he may testify or produce evidence
Act of Feb 11 1893 c 83 27 stat 443 49 USCA
I 46 See too ~ v United States 337 u S 137 146shy
147 (1949)middot Notet Denying -the Privilege against Self
Incrimination to Public Officers 64 Barv L R 987
988 (1951)
- 101 161 U s 591 (1896)
Shapiro v United St~~ 335 U S 1 6-7 (1948) where various
statutes are collated in the footnote The customary provision
in these statutes provides as follows No person shall be
excused from complying with any requirements ot this section
because of his privilege aga1nst self-incriminationgt but the
immunity provisions of the COmptuBory Testimony Act of
February 11 1893 shall apply with respect to allY 1nd1shy
vidual who specifically claims such pr1Y11ege tt
12 Rapacz ULimiting the Plea of Self-Incr1m1nat1ontl 20 Georgetown
L J 329 353 (1932) see footnote 3 of ~ v Connect~
302 U s 319 326 (1937) NPte liThe Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination the Doctr1ne of Waiver 61 Yale L J 104 110
(1952) middot
~f Palko v Connecticut 302 U s 319 326 (1937)
~ See dissents of Mr Justices Shiras Gray and White in ~ V4
Walker supra 161 U s 630638 Cf dissent of Mr Justice
Black in Ro~ers v United States 340 U s 367 376 (1950)
15 Potts Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for ContemptU I
74 U of Pa L R 691 780 (1926) L1acos uRights of Witnesses
Before Congressional Committees 33 Boston U L R 337 340
(1953) middot
t6 Liacos Id at 31tl
17 McGeary rlThe DeTelopmen-cs of Congressional Investigative Power ll
p 23 (1940) McGrain v Daughel~l 273 u s 135 (1927)
18 Sinclair v Unfted States~ 279 U s 263 (1929) ~arsba11 v
Unit~~State~ 176 F 2d 473 (nc Cir 1949) 2 Usc ~ 192
(Supp 1950)
19 Ne York City Bar Ass t n Committee on the Bill of Rights Report
on Congressional Committees presented December 14 1948 p 1
gQi Galloway PCong18ss1onal Investigations Proposed Reforms lt
18 U of Chi L R 478 479-481 (1951)
21 Dilliard lICongress1onal Investigations The Role of the Press
18 U of ChL L R 585 J 587 (1951)
22 Edgerton J dissenting in Barsky v United States 167 F 2d
241 252 (nc eir 1948) cert denied 334 U s 843 (1948)
petition for rehearing denied 339 U S 971 (1951)
~3 De Jonge v Oregon 299 U s 353 364 365 (1937)
24 Id
25 6 Richardson lIMes sOges and Papers of the Pres idents t 1 p 23
July 4 1861
26 See United St~~ v ~~phson 165 F 2d 82 (2 Cir 1947)
cert denied 333 u S 838 (1948) Lawson v United states
176 F 2d 49 (nc Cir 1949) cel~ denied 339 u s 934
(1950) Barsty Y ~ited S~ 167 F 2d 241 (DC eir
1948) cert denied 334 u s 843 (1948) MCGrain v Daugherty
273 u s 135 (1927) and cf Rumely v United States J 197
F 2d 166 (DC eir 1952) affd 73 s ct 543 (1953)
JJ B1a~ v ~~ted Sttlt~s 340 u s 159 (1950-)
gsectJ ~~ v United States 31~1 U s 479 (1951) See too
sectingleton v United States 343 U s 944 (1952) Note Recent
Extensions of the Witness Privilege Against Self-Incrim1nationll
53 Col L R 275 (1953)
29 Aiuppa v Un1tc~ states 201 F 2d 287 300 (6 eir 1952)
_I30 Note nMandatory Dismissal of Public Persol1nel and The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination 101 U ot Pa L R 1190 1191
fn 8 (1953)
31 Brown Be Fassett Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar
20 u or Chi L R 480 483 (1953)
32 Garner v Los Angeles Board) 341 u s 716 (1951) Gerende v
Board of Supervisors 341 U s 56 (1951) but com~are Wieman v
Updegraff 341~ U s 83 (1953)
34 See footnote 32
35 PG~ v Boa-roo of Education 31~2 U s 435 (1951)
ID Id at 493
38 Sec 9(h of lihe LalJor Management Rlations Act of 1947 29 USCA
St1Pp III Sec 141 Sec 159(b)
39 ft~rican C~~catons Association v ~uda 339 u S 382 (1950)
sustaining the validity of Sec 9(h) against the challenge that it
violated the First c-lT~nc1tlCiltl Ex Post FtiCto Lals and other iul1dashy
mental rights
40 Executive Order No 10450 issued Aporil zr 1953 (18 F R 2lt89)
41 Executive Orrler No 10491 issued Ocmiddottober 13 1953 (18 F R 6583)
~ Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary Interlocking Subshy
vcrs ion in Covernmcnt De~rtments II 83d Cong 1st ses5 Juy 30 J
1953 p 21 Being a cOImllunist is not a crime under federal law J
although it is in some states (see Liacos supra note 15 at
375) The Smith Act (18 USC Sec 2385 et seq) mkes advoshy
eating or teaching the violent overthrOf of any goverrment of the
United States or being a member of such a group and kno7ing its
purpose~a federal crime
43 See EaSley v F~cbardsonJ 182 F 2d 46 (DC 1950)J affd by an
evenly diiied court 341 TJ s 918 (1951) 1Etshingto v McGrath
182 F 2d 375 (DC 1950) aff1d 341 U s 923 (1951)j Or~~ v
vIil1ougbby 345 U s 83 91 (1953) Mr Justice Douglas concurring
i~ ~tiFascist Commi~~ v ~~EJ 341 U s 123 -182-183 (1951)
United Public W0rkers v --~1itcbell 330 U s 75 (1947)j Angilly - v
United States 199 F 2d 642) 644 (1950) cf NcAuliffe v rlew
Bedford 155 Mass 216 29 NE 517 (le9~) per Holmes J liThe
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but
he h(=l~s no constitltioi1al right to be a policezranu (Id at 220
29 NE at 5J7)
44 v1ie~sn _
v UpGegaff middot111 ~
3~middot4 u s 83 (1953) The Court ruleri as
contrry to due process the Cklahoma loyalty oath statute forshy
bidding IJ1l11ic emplo~rment of Persons who belonzea to certain
organizations regarciless of their knowledge of the character of
those oreenizations because of the indiscriminate classification
of lnnocent with kno~vilg activityll (d at 91)
~1 345 u S 83 (1953)middot
46 Id at 90
47 339 u s 3827 412 (1950) sustaininG the non-corJlIlunist affidavit
requirernelt of union leaders under the Taft -Hartley Act
~ Hoffman v United States 341 U s 179 (1951) suggests such
legislation if Congres3 concludes the lleed is great enough
See too Comment The Privilege Against Se1f-Llcriminetion Versus
Lmnurdty Z Proposed Statutes P 41 Gt~orgetom L J 511 (1953)
S Rept 153 on S 16 83d Cone 1st sess ~ 1 ald 2
April 17 1953 Report of Sel1a~~e Commttee on the JudiciaJ J
Interlocking S-lbversion in GOYf11llent Departments tl July 30
1953 83d Cong 1st sess p 50
~ HcfI1nan v Unitet States 341 u s 479 486 (1951)
50 Id U1ited States v ~isman 111 F 2d 260 262 (2 Cir 1950)
51 Note 61 Yale L J 105 109 (1952)
52 Rogers v United States 340 u s 367 375 (1951)
211 See e g Blau v Unjted StaIe~ 340 u s 159 (1950)
-shy54 Note J Co1t3resnic1al Inv estigat1ons--Self-Illcrimimtion Condemneshy
tiOll and Fair Hcar1ngll 22 U of Cinn L R 193 199-200 (1953)
55 See ~ovTn8end v ~~it~~ta~~3 95 F 2d 352 351 (DC Cir 1938)
cert denied 303 u S 664 (1938)
56 Byse TfA Report on the Pennsylvana Loyalty Act 101 U of Fa
L R 480 481-1~84 (1953) Wright Should Teachers Testify
Saturday Review Sept 2o 1953 p 23
57 See Meltzer Required Records The McCarran Act and The Privilege
Against Selfmiddotmiddot Incriminat ion ll 19 U of Chi L R 687 722 (1951)
y 83d Cong 1st Seas 1953 Also known as the Kefauver BUl
59 ~ v ltlalker 161 U S 591 (1896)
sect21 S 16 83d Cong 1st sess 1953 passed the Senate July 9 1953
after extensive debate Cong Ree 8646-8663 July 9 1953shy
S 16 amends B 3486 of Title 18 Sec 3486 presently furnishes
witnesses immunity from prosecution tor testimony before either
House or their Committees It appears to suffer from the same
deficiency present in a similar statute condemned in Counse~an v
Hitchcock 142 u s 547 (1892) S 16 is intended to StWP1y the
omission in the Hitchcock ease by providing not only that a
witness testimony may not be used against him but that such
witness shall be iImnune with respect to lIany transaction mtter
or thing concerning which he has been compelled to testIfy
sect 83d Congo 1st sess 1953
~ S Rept 153 83d Congo 1st sess p 2 (1953)
63 See Comment The Privi1ege Against Self-Incrimination Versus
Immunity Proposed statutes 41 Georgetown L J 511 523 (1953)
64 Supra footnote 7shy
sectif Delanel v ~ed States 199 F 2d 107 (1 Ci~ 1952)
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
If the proceeding is one before one of the Houses of Congress then
a majority vote of the members present is necessary Under S 16
if it is a proceeding before a committee two thirds of the members
must vote to grant the tmmunity In that event the tvothirds vote
must include at least two members of each of the two political parties
having the largest representation on such committee The House Bill
does not provide for notice to the Attorney General of the proposed
grant of immunity The Senate Bill provides for one weeks notice to
the Attorney General of the proposal but if the latter fails or reshy
fuses to assent to grant of immunity it may be conferred by majority
vote of either House It is hoped that this legislation will only be
resorted to where full diseloaure by witnesses is deemed of greater
tmportance than the possibility of punishing them for past offenses
By permitting one or several criminals to escape prosecution the
larger public peril contained in a gang of criminals or in their
leaders may be uncovered and the guilty brought to justice
The legislative proposals mentioned have much to commend them
In my opinion these bills would better achieve their purposes it they
required the concurrence of the Attorney General 1n the granting of any
immunity to a witness by a Joint Congressional Committee or either Heuse
committee or by Congress The Attorney General 1s the chief legal
officer of the Government of the United States As Buch it 1s his
responsibility to prosecute persons who offend the criminal laws of the
United states This responsibility must be coupled w1th adequate
authority to permit its discharge It would seem to be more advisable
for the Attorney General who has immediate knowledge of a criminals
background and propensities to decide whether immunity should be
granted for such a person To allow the Attorney General to participate
in the ultimate decision aa to whether immunity should be granted would
not impair Congressional investigatIons in the fields of internal
security crime and corruption Nor would it discourage witnesses
from providing information of importance to the investigation if the
Attorney Generals permission vas required before immunity was granted
On the other hand if these Bills were enacted in their present
form they might subject members of Congress to undue pressures for
granting immunity to criminals who are ineligible to receive it Also
they cuuld very easily cause embarrassment to Congress by tmped1ng or
blocking prosecutions planned by the Department of Justice on any matter 63
even incidentally testified to upon these 1nvestigations
The unfortunate experience which Congress had as far back as 1857 64
in granting immunity without concurrence of the Attorney General - should
~each that a similar course of action may be marked by eveD greater
failure today_ The witness might readily turn this division of authority
between Congress and the Department of Justice to his advantage by
obtaining an ~unity from the legislative committee or from Congress
over the objection of the Attorney General Thereafter he would be
free to testify concerning a broad area Of activities without fear that
he could be held to account criminally for other violations however
unrelated to the matter under investigation
Thus for example a Congreas1onal Committee or Congress might
furnish immunity to a person to obtain his testimony about his illicit
traffic in slot machine opercltlons between states This person may also
be guilty either of espionage or subversion or of selling narcotics to
youngs cers as to which an indictment is soon to be obtained To foreshy
close prosecution on these more serious crimes the witness would be
glad to volunteer information on his other activities if he knew in
advance that immunity would fallow for all of them Therefore greatest
care must be exercioed in granting immunity and then only upon a fully
informed judgment of all tle facts The Departlnent of Justice would
of course through the Fe~eral Bureau of Investigation the Crtmlnal
and Tax Divisions and the United states Attorneyo I offices be mosmiddott
likely to know the facts and the plans for prosecution Concurrence
by the Attorney General in conferring the immunity would also enable
the Department of Justice to maintuin its responsibility for the proper
administration of the crlminal law
The provision in S 10 for one weeks notice to the Attorney General
of the proposed grant of immunity does not fully cure this Bill of its
weakness in failing to require his affirmative concurrence in every
case Experience indicates that at times the views of the person who
1s charged with prooecut1ng criminals are disregarded by Congressional
Committees For example the successful criminal conviction obtained
by the Department of Justice ot the internal revenue collector in one of
the largest cities was recently nullified because of the action of a
House Committee in holding 1middotr1dely publicized hearings in the district in
65 which the trial subsequently took place These hearings took place
over the strong objection of the Department of Justice thut the pro
posed hearing would be of prejudice to the defendant on the trial
which was about to be initiated and would injure the Governments case
in disclosing its evidence In reversing the convlct1on l Chief Judge
Magruder observed that the character of the defendant was blackened
and discredited as the day of trial approached because of the publicity
invited and stimulated by the Committee over the radio and television
Thu6 1 mere advance notIfication to the Attorney General of a proposed
grant of tmmunity would never be a guarantee that the Committee would
be guided by the views of the Attorney General
S 16 and H R 2737 would also more readily carry out the aim of
obtaining evidence against leaders of subversion and criminal entershy
prisesj if provision for twmunity were granted to obtain testimony
not only before Congressional Committees but likewise before courts
and grand juries
For these reasons it is my opinion that if any measure is to be
enacted~~rmitting the granting of immunity to witnesses before either
House of Congress or its committees it should vest the Attorney General
or the Attorney General acting with the concurren~e of appropriate members
of Congress with the authority to grant such tmmunity and if the test shy
mony is sought for a court or grand jury that the Attorney General alone
be authorized to grant the ilmnunity
There remain for discussion two principal objections to this proshy
posed legislation which may be briefly considered here One objection
1s that when a witneAS is compelled to testify even under the protecshy
tion of immunity from criminal punihment) he is not relieved from
personal disgrace ~~lhich attach~8 to the exposure of his crime The
answer to this objection ia contained in II land mark decision of the 66
Supreme Court in Brown v Wrtlker
The design of tbe constitutional plivilege is not to aid the
witness in vindicating his character but to protect him
against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict him
of a criminal charge If he secure legal jnmllnity from prose-
cution the possible impairment of his good name is a penalty
which it is reasonable b0 should be compelled to pay for the
common good
The reasoning of this decision has never been qU~Gtioned and has 67
only recently been approved by the Sllpreme Court
The other chief objection to the proposed legislation is that while
a witness may receive itmlunity from federal prosecution) he may still
be subject to IJrosecution under ~tate lavl The Supreme Court has held
that this is not a valid objection to federal immunity laws~ since the
self-incrimination clause ln the Fifth Amendment operates ao a l1mitashy68
tion on the federal government only In United states v Murdock the
defendant was indicted for refUSing to answer questions of a revenue
agent relating to ctrt8 in income tax returns The refusal was ba sed on
the plea that hiD answers might 1ncrim1nate him in a state court The
Court said on this point
This court ha~ held that immunity against state prosecution is
not essential to the validity of federal statutes declaring that
a witnes3 shall not be excllpoundied from gtring evidence on the
ground that it vTill incriminate him and also that the ladt of
state power to give witnesses protection against federal
prosecution does not defeat a state immunity statute
Similarly a witness befo~e a state tribunal CBnnot refuse to 69
answer because of the threat of federal prosecution - However the
Federal District Court in Ohio recently held i1 Unted States v 70
Di Carlo that the defendant had the right to assert his privilege
because of possible prosecution under state law since the Senate
committee was authorized to investigate violations not only of the lawe 71
of the United States but also of the states M_ The Murdock case was
dtstingJished urlon the ground that the danger of state posecution 1n
that case was remote and uncertain thile in the Di Carlo case the
danger of state proaecutjon WilS imminent and real 72
The ---Di Carlo case has been received -lith mixed commelt It has73
not been followed so far as we k~ow- It appears to be contrary to deshy
cis10ns of co~~rts of appeals which have consistently adhered to the prinshy74
ciples of the Murdock case- In my opinion this decision of a district
court aoes not detract from the binding effect ofthe Supreme Courts deshy
eision in the Murdock case
The Department of Justice will recommend to the Congress in Jlouary
an immunity bill of the type I have descri-ced which protects the const1shy
tutional privileges ot witnesses before Congressional Committees courts
and juries but will at the some time aid materially in stamping out
criminal and subversive activities
Footnote Referet~es to Ad~res El~ited ~------ ___bull
Immunity From Prcsecuticn
Versus
Privilege Agaiust Self-Incrimination
Pittman liThe Colonial and Constitutional History of the
Privilege Against Sel-Incrimiootion 1n Amcicaff 21 Va
L R 763 764 770-773 (1935) Corwin The Supreme
Court I S Corctl~ction of the Self Incrirnination C1ause lf
29 lId~h L R 1 512 (1930) Ap~licability of
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to Legjslative
y Pittmenf2 at 774
~ ~ining v ~~8ey 211 U S 78 92 (1908)
L Id at 91
~ 34th Ceng 3d sess Globe PI 427 433 1-45 See
Eberling Constitutional Investigations pp 304-315shy
7 Eberling d at 320-323
~I 142 U s 547 (1892) This Act of 1862 revised an old
statute into two new sections by an amendment which
sought to insure that a witness who testified before
a federal grand jt~ or court (R s I 860 (1875raquo or
a Congressional Committee (R S B 859 (1875raquo would
not be later subjected to the use of his testimony in
any criminal proceeding aGainst him Section ~ 860 of
the amendment dealing with grand jurtes and courts came
under attack in Counselman v Hitchcock J supra and was
held to be invalid Since this part of the immunity proshy
vision tailed to accomplish ita purpose Congress repealed
it in 1910 (36 Stat 352 (19l0raquo) Congress apparently felt
that S 859 applying to Congressional Committees was still
of value and left it 1n force to this date (a s I 859
(1875) as amended 52 Stat 943 (1938) 18 usc e3486
(Supp V 1952)j see liThe Privilege Against Self
Incrimination versus Immunity Proposed Statutes 41
Georgetown L J 511 514 (1953) United States v ~
339 U s 323 335-337 (1950)
21 It read in patt as follows
No person shall be prosecuted for or on
account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he may testify or produce evidence
Act of Feb 11 1893 c 83 27 stat 443 49 USCA
I 46 See too ~ v United States 337 u S 137 146shy
147 (1949)middot Notet Denying -the Privilege against Self
Incrimination to Public Officers 64 Barv L R 987
988 (1951)
- 101 161 U s 591 (1896)
Shapiro v United St~~ 335 U S 1 6-7 (1948) where various
statutes are collated in the footnote The customary provision
in these statutes provides as follows No person shall be
excused from complying with any requirements ot this section
because of his privilege aga1nst self-incriminationgt but the
immunity provisions of the COmptuBory Testimony Act of
February 11 1893 shall apply with respect to allY 1nd1shy
vidual who specifically claims such pr1Y11ege tt
12 Rapacz ULimiting the Plea of Self-Incr1m1nat1ontl 20 Georgetown
L J 329 353 (1932) see footnote 3 of ~ v Connect~
302 U s 319 326 (1937) NPte liThe Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination the Doctr1ne of Waiver 61 Yale L J 104 110
(1952) middot
~f Palko v Connecticut 302 U s 319 326 (1937)
~ See dissents of Mr Justices Shiras Gray and White in ~ V4
Walker supra 161 U s 630638 Cf dissent of Mr Justice
Black in Ro~ers v United States 340 U s 367 376 (1950)
15 Potts Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for ContemptU I
74 U of Pa L R 691 780 (1926) L1acos uRights of Witnesses
Before Congressional Committees 33 Boston U L R 337 340
(1953) middot
t6 Liacos Id at 31tl
17 McGeary rlThe DeTelopmen-cs of Congressional Investigative Power ll
p 23 (1940) McGrain v Daughel~l 273 u s 135 (1927)
18 Sinclair v Unfted States~ 279 U s 263 (1929) ~arsba11 v
Unit~~State~ 176 F 2d 473 (nc Cir 1949) 2 Usc ~ 192
(Supp 1950)
19 Ne York City Bar Ass t n Committee on the Bill of Rights Report
on Congressional Committees presented December 14 1948 p 1
gQi Galloway PCong18ss1onal Investigations Proposed Reforms lt
18 U of Chi L R 478 479-481 (1951)
21 Dilliard lICongress1onal Investigations The Role of the Press
18 U of ChL L R 585 J 587 (1951)
22 Edgerton J dissenting in Barsky v United States 167 F 2d
241 252 (nc eir 1948) cert denied 334 U s 843 (1948)
petition for rehearing denied 339 U S 971 (1951)
~3 De Jonge v Oregon 299 U s 353 364 365 (1937)
24 Id
25 6 Richardson lIMes sOges and Papers of the Pres idents t 1 p 23
July 4 1861
26 See United St~~ v ~~phson 165 F 2d 82 (2 Cir 1947)
cert denied 333 u S 838 (1948) Lawson v United states
176 F 2d 49 (nc Cir 1949) cel~ denied 339 u s 934
(1950) Barsty Y ~ited S~ 167 F 2d 241 (DC eir
1948) cert denied 334 u s 843 (1948) MCGrain v Daugherty
273 u s 135 (1927) and cf Rumely v United States J 197
F 2d 166 (DC eir 1952) affd 73 s ct 543 (1953)
JJ B1a~ v ~~ted Sttlt~s 340 u s 159 (1950-)
gsectJ ~~ v United States 31~1 U s 479 (1951) See too
sectingleton v United States 343 U s 944 (1952) Note Recent
Extensions of the Witness Privilege Against Self-Incrim1nationll
53 Col L R 275 (1953)
29 Aiuppa v Un1tc~ states 201 F 2d 287 300 (6 eir 1952)
_I30 Note nMandatory Dismissal of Public Persol1nel and The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination 101 U ot Pa L R 1190 1191
fn 8 (1953)
31 Brown Be Fassett Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar
20 u or Chi L R 480 483 (1953)
32 Garner v Los Angeles Board) 341 u s 716 (1951) Gerende v
Board of Supervisors 341 U s 56 (1951) but com~are Wieman v
Updegraff 341~ U s 83 (1953)
34 See footnote 32
35 PG~ v Boa-roo of Education 31~2 U s 435 (1951)
ID Id at 493
38 Sec 9(h of lihe LalJor Management Rlations Act of 1947 29 USCA
St1Pp III Sec 141 Sec 159(b)
39 ft~rican C~~catons Association v ~uda 339 u S 382 (1950)
sustaining the validity of Sec 9(h) against the challenge that it
violated the First c-lT~nc1tlCiltl Ex Post FtiCto Lals and other iul1dashy
mental rights
40 Executive Order No 10450 issued Aporil zr 1953 (18 F R 2lt89)
41 Executive Orrler No 10491 issued Ocmiddottober 13 1953 (18 F R 6583)
~ Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary Interlocking Subshy
vcrs ion in Covernmcnt De~rtments II 83d Cong 1st ses5 Juy 30 J
1953 p 21 Being a cOImllunist is not a crime under federal law J
although it is in some states (see Liacos supra note 15 at
375) The Smith Act (18 USC Sec 2385 et seq) mkes advoshy
eating or teaching the violent overthrOf of any goverrment of the
United States or being a member of such a group and kno7ing its
purpose~a federal crime
43 See EaSley v F~cbardsonJ 182 F 2d 46 (DC 1950)J affd by an
evenly diiied court 341 TJ s 918 (1951) 1Etshingto v McGrath
182 F 2d 375 (DC 1950) aff1d 341 U s 923 (1951)j Or~~ v
vIil1ougbby 345 U s 83 91 (1953) Mr Justice Douglas concurring
i~ ~tiFascist Commi~~ v ~~EJ 341 U s 123 -182-183 (1951)
United Public W0rkers v --~1itcbell 330 U s 75 (1947)j Angilly - v
United States 199 F 2d 642) 644 (1950) cf NcAuliffe v rlew
Bedford 155 Mass 216 29 NE 517 (le9~) per Holmes J liThe
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but
he h(=l~s no constitltioi1al right to be a policezranu (Id at 220
29 NE at 5J7)
44 v1ie~sn _
v UpGegaff middot111 ~
3~middot4 u s 83 (1953) The Court ruleri as
contrry to due process the Cklahoma loyalty oath statute forshy
bidding IJ1l11ic emplo~rment of Persons who belonzea to certain
organizations regarciless of their knowledge of the character of
those oreenizations because of the indiscriminate classification
of lnnocent with kno~vilg activityll (d at 91)
~1 345 u S 83 (1953)middot
46 Id at 90
47 339 u s 3827 412 (1950) sustaininG the non-corJlIlunist affidavit
requirernelt of union leaders under the Taft -Hartley Act
~ Hoffman v United States 341 U s 179 (1951) suggests such
legislation if Congres3 concludes the lleed is great enough
See too Comment The Privilege Against Se1f-Llcriminetion Versus
Lmnurdty Z Proposed Statutes P 41 Gt~orgetom L J 511 (1953)
S Rept 153 on S 16 83d Cone 1st sess ~ 1 ald 2
April 17 1953 Report of Sel1a~~e Commttee on the JudiciaJ J
Interlocking S-lbversion in GOYf11llent Departments tl July 30
1953 83d Cong 1st sess p 50
~ HcfI1nan v Unitet States 341 u s 479 486 (1951)
50 Id U1ited States v ~isman 111 F 2d 260 262 (2 Cir 1950)
51 Note 61 Yale L J 105 109 (1952)
52 Rogers v United States 340 u s 367 375 (1951)
211 See e g Blau v Unjted StaIe~ 340 u s 159 (1950)
-shy54 Note J Co1t3resnic1al Inv estigat1ons--Self-Illcrimimtion Condemneshy
tiOll and Fair Hcar1ngll 22 U of Cinn L R 193 199-200 (1953)
55 See ~ovTn8end v ~~it~~ta~~3 95 F 2d 352 351 (DC Cir 1938)
cert denied 303 u S 664 (1938)
56 Byse TfA Report on the Pennsylvana Loyalty Act 101 U of Fa
L R 480 481-1~84 (1953) Wright Should Teachers Testify
Saturday Review Sept 2o 1953 p 23
57 See Meltzer Required Records The McCarran Act and The Privilege
Against Selfmiddotmiddot Incriminat ion ll 19 U of Chi L R 687 722 (1951)
y 83d Cong 1st Seas 1953 Also known as the Kefauver BUl
59 ~ v ltlalker 161 U S 591 (1896)
sect21 S 16 83d Cong 1st sess 1953 passed the Senate July 9 1953
after extensive debate Cong Ree 8646-8663 July 9 1953shy
S 16 amends B 3486 of Title 18 Sec 3486 presently furnishes
witnesses immunity from prosecution tor testimony before either
House or their Committees It appears to suffer from the same
deficiency present in a similar statute condemned in Counse~an v
Hitchcock 142 u s 547 (1892) S 16 is intended to StWP1y the
omission in the Hitchcock ease by providing not only that a
witness testimony may not be used against him but that such
witness shall be iImnune with respect to lIany transaction mtter
or thing concerning which he has been compelled to testIfy
sect 83d Congo 1st sess 1953
~ S Rept 153 83d Congo 1st sess p 2 (1953)
63 See Comment The Privi1ege Against Self-Incrimination Versus
Immunity Proposed statutes 41 Georgetown L J 511 523 (1953)
64 Supra footnote 7shy
sectif Delanel v ~ed States 199 F 2d 107 (1 Ci~ 1952)
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
for the Attorney General who has immediate knowledge of a criminals
background and propensities to decide whether immunity should be
granted for such a person To allow the Attorney General to participate
in the ultimate decision aa to whether immunity should be granted would
not impair Congressional investigatIons in the fields of internal
security crime and corruption Nor would it discourage witnesses
from providing information of importance to the investigation if the
Attorney Generals permission vas required before immunity was granted
On the other hand if these Bills were enacted in their present
form they might subject members of Congress to undue pressures for
granting immunity to criminals who are ineligible to receive it Also
they cuuld very easily cause embarrassment to Congress by tmped1ng or
blocking prosecutions planned by the Department of Justice on any matter 63
even incidentally testified to upon these 1nvestigations
The unfortunate experience which Congress had as far back as 1857 64
in granting immunity without concurrence of the Attorney General - should
~each that a similar course of action may be marked by eveD greater
failure today_ The witness might readily turn this division of authority
between Congress and the Department of Justice to his advantage by
obtaining an ~unity from the legislative committee or from Congress
over the objection of the Attorney General Thereafter he would be
free to testify concerning a broad area Of activities without fear that
he could be held to account criminally for other violations however
unrelated to the matter under investigation
Thus for example a Congreas1onal Committee or Congress might
furnish immunity to a person to obtain his testimony about his illicit
traffic in slot machine opercltlons between states This person may also
be guilty either of espionage or subversion or of selling narcotics to
youngs cers as to which an indictment is soon to be obtained To foreshy
close prosecution on these more serious crimes the witness would be
glad to volunteer information on his other activities if he knew in
advance that immunity would fallow for all of them Therefore greatest
care must be exercioed in granting immunity and then only upon a fully
informed judgment of all tle facts The Departlnent of Justice would
of course through the Fe~eral Bureau of Investigation the Crtmlnal
and Tax Divisions and the United states Attorneyo I offices be mosmiddott
likely to know the facts and the plans for prosecution Concurrence
by the Attorney General in conferring the immunity would also enable
the Department of Justice to maintuin its responsibility for the proper
administration of the crlminal law
The provision in S 10 for one weeks notice to the Attorney General
of the proposed grant of immunity does not fully cure this Bill of its
weakness in failing to require his affirmative concurrence in every
case Experience indicates that at times the views of the person who
1s charged with prooecut1ng criminals are disregarded by Congressional
Committees For example the successful criminal conviction obtained
by the Department of Justice ot the internal revenue collector in one of
the largest cities was recently nullified because of the action of a
House Committee in holding 1middotr1dely publicized hearings in the district in
65 which the trial subsequently took place These hearings took place
over the strong objection of the Department of Justice thut the pro
posed hearing would be of prejudice to the defendant on the trial
which was about to be initiated and would injure the Governments case
in disclosing its evidence In reversing the convlct1on l Chief Judge
Magruder observed that the character of the defendant was blackened
and discredited as the day of trial approached because of the publicity
invited and stimulated by the Committee over the radio and television
Thu6 1 mere advance notIfication to the Attorney General of a proposed
grant of tmmunity would never be a guarantee that the Committee would
be guided by the views of the Attorney General
S 16 and H R 2737 would also more readily carry out the aim of
obtaining evidence against leaders of subversion and criminal entershy
prisesj if provision for twmunity were granted to obtain testimony
not only before Congressional Committees but likewise before courts
and grand juries
For these reasons it is my opinion that if any measure is to be
enacted~~rmitting the granting of immunity to witnesses before either
House of Congress or its committees it should vest the Attorney General
or the Attorney General acting with the concurren~e of appropriate members
of Congress with the authority to grant such tmmunity and if the test shy
mony is sought for a court or grand jury that the Attorney General alone
be authorized to grant the ilmnunity
There remain for discussion two principal objections to this proshy
posed legislation which may be briefly considered here One objection
1s that when a witneAS is compelled to testify even under the protecshy
tion of immunity from criminal punihment) he is not relieved from
personal disgrace ~~lhich attach~8 to the exposure of his crime The
answer to this objection ia contained in II land mark decision of the 66
Supreme Court in Brown v Wrtlker
The design of tbe constitutional plivilege is not to aid the
witness in vindicating his character but to protect him
against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict him
of a criminal charge If he secure legal jnmllnity from prose-
cution the possible impairment of his good name is a penalty
which it is reasonable b0 should be compelled to pay for the
common good
The reasoning of this decision has never been qU~Gtioned and has 67
only recently been approved by the Sllpreme Court
The other chief objection to the proposed legislation is that while
a witness may receive itmlunity from federal prosecution) he may still
be subject to IJrosecution under ~tate lavl The Supreme Court has held
that this is not a valid objection to federal immunity laws~ since the
self-incrimination clause ln the Fifth Amendment operates ao a l1mitashy68
tion on the federal government only In United states v Murdock the
defendant was indicted for refUSing to answer questions of a revenue
agent relating to ctrt8 in income tax returns The refusal was ba sed on
the plea that hiD answers might 1ncrim1nate him in a state court The
Court said on this point
This court ha~ held that immunity against state prosecution is
not essential to the validity of federal statutes declaring that
a witnes3 shall not be excllpoundied from gtring evidence on the
ground that it vTill incriminate him and also that the ladt of
state power to give witnesses protection against federal
prosecution does not defeat a state immunity statute
Similarly a witness befo~e a state tribunal CBnnot refuse to 69
answer because of the threat of federal prosecution - However the
Federal District Court in Ohio recently held i1 Unted States v 70
Di Carlo that the defendant had the right to assert his privilege
because of possible prosecution under state law since the Senate
committee was authorized to investigate violations not only of the lawe 71
of the United States but also of the states M_ The Murdock case was
dtstingJished urlon the ground that the danger of state posecution 1n
that case was remote and uncertain thile in the Di Carlo case the
danger of state proaecutjon WilS imminent and real 72
The ---Di Carlo case has been received -lith mixed commelt It has73
not been followed so far as we k~ow- It appears to be contrary to deshy
cis10ns of co~~rts of appeals which have consistently adhered to the prinshy74
ciples of the Murdock case- In my opinion this decision of a district
court aoes not detract from the binding effect ofthe Supreme Courts deshy
eision in the Murdock case
The Department of Justice will recommend to the Congress in Jlouary
an immunity bill of the type I have descri-ced which protects the const1shy
tutional privileges ot witnesses before Congressional Committees courts
and juries but will at the some time aid materially in stamping out
criminal and subversive activities
Footnote Referet~es to Ad~res El~ited ~------ ___bull
Immunity From Prcsecuticn
Versus
Privilege Agaiust Self-Incrimination
Pittman liThe Colonial and Constitutional History of the
Privilege Against Sel-Incrimiootion 1n Amcicaff 21 Va
L R 763 764 770-773 (1935) Corwin The Supreme
Court I S Corctl~ction of the Self Incrirnination C1ause lf
29 lId~h L R 1 512 (1930) Ap~licability of
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to Legjslative
y Pittmenf2 at 774
~ ~ining v ~~8ey 211 U S 78 92 (1908)
L Id at 91
~ 34th Ceng 3d sess Globe PI 427 433 1-45 See
Eberling Constitutional Investigations pp 304-315shy
7 Eberling d at 320-323
~I 142 U s 547 (1892) This Act of 1862 revised an old
statute into two new sections by an amendment which
sought to insure that a witness who testified before
a federal grand jt~ or court (R s I 860 (1875raquo or
a Congressional Committee (R S B 859 (1875raquo would
not be later subjected to the use of his testimony in
any criminal proceeding aGainst him Section ~ 860 of
the amendment dealing with grand jurtes and courts came
under attack in Counselman v Hitchcock J supra and was
held to be invalid Since this part of the immunity proshy
vision tailed to accomplish ita purpose Congress repealed
it in 1910 (36 Stat 352 (19l0raquo) Congress apparently felt
that S 859 applying to Congressional Committees was still
of value and left it 1n force to this date (a s I 859
(1875) as amended 52 Stat 943 (1938) 18 usc e3486
(Supp V 1952)j see liThe Privilege Against Self
Incrimination versus Immunity Proposed Statutes 41
Georgetown L J 511 514 (1953) United States v ~
339 U s 323 335-337 (1950)
21 It read in patt as follows
No person shall be prosecuted for or on
account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he may testify or produce evidence
Act of Feb 11 1893 c 83 27 stat 443 49 USCA
I 46 See too ~ v United States 337 u S 137 146shy
147 (1949)middot Notet Denying -the Privilege against Self
Incrimination to Public Officers 64 Barv L R 987
988 (1951)
- 101 161 U s 591 (1896)
Shapiro v United St~~ 335 U S 1 6-7 (1948) where various
statutes are collated in the footnote The customary provision
in these statutes provides as follows No person shall be
excused from complying with any requirements ot this section
because of his privilege aga1nst self-incriminationgt but the
immunity provisions of the COmptuBory Testimony Act of
February 11 1893 shall apply with respect to allY 1nd1shy
vidual who specifically claims such pr1Y11ege tt
12 Rapacz ULimiting the Plea of Self-Incr1m1nat1ontl 20 Georgetown
L J 329 353 (1932) see footnote 3 of ~ v Connect~
302 U s 319 326 (1937) NPte liThe Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination the Doctr1ne of Waiver 61 Yale L J 104 110
(1952) middot
~f Palko v Connecticut 302 U s 319 326 (1937)
~ See dissents of Mr Justices Shiras Gray and White in ~ V4
Walker supra 161 U s 630638 Cf dissent of Mr Justice
Black in Ro~ers v United States 340 U s 367 376 (1950)
15 Potts Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for ContemptU I
74 U of Pa L R 691 780 (1926) L1acos uRights of Witnesses
Before Congressional Committees 33 Boston U L R 337 340
(1953) middot
t6 Liacos Id at 31tl
17 McGeary rlThe DeTelopmen-cs of Congressional Investigative Power ll
p 23 (1940) McGrain v Daughel~l 273 u s 135 (1927)
18 Sinclair v Unfted States~ 279 U s 263 (1929) ~arsba11 v
Unit~~State~ 176 F 2d 473 (nc Cir 1949) 2 Usc ~ 192
(Supp 1950)
19 Ne York City Bar Ass t n Committee on the Bill of Rights Report
on Congressional Committees presented December 14 1948 p 1
gQi Galloway PCong18ss1onal Investigations Proposed Reforms lt
18 U of Chi L R 478 479-481 (1951)
21 Dilliard lICongress1onal Investigations The Role of the Press
18 U of ChL L R 585 J 587 (1951)
22 Edgerton J dissenting in Barsky v United States 167 F 2d
241 252 (nc eir 1948) cert denied 334 U s 843 (1948)
petition for rehearing denied 339 U S 971 (1951)
~3 De Jonge v Oregon 299 U s 353 364 365 (1937)
24 Id
25 6 Richardson lIMes sOges and Papers of the Pres idents t 1 p 23
July 4 1861
26 See United St~~ v ~~phson 165 F 2d 82 (2 Cir 1947)
cert denied 333 u S 838 (1948) Lawson v United states
176 F 2d 49 (nc Cir 1949) cel~ denied 339 u s 934
(1950) Barsty Y ~ited S~ 167 F 2d 241 (DC eir
1948) cert denied 334 u s 843 (1948) MCGrain v Daugherty
273 u s 135 (1927) and cf Rumely v United States J 197
F 2d 166 (DC eir 1952) affd 73 s ct 543 (1953)
JJ B1a~ v ~~ted Sttlt~s 340 u s 159 (1950-)
gsectJ ~~ v United States 31~1 U s 479 (1951) See too
sectingleton v United States 343 U s 944 (1952) Note Recent
Extensions of the Witness Privilege Against Self-Incrim1nationll
53 Col L R 275 (1953)
29 Aiuppa v Un1tc~ states 201 F 2d 287 300 (6 eir 1952)
_I30 Note nMandatory Dismissal of Public Persol1nel and The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination 101 U ot Pa L R 1190 1191
fn 8 (1953)
31 Brown Be Fassett Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar
20 u or Chi L R 480 483 (1953)
32 Garner v Los Angeles Board) 341 u s 716 (1951) Gerende v
Board of Supervisors 341 U s 56 (1951) but com~are Wieman v
Updegraff 341~ U s 83 (1953)
34 See footnote 32
35 PG~ v Boa-roo of Education 31~2 U s 435 (1951)
ID Id at 493
38 Sec 9(h of lihe LalJor Management Rlations Act of 1947 29 USCA
St1Pp III Sec 141 Sec 159(b)
39 ft~rican C~~catons Association v ~uda 339 u S 382 (1950)
sustaining the validity of Sec 9(h) against the challenge that it
violated the First c-lT~nc1tlCiltl Ex Post FtiCto Lals and other iul1dashy
mental rights
40 Executive Order No 10450 issued Aporil zr 1953 (18 F R 2lt89)
41 Executive Orrler No 10491 issued Ocmiddottober 13 1953 (18 F R 6583)
~ Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary Interlocking Subshy
vcrs ion in Covernmcnt De~rtments II 83d Cong 1st ses5 Juy 30 J
1953 p 21 Being a cOImllunist is not a crime under federal law J
although it is in some states (see Liacos supra note 15 at
375) The Smith Act (18 USC Sec 2385 et seq) mkes advoshy
eating or teaching the violent overthrOf of any goverrment of the
United States or being a member of such a group and kno7ing its
purpose~a federal crime
43 See EaSley v F~cbardsonJ 182 F 2d 46 (DC 1950)J affd by an
evenly diiied court 341 TJ s 918 (1951) 1Etshingto v McGrath
182 F 2d 375 (DC 1950) aff1d 341 U s 923 (1951)j Or~~ v
vIil1ougbby 345 U s 83 91 (1953) Mr Justice Douglas concurring
i~ ~tiFascist Commi~~ v ~~EJ 341 U s 123 -182-183 (1951)
United Public W0rkers v --~1itcbell 330 U s 75 (1947)j Angilly - v
United States 199 F 2d 642) 644 (1950) cf NcAuliffe v rlew
Bedford 155 Mass 216 29 NE 517 (le9~) per Holmes J liThe
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but
he h(=l~s no constitltioi1al right to be a policezranu (Id at 220
29 NE at 5J7)
44 v1ie~sn _
v UpGegaff middot111 ~
3~middot4 u s 83 (1953) The Court ruleri as
contrry to due process the Cklahoma loyalty oath statute forshy
bidding IJ1l11ic emplo~rment of Persons who belonzea to certain
organizations regarciless of their knowledge of the character of
those oreenizations because of the indiscriminate classification
of lnnocent with kno~vilg activityll (d at 91)
~1 345 u S 83 (1953)middot
46 Id at 90
47 339 u s 3827 412 (1950) sustaininG the non-corJlIlunist affidavit
requirernelt of union leaders under the Taft -Hartley Act
~ Hoffman v United States 341 U s 179 (1951) suggests such
legislation if Congres3 concludes the lleed is great enough
See too Comment The Privilege Against Se1f-Llcriminetion Versus
Lmnurdty Z Proposed Statutes P 41 Gt~orgetom L J 511 (1953)
S Rept 153 on S 16 83d Cone 1st sess ~ 1 ald 2
April 17 1953 Report of Sel1a~~e Commttee on the JudiciaJ J
Interlocking S-lbversion in GOYf11llent Departments tl July 30
1953 83d Cong 1st sess p 50
~ HcfI1nan v Unitet States 341 u s 479 486 (1951)
50 Id U1ited States v ~isman 111 F 2d 260 262 (2 Cir 1950)
51 Note 61 Yale L J 105 109 (1952)
52 Rogers v United States 340 u s 367 375 (1951)
211 See e g Blau v Unjted StaIe~ 340 u s 159 (1950)
-shy54 Note J Co1t3resnic1al Inv estigat1ons--Self-Illcrimimtion Condemneshy
tiOll and Fair Hcar1ngll 22 U of Cinn L R 193 199-200 (1953)
55 See ~ovTn8end v ~~it~~ta~~3 95 F 2d 352 351 (DC Cir 1938)
cert denied 303 u S 664 (1938)
56 Byse TfA Report on the Pennsylvana Loyalty Act 101 U of Fa
L R 480 481-1~84 (1953) Wright Should Teachers Testify
Saturday Review Sept 2o 1953 p 23
57 See Meltzer Required Records The McCarran Act and The Privilege
Against Selfmiddotmiddot Incriminat ion ll 19 U of Chi L R 687 722 (1951)
y 83d Cong 1st Seas 1953 Also known as the Kefauver BUl
59 ~ v ltlalker 161 U S 591 (1896)
sect21 S 16 83d Cong 1st sess 1953 passed the Senate July 9 1953
after extensive debate Cong Ree 8646-8663 July 9 1953shy
S 16 amends B 3486 of Title 18 Sec 3486 presently furnishes
witnesses immunity from prosecution tor testimony before either
House or their Committees It appears to suffer from the same
deficiency present in a similar statute condemned in Counse~an v
Hitchcock 142 u s 547 (1892) S 16 is intended to StWP1y the
omission in the Hitchcock ease by providing not only that a
witness testimony may not be used against him but that such
witness shall be iImnune with respect to lIany transaction mtter
or thing concerning which he has been compelled to testIfy
sect 83d Congo 1st sess 1953
~ S Rept 153 83d Congo 1st sess p 2 (1953)
63 See Comment The Privi1ege Against Self-Incrimination Versus
Immunity Proposed statutes 41 Georgetown L J 511 523 (1953)
64 Supra footnote 7shy
sectif Delanel v ~ed States 199 F 2d 107 (1 Ci~ 1952)
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
Thus for example a Congreas1onal Committee or Congress might
furnish immunity to a person to obtain his testimony about his illicit
traffic in slot machine opercltlons between states This person may also
be guilty either of espionage or subversion or of selling narcotics to
youngs cers as to which an indictment is soon to be obtained To foreshy
close prosecution on these more serious crimes the witness would be
glad to volunteer information on his other activities if he knew in
advance that immunity would fallow for all of them Therefore greatest
care must be exercioed in granting immunity and then only upon a fully
informed judgment of all tle facts The Departlnent of Justice would
of course through the Fe~eral Bureau of Investigation the Crtmlnal
and Tax Divisions and the United states Attorneyo I offices be mosmiddott
likely to know the facts and the plans for prosecution Concurrence
by the Attorney General in conferring the immunity would also enable
the Department of Justice to maintuin its responsibility for the proper
administration of the crlminal law
The provision in S 10 for one weeks notice to the Attorney General
of the proposed grant of immunity does not fully cure this Bill of its
weakness in failing to require his affirmative concurrence in every
case Experience indicates that at times the views of the person who
1s charged with prooecut1ng criminals are disregarded by Congressional
Committees For example the successful criminal conviction obtained
by the Department of Justice ot the internal revenue collector in one of
the largest cities was recently nullified because of the action of a
House Committee in holding 1middotr1dely publicized hearings in the district in
65 which the trial subsequently took place These hearings took place
over the strong objection of the Department of Justice thut the pro
posed hearing would be of prejudice to the defendant on the trial
which was about to be initiated and would injure the Governments case
in disclosing its evidence In reversing the convlct1on l Chief Judge
Magruder observed that the character of the defendant was blackened
and discredited as the day of trial approached because of the publicity
invited and stimulated by the Committee over the radio and television
Thu6 1 mere advance notIfication to the Attorney General of a proposed
grant of tmmunity would never be a guarantee that the Committee would
be guided by the views of the Attorney General
S 16 and H R 2737 would also more readily carry out the aim of
obtaining evidence against leaders of subversion and criminal entershy
prisesj if provision for twmunity were granted to obtain testimony
not only before Congressional Committees but likewise before courts
and grand juries
For these reasons it is my opinion that if any measure is to be
enacted~~rmitting the granting of immunity to witnesses before either
House of Congress or its committees it should vest the Attorney General
or the Attorney General acting with the concurren~e of appropriate members
of Congress with the authority to grant such tmmunity and if the test shy
mony is sought for a court or grand jury that the Attorney General alone
be authorized to grant the ilmnunity
There remain for discussion two principal objections to this proshy
posed legislation which may be briefly considered here One objection
1s that when a witneAS is compelled to testify even under the protecshy
tion of immunity from criminal punihment) he is not relieved from
personal disgrace ~~lhich attach~8 to the exposure of his crime The
answer to this objection ia contained in II land mark decision of the 66
Supreme Court in Brown v Wrtlker
The design of tbe constitutional plivilege is not to aid the
witness in vindicating his character but to protect him
against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict him
of a criminal charge If he secure legal jnmllnity from prose-
cution the possible impairment of his good name is a penalty
which it is reasonable b0 should be compelled to pay for the
common good
The reasoning of this decision has never been qU~Gtioned and has 67
only recently been approved by the Sllpreme Court
The other chief objection to the proposed legislation is that while
a witness may receive itmlunity from federal prosecution) he may still
be subject to IJrosecution under ~tate lavl The Supreme Court has held
that this is not a valid objection to federal immunity laws~ since the
self-incrimination clause ln the Fifth Amendment operates ao a l1mitashy68
tion on the federal government only In United states v Murdock the
defendant was indicted for refUSing to answer questions of a revenue
agent relating to ctrt8 in income tax returns The refusal was ba sed on
the plea that hiD answers might 1ncrim1nate him in a state court The
Court said on this point
This court ha~ held that immunity against state prosecution is
not essential to the validity of federal statutes declaring that
a witnes3 shall not be excllpoundied from gtring evidence on the
ground that it vTill incriminate him and also that the ladt of
state power to give witnesses protection against federal
prosecution does not defeat a state immunity statute
Similarly a witness befo~e a state tribunal CBnnot refuse to 69
answer because of the threat of federal prosecution - However the
Federal District Court in Ohio recently held i1 Unted States v 70
Di Carlo that the defendant had the right to assert his privilege
because of possible prosecution under state law since the Senate
committee was authorized to investigate violations not only of the lawe 71
of the United States but also of the states M_ The Murdock case was
dtstingJished urlon the ground that the danger of state posecution 1n
that case was remote and uncertain thile in the Di Carlo case the
danger of state proaecutjon WilS imminent and real 72
The ---Di Carlo case has been received -lith mixed commelt It has73
not been followed so far as we k~ow- It appears to be contrary to deshy
cis10ns of co~~rts of appeals which have consistently adhered to the prinshy74
ciples of the Murdock case- In my opinion this decision of a district
court aoes not detract from the binding effect ofthe Supreme Courts deshy
eision in the Murdock case
The Department of Justice will recommend to the Congress in Jlouary
an immunity bill of the type I have descri-ced which protects the const1shy
tutional privileges ot witnesses before Congressional Committees courts
and juries but will at the some time aid materially in stamping out
criminal and subversive activities
Footnote Referet~es to Ad~res El~ited ~------ ___bull
Immunity From Prcsecuticn
Versus
Privilege Agaiust Self-Incrimination
Pittman liThe Colonial and Constitutional History of the
Privilege Against Sel-Incrimiootion 1n Amcicaff 21 Va
L R 763 764 770-773 (1935) Corwin The Supreme
Court I S Corctl~ction of the Self Incrirnination C1ause lf
29 lId~h L R 1 512 (1930) Ap~licability of
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to Legjslative
y Pittmenf2 at 774
~ ~ining v ~~8ey 211 U S 78 92 (1908)
L Id at 91
~ 34th Ceng 3d sess Globe PI 427 433 1-45 See
Eberling Constitutional Investigations pp 304-315shy
7 Eberling d at 320-323
~I 142 U s 547 (1892) This Act of 1862 revised an old
statute into two new sections by an amendment which
sought to insure that a witness who testified before
a federal grand jt~ or court (R s I 860 (1875raquo or
a Congressional Committee (R S B 859 (1875raquo would
not be later subjected to the use of his testimony in
any criminal proceeding aGainst him Section ~ 860 of
the amendment dealing with grand jurtes and courts came
under attack in Counselman v Hitchcock J supra and was
held to be invalid Since this part of the immunity proshy
vision tailed to accomplish ita purpose Congress repealed
it in 1910 (36 Stat 352 (19l0raquo) Congress apparently felt
that S 859 applying to Congressional Committees was still
of value and left it 1n force to this date (a s I 859
(1875) as amended 52 Stat 943 (1938) 18 usc e3486
(Supp V 1952)j see liThe Privilege Against Self
Incrimination versus Immunity Proposed Statutes 41
Georgetown L J 511 514 (1953) United States v ~
339 U s 323 335-337 (1950)
21 It read in patt as follows
No person shall be prosecuted for or on
account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he may testify or produce evidence
Act of Feb 11 1893 c 83 27 stat 443 49 USCA
I 46 See too ~ v United States 337 u S 137 146shy
147 (1949)middot Notet Denying -the Privilege against Self
Incrimination to Public Officers 64 Barv L R 987
988 (1951)
- 101 161 U s 591 (1896)
Shapiro v United St~~ 335 U S 1 6-7 (1948) where various
statutes are collated in the footnote The customary provision
in these statutes provides as follows No person shall be
excused from complying with any requirements ot this section
because of his privilege aga1nst self-incriminationgt but the
immunity provisions of the COmptuBory Testimony Act of
February 11 1893 shall apply with respect to allY 1nd1shy
vidual who specifically claims such pr1Y11ege tt
12 Rapacz ULimiting the Plea of Self-Incr1m1nat1ontl 20 Georgetown
L J 329 353 (1932) see footnote 3 of ~ v Connect~
302 U s 319 326 (1937) NPte liThe Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination the Doctr1ne of Waiver 61 Yale L J 104 110
(1952) middot
~f Palko v Connecticut 302 U s 319 326 (1937)
~ See dissents of Mr Justices Shiras Gray and White in ~ V4
Walker supra 161 U s 630638 Cf dissent of Mr Justice
Black in Ro~ers v United States 340 U s 367 376 (1950)
15 Potts Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for ContemptU I
74 U of Pa L R 691 780 (1926) L1acos uRights of Witnesses
Before Congressional Committees 33 Boston U L R 337 340
(1953) middot
t6 Liacos Id at 31tl
17 McGeary rlThe DeTelopmen-cs of Congressional Investigative Power ll
p 23 (1940) McGrain v Daughel~l 273 u s 135 (1927)
18 Sinclair v Unfted States~ 279 U s 263 (1929) ~arsba11 v
Unit~~State~ 176 F 2d 473 (nc Cir 1949) 2 Usc ~ 192
(Supp 1950)
19 Ne York City Bar Ass t n Committee on the Bill of Rights Report
on Congressional Committees presented December 14 1948 p 1
gQi Galloway PCong18ss1onal Investigations Proposed Reforms lt
18 U of Chi L R 478 479-481 (1951)
21 Dilliard lICongress1onal Investigations The Role of the Press
18 U of ChL L R 585 J 587 (1951)
22 Edgerton J dissenting in Barsky v United States 167 F 2d
241 252 (nc eir 1948) cert denied 334 U s 843 (1948)
petition for rehearing denied 339 U S 971 (1951)
~3 De Jonge v Oregon 299 U s 353 364 365 (1937)
24 Id
25 6 Richardson lIMes sOges and Papers of the Pres idents t 1 p 23
July 4 1861
26 See United St~~ v ~~phson 165 F 2d 82 (2 Cir 1947)
cert denied 333 u S 838 (1948) Lawson v United states
176 F 2d 49 (nc Cir 1949) cel~ denied 339 u s 934
(1950) Barsty Y ~ited S~ 167 F 2d 241 (DC eir
1948) cert denied 334 u s 843 (1948) MCGrain v Daugherty
273 u s 135 (1927) and cf Rumely v United States J 197
F 2d 166 (DC eir 1952) affd 73 s ct 543 (1953)
JJ B1a~ v ~~ted Sttlt~s 340 u s 159 (1950-)
gsectJ ~~ v United States 31~1 U s 479 (1951) See too
sectingleton v United States 343 U s 944 (1952) Note Recent
Extensions of the Witness Privilege Against Self-Incrim1nationll
53 Col L R 275 (1953)
29 Aiuppa v Un1tc~ states 201 F 2d 287 300 (6 eir 1952)
_I30 Note nMandatory Dismissal of Public Persol1nel and The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination 101 U ot Pa L R 1190 1191
fn 8 (1953)
31 Brown Be Fassett Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar
20 u or Chi L R 480 483 (1953)
32 Garner v Los Angeles Board) 341 u s 716 (1951) Gerende v
Board of Supervisors 341 U s 56 (1951) but com~are Wieman v
Updegraff 341~ U s 83 (1953)
34 See footnote 32
35 PG~ v Boa-roo of Education 31~2 U s 435 (1951)
ID Id at 493
38 Sec 9(h of lihe LalJor Management Rlations Act of 1947 29 USCA
St1Pp III Sec 141 Sec 159(b)
39 ft~rican C~~catons Association v ~uda 339 u S 382 (1950)
sustaining the validity of Sec 9(h) against the challenge that it
violated the First c-lT~nc1tlCiltl Ex Post FtiCto Lals and other iul1dashy
mental rights
40 Executive Order No 10450 issued Aporil zr 1953 (18 F R 2lt89)
41 Executive Orrler No 10491 issued Ocmiddottober 13 1953 (18 F R 6583)
~ Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary Interlocking Subshy
vcrs ion in Covernmcnt De~rtments II 83d Cong 1st ses5 Juy 30 J
1953 p 21 Being a cOImllunist is not a crime under federal law J
although it is in some states (see Liacos supra note 15 at
375) The Smith Act (18 USC Sec 2385 et seq) mkes advoshy
eating or teaching the violent overthrOf of any goverrment of the
United States or being a member of such a group and kno7ing its
purpose~a federal crime
43 See EaSley v F~cbardsonJ 182 F 2d 46 (DC 1950)J affd by an
evenly diiied court 341 TJ s 918 (1951) 1Etshingto v McGrath
182 F 2d 375 (DC 1950) aff1d 341 U s 923 (1951)j Or~~ v
vIil1ougbby 345 U s 83 91 (1953) Mr Justice Douglas concurring
i~ ~tiFascist Commi~~ v ~~EJ 341 U s 123 -182-183 (1951)
United Public W0rkers v --~1itcbell 330 U s 75 (1947)j Angilly - v
United States 199 F 2d 642) 644 (1950) cf NcAuliffe v rlew
Bedford 155 Mass 216 29 NE 517 (le9~) per Holmes J liThe
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but
he h(=l~s no constitltioi1al right to be a policezranu (Id at 220
29 NE at 5J7)
44 v1ie~sn _
v UpGegaff middot111 ~
3~middot4 u s 83 (1953) The Court ruleri as
contrry to due process the Cklahoma loyalty oath statute forshy
bidding IJ1l11ic emplo~rment of Persons who belonzea to certain
organizations regarciless of their knowledge of the character of
those oreenizations because of the indiscriminate classification
of lnnocent with kno~vilg activityll (d at 91)
~1 345 u S 83 (1953)middot
46 Id at 90
47 339 u s 3827 412 (1950) sustaininG the non-corJlIlunist affidavit
requirernelt of union leaders under the Taft -Hartley Act
~ Hoffman v United States 341 U s 179 (1951) suggests such
legislation if Congres3 concludes the lleed is great enough
See too Comment The Privilege Against Se1f-Llcriminetion Versus
Lmnurdty Z Proposed Statutes P 41 Gt~orgetom L J 511 (1953)
S Rept 153 on S 16 83d Cone 1st sess ~ 1 ald 2
April 17 1953 Report of Sel1a~~e Commttee on the JudiciaJ J
Interlocking S-lbversion in GOYf11llent Departments tl July 30
1953 83d Cong 1st sess p 50
~ HcfI1nan v Unitet States 341 u s 479 486 (1951)
50 Id U1ited States v ~isman 111 F 2d 260 262 (2 Cir 1950)
51 Note 61 Yale L J 105 109 (1952)
52 Rogers v United States 340 u s 367 375 (1951)
211 See e g Blau v Unjted StaIe~ 340 u s 159 (1950)
-shy54 Note J Co1t3resnic1al Inv estigat1ons--Self-Illcrimimtion Condemneshy
tiOll and Fair Hcar1ngll 22 U of Cinn L R 193 199-200 (1953)
55 See ~ovTn8end v ~~it~~ta~~3 95 F 2d 352 351 (DC Cir 1938)
cert denied 303 u S 664 (1938)
56 Byse TfA Report on the Pennsylvana Loyalty Act 101 U of Fa
L R 480 481-1~84 (1953) Wright Should Teachers Testify
Saturday Review Sept 2o 1953 p 23
57 See Meltzer Required Records The McCarran Act and The Privilege
Against Selfmiddotmiddot Incriminat ion ll 19 U of Chi L R 687 722 (1951)
y 83d Cong 1st Seas 1953 Also known as the Kefauver BUl
59 ~ v ltlalker 161 U S 591 (1896)
sect21 S 16 83d Cong 1st sess 1953 passed the Senate July 9 1953
after extensive debate Cong Ree 8646-8663 July 9 1953shy
S 16 amends B 3486 of Title 18 Sec 3486 presently furnishes
witnesses immunity from prosecution tor testimony before either
House or their Committees It appears to suffer from the same
deficiency present in a similar statute condemned in Counse~an v
Hitchcock 142 u s 547 (1892) S 16 is intended to StWP1y the
omission in the Hitchcock ease by providing not only that a
witness testimony may not be used against him but that such
witness shall be iImnune with respect to lIany transaction mtter
or thing concerning which he has been compelled to testIfy
sect 83d Congo 1st sess 1953
~ S Rept 153 83d Congo 1st sess p 2 (1953)
63 See Comment The Privi1ege Against Self-Incrimination Versus
Immunity Proposed statutes 41 Georgetown L J 511 523 (1953)
64 Supra footnote 7shy
sectif Delanel v ~ed States 199 F 2d 107 (1 Ci~ 1952)
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
65 which the trial subsequently took place These hearings took place
over the strong objection of the Department of Justice thut the pro
posed hearing would be of prejudice to the defendant on the trial
which was about to be initiated and would injure the Governments case
in disclosing its evidence In reversing the convlct1on l Chief Judge
Magruder observed that the character of the defendant was blackened
and discredited as the day of trial approached because of the publicity
invited and stimulated by the Committee over the radio and television
Thu6 1 mere advance notIfication to the Attorney General of a proposed
grant of tmmunity would never be a guarantee that the Committee would
be guided by the views of the Attorney General
S 16 and H R 2737 would also more readily carry out the aim of
obtaining evidence against leaders of subversion and criminal entershy
prisesj if provision for twmunity were granted to obtain testimony
not only before Congressional Committees but likewise before courts
and grand juries
For these reasons it is my opinion that if any measure is to be
enacted~~rmitting the granting of immunity to witnesses before either
House of Congress or its committees it should vest the Attorney General
or the Attorney General acting with the concurren~e of appropriate members
of Congress with the authority to grant such tmmunity and if the test shy
mony is sought for a court or grand jury that the Attorney General alone
be authorized to grant the ilmnunity
There remain for discussion two principal objections to this proshy
posed legislation which may be briefly considered here One objection
1s that when a witneAS is compelled to testify even under the protecshy
tion of immunity from criminal punihment) he is not relieved from
personal disgrace ~~lhich attach~8 to the exposure of his crime The
answer to this objection ia contained in II land mark decision of the 66
Supreme Court in Brown v Wrtlker
The design of tbe constitutional plivilege is not to aid the
witness in vindicating his character but to protect him
against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict him
of a criminal charge If he secure legal jnmllnity from prose-
cution the possible impairment of his good name is a penalty
which it is reasonable b0 should be compelled to pay for the
common good
The reasoning of this decision has never been qU~Gtioned and has 67
only recently been approved by the Sllpreme Court
The other chief objection to the proposed legislation is that while
a witness may receive itmlunity from federal prosecution) he may still
be subject to IJrosecution under ~tate lavl The Supreme Court has held
that this is not a valid objection to federal immunity laws~ since the
self-incrimination clause ln the Fifth Amendment operates ao a l1mitashy68
tion on the federal government only In United states v Murdock the
defendant was indicted for refUSing to answer questions of a revenue
agent relating to ctrt8 in income tax returns The refusal was ba sed on
the plea that hiD answers might 1ncrim1nate him in a state court The
Court said on this point
This court ha~ held that immunity against state prosecution is
not essential to the validity of federal statutes declaring that
a witnes3 shall not be excllpoundied from gtring evidence on the
ground that it vTill incriminate him and also that the ladt of
state power to give witnesses protection against federal
prosecution does not defeat a state immunity statute
Similarly a witness befo~e a state tribunal CBnnot refuse to 69
answer because of the threat of federal prosecution - However the
Federal District Court in Ohio recently held i1 Unted States v 70
Di Carlo that the defendant had the right to assert his privilege
because of possible prosecution under state law since the Senate
committee was authorized to investigate violations not only of the lawe 71
of the United States but also of the states M_ The Murdock case was
dtstingJished urlon the ground that the danger of state posecution 1n
that case was remote and uncertain thile in the Di Carlo case the
danger of state proaecutjon WilS imminent and real 72
The ---Di Carlo case has been received -lith mixed commelt It has73
not been followed so far as we k~ow- It appears to be contrary to deshy
cis10ns of co~~rts of appeals which have consistently adhered to the prinshy74
ciples of the Murdock case- In my opinion this decision of a district
court aoes not detract from the binding effect ofthe Supreme Courts deshy
eision in the Murdock case
The Department of Justice will recommend to the Congress in Jlouary
an immunity bill of the type I have descri-ced which protects the const1shy
tutional privileges ot witnesses before Congressional Committees courts
and juries but will at the some time aid materially in stamping out
criminal and subversive activities
Footnote Referet~es to Ad~res El~ited ~------ ___bull
Immunity From Prcsecuticn
Versus
Privilege Agaiust Self-Incrimination
Pittman liThe Colonial and Constitutional History of the
Privilege Against Sel-Incrimiootion 1n Amcicaff 21 Va
L R 763 764 770-773 (1935) Corwin The Supreme
Court I S Corctl~ction of the Self Incrirnination C1ause lf
29 lId~h L R 1 512 (1930) Ap~licability of
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to Legjslative
y Pittmenf2 at 774
~ ~ining v ~~8ey 211 U S 78 92 (1908)
L Id at 91
~ 34th Ceng 3d sess Globe PI 427 433 1-45 See
Eberling Constitutional Investigations pp 304-315shy
7 Eberling d at 320-323
~I 142 U s 547 (1892) This Act of 1862 revised an old
statute into two new sections by an amendment which
sought to insure that a witness who testified before
a federal grand jt~ or court (R s I 860 (1875raquo or
a Congressional Committee (R S B 859 (1875raquo would
not be later subjected to the use of his testimony in
any criminal proceeding aGainst him Section ~ 860 of
the amendment dealing with grand jurtes and courts came
under attack in Counselman v Hitchcock J supra and was
held to be invalid Since this part of the immunity proshy
vision tailed to accomplish ita purpose Congress repealed
it in 1910 (36 Stat 352 (19l0raquo) Congress apparently felt
that S 859 applying to Congressional Committees was still
of value and left it 1n force to this date (a s I 859
(1875) as amended 52 Stat 943 (1938) 18 usc e3486
(Supp V 1952)j see liThe Privilege Against Self
Incrimination versus Immunity Proposed Statutes 41
Georgetown L J 511 514 (1953) United States v ~
339 U s 323 335-337 (1950)
21 It read in patt as follows
No person shall be prosecuted for or on
account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he may testify or produce evidence
Act of Feb 11 1893 c 83 27 stat 443 49 USCA
I 46 See too ~ v United States 337 u S 137 146shy
147 (1949)middot Notet Denying -the Privilege against Self
Incrimination to Public Officers 64 Barv L R 987
988 (1951)
- 101 161 U s 591 (1896)
Shapiro v United St~~ 335 U S 1 6-7 (1948) where various
statutes are collated in the footnote The customary provision
in these statutes provides as follows No person shall be
excused from complying with any requirements ot this section
because of his privilege aga1nst self-incriminationgt but the
immunity provisions of the COmptuBory Testimony Act of
February 11 1893 shall apply with respect to allY 1nd1shy
vidual who specifically claims such pr1Y11ege tt
12 Rapacz ULimiting the Plea of Self-Incr1m1nat1ontl 20 Georgetown
L J 329 353 (1932) see footnote 3 of ~ v Connect~
302 U s 319 326 (1937) NPte liThe Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination the Doctr1ne of Waiver 61 Yale L J 104 110
(1952) middot
~f Palko v Connecticut 302 U s 319 326 (1937)
~ See dissents of Mr Justices Shiras Gray and White in ~ V4
Walker supra 161 U s 630638 Cf dissent of Mr Justice
Black in Ro~ers v United States 340 U s 367 376 (1950)
15 Potts Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for ContemptU I
74 U of Pa L R 691 780 (1926) L1acos uRights of Witnesses
Before Congressional Committees 33 Boston U L R 337 340
(1953) middot
t6 Liacos Id at 31tl
17 McGeary rlThe DeTelopmen-cs of Congressional Investigative Power ll
p 23 (1940) McGrain v Daughel~l 273 u s 135 (1927)
18 Sinclair v Unfted States~ 279 U s 263 (1929) ~arsba11 v
Unit~~State~ 176 F 2d 473 (nc Cir 1949) 2 Usc ~ 192
(Supp 1950)
19 Ne York City Bar Ass t n Committee on the Bill of Rights Report
on Congressional Committees presented December 14 1948 p 1
gQi Galloway PCong18ss1onal Investigations Proposed Reforms lt
18 U of Chi L R 478 479-481 (1951)
21 Dilliard lICongress1onal Investigations The Role of the Press
18 U of ChL L R 585 J 587 (1951)
22 Edgerton J dissenting in Barsky v United States 167 F 2d
241 252 (nc eir 1948) cert denied 334 U s 843 (1948)
petition for rehearing denied 339 U S 971 (1951)
~3 De Jonge v Oregon 299 U s 353 364 365 (1937)
24 Id
25 6 Richardson lIMes sOges and Papers of the Pres idents t 1 p 23
July 4 1861
26 See United St~~ v ~~phson 165 F 2d 82 (2 Cir 1947)
cert denied 333 u S 838 (1948) Lawson v United states
176 F 2d 49 (nc Cir 1949) cel~ denied 339 u s 934
(1950) Barsty Y ~ited S~ 167 F 2d 241 (DC eir
1948) cert denied 334 u s 843 (1948) MCGrain v Daugherty
273 u s 135 (1927) and cf Rumely v United States J 197
F 2d 166 (DC eir 1952) affd 73 s ct 543 (1953)
JJ B1a~ v ~~ted Sttlt~s 340 u s 159 (1950-)
gsectJ ~~ v United States 31~1 U s 479 (1951) See too
sectingleton v United States 343 U s 944 (1952) Note Recent
Extensions of the Witness Privilege Against Self-Incrim1nationll
53 Col L R 275 (1953)
29 Aiuppa v Un1tc~ states 201 F 2d 287 300 (6 eir 1952)
_I30 Note nMandatory Dismissal of Public Persol1nel and The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination 101 U ot Pa L R 1190 1191
fn 8 (1953)
31 Brown Be Fassett Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar
20 u or Chi L R 480 483 (1953)
32 Garner v Los Angeles Board) 341 u s 716 (1951) Gerende v
Board of Supervisors 341 U s 56 (1951) but com~are Wieman v
Updegraff 341~ U s 83 (1953)
34 See footnote 32
35 PG~ v Boa-roo of Education 31~2 U s 435 (1951)
ID Id at 493
38 Sec 9(h of lihe LalJor Management Rlations Act of 1947 29 USCA
St1Pp III Sec 141 Sec 159(b)
39 ft~rican C~~catons Association v ~uda 339 u S 382 (1950)
sustaining the validity of Sec 9(h) against the challenge that it
violated the First c-lT~nc1tlCiltl Ex Post FtiCto Lals and other iul1dashy
mental rights
40 Executive Order No 10450 issued Aporil zr 1953 (18 F R 2lt89)
41 Executive Orrler No 10491 issued Ocmiddottober 13 1953 (18 F R 6583)
~ Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary Interlocking Subshy
vcrs ion in Covernmcnt De~rtments II 83d Cong 1st ses5 Juy 30 J
1953 p 21 Being a cOImllunist is not a crime under federal law J
although it is in some states (see Liacos supra note 15 at
375) The Smith Act (18 USC Sec 2385 et seq) mkes advoshy
eating or teaching the violent overthrOf of any goverrment of the
United States or being a member of such a group and kno7ing its
purpose~a federal crime
43 See EaSley v F~cbardsonJ 182 F 2d 46 (DC 1950)J affd by an
evenly diiied court 341 TJ s 918 (1951) 1Etshingto v McGrath
182 F 2d 375 (DC 1950) aff1d 341 U s 923 (1951)j Or~~ v
vIil1ougbby 345 U s 83 91 (1953) Mr Justice Douglas concurring
i~ ~tiFascist Commi~~ v ~~EJ 341 U s 123 -182-183 (1951)
United Public W0rkers v --~1itcbell 330 U s 75 (1947)j Angilly - v
United States 199 F 2d 642) 644 (1950) cf NcAuliffe v rlew
Bedford 155 Mass 216 29 NE 517 (le9~) per Holmes J liThe
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but
he h(=l~s no constitltioi1al right to be a policezranu (Id at 220
29 NE at 5J7)
44 v1ie~sn _
v UpGegaff middot111 ~
3~middot4 u s 83 (1953) The Court ruleri as
contrry to due process the Cklahoma loyalty oath statute forshy
bidding IJ1l11ic emplo~rment of Persons who belonzea to certain
organizations regarciless of their knowledge of the character of
those oreenizations because of the indiscriminate classification
of lnnocent with kno~vilg activityll (d at 91)
~1 345 u S 83 (1953)middot
46 Id at 90
47 339 u s 3827 412 (1950) sustaininG the non-corJlIlunist affidavit
requirernelt of union leaders under the Taft -Hartley Act
~ Hoffman v United States 341 U s 179 (1951) suggests such
legislation if Congres3 concludes the lleed is great enough
See too Comment The Privilege Against Se1f-Llcriminetion Versus
Lmnurdty Z Proposed Statutes P 41 Gt~orgetom L J 511 (1953)
S Rept 153 on S 16 83d Cone 1st sess ~ 1 ald 2
April 17 1953 Report of Sel1a~~e Commttee on the JudiciaJ J
Interlocking S-lbversion in GOYf11llent Departments tl July 30
1953 83d Cong 1st sess p 50
~ HcfI1nan v Unitet States 341 u s 479 486 (1951)
50 Id U1ited States v ~isman 111 F 2d 260 262 (2 Cir 1950)
51 Note 61 Yale L J 105 109 (1952)
52 Rogers v United States 340 u s 367 375 (1951)
211 See e g Blau v Unjted StaIe~ 340 u s 159 (1950)
-shy54 Note J Co1t3resnic1al Inv estigat1ons--Self-Illcrimimtion Condemneshy
tiOll and Fair Hcar1ngll 22 U of Cinn L R 193 199-200 (1953)
55 See ~ovTn8end v ~~it~~ta~~3 95 F 2d 352 351 (DC Cir 1938)
cert denied 303 u S 664 (1938)
56 Byse TfA Report on the Pennsylvana Loyalty Act 101 U of Fa
L R 480 481-1~84 (1953) Wright Should Teachers Testify
Saturday Review Sept 2o 1953 p 23
57 See Meltzer Required Records The McCarran Act and The Privilege
Against Selfmiddotmiddot Incriminat ion ll 19 U of Chi L R 687 722 (1951)
y 83d Cong 1st Seas 1953 Also known as the Kefauver BUl
59 ~ v ltlalker 161 U S 591 (1896)
sect21 S 16 83d Cong 1st sess 1953 passed the Senate July 9 1953
after extensive debate Cong Ree 8646-8663 July 9 1953shy
S 16 amends B 3486 of Title 18 Sec 3486 presently furnishes
witnesses immunity from prosecution tor testimony before either
House or their Committees It appears to suffer from the same
deficiency present in a similar statute condemned in Counse~an v
Hitchcock 142 u s 547 (1892) S 16 is intended to StWP1y the
omission in the Hitchcock ease by providing not only that a
witness testimony may not be used against him but that such
witness shall be iImnune with respect to lIany transaction mtter
or thing concerning which he has been compelled to testIfy
sect 83d Congo 1st sess 1953
~ S Rept 153 83d Congo 1st sess p 2 (1953)
63 See Comment The Privi1ege Against Self-Incrimination Versus
Immunity Proposed statutes 41 Georgetown L J 511 523 (1953)
64 Supra footnote 7shy
sectif Delanel v ~ed States 199 F 2d 107 (1 Ci~ 1952)
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
1s that when a witneAS is compelled to testify even under the protecshy
tion of immunity from criminal punihment) he is not relieved from
personal disgrace ~~lhich attach~8 to the exposure of his crime The
answer to this objection ia contained in II land mark decision of the 66
Supreme Court in Brown v Wrtlker
The design of tbe constitutional plivilege is not to aid the
witness in vindicating his character but to protect him
against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict him
of a criminal charge If he secure legal jnmllnity from prose-
cution the possible impairment of his good name is a penalty
which it is reasonable b0 should be compelled to pay for the
common good
The reasoning of this decision has never been qU~Gtioned and has 67
only recently been approved by the Sllpreme Court
The other chief objection to the proposed legislation is that while
a witness may receive itmlunity from federal prosecution) he may still
be subject to IJrosecution under ~tate lavl The Supreme Court has held
that this is not a valid objection to federal immunity laws~ since the
self-incrimination clause ln the Fifth Amendment operates ao a l1mitashy68
tion on the federal government only In United states v Murdock the
defendant was indicted for refUSing to answer questions of a revenue
agent relating to ctrt8 in income tax returns The refusal was ba sed on
the plea that hiD answers might 1ncrim1nate him in a state court The
Court said on this point
This court ha~ held that immunity against state prosecution is
not essential to the validity of federal statutes declaring that
a witnes3 shall not be excllpoundied from gtring evidence on the
ground that it vTill incriminate him and also that the ladt of
state power to give witnesses protection against federal
prosecution does not defeat a state immunity statute
Similarly a witness befo~e a state tribunal CBnnot refuse to 69
answer because of the threat of federal prosecution - However the
Federal District Court in Ohio recently held i1 Unted States v 70
Di Carlo that the defendant had the right to assert his privilege
because of possible prosecution under state law since the Senate
committee was authorized to investigate violations not only of the lawe 71
of the United States but also of the states M_ The Murdock case was
dtstingJished urlon the ground that the danger of state posecution 1n
that case was remote and uncertain thile in the Di Carlo case the
danger of state proaecutjon WilS imminent and real 72
The ---Di Carlo case has been received -lith mixed commelt It has73
not been followed so far as we k~ow- It appears to be contrary to deshy
cis10ns of co~~rts of appeals which have consistently adhered to the prinshy74
ciples of the Murdock case- In my opinion this decision of a district
court aoes not detract from the binding effect ofthe Supreme Courts deshy
eision in the Murdock case
The Department of Justice will recommend to the Congress in Jlouary
an immunity bill of the type I have descri-ced which protects the const1shy
tutional privileges ot witnesses before Congressional Committees courts
and juries but will at the some time aid materially in stamping out
criminal and subversive activities
Footnote Referet~es to Ad~res El~ited ~------ ___bull
Immunity From Prcsecuticn
Versus
Privilege Agaiust Self-Incrimination
Pittman liThe Colonial and Constitutional History of the
Privilege Against Sel-Incrimiootion 1n Amcicaff 21 Va
L R 763 764 770-773 (1935) Corwin The Supreme
Court I S Corctl~ction of the Self Incrirnination C1ause lf
29 lId~h L R 1 512 (1930) Ap~licability of
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to Legjslative
y Pittmenf2 at 774
~ ~ining v ~~8ey 211 U S 78 92 (1908)
L Id at 91
~ 34th Ceng 3d sess Globe PI 427 433 1-45 See
Eberling Constitutional Investigations pp 304-315shy
7 Eberling d at 320-323
~I 142 U s 547 (1892) This Act of 1862 revised an old
statute into two new sections by an amendment which
sought to insure that a witness who testified before
a federal grand jt~ or court (R s I 860 (1875raquo or
a Congressional Committee (R S B 859 (1875raquo would
not be later subjected to the use of his testimony in
any criminal proceeding aGainst him Section ~ 860 of
the amendment dealing with grand jurtes and courts came
under attack in Counselman v Hitchcock J supra and was
held to be invalid Since this part of the immunity proshy
vision tailed to accomplish ita purpose Congress repealed
it in 1910 (36 Stat 352 (19l0raquo) Congress apparently felt
that S 859 applying to Congressional Committees was still
of value and left it 1n force to this date (a s I 859
(1875) as amended 52 Stat 943 (1938) 18 usc e3486
(Supp V 1952)j see liThe Privilege Against Self
Incrimination versus Immunity Proposed Statutes 41
Georgetown L J 511 514 (1953) United States v ~
339 U s 323 335-337 (1950)
21 It read in patt as follows
No person shall be prosecuted for or on
account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he may testify or produce evidence
Act of Feb 11 1893 c 83 27 stat 443 49 USCA
I 46 See too ~ v United States 337 u S 137 146shy
147 (1949)middot Notet Denying -the Privilege against Self
Incrimination to Public Officers 64 Barv L R 987
988 (1951)
- 101 161 U s 591 (1896)
Shapiro v United St~~ 335 U S 1 6-7 (1948) where various
statutes are collated in the footnote The customary provision
in these statutes provides as follows No person shall be
excused from complying with any requirements ot this section
because of his privilege aga1nst self-incriminationgt but the
immunity provisions of the COmptuBory Testimony Act of
February 11 1893 shall apply with respect to allY 1nd1shy
vidual who specifically claims such pr1Y11ege tt
12 Rapacz ULimiting the Plea of Self-Incr1m1nat1ontl 20 Georgetown
L J 329 353 (1932) see footnote 3 of ~ v Connect~
302 U s 319 326 (1937) NPte liThe Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination the Doctr1ne of Waiver 61 Yale L J 104 110
(1952) middot
~f Palko v Connecticut 302 U s 319 326 (1937)
~ See dissents of Mr Justices Shiras Gray and White in ~ V4
Walker supra 161 U s 630638 Cf dissent of Mr Justice
Black in Ro~ers v United States 340 U s 367 376 (1950)
15 Potts Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for ContemptU I
74 U of Pa L R 691 780 (1926) L1acos uRights of Witnesses
Before Congressional Committees 33 Boston U L R 337 340
(1953) middot
t6 Liacos Id at 31tl
17 McGeary rlThe DeTelopmen-cs of Congressional Investigative Power ll
p 23 (1940) McGrain v Daughel~l 273 u s 135 (1927)
18 Sinclair v Unfted States~ 279 U s 263 (1929) ~arsba11 v
Unit~~State~ 176 F 2d 473 (nc Cir 1949) 2 Usc ~ 192
(Supp 1950)
19 Ne York City Bar Ass t n Committee on the Bill of Rights Report
on Congressional Committees presented December 14 1948 p 1
gQi Galloway PCong18ss1onal Investigations Proposed Reforms lt
18 U of Chi L R 478 479-481 (1951)
21 Dilliard lICongress1onal Investigations The Role of the Press
18 U of ChL L R 585 J 587 (1951)
22 Edgerton J dissenting in Barsky v United States 167 F 2d
241 252 (nc eir 1948) cert denied 334 U s 843 (1948)
petition for rehearing denied 339 U S 971 (1951)
~3 De Jonge v Oregon 299 U s 353 364 365 (1937)
24 Id
25 6 Richardson lIMes sOges and Papers of the Pres idents t 1 p 23
July 4 1861
26 See United St~~ v ~~phson 165 F 2d 82 (2 Cir 1947)
cert denied 333 u S 838 (1948) Lawson v United states
176 F 2d 49 (nc Cir 1949) cel~ denied 339 u s 934
(1950) Barsty Y ~ited S~ 167 F 2d 241 (DC eir
1948) cert denied 334 u s 843 (1948) MCGrain v Daugherty
273 u s 135 (1927) and cf Rumely v United States J 197
F 2d 166 (DC eir 1952) affd 73 s ct 543 (1953)
JJ B1a~ v ~~ted Sttlt~s 340 u s 159 (1950-)
gsectJ ~~ v United States 31~1 U s 479 (1951) See too
sectingleton v United States 343 U s 944 (1952) Note Recent
Extensions of the Witness Privilege Against Self-Incrim1nationll
53 Col L R 275 (1953)
29 Aiuppa v Un1tc~ states 201 F 2d 287 300 (6 eir 1952)
_I30 Note nMandatory Dismissal of Public Persol1nel and The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination 101 U ot Pa L R 1190 1191
fn 8 (1953)
31 Brown Be Fassett Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar
20 u or Chi L R 480 483 (1953)
32 Garner v Los Angeles Board) 341 u s 716 (1951) Gerende v
Board of Supervisors 341 U s 56 (1951) but com~are Wieman v
Updegraff 341~ U s 83 (1953)
34 See footnote 32
35 PG~ v Boa-roo of Education 31~2 U s 435 (1951)
ID Id at 493
38 Sec 9(h of lihe LalJor Management Rlations Act of 1947 29 USCA
St1Pp III Sec 141 Sec 159(b)
39 ft~rican C~~catons Association v ~uda 339 u S 382 (1950)
sustaining the validity of Sec 9(h) against the challenge that it
violated the First c-lT~nc1tlCiltl Ex Post FtiCto Lals and other iul1dashy
mental rights
40 Executive Order No 10450 issued Aporil zr 1953 (18 F R 2lt89)
41 Executive Orrler No 10491 issued Ocmiddottober 13 1953 (18 F R 6583)
~ Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary Interlocking Subshy
vcrs ion in Covernmcnt De~rtments II 83d Cong 1st ses5 Juy 30 J
1953 p 21 Being a cOImllunist is not a crime under federal law J
although it is in some states (see Liacos supra note 15 at
375) The Smith Act (18 USC Sec 2385 et seq) mkes advoshy
eating or teaching the violent overthrOf of any goverrment of the
United States or being a member of such a group and kno7ing its
purpose~a federal crime
43 See EaSley v F~cbardsonJ 182 F 2d 46 (DC 1950)J affd by an
evenly diiied court 341 TJ s 918 (1951) 1Etshingto v McGrath
182 F 2d 375 (DC 1950) aff1d 341 U s 923 (1951)j Or~~ v
vIil1ougbby 345 U s 83 91 (1953) Mr Justice Douglas concurring
i~ ~tiFascist Commi~~ v ~~EJ 341 U s 123 -182-183 (1951)
United Public W0rkers v --~1itcbell 330 U s 75 (1947)j Angilly - v
United States 199 F 2d 642) 644 (1950) cf NcAuliffe v rlew
Bedford 155 Mass 216 29 NE 517 (le9~) per Holmes J liThe
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but
he h(=l~s no constitltioi1al right to be a policezranu (Id at 220
29 NE at 5J7)
44 v1ie~sn _
v UpGegaff middot111 ~
3~middot4 u s 83 (1953) The Court ruleri as
contrry to due process the Cklahoma loyalty oath statute forshy
bidding IJ1l11ic emplo~rment of Persons who belonzea to certain
organizations regarciless of their knowledge of the character of
those oreenizations because of the indiscriminate classification
of lnnocent with kno~vilg activityll (d at 91)
~1 345 u S 83 (1953)middot
46 Id at 90
47 339 u s 3827 412 (1950) sustaininG the non-corJlIlunist affidavit
requirernelt of union leaders under the Taft -Hartley Act
~ Hoffman v United States 341 U s 179 (1951) suggests such
legislation if Congres3 concludes the lleed is great enough
See too Comment The Privilege Against Se1f-Llcriminetion Versus
Lmnurdty Z Proposed Statutes P 41 Gt~orgetom L J 511 (1953)
S Rept 153 on S 16 83d Cone 1st sess ~ 1 ald 2
April 17 1953 Report of Sel1a~~e Commttee on the JudiciaJ J
Interlocking S-lbversion in GOYf11llent Departments tl July 30
1953 83d Cong 1st sess p 50
~ HcfI1nan v Unitet States 341 u s 479 486 (1951)
50 Id U1ited States v ~isman 111 F 2d 260 262 (2 Cir 1950)
51 Note 61 Yale L J 105 109 (1952)
52 Rogers v United States 340 u s 367 375 (1951)
211 See e g Blau v Unjted StaIe~ 340 u s 159 (1950)
-shy54 Note J Co1t3resnic1al Inv estigat1ons--Self-Illcrimimtion Condemneshy
tiOll and Fair Hcar1ngll 22 U of Cinn L R 193 199-200 (1953)
55 See ~ovTn8end v ~~it~~ta~~3 95 F 2d 352 351 (DC Cir 1938)
cert denied 303 u S 664 (1938)
56 Byse TfA Report on the Pennsylvana Loyalty Act 101 U of Fa
L R 480 481-1~84 (1953) Wright Should Teachers Testify
Saturday Review Sept 2o 1953 p 23
57 See Meltzer Required Records The McCarran Act and The Privilege
Against Selfmiddotmiddot Incriminat ion ll 19 U of Chi L R 687 722 (1951)
y 83d Cong 1st Seas 1953 Also known as the Kefauver BUl
59 ~ v ltlalker 161 U S 591 (1896)
sect21 S 16 83d Cong 1st sess 1953 passed the Senate July 9 1953
after extensive debate Cong Ree 8646-8663 July 9 1953shy
S 16 amends B 3486 of Title 18 Sec 3486 presently furnishes
witnesses immunity from prosecution tor testimony before either
House or their Committees It appears to suffer from the same
deficiency present in a similar statute condemned in Counse~an v
Hitchcock 142 u s 547 (1892) S 16 is intended to StWP1y the
omission in the Hitchcock ease by providing not only that a
witness testimony may not be used against him but that such
witness shall be iImnune with respect to lIany transaction mtter
or thing concerning which he has been compelled to testIfy
sect 83d Congo 1st sess 1953
~ S Rept 153 83d Congo 1st sess p 2 (1953)
63 See Comment The Privi1ege Against Self-Incrimination Versus
Immunity Proposed statutes 41 Georgetown L J 511 523 (1953)
64 Supra footnote 7shy
sectif Delanel v ~ed States 199 F 2d 107 (1 Ci~ 1952)
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
This court ha~ held that immunity against state prosecution is
not essential to the validity of federal statutes declaring that
a witnes3 shall not be excllpoundied from gtring evidence on the
ground that it vTill incriminate him and also that the ladt of
state power to give witnesses protection against federal
prosecution does not defeat a state immunity statute
Similarly a witness befo~e a state tribunal CBnnot refuse to 69
answer because of the threat of federal prosecution - However the
Federal District Court in Ohio recently held i1 Unted States v 70
Di Carlo that the defendant had the right to assert his privilege
because of possible prosecution under state law since the Senate
committee was authorized to investigate violations not only of the lawe 71
of the United States but also of the states M_ The Murdock case was
dtstingJished urlon the ground that the danger of state posecution 1n
that case was remote and uncertain thile in the Di Carlo case the
danger of state proaecutjon WilS imminent and real 72
The ---Di Carlo case has been received -lith mixed commelt It has73
not been followed so far as we k~ow- It appears to be contrary to deshy
cis10ns of co~~rts of appeals which have consistently adhered to the prinshy74
ciples of the Murdock case- In my opinion this decision of a district
court aoes not detract from the binding effect ofthe Supreme Courts deshy
eision in the Murdock case
The Department of Justice will recommend to the Congress in Jlouary
an immunity bill of the type I have descri-ced which protects the const1shy
tutional privileges ot witnesses before Congressional Committees courts
and juries but will at the some time aid materially in stamping out
criminal and subversive activities
Footnote Referet~es to Ad~res El~ited ~------ ___bull
Immunity From Prcsecuticn
Versus
Privilege Agaiust Self-Incrimination
Pittman liThe Colonial and Constitutional History of the
Privilege Against Sel-Incrimiootion 1n Amcicaff 21 Va
L R 763 764 770-773 (1935) Corwin The Supreme
Court I S Corctl~ction of the Self Incrirnination C1ause lf
29 lId~h L R 1 512 (1930) Ap~licability of
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to Legjslative
y Pittmenf2 at 774
~ ~ining v ~~8ey 211 U S 78 92 (1908)
L Id at 91
~ 34th Ceng 3d sess Globe PI 427 433 1-45 See
Eberling Constitutional Investigations pp 304-315shy
7 Eberling d at 320-323
~I 142 U s 547 (1892) This Act of 1862 revised an old
statute into two new sections by an amendment which
sought to insure that a witness who testified before
a federal grand jt~ or court (R s I 860 (1875raquo or
a Congressional Committee (R S B 859 (1875raquo would
not be later subjected to the use of his testimony in
any criminal proceeding aGainst him Section ~ 860 of
the amendment dealing with grand jurtes and courts came
under attack in Counselman v Hitchcock J supra and was
held to be invalid Since this part of the immunity proshy
vision tailed to accomplish ita purpose Congress repealed
it in 1910 (36 Stat 352 (19l0raquo) Congress apparently felt
that S 859 applying to Congressional Committees was still
of value and left it 1n force to this date (a s I 859
(1875) as amended 52 Stat 943 (1938) 18 usc e3486
(Supp V 1952)j see liThe Privilege Against Self
Incrimination versus Immunity Proposed Statutes 41
Georgetown L J 511 514 (1953) United States v ~
339 U s 323 335-337 (1950)
21 It read in patt as follows
No person shall be prosecuted for or on
account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he may testify or produce evidence
Act of Feb 11 1893 c 83 27 stat 443 49 USCA
I 46 See too ~ v United States 337 u S 137 146shy
147 (1949)middot Notet Denying -the Privilege against Self
Incrimination to Public Officers 64 Barv L R 987
988 (1951)
- 101 161 U s 591 (1896)
Shapiro v United St~~ 335 U S 1 6-7 (1948) where various
statutes are collated in the footnote The customary provision
in these statutes provides as follows No person shall be
excused from complying with any requirements ot this section
because of his privilege aga1nst self-incriminationgt but the
immunity provisions of the COmptuBory Testimony Act of
February 11 1893 shall apply with respect to allY 1nd1shy
vidual who specifically claims such pr1Y11ege tt
12 Rapacz ULimiting the Plea of Self-Incr1m1nat1ontl 20 Georgetown
L J 329 353 (1932) see footnote 3 of ~ v Connect~
302 U s 319 326 (1937) NPte liThe Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination the Doctr1ne of Waiver 61 Yale L J 104 110
(1952) middot
~f Palko v Connecticut 302 U s 319 326 (1937)
~ See dissents of Mr Justices Shiras Gray and White in ~ V4
Walker supra 161 U s 630638 Cf dissent of Mr Justice
Black in Ro~ers v United States 340 U s 367 376 (1950)
15 Potts Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for ContemptU I
74 U of Pa L R 691 780 (1926) L1acos uRights of Witnesses
Before Congressional Committees 33 Boston U L R 337 340
(1953) middot
t6 Liacos Id at 31tl
17 McGeary rlThe DeTelopmen-cs of Congressional Investigative Power ll
p 23 (1940) McGrain v Daughel~l 273 u s 135 (1927)
18 Sinclair v Unfted States~ 279 U s 263 (1929) ~arsba11 v
Unit~~State~ 176 F 2d 473 (nc Cir 1949) 2 Usc ~ 192
(Supp 1950)
19 Ne York City Bar Ass t n Committee on the Bill of Rights Report
on Congressional Committees presented December 14 1948 p 1
gQi Galloway PCong18ss1onal Investigations Proposed Reforms lt
18 U of Chi L R 478 479-481 (1951)
21 Dilliard lICongress1onal Investigations The Role of the Press
18 U of ChL L R 585 J 587 (1951)
22 Edgerton J dissenting in Barsky v United States 167 F 2d
241 252 (nc eir 1948) cert denied 334 U s 843 (1948)
petition for rehearing denied 339 U S 971 (1951)
~3 De Jonge v Oregon 299 U s 353 364 365 (1937)
24 Id
25 6 Richardson lIMes sOges and Papers of the Pres idents t 1 p 23
July 4 1861
26 See United St~~ v ~~phson 165 F 2d 82 (2 Cir 1947)
cert denied 333 u S 838 (1948) Lawson v United states
176 F 2d 49 (nc Cir 1949) cel~ denied 339 u s 934
(1950) Barsty Y ~ited S~ 167 F 2d 241 (DC eir
1948) cert denied 334 u s 843 (1948) MCGrain v Daugherty
273 u s 135 (1927) and cf Rumely v United States J 197
F 2d 166 (DC eir 1952) affd 73 s ct 543 (1953)
JJ B1a~ v ~~ted Sttlt~s 340 u s 159 (1950-)
gsectJ ~~ v United States 31~1 U s 479 (1951) See too
sectingleton v United States 343 U s 944 (1952) Note Recent
Extensions of the Witness Privilege Against Self-Incrim1nationll
53 Col L R 275 (1953)
29 Aiuppa v Un1tc~ states 201 F 2d 287 300 (6 eir 1952)
_I30 Note nMandatory Dismissal of Public Persol1nel and The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination 101 U ot Pa L R 1190 1191
fn 8 (1953)
31 Brown Be Fassett Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar
20 u or Chi L R 480 483 (1953)
32 Garner v Los Angeles Board) 341 u s 716 (1951) Gerende v
Board of Supervisors 341 U s 56 (1951) but com~are Wieman v
Updegraff 341~ U s 83 (1953)
34 See footnote 32
35 PG~ v Boa-roo of Education 31~2 U s 435 (1951)
ID Id at 493
38 Sec 9(h of lihe LalJor Management Rlations Act of 1947 29 USCA
St1Pp III Sec 141 Sec 159(b)
39 ft~rican C~~catons Association v ~uda 339 u S 382 (1950)
sustaining the validity of Sec 9(h) against the challenge that it
violated the First c-lT~nc1tlCiltl Ex Post FtiCto Lals and other iul1dashy
mental rights
40 Executive Order No 10450 issued Aporil zr 1953 (18 F R 2lt89)
41 Executive Orrler No 10491 issued Ocmiddottober 13 1953 (18 F R 6583)
~ Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary Interlocking Subshy
vcrs ion in Covernmcnt De~rtments II 83d Cong 1st ses5 Juy 30 J
1953 p 21 Being a cOImllunist is not a crime under federal law J
although it is in some states (see Liacos supra note 15 at
375) The Smith Act (18 USC Sec 2385 et seq) mkes advoshy
eating or teaching the violent overthrOf of any goverrment of the
United States or being a member of such a group and kno7ing its
purpose~a federal crime
43 See EaSley v F~cbardsonJ 182 F 2d 46 (DC 1950)J affd by an
evenly diiied court 341 TJ s 918 (1951) 1Etshingto v McGrath
182 F 2d 375 (DC 1950) aff1d 341 U s 923 (1951)j Or~~ v
vIil1ougbby 345 U s 83 91 (1953) Mr Justice Douglas concurring
i~ ~tiFascist Commi~~ v ~~EJ 341 U s 123 -182-183 (1951)
United Public W0rkers v --~1itcbell 330 U s 75 (1947)j Angilly - v
United States 199 F 2d 642) 644 (1950) cf NcAuliffe v rlew
Bedford 155 Mass 216 29 NE 517 (le9~) per Holmes J liThe
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but
he h(=l~s no constitltioi1al right to be a policezranu (Id at 220
29 NE at 5J7)
44 v1ie~sn _
v UpGegaff middot111 ~
3~middot4 u s 83 (1953) The Court ruleri as
contrry to due process the Cklahoma loyalty oath statute forshy
bidding IJ1l11ic emplo~rment of Persons who belonzea to certain
organizations regarciless of their knowledge of the character of
those oreenizations because of the indiscriminate classification
of lnnocent with kno~vilg activityll (d at 91)
~1 345 u S 83 (1953)middot
46 Id at 90
47 339 u s 3827 412 (1950) sustaininG the non-corJlIlunist affidavit
requirernelt of union leaders under the Taft -Hartley Act
~ Hoffman v United States 341 U s 179 (1951) suggests such
legislation if Congres3 concludes the lleed is great enough
See too Comment The Privilege Against Se1f-Llcriminetion Versus
Lmnurdty Z Proposed Statutes P 41 Gt~orgetom L J 511 (1953)
S Rept 153 on S 16 83d Cone 1st sess ~ 1 ald 2
April 17 1953 Report of Sel1a~~e Commttee on the JudiciaJ J
Interlocking S-lbversion in GOYf11llent Departments tl July 30
1953 83d Cong 1st sess p 50
~ HcfI1nan v Unitet States 341 u s 479 486 (1951)
50 Id U1ited States v ~isman 111 F 2d 260 262 (2 Cir 1950)
51 Note 61 Yale L J 105 109 (1952)
52 Rogers v United States 340 u s 367 375 (1951)
211 See e g Blau v Unjted StaIe~ 340 u s 159 (1950)
-shy54 Note J Co1t3resnic1al Inv estigat1ons--Self-Illcrimimtion Condemneshy
tiOll and Fair Hcar1ngll 22 U of Cinn L R 193 199-200 (1953)
55 See ~ovTn8end v ~~it~~ta~~3 95 F 2d 352 351 (DC Cir 1938)
cert denied 303 u S 664 (1938)
56 Byse TfA Report on the Pennsylvana Loyalty Act 101 U of Fa
L R 480 481-1~84 (1953) Wright Should Teachers Testify
Saturday Review Sept 2o 1953 p 23
57 See Meltzer Required Records The McCarran Act and The Privilege
Against Selfmiddotmiddot Incriminat ion ll 19 U of Chi L R 687 722 (1951)
y 83d Cong 1st Seas 1953 Also known as the Kefauver BUl
59 ~ v ltlalker 161 U S 591 (1896)
sect21 S 16 83d Cong 1st sess 1953 passed the Senate July 9 1953
after extensive debate Cong Ree 8646-8663 July 9 1953shy
S 16 amends B 3486 of Title 18 Sec 3486 presently furnishes
witnesses immunity from prosecution tor testimony before either
House or their Committees It appears to suffer from the same
deficiency present in a similar statute condemned in Counse~an v
Hitchcock 142 u s 547 (1892) S 16 is intended to StWP1y the
omission in the Hitchcock ease by providing not only that a
witness testimony may not be used against him but that such
witness shall be iImnune with respect to lIany transaction mtter
or thing concerning which he has been compelled to testIfy
sect 83d Congo 1st sess 1953
~ S Rept 153 83d Congo 1st sess p 2 (1953)
63 See Comment The Privi1ege Against Self-Incrimination Versus
Immunity Proposed statutes 41 Georgetown L J 511 523 (1953)
64 Supra footnote 7shy
sectif Delanel v ~ed States 199 F 2d 107 (1 Ci~ 1952)
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
Footnote Referet~es to Ad~res El~ited ~------ ___bull
Immunity From Prcsecuticn
Versus
Privilege Agaiust Self-Incrimination
Pittman liThe Colonial and Constitutional History of the
Privilege Against Sel-Incrimiootion 1n Amcicaff 21 Va
L R 763 764 770-773 (1935) Corwin The Supreme
Court I S Corctl~ction of the Self Incrirnination C1ause lf
29 lId~h L R 1 512 (1930) Ap~licability of
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to Legjslative
y Pittmenf2 at 774
~ ~ining v ~~8ey 211 U S 78 92 (1908)
L Id at 91
~ 34th Ceng 3d sess Globe PI 427 433 1-45 See
Eberling Constitutional Investigations pp 304-315shy
7 Eberling d at 320-323
~I 142 U s 547 (1892) This Act of 1862 revised an old
statute into two new sections by an amendment which
sought to insure that a witness who testified before
a federal grand jt~ or court (R s I 860 (1875raquo or
a Congressional Committee (R S B 859 (1875raquo would
not be later subjected to the use of his testimony in
any criminal proceeding aGainst him Section ~ 860 of
the amendment dealing with grand jurtes and courts came
under attack in Counselman v Hitchcock J supra and was
held to be invalid Since this part of the immunity proshy
vision tailed to accomplish ita purpose Congress repealed
it in 1910 (36 Stat 352 (19l0raquo) Congress apparently felt
that S 859 applying to Congressional Committees was still
of value and left it 1n force to this date (a s I 859
(1875) as amended 52 Stat 943 (1938) 18 usc e3486
(Supp V 1952)j see liThe Privilege Against Self
Incrimination versus Immunity Proposed Statutes 41
Georgetown L J 511 514 (1953) United States v ~
339 U s 323 335-337 (1950)
21 It read in patt as follows
No person shall be prosecuted for or on
account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he may testify or produce evidence
Act of Feb 11 1893 c 83 27 stat 443 49 USCA
I 46 See too ~ v United States 337 u S 137 146shy
147 (1949)middot Notet Denying -the Privilege against Self
Incrimination to Public Officers 64 Barv L R 987
988 (1951)
- 101 161 U s 591 (1896)
Shapiro v United St~~ 335 U S 1 6-7 (1948) where various
statutes are collated in the footnote The customary provision
in these statutes provides as follows No person shall be
excused from complying with any requirements ot this section
because of his privilege aga1nst self-incriminationgt but the
immunity provisions of the COmptuBory Testimony Act of
February 11 1893 shall apply with respect to allY 1nd1shy
vidual who specifically claims such pr1Y11ege tt
12 Rapacz ULimiting the Plea of Self-Incr1m1nat1ontl 20 Georgetown
L J 329 353 (1932) see footnote 3 of ~ v Connect~
302 U s 319 326 (1937) NPte liThe Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination the Doctr1ne of Waiver 61 Yale L J 104 110
(1952) middot
~f Palko v Connecticut 302 U s 319 326 (1937)
~ See dissents of Mr Justices Shiras Gray and White in ~ V4
Walker supra 161 U s 630638 Cf dissent of Mr Justice
Black in Ro~ers v United States 340 U s 367 376 (1950)
15 Potts Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for ContemptU I
74 U of Pa L R 691 780 (1926) L1acos uRights of Witnesses
Before Congressional Committees 33 Boston U L R 337 340
(1953) middot
t6 Liacos Id at 31tl
17 McGeary rlThe DeTelopmen-cs of Congressional Investigative Power ll
p 23 (1940) McGrain v Daughel~l 273 u s 135 (1927)
18 Sinclair v Unfted States~ 279 U s 263 (1929) ~arsba11 v
Unit~~State~ 176 F 2d 473 (nc Cir 1949) 2 Usc ~ 192
(Supp 1950)
19 Ne York City Bar Ass t n Committee on the Bill of Rights Report
on Congressional Committees presented December 14 1948 p 1
gQi Galloway PCong18ss1onal Investigations Proposed Reforms lt
18 U of Chi L R 478 479-481 (1951)
21 Dilliard lICongress1onal Investigations The Role of the Press
18 U of ChL L R 585 J 587 (1951)
22 Edgerton J dissenting in Barsky v United States 167 F 2d
241 252 (nc eir 1948) cert denied 334 U s 843 (1948)
petition for rehearing denied 339 U S 971 (1951)
~3 De Jonge v Oregon 299 U s 353 364 365 (1937)
24 Id
25 6 Richardson lIMes sOges and Papers of the Pres idents t 1 p 23
July 4 1861
26 See United St~~ v ~~phson 165 F 2d 82 (2 Cir 1947)
cert denied 333 u S 838 (1948) Lawson v United states
176 F 2d 49 (nc Cir 1949) cel~ denied 339 u s 934
(1950) Barsty Y ~ited S~ 167 F 2d 241 (DC eir
1948) cert denied 334 u s 843 (1948) MCGrain v Daugherty
273 u s 135 (1927) and cf Rumely v United States J 197
F 2d 166 (DC eir 1952) affd 73 s ct 543 (1953)
JJ B1a~ v ~~ted Sttlt~s 340 u s 159 (1950-)
gsectJ ~~ v United States 31~1 U s 479 (1951) See too
sectingleton v United States 343 U s 944 (1952) Note Recent
Extensions of the Witness Privilege Against Self-Incrim1nationll
53 Col L R 275 (1953)
29 Aiuppa v Un1tc~ states 201 F 2d 287 300 (6 eir 1952)
_I30 Note nMandatory Dismissal of Public Persol1nel and The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination 101 U ot Pa L R 1190 1191
fn 8 (1953)
31 Brown Be Fassett Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar
20 u or Chi L R 480 483 (1953)
32 Garner v Los Angeles Board) 341 u s 716 (1951) Gerende v
Board of Supervisors 341 U s 56 (1951) but com~are Wieman v
Updegraff 341~ U s 83 (1953)
34 See footnote 32
35 PG~ v Boa-roo of Education 31~2 U s 435 (1951)
ID Id at 493
38 Sec 9(h of lihe LalJor Management Rlations Act of 1947 29 USCA
St1Pp III Sec 141 Sec 159(b)
39 ft~rican C~~catons Association v ~uda 339 u S 382 (1950)
sustaining the validity of Sec 9(h) against the challenge that it
violated the First c-lT~nc1tlCiltl Ex Post FtiCto Lals and other iul1dashy
mental rights
40 Executive Order No 10450 issued Aporil zr 1953 (18 F R 2lt89)
41 Executive Orrler No 10491 issued Ocmiddottober 13 1953 (18 F R 6583)
~ Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary Interlocking Subshy
vcrs ion in Covernmcnt De~rtments II 83d Cong 1st ses5 Juy 30 J
1953 p 21 Being a cOImllunist is not a crime under federal law J
although it is in some states (see Liacos supra note 15 at
375) The Smith Act (18 USC Sec 2385 et seq) mkes advoshy
eating or teaching the violent overthrOf of any goverrment of the
United States or being a member of such a group and kno7ing its
purpose~a federal crime
43 See EaSley v F~cbardsonJ 182 F 2d 46 (DC 1950)J affd by an
evenly diiied court 341 TJ s 918 (1951) 1Etshingto v McGrath
182 F 2d 375 (DC 1950) aff1d 341 U s 923 (1951)j Or~~ v
vIil1ougbby 345 U s 83 91 (1953) Mr Justice Douglas concurring
i~ ~tiFascist Commi~~ v ~~EJ 341 U s 123 -182-183 (1951)
United Public W0rkers v --~1itcbell 330 U s 75 (1947)j Angilly - v
United States 199 F 2d 642) 644 (1950) cf NcAuliffe v rlew
Bedford 155 Mass 216 29 NE 517 (le9~) per Holmes J liThe
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but
he h(=l~s no constitltioi1al right to be a policezranu (Id at 220
29 NE at 5J7)
44 v1ie~sn _
v UpGegaff middot111 ~
3~middot4 u s 83 (1953) The Court ruleri as
contrry to due process the Cklahoma loyalty oath statute forshy
bidding IJ1l11ic emplo~rment of Persons who belonzea to certain
organizations regarciless of their knowledge of the character of
those oreenizations because of the indiscriminate classification
of lnnocent with kno~vilg activityll (d at 91)
~1 345 u S 83 (1953)middot
46 Id at 90
47 339 u s 3827 412 (1950) sustaininG the non-corJlIlunist affidavit
requirernelt of union leaders under the Taft -Hartley Act
~ Hoffman v United States 341 U s 179 (1951) suggests such
legislation if Congres3 concludes the lleed is great enough
See too Comment The Privilege Against Se1f-Llcriminetion Versus
Lmnurdty Z Proposed Statutes P 41 Gt~orgetom L J 511 (1953)
S Rept 153 on S 16 83d Cone 1st sess ~ 1 ald 2
April 17 1953 Report of Sel1a~~e Commttee on the JudiciaJ J
Interlocking S-lbversion in GOYf11llent Departments tl July 30
1953 83d Cong 1st sess p 50
~ HcfI1nan v Unitet States 341 u s 479 486 (1951)
50 Id U1ited States v ~isman 111 F 2d 260 262 (2 Cir 1950)
51 Note 61 Yale L J 105 109 (1952)
52 Rogers v United States 340 u s 367 375 (1951)
211 See e g Blau v Unjted StaIe~ 340 u s 159 (1950)
-shy54 Note J Co1t3resnic1al Inv estigat1ons--Self-Illcrimimtion Condemneshy
tiOll and Fair Hcar1ngll 22 U of Cinn L R 193 199-200 (1953)
55 See ~ovTn8end v ~~it~~ta~~3 95 F 2d 352 351 (DC Cir 1938)
cert denied 303 u S 664 (1938)
56 Byse TfA Report on the Pennsylvana Loyalty Act 101 U of Fa
L R 480 481-1~84 (1953) Wright Should Teachers Testify
Saturday Review Sept 2o 1953 p 23
57 See Meltzer Required Records The McCarran Act and The Privilege
Against Selfmiddotmiddot Incriminat ion ll 19 U of Chi L R 687 722 (1951)
y 83d Cong 1st Seas 1953 Also known as the Kefauver BUl
59 ~ v ltlalker 161 U S 591 (1896)
sect21 S 16 83d Cong 1st sess 1953 passed the Senate July 9 1953
after extensive debate Cong Ree 8646-8663 July 9 1953shy
S 16 amends B 3486 of Title 18 Sec 3486 presently furnishes
witnesses immunity from prosecution tor testimony before either
House or their Committees It appears to suffer from the same
deficiency present in a similar statute condemned in Counse~an v
Hitchcock 142 u s 547 (1892) S 16 is intended to StWP1y the
omission in the Hitchcock ease by providing not only that a
witness testimony may not be used against him but that such
witness shall be iImnune with respect to lIany transaction mtter
or thing concerning which he has been compelled to testIfy
sect 83d Congo 1st sess 1953
~ S Rept 153 83d Congo 1st sess p 2 (1953)
63 See Comment The Privi1ege Against Self-Incrimination Versus
Immunity Proposed statutes 41 Georgetown L J 511 523 (1953)
64 Supra footnote 7shy
sectif Delanel v ~ed States 199 F 2d 107 (1 Ci~ 1952)
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
~I 142 U s 547 (1892) This Act of 1862 revised an old
statute into two new sections by an amendment which
sought to insure that a witness who testified before
a federal grand jt~ or court (R s I 860 (1875raquo or
a Congressional Committee (R S B 859 (1875raquo would
not be later subjected to the use of his testimony in
any criminal proceeding aGainst him Section ~ 860 of
the amendment dealing with grand jurtes and courts came
under attack in Counselman v Hitchcock J supra and was
held to be invalid Since this part of the immunity proshy
vision tailed to accomplish ita purpose Congress repealed
it in 1910 (36 Stat 352 (19l0raquo) Congress apparently felt
that S 859 applying to Congressional Committees was still
of value and left it 1n force to this date (a s I 859
(1875) as amended 52 Stat 943 (1938) 18 usc e3486
(Supp V 1952)j see liThe Privilege Against Self
Incrimination versus Immunity Proposed Statutes 41
Georgetown L J 511 514 (1953) United States v ~
339 U s 323 335-337 (1950)
21 It read in patt as follows
No person shall be prosecuted for or on
account of any transaction matter or thing concerning
which he may testify or produce evidence
Act of Feb 11 1893 c 83 27 stat 443 49 USCA
I 46 See too ~ v United States 337 u S 137 146shy
147 (1949)middot Notet Denying -the Privilege against Self
Incrimination to Public Officers 64 Barv L R 987
988 (1951)
- 101 161 U s 591 (1896)
Shapiro v United St~~ 335 U S 1 6-7 (1948) where various
statutes are collated in the footnote The customary provision
in these statutes provides as follows No person shall be
excused from complying with any requirements ot this section
because of his privilege aga1nst self-incriminationgt but the
immunity provisions of the COmptuBory Testimony Act of
February 11 1893 shall apply with respect to allY 1nd1shy
vidual who specifically claims such pr1Y11ege tt
12 Rapacz ULimiting the Plea of Self-Incr1m1nat1ontl 20 Georgetown
L J 329 353 (1932) see footnote 3 of ~ v Connect~
302 U s 319 326 (1937) NPte liThe Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination the Doctr1ne of Waiver 61 Yale L J 104 110
(1952) middot
~f Palko v Connecticut 302 U s 319 326 (1937)
~ See dissents of Mr Justices Shiras Gray and White in ~ V4
Walker supra 161 U s 630638 Cf dissent of Mr Justice
Black in Ro~ers v United States 340 U s 367 376 (1950)
15 Potts Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for ContemptU I
74 U of Pa L R 691 780 (1926) L1acos uRights of Witnesses
Before Congressional Committees 33 Boston U L R 337 340
(1953) middot
t6 Liacos Id at 31tl
17 McGeary rlThe DeTelopmen-cs of Congressional Investigative Power ll
p 23 (1940) McGrain v Daughel~l 273 u s 135 (1927)
18 Sinclair v Unfted States~ 279 U s 263 (1929) ~arsba11 v
Unit~~State~ 176 F 2d 473 (nc Cir 1949) 2 Usc ~ 192
(Supp 1950)
19 Ne York City Bar Ass t n Committee on the Bill of Rights Report
on Congressional Committees presented December 14 1948 p 1
gQi Galloway PCong18ss1onal Investigations Proposed Reforms lt
18 U of Chi L R 478 479-481 (1951)
21 Dilliard lICongress1onal Investigations The Role of the Press
18 U of ChL L R 585 J 587 (1951)
22 Edgerton J dissenting in Barsky v United States 167 F 2d
241 252 (nc eir 1948) cert denied 334 U s 843 (1948)
petition for rehearing denied 339 U S 971 (1951)
~3 De Jonge v Oregon 299 U s 353 364 365 (1937)
24 Id
25 6 Richardson lIMes sOges and Papers of the Pres idents t 1 p 23
July 4 1861
26 See United St~~ v ~~phson 165 F 2d 82 (2 Cir 1947)
cert denied 333 u S 838 (1948) Lawson v United states
176 F 2d 49 (nc Cir 1949) cel~ denied 339 u s 934
(1950) Barsty Y ~ited S~ 167 F 2d 241 (DC eir
1948) cert denied 334 u s 843 (1948) MCGrain v Daugherty
273 u s 135 (1927) and cf Rumely v United States J 197
F 2d 166 (DC eir 1952) affd 73 s ct 543 (1953)
JJ B1a~ v ~~ted Sttlt~s 340 u s 159 (1950-)
gsectJ ~~ v United States 31~1 U s 479 (1951) See too
sectingleton v United States 343 U s 944 (1952) Note Recent
Extensions of the Witness Privilege Against Self-Incrim1nationll
53 Col L R 275 (1953)
29 Aiuppa v Un1tc~ states 201 F 2d 287 300 (6 eir 1952)
_I30 Note nMandatory Dismissal of Public Persol1nel and The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination 101 U ot Pa L R 1190 1191
fn 8 (1953)
31 Brown Be Fassett Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar
20 u or Chi L R 480 483 (1953)
32 Garner v Los Angeles Board) 341 u s 716 (1951) Gerende v
Board of Supervisors 341 U s 56 (1951) but com~are Wieman v
Updegraff 341~ U s 83 (1953)
34 See footnote 32
35 PG~ v Boa-roo of Education 31~2 U s 435 (1951)
ID Id at 493
38 Sec 9(h of lihe LalJor Management Rlations Act of 1947 29 USCA
St1Pp III Sec 141 Sec 159(b)
39 ft~rican C~~catons Association v ~uda 339 u S 382 (1950)
sustaining the validity of Sec 9(h) against the challenge that it
violated the First c-lT~nc1tlCiltl Ex Post FtiCto Lals and other iul1dashy
mental rights
40 Executive Order No 10450 issued Aporil zr 1953 (18 F R 2lt89)
41 Executive Orrler No 10491 issued Ocmiddottober 13 1953 (18 F R 6583)
~ Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary Interlocking Subshy
vcrs ion in Covernmcnt De~rtments II 83d Cong 1st ses5 Juy 30 J
1953 p 21 Being a cOImllunist is not a crime under federal law J
although it is in some states (see Liacos supra note 15 at
375) The Smith Act (18 USC Sec 2385 et seq) mkes advoshy
eating or teaching the violent overthrOf of any goverrment of the
United States or being a member of such a group and kno7ing its
purpose~a federal crime
43 See EaSley v F~cbardsonJ 182 F 2d 46 (DC 1950)J affd by an
evenly diiied court 341 TJ s 918 (1951) 1Etshingto v McGrath
182 F 2d 375 (DC 1950) aff1d 341 U s 923 (1951)j Or~~ v
vIil1ougbby 345 U s 83 91 (1953) Mr Justice Douglas concurring
i~ ~tiFascist Commi~~ v ~~EJ 341 U s 123 -182-183 (1951)
United Public W0rkers v --~1itcbell 330 U s 75 (1947)j Angilly - v
United States 199 F 2d 642) 644 (1950) cf NcAuliffe v rlew
Bedford 155 Mass 216 29 NE 517 (le9~) per Holmes J liThe
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but
he h(=l~s no constitltioi1al right to be a policezranu (Id at 220
29 NE at 5J7)
44 v1ie~sn _
v UpGegaff middot111 ~
3~middot4 u s 83 (1953) The Court ruleri as
contrry to due process the Cklahoma loyalty oath statute forshy
bidding IJ1l11ic emplo~rment of Persons who belonzea to certain
organizations regarciless of their knowledge of the character of
those oreenizations because of the indiscriminate classification
of lnnocent with kno~vilg activityll (d at 91)
~1 345 u S 83 (1953)middot
46 Id at 90
47 339 u s 3827 412 (1950) sustaininG the non-corJlIlunist affidavit
requirernelt of union leaders under the Taft -Hartley Act
~ Hoffman v United States 341 U s 179 (1951) suggests such
legislation if Congres3 concludes the lleed is great enough
See too Comment The Privilege Against Se1f-Llcriminetion Versus
Lmnurdty Z Proposed Statutes P 41 Gt~orgetom L J 511 (1953)
S Rept 153 on S 16 83d Cone 1st sess ~ 1 ald 2
April 17 1953 Report of Sel1a~~e Commttee on the JudiciaJ J
Interlocking S-lbversion in GOYf11llent Departments tl July 30
1953 83d Cong 1st sess p 50
~ HcfI1nan v Unitet States 341 u s 479 486 (1951)
50 Id U1ited States v ~isman 111 F 2d 260 262 (2 Cir 1950)
51 Note 61 Yale L J 105 109 (1952)
52 Rogers v United States 340 u s 367 375 (1951)
211 See e g Blau v Unjted StaIe~ 340 u s 159 (1950)
-shy54 Note J Co1t3resnic1al Inv estigat1ons--Self-Illcrimimtion Condemneshy
tiOll and Fair Hcar1ngll 22 U of Cinn L R 193 199-200 (1953)
55 See ~ovTn8end v ~~it~~ta~~3 95 F 2d 352 351 (DC Cir 1938)
cert denied 303 u S 664 (1938)
56 Byse TfA Report on the Pennsylvana Loyalty Act 101 U of Fa
L R 480 481-1~84 (1953) Wright Should Teachers Testify
Saturday Review Sept 2o 1953 p 23
57 See Meltzer Required Records The McCarran Act and The Privilege
Against Selfmiddotmiddot Incriminat ion ll 19 U of Chi L R 687 722 (1951)
y 83d Cong 1st Seas 1953 Also known as the Kefauver BUl
59 ~ v ltlalker 161 U S 591 (1896)
sect21 S 16 83d Cong 1st sess 1953 passed the Senate July 9 1953
after extensive debate Cong Ree 8646-8663 July 9 1953shy
S 16 amends B 3486 of Title 18 Sec 3486 presently furnishes
witnesses immunity from prosecution tor testimony before either
House or their Committees It appears to suffer from the same
deficiency present in a similar statute condemned in Counse~an v
Hitchcock 142 u s 547 (1892) S 16 is intended to StWP1y the
omission in the Hitchcock ease by providing not only that a
witness testimony may not be used against him but that such
witness shall be iImnune with respect to lIany transaction mtter
or thing concerning which he has been compelled to testIfy
sect 83d Congo 1st sess 1953
~ S Rept 153 83d Congo 1st sess p 2 (1953)
63 See Comment The Privi1ege Against Self-Incrimination Versus
Immunity Proposed statutes 41 Georgetown L J 511 523 (1953)
64 Supra footnote 7shy
sectif Delanel v ~ed States 199 F 2d 107 (1 Ci~ 1952)
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
- 101 161 U s 591 (1896)
Shapiro v United St~~ 335 U S 1 6-7 (1948) where various
statutes are collated in the footnote The customary provision
in these statutes provides as follows No person shall be
excused from complying with any requirements ot this section
because of his privilege aga1nst self-incriminationgt but the
immunity provisions of the COmptuBory Testimony Act of
February 11 1893 shall apply with respect to allY 1nd1shy
vidual who specifically claims such pr1Y11ege tt
12 Rapacz ULimiting the Plea of Self-Incr1m1nat1ontl 20 Georgetown
L J 329 353 (1932) see footnote 3 of ~ v Connect~
302 U s 319 326 (1937) NPte liThe Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination the Doctr1ne of Waiver 61 Yale L J 104 110
(1952) middot
~f Palko v Connecticut 302 U s 319 326 (1937)
~ See dissents of Mr Justices Shiras Gray and White in ~ V4
Walker supra 161 U s 630638 Cf dissent of Mr Justice
Black in Ro~ers v United States 340 U s 367 376 (1950)
15 Potts Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for ContemptU I
74 U of Pa L R 691 780 (1926) L1acos uRights of Witnesses
Before Congressional Committees 33 Boston U L R 337 340
(1953) middot
t6 Liacos Id at 31tl
17 McGeary rlThe DeTelopmen-cs of Congressional Investigative Power ll
p 23 (1940) McGrain v Daughel~l 273 u s 135 (1927)
18 Sinclair v Unfted States~ 279 U s 263 (1929) ~arsba11 v
Unit~~State~ 176 F 2d 473 (nc Cir 1949) 2 Usc ~ 192
(Supp 1950)
19 Ne York City Bar Ass t n Committee on the Bill of Rights Report
on Congressional Committees presented December 14 1948 p 1
gQi Galloway PCong18ss1onal Investigations Proposed Reforms lt
18 U of Chi L R 478 479-481 (1951)
21 Dilliard lICongress1onal Investigations The Role of the Press
18 U of ChL L R 585 J 587 (1951)
22 Edgerton J dissenting in Barsky v United States 167 F 2d
241 252 (nc eir 1948) cert denied 334 U s 843 (1948)
petition for rehearing denied 339 U S 971 (1951)
~3 De Jonge v Oregon 299 U s 353 364 365 (1937)
24 Id
25 6 Richardson lIMes sOges and Papers of the Pres idents t 1 p 23
July 4 1861
26 See United St~~ v ~~phson 165 F 2d 82 (2 Cir 1947)
cert denied 333 u S 838 (1948) Lawson v United states
176 F 2d 49 (nc Cir 1949) cel~ denied 339 u s 934
(1950) Barsty Y ~ited S~ 167 F 2d 241 (DC eir
1948) cert denied 334 u s 843 (1948) MCGrain v Daugherty
273 u s 135 (1927) and cf Rumely v United States J 197
F 2d 166 (DC eir 1952) affd 73 s ct 543 (1953)
JJ B1a~ v ~~ted Sttlt~s 340 u s 159 (1950-)
gsectJ ~~ v United States 31~1 U s 479 (1951) See too
sectingleton v United States 343 U s 944 (1952) Note Recent
Extensions of the Witness Privilege Against Self-Incrim1nationll
53 Col L R 275 (1953)
29 Aiuppa v Un1tc~ states 201 F 2d 287 300 (6 eir 1952)
_I30 Note nMandatory Dismissal of Public Persol1nel and The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination 101 U ot Pa L R 1190 1191
fn 8 (1953)
31 Brown Be Fassett Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar
20 u or Chi L R 480 483 (1953)
32 Garner v Los Angeles Board) 341 u s 716 (1951) Gerende v
Board of Supervisors 341 U s 56 (1951) but com~are Wieman v
Updegraff 341~ U s 83 (1953)
34 See footnote 32
35 PG~ v Boa-roo of Education 31~2 U s 435 (1951)
ID Id at 493
38 Sec 9(h of lihe LalJor Management Rlations Act of 1947 29 USCA
St1Pp III Sec 141 Sec 159(b)
39 ft~rican C~~catons Association v ~uda 339 u S 382 (1950)
sustaining the validity of Sec 9(h) against the challenge that it
violated the First c-lT~nc1tlCiltl Ex Post FtiCto Lals and other iul1dashy
mental rights
40 Executive Order No 10450 issued Aporil zr 1953 (18 F R 2lt89)
41 Executive Orrler No 10491 issued Ocmiddottober 13 1953 (18 F R 6583)
~ Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary Interlocking Subshy
vcrs ion in Covernmcnt De~rtments II 83d Cong 1st ses5 Juy 30 J
1953 p 21 Being a cOImllunist is not a crime under federal law J
although it is in some states (see Liacos supra note 15 at
375) The Smith Act (18 USC Sec 2385 et seq) mkes advoshy
eating or teaching the violent overthrOf of any goverrment of the
United States or being a member of such a group and kno7ing its
purpose~a federal crime
43 See EaSley v F~cbardsonJ 182 F 2d 46 (DC 1950)J affd by an
evenly diiied court 341 TJ s 918 (1951) 1Etshingto v McGrath
182 F 2d 375 (DC 1950) aff1d 341 U s 923 (1951)j Or~~ v
vIil1ougbby 345 U s 83 91 (1953) Mr Justice Douglas concurring
i~ ~tiFascist Commi~~ v ~~EJ 341 U s 123 -182-183 (1951)
United Public W0rkers v --~1itcbell 330 U s 75 (1947)j Angilly - v
United States 199 F 2d 642) 644 (1950) cf NcAuliffe v rlew
Bedford 155 Mass 216 29 NE 517 (le9~) per Holmes J liThe
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but
he h(=l~s no constitltioi1al right to be a policezranu (Id at 220
29 NE at 5J7)
44 v1ie~sn _
v UpGegaff middot111 ~
3~middot4 u s 83 (1953) The Court ruleri as
contrry to due process the Cklahoma loyalty oath statute forshy
bidding IJ1l11ic emplo~rment of Persons who belonzea to certain
organizations regarciless of their knowledge of the character of
those oreenizations because of the indiscriminate classification
of lnnocent with kno~vilg activityll (d at 91)
~1 345 u S 83 (1953)middot
46 Id at 90
47 339 u s 3827 412 (1950) sustaininG the non-corJlIlunist affidavit
requirernelt of union leaders under the Taft -Hartley Act
~ Hoffman v United States 341 U s 179 (1951) suggests such
legislation if Congres3 concludes the lleed is great enough
See too Comment The Privilege Against Se1f-Llcriminetion Versus
Lmnurdty Z Proposed Statutes P 41 Gt~orgetom L J 511 (1953)
S Rept 153 on S 16 83d Cone 1st sess ~ 1 ald 2
April 17 1953 Report of Sel1a~~e Commttee on the JudiciaJ J
Interlocking S-lbversion in GOYf11llent Departments tl July 30
1953 83d Cong 1st sess p 50
~ HcfI1nan v Unitet States 341 u s 479 486 (1951)
50 Id U1ited States v ~isman 111 F 2d 260 262 (2 Cir 1950)
51 Note 61 Yale L J 105 109 (1952)
52 Rogers v United States 340 u s 367 375 (1951)
211 See e g Blau v Unjted StaIe~ 340 u s 159 (1950)
-shy54 Note J Co1t3resnic1al Inv estigat1ons--Self-Illcrimimtion Condemneshy
tiOll and Fair Hcar1ngll 22 U of Cinn L R 193 199-200 (1953)
55 See ~ovTn8end v ~~it~~ta~~3 95 F 2d 352 351 (DC Cir 1938)
cert denied 303 u S 664 (1938)
56 Byse TfA Report on the Pennsylvana Loyalty Act 101 U of Fa
L R 480 481-1~84 (1953) Wright Should Teachers Testify
Saturday Review Sept 2o 1953 p 23
57 See Meltzer Required Records The McCarran Act and The Privilege
Against Selfmiddotmiddot Incriminat ion ll 19 U of Chi L R 687 722 (1951)
y 83d Cong 1st Seas 1953 Also known as the Kefauver BUl
59 ~ v ltlalker 161 U S 591 (1896)
sect21 S 16 83d Cong 1st sess 1953 passed the Senate July 9 1953
after extensive debate Cong Ree 8646-8663 July 9 1953shy
S 16 amends B 3486 of Title 18 Sec 3486 presently furnishes
witnesses immunity from prosecution tor testimony before either
House or their Committees It appears to suffer from the same
deficiency present in a similar statute condemned in Counse~an v
Hitchcock 142 u s 547 (1892) S 16 is intended to StWP1y the
omission in the Hitchcock ease by providing not only that a
witness testimony may not be used against him but that such
witness shall be iImnune with respect to lIany transaction mtter
or thing concerning which he has been compelled to testIfy
sect 83d Congo 1st sess 1953
~ S Rept 153 83d Congo 1st sess p 2 (1953)
63 See Comment The Privi1ege Against Self-Incrimination Versus
Immunity Proposed statutes 41 Georgetown L J 511 523 (1953)
64 Supra footnote 7shy
sectif Delanel v ~ed States 199 F 2d 107 (1 Ci~ 1952)
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
t6 Liacos Id at 31tl
17 McGeary rlThe DeTelopmen-cs of Congressional Investigative Power ll
p 23 (1940) McGrain v Daughel~l 273 u s 135 (1927)
18 Sinclair v Unfted States~ 279 U s 263 (1929) ~arsba11 v
Unit~~State~ 176 F 2d 473 (nc Cir 1949) 2 Usc ~ 192
(Supp 1950)
19 Ne York City Bar Ass t n Committee on the Bill of Rights Report
on Congressional Committees presented December 14 1948 p 1
gQi Galloway PCong18ss1onal Investigations Proposed Reforms lt
18 U of Chi L R 478 479-481 (1951)
21 Dilliard lICongress1onal Investigations The Role of the Press
18 U of ChL L R 585 J 587 (1951)
22 Edgerton J dissenting in Barsky v United States 167 F 2d
241 252 (nc eir 1948) cert denied 334 U s 843 (1948)
petition for rehearing denied 339 U S 971 (1951)
~3 De Jonge v Oregon 299 U s 353 364 365 (1937)
24 Id
25 6 Richardson lIMes sOges and Papers of the Pres idents t 1 p 23
July 4 1861
26 See United St~~ v ~~phson 165 F 2d 82 (2 Cir 1947)
cert denied 333 u S 838 (1948) Lawson v United states
176 F 2d 49 (nc Cir 1949) cel~ denied 339 u s 934
(1950) Barsty Y ~ited S~ 167 F 2d 241 (DC eir
1948) cert denied 334 u s 843 (1948) MCGrain v Daugherty
273 u s 135 (1927) and cf Rumely v United States J 197
F 2d 166 (DC eir 1952) affd 73 s ct 543 (1953)
JJ B1a~ v ~~ted Sttlt~s 340 u s 159 (1950-)
gsectJ ~~ v United States 31~1 U s 479 (1951) See too
sectingleton v United States 343 U s 944 (1952) Note Recent
Extensions of the Witness Privilege Against Self-Incrim1nationll
53 Col L R 275 (1953)
29 Aiuppa v Un1tc~ states 201 F 2d 287 300 (6 eir 1952)
_I30 Note nMandatory Dismissal of Public Persol1nel and The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination 101 U ot Pa L R 1190 1191
fn 8 (1953)
31 Brown Be Fassett Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar
20 u or Chi L R 480 483 (1953)
32 Garner v Los Angeles Board) 341 u s 716 (1951) Gerende v
Board of Supervisors 341 U s 56 (1951) but com~are Wieman v
Updegraff 341~ U s 83 (1953)
34 See footnote 32
35 PG~ v Boa-roo of Education 31~2 U s 435 (1951)
ID Id at 493
38 Sec 9(h of lihe LalJor Management Rlations Act of 1947 29 USCA
St1Pp III Sec 141 Sec 159(b)
39 ft~rican C~~catons Association v ~uda 339 u S 382 (1950)
sustaining the validity of Sec 9(h) against the challenge that it
violated the First c-lT~nc1tlCiltl Ex Post FtiCto Lals and other iul1dashy
mental rights
40 Executive Order No 10450 issued Aporil zr 1953 (18 F R 2lt89)
41 Executive Orrler No 10491 issued Ocmiddottober 13 1953 (18 F R 6583)
~ Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary Interlocking Subshy
vcrs ion in Covernmcnt De~rtments II 83d Cong 1st ses5 Juy 30 J
1953 p 21 Being a cOImllunist is not a crime under federal law J
although it is in some states (see Liacos supra note 15 at
375) The Smith Act (18 USC Sec 2385 et seq) mkes advoshy
eating or teaching the violent overthrOf of any goverrment of the
United States or being a member of such a group and kno7ing its
purpose~a federal crime
43 See EaSley v F~cbardsonJ 182 F 2d 46 (DC 1950)J affd by an
evenly diiied court 341 TJ s 918 (1951) 1Etshingto v McGrath
182 F 2d 375 (DC 1950) aff1d 341 U s 923 (1951)j Or~~ v
vIil1ougbby 345 U s 83 91 (1953) Mr Justice Douglas concurring
i~ ~tiFascist Commi~~ v ~~EJ 341 U s 123 -182-183 (1951)
United Public W0rkers v --~1itcbell 330 U s 75 (1947)j Angilly - v
United States 199 F 2d 642) 644 (1950) cf NcAuliffe v rlew
Bedford 155 Mass 216 29 NE 517 (le9~) per Holmes J liThe
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but
he h(=l~s no constitltioi1al right to be a policezranu (Id at 220
29 NE at 5J7)
44 v1ie~sn _
v UpGegaff middot111 ~
3~middot4 u s 83 (1953) The Court ruleri as
contrry to due process the Cklahoma loyalty oath statute forshy
bidding IJ1l11ic emplo~rment of Persons who belonzea to certain
organizations regarciless of their knowledge of the character of
those oreenizations because of the indiscriminate classification
of lnnocent with kno~vilg activityll (d at 91)
~1 345 u S 83 (1953)middot
46 Id at 90
47 339 u s 3827 412 (1950) sustaininG the non-corJlIlunist affidavit
requirernelt of union leaders under the Taft -Hartley Act
~ Hoffman v United States 341 U s 179 (1951) suggests such
legislation if Congres3 concludes the lleed is great enough
See too Comment The Privilege Against Se1f-Llcriminetion Versus
Lmnurdty Z Proposed Statutes P 41 Gt~orgetom L J 511 (1953)
S Rept 153 on S 16 83d Cone 1st sess ~ 1 ald 2
April 17 1953 Report of Sel1a~~e Commttee on the JudiciaJ J
Interlocking S-lbversion in GOYf11llent Departments tl July 30
1953 83d Cong 1st sess p 50
~ HcfI1nan v Unitet States 341 u s 479 486 (1951)
50 Id U1ited States v ~isman 111 F 2d 260 262 (2 Cir 1950)
51 Note 61 Yale L J 105 109 (1952)
52 Rogers v United States 340 u s 367 375 (1951)
211 See e g Blau v Unjted StaIe~ 340 u s 159 (1950)
-shy54 Note J Co1t3resnic1al Inv estigat1ons--Self-Illcrimimtion Condemneshy
tiOll and Fair Hcar1ngll 22 U of Cinn L R 193 199-200 (1953)
55 See ~ovTn8end v ~~it~~ta~~3 95 F 2d 352 351 (DC Cir 1938)
cert denied 303 u S 664 (1938)
56 Byse TfA Report on the Pennsylvana Loyalty Act 101 U of Fa
L R 480 481-1~84 (1953) Wright Should Teachers Testify
Saturday Review Sept 2o 1953 p 23
57 See Meltzer Required Records The McCarran Act and The Privilege
Against Selfmiddotmiddot Incriminat ion ll 19 U of Chi L R 687 722 (1951)
y 83d Cong 1st Seas 1953 Also known as the Kefauver BUl
59 ~ v ltlalker 161 U S 591 (1896)
sect21 S 16 83d Cong 1st sess 1953 passed the Senate July 9 1953
after extensive debate Cong Ree 8646-8663 July 9 1953shy
S 16 amends B 3486 of Title 18 Sec 3486 presently furnishes
witnesses immunity from prosecution tor testimony before either
House or their Committees It appears to suffer from the same
deficiency present in a similar statute condemned in Counse~an v
Hitchcock 142 u s 547 (1892) S 16 is intended to StWP1y the
omission in the Hitchcock ease by providing not only that a
witness testimony may not be used against him but that such
witness shall be iImnune with respect to lIany transaction mtter
or thing concerning which he has been compelled to testIfy
sect 83d Congo 1st sess 1953
~ S Rept 153 83d Congo 1st sess p 2 (1953)
63 See Comment The Privi1ege Against Self-Incrimination Versus
Immunity Proposed statutes 41 Georgetown L J 511 523 (1953)
64 Supra footnote 7shy
sectif Delanel v ~ed States 199 F 2d 107 (1 Ci~ 1952)
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
26 See United St~~ v ~~phson 165 F 2d 82 (2 Cir 1947)
cert denied 333 u S 838 (1948) Lawson v United states
176 F 2d 49 (nc Cir 1949) cel~ denied 339 u s 934
(1950) Barsty Y ~ited S~ 167 F 2d 241 (DC eir
1948) cert denied 334 u s 843 (1948) MCGrain v Daugherty
273 u s 135 (1927) and cf Rumely v United States J 197
F 2d 166 (DC eir 1952) affd 73 s ct 543 (1953)
JJ B1a~ v ~~ted Sttlt~s 340 u s 159 (1950-)
gsectJ ~~ v United States 31~1 U s 479 (1951) See too
sectingleton v United States 343 U s 944 (1952) Note Recent
Extensions of the Witness Privilege Against Self-Incrim1nationll
53 Col L R 275 (1953)
29 Aiuppa v Un1tc~ states 201 F 2d 287 300 (6 eir 1952)
_I30 Note nMandatory Dismissal of Public Persol1nel and The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination 101 U ot Pa L R 1190 1191
fn 8 (1953)
31 Brown Be Fassett Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar
20 u or Chi L R 480 483 (1953)
32 Garner v Los Angeles Board) 341 u s 716 (1951) Gerende v
Board of Supervisors 341 U s 56 (1951) but com~are Wieman v
Updegraff 341~ U s 83 (1953)
34 See footnote 32
35 PG~ v Boa-roo of Education 31~2 U s 435 (1951)
ID Id at 493
38 Sec 9(h of lihe LalJor Management Rlations Act of 1947 29 USCA
St1Pp III Sec 141 Sec 159(b)
39 ft~rican C~~catons Association v ~uda 339 u S 382 (1950)
sustaining the validity of Sec 9(h) against the challenge that it
violated the First c-lT~nc1tlCiltl Ex Post FtiCto Lals and other iul1dashy
mental rights
40 Executive Order No 10450 issued Aporil zr 1953 (18 F R 2lt89)
41 Executive Orrler No 10491 issued Ocmiddottober 13 1953 (18 F R 6583)
~ Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary Interlocking Subshy
vcrs ion in Covernmcnt De~rtments II 83d Cong 1st ses5 Juy 30 J
1953 p 21 Being a cOImllunist is not a crime under federal law J
although it is in some states (see Liacos supra note 15 at
375) The Smith Act (18 USC Sec 2385 et seq) mkes advoshy
eating or teaching the violent overthrOf of any goverrment of the
United States or being a member of such a group and kno7ing its
purpose~a federal crime
43 See EaSley v F~cbardsonJ 182 F 2d 46 (DC 1950)J affd by an
evenly diiied court 341 TJ s 918 (1951) 1Etshingto v McGrath
182 F 2d 375 (DC 1950) aff1d 341 U s 923 (1951)j Or~~ v
vIil1ougbby 345 U s 83 91 (1953) Mr Justice Douglas concurring
i~ ~tiFascist Commi~~ v ~~EJ 341 U s 123 -182-183 (1951)
United Public W0rkers v --~1itcbell 330 U s 75 (1947)j Angilly - v
United States 199 F 2d 642) 644 (1950) cf NcAuliffe v rlew
Bedford 155 Mass 216 29 NE 517 (le9~) per Holmes J liThe
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but
he h(=l~s no constitltioi1al right to be a policezranu (Id at 220
29 NE at 5J7)
44 v1ie~sn _
v UpGegaff middot111 ~
3~middot4 u s 83 (1953) The Court ruleri as
contrry to due process the Cklahoma loyalty oath statute forshy
bidding IJ1l11ic emplo~rment of Persons who belonzea to certain
organizations regarciless of their knowledge of the character of
those oreenizations because of the indiscriminate classification
of lnnocent with kno~vilg activityll (d at 91)
~1 345 u S 83 (1953)middot
46 Id at 90
47 339 u s 3827 412 (1950) sustaininG the non-corJlIlunist affidavit
requirernelt of union leaders under the Taft -Hartley Act
~ Hoffman v United States 341 U s 179 (1951) suggests such
legislation if Congres3 concludes the lleed is great enough
See too Comment The Privilege Against Se1f-Llcriminetion Versus
Lmnurdty Z Proposed Statutes P 41 Gt~orgetom L J 511 (1953)
S Rept 153 on S 16 83d Cone 1st sess ~ 1 ald 2
April 17 1953 Report of Sel1a~~e Commttee on the JudiciaJ J
Interlocking S-lbversion in GOYf11llent Departments tl July 30
1953 83d Cong 1st sess p 50
~ HcfI1nan v Unitet States 341 u s 479 486 (1951)
50 Id U1ited States v ~isman 111 F 2d 260 262 (2 Cir 1950)
51 Note 61 Yale L J 105 109 (1952)
52 Rogers v United States 340 u s 367 375 (1951)
211 See e g Blau v Unjted StaIe~ 340 u s 159 (1950)
-shy54 Note J Co1t3resnic1al Inv estigat1ons--Self-Illcrimimtion Condemneshy
tiOll and Fair Hcar1ngll 22 U of Cinn L R 193 199-200 (1953)
55 See ~ovTn8end v ~~it~~ta~~3 95 F 2d 352 351 (DC Cir 1938)
cert denied 303 u S 664 (1938)
56 Byse TfA Report on the Pennsylvana Loyalty Act 101 U of Fa
L R 480 481-1~84 (1953) Wright Should Teachers Testify
Saturday Review Sept 2o 1953 p 23
57 See Meltzer Required Records The McCarran Act and The Privilege
Against Selfmiddotmiddot Incriminat ion ll 19 U of Chi L R 687 722 (1951)
y 83d Cong 1st Seas 1953 Also known as the Kefauver BUl
59 ~ v ltlalker 161 U S 591 (1896)
sect21 S 16 83d Cong 1st sess 1953 passed the Senate July 9 1953
after extensive debate Cong Ree 8646-8663 July 9 1953shy
S 16 amends B 3486 of Title 18 Sec 3486 presently furnishes
witnesses immunity from prosecution tor testimony before either
House or their Committees It appears to suffer from the same
deficiency present in a similar statute condemned in Counse~an v
Hitchcock 142 u s 547 (1892) S 16 is intended to StWP1y the
omission in the Hitchcock ease by providing not only that a
witness testimony may not be used against him but that such
witness shall be iImnune with respect to lIany transaction mtter
or thing concerning which he has been compelled to testIfy
sect 83d Congo 1st sess 1953
~ S Rept 153 83d Congo 1st sess p 2 (1953)
63 See Comment The Privi1ege Against Self-Incrimination Versus
Immunity Proposed statutes 41 Georgetown L J 511 523 (1953)
64 Supra footnote 7shy
sectif Delanel v ~ed States 199 F 2d 107 (1 Ci~ 1952)
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
34 See footnote 32
35 PG~ v Boa-roo of Education 31~2 U s 435 (1951)
ID Id at 493
38 Sec 9(h of lihe LalJor Management Rlations Act of 1947 29 USCA
St1Pp III Sec 141 Sec 159(b)
39 ft~rican C~~catons Association v ~uda 339 u S 382 (1950)
sustaining the validity of Sec 9(h) against the challenge that it
violated the First c-lT~nc1tlCiltl Ex Post FtiCto Lals and other iul1dashy
mental rights
40 Executive Order No 10450 issued Aporil zr 1953 (18 F R 2lt89)
41 Executive Orrler No 10491 issued Ocmiddottober 13 1953 (18 F R 6583)
~ Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary Interlocking Subshy
vcrs ion in Covernmcnt De~rtments II 83d Cong 1st ses5 Juy 30 J
1953 p 21 Being a cOImllunist is not a crime under federal law J
although it is in some states (see Liacos supra note 15 at
375) The Smith Act (18 USC Sec 2385 et seq) mkes advoshy
eating or teaching the violent overthrOf of any goverrment of the
United States or being a member of such a group and kno7ing its
purpose~a federal crime
43 See EaSley v F~cbardsonJ 182 F 2d 46 (DC 1950)J affd by an
evenly diiied court 341 TJ s 918 (1951) 1Etshingto v McGrath
182 F 2d 375 (DC 1950) aff1d 341 U s 923 (1951)j Or~~ v
vIil1ougbby 345 U s 83 91 (1953) Mr Justice Douglas concurring
i~ ~tiFascist Commi~~ v ~~EJ 341 U s 123 -182-183 (1951)
United Public W0rkers v --~1itcbell 330 U s 75 (1947)j Angilly - v
United States 199 F 2d 642) 644 (1950) cf NcAuliffe v rlew
Bedford 155 Mass 216 29 NE 517 (le9~) per Holmes J liThe
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but
he h(=l~s no constitltioi1al right to be a policezranu (Id at 220
29 NE at 5J7)
44 v1ie~sn _
v UpGegaff middot111 ~
3~middot4 u s 83 (1953) The Court ruleri as
contrry to due process the Cklahoma loyalty oath statute forshy
bidding IJ1l11ic emplo~rment of Persons who belonzea to certain
organizations regarciless of their knowledge of the character of
those oreenizations because of the indiscriminate classification
of lnnocent with kno~vilg activityll (d at 91)
~1 345 u S 83 (1953)middot
46 Id at 90
47 339 u s 3827 412 (1950) sustaininG the non-corJlIlunist affidavit
requirernelt of union leaders under the Taft -Hartley Act
~ Hoffman v United States 341 U s 179 (1951) suggests such
legislation if Congres3 concludes the lleed is great enough
See too Comment The Privilege Against Se1f-Llcriminetion Versus
Lmnurdty Z Proposed Statutes P 41 Gt~orgetom L J 511 (1953)
S Rept 153 on S 16 83d Cone 1st sess ~ 1 ald 2
April 17 1953 Report of Sel1a~~e Commttee on the JudiciaJ J
Interlocking S-lbversion in GOYf11llent Departments tl July 30
1953 83d Cong 1st sess p 50
~ HcfI1nan v Unitet States 341 u s 479 486 (1951)
50 Id U1ited States v ~isman 111 F 2d 260 262 (2 Cir 1950)
51 Note 61 Yale L J 105 109 (1952)
52 Rogers v United States 340 u s 367 375 (1951)
211 See e g Blau v Unjted StaIe~ 340 u s 159 (1950)
-shy54 Note J Co1t3resnic1al Inv estigat1ons--Self-Illcrimimtion Condemneshy
tiOll and Fair Hcar1ngll 22 U of Cinn L R 193 199-200 (1953)
55 See ~ovTn8end v ~~it~~ta~~3 95 F 2d 352 351 (DC Cir 1938)
cert denied 303 u S 664 (1938)
56 Byse TfA Report on the Pennsylvana Loyalty Act 101 U of Fa
L R 480 481-1~84 (1953) Wright Should Teachers Testify
Saturday Review Sept 2o 1953 p 23
57 See Meltzer Required Records The McCarran Act and The Privilege
Against Selfmiddotmiddot Incriminat ion ll 19 U of Chi L R 687 722 (1951)
y 83d Cong 1st Seas 1953 Also known as the Kefauver BUl
59 ~ v ltlalker 161 U S 591 (1896)
sect21 S 16 83d Cong 1st sess 1953 passed the Senate July 9 1953
after extensive debate Cong Ree 8646-8663 July 9 1953shy
S 16 amends B 3486 of Title 18 Sec 3486 presently furnishes
witnesses immunity from prosecution tor testimony before either
House or their Committees It appears to suffer from the same
deficiency present in a similar statute condemned in Counse~an v
Hitchcock 142 u s 547 (1892) S 16 is intended to StWP1y the
omission in the Hitchcock ease by providing not only that a
witness testimony may not be used against him but that such
witness shall be iImnune with respect to lIany transaction mtter
or thing concerning which he has been compelled to testIfy
sect 83d Congo 1st sess 1953
~ S Rept 153 83d Congo 1st sess p 2 (1953)
63 See Comment The Privi1ege Against Self-Incrimination Versus
Immunity Proposed statutes 41 Georgetown L J 511 523 (1953)
64 Supra footnote 7shy
sectif Delanel v ~ed States 199 F 2d 107 (1 Ci~ 1952)
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
43 See EaSley v F~cbardsonJ 182 F 2d 46 (DC 1950)J affd by an
evenly diiied court 341 TJ s 918 (1951) 1Etshingto v McGrath
182 F 2d 375 (DC 1950) aff1d 341 U s 923 (1951)j Or~~ v
vIil1ougbby 345 U s 83 91 (1953) Mr Justice Douglas concurring
i~ ~tiFascist Commi~~ v ~~EJ 341 U s 123 -182-183 (1951)
United Public W0rkers v --~1itcbell 330 U s 75 (1947)j Angilly - v
United States 199 F 2d 642) 644 (1950) cf NcAuliffe v rlew
Bedford 155 Mass 216 29 NE 517 (le9~) per Holmes J liThe
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but
he h(=l~s no constitltioi1al right to be a policezranu (Id at 220
29 NE at 5J7)
44 v1ie~sn _
v UpGegaff middot111 ~
3~middot4 u s 83 (1953) The Court ruleri as
contrry to due process the Cklahoma loyalty oath statute forshy
bidding IJ1l11ic emplo~rment of Persons who belonzea to certain
organizations regarciless of their knowledge of the character of
those oreenizations because of the indiscriminate classification
of lnnocent with kno~vilg activityll (d at 91)
~1 345 u S 83 (1953)middot
46 Id at 90
47 339 u s 3827 412 (1950) sustaininG the non-corJlIlunist affidavit
requirernelt of union leaders under the Taft -Hartley Act
~ Hoffman v United States 341 U s 179 (1951) suggests such
legislation if Congres3 concludes the lleed is great enough
See too Comment The Privilege Against Se1f-Llcriminetion Versus
Lmnurdty Z Proposed Statutes P 41 Gt~orgetom L J 511 (1953)
S Rept 153 on S 16 83d Cone 1st sess ~ 1 ald 2
April 17 1953 Report of Sel1a~~e Commttee on the JudiciaJ J
Interlocking S-lbversion in GOYf11llent Departments tl July 30
1953 83d Cong 1st sess p 50
~ HcfI1nan v Unitet States 341 u s 479 486 (1951)
50 Id U1ited States v ~isman 111 F 2d 260 262 (2 Cir 1950)
51 Note 61 Yale L J 105 109 (1952)
52 Rogers v United States 340 u s 367 375 (1951)
211 See e g Blau v Unjted StaIe~ 340 u s 159 (1950)
-shy54 Note J Co1t3resnic1al Inv estigat1ons--Self-Illcrimimtion Condemneshy
tiOll and Fair Hcar1ngll 22 U of Cinn L R 193 199-200 (1953)
55 See ~ovTn8end v ~~it~~ta~~3 95 F 2d 352 351 (DC Cir 1938)
cert denied 303 u S 664 (1938)
56 Byse TfA Report on the Pennsylvana Loyalty Act 101 U of Fa
L R 480 481-1~84 (1953) Wright Should Teachers Testify
Saturday Review Sept 2o 1953 p 23
57 See Meltzer Required Records The McCarran Act and The Privilege
Against Selfmiddotmiddot Incriminat ion ll 19 U of Chi L R 687 722 (1951)
y 83d Cong 1st Seas 1953 Also known as the Kefauver BUl
59 ~ v ltlalker 161 U S 591 (1896)
sect21 S 16 83d Cong 1st sess 1953 passed the Senate July 9 1953
after extensive debate Cong Ree 8646-8663 July 9 1953shy
S 16 amends B 3486 of Title 18 Sec 3486 presently furnishes
witnesses immunity from prosecution tor testimony before either
House or their Committees It appears to suffer from the same
deficiency present in a similar statute condemned in Counse~an v
Hitchcock 142 u s 547 (1892) S 16 is intended to StWP1y the
omission in the Hitchcock ease by providing not only that a
witness testimony may not be used against him but that such
witness shall be iImnune with respect to lIany transaction mtter
or thing concerning which he has been compelled to testIfy
sect 83d Congo 1st sess 1953
~ S Rept 153 83d Congo 1st sess p 2 (1953)
63 See Comment The Privi1ege Against Self-Incrimination Versus
Immunity Proposed statutes 41 Georgetown L J 511 523 (1953)
64 Supra footnote 7shy
sectif Delanel v ~ed States 199 F 2d 107 (1 Ci~ 1952)
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
See too Comment The Privilege Against Se1f-Llcriminetion Versus
Lmnurdty Z Proposed Statutes P 41 Gt~orgetom L J 511 (1953)
S Rept 153 on S 16 83d Cone 1st sess ~ 1 ald 2
April 17 1953 Report of Sel1a~~e Commttee on the JudiciaJ J
Interlocking S-lbversion in GOYf11llent Departments tl July 30
1953 83d Cong 1st sess p 50
~ HcfI1nan v Unitet States 341 u s 479 486 (1951)
50 Id U1ited States v ~isman 111 F 2d 260 262 (2 Cir 1950)
51 Note 61 Yale L J 105 109 (1952)
52 Rogers v United States 340 u s 367 375 (1951)
211 See e g Blau v Unjted StaIe~ 340 u s 159 (1950)
-shy54 Note J Co1t3resnic1al Inv estigat1ons--Self-Illcrimimtion Condemneshy
tiOll and Fair Hcar1ngll 22 U of Cinn L R 193 199-200 (1953)
55 See ~ovTn8end v ~~it~~ta~~3 95 F 2d 352 351 (DC Cir 1938)
cert denied 303 u S 664 (1938)
56 Byse TfA Report on the Pennsylvana Loyalty Act 101 U of Fa
L R 480 481-1~84 (1953) Wright Should Teachers Testify
Saturday Review Sept 2o 1953 p 23
57 See Meltzer Required Records The McCarran Act and The Privilege
Against Selfmiddotmiddot Incriminat ion ll 19 U of Chi L R 687 722 (1951)
y 83d Cong 1st Seas 1953 Also known as the Kefauver BUl
59 ~ v ltlalker 161 U S 591 (1896)
sect21 S 16 83d Cong 1st sess 1953 passed the Senate July 9 1953
after extensive debate Cong Ree 8646-8663 July 9 1953shy
S 16 amends B 3486 of Title 18 Sec 3486 presently furnishes
witnesses immunity from prosecution tor testimony before either
House or their Committees It appears to suffer from the same
deficiency present in a similar statute condemned in Counse~an v
Hitchcock 142 u s 547 (1892) S 16 is intended to StWP1y the
omission in the Hitchcock ease by providing not only that a
witness testimony may not be used against him but that such
witness shall be iImnune with respect to lIany transaction mtter
or thing concerning which he has been compelled to testIfy
sect 83d Congo 1st sess 1953
~ S Rept 153 83d Congo 1st sess p 2 (1953)
63 See Comment The Privi1ege Against Self-Incrimination Versus
Immunity Proposed statutes 41 Georgetown L J 511 523 (1953)
64 Supra footnote 7shy
sectif Delanel v ~ed States 199 F 2d 107 (1 Ci~ 1952)
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
y 83d Cong 1st Seas 1953 Also known as the Kefauver BUl
59 ~ v ltlalker 161 U S 591 (1896)
sect21 S 16 83d Cong 1st sess 1953 passed the Senate July 9 1953
after extensive debate Cong Ree 8646-8663 July 9 1953shy
S 16 amends B 3486 of Title 18 Sec 3486 presently furnishes
witnesses immunity from prosecution tor testimony before either
House or their Committees It appears to suffer from the same
deficiency present in a similar statute condemned in Counse~an v
Hitchcock 142 u s 547 (1892) S 16 is intended to StWP1y the
omission in the Hitchcock ease by providing not only that a
witness testimony may not be used against him but that such
witness shall be iImnune with respect to lIany transaction mtter
or thing concerning which he has been compelled to testIfy
sect 83d Congo 1st sess 1953
~ S Rept 153 83d Congo 1st sess p 2 (1953)
63 See Comment The Privi1ege Against Self-Incrimination Versus
Immunity Proposed statutes 41 Georgetown L J 511 523 (1953)
64 Supra footnote 7shy
sectif Delanel v ~ed States 199 F 2d 107 (1 Ci~ 1952)
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
66 161 U S 591 60S) 606 (1896) Moreover under 2 useA
~ 193 no witness is privileged to refuse to testify upon the
groundchat his testimony rna] -tend to disgracr~ him or othc~middotTise
render him irfamous See too Dodd 8elf-Incrimination by
Witness Befor~ Congressional COTJidttees ll 11 Fed R D 245 (1951)
67 Smith v United States 337 U S 137 146-147 (1949)
sectsectJ 284 u S 141 J 149 (1931) see also Feldallall v Unted States 332
U s 487 491-492 (1924) ~ v Halke~ 161 U S 591 (1896)
Adamson v California 332 U s 1+6 (1946) 26 Temple L Q 64 68
(1952) 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2258 (3d ed 1940)
69 ~e~c1 v Kp~~ 199 u S 372 (1905)
70 102 F SUppa 5gr (ND Ohio 1952)
71 Senate PesOlution 202 approved May 3 1950 8lst Cong 2nd sess
See Aiuppa v United S~ 201 F 2d 237 (6 Cir 1952)
72 See eg 4 fJ~anford L R 594 (1952) 66 liarv L R 18G (1952)
31 Texas L R 433 (1953) 22 U of Cion L R 193 (1953)
26 Temple L Q 64 (19~2)
73 ~nited St~tea v Pechart 103 F Supp 417 (ND Cal) cites the
Di Carlo csse in a footnote but does not follow it It declares
in accord with the majority rule that The jnclimination must be
with respect to a Federal offense or violation of Federal Law
(Id at 1~13)
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22
~ See United States v Pierre 128 F 2d 979 (2 Cir 1942)
Camarot v ynited States 111 F 2d 243 (3 Clr 1940) cert
denied 311 u S 651 (191jmiddotO) 5lra~~un v United S~ 99 F 2d
746 (9 eire 1938) and see 8 Higmore on Evidence B2258 (3d ed
1940) 26 Temple L Q 64 68 footnote 22