IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PEORIA DIVISION ALAN BEAMAN, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) Case No. 10 CV 1019 JAMES SOUK, Former Assistant State’s Attorney, ) CHARLES REYNARD, Former McLean County ) The Hon. Joe Billy McDade State’s Attorney, JOHN BROWN, Former McLean ) County Deputy Sheriff, TIM FREESMEYER, ) Magistrate Judge Byron G. Cudmore Former Normal Police Detective, ROB ) HOSPELHORN, Former Normal Police Detective, ) DAVE WARNER, Former Normal Police ) Detective, FRANK ZAYAS, Former Normal Police ) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED Lieutenant, COUNTY OF McLEAN, ILLINOIS, ) and TOWN OF NORMAL, ILLINOIS, ) ) Defendants. )

PLAINTIFF’S CORRECTED FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT Plaintiff, ALAN BEAMAN, by his undersigned attorneys, for his complaint against

Defendants JAMES SOUK, Former Assistant State’s Attorney, CHARLES REYNARD, Former

McLean County State’s Attorney, JOHN BROWN, Former McLean County Deputy Sheriff,

TIM FREESMEYER, Former Normal Police Detective, ROB HOSPELHORN, Former Normal

Police Detective, DAVE WARNER, Former Normal Police Detective, FRANK ZAYAS, Former

Normal Police Lieutenant, COUNTY OF McLEAN, ILLINOIS, and TOWN OF NORMAL,

ILLINOIS, alleges as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. This suit is brought to redress the enormous injury inflicted upon Plaintiff by

those individuals responsible for the investigation and prosecution of the August 1993 murder of

Jennifer Lockmiller. The above-named individual Defendants and other unknown co-

E-FILED Friday, 13 May, 2011 09:58:37 AM

Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

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conspirators, individually and in conspiracy, caused Plaintiff to be convicted of Lockmiller’s

murder a crime he did not commit and to spend over thirteen years of his life in prison.

2. The Defendants caused material exculpatory evidence to be concealed from

Plaintiff and his defense counsel, in violation of Plaintiff’s right to a fair trial under the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Specifically, the Defendants

developed evidence showing that Plaintiff did not have the opportunity to commit the murder

and that there was a viable alternative suspect in the murder. They caused this evidence to be

concealed from Plaintiff and his defense counsel. Had this exculpatory evidence been disclosed

to Plaintiff, Plaintiff would not have been convicted.1

3. The Defendants also caused the prosecution of Plaintiff with knowledge that there

was no probable cause to do so. The Defendants concealed material exculpatory evidence as

described above and Defendant Freesmeyer gave false and misleading testimony, causing

Plaintiff to be wrongfully indicted and convicted without probable cause.

4. The Defendants’ unconstitutional, malicious, and fraudulent conduct resulted in

Plaintiff’s wrongful conviction and incarceration for Lockmiller’s murder. As a direct result of

the Defendants’ misconduct, Plaintiff has unnecessarily endured extraordinary hardship and

suffered incalculable pain, for which he seeks redress in this suit.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

5. This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress the deprivation

under color of law of Plaintiff’s rights as secured by the United States Constitution as well as

deprivation of rights under state law.

6. This Court has jurisdiction of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.

1 The District Court dismissed Plaintiff’s due process claim concerning the concealment of evidence related to the alternative “bypass route.” Plaintiff re-alleges these facts solely to preserve the issue for appellate review.

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7. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). The parties reside, or,

at the time the events took place, formerly resided in this judicial district, and the events giving

rise to the claims asserted herein occurred here as well.

8. This action is properly filed in the Peoria Division of this District pursuant to

Local Rule 40.1(A) because the events giving rise to the claims asserted herein occurred in

McLean County, Illinois.

PARTIES

9. Plaintiff Alan Beaman, 38, currently resides in Rockford, Illinois. At the time of

his wrongful prosecution for the murder of Jennifer Lockmiller, Plaintiff was a 22-year-old

theater major attending Illinois Wesleyan University in Bloomington, Illinois.

10. Defendant James Souk was at all times relevant to this action employed as an

Assistant State’s Attorney by the McLean County State’s Attorney’s Office. Defendant Souk

participated in, supervised, and directed the Lockmiller murder investigation and also acted as

the primary prosecutor throughout Plaintiff’s criminal trial.

11. Defendant Charles Reynard was at all times relevant to this action employed as

the McLean County State’s Attorney. Defendant Reynard participated in, supervised, and

directed the Lockmiller murder investigation and also supervised the criminal prosecution of

Plaintiff.

12. Defendant John Brown was at all times relevant to this action employed as a

McLean County Deputy Sheriff. Defendant Brown participated in, supervised, and ratified the

decisions taken in the course of the Lockmiller murder investigation.

13. Defendant Timothy Freesmeyer was at all times relevant to this action employed

as a Detective in the Normal Police Department. Defendant Freesmeyer participated in the

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Lockmiller murder investigation. In or around October 1993, Defendant Freesmeyer was

appointed the lead investigator in the Lockmiller murder investigation.

14. Defendant Rob Hospelhorn was at all times relevant to this action employed as a

Detective in the Normal Police Department. Defendant Hospelhorn participated in the

Lockmiller murder investigation.

15. Defendant Dave Warner was at all times relevant to this action employed as a

Detective in the Normal Police Department. Defendant Warner participated in the Lockmiller

murder investigation.

16. Defendant Frank Zayas was at all times relevant to this action employed as a

Lieutenant in the Normal Police Department. Defendant Zayas participated in, supervised, and

ratified the decisions taken in the course of the Lockmiller murder investigation.

17. Defendant County of McLean is a political subdivision of the State of Illinois. At

all times relevant to this action, the County of McLean was the employer and principal of

Defendants Souk, Reynard, and Brown.

18. Defendant Town of Normal is a political subdivision of the State of Illinois. At

all times relevant to this action, the Town of Normal was the employer and principal of

Defendants Freesmeyer, Hospelhorn, Warner, and Zayas.

19. All of the individual Defendants are sued in their individual capacities. Each of

the individual Defendants acted within the scope of his employment and under color of state law

while engaging in the actions alleged in this complaint and at all times relevant to this action.

ALLEGATIONS OF FACT

The Murder of Jennifer Lockmiller

20. On Saturday, August 28, 1993, shortly after 2:00 p.m., Normal police officers,

including Defendants Hospelhorn and Warner, responded to the apartment of Jennifer

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Lockmiller, a 21-year-old Illinois State University student who resided near the university’s

campus in Normal, Illinois. The officers discovered Lockmiller’s severely decomposed and

partially unclothed body on the floor of her bedroom, with an electrical cord from an alarm

clock wrapped around her throat and a box fan lying across her face. Lockmiller had also been

stabbed with a pair of scissors, which were buried in her chest up to the handles. The autopsy,

conducted the next morning, indicated that Lockmiller had died of ligature strangulation with

the electrical cord from the alarm clock.

21. The bizarre murder of a young college student in her apartment quickly became a

high profile story in the “twin” college towns of Normal and Bloomington, Illinois. The

impending start of the school year and return of the students to both ISU in Normal and IWU in

Bloomington placed extreme pressure on the Defendants to solve the murder.

22. Because of the high-profile nature of the case, Defendants Souk and Reynard

were actively involved in the Lockmiller murder investigation from day one. They remained

intimately involved throughout the course of the investigation so much so that in or around

late September or early October 1993, the individual Normal police officer Defendants began

conducting their investigation of the Lockmiller murder out of a work space at the McLean

County State’s Attorney’s Office. In addition, Reynard and Souk both approved a series of

“consensual overhear” requests, taped conversations that were later used as evidence against

Plaintiff at trial. Souk and Reynard also participated in the daily “investigators’ meetings” held

at the Normal Police Department, during which the State’s Attorneys and detectives planned

strategy, discussed the available evidence, and developed potential suspects. It was during one

or more of these meetings that the investigative team, which included defendants Zayas,

Hospelhorn, Brown, Warner, Freesmeyer, Souk, and Reynard, made the decision not to disclose

evidence to the defense concerning the existence of John Doe as an alternative suspect. During

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another such meeting, in May 1994, the team decided to arrest Plaintiff for the murder of

Lockmiller.

23. Defendant Freesmeyer, who in or around October 1993 became the lead detective

in the Lockmiller murder investigation, had never managed a murder investigation before. He

had a strong incentive to solve the murder to establish his reputation as an effective investigator.

The pressures of Freesmeyer’s career, coupled with his inexperience, compromised his ability to

conduct a fair investigation.

Tunnel Vision: Immediate Focus on Plaintiff

24. Because there were no signs of forced entry or a struggle at the crime scene, the

Defendants immediately assumed that Lockmiller was murdered by an acquaintance. They

focused their investigation entirely on Lockmiller’s romantic interests, making no effort to

investigate any alternative scenarios for her death.

25. Within hours of the discovery of Lockmiller’s body, Plaintiff was the prime

suspect in her murder. He and Lockmiller had begun dating in or around July 1992 and had

broken off their relationship approximately one month prior to the murder. At the time of the

murder, however, Plaintiff was living at his parents’ home in Rockford, Illinois approximately

140 miles away from Normal. In fact, Plaintiff was completely innocent of any involvement

whatsoever in Lockmiller’s murder and he had no knowledge of who had committed the crime.

26. Plaintiff remained the main suspect throughout the investigation, despite the fact

that the Defendants were unable to locate any physical evidence definitively linking him to the

crime scene.

27. Further, although the decomposed state of the body made it impossible to pinpoint

the exact time or date of Lockmiller’s death, the Defendants tailored their theory of the crime to

fit Plaintiff’s schedule. They theorized that the murder had occurred close to 12:00 p.m. on

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Wednesday, August 25, 1993 the only time that day at which Plaintiff could have even

conceivably had the chance to drive the two hours to and from Normal. The State maintained

this theory of the time of the murder at Plaintiff’s trial.

28. Focusing solely on Plaintiff, Defendants Zayas, Hospelhorn, Warner, Brown, and

Freesmeyer conducted superficial investigations of the following other potential suspects:

(a) Michael Swaine, who was Lockmiller’s current boyfriend and was living

with her at the time of her murder, was eliminated as a suspect and began

actively cooperating in the investigation of Plaintiff a mere four days after

the body was discovered, even though several of Lockmiller’s neighbors

reported seeing a car fitting the description of Swaine’s in the parking lot

of Lockmiller’s apartment complex on the afternoon of Wednesday,

August 25; four of Swaine’s fingerprints were lifted from the alarm clock

used to strangle Lockmiller; and Swaine’s DNA profile was found on

Lockmiller’s bedsheet. Despite the fact that this evidence was nearly

identical to the evidence developed against Plaintiff, Defendant

Freesmeyer relied upon Swain to help inculpate Plaintiff, requesting that

Swain conduct consensual overhears with Plaintiff, both in person and

over the telephone, though Swain himself was still a suspect. Other

individual Defendants, including Hospelhorn, Warner, and Reynard,

supported Freesmeyer’s use of Swain in the investigation.

(b) Stacy “Bubba” Gates, who, like Plaintiff, was one of Lockmiller’s former

boyfriends, was eliminated as a suspect despite the fact that he had

recently moved to Peoria to be closer to Lockmiller and that he and

Lockmiller had plans to see each other on the Saturday after the murder.

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(c) John Doe, another ex-boyfriend of Lockmiller’s, was never eliminated as a

suspect and had both the motive and opportunity to commit the murder, as

is more fully described below.2

Withholding of Material Exculpatory Evidence

29. Throughout the investigation, the individual Defendants developed exculpatory

evidence suggesting that Plaintiff did not have the opportunity to commit the murder and that

John Doe was a viable alternative suspect in the murder. The Defendants caused this evidence

to be concealed from Plaintiff and his defense counsel. Had the evidence been disclosed,

Plaintiff would not have been convicted.

Plaintiff’s Opportunity to Commit the Murder3

30. The Defendants concealed from Plaintiff and his defense counsel the fact that

their own investigation had confirmed Plaintiff’s alibi and essentially eliminated his opportunity

to commit the murder.

31. Plaintiff was videotaped leaving Bell Federal Savings & Loan in Rockford at

10:11:43 a.m. on the day of the murder. Phone records also showed that at 10:37 a.m. that day,

a two-minute phone call was placed from Plaintiff’s residence to his church. At 10:39 a.m., a

one-minute phone call was placed from Plaintiff’s residence to the home of Mitchell Olson, the

church’s director of youth ministries and music.

32. The State’s case against Plaintiff heavily relied upon the theory that Plaintiff did

not make the phone calls from his residence on the day of the murder. Plaintiff’s mother, Carol

Beaman, testified that when she returned home at approximately 2:16 p.m. that afternoon,

Plaintiff was in his room and his car was in the driveway. If Plaintiff made the phone calls at

2 To protect his identity and to promote continued investigation, John Doe’s actual name is not being released into the public record at this time. 3 See fn. 1.

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10:37 a.m. and 10:39 a.m., it would have been practically impossible for him to drive the 140

miles to Normal, commit the murder, and drive back to Rockford in time to be home before his

mother arrived.

33. It was undisputed that only Plaintiff or Mrs. Beaman could have made the phone

calls. At trial, Mrs. Beaman testified that she did not make the phone calls.

34. Prior to trial, Defendant Freesmeyer and other unknown individuals conducted a

number of time trials between Bell Federal and Plaintiff’s residence to determine whether

Plaintiff had enough time to leave Bell Federal at 10:11 a.m. and arrive home in time to make

the first phone call at 10:37 a.m. Defendants Souk and/or Reynard were directly and actively

involved in the planning of these time trials. On information and belief, Defendant Souk also

participated in and was physically present with Defendant Freesmeyer on at least one of these

time trials.

35. On or around June 22, 1994, Defendant Freesmeyer recorded that the drive from

Bell Federal to Plaintiff’s residence, observing all speed limits, was 31 minutes. At trial,

Defendant Freesmeyer testified that this route went through downtown Rockford and was the

“most direct” route from Bell Federal to Plaintiff’s residence. Based upon this time trial

which was the only time trial presented to the jury Plaintiff would have arrived home at 10:42

a.m. The State highlighted the importance of this time trial to the jury, arguing that Plaintiff

could not have driven home from Bell Federal in time to make the phone calls. The evidence

regarding this time trial thus substantially bolstered the State’s theory that Plaintiff must have

driven from Bell Federal to Normal, committed the murder, and returned to his residence in

Rockford in the early afternoon.

36. Without documenting it in any report, Defendant Freesmeyer and other unknown

individuals had timed an alternate route from Bell Federal to Plaintiff’s residence at least once

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prior to trial. This alternate route (hereinafter referred to as the “bypass route”) bypassed

downtown Rockford by way of U.S. Route 20. Defendant Freesmeyer completed his drive from

Bell Federal to Plaintiff’s residence using the bypass route in 25 minutes more than enough

time for Plaintiff to have made it home by 10:37 a.m. to make the phone calls.

37. Defendant Freesmeyer omitted any mention of his time trial of the bypass route in

any written report or memorandum documenting the investigation. If a report of this or any

subsequent time trials of the bypass route ever existed, it was never disclosed. The reports that

were disclosed included only the time trials that supported the prosecution’s theory that Plaintiff

had taken the slower route home and thus did not make the phone calls, and omitted the time

trial that bolstered Plaintiff’s alibi the day of the murder. Defendant Souk testified in the post-

conviction proceedings that he did not feel he was obligated to tender the bypass timing results

to the defense.

38. At Plaintiff’s trial, Defendant Freesmeyer did not testify as to any time trial he

conducted using the bypass route.

39. Acting individually and in conspiracy with each other and other unknown co-

conspirators, the Defendants caused this exculpatory time trial evidence to be concealed from

Plaintiff and his defense counsel.

40. Had this evidence been disclosed to Plaintiff and his defense counsel, Plaintiff

would have shown that he made the phone calls from his residence at 10:37 a.m. and 10:39 am

and therefore did not have the opportunity to commit the murder.

John Doe as an Alternative Suspect

41. The Defendants also developed and concealed important evidence suggesting that

John Doe had both the opportunity and motive to commit the murder and was therefore a viable

alternative suspect. Throughout the investigation, each of the officers named in this suit (Zayas,

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Brown, Warner, Hospelhorn, and Freesmeyer) either interviewed John Doe himself, as

described below, or collected information about John Doe and his relationship with Lockmiller.

Detective Tony Daniels, who is not a defendant here, has stated that Doe was never cleared as a

potential suspect and that he was in fact a “stronger” suspect than Plaintiff. As detailed in

paragraph 44, below, the Defendants never informed either Plaintiff or his defense counsel of

exculpatory information regarding Doe that their investigation had uncovered. Had the

Defendants turned over all of the evidence they possessed regarding John Doe, Plaintiff would

have been permitted to present Doe as an alternative suspect to the jury and Plaintiff would not

have been convicted of the murder.

42. During their investigation of the Lockmiller murder in September 1993, Normal

Police Detective Tony Daniels and Defendant Hospelhorn conducted two interviews with John

Doe. Doe admitted that he was one of Lockmiller’s former boyfriends and that he and

Lockmiller had been about to rekindle their romantic relationship just before her death. He said

that Lockmiller and her new boyfriend, Michael Swaine, had stopped by Doe’s apartment a few

days before the murder. Doe also admitted that he had sold drugs to Lockmiller in the past and

that, at the time of her death, Lockmiller owed Doe money for marijuana.

43. Doe appeared to be evasive and very nervous during his interviews with the

police. In fact, he initially gave a false alibi for the day of the murder. During his first

interview, Doe claimed that he went out of town on August 24, 1993 the day before the

murder. At his second interview, Doe admitted that he did not leave his apartment in

Bloomington until 4:00 p.m. on August 25. Doe’s girlfriend informed police that on August

25th she was only with Doe from 2:00 p.m. until approximately 4:20 p.m. Doe therefore had no

alibi for the suspected time of Lockmiller’s murder.

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44. In addition to this evidence, the Defendants were in possession of the following

information, which was concealed from Plaintiff and his defense counsel:

(a) On September 30, 1993, Doe submitted to a polygraph examination at the

Illinois State Police Bureau of Forensic Sciences in Morton, Illinois.

Throughout the course of the examination, Doe did not follow specific

directions necessary for the proper completion of a polygraph examination

and ultimately informed the polygraph examiner that he was unable to

comply. The record of Doe’s polygraph examination is documented in a

report authored by Terrence McCann and addressed to Defendant Warner.

Tellingly, the report designates Doe as a “suspect.”

(b) In October 1994, Doe was arrested and charged with domestic battery

against his girlfriend and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver.

Doe’s girlfriend told police that she was the victim of physical abuse on a

continual basis and that on that particular day, Doe had pinned her down

on the floor and elbowed her repeatedly in the chest.

(c) After his arrest, Doe’s girlfriend filed a petition for order of protection

against Doe. She stated that Doe had physically abused her on numerous

prior occasions. Additionally, she stated that Doe was taking injections of

street steroids, which caused him to act erratically.

Plaintiff did not become aware of this additional evidence regarding John Doe until his post-

conviction proceeding, at which time he promptly alleged that he had been prejudiced by the

failure to disclose it.

45. Acting individually and in conspiracy with each other and with other unknown

co-conspirators, the Defendants caused the information about Doe’s incomplete polygraph

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examination, drug and domestic violence charges, petition for order of protection, and steroid

use to be concealed from Plaintiff and his defense counsel.

46. In fact, Defendants Freesmeyer and Souk affirmatively represented that there was

no evidence implicating anyone else in Lockmiller’s murder. At the grand jury proceeding,

Defendant Freesmeyer falsely testified that he was unable to locate any other person who had

any conceivable motive to commit the murder. At a pretrial hearing, Souk told Plaintiff,

defense counsel, and the court that he knew of “no such evidence” with which the defense could

argue that any other party “might be found responsible” for the murder. At a subsequent pretrial

discussion, Souk argued that Doe was “six months removed” from the case and again

represented that there was no evidence suggesting that Doe was a viable alternative suspect.

47. Had the evidence regarding Doe been disclosed to Plaintiff and his defense

counsel, Plaintiff would have been permitted to present Doe as an alternative suspect at trial.

This evidence was highly material. Indeed, one of the State’s themes at trial was “[s]uspect

everyone in turn and then wipe him or her off the list.” The prosecutors also argued that the

State had “proved up everybody else’s” alibi but Plaintiff’s. The concealment of the evidence

regarding Doe’s motive and opportunity to commit the murder left Plaintiff without the means

to challenge these false assertions.

48. Had Plaintiff been permitted to present Doe as an alternative suspect, Plaintiff

would not have been convicted of the murder of Jennifer Lockmiller.

The Malicious Prosecution

49. On May 16, 1994, Defendants Reynard, Souk, Zayas, Brown, and Freesmeyer,

and potentially unknown others, met to review the facts of the case. According to Freesmeyer’s

police reports, during this meeting the Defendants decided to “effect the arrest of [Plaintiff] for

the homicide of Jennifer Lockmiller.”

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50. Plaintiff was arrested for the murder of Jennifer Lockmiller the very next day, on

May 17, 1994. In July 1994, a grand jury returned indictments against Plaintiff for two counts

of first degree murder. In March 1995, Plaintiff stood trial in the Circuit Court of McLean

County.

51. At trial, the only evidence the State presented to link Plaintiff to the murder was

wholly circumstantial. Specifically, the State’s theory relied upon 1) very questionable and

incomplete evidence that Plaintiff had only a tiny window of opportunity to drive 140 miles to

and from Normal to commit the murder on August 25, 1993, and 2) the false assertions that

there was no viable alternative suspect in Lockmiller’s murder. In reversing Plaintiff’s

conviction, the Illinois Supreme Court found that the State’s case was founded solely upon

“tenuous circumstantial evidence” of Plaintiff’s guilt.

52. The initiation and continuation of the criminal proceedings against Plaintiff were

the result of improper conduct by the Defendants. All of the individual Defendants caused

material exculpatory evidence to be withheld as is more fully described above. Defendant

Freesmeyer gave false and misleading testimony during the criminal proceedings as is more

fully described above.

53. As a proximate result of the Defendants’ misconduct described above, Plaintiff

was wrongfully indicted, convicted, and sentenced to 50 years’ imprisonment in the Illinois

Department of Corrections.

Conspiracy to Violate Plaintiff’s Rights Under Federal and State Law, and Failure to Intervene to Prevent Such Violations

54. The individual named Defendants engaged, and continue to engage, in a

conspiracy to conceal material and exculpatory evidence from Plaintiff and his defense counsel

concerning an alternative suspect, John Doe; to maliciously prosecute Plaintiff for the murder of

Jennifer Lockmiller; and to intentionally cause Plaintiff severe and lasting emotional

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distress. Because the individual Defendants made an express agreement to conceal all

information related to the existence of John Doe, and because each Defendant committed one or

more overt acts in furtherance of this conspiracy, each is individually liable for conspiring to

violate Plaintiff’s constitutional right to due process and to maliciously prosecute Plaintiff and

intentionally inflict emotional distress upon him.

55. Defendants Freesmeyer, Hospelhorn, Warner, Brown, Zayas, Souk, and Reynard

entered into a voluntary agreement that they would not disclose to Plaintiff any information

concerning John Doe, and thereby insured that Plaintiff was wrongfully prosecuted for

Lockmiller’s murder. The individual Defendants held daily meetings during the course of the

investigation in which they discussed, among other things, the viability of potential

suspects. During one or more such meetings, the individual Defendants made an agreement or

series of agreements that they would not disclose the existence of an alternative suspect, John

Doe, to Plaintiff or his criminal defense counsel.

56. Pursuant to this agreement or agreements, the named officer Defendants

(Freesmeyer, Hospelhorn, Warner, Brown, and Zayas) purposefully omitted any significant

mention of Doe from police reports and any other records turned over to the defense. The

Defendants continued to conceal information about Doe after Plaintiff’s arrest, throughout the

pendency of his criminal trial, and after he was wrongly convicted for first-degree murder.

57. Each of the individual police Defendants committed one or more overt acts in

furtherance of the conspiracy to conceal this exculpatory evidence:

(a) Defendant Hospelhorn interviewed John Doe and John Doe’s girlfriend on

multiple occasions. During each interview, Doe gave different accounts of

his whereabouts in the days before Lockmiller’s murder, and it was John

Doe’s girlfriend who in fact informed police that Doe had previously lied

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about where he was when Lockmiller was killed. Hospelhorn, on

information and belief, was also present when Doe obtained an

inconclusive polygraph, after he attempted to “manipulate” the

examination.

(b) The other individual officers, Freesmeyer, Warner, Brown, and Zayas,

were also involved in developing information about Doe’s background

and obtaining evidence concerning his relationship with

Lockmiller. Though each of the individual detectives gathered evidence

that was indicative of Doe’s guilt, they continued their efforts to inculpate

Plaintiff for the murder and failed to document evidence relating to Doe.

(c) Defendant Zayas signed and approved his inferior officers’ police reports,

though they purposefully omitted mention of Doe as a suspect. Zayas also

participated in the consensual overhears that were used to further inculpate

Plaintiff in Lockmiller’s murder.

(d) Defendant Freesmeyer, as the lead detective on the case, made every effort

throughout the investigation to ensure that Plaintiff was found guilty of

Lockmiller’s murder, going so far as to lie about the existence of other

suspects at trial.

58. In the course of their participation in the investigators’ meetings, Souk and

Reynard learned about Doe’s existence and the circumstantial evidence suggesting his guilt.

Souk and Reynard agreed with the individual police Defendants that information about Doe

should be concealed. They also committed one or more overt acts in furtherance of the

conspiracy:

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(a) Souk and Reynard approved the overhear requests used to attempt to

develop evidence against Plaintiff.

(b) Souk signed the warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest.

(c) In a pre-trial conference, Souk intentionally and falsely stated that the

police had no other suspects, other than Plaintiff, for Lockmiller’s

murder.

(d) Throughout the investigation, Souk was in “daily contact” with

Freesmeyer, the lead investigator in the case; Souk reviewed all of

Freesmeyer’s police reports (both those that became part of the official

investigation record and those that did not); Souk “knew what was

important” in the investigation “and what wasn’t”; and Freesmeyer looked

to Souk for direction in handling the investigation.

59. Each of the individual Defendants knew that a constitutional violation, i.e., the

suppression of material and exculpatory evidence, had been and was being committed by other

named Defendants in this suit, and each had a realistic opportunity to intervene in order to

prevent harm to Plaintiff. Yet, none of the individual Defendants disclosed the concealed

information concerning John Doe, and thus each failed to intervene to prevent the violation of

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Plaintiff’s Exoneration

60. On May 22, 2008, after a lengthy appellate and post-conviction process, the

Illinois Supreme Court unanimously reversed the judgments of the circuit and appellate courts

upholding Plaintiff’s conviction. People v. Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d 56 (2008). The Illinois

Supreme Court held that the suppression of material exculpatory information relating to John

Doe violated Plaintiff’s constitutional right to due process under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.

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83 (1963). Accordingly, it vacated Plaintiff’s conviction and remanded to the circuit court for a

new trial.

61. After spending over thirteen years in prison, Plaintiff was released on bond on

June 26, 2008.

62. On January 29, 2009, the State chose not to initiate a new trial and dismissed all

charges against Plaintiff.

Plaintiff’s Damages

63. Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer enormous injury as a direct and

proximate result of the Defendants’ misconduct. Plaintiff spent more than thirteen years of his

life imprisoned for a crime of which he was completely innocent. He woke up each day with

this reality, not knowing whether he would ever succeed in proving the wrongfulness of his

conviction and incarceration.

64. During this time, Plaintiff was separated from his family and friends. He was also

deprived of the opportunity to continue his education, engage in productive labor, pursue a

career, and start a family.

65. Following his exoneration and release from custody, Plaintiff suffers from lasting

psychological damage, including Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. His reputation in his home

town of Rockford, Illinois, has also been irreparably tarnished. People in Plaintiff’s community

still believe that he murdered Jennifer Lockmiller, making it incredibly difficult for Plaintiff to

move on with his life. In addition to causing psychological damage, this has caused Plaintiff

extreme hardship, resulting, among other things, in Plaintiff’s loss of gainful employment.

COUNT I 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Due Process

66. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 65 as if fully set forth herein.

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67. As described more fully above, the individual Defendants,4 while acting

individually, jointly, and in conspiracy, as well as under color of law and within the scope of

their employment, deprived Plaintiff of his constitutional right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.

68. The individual Defendants, acting in conspiracy, withheld the exculpatory

material described in the preceding paragraphs from Plaintiff after his arrest and during the

pendency of the criminal proceedings against Plaintiff at all times, up to and including the time

of Plaintiff’s conviction.

69. In the manner described more fully above, the Defendants deliberately caused

material exculpatory evidence to be withheld from Plaintiff and his defense counsel, thereby

misleading and misdirecting the criminal prosecution of Plaintiff. The exculpatory evidence

concealed from Plaintiff and his defense counsel includes but is not limited to the following:

(a) reports of Defendant Freesmeyer’s time trial(s) from Bell Federal to

Plaintiff’s residence using the bypass route;

(b) the report of the polygraph examination administered to John Doe on

September 30, 1993;

(c) the police reports documenting John Doe’s arrest for domestic assault;

(d) the petition for an order of protection filed against Doe by his girlfriend

and the statements contained therein; and

(e) further and additional exculpatory evidence not yet known to Plaintiff.

Absent the Defendants’ misconduct, the prosecution of Plaintiff could not

and would not have been pursued.

4 The District Court dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims against Defendants Souk and Reynard on the grounds of absolute immunity or, alternatively, qualified immunity. Plaintiff repleads the allegations against these Defendants for the purposes of preserving the issue for review on appeal.

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70. The Defendants’ misconduct directly resulted in the unjust criminal conviction of

Plaintiff, thereby denying him his constitutional right to a fair trial and a fair appeal thereof.

71. The misconduct described in this Count was objectively unreasonable and was

undertaken intentionally with willful indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

72. As a direct and proximate result of this deprivation of his constitutional right to a

fair trial, Plaintiff suffered injuries, including, but not limited to, emotional distress, as is more

fully alleged above.

COUNT II 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Conspiracy

73. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 72 as if fully alleged herein.

74. All of the individual Defendants5 and other co-conspirators not yet known to

Plaintiff reached an agreement amongst themselves to deprive Plaintiff of material exculpatory

evidence and information related to the existence of John Doe as an alternative and viable

suspect, information to which he was lawfully entitled and which would have led to his more

timely exoneration of the false changes, all in violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights as

described above.

75. In this manner, the Defendants, acting in concert with other unknown co-

conspirators, have conspired by concerted action to accomplish an unlawful purpose by an

unlawful means.

76. In furtherance of the conspiracy, each of the co-conspirators committed overt acts

and was an otherwise willful participant in joint activity.

77. The misconduct described in this Count was objectively unreasonable and was

undertaken intentionally with willful indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 5 The District Court dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims against Defendants Souk and Reynard on the grounds of absolute immunity or, alternatively, qualified immunity. Plaintiff repleads the allegations against these Defendants for the purposes of preserving the issue for review on appeal.

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78. As a direct and proximate result of the illicit prior agreement referenced above,

Plaintiff’s rights were violated. He suffered injuries, including, but not limited to, emotional

distress, as is more fully alleged above.

COUNT III 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Failure to Intervene

79. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 78 as if fully alleged herein.

80. In the manner described above, during the constitutional violations described

above, one or more of the individual Defendants,6 and other unknown individuals, stood by

without intervening to prevent the misconduct.

81. None of the Defendants took any steps to disclose to Plaintiff or his defense

counsel exculpatory evidence and information concerning John Doe, either during Plaintiff’s

criminal proceedings or anytime in the sixteen years since Plaintiff was convicted.

82. The misconduct described in this Count was objectively unreasonable and was

undertaken intentionally with willful indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

83. As a direct and proximate result of this failure to intervene to prevent the violation

of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Plaintiff suffered injuries, including, but not limited to,

emotional distress, as is more fully alleged above.

COUNT IV State Law Claim – Malicious Prosecution

84. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 83 as if fully alleged herein.

85. All of the individual Defendants caused Plaintiff to be improperly subjected to

judicial proceedings for which there was no probable cause. These judicial proceedings were

6 The District Court dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims against Defendants Souk and Reynard on the grounds of absolute immunity or, alternatively, qualified immunity. Plaintiff repleads the allegations against these Defendants for the purposes of preserving the issue for review on appeal.

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instituted and continued maliciously, resulting in injury to Plaintiff. All such proceedings were

ultimately terminated in Plaintiff’s favor in a manner indicative of innocence.

86. The Defendants identified above accused Plaintiff of murdering Lockmiller

knowing those accusations to be without probable cause. The individual Normal police officer

Defendants made statements to prosecutors with the intent of exerting influence to institute and

continue judicial proceedings against Plaintiff.

87. The initiation and continuation of the criminal proceedings against Plaintiff were

the result of improper conduct by the Defendants. All of the individual Defendants withheld

material exculpatory evidence as is more fully alleged above. Defendant Freesmeyer gave

knowingly false and misleading testimony as is more fully alleged above.

88. The misconduct described in this Count was undertaken with malice, willfulness,

and reckless indifference to Plaintiff’s rights.

89. As a direct and proximate result of this misconduct, Plaintiff suffered injuries,

including, but not limited to, emotional distress, as is more fully alleged above.

COUNT V State Law Claim – Civil Conspiracy

90. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 89 as if fully alleged herein.

91. As described more fully in the preceding paragraphs, all of the individual

Defendants, acting in concert with other known and unknown co-conspirators, conspired by

concerted action to accomplish an unlawful purpose by unlawful means.

92. In furtherance of the conspiracy, the Defendants identified above committed overt

acts and were otherwise willful participants in joint activity.

93. The misconduct described in this Count was undertaken with malice, willfulness

and reckless indifference to Plaintiff’s rights.

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94. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ conspiracy, Plaintiff suffered

injuries, including, but not limited to, emotional distress, as is more fully alleged above.

COUNT VI State Law Claim – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

95. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 94 as if fully alleged herein.

96. The acts and conduct of the individual Defendants as set forth above were

extreme and outrageous. The Defendants intended to cause or were in reckless disregard of the

probability that their conduct would cause severe emotional distress to Plaintiff, as is more fully

alleged above.

97. The individual Defendants’ actions and conduct did directly and proximately

cause severe emotional distress to Plaintiff, and thereby constituted intentional infliction of

emotional distress.

98. The misconduct described in this Count was undertaken with malice, willfulness

and reckless indifference to the rights of others.

99. As a proximate result of the Defendants’ wrongful acts, Plaintiff suffered injuries,

including, but not limited to, emotional distress, as is more fully alleged above.

COUNT VII State Law Claim – Respondeat Superior

100. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 99 as if fully alleged herein.

101. In committing the acts alleged in the preceding paragraphs, the individual Normal

police officer Defendants were members of, and agents of, the Normal Police Department,

acting at all relevant times within the scope of their employment and under color of law.

102. Defendant Town of Normal is liable as principal for all torts committed by its

agents.

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COUNT VIII State Law Claim – Indemnification

103. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 102 as if fully alleged herein.

104. Illinois law provides that public entities are directed to pay any tort judgment for

compensatory damages for which employees are liable within the scope of their employment

activities.

105. Defendants Souk and Reynard were employees of the McLean County State’s

Attorney’s Office who acted within the scope of their employment in committing the

misconduct described herein.

106. Defendant Brown was an employee of the McLean County Sheriff’s Department

who acted within the scope of his employment in committing the misconduct described herein.

107. The individual Normal police officer Defendants are or were employees of the

Normal Police Department who acted within the scope of their employment in committing the

misconduct described herein.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Alan Beaman prays that this Court enter judgment in his favor

and against Defendants James Souk, Former Assistant State’s Attorney, Charles Reynard,

Former McLean County State’s Attorney, John Brown, Former McLean County Deputy Sheriff,

Tim Freesmeyer, Former Normal Police Detective, Rob Hospelhorn, Former Normal Police

Detective, Dave Warner, Former Normal Police Detective, Frank Zayas, Former Normal Police

Lieutenant, the County of McLean, Illinois, and the Town of Normal, Illinois, awarding

compensatory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees, and punitive damages against each of the

individual Defendants in their individual capacities; and for such further and additional relief as

this Court may deem appropriate and just.

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JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff demands trial by jury.

Respectfully submitted,

ALAN BEAMAN

By: /s/ Locke E. Bowman

One of his attorneys

Locke E. Bowman Alexa Van Brunt Roderick MacArthur Justice Center Northwestern University School of Law 375 East Chicago Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60611 (312) 503-0844 Jeffrey Urdangen Bluhm Legal Clinic Northwestern University School of Law 375 East Chicago Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60611 (312) 503-7413

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned, an attorney, certifies that he electronically filed the foregoing document

using the Court’s CM/ECF system, which automatically served copies upon all parties listed on

the attached Service List on May 11, 2011.

/s/ Locke E. Bowman _

Locke E. Bowman

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SERVICE LIST Beaman v. Souk et al.

No. 10 CV 1019 Jeffrey Urdangen Bluhm Legal Clinic Northwestern University School of Law 375 East Chicago Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60611 (312) 503-7413; (312) 503-2704 (Fax) Attorney for Plaintiff James G. Sotos Elizabeth A. Ekl Elizabeth K. Barton James G. Sotos & Associates, Ltd. 550 East Devon, Suite 150 Itasca, Illinois 60143 (630) 735-3300; (630) 773-0980 (Fax) Attorneys for Defendants James Souk, Charles Reynard, John Brown, and County of McLean, Illinois Thomas G. DiCianni Lucy B. Fadel Ancel, Glink, Diamond, Bush, DiCianni & Krafthefer, P.C. 140 South Dearborn Street, Suite 600 Chicago, Illinois 60603 (312) 782-7606; (312) 782-0943 (Fax) Attorneys for Defendants Tim Freesmeyer, Rob Hospelhorn, Dave Warner, Frank Zayas, and Town of Normal, Illinois

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