ii 3 gametheory
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1 Competitor Analysis
Competitive Rivalry & Collusion
10/3/11
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2 Competitor Analysis
Quiz 1: 10 Minutes10/3/11
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4 Competitor Analysis
Agenda
Using game theory to predict rival’s actions and responses to a given strategy Game theory & prisoner’s dilemma Sequential/Extended form games
Exercise: Knee-jerk reactions: 2 player repeated game 4 player repeated game
Behavioral approach to anticipating rivals
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5 Competitor Analysis
Can you beat the prisoner’s dilemma?
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6 Competitor Analysis
Prisoners’ Dilemma Prisoner’s Dilemma is a situation where
individuals’ incentives and those of the group are in conflict: The group would jointly benefit from
cooperating, but… Each group member has an incentive not to
cooperate.
Cooperation tends to break down unless there is some mechanism to enforce cooperation.
We see this in many settings and knowing how to strategize in this context is critical. Politics: Arms races, pollution Sports: Steroid use Business: Price or advertising wars On campus: Group projects? Other?
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7 Competitor Analysis
Formal Definition Prisoner’s Dilemma: Simultaneous-move
non-cooperative game where all players have a dominant strategy, and the resulting Nash equilibrium is Pareto inefficient.
Non-Cooperative Game: Each player seeks to maximize his/her individual payoff and assumes others do the same.
Dominant Strategy: A strategy that is always the best choice for a player, regardless of what other players choose to do.
Nash equilibrium: A combination of strategies where no player would wish to unilaterally change his/her strategy.
Pareto inefficient: The game has another possible outcome that would make at least one player better off, without making other players any worse off.
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8 Competitor Analysis
Example 2
RedC D
BlueB
A
$500
$700
$200
$400
$1000
$400
$100
$300
Prisoner’s Dilemma? • Dominant strategies?• Nash equilibrium?• Pareto inefficient?
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9 Competitor Analysis
Example 2
RedC D
BlueB
A
N$500
$700
$200
$400
$1000
$400
$100
$300
Prisoner’s Dilemma? • Dominant strategies?• Nash equilibrium?• Pareto inefficient?
OneOneNo
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10 Competitor Analysis
Genzyme v. J&J: Can they get the R&D “war” under control?
J&J (Orthovisc)3 Shot 1
shot
Genzyme
3 shot
1 shot
+--
++-
+++
--
-Prisoner’s Dilemma? • Dominant strategies?• Nash equilibrium?• Pareto inefficient?
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11 Competitor Analysis
Genzyme v. J&J: Can they get the R&D “war” under control?
J&J (Orthovisc)3 Shot 1
shot
Genzyme
3 shot
1 shot N
+--
++-
+++
--
-Prisoner’s Dilemma? • Dominant strategies?• Nash equilibrium?• Pareto inefficient?
TwoOneYes
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12 Competitor Analysis
Exercise: Knee-Jerk Reactions
How can we promote cooperation to preserve industry profitability?
Imagine a game between Genzyme and J&J to limit the “R&D war” (for the time being, ignoring other competitors)
Can they get control of R&D expenditures so they can realize a higher return?
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20 Competitor Analysis
Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games
Repeated games can lead to cooperation – even if they play “non-cooperatively.” Why? How?
What determines whether cooperation will emerge? Gains to defecting in the current round? Likelihood of retaliation in future rounds? Cost imposed by retaliation in future rounds? Relative value placed on future vs. present
payoffs?
Axelrod tested algorithms (2-player repeated games) Tit-for-tat worked best – cooperative in the 1st
round then repeat opponent’s prior move. Never instigate, always respond in kind, and always forgive.
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22 Competitor Analysis
Exercise: Knee-Jerk Reactions II (4 Player
version)
How can we promote cooperation to preserve industry profitability?
How does the game change as more firms enter the industry?
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23 Competitor Analysis
Behavioral Approach to Anticipating Rivals’ Responses
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25 Competitor Analysis
Using Resources to Predict rivals’ actions: timing & magnitude
Motivation/Perceived
Threat
Rival’s Response
(e.g., lag, order,magnitude)
Awarenessof Rival
Ability toRespond
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26 Competitor Analysis
ResourceSimilarity
Market Commonali
ty
Rival Cognition
Awareness & Motivation: How to stay under the radar…
Is firm in same
league?
Do the mkts overlap?
Is firm viewed as a
threat?
Motivation/Perceived
Threat
Rival’s Response
(e.g., lag, order,magnitude)
Awarenessof Rival
Ability toRespond
Resource Strength
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30 Competitor Analysis
Competitor’s Cognition
Beliefs: How does the competitor view the industry (themselves and rivals)?
Intentions: What are the competitor’s goals & objectives?
Past Actions: To what extent is the rival bound or constrained by past actions?
Psst: “J&J anticoagulant may be approved.”Psst: “J&J acquires Micrus Endovascular.”Psst: “J&J heart failure study published”
Patents
Apps
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31 Competitor Analysis
Key Points in Competitor Analysis
Estimate payoff structure. Assess payoffs to predict rival responses to proposed strategies.
Anticipate rivals’ perceptions. Market commonality, resource similarity & cognition indicate whether a move will elicit a response.
Collusion & prisoners’ dilemma. Sustaining cooperation requires an effective enforcement mechanism. Threat of retaliation depends on: Number of players Severity of retaliation Benefits of defecting Visibility of
defections Current v. future payoffs
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32 Competitor Analysis
British Sky Broadcasting10/5/11
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34 Competitor Analysis
Flying Fickle Finger of Fate Falls on Team 22
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35 Competitor Analysis
Agenda
What is the strategic problem?
What is the extent of resources BSkyB would commit to improve the situation?
What is the range of possible solutions to consider?
Recommendations?
What did they do?
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36 Competitor Analysis
Five Forces Analysis
RivalrySupplier Power
Entry Barriers
Substitute
Products
Buyer Power
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37 Competitor Analysis
Factor Influencing Bargaining Power?
Entry barriers Substitutes Buyer power Supplier power Rivalry0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
12%
3%10%
57%
18%
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38 Competitor Analysis
Supplier Poweris Highest When:
Buyer Power
Supplier Power
Entry Barriers
Substitute
Products
Rivalry
Buyer Power
Supplier Power
Suppliers are large and concentrated/little rivalry
Differentiated products increase switching costs between vendors and/or substitute products
Suppliers can forward integrate Focal industry represents a small % of
suppliers’ business
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39 Competitor Analysis
Outlook for BSB?
Great! (Buy) Not Sure (Hold) Poor! (Sell)0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45% 40%44%
16%
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40 Competitor Analysis
Using Resources to Predict rivals’ actions: timing & magnitude
Motivation/Perceived
Threat
Rival’s Response
(e.g., lag, order,magnitude)
Awarenessof Rival
Ability toRespond
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45 Competitor Analysis
Predicting the Unpredictable?
What are the sources of uncertainty?
How might these interact to form scenarios?
What are the trigger points to identify the scenarios?
How can you prepare for the scenarios?
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46 Competitor Analysis
Bidding War for Broadcast Rights
ONdigitalNoBid Bid
BSBNoBi
d
BidN
+--
++-
+++
--
-
Prisoner’s Dilemma? • Dominant strategies?• Nash equilibrium?• Pareto inefficient?
TwoOneYes
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47 Competitor Analysis
BSkyB Buys Manchester United for £623.4m
Getting a Leg Up on Football
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48 Competitor Analysis
Payoffs with a BSB Toehold
ONdigitalNoBid
Bid
BSBNoBi
d
Bid
0
0
N-CRadv
V-.92CL
V-CL
.08CL-CRadv -CF-CRadv
V-.92CH
Where: • V=value of Manchester
United• CL/CH/CH=cost of
low/high/failed bid• CRadv=cost from rival’s
advantage
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49 Competitor Analysis
What Happened? Manchester United accepted a
£623.4m bid from BSkyB (9/98). UK Monopolies and Mergers
Commission blocked the bid (4/99). “The toehold effect would have consequences
for any future collective sale of Premier League rights …If BSkyB acquired Manchester United, 5-8% of whatever it paid to obtain the Premier League rights would flow back to it.”
BSB acquired 9.9% stakes in 4 Premier League clubs (Manchester United, Leeds United, Sunderland, Manchester City).
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50 Competitor Analysis
British Sky Take-Aways
Illustrates how industry structure (5 forces) can be used to frame strategic problems.
Opportunity to apply game theory to a strategic challenge and see how strategic moves can alter the payoff structure.
Explore creativity and strategic strategy formulation.
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51 Competitor Analysis
Aldi Invades Badger Territory
Field trip! Visit 1 of the 3 Madison Aldi stores & identify a the best bargain for $10 or less.
Analysis. What could your client do to lower their cost structure? What policies couldn’t be copied?
Aldi Poll (Still only need to do 8 but it is 8 of 12)
Teams 1-3/12-14: Copp’s, Metcalfe’s, or Hy-Vee Teams 4-5/15-16: Wal-Mart, Sam’s Club,
Costco, Woodman’s Teams 6-7/17-18: Cub Foods or Pick-N-Save Team 8-9/19-20: Whole Foods, Trader Joe’s,
Fresh Madison Mkt, or Willy St. Coop Team 10-11/21-22: PDQ, Stop-N-Go, Stop-N-
Shop, Quick Mart