T H E E C O N O M I C W E E K L Y May 20, 1961

systems of pol i t ica l organisation for the country. It was argued by some, at times convinc ingly , that Ind ian p o l i t y should take as its model "ou r o w n ' ancient inst i tut ions, w i t h modi­fications to suit present day condi­tions. It was argued that adult franchise, and rule by the bal lot Were not suited to the mass poverty and i l l i te racy of I n d i a ; they were also 'not necessary, as India had better t radi t ional patterns to f a l l back upon. Opponents of ti l ls view pointed out. however, that the only relevant experience we had had of any system of pol i t ica l organisation was that of par l iamentary democra­cy. Earlier experience was loo vague and f ragmentary to draw upon. The socalled t rad i t iona l ly I nd i an systems were not relevant to the values and needs of modern society seeking to achieve social and economic justice. Even those who advocated par l iamentary de­mocracy were d iv ided among themselves: some favoured the presidential system based on the t i n t e d States model as being more democratic and more suited to I nd i an conditions-; others preferred the Br i t i sh model . As it turned out. Ind ia ul t imately adopted the latter w i th a few modifications, pa r t i cu la r ly the 'division., of autho­r i t y ' between the centre and the States and consequent changes in the position of the Head of the

Parliamentary Government Law and Usage

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its l imi ta t ions . These become a l l the more serious because the t radi t ions and conventions that enable some other democracies to overcome the shortcomings of their f o r m a l order have yet to evolve. The develop­ment of the ins t i tu t ional pat tern can. however, be looked upon w i t h some confidence. The evolution is on the r igh t lines al though it has a long way to go. Rut for the process to continue, momentary notions about the future ins t i tu t ional order should not be allowed to distract it f rom the mainstream of development. There is also reason to sound a note of w a r n i n g about certain re­cent p o l i t i c a l developments. The posit ion needs to be examined w i th a view to dis t inguish elements which advance democracy f rom those which impede i t .

Choice of Inst i tut ions The evolut ion of our par l iamen­

tary inst i tut ions along possibly new lines of development is the subject of this ar t ic le . I t is necessary f i rs t to examine some preva i l ing opinions and the theoretical assumptions that seek to " l eg i t im i se" the exist ing ins t i tu t iona l pattern and see 'how these assumptions differ f r o m actual practice before a t tempt ing to define the precise substantive process that obtains in the country .

The Constituent Assembly, d u r i n g i ts deliberations on the Draf t Const i tut ion, considered alternative

T W O dimensions o f the Ind ian pol i t ica l s i tuat ion—the horizontal

d i s t r ibu t ion of power between the Centre and the States, and the ver t i ­cal d i s t r ibu t ion w i t h i n the S t a t e s -have so far been analysed. W e - n o w t u r n to the power relations in the "core" of our pol i t ica l system—the par l iamentary set-up.

It is necessary to emphasise a the outset that the Ind ian system has worked admi rab ly wel l within the limits of its constitutional frame work. U n l i k e in so many "new" countries, the essentials of a free po l i ty are preserved. Freedom of speech and association are jealously guarded; po l i t i ca l opposi t ion, orga­nised or otherwise, is a l lowed fu l l scope; new methods of diffusing power are being t r i ed , albeit at times p remature ly ; sectional loyalties are restrained f rom assuming dan gerous propor t ions . Pub l i c o p i n i o n , when expressed power fu l ly , is ef­fective, al though very often belated­l y . A n d the par ty system, a l though weak and f ragmentary , pe r fo rms the a l l - impor tant funct ion of mainta in­i n g s tab i l i ty and po l i t i ca l con t inu i ty . It has succeeded in p r o v i d i n g a comprehensive frame of reference to the pol i t ica l process, thanks to a subtle dispensation of patronage and an intr icate system of "connec­t ions" wielded by the r u l i n g p a r l y

The const i tu t ional f ramework , w i t h i n w h i c h this system works has

Even after independence the Congress continues to be regarded as the party of the entire Indian peo­ple. It has launched a movement for social and economic reconstruction which is no less significant than the independence movement.

The Congress has succeeded in encompassing within its folds the most important interests in the country. A large part of the political process therefore takes place within the Congress which, in fact con­stitutes a party system by itself .

Political opposition is more effective when it comes from within the Congress, than from other par ties. Being in, power at the Centre and in all the States, the Congress Party provides the most efficient channel of communication between the people and Central and State Governments.

The concentration of power within the Congress Party may itself be a matter for concern. But its uninterrupted spell in power has meant political stability.

Whether the system of government which has evolved will endure or not will depend on the interplay of personalities and the fortunes of particular political parties in the next decade.

Provided there are no major upheavals, there is reason to hope that the substantive pattern of govern­ment set up by the Congress will be able to meet the requirements of a developing polity

May 20, 1961 T H E E C O N O M I C W E E K L Y

State, the Upper House of Par l ia­ment, the Judic iary and the ser­vices.

Critics of Parliamentary Democracy Even after the Consti tut ion was

adopted, the differences of op in ion persisted. M a n y felt that pa r l i a ­mentary democracy was unsuited to car ry out the economic and social " r e v o l u t i o n " on wh ich the country had launched soon after the adop­t ion of the Const i tut ion. The spec­tacular success of the Bhoodan movement of V inoba Bhave drew widespread attention in I n d i a and abroad. Some described the Bhoo­dan movement as a new level of pol i t ics . 1 They expected the energy let loose by the movement to be able to change the character of I n d i a n poli t ics .

It was also felt that parl iamen­tary government was an inadequate basis for democracy. Whether the "one man, one vote" p r inc ip le could provide a good and just gov­ernment was doubted.2 As a result, elaborate alternative systems of pol i t ica l organisation were sought to be devised in which democracy could be in t imate ly tied up w i t h the l i fe experience of the people, thus avoid ing both the remoteness of the seat of au thor i ty and the new despotism of ma jor i ty rule.3

There were others who, whi le ad­m i t t i n g that par l iamentary govern­ment marked a substantial advance on earlier forms of po l i t i ca l orga­nisation, felt that i t seriously l i m i t ­ed the evolution of democratic habits and conventions. I t led to concentration of power and bureau-cratisation of in i t i a t ive which were i n i m i c a l to the growth of i nd iv idua l freedom. Par t ic ipa t ion by the people was l imi t ed to the r igh t to cast a vote once every five years and the d iv is ion between po l i t i c a l 'haves' and 'have-nots' assumed a new class character. Po l i t i ca l deci­sions came to the i n d i v i d u a l as fait accompli. T h i s led h i m to look for security in parochial loyalt ies wh ich undermined the g rowth of nat ional consciousness. Above a l l , the system, was basically unstable, encouraging indisc ipl ine and dis­order.4

These difficulties were accentuat­ed in a country where democratic t radi t ions were want ing , where there was no agreed code of po l i ­t i ca l behaviour. mediums of ex­pression of publ ic op in ion were

few, and the habi t of vo lun ta ry effort and self-reliance was lacking . The success of par l iamentary gov­ernment in other countries could be traced to the tradit ions of dissent and tolerance and vigorous develop­ment of vo lun ta ry and self-govern­ing associations5. The impor tan t po in t is that these insti tutions pre­ceded the rise of par l iamentary government in those countries.6

Distrust of Ins t i tu t ional Innovations

The proponents of these views, unl ike the Bhoodan School, seem to have no in tent ion of discarding the constitutional apparatus of par­l iamentary government. Indeed they are sceptical of inst i tut ional innovations. They believe that far too many of India 's po l i t i ca l diffi­culties arose precisely because of a too r i g i d and formalis t ic interpre­tat ion of the Consti tutional p rov i ­sions. The i n i t i a l task, they beli­eve, is, to spread habits of self-help and social and pol i t ica l conscious-ness and popularise voluntary asso­ciations which would make a rb i t r a ry government impossible and al low increasing par t ic ipa t ion by the people in the decision-making pro­cess. Only then can ins t i tu t ional reforms be worked out piecemeal.7

The ins t i tu t ional assumptions under ly ing the system of govern­ment, based on the Br i t i sh model, adopted in Ind ia have been the object of continuous study, s tar t ing w i t h the b r i l l i an t exposit ion of W a l ­ter Bagehot in mid-nineteenth cen­tu ry 8 . The p r i nc ipa l features of this system are representative demo­cracv on the basis of a broad-based franchise, strong government under the guidance of a collectively res­ponsible Cabinet,9 an independent j ud ic i a ry , po l i t i ca l organisation of the nation through po l i t i ca l parties competing for power whi le agreeing on fundamentals,1 0 recognit ion of the p ivota l role of the opposi t ion in the scheme of government,1 1 pol i t ica l neutra l i ty of the Head of State and the c i v i l service12 and the pr inciples of popular mandate.13 min is te r ia l responsibil i ty,1 4 and adminis t ra t ive con t inu i ty and anonymity 1 5 .

M u c h of this arrangement is based on consti tut ional conventions and pol i t ica l usage regard ing the relat ionship between the administ­ra t ion and po l i t i ca l parties, the gov-ernment and opposi t ion , and M i n i ­sters and c i v i l servants, many of which are l ack ing in I n d i a , as

revealed by the experience of the last decade and more. The absence of these conventions and the deve­lopment of new usages as well as the existence of a different c l imate of op in ion account for the gap be­tween the theory of par l iamentary government and the actual prac­tice i n I n d i a .

Apathy of the Major i ty Pol i t ica l attitudes l ike t r ad i ­

t ion are a product of history and persist th rough t ime. It is remark­able that recent developments in ideas regarding the functions of government in Ind ia have lent weight to some t rad i t iona l notions. Acco rd ing to the trusteeship theory, the possession of po l i t i ca l power is considered the legit imate preserve of a few who, in tu rn , look after the interests of the mul t i tude as best as they can. It was considered pre­sumptuous for o rd ina ry people to c la im to be able to run the govern­ment. That was the natural task of "kshatr iyas" . I m p l i c i t in this pre­scr ipt ive view of hold ing publ ic office is an att i tude of irresponsibi­l i t y and fatalism towards pol i t ical events.

It was to be expected that the i n ­st i tut ions of a democratic pol i ty wou ld counter such attitudes by de­ve loping new norms of pol i t ica l be­haviour. This has not happened. On the contrary, the old norms have found a new lease of l ife f r o m mod­ern notions of a welfare state, social security and planned economic de­velopment. The paternal at t i tude of the rulers and the apathy of the ruled are the inevitable concomit­ants of a welfare state. Even in the U K the revival of paternal att i tude on the par t of the Government re­miniscent of the House of Stuarts hap been noticed w i t h the coming of the welfare state16. In a country l ike Ind i a where ' u t i l i t a r i a n ' notions of government have hard ly percolat­ed beyond a t i n y coterie of nine­teenth century l iberals and where the t rad i t iona l at t i tude towards gov­ernment as a trust continues, the succession of an alien adminis t ra­t ion that presumed to " c i v i l i s e " the natives by a nationalist elite deter­mined to ameliorate the "cond i t ion of the people" has led to a posi t ion where ind iv idua ls are not a l lowed to take decisions for themselves for fear that they w i l l make mistakes. The doctr ine of the Real W i l l takes root and. stunts the development of the sp i r i t of adventure and self-reli-

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ance. Such a climate is conducive to the g rowth of a democracy, that is collectivist rather than one that is l ibera l -par l iamentary .

Irresponsibility in Highest Circle

The tendency to shi rk responsibi-l i t y is shared also by those in high­est pol i t ica l positions. Thus it is not uncommon for Minis ters to t r y to shift responsibi l i ty on to c iv i l servants in cases of misgovernment and assert that they had "acted on the best available advice" ; the c i v i l servants, in t u r n , blame par ty bos­ses' to whose pressure, however, they usually succumb; the organisa­t iona l w ing of the par ty blames the governmental or par l iamentary w i n g ; the States blame the Centre and the Centre blames the States and both blame the Planning Com­miss ion; pol i t ic ians take cover under "pa r t y d i sc ip l ine" to explain away embarrassing questions; above a l l , the P r ime Min i s te r himself complains of factions and groups in his own par ty and administrat ive inefficiency and careerism in his government. Cabinet Minis ters d i f ­fer publ ic ly on impor tan t po l i cy issues and State Governors spread confusion by t h ink ing loudly in publ ic 1 7 . It has become a common­place for Minis ters out of office to become hypercr i t i ca l of the Gov­ernment even though they never so much as uttered a word of dissent when in office.

The habit of compla in ing and the tendency to evade responsibi l i ty also affect a very impor tan t problem of Ind ian politics — the m i n o r i t y p rob lem. In a democracy, the social or economic m i n o r i t y becomes a pol i t ica l m ino r i t y . Then by per­suasion and public propaganda this pol i t ica l minor i ty strives to become a ma jo r i ty . The consequent alter­nation between major i ty and mino­r i t y lays the foundat ion of a v igo­rous par ty system and checks p o l i ­t ica l au thor i ty f r o m becoming ar­b i t r a ry towards minor i t ies .

The tendency in Ind ia is quite the reverse. Minor i t i e s remain in a more or less permanent state of m i n o r i t y . There is hard ly any attempt to open up m i n o r i t y orga­nisations to outsiders, b u i l d up a po l i t i ca l movement or create publ ic o p i n i o n . The minor i t i es prefer to continue as minori t ies and ask for special privileges as a group wh ich accepts its m i n o r i t y status as some­t h i n g given and unchangeable. The

government reciprocates by plead­i n g greater consideration for mino­ri t ies1 8 on the one hand and by condemning the growth of sectional­ism in polit ics on the other. The result is that pol i t ica l bargaining takes a communal colour and pro­gress toward secularism is frust­rated.

This is true not on ly of com­munal or economic minori t ies , but also of po l i t i ca l and professional groups. The opposi t ion cites the " p o l i t i c a l compulsions of a back­ward economy" and pleads for a share in pol i t ical authori ty 1 9 whi le their t rue function is to b u i l d up a vigorous opposit ion and t ry to cap­ture power. It forgets that the best means of sharing power w i t h the ru l i ng group in a democracy is pre­cisely to bu i ld up an effective op­position, by restr ict ing the power of the ma jo r i ty group.

Even more deplorable is the tendency among professional groups to demand special consideration, such as representation on impor tan t publ ic bodies. The latest example is provided by the demand made by the Inst i tute of Engineers for special seats in the legislatures20 . Such de­mands are made in the belief that op in ion in order to be effective must take the f o r m of legislative repre­sentation and that official agencies are the only seats of power. There is l i t t l e attempt at cu l t iva t ing spe­cial " lobbies" on behalf of non-pol i t ical groups and voluntary orga­nisations representing v i t a l inte­rests.

Positive Developments

Those, then, are some of the shortcomings of the . actual opera­t ion of the pol i t ica l process in this country . They should not, however, lead us to neglect some positive developments. W h i l e the deeper bases of democracy are largely want ing , certain workable conven­tions have taken root. The majo­r i t y rule has not turned in to a ty ­r anny ; the opposit ion in Parlia­ment is given more weight than its numer ica l strength war ran ts ; there are some indiv idual i s t s in the ru l ­ing par ty who do not hesitate to support the opposi t ion when the ru l i ng par ty is gu i l ty of a dist inct breach of the rules of the game; the j u d i c i a r y , at least at the higher levels, is awake to its responsibilit ies as a watchdog of the pub l i c inte­rest (a l though there is at t imes a

tendency to stretch the classical doctr ine of the l iberal state too fa r ) ; a par t of the press has re-fused to be gagged; and the natio­nal leadership restrains fanaticism and j ingo i sm in the ru l i ng party f rom becoming a menace. Of course, these developments are a result of the presence of powerful personalities steeped in l iberal tra­di t ions and have not become gene­ra l ly accepted conventions w h i c h could effectively prevent the rise of undemocratic forces in the future. There is reason to believe, however, that these values are spreading and, provided there is no major p o l i t i c a l disturbance in the coming decade, democracy w i l l have struck roots. Meanwhi le the cul tural climate wou ld also become conducive to the g rowth of an open and flexible society.

Congress Continues to Dominute We can now examine the w o r k i n g

of par l iamentary government in I n d i a against the background of ideas, attitudes and the broad inst i­tut ional m a t r i x analysed above. Only tentative observations on the behaviour of specific inst i tut ions can be made here. The ru l i ng par ty has not given up the posit ion of be­ing the par ty of the entire Ind i an people, charged w i t h launching a movement for social and economic reconstruction which is no less sig­nificant than the movement for national independence. A large part of the pol i t ica l process takes place w i t h i n the r u l i n g par ty and almost the entire pol i t ical leadership is p rovided by Congressmen. Public identifies the Congress Par ty w i t h the government and the adminis t ra­t ion. The Congress Party constitu­tes an elaborate party system by itself. Pol i t ica l opposi t ion is more effective when it comes f rom w i t h i n the ru l i ng par ty than f r o m other parties. It has succeeded to a re­markable extent in accomodating the most impor tan t interests in the country, a l lowing them to become so many pressure groups and medi­a t ing between them to achieve work­able solutions. It also provides an efficient channel of communicat ion between the general public and the Central and State governments. The organisational w i n g of the par ty asserts itself to take up the cause of aggrieved interests against the government. Not that it always succeeds.

The concentration of power wi th ­in the r u l i n g par ty is cer ta inly a

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cause for concern. Th i s is p a r t i ­cular ly evident at the t ime of elec­tions when the par ty has to rely heavily on the ab i l i ty of i ts ' char i ­smatic' leadership. Between elec­tions, however, continuous accomo­dat ion and adjustment between the government, the r u l i n g par ty and the general publ ic can be discerned at the State and dis tr ict levels, in par t icular . A l l this makes for po l i ­t ical s tabi l i ty . On the other hand, it also means that the country re­mains total ly unprepared for a pol i ­t ical change. The Congress tole­rates opposi t ion but it does not con­sider w i t h equanimi ty the prospects of the opposit ion get t ing in to power. The posit ion of the Congress Party in Ind ian poli t ics is in many res­pects unique among par l iamentary democracies.

Ministries Lack Homogencity

This is also reflected in the work­ing of the. Cabinet and the govern­ment. The p r inc ip l e of collective responsibi l i ty is not always observed even though i t is l a id down in the Const i tu t ion and is not a mere mat­er of convention. This is the re­sult of the fact that the Central and State Minis t r ies lack uni ty and homogeneity. They resemble more a coali t ion of regional and pol i t ica l interests than a group united by common loyalties and shared ideas. The eclecticism is more marked at the State level where diverse inte­rests have to be accomodated. At the Centre the powerful personality of the Pr ime Min i s te r does make for some sort of teamwork and camaraderie. The tendency for i n ­d iv idua l ministers to continue in office f rom one election to another, un t i l death, po l i t i ca l defeat or the manifest disfavour of the H i g h Command removes h i m also makes for cont inui ty in po l i t i ca l experi­ence. But , again, it creates frustra­t ion and a sense of being left out among others.

These characteristics affect the relat ionship between the executive and the legislature to a marked degree. But the most far-reaching consti tut ional innovat ion is the evo­lu t ion of the office of the Pr ime Minis te r . There is no doubt that Shr i Nehru 's powerfu l personality is the p r i n c i p a l factor in mou ld ing this office. The freedom he enjoys in the choice of his colleagues makes it possible for indiv iduals whose sole support comes f r o m the P r ime Min i s t e r to hold office fo r a n u m ­

ber of years, The benefit of the P r ime Minis ter ' s patronage has, more often than not, gone to able men wi thout popular or par ty sup­por t . Membership of the par ty and a seat in the legislature duly fo l low on the assumption of Minis ­terial office. The si tuation is not diss imilar to that in eighteenth cen­tu ry England when rotten boroughs and the patronage of barons en­abled men l ike Pi t t , Burke and Fox to get in to Par l iament . Shr i Nehru has often cast his net wide, inc lud­ing the State Minis t r ies , to get able persona fo r his Cabinet. He is relat ively unfettered in his choice, unl ike the Br i t i sh Pr ime Minis ter , who has to comply w i t h a number of conventions (such as the r i g i d d iv i s ion between the Houses of Par l iament) and consult impor tan t par ty leaders.21 Shr i Nehru's choice has become even more free wi th the departure of elderly pol i t ic ians f r o m the po l i t i ca l scene. The stature, prestige and in i t i a t ive enjoyed by Shr i Nehru make his posi t ion com­parable to that of the Un i t ed States President rather than the Br i t i sh P r ime Min i s t e r ' 2 .

President's Controversial Position

The same cannot be said of the Chief Minis ters of var ious States. B a r r i n g a few exceptions, every Chief Min i s t e r is under continuous pressure to accomodate men who have a large fo l l owing in the par ty in par t icu lar regions or among par t icu la r interests. R i g i d adherence to the p r inc ip le of seniori ty in the par ty and the government fur ther restricts the Chief Minis ter ' s f ree­dom to choose his colleagues. There have been innumberable instances of factions w i t h i n the r u l i n g par ty having to be appeared by d i s t r i ­bu t ing the spoils of office, if neces­sary by enlarging the Cabinet. The si tuat ion is even more delicate in States where a coali t ion govern­ment is in power.

The extent to wh ich the prece­dents established by Shr i Nehru at the Centre w i l l become generally accepted conventions w i l l depend on future events, pa r t i cu l a r ly on the personality of the next P r ime Min i s te r and of his colleagues.

The consti tutional posit ion of the Un ion President has been the subject of considerable controversy in this country . The Const i tu t ion v e s t s enormous powers in the President, w h i c h make h i m incomparab ly

more powerful than the Br i t i sh monarch2 3 . On the other hand, from the debates in the Constituent As­sembly it is clear that the framers of the Consti tution desired to l i m i t the status of the President to that of a Consti tutional figurehead. But the actual l i m i t i n g of the President's powers has been made to depend on the growth of conventions to that effect. The conventions which w i l l develop in course of t ime w i l l depend to a large extent on the first half a dozen or so incumbents of the President's office, on their personalities and on those of the Pr ime Ministers: w i th whom they have to work .

Dr Rajendra Prasad's impact on the President's office is not clear. It is known, however, that the first President has not been content to remain a silent observer of po l i t i ca l events. He has made his weight felt, where necessary by expressing f rankly his differences w i t h the Cabinet. This is natural since the President and the Minis ­ters were comrades du r ing the freedom struggle and they now react to each other as indiv iduals , not as insti tutions. W i t h i n the l imi t s of consti tutional p ropr ie ty , therefore, the President may wie ld considerable influence by v i r tue of his in formal relationship w i t h the Pr ime Minis te r and other impor tant ministers.

State Governors

That , however, is not the whole story. The President is becoming an active factor in polit ics, lending his support to impor tant factions w i t h i n the r u l i n g party. He maintains d i ­rect contacts w i t h poli t icians, leaders of interest groups and even admi­nistrators, and wields an influence far in excess of that wielded by the Br i t i sh monarch. The Presidents support to the H i n d i lobby in Par­liament and in the government, his close relat ionship w i t h the Northern group in the Cabinet and his expres­sion of strong difference of op in ion on the government's social and eco­nomic policies indicate the manner in which Dr Prasad is t r y i n g to as­sert himself. There may be many other instances that have not yet come to l igh t .

The posit ion of the State Govern­ors is s imi la r to that of the Presi­dent. G o v e n o r s have frequently expressed their differences on par t i ­cular policies of the State Govern­ments. There have also been in -

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stances where the Governor has looked more to the Centre than to the elected m i n i s t r y in the State. The weight he pulls w i t h the Centre has reinforced his position in the State. The appointment of p o l i t i ­cians who are not w i l l i n g to be pas­sive figureheads has also led to the modif ica t ion in practice of the Gov­ernor's role as envisaged in the Const i tu t ion.

These developments w i t h regard to the posi t ion of the President and the Governors may not be entirely unwelcome. It may effectively check the increasing power of the head of the government. M u c h would de­pend, however, on the purposes for wh ich the President's or the Gov­ernors ' influence is exerted.

Regional Al ignment in Legislatures

The w o r k i n g of the U n i o n and State legislatures d u r i n g the last fifteen years reveals impor tant trends. The domina t ion of the Congress Par ty at the Centre and in most of the States has ensured that the legislatures are consulted on all impor tan t matters. The overwhelming strength of the r u l ­i n g pa r ty also makes for f rank and open discussions by par tymen on the floor of the House. M P s - a n d M L As are aligned on regional lines wh ich cut across par ty loya l ­ties. The w o r k i n g of Par l iamentary Committees reveals a fusion of views of members of opposing parties. These Committees, by their frank c r i t i c i sm of the government have become watchdogs of publ ic inter­est. T h e i r constant scrut iny has helped to ma in ta in financial pro­pr ie ty and adminis t ra t ive efficien­cy2 4 . I n f o r m a l contacts between M L A s or M P s and ministers make it possible to sound the gov­ernment on impor t an t movements in pub l i c op in ion . T h i s process is more noticeable in State capitals than at the Centre. An M L A is much closer to his constituents than an M P. W h e n the State assemblies are in session hectic ac­t i v i t y goes on in the corr idors , members' chambers and w a i t i n g rooms wh ich bears testimony to the opening out of the seat of author i ­ty under pressure of democratic pol i t ics . S i m i l a r contacts between the rulers and the ruled are notice­able when ministers visi t the con­stituencies. Not a l l complaints are heard, fa r leas satisfied. But it is clear that the contacts are i n ­creasing.

Conventions of Parliamentary Government

Consti tut ional conventions harden over a per iod of t ime. For a prece­dent to become a convention, at least three condit ions must be fu l ­filled : i t must possess the sanction of long usage; i t must command general acquiescence; and it must be in consonance w i t h accepted consti tut ional pr inciples . The most impor tan t condi t ion is the sanctity of t ime w h i c h transforms i nd iv idua l acts in to conventions. ' T h o s e who take decisions create precedents wh ich others tend to fol low, and when they have been followed long enough they acquire the sanctity and the respectabili ty of age. They not on ly are followed but they have to be fo l l owed" 2 5 .

Some of the conventions of par­l iamentary government have been specified in the Ind i an Const i tut ion. They, therefore, acquire the force of law. Others wh ich have not been specifically mentioned draw their v a l i d i t y f rom the B r i t i s h ex­perience and the po l i t i ca l experi­ence of English rule in Ind i a . S t i l l others find their sanction in the debates of the Constituent Assemb­l y . I t is about the conventions that have g rown since the adopt ion of the Const i tut ion that doubt prevails.

Ins t i tu t ions in Ind ia are s t i l l in a stage of flux. The i r behaviour does not f o l l ow a consistent pat tern . The posi t ion is made difficult by the fact that the same par ty has conti­nued in office throughout this per iod . I t is not clear if the precedents i t has set wou ld be b ind ing on ano­ther pa r ty when it comes to power . A g a i n , many recent usages have been the direct result of the impact of dominant personalities "Char is ­mat ic" behaviour can hard ly lead to the g rowth of conventions wh ich must be based on general concen­sus. Fur ther pol i t ica l decisions, special ly those taken w i t h i n the r u l i n g party 's H i g h Command o r the Cabinet, were made in an atmosphere of secrecy. They thus become open to different interpre­tations. F i n a l l y . developments in the Centre and the different States are not always u n i f o r m .

The progress f rom monarchia l to par l iamentary and finally to cabinet government in England has been the result par t ly of a po l i ­t ical revolu t ion but largely of the

g rowth of conventions. In Ind i a , however such precedents as have been established must be taken as provis ional ind ica t ing possi­ble lines of development rather than accepted conventions,

' Functional ' Upper Houses ?

It is possible, at the same t ime, to argue that the consti tutional structure adopted in great detail by the Constituent Assembly is res-trie t ing flexible pol i t ical develop­ment. The Amer ican type of exe­cutive in place of the Cabinet government. wi thout however a strict separation of powers. may have been more suitable for a country l ike India which needs cen­tralised direct ion by able and de­voted men more than a hor izontal ly and ver t ical ly p lu ra l po l i t i ca l order. Or, again, a s trong case can be made out for a " func t i ona l " Upper House whereby different i n ­terests and associations could be intimately associated w i th pol i t ica l deliberations. Since strong lines communicat ion between social and pol i t ica l inst i tut ions have yet to be bui l t , an Upper House so constitut­ed would supplement the Lower House by b r i n g i n g the specialised knowledge of its Members to bear upon Government's pol icy . This is not however possible wi thou t amending the Const i tut ion. It is possible that the Indian genius for adaptation and assimilation may overcome the l imi ta t ions imposed by the Const i tut ion. On the other hand, the Ind ian t rad i t ion of scho­lastic in terpreta t ion of texts may make for fo rma l r i g i d i t y even though flexible insti tutions may be required po l i t i ca l ly .

It is clear f rom the above review of par l iamentary government in Ind ia that many inst i tut ions and processes of pol i t ical l i fe as they have evolved in practice differ f rom the forms la id down in the Const i tut ion. Poli t icians bound to­gether by considerations of expe-diency and a common loyalty to the Pr ime Minis ter who enjoys al­most complete freedom in choosing his colleagues, continue uninter­rupted in office provided they keep al ive, retain the safe seats f rom which they are elected and enjoy the confidence of their leader. The Head of the State, prominent in­dividuals outside the min i s t ry and the par l iamentary committees pro-

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vide the c r i t i c i sm that keeps the government alert and wa tch fu l ; and the r u l i n g par ty which shows the characteristics of a coa l i t ion of divergent interests provides the larger f ramework of pol i t ica l deci­s ion-making. Th i s is more an amalgam of the Br i t i sh . Amer ican and continental systems of govern­ment than an exact replica of the Engl ish, al though the legal and consti tutional rules are largely borrowed f r o m the latter.

The Pr ime Minis te r and the close c i rc le o f leaders a round h i m in the Congress Party also control the State ministr ies w h i c h fo l low, w i t h modif icat ions to suit peculiar local circumstances and problems, the pat tern established at the Centre. Th i s system has not yet achieved s tabi l i ty . M u c h would depend on the in ter-play of personalities and the fortunes of pol i t ica l parties in the next decade. Provided there is no major disturbance in the ideological balance, there is hope that the substantive pat tern that has emerged w i l l be able to meet the demands of a developing po l i ty .

The extent to wh ich future ex­perience w i l l necessitate a modi f i ­cation of po l i t i c a l inst i tut ions and processes and the extent to which par l iamentary government wou ld effectively continue in the exist ing forms w i l l depend on the resilence of our po l i t i c a l inst i tut ions and the qua l i ty of statesmanship. Conf i -dent predict ions on these questions are not possible. One can only broadly trace the contours of pos­sible development. T h i s is what has been attempted in this ar t ic le .

Notes 1 W H Morris-Jones, Parliament in

India, pp 37-40 2 Jayaprakash Narayan, Towards a New

Society; 1958, p 89 3 Jayaprakash Narayan, A Plea for

Reconstruction of Indian Polity 4 Rajni Kothari, 'Direct Action: A

Pattern of Political Behaviour', Quest, Jan 1960, pp 22-35

5 Report on the Rhodes Seminar on Democracy in the New States by Edward Shils, 'Old Societies New States', pp 18-19

6 Frank Tannenbaum, 'On Political Stability;' Political Science Quarterly., June 1960

7 Daya Krishna, What is Democracy, Rhodes Seminar Papers 1958, pp 70-71

8 The English Constitution, 1867

9 Sir Ivor Jennings, Cabinet Govern­ment, Ch I

10 Robert Mckenzie, 'Harold Laski and the Social Basis of the Constitution' British Journal of Sociology, Vol III No 2

11 Sir Ivor Jennings, The British Con stitution, 1950, pp 80-90

12 For the best short statement of the principle, see Herbert Morrison, Socialization and Transport, p 106. Also, his Government and Parliament pp 334-5. See, however, Harold Laski, Reflections on the Constitu­tion, pp 168-72, for a deviation from the prevailing view.

13 K B Smellie, A Hundred Years of English Government, p 124

14 Sir John Anderson, The Machinery of Government, (Romanes- Lecture), 1946

15 William Beveridge, The Public Ser­vice in War and Peace, 1920. For a more recent and authoritative state­ment, see C R Attlee, 'Civil Servants, Ministers, Parliament and the Public' Indian Journal of Public Adminis­tration, Vol I, No 2 pp 102-3

16 The Fabian Tract' by Andrey Har vey, Casualties of the Welfare State

17 On the question of the paramount need of maintaining standards of propriety in politics, see the inspir­ing Presidential Address of Prof R Bhaskaran, delivered at the 23rd Annual Conference of the Indian

Political Science Association, Patna, 1960.

18 Congress Resolution on 'National Integration, passed at the 66th An­nual Session held at Bhavnagar

19 Asoka Mehta, Politics of Planned Economy

20 Times of India, Feb 11, 1961

21 Sir Ivor Jennings, Cabinet Govern-ment, Ch 3

22 See, however, a recent controversy started by Max Beloff in the Daily Telegraph in which it is alleged that a one-man government is emerging in great Britain ever since the days of Lloyd George. For a summary, and a rejection of this view, see The Economist, August 13, 1960

23 Sir Ivor Jennings, Cabinet govern­ment, Ch X I I . The strict limitation of the powers of the British monarch, however, is a development of the last fifty years only. See Frank Hardie, The Political Influence of Queen Victoria, which dispels Bagehot's reading of the reign. See also Harold Nicolson, King George V; His Life and Reign; and Harold Laski, The crisis and the Constitution, especial­ly pp 31-36

24 For an excellent review of the working of parliamentary committees in India, see W H Morris-Jones, Parliament in India, pp 279-315

25 Sir Ivor Jennings, Cabinet-Govern­ment, p 2