immigrunt incolporution und politicul purticipution in the...

Immigrunt Incolporution und Politicul Purticipution in the United States' S. Karthick Ramakrishnan Princeton University

Thomas J. Espenshade Princeton University

This article examines several factors related to immigrant incorporation that have been ignored in previous studies of voting participation. We add various immigrant-related variables to a model that controls for individual resources, social incorporation, institutional barriers and contexts of political mobilization. We find little support for straight-line assimilationist theories of immigrant adaptation. We also find that coming from a repressive regime has no significant effect on voting and that living in areas with Spanish-language ballots does not increase the likelihood of voting among first generation Latinos. Our results also suggest that anti- immigrant legislation has a positive effect on participation among first and second generation immigrants. Overall, the immigrant-related variables introduced in our analysis add significantly to the existing theoretical knowledge on voting participation in the United States.

In the past decade, there has been a substantial amount of research on the demographic, economic and social incorporation of immigrants in the Unit- ed States. In the demographic arena, researchers have investigated how migrants' patterns of fertility, health and mortality, and settlement compare with those of natives (Kahn, 1994; Guendelman et al., 1990; Frey, 1996; White and Omer, 1997).

Studies of the economic and social incorporation of immigrants have analyzed immigrants' earnings and employment opportunities in relation to those of the native-born and how immigrants' education, occupational mobility, and English-language ability change with the passage of time in the

'An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Population Asso- ciation of America, Los Angeles, CA, March 23-25, 2000. We thank the anonymous review- ers for their valuable suggestions. We also thank R. Douglas Arnold, Larry Bartels, Jennifer Hochschild, Jane Junn, Tali Mendelberg, Debbie Schildkraut and Min Zhou for their feed- back and criticisms. Finally, we thank Sipra Roy for her help with creating the graphs and tables for this paper, and the Office of Population Research Center Grant #P30HD32030 for the use of facilities at the Office of Population Research at Princeton University.

0 2001 by the Center for Migration Studies of New York. All rights reserved. 0 198-91 83/01 /3503.0 135

870 ZMR Volume 35 Number 3 (Fall 2001): 870-909

IMMIGRANT INC@KI’ORATI@N AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATIoN IN THE u. s. 87 1

United States (Borjas, 1999; Stevens, 1992; Portes and MacLeod, 1999; Espenshade and Fu, 1997; Lbpez, 1999).

Studies of political incorporation have focused primarily on the determinants of naturalization and differences in citizenship acquisition across different nationalities (Portes and MOZO, 1985; Liang, 1994; Yang, 1994). Scholars of immigrant incorporation have paid considerably less attention to voting and other forms of political participation occur after naturalization. Although first and second generation constitute nearly 15 percent of eligible voters in the United States, there have been fay systematic studies of voting participation across immigrant generations. Many of the studies have had a limited scope, applying either to particular ethnic populations or to particular localities. Examples of early works on generational differences in participation include articles by Lamar Kellstedt (1974) and James Lamare (1982). Kellstedt’s study of Buffalo, New York showed that second generation respondents have higher rates of voting participation than either immigrants or nonethnic first or higher generation respondents. Lamare noted in his study of Chicano children in El Paso, Texas that third generation respondents had the highest levels of psychological identification and affect towards the political system.2 More recently, there have been a few cross-ethnic studies of immigrant political incorporation in particular states such as California and Texas (Uhlaner etal., 1989; Cho, 1999; Junn, 1999) or in metropolitan areas such as New York and Los Angeles (Mollenkopf et al., 1999; Wong, 2000). In their study of political participation in California, Uhlaner et al., note that voting among immigrants is influenced by the duration of their stay in the United States, as well as by their ability to speak English. Cho (1 999) also finds such factors to be important and suggests that immigrants educated abroad are less likely to vote than those educated in the United States. Final- ly, Junn (1999) concludes that immigrants may be less likely to participate in “system-directed activities such as voting, but they are just as likely as the native born to participate in “direct” political activities such as protests. While these studies all offer important insights regarding immigrant political incorporation, they are limited by the fact that they examine only particular states or metropolitan areas.

There are a few national-level studies of generational status and voting participation, but these, too, have had their limitations. During the past decade, there have been three national-level studies on generational status and voting participation, two of which have been restricted to Latino subpopula-

2Larnare refers to children whose parents were born in the United States as ‘second generation.’

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tions (Bass and Casper, 1999; DeSipio, 1996b; also see Hill and Moreno, 1996).3 None of these recent studies explicitly considers generational status in their analyses, as they focus solely on differences between native-born and foreign-born citizens. As we shall see, separating out the second generation offers some important insights on processes of political adaptation among immigrants. In addition, these studies are largely demographic in nature, paying little attention to how political contexts affect individuals’ propensities to vote. For example, this research fails to account for institutional barriers to registering and voting, as well as the intensity of electoral competition.

Our goal in this paper is to build a more complete model of voting participation, drawing on some of the recent theoretical insights on the effects of political mobilization and macropolitical contexts on electoral participation (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Shachar and Nalebuff, 1999). After review- ing the standard theoretical literature on voting participation, we introduce several factors related to immigrant incorporation that have not previously been considered in studies of voting participation. An analysis of voting participation is conducted using data from three recent Current Population Sur- vey Voter Supplements (CPS). Although we incorporate such factors as individual resources and contexts of political mobilization, our empirical analysis emphasizes factors related to immigrant incorporation. Finally, the theoretical implications of the results of our model are discussed, especially as they relate to assimilationist accounts of immigrant adaptation and the impact of immigrant legislation on political participation.

TRADITIONAL MODELS OF VOTING PARTICIPATION Theories of electoral turnout have tended to emphasize one or more of the following sets of factors: 1) demographic characteristics and individual resources related to socioeconomic status, 2) incorporation into social networks, 3) institutional barriers to registering and voting, 4) strategic mobilization by political actors, and 5 ) attitudinal factors such as partisanship, political interest and political efficacy.4 Our theoretical model incorporates the first four sets of factors. Factors related to individual attitudes and orien-

3Although Hill and Moreno are interested in the question of whether second-generation Cubans are more likely to participate in politics, they do not explicitly include generational status in their multivariate model. Instead, they use a continuous variable that measures the percent of one’s life the respondent has spent in the United States. *In the standard theoretical literature on voting participation, “external efficacy” refers to the extent to which respondents believe that their participation matters and “internal effrcacy” refers to the extent to which respondents feel that they understand government and politics.

IMMIGRANT INCORPORATION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE U. S. 873

tations are set aside because the CPS does not provide any meaningful measures for such variables. The issue of individual-level data on political attitudes is addressed later in the discussion of data sources.

Individual Resources and Demographic Characteristics Theorists have devoted considerable attention to individual resources such as education and income on electoral participation. Studies both of the Current Population Survey and the National Election Study (NES) have shown that educational attainment has the strongest effects on voting, serving both as an indicator of political skills and the likelihood of being mobilized (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). Income has also been shown to be a significant predictor of voting participation, although its effects are generally weaker than those of education.

In addition to resources, theorists have also drawn attention to the importance of individual demographic characteristics such as age and race. Age has a positive, curvilinear relationship to voter turnout: older citizens tend to have higher levels of political knowledge and partisan identification (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). Racial gaps in voting have been shown to be significant for Latinos and Asian-Americans, but not for African-Ameri- cans. Since the passage of the National Voting Rights Act in 1965, racial gaps in registration and voting between blacks and whites have narrowed considerably. Even as early as 1980, scholars began to note that, after controlling for other demographic factors, whites did not have a significant advantage in participation over blacks (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). By contrast, studies of Latino political participation have shown a persistent gap in voting participation between Latinos and non-Latinos (Calvo and Rosenstone, 1984; Hero and Campbell, 1996). There have been few national studies of voting participation among Asian-Americans; most studies have focused on particular states such as California or particular metropolitan areas such as Los Angeles (Lien, 1997; Uhlaner et a l , 1989; Nakanishi, 1986). However, one recent analysis of CPS data reveals that Asian-Americans were the group least likely to vote in the 1992 general election (Lien, 1998).

Social Incorporation In addition to individual-level factors, theorists have also paid attention to the incorporation of individuals into communities or social contexts that encour- age or discourage political participation. Chief among the social-contextual variables mentioned are employment status, residential stability and marital


status. The unemployed are less likely to participate in politics, not only because they tend to have lower incomes, but also because they do not participate in social networks in the workplace that reward political participation (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). People with low levels of residential stability are less likely to participate because they are less likely to be vested in their communities and are less likely to have sta- ble networks of friends and neighbors. These networks are considered to be important in fostering political participation because they subsidize the costs of obtaining political information. Furthermore, peer influences among spouses and social networks are believed to foster participation by applying selective sanctions for noncompliance (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). While peer influences can indeed operate in the opposite direction (towards political apathy and abstention from voting), past evidence from both the CPS and the NES indicate otherwise; those who are more embedded in social networks are indeed more likely to vote (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993).

Institutional Barriers While an individual’s resources and degree of “social connectedness” have a strong influence on his or her likelihood to vote, macropolitical contexts also matter. Institutional barriers to voting can have a substantial impact on voter turnout, as witnessed by low levels of black turnout during the Jim Crow era of poll taxes and literacy tests. After the elimination of such restrictions during the 1960s, the most significant barriers that remain are state-level rules on registration and absentee voting. States with restrictive eligibility for absentee voting decrease the probability of voting among registered citizens (Oliv- er, 1996). Similarly, citizens who live in states with early closing dates for registration are less likely to register in time for elections.

Political Mobilization The level of political mobilization in a given state or congressional district can have a significant influence on voter turnout. From the early works of V.O. Key (1949) and E. E. Schattschneider (1960),5 political scientists have noted the importance of political mobilization and parry competition in inducing

5In his comparative study of Southern politics, Key (1747) noted that states with higher partisan or factional competition had higher levels of voter turnout. Indeed, Key attributed the low turnout among poor Southern whites, not as much to poll taxes or literacy tests, but to the lack of two-party competition in the South.

IMMIGRANT INCORPORATION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE u. s. 875

higher levels of voter turnout. Recent studies of electoral turnout have revived concerns about party competition and political mobilization in general (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Schachar and Nalebuff, 1999). They show that individuals who live in states where presidential contests are close are more likely to vote than those living in states where there is a clear favorite. This is due largely to differences in state-level mobilization by political actors. As Rosenstone and Hansen put it, “campaigns, interest groups, and the media.. .contest every inch in campaigns that stand to be decided by tenths of percentage points, and they tacitly concede campaigns that look to be blowouts” ( 179).

Political mobilization also varies by the number of major electoral contests in a given election. States that have a governor‘s race or a senate race concurrent with presidential or house elections have higher levels of political mobilization and voter turnout. The effects can be especially strong during midterm elections, when there is no presidential contest to generate interest among poten- tial voters (Rosenstone and Hansen: 184). Finally, the historical legacy of mobilization and participation in a particular state or region can have a significant influence on individuals’ propensities to register and vote. Indeed, political scientists in the 1970s and 1980s noted a kind of regional “political culture” in the South, a vestige of one-party competition and racial disenfranchisement that led to lower turnout among Southern blacks and whites.

I M M r ~ ~ T I N C O ~ O ~ T I U N - AN EXRANLIED MODEL OF VOTING PARTICIPATION When considering political participation, as well as other processes of immigrant adaptation, it is useful to think of such processes as having at least two temporal dimensions - across time within a particular immigrant generation and across generations. For example, researchers have typically found that earnings and English-language ability improve the longer immigrants live in the United States. At the same time, there are also differences in language acquisition across generations. Foreign-born individuals frequently do not speak English as well as their native-born children, and second generation immigrants often retained some understanding of their parents’ mother tongue. Those in the third generation or higher typically lose all proficiency in the original migrants’ language unless they make some special effort to regain it (Fishman, 1972; Lbpez, 1999). This study incorporates both these temporal dimensions and other new features as predictors of political participation.


Generational Status Traditional theories of immigrant adaptation considered assimilation to be a unilinear process, whereby the economic and social conditions of individuals and ethnic groups improve over each succeeding generation. Over the past decade, several studies have challenged the applicability of “straight-line’’ theories of immigrant adaptation to the “new” second generation (Gans, 1992; Portes and Zhou, 1993; Rumbaut, 1997; Zhou, 1997). Many of the revi- sionist perspectives present a model of “segmented assimilation,” in which different group characteristics and modes of incorporation lead to diverse outcomes that can include second generation decline. In order to test the applicability of the straight-line and segmented assimilation models of immigrant incorporation, we analyze generational patterns in participation across different racial/ethnic groups. We expect to find different generational patterns across racial groups because of stark differences in the historical recep- tion given to immigrants from Europe versus those from Asia and Latin America (Espiritu, 1992). While urban machines and mobilization under the New Deal ensured the political incorporation of immigrants from Europe, exclusionary laws and discriminatory practices prevented many Asian and Mexican immigrants from exercising their political voice until the 1970s (de la Garza, 1996; Espiritu, 1992).6

Within each raciallethnic group, we expect first generation citizens to be the least likely to vote because of linguistic and cultural barriers that make it more difficult for them to obtain political information or vote in areas with English-only ballots. First generation citizens are also more likely than those in higher generations to retain ties to political institutions in the home country. O n the other hand, there may indeed be selection effects whereby those who choose to naturalize have unusually high levels of commitment to political participation or high levels of political awareness after preparing for the citizenship exam. Even with these selection effects, however, we still expect participation to be lowest among first generation respondents because of the overriding importance of linguistic barriers, cultural barriers and immigrant political orientations.

Duration of Stay in the United States For the foreign-born, duration of stay in the United States can be an important indicator of the extent to which immigrants are incorporated into

%deed, most Asian immigrants were not able to naturalize until 1952.


domestic political institutions. Based on previous findings among Latino and Asian-American populations (Uhlaner et al., 1989, Hill and Moreno, 1996), we expect longer residence in the United States to lead to greater political participation among first generation citizens. Just as immigrants who have lived in the United States for a longer period of time are more fluent in English, they also tend to have greater contact with, and stronger commitments to, the mainstream political system. For example, Cain, Kiewiet and Uhlaner (1991) note in their study of California residents that partisan identification among Latinos, Chinese and Korean immigrants becomes stronger the longer they stay in the United States.

Political Socialization in the Home Country For naturalized citizens, prior experience with repressive or democratic regimes (hereafter referred to as “prior political experience”) can have a significant impact on the propensity to vote. Those fleeing regimes with long histories of political repression may be mistrustful of the political system and therefore be less likely to vote in elections. On the other hand, they may rel- ish the freedom of choosing among competing candidates for political office and therefore be more likely to vote. So far, only comparative studies of Cuban and Mexican immigrants have examined whether prior political experience has a significant impact on subsequent participation. Based on precinct-level data from Miami, Portes and Mozo (1985) argue that Cuban- Americans have higher levels of turnout than other Hispanic subgroups. Multivariate analyses of the Latino National Political Survey add further cre- dence to the prior political experience hypothesis - Cuban immigrants are more likely to vote than Mexican immigrants, even after controlling for age, education, income and length of stay in the United States (Arvizu and Gar- cia, 1996). However, given the small number of countries of origin in such studies (Cuba and Mexico), the effect of prior political experience on voting participation has not been systematically tested. It remains to be seen whether the voting participation of Cuban Americans is consistent with that of immigrants from other communist or repressive regimes.

Finally, just as prior political experience may influence voting participation among foreign-born citizens, it may also influence participation among children of the first generation. Studies of political socialization have shown that childhood exposure to political activities or discussions by parents has a significant impact on subsequent adult participation (Jennings and Niemi, 1981; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995). Thus, if an immigrant family’s


“prior political experience” does indeed have a significant impact on political participation in the United States, we would expect the impact to be present among the second generation as well, albeit perhaps to a lesser degree.

Linguistic Barriers to Participation The traditional literature on barriers to voting participation has focused the effects of absentee ballot restrictions, registration requirements and racial ger- rymandering on voter turnout. When considering the political incorporation of immigrants, linguistic barriers to participation can play just as important a role as some of the other barriers to participation. The presence or absence of multilingual ballots should have their greatest impact on individuals with the lowest levels of English proficiency. Thus, for example, living in a Span- ish-ballot area versus an English-only-ballot area should increase turnout among Latino immigrants, and the difference should be greater for the first generation than for higher generation Latinos.

Ethnic Residential Concentration Those who live in states or metropolitan areas with high concentrations of co- ethnics are more likely to have contacts with, or exposure to, ethnic media and community organizations. Having higher concentrations of co-ethnics therefore lowers the per-capita cost of ethnic mobilization by interest groups, party organizations and candidate organizations. At the same time, previous studies of Latino participation have shown that areas of high ethnic concentrations can also be areas of lower mobilization and participation (DeSipio, 1996a; de la Garza, 1996). This may be due to the effect of other social contextual factors associated with high Latino and immigrant concentrations: higher residential poverty, greater proportions of noncitizens, and peers with low English proficiency (Cho, 1999; Espenshade and Fu, 1997). If proximity to co-ethnics does indeed lead to higher electoral mobilization, we would expect such mobilization to have a stronger effect on the voting participation of those in the second generation or higher. While first generation citizens may have deeper ties to their co-ethnic communities, such ties may not lead to greater participation in the United States because first generation ethnic organizations tend to orient them- selves more towards homeland politics than U.S. politics (Jones-Correa, 1998).

Mobilization over Anti-Immigrant Legishtion While mobilization among residential co-ethnics may have their strongest effects among those in higher generations, we expect anti-immigrant legislation

IMMIGRANT INCORPORATION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION I N THE U. S. 879

to have a distinct mobilizing effect on first and second generation immigrants. Those in the first or second generation are more likely to mobilize against laws that threaten to cut off public benefits to immigrants because they are more likely to have relatives that stand to lose those benefits. Media reports of the 1996 election indicate that immigrant legislation in 1996 was indeed more salient for immigrants than for the rest of the population (Glastris et al, 1997; McDon- nell and Ramos, 1996). This article assesses the impact of anti-immigration legislation on turnout by examining whether mobilization over Proposition 187 in California led to a disproportionate increase in voting participation among first and second generation immigrants.

To summarize, traditional theories of political participation have examined the effects of individual resources, social incorporation and political mobilization on voter turnout. In this study, we introduce additional variables related to immigrant incorporation that may influence voting participation. Some of these variables have been included in previous studies of political participation that have been limited to particular ethnic groups or to particular regions. We examine the effects of these new immigrant- related variables across racial/ethnic groups by using national data on voting by participation.

DATA AND METHODS This analysis relies on the Current Population Survey November Voter Sup- plements (CPS) from 1994, 1996 and 1998. The CPS offers several advantages in the study of voting participation across immigrant generations. First, it is the only national survey since 1994 that includes questions on voting as well as questions on the nativity of respondents and their parents. Similar questions have been absent from the National Black Election Study and from the National Election Study (NES) since 1994. As for Latinos, a 1996 survey by the Tomis Rivera Policy Institute (TRPI) includes questions on the generational status of respondents, but the sample is limited to three states (California, Florida and Texas). The last national survey of Latinos on voting participation that included generational status was the Latino National Polit- ical Survey in 1990. The CPS, then, remains the only source of information on voting that has consistently asked questions on the generational status of respondents in recent elections.

There are several other advantages to using the CPS to analyze immigrant voting participation. One is the size of the sample for each election year, which yields large subsamples of immigrant generations across raciaUethnic


groups. In 1998, for instance, the sample of first generation citizens induded 1,8 17 whites, 263 blacks, 1,05 1 Asian-Americans and 1,046 Latinos.’ Anoth- er advantage to the CPS is the richness of the data on immigrant characteristics. For instance, the NES contains information on whether respondents and their parents were born in the United States or abroad, but it does not include country-of-origin information for first and second generation immigrants. The lack of country-of-origin data prevents us from examining the effect of repressive-regime origins on voting participation. Furthermore, the national data in the CPS has greater variation than the three-state T W I survey on factors such as state concentration of Latinos and access to Spanish-language ballots. Final- ly, neither the NES nor the TWI datasets include information such as the duration of stay in the United States for first generation citizens.

At the same time, there are two limitations to utilizing Current Population Survey data to analyze voting participation. First, the CPS does not include any individual-level information on political attitudes or party contact that have been known to lead to greater participation. It has been well documented that individual contact with party organizations, strong party identification, and feelings of political efficacy increase the likelihood that a person will vote (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Miller and Shanks, 1996; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995). Another limitation is that the CPS does not include validated measures of voting that confirm whether or not an individual’s reported vote matches public records of registration and voting. Although misreporting in the CPS is considerably lower than misreporting in other surveys such as the National Election Study (Presser etal , 1990), past studies have shown that levels of misreporting among blacks and Latinos are higher than those among whites (Abramson and Claggett, 1992; Shaw et aL, 1999).8

We address the first limitation by including contextual measures of political mobilization and state legacies of voting participation, but we cannot find a similar solution for other attitudinal factors such as political efficacy and

’These figures are based on valid responses among adult U.S. citizens to the registration and voting questions in the CPS Voter Supplement. Those who identify as “American Indian, Aleut, Eskimo” are dropped from the analysis because their generational subsamples are too small to provide reliable estimates. 8There is some disagreement as to whether the higher level of mismatch between reported and validated votes among blacks is due to the higher propensity of black to rnisreport or to the fact that blacks are more likely to live in areas with poor record-keeping of registrations and votes. Abramson and Claggett ( 1 992) do not find any substantial differences in the quality of record-keeping by race, based on self-reports by voter registrars. Presser et al. (1990), based on requests for information by investigators, find that blacks in the NES are twice as likely as whites to come from areas with poor record-keeping.

IMMIGRANT lNCORPORATION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE u. s. 88 1

party identification.’ Next, in order to address the problem of vote misreporting, we examined validated data in the TRPI and NES to determine whether there are any generational differences in the propensity to misreport the vote. There were no significant generational differences in vote misreporting among Latinos in the TRPI survey. We used the NES to examine vote misreporting only among white respondents because the size of the black, Asian- American and Latino subsamples were too small for our analysis. Second generation whites in the NES were less likely to misreport their votes than those in other immigrant generations. As we shall see, if a similar pattern of misreporting occurs for whites in the CPS as it does in the NES, then the true generational differences in voting participation would be even larger than the difference found in our analysis. O n balance, then, we consider the Current Population Survey to be a valuable dataset with which to examine the various questions that we have raised related to immigrant incorporation.

Our sample for the CPS is limited to U.S. citizens who are at least 18 years old. We designate those born outside the United States as “first generation,” those born in the United States with at least one foreign-born parent as “second generation,” and those born in the United States with U.S.-born parents as ‘3+ generation.” We fit a logistic regression model to the data because the dependent variable - voted or did not vote in the November elections - is dichotomous. Our independent variables include not only individual-level data from the CPS, but also several contextual variables from other data sources. We obtained information on registration requirements from the League of Women Voters and data on absentee ballot requirements from a recent study ofvoting participation (Oliver, 1996). We also use information on the closeness of senatorial, gubernatorial and presidential races from pre-election surveys in Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports and Associated Press Research (Cranford, 1994; Babson and Groppe, 1994; Greenblatt, 1996; Greenblatt and Wells, 1996; Yoachum, 1996; Cassata, 1998; Foerstel, 1998). Finally, we obtained aggregate state-level data on voter turnout from the Federal Election Commission. Instead of using the dummy variable “South” to capture the effect of historical legacies of voting participation on contemporary turnout, we use an average of voter turnout from 1972-1992 for each state. We find this measure of state political culture to

9Admittedly, contextual measures of electoral mobilization have a much weaker effect on individual voting than individual-level measures of party contact. Part of the reason is the endo- geneity between individual-level contact and participation. Parties are more likely to contact individuals who have participated in the past, or who are pre-disposed to participate because of their socioeconomic status.


be superior for two reasons. First, it looks at contemporary political culture, taking into account changes in registration and turnout in the South after the Civil Rights era and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Furthermore, the measure allows for state-level variation and does not limit the effect of “political culture” to one regional bloc - namely the Confederate South. We provide a more complete description of the variables and their sources in the Appendix.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS There are considerable differences in voting participation, both within the first generation as well as across immigrant generations (Figure 1). Looking first at the tabulated data on voter turnout within the first generation, we see a progressive increase in voting participation as immigrants spend more of their lives in the United States. This pattern appears for all raciallethnic groups. Across immigrant generations, however, there are considerable differences in voter turnout for members of different racial groups. Among whites, we do not find a linear increase in participation from the first generation to higher generations. Instead, we see a pattern of “second generation advantage” - a progressive increase in participation within the first generation by duration of stay in the United States, a peak in participation among the second generation, followed by a decline among “3+ generation” respondents.

Among blacks, we do not find a second generation advantage. Voting among blacks is highest among those first generation respondents who have lived in the United States for 20 years or more. Similar results hold true for Latinos, while for Asian- Americans turnout is highest among those in the third generation or higher. The bivariate results for generational status and voter turnout therefore indicate that the second generation advantage applies only to whites. Among Asian-Americans, a more straight-line pattern seems to hold, where there is a progressive increase in participation by immigrant generation. Blacks and Latinos experience a similar monotonic increase in participation, except that the highest level of turnout is among long-term immigrant citizens.

Since there are many factors related to individual resources, social incorporation, institutional barriers and political mobilization that may account for differences in turnout, we need to re-examine the issue of generational differences in a multivariate model that controls for such factors. In our multivariate analyses, we fit our model to the entire sample of adult citizens and then apply the same model to each immigrant generation separately. Many of the traditional variables mentioned in the background literature are significant across all immigrant generations (see Appendix Tables A-1 to A-3).

IMMIGRANT INCORPORATION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION I N THE U. S. 883

Figure 1 Generational Differences in Voting Participation, Midterm Elections 1994-1998'

Source: Current Population Survey, November 1994, 1998. Note: 'Tabulated results are only for the midterm elections of 1994 and 1998 because the general level of turnout in presidential elections is much higher. Generational differences in turnout are still present among all racial grnups in 1996, although the differences are smaller for all groups other than non-Hispanic whites.

Regardless of generation, the likelihood of voting increases with age and reaches a peak among 70-79 year olds before decreasing among the very old. Education also has similar effects across all immigrant generations, with voting highest among college graduates and those with graduate degrees.10 High- er income consistently leads to greater voting participation, except for first generation respondents for whom the effect is weaker and varies from year to year. Among factors related to social incorporation, marital status and residential stability show a robust relationship to voting participation across immigrant generations. Married individuals are consistently more likely to vote than those who are not married, while those who have lived three or more

'OWhile the findings for age and education are in line with the standard accounts of voting participation, they run contrary to the finding by Cho (1999) that older Asian and Latino immigrants are less likely to vote than younger ones, and that higher education decreases the likelihood of participation among Asian immigrants. Even when we restrict the sample to only Asians and Latinos, the traditional patterns hold - age and education increase the likelihood of participation. It is possible that the difference is due to the fact that the dataset that Cho utilizes is from the mid 1980s and is limited to California.

884 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION &VIEW

years in a given address are more likely to vote than recent movers. Employ- ment status has an inconsistent relationship to voting across generations and over time. The coefficients for the variable display inconsistent signs and are frequently statistically insignificant. Finally, contextual variables such as the closeness of presidential races and eligibility for absentee ballots show weak and inconsistent relationships to voting. On the other hand, restrictive registration requirements are consistently associated with lower voting participation and the closeness of senate/governor races with higher participation in midterm elections. In sum, our empirical results confirm findings from previous studies that age, education, marital status and residential stability all have a significant effect on voting participation that is consistent across immigrant generations. Con- textual factors such as registration requirements and the closeness of senate/governor races also have a significant impact on voting participation. On the other hand, factors such as employment status, absentee voting eligibility and the closeness of presidential races do not have a significant impact on voter turnout.

Even after controlling for traditional factors related to voting participation, many of the new variables of immigrant incorporation prove to be significant in all three election years (see Figures 2-4 below). These new variables are also jointly significant. The null hypothesis that the newly-included variables are jointly insignificant was rejected based on chi-squared likelihood-ratio tests in both the full samples and in the generational subsamples.11 For the rest of our discussion, we shall focus on the new set of variables introduced in the analysis. We do so primarily because many of these variables have not received systematic attention in studies of voting participation and because they shed new light on the political incorporation of different immigrant generations.

IMPACTS OF THE NEWEXPLANATORY VARLABLES Generational Patterns across RuciaL/Ethnic Groups Even after controlling for individual resources, social incorporation and contexts of political mobilization, generational differences in the likelihood of voting remain significant for all raciallethnic groups. Looking across immigrant generations, the full model reveals that the “second generation advan-

llWe reject the null hypothesis by using the likelihood-ratio test. For example, in 1996 the likelihood-ratio statistic, -2*(log likelihood of traditional model - log likelihood of full model), is 836.35. This is well beyond the .01 chi-squared critical value of 49.59 for 29 degrees of freedom. The likelihood-ratio statistics for the generational sub-samples in 1996 are 164.64 for the first generation (.01 chi-squared=41.63 for 23 d.f.), 85.20 for the second generation (.01 chi-squared=29.14 for 14 d.f.) and 521.80 for the 3+ generation (.01 chi- squared= 27.69 for 13 d.E).


Figure 2 Immigrant Incorporation and Voting Participation in 1994 Logistic Regression Estimates of Selected Variables in Full Sample Model

White, 1st t e n 4Oys

1stGen 10-19ys 1st t e n 19ys

Second Generation

Black, 1st Gen 4 0 ys

1st Gen 10-19ys

1st Gen 19ys Second Generation

Third and Higher Gen

Asian, 1st Gen c10 ys

l s t t e n 10-19ys

1 s t Gen 19 ys

Second Generation


Latino, 1st Gen cloys 1st Gen 10-19ys

1st Gen 19 ys

Second Generation

Third and Higher Gen From Repressive Regime

Parent from Repressive Regime

In Spanish Ballot Area

Latino x in Spanish Ballot Area

State % Black

Black x State K Black

State % Asian

Asian x State K Asian State K Latino

Latino x State K Latino State Voting History

California

-2.00 -1.50 -1.00 -0.50 0.00

COEFFICIENT

‘p



White, 1st Gen



White, 1st Gen 4 0 ys 1stGen 10-19ys

1st Gen 19 ys Second Generation

Black, 1st Gen 4 0 ys 1st Gen 10-19ys

1st Gen 19 ys

Second Generation


Asian, 1st t e n 4 0 ys

1st Gen 10-19 ys

1st Gen 19 ys Second Generation


Latino, 1st Gen


lived in the United States for 20 years or more.15 The likelihood of participation actually decreases for second generation Latinos and remains low for those in the third generation and higher. So, we see that generational patterns in participation vary across racial/ethnic groups - highest participation among long-term immigrants for Latinos, a straight-line pattern among blacks, a tapering off in participation for Asian-Americans, and a second generation advantage among whites.

What accounts for these different generational patterns in participation? Looking first at whites, we see that conventional assimilationist accounts of cultural and political adaptation may explain why participation among second generation citizens is higher than that among first generation citizens. Second generation respondents may be less likely to face societal discrimina- tion and linguistic barriers to participation and may be less likely than first generation citizens to be oriented towards homeland politics. However, “straight-line” assimilationist theories cannot account for why second generation whites are consistently more likely to participate than those in higher generations. One plausible explanation for the second generation advantage among whites is that those in the “3+ generation” may be less attached to political institutions than their parents’ generation.16 The second generation advantage may also be driven by a sense of relative deprivation based on dis- crimination against the first generation. In their book Immigrant America, Alejandro Portes and Rubtn Rumbaut (1996) note that hostile reactions to first generation immigrants stir “ethnic militancy among subsequent generations.. .descendants of the first immigrants have gained ‘voice’ and have used

15Pantoja and Segura (2000) find, in their analysis of the 1996 TRPI survey, that California residents who recently naturalized had the highest rates of voting participation among Lati- nos. Their findings do not necessarily contradict ours. First, even the TRPI survey shows that immigrants other than those recently naturalized in CaIifornia were less likely to vote than higher-generation respondents. Furthermore, the date of naturalization among Latinos is not strongly related to the date of arrival in the United States (Portes and Rumbaut, 1996). Indeed, during the mid-1990s, many of those who naturalized were long-term residents who gained eligibility after being legalized under the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 (Immigration and Naturalization Services, 1997). We cannot have an exact comparison between the CPS and the TRPI surveys because the latter do not ask questions on the duration of stay in the United States. ‘6In his pioneering work on immigrant adaptation, Marcus Lee Hansen (1938, 1987) suggests that second-generation enthusiasm for American institutions may spring from a desire to escape from the immigrant generation’s cultural influences. According to Hansen, this desire wanes by the third generation: “What the son wishes to forget the grandson wishes to remem- ber” (1987, p. 15). It is unclear, however, whether this resurgence in ethnicity by the third generation leads to a decrease in attachment to domestic politics.


it to reaffirm identities attacked previously with so much impunity” (95). Whatever the reason, it is clear that straight-line assimilationist theories cannot account for the generational differences in participation among whites.

Just as straight-line assimilationist theories are unable to account for the generational pattern in participation among whites, they are of limited value in accounting for the patterns among non-whites. First, it is important to note that, unlike their white counterparts, many blacks, Asian-Americans and Latinos in the third generation and higher confronted significant barriers to social incorporation and political participation until the 1970s. Despite this legacy of disenfranchisement, blacks in the third generation and higher have been able to reach parity in participation with whites, thanks largely to the mobilizing effects of the civil rights movement. Several studies have shown that, even though blacks faced enormous barriers to participation until the 1960s, the civil rights movement was a powerful mobilizer that enhanced citizens‘ sense of group consciousness and political efficacy (Verba and Nie, 1972; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). Asian-Americans and Latinos also faced several institutional barriers to participation until the 1970s, but they did not experience a social movement on the scale of the civil rights movement.” As other scholars have noted, the absence of such broad-scale move- ments among third and higher generation Asian-Americans and Latinos may account for the continued racial gap in participation for such groups (DeSi- pio, 1996a; Uhlaner et a l , 1989).1* The persistence of this racial gap thus challenges conventional assimilationist accounts of immigrant incorporation that would suggest convergence in participation by the third generation.

Duration of Stay in the United States For some racial/ethnic groups, longer stay in the United States among first generation citizens dramatically increases the likelihood of voting. Among first generation Latinos, those living in the United States for 20 years or more (“long- term residents”) were 39 percent more likely to have voted in the 1996 election than those living in the United States for 10 to 19 years (“medium-term residents”). The difference was even greater in the 1994 midterm election, where long-term Latino residents were twice as likely to have voted as medium-term residents. Similarly, among first generation whites, long-term residents were 43

~7Institutionai barriers were especially strong for Asian immigrants, most of whom were not able to naturalize until 1952 (Espiritu, 1992). ‘*Indeed, Pantoja and Segura’s study of Latino participation (2000) suggests that immigrants who naturalized in California during the 1990s were more likely than native-born Latinos to be mobilized in the 1996 election.

890 INTERNATIONAL MIGUTION &VIEW

percent to 70 percent more likely to vote than medium-term residents, depending on the election year.19 For black and Asian-American immigrants, however, there is no clear relationship between duration of stay in the United States and the likelihood of voting. So, even though duration of stay is associated with higher turnout for all racial/ethnic groups in the bivariate analysis (Figure l), the relationship has a positive slope only for Latinos and whites when controlling for the various other factors in our full model.

Political Experiences in the Home Country Prior political experience with repressive regimes has no consistent effect on voting participation. Looking at the first generation subsamples within each election year, we see that those who emigrate from repressive states do not have higher rates of voting than those who come from democratic states. While some may argue that the experience of immigrants from communist countries is distinct from those that come from other repressive regimes, the results were almost identical when we ran a separate model using “Communist Regime Ori- gin” instead of “Repressive Regime Origin.” Just as fleeing from communism may increase the motivation to participate among some groups such as Cuban- Americans, it can also lower the likelihood of participation among groups such as Vietnamese-Americans, many of whom harbor a distrust of the political system (Collett, 2000). Thus, on balance, coming from a communist regime or repressive regime has no net significant effect on voting participation. Finally, given the weak effects of repressive regime origins on participation among first generation respondents, it is perhaps not surprising that such experiences have even weaker effects on the second generation.

Linguistic Barriers to Participation As indicated earlier, studies have shown that first generation respondents have lower levels of English proficiency than those in higher generations. We would

‘9It is possible that part of the low voter turnout among short-term immigrant residents is due to the misreporting of citizenship status, especially by undocumented migrants who may report being citizens when in fact they are not. However, our finding that longer duration of stay leads to greater political participation holds for white immigrants as well as Latino irnmi- grants (the former are much less likely to be undocumented than the latter). Finally, even among Latinos, the relationship between longer duration and greater participation holds across medium-term and long-term immigrants for all election years. This finding strongly suggests that political socialization is occurring and that the difference in participation between short-term and medium-term immigrants is not due solely to the misreporting of citizenship status by recent arrivals.

IMMIGRANT INCORPORAT~ON AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION I N THE U. S. 89 1

therefore expect Spanish-language ballots to increase turnout among first generation Latinos. Our analysis reveals that the presence of Spanish ballots is not sufficient to ensure higher voting among first generation Latinos.20 Some may argue that the coefficient is insignificant because the CPS is conducted entirely in English and therefore does not include those who are most likely to benefit directly from Spanish-language ballots. While the CPS is conducted in Eng- lish, non-English speakers are still included in the survey because respondents who can speak English can report data for household members who do not speak English well. First generation respondents who have another household member report for them tend to have a lower level of English proficiency than those who responses are self-reported (Espenshade and Fu, 1997). We per- formed an alternative test of the effects of Spanish-language ballots by restricting the sample to first generation Latinos who had lower levels of English proficiency by excluding self-reported responses. In results not reported here, we found that even in this restricted sample an individual’s residence in areas with Spanish ballots does not increase the likelihood of voting. Our evidence therefore casts doubt on the importance of Spanish language ballots in stimulating turnout among first generation Latinos.21

Ethnic Residential Concentration

Proximity to co-ethnics has weak effects on voting participation, both in the full sample and across immigrant generations. The only exception is among “3+ generation” Asian-Americans, who are consistently more likely to vote in states with high proportions of co-ethnics. It is possible that the proportion of co-ethnics in a respondent‘s metropolitan area is a better measure of ethnic mobilization than the proportion of co-ethnics in a respondent’s state.22 However, when we substitute metropolitan concentrations for state concentrations of co-ethnics, we find the results to be similar. The lack of any significant effect of ethnic concentration on voting participation thus seems to support the findings of earlier studies among Latinos, in which factors such as residential poverty and in high proportions of noncitizens produce lower than expected mobilization states with high concentration of Latinos (DeSi- pio, 1996a).

20Even when we modified the interaction term to account for the percent of one’s life a Lati- no first generation respondent had spent in the US., living in Spanish-ballot areas had no effect on the likelihood of voting. *‘This is consistent with tabulated reports from the Latino National Political Survey, which indicate that the presence of Spanish-language ballots has a modest effect on turnout among Spanish-dominant speakers (de la Garza eta[., 1992).


State History of Voting Participation

A state’s political culture, as measured by its recent history of voting participation, leads to a significant increase in an individual’s likelihood to vote. Although the coefficients for the variable are relatively small, their impact is significant when one considers the wide variation in the legacy of voting participation across states. Depending on the election year, those living in Delaware, a state one standard deviation above the mean level of participation, were 49 percent to 58 percent more likely to have voted than those living in Tennessee, whose history of voting participation is one standard deviation below the mean. What is significant for our study of immigrant voting participation is that this increase is similar across all immigrant generations.23

If, as traditional assimilation theories would suggest, first generation citizens are less likely to be incorporated into social and political institutions in the United States, then one would expect them to be the group least affected by their state’s political culture. Our results indicate otherwise - even first generation citizens are influenced by the legacy of voting participation in their state of residence.

Mobilization over Anti-Immigrant Legislation

We hypothesized that anti-immigrant legislation would have a differential impact on voting participation across immigrant generations. We do not have individual-level data on whether respondents were aware of anti-immigrant legislation or were motivated to vote because of it. However, we do know that anti-immigrant legislation emerged in California in 1994, two years before the passage of national legislation restricting immigrant access to welfare benefits. Proposition 187, which sought to deny public benefits to undocumented immigrants, was a prominent election issue in 1994, and Governor Pete Wilson made it a major part of his re-election campaign. By contrast, anti-immigrant legislation did not enter the national legislative agenda until after the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994 and did not become law until the summer of 1996. Thus, mobilization over anti-immigrant legislation began in California months before the 1994 general election,

22For state-wide contests and presidential elections, we assume that ethnic groups, party organizations and candidate organizations attempt to mobilize ethnic voters from across the state. However, it is likely that the per-capita cost of ethnic mobilization will be lower in cities where there are higher concentrations of co-ethnics. 23The only exception is for first generation immigrants in 1994.


whereas in the rest of the country mobilization did not occur until well after the election. Given this difference in the exposure to anti-immigrant legislation, we would expect first and second generation immigrants in California to be much more likely to vote in 1994 than their generational peers elsewhere. Furthermore, since anti-immigration legislation was no longer con- fined to California by 1996, we would not expect California residence to have a unique impact on immigrant participation after the 1994 election.24

The evidence from 1994 through 1998 supports our hypothesis regarding anti-immigrant legislation and voting behavior. In 1994, first generation immigrants in California were twice as likely to have voted as their generational counterparts in other states that did not have similar measures. Simi- larly, second generation immigrants in California were 83 percent more likely to have voted as their generational peers elsewhere. By contrast, “3+ generation” citizens in California were only 32 percent more likely to have voted than their generational peers in other states. By 1996, the unique mobilization among first and second generation citizens in California seems to have dissipated. After the passage of national legislation in 1996, the enormous “California effect” for first and second generation immigrants disappeared, whereas it remained roughly the same for “3+ generation” respondents.25 Similar results held true for 1998, an election that had a governor’s race in California like in 1994, but that did not have a ballot initiative related to immigration.26 During that year, the “California effect” was significant only among first and 3+ generation respondents. Even among first generation respondents, the magnitude of the California advantage paled in comparison to that in 1994 - 33 percent in 1998 versus 105 percent in 1994. The results therefore suggest that anti-immigrant legislation in 1994 did indeed have a significant and selective impact on voting among first and second generation citizens in California. While a true test of our hypothesis would require individual-level data on political knowledge and opinions, these findings suggest a strong link between anti-immigrant legislation and immigrant participation. 2% 1998, the initiative on bilingual education in California (Proposition 227) captured the attention of many immigrant voters, but the measure was part of the June primary, not the November election. 25Based on their andysis of theTRP1 survey, Pantoja and Segura (2000) argue that anti-immigrant legislation continued to have a positive impact on voting in 1796 among recently-naturalized Latinos in California. Our evidence indicates that such an impact was not present among the rest of the naturalized population. ZGUnlike Proposition 187, the 1978 initiative on bilingual education (Proposition 227) was held in the June primary and not the November election.

894 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REww

DISCUSSION This article has examined the influence of immigrant generational status on voting participation in U.S. elections. Adding to the accumulating evidence from other recent studies of immigrant incorporation, our analysis casts doubt on the applicability of straight-line assimilationist theories to contemporary immigrant adaptation. Immigrant political incorporation proceeds in a different manner for members of different racial/ethnic groups. Blacks are the only group for whom participation increases in a linear manner from the first generation to higher generations. For whites, we find that voting participation is highest among second generation respondents. As we had suggested earlier, this second generation advantage may be due to higher levels of cynicism among those in the third generation or higher or to a greater sense of relative deprivation among second generation respondents. Further exam- ination of surveys such as the National Election Study or historical studies of particular communities may shed additional light on the reasons why second generation whites have the highest rates of voting participation. For Asian- Americans, there is an increase in voting participation after the first generation, but it tapers off after the second generation. For Latinos, the likelihood of voting is lower among second and “3+ generation” respondents than among long-term immigrant residents. The persistence of a racial gap in participation among Latinos and Asian-Americans challenges assimilationist accounts of immigrant incorporation that would suggest a convergence in participation by the third generation. What we find instead is evidence of segmented assimilation, whereby different processes of political socialization produce different generational patterns in participation that do not lead to convergence by the third generation.

The durability of racial differences in political participation is not the only limitation of straight-line assimilationist theories of immigrant incorporation. We also find that first generation citizens are just as likely to be influenced by their state “political culture” as citizens from higher generations. Furthermore, linguistic barriers may not be the primary obstacles to voting among first generation Latinos, because Spanish-language ballots do not increase the likelihood of participation among first generation citizens. Final- ly, longer stay in the United States leads to greater participation for whites and Latinos of the first generation, but not for blacks or Asian-Americans. Thus, the evidence presented in this study raises serious doubts about the applicability of straight-line assimilationist theories across immigrant generations and across racial/ethnic groups.


Our analysis also indicates that prior political experience is not as important to voting participation as has been previously suggested. Immigrants from communist states or other repressive regimes do not have higher rates of participation than immigrants from democratic countries. Furthermore, second generation citizens whose parents emigrated from repressive regimes are not more likely to vote than those whose parents came from democratic regimes. Thus, the high level of voting participation among first and second generation Cuban-Americans seems to be an exception that does not hold for immigrants from other repressive regimes.

What does lead to higher voting participation among first and second generation immigrants is the presence of anti-immigrant legislation. Immi- grant legislation in 1994 had profound impacts on turnout among first and second generation immigrants in California. Some may argue that the loss of a “California effect” among first and second generation immigrants in 1996 is indicative of the generalized mobilization of a national election and not of immigration issues in particular. However, the fact that the California advantage persisted among “3+ generation” respondents through 1998 while it largely disappeared among first and second generation respondents suggests that anti-immigrant legislation in California did indeed have a selective impact on voting among first and second generation immigrants.

Taken together, these findings add substantially to our knowledge of the determinants of voting participation and extend in important ways the lessons from more traditional models of voting behavior. Our findings also point to the need for more systematic research on immigrant incorporation and political participation. We need more studies of generational differences in political participation for activities other than voting - attending rallies, writing legislators, working for a campaign, and contributing money for political causes.27 There also needs to be more research on the attitudinal factors and historical processes that have led to a higher level of participation among second generation whites. It remains to be seen whether the patterns and trends noted in this analysis will continue into the 2000 elections and beyond. With record numbers of immigrants applying for naturalization, with the “new” second generation reaching voting age, and with parties and interest groups attempting to mobilize ethnic voters, generational differences in voting participation may not remain the same in the next decade as they have during the 1990s.

27Louis Desipio (1999) provides a preliminary analysis of differences in such activities as reflected in the Latino National Political Survey and the Citizen Participation Survey.


APPENDIX

Data on individual characteristics and voting participation were obtained from the Voter Supplement to the November Current Population Survey in 1994, 1996 and 1998. Data sources for other variables are noted below.

INDIVIDUAL RESOURCES Age: Series of dummy variables with “Age 18-29” as the omitted category. Income: Series of dummy variables with Family Income below $10,000 as the omitted category. Education: Less than High School as the omitted category.

High School Grad 1 if respondent graduated or obtained GED or equiv- alent, 0 otherwise. Some College: 1 if respondent received associate’s degree or did not complete college, 0 otherwise. College Grad 1 if respondent received a bachelor’s degree, 0 otherwise. Post Graduate: 1 if respondent received a graduate degree, 0 otherwise.

RACE/ETHNICITYAND OTHER DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES

RacelEtbnicity: Non-His panic white as the omitted category. Black 1 if black, non-Hispanic, 0 otherwise. Asian: 1 if Asian, non-Hispanic, 0 otherwise. Latino: 1 if respondent of Hispanic Origin (any race), 0 otherwise.

Female: 1 if female, 0 otherwise. First Generation: 1 if born outside the United States or outlying territories, 0 otherwise. First Generation 0-9 ys. in the United States: First Generation and lived in the United States less than ten years. First Generation 10-19 ys. in the United States: First Generation and lived in the United States 10 to 19 years. First Generation 20+ ys. in the United States: First Generation, and lived in the United States more than 20 years. Second Generation: 1 if born in the United States or outlying territories and either parent not born in the United States or outlying territories, O otherwise. 3+ generation: 1 if respondent born in the United States with U.S.-born parents, 0 otherwise.

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION &VIEW 897

SOCIAL INCORPORA TION Long-Term Resident 1 if respondent has lived in the same address for five years or more, 0 otherwise.

Married 1 if married, 0 if unmarried, widowed, divorced or separated. Employed: 1 if currently employed, 0 otherwise. Self-Report: 1 if response if self-reported, 0 otherwise.

INSTITUTIONRC BARRIERS Liberal Absentee Eligibility 1 if Universal Eligibility (anyone can vote absentee) or Expanded Eligibility (automatic eligibility for citizens of a certain age or who live a certain distance from the polls), 0 otherwise. Source: Oliver, 1996. Early Registration Deadline: Individual lives in state where one has to register at least 21 days prior to election day. Data obtained from the League of Women Voters (www.lwv.org)

MOBILIZATION CONTEXTS Presidentid Toss-up: 1 if state ranked as “Clinton Slightly Favored,” “Dole Slightly Favored,” or “Toss-up” = 1, 0 otherwise. Source: Associated Press Research, as reported in the San Francisco Chronicle (Yoachum, 1996). Senate or Governor Toss-up: 1 if state ranked as Highly Vulnerable of Vulner- able by the Congressional Quarterly. During each election season, the Con- gressional Quarterly comes up with a survey of Senate and Governor Races based on opinion polls and surveys of candidate and party organizations (Sources: Babson and Groppe, 1994; Cassata, 1998; Cranford, 1994; Foers- tel, 1998; Greenblatt, 1996; Greenblatt and Wells, 1996).

OTHER VARIABLES From Repressive Regime: 1 if respondent came from a repressive regime at the time of entry to the United States, 0 otherwise. Regime coded as “repressive” if it was ranked as ‘partly free’ or ‘not free’ by Freedom House. Freedom House rankings of countries began in 1972. For years prior to 1972, countries were coded as repressive if they were communist countries or if they were ranked as repressive in 1972, and continued to be repressive for more than 75 percent of the years since 1972. Source: Freedom House (http://www.free- domhouse.org/ratings)


Parentsfrom Repressive Regime: 1 if one or both of respondent’s parents are from Repressive Regime, 0 otherwise. In Spanish Ballot Area: 1 if respondent lives in a County, State or Metropoli- tan Area with Spanish language ballots. Source: United States General Accounting Offtce, 1997. % State Black, % State Asian, % State Latino: State ethnic proportions are based on Census reports that take into account the total state population. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, “1990 to 1998 Annual Time Series of State Population Estimates By Race and Hispanic Origin.” http://www.census.gov/population/www/estimates/st-srh. html State Voting History: Average of percent voting in each state from 1972-1 992. Source: Federal Election Commission (http://www.fec.gov/ votregis/turn/ turn.htm) California: 1 if respondent is resident of California, 0 otherwise.

APPE

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1s

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Seco

nd G

ener

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n

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k,

0.37

91'

0.68

97'

1.22

74'

1.34

38'

0.91

79'

0.16

81'

0.34

81'

0.59

05'

0.74

01'

0.39

18'

0.69

48'

1.33

48'

1.89

46'

2.30

05'

0.60

64'

0.41

05'

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0.16

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32'

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00

0.04

1 1

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13

0.04

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0.04

40

0.02

83

0.03

14

0.03

83

0.05

51

0.01

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0.02

05

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36

0.01

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0.02

37

0.02

78

0.02

45

0.02

13

0.26

96

0.15

57

0.07

69

0.04

46

0.68

03

0.28

59

0.29

32

0.24

70

0.20

05

0.25

01'

0.77

11'

0.88

97'

0.72

12'

0.03

66

0.07

63

0.17

54

0.49

69'

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115b

0.

3561

' 0.

9757

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0749

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6098

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3202

' 0.

1194

0.07

55

0.12

77

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199

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417

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604

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555

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110'

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8'

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653'

0.

0431

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7

0.12

36

0.27

43b

0.14

36

0.64

16'

0.15

59

1.16

59'

0.18

20

1.40

29'

0.19

93

0.76

83'

0.15

27

0.34

09'

0.15

09

0.46

53'

0.16

89

0.48

34'

0.1 8

26

0.69

86'

0.17

95

0.31

01b

0.11

50

0.59

89'

0.12

55

1.20

97'

0.13

51

1.78

48'

0.18

72

2.2

13 1

0.08

54

0.77

85'

0.09

00

0.50

70'

0.09

81

0.03

82

0.08

02

0.16

70b

0.12

30

0.01

81

0.14

96

0.03

78

0.12

01

0.12

63

0.10

59

0.09

71

0.2

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