AIFAD

INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

Kingdom of Swaziland

Smallholder Agricultural Development Project

Interim Evaluation Report

October 2001Report No. 1206-SZ

Photograph on cover page:Kingdom of Swaziland

A beneficiary of the Smallholder Agricultural Development Project

KINGDOM OF SWAZILAND

INTERIM EVALUATION REPORT

SMALLHOLDER AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (323-SZ)

Table of Contents

Abbreviations and Acronyms iiiMap ivExecutive Summary v

CHAPTER I: COUNTRY AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

A. GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION AND MAJOR AGRO-ECOLOGICAL ZONES 1B. THE REGIONAL CONTEXT 1C. THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT 2D. THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 2E. SOCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS AND POVERTY CONTEXT 4

CHAPTER II: EVALUATION SETTING, METHODOLOGY AND PROJECT OBJECTIVES

A. MISSION PURPOSE AND ITINERARY 6B. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY AND PROCESS 7C. PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND COMPONENTS 8D. PROJECT AREA 8E. PROJECTS COSTS, FINANCING AND IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS 9

CHAPTER III: OVERALL IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS

A. OVERVIEW 10B. PROJECT FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND PROCUREMENT 11C. PROJECT MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY 13D. PROJECT DESIGN WEAKNESSES 16E. TARGETING 16

CHAPER IV: IMPLEMENTATION BY COMPONENT

A. IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT 18B. LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT 23C. CROP DEVELOPMENT 26D. CREDIT 28E. MARKETING 30F. OTHER INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING EFFORTS 32G. MONITORING AND EVALUATION 33H. COMPLIANCE WITH LOAN AGREEMENT AND COVENANTS 34

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CHAPTER V: IMPACT AND SUSTAINABILITY

A. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 35B. OVERALL 35

CHAPTER VI: LESSONS LEARNED

A. ACHIEVING QUANTIFIABLE AND VERIFIABLE IMPACT AT THE LEVELOF RESOURCE POOR HOUSEHOLDS 42

B. PARTICIPATORY PROCESSES – VITAL FOR POVERTY ALLEVIATION 43C. SUPERVISION 43D. PROJECT CO-ORDINATION AND MANAGEMENT 43E. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE VERSUS NGO AND PRIVATE SECTOR 44

CHAPTER VII: THE FUTURE

A. INTRODUCTION 45B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ONGOING PROJECT 45C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE PROJECTS 52

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Regional distribution of polulation 4Table 2: Disbursements by Category and Balance of IFAD loan (May 2, 2001) 11Table 3: Prevalence of malnutrition among under-five children, Swaziland, 2000 36Table 4: Comparative Stunting Rates ( 1983-2000) 38Table 5: Percentage of homesteads by status of maize production 39Table 6: Incremental irrigable area for seven sites 47

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Comparison of Actual Rate with Project Rate of Disbursement 11Figure 2: Prevalence of stunting by age 37Figure 3: Trends in Stunting 1983-2000 37

ANNEXES (Volume II)

1. Irrigation Development2. Crop Production3. A Proven Alternative to Shifting Agriculture: The World-wide Experience with Greenmanure

Cover Crops4. Livestock Development5. Smallholder Credit6. Marketing of Produce in Smallholder Sub-sector7. Wrap-up Meeting, 25 May 2001: Recommendations

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AfDB African Development BankCCU Central Co-operative UnionCI Cooperating InstitutionCMA Common Monetary AreaCSO Central Statistical OfficeETF Enterprise Trust FundFMD Foot and Mouth DiseaseGLMDAs Grazing Land Management AreasIE Interim EvaluationIFAD International Fund for Agriculture DevelopmentIMBITA Imbita Swaziland Women’s Finance TrustM&E Monitoring and EvaluationMOAC Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operativesMOF Ministry of FinanceNAMBOARD National Agriculture Marketing BoardNGO Non-Governmental OrganisationPC Project Co-ordinatorPCC Project Co-ordination CommitteeSACU South African Customs UnionSAR Staff Appraisal ReportSCMP Smallholder Credit and Marketing ProjectSDSB Swaziland Development and Savings BankSFDF Small Farmer Development FoundationSNL Swazi Nation LandTA Technical AssistanceTDL Title Deed LandVFTC Veterinary and Farmer Training Centre

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KINGDOM OF SWAZILAND

INTERIM EVALUATION REPORT

SMALLHOLDER AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

323 SZ

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BACKGROUND

A. Objectives, Components and Project Area

1. The Project aims at improving the incomes and food security of Swaziland’s disadvantagedsmallholder families, particularly women on Swazi Nation Land (SNL). It sets out to improveincomes of smallholders and standards of living of disadvantaged smallholders on SNL. The mainobjectives of the project are to: (i) assist the Government in its overall efforts to achieve food self-sufficiency; (ii) strengthen the institutions already supported under the Swaziland Credit andMarketing Project (SCMP); and (iii) address constraints to raised productivity in rainfed cropproduction and the livestock sub-sector, particularly the need to introduce new systems of productionthat will reduce the number of cattle in the range. The project intended to develop grassrootsinstitutions to achieve the project objectives.

2. The four major project components of the project are: (i) crop production including irrigation;(ii) livestock production; (iii) credit; and (iv) institutional strengthening. About 5 000 householdswould receive the full complement of inputs and services. Other families on SNL would benefit fromgeneral extension and adaptive research services.

3. The project area consists of the SNL areas, which comprise up 60% total arable land 70% of itspopulation. It was intended to include all the four agro-ecological zones. Support for agriculturaldevelopment particularly in terms of adaptive research and small scale irrigation development, wouldbe directed to the Lowveld and those parts of the Middle and Highveld, where the irregular rainfallpattern is a major constraint to agricultural production.

B. Projects Costs, Financing and Implementation Arrangements

4. The total project costs for the seven-year disbursement period were estimated at E 31 million(USD 8.4 million, including physical and price contingencies). The foreign exchange costs of theproject comprised 63% of the total base costs, equal to USD 5.2 million. Physical and pricecontingencies represented 12% of project base costs.

5. IFAD had approved a loan of USD 6.9 million to cover 83% of total project costs. Governmentof Swaziland /SDSB/NAMBOARD had agreed to finance USD 1.5 million, of which USD 0.8 millionwould be taxes and duties. Beneficiaries would contribute about USD 0.1 million reflecting theirdown payments for loans received under the line of credit and labour input for irrigation developmentand construction of grazing land management areas (GLMDA.)

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C. Project Organisation and Management

6. Responsibility for the implementation of each component was assigned to the relevant technicaldepartment or agency. The project would seek to direct existing services to meet specific target groupneeds. It would provide any necessary incremental support for this purpose. The Department ofAgriculture would be responsible for the dryland and irrigated crop production programmes, forextension and adaptive research services. For small-scale irrigation development, responsibility wouldbe reorganised in Small-scale Irrigation Section within the Department of Agriculture. TheDepartments of Veterinary Services and Co-operative Development, respectively, would beresponsible for the livestock production and co-operative development component. NGOs or otherentities under the auspices of the PCC would undertake group development. SDSB would beresponsible for credit and the NAMBOARD / Nokwane market for input supply and producemarketing. The African Development Bank was assigned to be the Cooperating Institution (CI).

FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE AND PROCUREMENT

A. Financial Performance

7. IFAD appraised the project early in 1993. Total project costs are US$ 8.56 million, of whichthe IFAD loan represents SDR 5.1 million (USD 6.9 million). The Project Accountant could notprovide details of the balance available for disbursement during the remainder of the project life. TheTA has been ineffective in assisting the Project to design the systems and procedures. The situationwas compounded by a high rate of staff turnover. The budgeting process in the project was top-down,providing little or no space for participatory processes, reflecting the government’s traditionalbudgeting system. The community organisations had no role in budget planning exercise.Beneficiaries, project implementers - and the mission – fail to ascertain the quantum of investmentsand cost effectiveness of investments made by the project at each community/group

8. IFAD’s cumulative disbursement as of 2 May 2001 was SDR 2 694 499, or 47% of the totalallocation of SDR 5 100 000. The actual rate of disbursement has been much lower than the projectedrate. The AfDB operates with a different set of data, which is not reconcilable with IFAD data. TheAfDB data indicates a lower disbursement of merely SDR 2.02 million, representing 40% of theIFAD loan amount.

B. Procurement

9. The project design indicated that the Government procurement procedures were satisfactory toboth IFAD and the CI and would be followed under SADP. But procedures are excessivelycomplicated for smaller procurements. For any procurement exceeding E 5 000 up to USD 50 000, thePCU has to obtain three quotations and seek authority to spend from the tender board in the Ministryof Finance. These procedures are unpractical to follow in a project setting and easily cause non-justified delays.

10. The CI has remained too passive regarding involvement of NGOs for micro-schemes andengagement of private contractors for small-scale schemes. The project had initially engaged NGOsfrom developing micro-schemes. The project has made partial payments towards these contracts. TheNGOs due to non-payment on their own had to switch to other donors to obtain funds for completingthe works. The non-payment of NGOs and the absence of a well-designed procedure to engage theNGOs to implement project activities contributed to the decision by NGOs to disengage themselvesfrom the project.

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PROJECT MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY

11. The Project established a Project Co-ordination Unit (PCU) with a PC, Counterpart Project Co-ordinator (TA), Project Financial Advisor/Financial Controller (TA), Project Accountant, Economistand Secretary. A Project Co-ordinating Committee (PCC) was established. The project subsequentlyestablished a system of monthly meetings at the PCU level chaired by the Under Secretary.

12. But this system for coordination did not meet expectations. The different complementaryproject supported services did not materialize as expected at the site level. Instead, each sub-component is being implemented in isolation, independent of other activities. Project activities havebecome fragmented. The co-ordination of the various project-implementing departments has beeninadequate. Two issues are evident. First, the project work plan and budget preparation wascomponent driven contrary to the design expectations. Second, the regional level officials were notinvolved in preparing the project work plan and budget to ensure co-ordinated services to thecommunity / farmer organisations.

13. The capacity of the project management has been inadequate. The project was established as asmall unit with only three staff. The project technical assistance became ineffective due to theturnover of trained staff and inability of the TA to conceptualise community institution developmentas the core activity and as the basis to fund other interventions. The project staff are drawn from theMOAC cadre; they consider that their compensation levels do not match the project workload. Thecomponent heads were required to undertake the project activities in addition to their regular workwith little difference between them. As a result, project activities became an appendage of the regulardepartment work.

14. The project design had provided an initial framework to develop sustainable farmerorganisations by using NGOs. The framework, though not well articulated, could have been adjustedbased on the experience in participatory development in other countries. The project initiallycontracted NGOs but with the unresolved dispute over contract payments, NGOs withdrew. Theproject was neither assisted in settling the payment dispute with NGOs, nor to come up with analternative framework for developing farmer organisations. The project’s intention of developingfarmer organisations in the irrigation schemes was thwarted.

15. The supervision by the CI was inadequate. The Aide Memoires of the CI indicate simplerecording of performance as against the appraisal targets. Efforts of the supervision missions to set outthe issues and recommendations to address the issues with clearly articulated implementation steps arenot evident. In addition, strategy development and adjusting the project activities based on theinternational experience gained in participatory development and lessons learned fromimplementation experience have been neglected. The issues related to NGO involvement in micro-irrigation and group development, non-payment of contract amount to NGOs, constraints to delivercredit to the target group through SDSB, financial management, the flow of funds and use of privatecontractors for irrigation works remain unresolved.

PROJECT DESIGN WEAKNESSES

16. Overall, design features have been inadequate. First, the processes to develop communityinstitutions/farmer organisations as the core of development architecture have not been articulated.The sectoral interventions were not based on the assessed needs and priorities of theseinstitutions/organisations. Second, small stock development (pigs and poultry), as preferred by theIFAD target group, was largely ignored. Third, processes for engaging the NGOs, including selection,contracting and payment procedures were not spelt out. Fourth, the risks of involving only a singlefinancial institution – the SDSB – to deliver credit to resource poor households (given the experience

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in the earlier SCMP) were not explored. Fifth, the capacity and the need for direct execution ofirrigation works by the Irrigation Section were not analysed: the limited capacity and the residualoption of contracting irrigation works to private contractors were not made clear.

TARGETING

17. The project design identifies four categories of homesteads on the basis of cash or resourceendowment, homestead labour, and associated farming practices. They are: (i) cash/resource rich -labour rich; (ii) cash /resource rich - labour poor; (iii) cash/resource poor - labour rich; and (iv)cash/resource poor - labour poor. It was suggested that the target group for the project could be foundin the latter two categories.

18. The project design did not set out a plan to operationalise the targeting criteria to select thosehouseholds that should benefit from the project. It did not even specify an area with concentration oftarget group households, or establish a methodology to identify such areas with concentration of targetgroup households. The project allocated 24% of the funds for cattle development catering to farmers,who do not fall within the target group criteria. The situation is worsened by inadequate emphasis onsmall stock development (poultry and pigs), which are the activities preferred by the cash/resourcepoor and labour poor households.

IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS BY COMPONENT

A. Irrigation Development

19. The project had intended to: (i) expand two existing SCMP schemes by 5 ha each, to make useof water delivery infrastructure already provided; (ii) develop or rehabilitate about 75 ha of small-scale irrigation schemes; (iii) develop/rehabilitate one hundred hectares of new, intensive micro-smallholder irrigation schemes at an average size 1 ha; and (iv) consolidate and reorganise another257 ha of existing schemes to promote farmer-management. The irrigation component was to benefit2 215 farmers

20. Twelve small-scale irrigation schemes have received attention from the project to date,including one of those intended for expansion (Ntamakuphila). The total irrigable area of theseschemes at full development will be some 214 ha. However, even though substantial work has beendone on some of these schemes, none of them is yet fully operational, even though seven years haveelapsed since project effectiveness. Physical works have not yet been started on four of the schemesCompared with the ‘without project’ situation, the incremental area developed/rehabilitated andbrought into operation/production at the time of the IE is less than 10 ha, compared with the target of85 ha. Three micro schemes, amounting to a total of about 4.5 ha, have been completed by SFDF andare operational. A further three micro schemes totalling 3-4 ha are reported by the Irrigation Sectionto have been completed (possibly by Women Resource Centre).

21. Thus, the sum total achieved to date is less than 10 ha of small-scale schemes and about 4.5 haof micro schemes, compared with the targets of 85 ha and 100 ha, respectively. Nothing has beenachieved on the intended consolidation and reorganisation of the 257 ha of ‘old IFAD schemes’.Moreover, regrettably, the quality of design and construction work leaves much to be desired. Theapproach to development has also sometimes been top-down

22. The main reasons for these disappointing results are: (i) inadequate manpower within theIrrigation Section as it has only one irrigation engineer to cover the whole country and the intended

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overseas training for two irrigation staff apparently never took place; (ii) difficulties with procurementof construction materials and the flow of funds, mainly as a result of the lack of a special account,combined with cumbersome procurement procedures; (iii) difficulties in arranging for force-accountwork through the Land Development Service which apparently is poorly equipped; (iv) apparentreluctance to contract out for plant hire or construction services even when the Land DevelopmentService is unable to assist; (v) lack of awareness of the state of project finances and consequentinadequate budgeting; and (iv) failure on the part of the PCU to successfully contract NGOs.

23. However, there are two encouraging points: (i) the schemes have generally been initiated by thefarmer groups, who have unstintingly provided their labour (and a small amount of cash) towardsscheme construction; and (ii) the groups generally appear to be committed to meeting operation andmaintenance costs. The completed micro-scale schemes appear to be functioning well.

24. With one notable exception (Lavumisa), targeting has generally been satisfactory. Again withthe exception of Lavumisa and in the case of Mhlangeni, women are in the majority in thememberships of the scheme. They far outnumber men in the memberships of the micro-schemes. Thecase of Lavumisa is cause for concern. This 51 ha sprinkler scheme has not been commissioned sinceit is not yet fully equipped. It was developed together with a 120 ha drip irrigation scheme for sugarcane and a 73 ha drip irrigation scheme for vegetables (which has now apparently been abandoned).This does not appear to be in keeping with project guidelines for targeting.

25. With the exception of Lavumisa, allocated plot sizes appear to be reasonably in keeping withexpectations, although the process may be a cause for concern, since the project has not documented‘ownership identity’ of the schemes. There is little in the way of documentation on file to show thatthe Chief has given his permission for the use of the land on any of the schemes and that the users(particularly women) have security of tenure.

26. There is no doubt that the few developments completed to date are having a significant impacton household incomes and nutrition and that these benefits in most cases will far outweigh the costs.However, this situation will continue only if the present limited market access is maintained orimproved and the schemes are sustainable. Neither is at present guaranteed – and prospects have notbeen improved by the failure to contract NGOs for group development.

27. The quality of supervision is a cause of concern. Only one supervision mission included anengineer. All irrigation sub-components require an engineer to participate in supervision missions, forexample to endorse subproject investment decisions. If there are budgetary constraints to including anengineer in supervision missions, future project designs should concentrate on even lower technologythan employed on this project – perhaps restricted to micro-schemes.

B. Livestock Development

28. The services to be provided under the livestock component, as per project design, were not tospecifically directed to assist the core poor homesteads. Instead, they were to reach a wider spectrumof SNL farmers. The emphasis was on disease control and prevention, destocking and education andtraining of farmers and staff.

29. The interventions proposed were: (i) completion of 15 km outer border Foot and Mouth Disease(FMD) fence on the border to Mozambique and vaccination of animals in the buffer zone againstFMD; and (ii) reduction of the dipping intervals by researching the partial substitution of some of thedippings with vaccinations against tick-borne diseases; (iii) stall feeding experiments; (iv) support tothe Livestock Marketing Unit to develop a marketing information system; (v) training of lead farmersand professionals on alternative production systems through one-week residential training courses atthe VFTC in Mpisi.; and (vi) grassland management activity with the aim of involving the communityto rehabilitate nine existing GLMDAs and to establish three new ones.

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30. Activities to prevent the Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) are based on well-establishedGovernment practices and procedures. Until an outbreak of FMD in November and December 2000 inthe regions of Manzini, Lubombo and Hhohho, Swaziland had been free of the disease for more thantwenty years. It had, in May 2000, obtained status, granted by the World Organisation for AnimalHealth, as a ‘FMD Free Country Without Vaccination’. The fencing work has been efficiently done.Results are analysed from five dipping tanks to be compared with data from vaccination against tick-borne diseases. Seventy animals were vaccinated in 1996. Only one died, although none of thesurviving 69 had ever been dipped since 1996. This result suggests that vaccination can be used toreduce the number of dippings. The current system of dipping with the government subsidising theentire cost is not sustainable.

31. The pilot feeding trials have failed. The trials were conducted on government farms and effortswere not directed towards finding cheap local feed materials. The dissemination of price data by theLivestock Marketing Unit is so far limited to cattle prices. The Unit has also conducted courses forfarmers in grading of cattle. The Unit has completed building three sales yards and expects tocomplete the remaining three within the life of the project.

32. The Veterinary and Farmer Training Centre (VFTC) at Mpisi has played a useful role intraining 1 511 farmers of whom 76% were women. The VFTC has established units for fattening ofcattle, dairy production, broiler, egg and pig production with project funds. The GLMDAs aretechnically well established and demonstrate that rotational grazing leads to higher grass production.Pasture sites visited show very good stands of grass under fenced conditions.

33. The project has rendered partial support to the Philani Poultry Co-operative Society Abattoir,which has a daily slaughter and sale of 1 000 broilers. This is a co-operative with 53 women poultryproducers that have built an abattoir, initially by members contributing E 12 000. Subsequently,funding was sourced from an NGO based in the UK to expand the abattoir. The present IFAD projecthas assisted with training programmes in management, preparation of business plans, training inmarketing and record keeping.

34. The project design had put undue emphasis on cattle. This happened even though the SAR hadreported that no less than 42% of the SNL homesteads did not own cattle. The baseline studyconducted for the Mid-Term Review found more than 60% of the homesteads without cattle. Yet, forall practical purposes the appraisal report equated cattle with livestock. No attention was given toother animals – even though non-ownership of cattle might be taken as a proxy for poverty. Theproject has put most of its resources into cattle – with an inherent strong gender bias towards men –with no uptake of stall-feeding among SNL farmers. Women have taken to poultry and pig productionin spite of very limited support from the project.

C. Crop Development

35. Adaptive Research, Extension and Farm Mechanisation Support are the three sub-componentsof the crop development component. The adaptive research sub-component includes development of:(i) low risk packages for maize production with appropriate inter-cropping; (ii) suitable cottonpackage; (iii) fodder production; (iv) varietal testing on irrigated vegetable crops; and (v) productiontechniques to improve marketable quality and priority would be given to tomatoes.

36. The approach to improving rainfed agriculture in Swaziland has been that of trying to findsubstitutes for maize wherever rainfall is close to or below 800 mm/year (representing around 40% ofthe arable land). Thus, the adaptive research work in the project has taken two basic directions: (i)develop crops designed for irrigation schemes; and (ii) develop sorghum, sweet potatoes, cassava,groundnuts, cotton, etc., as somewhat drought-resistant alternatives to maize. The extension program

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has dedicated some of its efforts to the management and training of farmers in irrigation schemes. Thefarm mechanisation work has been much more focused on rainfed farming.

37. Some 16 varieties of some 10 species of field crops (maize, sorghum, cowpeas, groundnuts,sweet potatoes, and cassava), vegetables (onions and tomatoes), and fruits (avocados and mangos) arenow ready to be multiplied and tried more widely by farmers; none of the seeds of these species havebeen multiplied. Thus, none of these investigative efforts have benefited more than a handful offarmers. The project has not recognised the strength of cultural habits, of the desire to grow maize andthe need to improve maize cultivation practices. Seed producer groups for spreading drought resistantcrops are part of the regular menu of donor supported activities in other countries such as Zambia andZimbabwe: but the SADP design did not provide such support.

38. Extension work has reached virtually all of its recent objectives in terms of classroom-basedtrainings and field days conducted, but the impact on farmers’ practices is once again fairly minimal,being restricted almost entirely to the spread of certain varieties of seed material. The farmmechanisation programme could compete with commercial tractors, only because the service issubsidised.

D. Credit

39. The project would establish a revolving fund with the SDSB to provide credit to thebeneficiaries under the project. In this context, the project design comprised two important features.First, attempts would be made to improve the viability of the Agricultural Development Fund throughgroup lending to reduce transaction costs and increase lending. Second, it was intended to use NGOsto train group leaders in leadership, group dynamics and record keeping and savings mobilisation.

40. The project had made an allocation of SDR 510 000 towards incremental credit. A subsidiaryloan agreement was signed between the MOAC and SDSB as early as 1993/94. The subsidiary loanagreement is weak. It is not clear as to who would bear the credit risk and also about the subsidiaryloan repayment modalities. Owing to its preoccupation with restructuring, SDSB has not participatedin the project until recently. Only during the year 2001 did it submit a work plan and the MOACsubmitted a withdrawal application during July 2000. Surprisingly, the entire amount allocated underthe project was released to SDSB without taking into account the SAR stipulations on release ofincremental credit funds and also without testing the ability of SDSB to fund project beneficiaries.

41. A statement provided by SDSB indicates that disbursements have been made to the tune of E 1634 986 to farmers. However, SDSB is yet to deliver credit to the farmer groups mobilised under theproject. The responsibility for the inability of SDSB to deliver to project farmers partly lies also withMOAC. The latter has not engaged NGOs to mobilise groups and link them to SDSB. SDSB on theother hand had received 24 person months of TA from the project. In spite of this TA, no SDSBstrategy for group lending materialised. The bank even did not request the MOAC to engage NGOs topromote groups while submitting the work plan. SDSB is not geared to providing loans to the farmerorganisations promoted under the project, as the transaction costs to reach such farmers are higher.Farmers who are interested in small working capital loans find it difficult to meet the requirements of25% contribution and to prove their credit worthiness. The current situation of SDSB does not favourexperimentation in service delivery to the resource poor households on SNL.

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E. Marketing

42. The IFAD project has intended to address the constraints encountered in SCMP namely: (i)failure of Encabeni (formerly Nokwane) to attract smallholder produce; (ii) absence of Encabenimarket/domestic producer linkages and (iii) lack of well planned and phased production programmesfor market oriented production. Moreover, NAMBOARD’s statutory and commercial functions wereto be separated.

43. NAMBOARD is mandated by the parliament to regulate imports as well as to determine levieson scheduled produce (vegetables, maize wheat and wheat products and poultry and poultry products)in conjunction with MOAC. It is required to facilitate procurement of scheduled agricultural productsto meet any shortfall in production for which import permits are issued and the levy at the border iscollected. But, it does not yet have a mechanism to collect data on a scientific basis on localproduction and determine shortfalls to determine the quantum of import.

44. NAMBOARD has established a system of procurement of vegetables from the farm gate. Itmanages two depots (Lomahasha and Piggs Peak) in the country. NAMBOARD staff directly sellprocured vegetables to major consumers and retailers through these two depots. NAMBOARD didseparate the statutory and commercial functions for a short time. But, as the commercial functions arenot financially viable, the separation of these two activities was rolled back. The statutory functioncontinues to subsidise the commercial functions. It competes with private sector by offering betterprices, using its purchasing power derived from import levy collection. The net result is that the leviescollected from the imports of scheduled produce do not reach the national exchequer but are spent onmaintaining the loss making commercial activity. At the same time, development of the private sectormarketing sector is stifled to the detriment of the interests of the farmers and the consumers in thelonger term.

45. The NAMBOARD under instructions from MOAC is now in the process of working out jointventure arrangements with a private trader for the Encabeni market, which is the hub of vegetablemarketing. Encabeni is currently negotiating with Pick and Pay to export baby vegetables to SouthAfrica. In addition, Encabeni also has a marketing agent in South Africa to supply vegetables to theEU market; the current export volume is very small.

F. Other Institutional Strengthening Efforts

Drought early warning and contingency planning46. The project intended to support the National Early Warning Support Unit (NEWU), whichbecame operational in 1987. The Unit is located within the Economic Planning and Analysis Section.It was intended at the outset that the unit would have a Nutritionist, but that post is yet to be created.The Unit produces monthly food security reports. It acts as a secretariat for the national early warningtechnical advisory committee, which meets on a quarterly basis. All equipment and training have beenprovided. But the long-term training as agreed in the Mid-Term Review is yet to be provided.

G. CCU

47. The Project proposed a study to prepare a strategic plan for strengthening CCU to ensure that itemerges as a financially viable institution. FINTEC consultants Cairo was selected to undertake thisstudy. The study amongst others proposed internal reorganisation of the CCU, increasing its tradingactivity, broadening its membership and implementation of several projects. This report wassubmitted in 1996. The CCU has now embarked on a restructuring process, assisted by the EnterpriseDevelopment Fund. Discussions with the officials of the CCU indicate that the CCU would be eveninterested in moving from trading towards producing fertiliser and animal feed. Yet, there is a need to

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carefully review benefits and costs of such aspirations since trading – but not production - remains thecore strength of CCU.

H. MOAC Reorganisation

48. Zimken Management Consultants have been engaged to conduct a study on the reorganisationof MOAC. They have submitted a report in February 2001. This report has been discussed andapproved by the MOAC and forwarded to the Ministry of Public Services and Information. TheMinistry of Public Services Affairs and Information is now in the process of implementing the PublicSector Reform Programme. The MOAC reorganisation would be considered as a part of thisprogramme. A weakness of this study is that it does not analyse the service delivery approach,diffusion and outreach methods and the organisational requirements to assist the resource poor SNLfarmers.

MONITORING AND EVALUATION

49. In October 1994, a two-day Monitoring and Evaluation Seminar was organised with the help ofMananga Management Centre. This included a session introducing the Logical Framework Approach.The log frame concept is being used in a rudimentary way to report project progress. The MonitoringOfficer made some attempts to draw formats to report component-wise activities, outputs andobjectives. But these were not adopted and used by the Component Managers. Subsequently, a three-month TA was provided to develop the project monitoring and evaluation system. Even now, theformats designed by the TA are not being fully used by the Component Managers to report progress inproject implementation.

50. The project engaged a consultancy company to undertake base line survey. The baseline surveywas conducted in 1996. The baseline survey provides very good details on overall poverty status andfarming systems. But it fails to identify the impact points at the community and household level thatneed to be monitored during the subsequent evaluation/impact surveys. The evaluation surveysproposed to occur once in every two years have not been undertaken. The project was required toundertake an impact evaluation study as an input to the Project Completion Report. Actions to initiatethe process are yet to be taken.

51. The project document did not set out the outcomes that could be measured to assess the projectimpact. It indicates calculating net worth of the project beneficiaries over a period of time as a meansto assess the impact of the project. Collection of data on assets and liabilities to assess the net worth issubject to a large number of assumptions. Such an attempt would not provide accurate or meaningfuldata with which to assess changes in IFAD target group well-being.

COMPLIANCE WITH LOAN AGREEMENT AND COVENANTS

52. The loan agreement between IFAD and the government comprised two covenants. The first onepertains to periodic revision of the interest rates. It would be applied to credits to be made out of theproceeds of the loan so as to take appropriate measures consistent with the policies of the borrower inorder to harmonise the interest rates on credits with the Fund’s policy on relending rates. The secondcovenant requires SDSB to minimise its costs. Compliance with these covenants was of littleconsequence as the SDSB received project funding only in 2001.

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IMPACT AND SUSTAINABILITY

53. Poverty is not being reduced. The project was designed to improve the incomes and foodsecurity of Swaziland’s disadvantaged smallholder families, particularly women on SNL. However,during the course of project implementation the food and nutrition security situation in Swaziland hasdeteriorated. According to the national nutritional survey conducted in the year 2000, 30% of childrenunder age five are stunted while those wasted were less than 2%. Under weight, as measured byweight-for-age was found in 10% of the children. This means that a significant number of childrenstart schooling when they are nutritionally compromised. The deterioration of nutritional status wasthe highest in Shiselweni region. Chronic malnutrition measured by children’s stunting rate almostdoubled, from 21% in 1995 to 38% in 2000. Nutritional status of children improved marginally from1995 to 2000 in respect of Hhoho and Manzini whilst the situation was static in case of Lubombo

54. The IE mission commissioned a small survey to collect data on trends. A total of 244households were interviewed. The majority of the heads of household were married (61 %), withabout 27% widowed. About half of them were not employed, 27 % were in skilled employment and22 % in unskilled employment. Close to 50% of the households received remittances. Half of thehouseholds had no cattle, while 18% had more than ten. Only 5% of the sample had no farming land.Nationally, the homesteads that never produce enough or do not produce maize represent more than50%; in Shiselweni and Lubombo the proportion is higher than the national figure. Most of Lubomboand Shiselweni consist of the drought-prone Lowveld agro-ecological zone.

55. From this survey, it becomes apparent that the poor do not perceive their lives to be improving.First of all, very few of them identified sale of agricultural produce as an income source. Secondly,even fewer perceive that there has been an increase in income or consumption from the variousagricultural produce. Due to the scattered nature of the IFAD projects, it will always be next toimpossible to determine their impact on the socio-economic situation of households. For definitecharting of the impact of the project, there need to be reliable indicators that can detect improvementsin quality of life over time.

56. The undertaking of this survey further demonstrates first, the feasibility even by a rapid ruralassessment to obtain impact data.1 Second, it demonstrates the high cost of missed opportunities toIFAD and the MOAC of not ensuring that at least minimal data sets are provided to gauge progress ofa USD 8 million project, evidence of emerging impact or its absence, and seek to take correctiveaction within the project’s lifetime.

57. The irrigation component did much less than expected. Incrementally, it added only 11.3 ha, ofwhich about 4.0 ha were in small-scale schemes and about 7.3 ha are in micro schemes – comparedwith the targets of 85 ha and 100 ha respectively. Nothing has been achieved on the intendedconsolidation and reorganisation of the 257 ha of ‘old IFAD schemes’. However, the micro schemesthat have been developed to date are producing a range of vegetables for home consumption and localmarketing and appear to have a significant impact on household incomes and nutrition. From aconsideration of the costs mentioned above and the indicative crop budgets and representative farmmodel these benefits far outweigh the costs. The project did not envisage a system of cost recoveryfor the investments made in the irrigation infrastructure. The farmer organisations were not developedto take over the responsibility of operation and maintenance. As a result, the sustainability ofirrigation investments is in doubt.

58. Most of the planned adaptive research has been undertaken on maize, cowpeas, groundnuts,sorghum, tomatoes, cabbage, amaranthus, potatoes, onions, corchora and okra. However, there hasbeen virtually no positive impact yet of all this work on the smallholder farmers’ productivity. Ofcourse, in some cases, the reason for the lack of impact was that the trials were unsuccessful, as in the 1 Designed and conducted within a period of one month.

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case of the sorghum trials, in which bird damage was severe. Little attention was given at time ofdesign to the step-wise processes that are required to move from the stage of adaptive research towidespread dissemination and uptake. Such steps were neither envisioned nor implemented.

59. The livestock component has been relatively successful when compared to other components.Until an outbreak of FMD in the regions of Manzini, Lubombo and Hhohho in November andDecember 2000, Swaziland had been free of FMD for more than twenty years. A partial cost-recoverypractice was evolving in the dips was evolving owing to budgetary constraints. However, this wasdiscontinued when the project funds were made available for this activity. This is contrary to what isrequired for a sustainable arrangement, where farmer involvement is necessary in management,investment and cost recovery of the dips. But an important spin-off effect has been the increasedcapability of the staff of the Epidemiology Unit to conduct on-farm research.

60. The training programmes conducted by the Livestock Training Centre at Mpisi have helped inupgrading the capabilities of farmers. Even though the SAR did not place any special emphasis ontraining in small stock development, the training centre developed a few modules in pig rearing andpoultry farming. This effort has had a positive catalytic effect on uptake of small-stock relatedactivities by the women. These activities at present depend on commercial inputs. Efforts to developlocal feed resources are vital for long-term sustainability of these interventions. The income levels ofthe women undertaking pig rearing and poultry production have increased substantially. The inabilityof the women to access credit has been the main constraint; inadequate working capital has led toclosure of a number of poultry units.

61. Credit and marketing components were the ones that have had least impact on the project targetgroup. Despite the fact that the project disbursed the entire credit allocation to SDSB, nodisbursements were made to the project beneficiaries. The activities under the marketing componentnever were geared to develop linkages between the private sector and the project beneficiaries.Produce has been purchased at relatively high prices with revenues generated from import levies:development of the small-scale private sector marketing has been discouraged.

LESSONS LEARNED

62. Targeting: SADP rightly targeted the SNL where most resource poor households live. The IEsurvey clearly demonstrates two issues related to identifying resource poor households. First, theproject design did not take into account the regional disparities. This resulted in a scattered projectimplementation, increasing logistic and management problems. In turn, this has contributed to thedifficulty in identifying and quantifying impact of the project. Second, the project provided merelybroad or vague guidelines for identifying resource poor households. As a result, the project fundedirrigation interventions appear to have been targeted to the resource poor households, but in realityreached the better off households. The project design did not pursue or reflect household survey datathat show that some 50% of the households possess no cattle and about 5% have no farmland. The IEis of the view that these categories of households form the focus target group of IFAD.

63. A three-pronged approach is necessary to identify IFAD target group and to assess impact ofthe project. First, prior to project design, using relevant, valid and low cost data, the most vulnerableareas requiring project interventions will have to be identified. Chronic malnutrition data is one suchindicator that represents overall wellbeing of the household/community. Subsequently targets need tobe fixed as a part of the objectives of project to reduce chronic malnutrition. Second, with detailedsurvey data for these households, projects will have to design interventions that reach the poorestgroups. These interventions are generally low cost / low capital in nature: they increase the risk takingability of the households by focussing on their core strengths, and solutions that are found at the levelof the community. Third, the welfare of the community over a period of time can be tracked by

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conducting low cost surveys to collect data on trends across sites in prevalence of chronicmalnutrition. Reduction in these rates indicates gains in the welfare of the community.

64. Participatory Processes: This project design had realised the importance of participatoryprocesses as a vital instrument to permit resource poor households to articulate their preferences. Ithad also visualised the need for engaging NGOs to develop farmer organisations. But unfortunately,the project design did not have community mobilisation as a separate supporting ‘integrating’component that would form the basis for designing the interventions in other activities, for irrigation,livestock development and adaptive research.

65. Participation is generally not well understood. Some even regard mere consultation with thebeneficiaries as participation. Four steps are essential to empower resource poor households toachieve participatory development. First, ascertaining the level of interest of the target group inparticipatory development is vital. This includes formulation of a social charter outlining the vision ofthe community with regard to overcoming issues that may relate to health, education, environment,natural resources, women and resource poor. The most important is the social action phase by thecommunity to demonstrate their ability to work together by undertaking activities using their ownresources. Second, capacity building of the project staff, NGO staff and the selected communitymembers is the next important step covering community development planning and financialmanagement. The third step involves community institution development and implementation of theinterventions; these involve community level planning, facilitation of the community to identify lowcost options and sustainable solutions, provision of necessary financial resources and implementationof the intervention by the community themselves. The fourth step represents monitoring the progressincluding financial discipline, evaluating the impact of the project interventions and adjusting theproject priorities and interventions based on the lessons learned.

66. Supervision: Most if not all of the persistency of the problems encountered can be traced backto poor supervision. Supervising process-oriented projects is not as simple as sector specific projects.The CI needs to use for referral and periodic assistance a core group of consultants with hands-onexperience in participatory development and technical interventions such as in the case of irrigation.Even if supervision costs were a constraint, the savings made by the CI by not including an engineerin the supervision are not comparable to the cost of unproductive investments made in irrigationinfrastructure. There is reason both for IFAD PMD and the CI to consider the opportunity costs, thewider dimension and missed opportunities of an excessive economy in curtailing supervision budgets.Project Co-ordination and Management: Too much reliance was placed for too long on a Project Co-ordinator drawn from within the ranks of MOAC, with little in the way of incentives to goodperformance – or disincentives to poor performance. Experience with other projects in the regionsuggests that a national Project Co-ordinator recruited from the private sector might have been moreeffective. Knowing that his/her job depended on it, he or she would have seen that a PCC wasessential for effective project management and would have insisted that the supervision took the issueup at the right time and place.

67. Even though the irrigation section has no capacity to undertake direct implementation, oddly allirrigation works were assigned to it. As a result, the project had to rely heavily on governmentprocedures for procurement and funds flow. This has resulted in piece-meal approach to irrigationinfrastructure development. This issue could have been remedied if the project were to engagecontractor for implementation and the irrigation section for supervision. It is essential that thegovernment take up the role of the facilitator rather than that of the implementer.

68. Technical Assistance versus NGO and Private Sector: This project is yet another example ofone that makes a feeble attempt to engage the NGO and private sector. More than three years havegone by: substantial funds were invested in technical assistance for the Irrigation Section without anysign of increased capacity. There was and is a dynamic private sector within Swaziland and across theborder in South Africa that could have undertaken the design and implementation of most, if not all,

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of the schemes targeted. The Appraisal Report and Loan Agreement should be much firmer on theissues related to involvement of NGOs and private sector.

FUTURE

69. The project is due for closure on 31 March 2001. The AfDB vide letter dated 8 November 2000has informed MOAC that the loan account will close on 30 September 2001; thereafter only eligibleexpenditure properly entered into before this date and winding down activities will be settled fromproject funds. The last date of withdrawal from the loan account will be 31 December 2002. Thismeans that the project can continue to implement its activities beyond another 12 months.

70. Project Co-ordination: It is important that the PCC system is revived headed by the PS andattended by all the Department Heads, with the PC acting as secretary. Such a forum would pass onthe ownership of the project to the heads of the department. These meetings could be held once eachthree months. In addition, the Ministry has a system of fortnightly meeting of department heads. It isrecommended that the PC also be invited to attend these monthly meetings to discuss the projectissues on a regular basis.

71. Project management capability: This project intended to use line departments. Hence the PCUhad a small staff compliment. However, there is a need to strengthen its capacity by employing acommunity development officer from the NGO/private sector with experience in working with theNGOs. It is also recommended that the PCU officially request IFAD to provide an IrrigationSpecialist and an Engineer to join future supervision missions for the project. The project accountingsystem will have to be improved by employing a local short-term Financial Management Specialist.Two project vehicles be allowed special registration so as to allow mobility for the staff to workduring weekends/holidays and after office hours. The PS of MOAC may write to Ministry of PublicService and Information seeking approval for paying the government approved incentives to theproject staff.

72. Shift from direct implementation to facilitation: The government should move away from directimplementation responsibility and focus on facilitation and supervision. Implementation should beundertaken by private contractors/NGOs.

73. Support to field level staff: training and motorcycles: It is recommended that the field levelstaff be provided with training in leadership, communication, use of PRA tools to identify farmers’priorities and to focus on existing groups instead of building new groups. The PCU be permitted toprocess pending long-term training applications and motorcycles for use by the field level staff ofAgriculture and Livestock Department.

74. Irrigation development and support of NGOs The outstanding payments for the NGOs willhave to be settled by forming a committee consisting of the PC, the Project Accountant, the IrrigationEngineer, and a representative from CANGO. It is recommended that the project should now focus oncompleting and consolidating the small-scale schemes in Nkwene, Mhlangeni, Lesibovu, Kholwane,Mgeza and Ekuthuleni: this would result in an achievement of approximately 90% of the AppraisalReport target for small-scale schemes. The TAG for implementation support should be used toemploy a national or regional technical assistant to assist the Head of Section in completing alloutstanding groundwork (design, procurement of materials, planning/organising construction oralternatively procuring contractors) over a period of 5-6 months. In the case of Ekuthuleni, the schemedesign should be obtained from a reputable irrigation equipment supplier on a turnkey basis includingsupply and installation, following local competitive bidding; in view of the topography and proposeduse, consideration should be given to drip irrigation, rather than a sprinkler system.

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75. The CI use TAG funds to recruit a regional irrigation consultant to participate in the next twosupervision missions and provide approvals for the procurements at the time of supervision mission.NGOs be contracted as soon as possible to initiate group development on the above seven schemes.Smallholder Poultry Development: The evidence across IFAD projects is very consistent in showingthat first, women headed households tend to be poorer than male headed households and second, theirpriorities are centred around small animals, particularly scavenging poultry. It is recommended that ateam consisting of members from the Livestock Department and the Home Economics Section andthe SDSB should visit all small poultry farmers to establish linkages with extension and credit. On themarketing side, the Philani Poultry Co-operative Society Abattoir is a model to follow and the projectshould attempt to replicate this in as many sites as possible. The small animals can help poor familiesin starting an asset creation process as clearly demonstrated in the IFAD/Danida sponsoredSmallholder Livestock project in Bangladesh. Swaziland should build up human capacity in this area.The first step would be to contact the Network for Poultry Production and Health in DevelopingCountries (NPPADC) to request its co-operation in planning and conducting a study tour toBangladesh for three women poultry extension workers and one regional level Home EconomicsOfficer.

76. Concurrently, the Livestock Department will have to initiate a Poultry Sector Study tounderstand the strengths and weakness of all the actors involved in poultry production in Swaziland,comparative advantages of smallholder poultry based on commercial inputs vis-à-vis largecommercial farms and possibilities to reduce production costs by developing semi-intensive systems.It is recommended that a TA with background in commercial as well as semi-intensive smallholdersystem be recruited to undertake this study.

77. Pig Rearing: This sector also suffers from high dependence on commercial feed. It isrecommended that Livestock Department of MOAC engage the services of the Animal Productionand Health Department, University of Swaziland to conduct a literature review and identify cheapfeed resources within the country. Trials in the SNL households in collaboration with farmers andpiggery extension officers would have to be set up.

78. Analysis of the tick-borne disease data, development of a strategy and study tours: The field-based data be analysed in order to come up with a new, probably reduced dipping strategy. It isrecommended that TA for this activity be recruited immediately. It is also recommended that thetechnical staff and some of participating farmers of the sites for the five dipping tanks installed visitneighbouring countries to update themselves on current tick control strategies.

79. Livestock marketing: It is recommended the Livestock Marketing Unit will have to gather andpublish prices of not only cattle, but on all commonly marketed animals. In addition, the sales yardsbuilt under the project should be handed over to the farmer organisations.

80. Information technology: The training courses on the use of computers for the FMD andLivestock Marketing should be initiated without delay. The VFTC at Mpisi should get the fourtelephone lines it has applied for and be provided with Internet access and the required training to usethe equipment.

81. Crop Development: Intercropping of maize with green manure/cover crops (gm/ccs) willlargely control weeds while providing a good increase in the productivity of subsequent crops. Itdecreases the cost of applying chemical fertilisers and weeding the maize plots. The introducedvarieties of cowpeas, groundnuts and sweet potatoes seem to be especially popular among Swazifarmers, and should be spread as far and wide as possible. It is recommended that the AdaptiveResearch and Extension establish linkages with the existing Zenzele groups and develop a system of aseed revolving fund for quicker distribution of drought resistant crop varieties. It is also recommendedthat the Adaptive Research conduct field trials involving the farmers in the Zenzele groups to test thegm/ccs.

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82. Credit: A study tour of officers from the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank, the SDSB andthe Co-operative Department may be arranged to visit Palli Karma Sahyak Foundation (PKSF) inBangladesh and Small Industries Development Bank of India (National Micro Finance SupportProgramme).

83. It is also recommended that the PCU establish an Expert Committee consisting of membersfrom MOF, Central Bank, SDSB, MOAC and CANGO to: (i) assess the performance of existingmicro-finance institutions, evolve accreditation criteria and develop systems and procedures to start arefinance window for these institutions; and (ii) review the subsidiary loan agreement to address itsweaknesses and institute measures to use part of the funds released to SDSB to finance micro-financeinstitutions.

84. There has been no effort to develop community institutions in the rain-fed areas. It isrecommended that the Home Economics Section identify women groups that have been trained underthe project and empower these women to form about 10 savings and credit groups. In addition, acontract for mobilising 10 savings and credit groups may be given to an NGO (ACAT is suggested) soas to ensure that the project at least develops about 20 groups. These groups need to be the focalpoints for seed multiplication, small stock development and testing green manure cover crops. For thispurpose the Home Economics Section and the selected NGO would have to develop the requiredlinkages with research and extension.

85. Marketing of Horticultural Produce: In the medium and long-term, NAMBOARD will have tocompletely privatise its vegetable marketing activity. NAMBOARD, using its revenues from thestatutory functions, will have to proactively facilitate growth of the private sector in marketing ofagricultural produce.

86. Drought Early Warning and Contingency Planning: The current approach to developingforecast on drought focuses on assessing supply of food and not on the capability of the household toacquire food. In order to fine tune the data collection and to develop required drought mitigationstrategies, it is suggested that a post of nutritionist be created within the unit and the SwazilandNational Nutritional Council be included as a member of the Early Warning Technical AdvisoryCommittee.

87. CCU: The CCU is on a path of restructuring with the help of Enterprise Development Fund.The CCU is interested in moving from trading to production of fertiliser and animal feed. It needs tomake a full assessment of: (i) its own institutional strengths and weaknesses to undertake suchbusinesses; (ii) its comparative advantage vis-à-vis private sector; and (iii) techno-economicfeasibility of the project, before venturing into diverse commercial activities that are not its corestrengths.

88. MOAC Reorganisation: It is recommended that the MOAC revisit the proposals made in thereorganisation study to look into the service delivery strategy needed to reach, and provide facilitationand empower the resource poor households on the SNL.

89. Monitoring and Evaluation: The project should immediately initiate actions to locate aconsultancy company to undertake an impact assessment study. The PC and the Monitoring Officershould make frequent field visits to ascertain the progress in implementation of the project activitiesand get feedback from the primary stakeholders for taking corrective actions in implementation.

90. Framework to assist resource poor households: Four factors need attention while developingfuture rural development strategies for Swaziland. First, a study conducted by the International FoodPolicy Research Institute (IFPRI) indicates that any meaningful poverty reduction strategy needs toaddress women’s education, health, status and food availability. Experiences in Swaziland indicatethat community institutions play an important role in building education facilities. There is increasingcontrol of resources by women in case of small stock development and vegetable production

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interventions. Savings and credit group development have taken off with the involvement of NGOs,Co-operative Department and Home Economics Section. The interest of farmers is shifting towardslow cost gravity fed systems that are easy to maintain.

91. Second, the land tenure system favours those with privileged access to human and financialresources. At the same time, it restricts investment in land by those with limited resources. Resourcepoor farmers may fear loss of land and also investment made owing to inability to cultivate the land asa result of labour shortage. Or they may be subject to land reallocation by the Traditional Chiefs.These in-built fears drive the rural communities on SNL to invest in cattle, which is a low risk andmobile investment but with low economic return. Literature published as early as 1991 indicates thatthere are strains in the social framework in SNL areas. These will become more evident as the numberof landless increases along with the pressures to privatise communal lands to satisfy the demand bycommercial companies and entrepreneurial farmers.2 Resolution of issues related to security of tenurebecomes central to any meaningful investment strategy in SNL.

92. Third, the AIDS epidemic has its debilitating human and social impact; it also affects the scopefor productive investment and production in the rural areas. The average life expectancy in Swazilandis now as low as 38 years. These factors do not bode well for any investment that requires a highlabour input. The strategy for any future rural development needs to focus on investments, where thepriorities are determined by the communities and not investment strategies designed and deliveredfrom outside.

93. Fourth, the projects so far implemented in Swaziland suffer from top-down implementationmode with little participation of the communities. Inadequate participation of the communities ismasked when governments provide high subsidies. To achieve sustainability, participation of thecommunities needs to be enhanced.

94. Interventions required to improve livelihood systems of the resource poor households vary fromcommunity to community. Projects with a set of activities that are inflexible will not be able torespond to the requirements and priorities of the community. A system of flexibility will have to beintroduced in the project design. Impact and sustainability are enhanced when the ability of thecommunities to identify constraints, and to prioritise and implement the interventions arestrengthened. This will have to be coupled with adequate control by the community over the financialresources for implementing activities at the community level. Such devolution of financial powerswould empower the communities. It increases their ownership of interventions.

95. Rehabilitation of Old Irrigation Schemes: The data available suggest that some 300 ha arecultivated by existing small-scale irrigation schemes in Swaziland. If the sample visited by themission is representative, most of this hectarage is under-performing. It would appear logical toconcentrate first on improving the performance of these schemes – through rehabilitation and groupdevelopment – before embarking on a specific project for expansion.

2 D.C. Funnel (1991), Under the Shadow of Apartheid: Agrarian Transformation in Swaziland, Aveburyacademic Publishing Group, England.

KINGDOM OF SWAZILAND

INTERIM EVALUATION REPORT

SMALLHOLDER AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

323-SZ

MAIN REPORT

CHAPTER 1

COUNTRY AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

A. Geographic Location and Major Agro-ecological Zones

1. The Kingdom of Swaziland is situated between South Africa on the North, South, South Eastand West and the Republic of Mozambique on the East. It is a land-locked country. It liesapproximately between latitudes 31° and 32° and longitude 26° and 28° east. Swaziland has 17 364km2 of land area and is the second smallest country in the African continent; the Gambia being thesmallest.

2. Topographically, Swaziland can be divided into six agro-ecological zones: the Highveld (HV),the Upper Middleveld (UM), the Lower Middleveld (LM), the Western Lowveld (LE), and theLubombo Range. The agro-ecological zones of Swaziland run approximately in a parallel fashion toeach other from North to South.

3. The climatic and topographic characteristics of these zones play a significant role indetermining the land use patterns of the country. Though the Middleveld is comparable to theHighveld and the Lowveld in terms of total land area, the former represents a more importantagricultural zone through its higher crop yields and the number of smallholder farms. In 1994/95, forinstance, 40% of the crop-growing land holding were located in this zone as compared to 28 and 24%in the Highveld and Lowveld zones, respectively. The Lubombo plateau, on the other hand,comprises only 8% of the total land area and 9% of the small-scale land holdings in 1994/95.

B. The Regional Context

4. Swaziland has a small, reasonably diversified and open economy that is vulnerable toexogenous economic shocks and influences. The country’s economic development is closely alignedto that of South Africa through membership in the South African Customs Union (SACU) and theRand Common Monetary Area (CMA).3 South Africa is Swaziland’s most important trading partnerand a major source of foreign direct investment. It accounts for roughly 80% and 30% of Swaziland’s

3 SACU is the world’s oldest customs union agreement.

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merchandise imports and exports, respectively. Swaziland’s prospects for a sustained economictransformations and macroeconomic stability are closely linked to the performance of the SouthAfrica economy.

5. Economic restructuring, privatisation and liberalisation in South Africa and Mozambique haveimproved the investment climate in Swaziland’s neighbours. These developments although positiveper se, may divert some investment away from Swaziland. Swaziland needs to continue to attractforeign direct investment. To achieve these twin objectives, stable macroeconomic management andpeaceful political change are crucial. To this end, maintained economic growth and policies that areeffective in alleviating poverty are crucial.

C. The Economic Context

6. Swaziland is considered a middle-income country. Swaziland’s per capita GNP, at slightlyover US $1 000 is the fifth highest in the SADC region (after South Africa, Mauritius, Bostwana andNamibia), even though the country accounts for less than half a percent of the region’s population.During the past decade the economy of Swaziland depended heavily on export based agriculturalproduction. Real growth in economic activity during 1991-1999 was low, owing to a combination offactors such as drought, unfavourable international commodity prices and a slow down in foreigncapital inflows.

7. Over the period 1991-1999, gross national savings (GNS) as a percentage of GDP averaged29.4%. The share of customs receipts to total GNS remained by far the largest item. However, theyear on year proportion of GNS to GDP decelerated slightly in 1999 to 33.4% from 34.4% in 1998.4

The fall is attributable to government dissaving, as evidenced by the deterioration in government netbalances with the banking system. Despite the SACU receipts being the major contributor to GNS,growth in government national savings has been relatively lower when compared to growth in privatenational savings.

8. The Government budget situation weakened towards the end of the 1990’s. Governmentexpenditure growth exceeds revenue growth. Government programmes have to put more attention onensuring that farmers’ demand is met. Efficiency in resource utilisation needs to improve. Subsidiesneed to phased out and cost recovery improved.

D. The Agricultural Sector

9. The agricultural sector plays a significant role in the country’s development. The contributionof agriculture to GDP at factor cost deteriorated to 8.6% in 1996/97 compared to 13.2% in 1990/91. Itrecovered to 9.8% in 1998/99. A virtual moratorium on provision of credit to the farmers by theSDSB has constrained the agriculture sector to regain its old stature. This is due to the on-goingrestructuring process at the SDSB. Agricultural output showed a growth of 2.2% in 1998/99 afterdeclining by 3.5% in 1997/98.

10. The sector is highly dualistic. A highly developed commercial sub-sector coexists with a lowproductivity agriculture on the SNL areas. Large-scale capital intensive, export-oriented enterprisesand farms have been developed using mostly foreign capital. This subsector is sensitive todevelopments in South Africa, e.g., trade, foreign investment flows and labour as well as to changesin commodity markets, particularly for sugar. Irrigation is common especially for sugar cane, whichreduces climatic risk. The second system consists of a low productivity smallholder sub-sector,

4 Annual Report, Financial year 1999-2000, Central Bank of Swaziland.

3

characterised by semi-subsistence and rain-fed production, communal grazing and high vulnerabilityto droughts and other changes in rainfall patterns.

(1) The Swazi Nation Land (SNL)

11. The SNL, covers 66% of the country’s land area, and represents a main source of livelihood formost Swazis. SNL areas are characterised by a communally based tenure system: the King holds landin trust for the Swazi Nation. Rights to cultivate on the SNL are derived from traditional socialrelationships which stipulate that the land can only be used but not sold. Small-scale farmersconcentrated on the SNL produce food crops mainly for subsistence and market occasional surpluses.Dominant crops and crop mixtures include maize, cotton, vegetables, and groundnuts. The raising oflivestock is common (mainly chicken, goats, pigs, sheep, cattle, etc.). Communal grazing is the mostdominant practice due to the system of land tenure that is prevalent in this sub-sector.

12. Output fluctuates widely. Production from the SNL sector expanded by 6% in 1998/99compared to a decline of 26% in the previous year. Accounting for this movement was a substantialincrease of 62% in maize production during 1997/98 cropping season. Maize production is highlysensitive to drought. The close linkage of SNL agriculture with the rainfall rendered the governmentpolicy of transforming this subsector from subsistence level to commercial farming unattainable.However, maize cultivation under rainfed condition is the most important livelihood system for theSNL farmers. Successful efforts to improve productivity and to reduce risk and cost of production arehighly important.

13. The major challenge facing the Swazi nation is to transform the SNL remains. The land tenuresystem in the SNL is not conducive to attract private investment in agricultural production. Even inthe areas that have access to irrigation, private investment is negligible. Government continues toprovide all irrigation infrastructure (both upstream and downstream developments) free of cost to theSNL farmers. However, large numbers of farmers continue to undertake maize cultivation under rain-fed condition with traditional methods, despite inadequate returns on investment. Improved copingstrategies are needed

(2) The Individual Tenure Farms (ITF)

14. Land in this sub-sector is owned through freehold and concessionaire title and includescommercial forests, farms and ranches as well as land owned by the Swazi Government. Large-scaleproducers are located on the ITF. They consist of roughly 800 farms that produce mainly sugar cane,citrus, pineapples, cotton, maize, vegetables and cattle. This sub-sector is based on morecommercially developed, large-scale, capital-intensive enterprises, export oriented production withconsiderable dependence on foreign private capital and management. 5 Most products of the ITF aredesigned for the export markets. Sugar cane is the most dominant crop and leading export earner.

(3) The Agricultural Policy

15. Commercial imports of maize and food aid aimed at satisfying domestic demand have persistedover the years. The overall growth in agricultural output has persistently lagged behind the rate ofpopulation increase. This indicates that the policy of producing maize to the level of self-sufficiencyis not supported by the efforts to search and replicate technological innovations required forenhancing the productivity of SNL. Such an effort need to take into account the fact that the farmerson SNL are not only risk averse but also have limited labour for intensive cultivation and have limited

5 National Development Strategy, op cit, January 1994, p. 20.

4

cash for buying farm inputs. It needs to better recognised that farmers’ coping strategies in the wakeof crop failure are reasonably low cost and free ranging poultry and small stock development holdsmuch promise if properly pursued.

16. The diversification of agricultural production and exports is the major avenue for enhancedcompetitiveness and profitability of Swaziland’s agricultural sector in the region. But minimal policyefforts are being devoted to this area. Swaziland enjoys high potential in the production of high-valuecrops and animal products – e.g., horticulture (citrus, sub-tropical fruits, flowers and vegetables),sugar, cotton, beef and poultry. This is due to:

1) the nation’s low labour costs;

2) rich natural endowment and climate; and

3) the currency devaluation which has made Swaziland’s export much cheaper than similar productsin competing countries.

17. To facilitate increases in the production of non-traditional crops, not only is the countryrequired to design appropriate policies but there is also an urgent need for accelerated investments inagricultural research technology aimed at yield enhancement of such commodities.

18. However, such efforts would be capital intensive and would benefit a limited number ofhouseholds that have access to capital, labour and land. Benefits to the majority of the resource poorhouseholds would be limited.

E. Social Sector Developments and Poverty Context

(1) Demographic Trend

19. Swaziland, with an annual population growth rate of 2.9%, has a population of 980 700inhabitants (1997 Census). Almost 80% reside in the rural areas. The population is young, 43% ofthe population consisting of children under 15 years of age, and only 4.6% over 60 years of age. TheManzini region has the largest proportion of total population at 30.2% and the Lubombo region hasthe smallest at 20.9%. Over the last three census periods, Manzini has increased its share of totalpopulation. (Table 1).

Table 1: Regional distribution of population (%)

Region Year1997 1986 1976

Hhohho 27.5 26.3 27Manzini 30.2 28.3 28.2

Shiselweni 21.4 22.8 23.7Lubombo 20.9 22.6 21.1

Source C.S.O. 1976, 1986, 1997 Census Reports

(2) Social Sector Indicators

20. Life expectancy improved from 44 years in 1966, 46.5 years in 1976, 56 in 1986, to 61 in 1991.But it declined to 58.8 years in 1997. Similarly infant mortality rate decreased from 156 per thousand

5

in 1976, to 99 in 1986 and to 72 in 1991. HIV/AIDS, Malaria, TB and other communicable diseasesrepresent a major challenge and impact mortality.

21. Sentinel surveillance data indicate that the prevalence of HIV infection among pregnant womenwho attend antenatal care has increased at an alarming rate from 3.9% in 1992 to 34.2% in 2000. Thedrop in life expectancy in 1997 suggests that the AIDS pandemic is reversing the gains in humandevelopment indicators that have been achieved over the past decades.

22. Swaziland’s country’s socio-economic indicators are lower than those of other countries withthe same per capita income are. Specifically infant mortality and under-five mortality rates ofSwaziland are generally exceeding those in other Southern African countries of similar economicstanding. Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe have substantially lower infant and child mortality rates.The disparities in these rates are significant in that infant and child mortality rate is determined byenvironmental or exogenous factors that emanate from poor living conditions and poverty. The 1998UNDP Human Development report estimates that Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe have infantmortality rates of 40, 60 and 49 respectively. Swaziland’s infant mortality rate is 68. The childmortality rate for Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe are 50, 77 and 73 and again Swaziland tops thegroup with 97.

23. The country’s unfavourable mortality rates and human development indicators, point towards askewed income distribution. The data from the 1995 Income and Expenditure survey indicated thatthe share of the poorest 10% is a mere 1.4% of total consumption; the share of the richest 10% was43%. These disparities are higher in urban areas, while in rural areas and the poorer regions; incometends to be more evenly distributed.

24. Furthermore, 48% of the population do not earn enough to afford adequate food, i.e. they livebelow the food poverty line.6 About 66% of the population do not earn enough to afford the basicneeds of shelter, food, and clothing, i.e. they live below the total poverty line.7 The incidence ofpoverty varies by region, with Shiselweni and Lubombo consistently showing higher povertyprevalence rates. A further cause of concern is that chronic malnutrition prevalence is increasing.

6 Food Poverty Line is defined as the level of income sufficient to buy 2100 calories per capita a day. Based onthe 1995 Household Income and Expenditure Survey, the food poverty line was E 47.70 per month.7 Total Poverty Line is defined as the level of income sufficient to buy 2100 calories per capita day and essentialnon-food expenditures. Based on the 1995 Household Income and Expenditure Survey the total poverty line wasE 71.07 per month ( E72.20 per month for urban areas and E67.25 for rural areas).

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CHAPTER II

EVALUATION SETTING, METHODOLOGY AND PROJECTOBJECTIVES

A. Mission Purpose and Itinerary

(1) Objective

25. The rationale for undertaking this IE was to distil the lessons from the project implementationexperience to enhance impact of the project at the household and community levels. Towards this end,this IE is based on an in-depth analysis of strengths and weaknesses in project implementationtogether with Swaziland stakeholders. The mission followed an approach in its evaluation thatemphasised participation and obtaining information from farmers. The SADP M&E system hadfurnished no data on adoption or impact. In this context, conducting combined structured and “open-ended” discussions with stakeholders to draw upon their knowledge becomes particularly important.

26. The IE in the final analysis draws lessons from IFAD’s and other donors’ experience that areuseful in resolving constraints and in reinforcing positive experiences of the on-going project. Inaddition, these lessons are useful in future programme design.

27. The IE set out to:1) Identify strengths and weaknesses in the present implementation process.2) Assess the efficiency of resource use in the present implementation processes.3) Assess the institutional capabilities (including skills, processes and operational resources)

required to deliver services in line with the expressed needs of the target group.4) Assess the preconditions required for the target group to absorb the interventions under the

project, and the extent to which services provided match real needs and constraints of the targetgroup.

5) Assess the impact of adopted project services, using secondary data and mission fact-findingmethods, taking into account present trends in resource use and constraints of the target grouphouseholds.

6) Design and disseminate in a participatory mode with all stakeholders means with which to resolveconstraints and reinforce positive experience.

(2) Mission Composition

28. The IE team visited the Kingdom of Swaziland from April 25 to May 27, 2001. The teamcomprised: (i) Shreekantha Shetty (Team Leader, Project Management, Credit, and Monitoring andEvaluation); (ii) Roland Bunch (Crop Development, Drought Early Warning System, FarmMechanisation and Extension Services); (iii) Frands Dolberg (Livestock and Gender issues); (iv)Patricia Musi (Community Institution Development, and Food and Nutrition Security); SydneyKunene (Marketing); Tony Peacock (Water Management/Irrigation Adviser, SADC Multi-DonorHub). Per Eklund, Sr. Evaluation officer, OE started up the mission and participated in the firststakeholders’ workshop.

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(3) Mission Itinerary

29. Mr. P. Eklund, Sr. Evaluation Officer, IFAD OE arrived on 25 April 2001 and discussedevaluation methodology with MOAC officials to prepare the necessary groundwork for conductingthe first stakeholders’ workshop. Other members of the mission arrived on 29 April. After conductingthe first stakeholders’ workshop in Mbabane on 2-3 May, the mission visited project sites. Itconducted on 22-23 May in Pigg’s Peak with stakeholders the final workshop, farmer representativesbeing present. The mission presented its findings at a wrap up meeting held on 25 May. It departed on27 May.

30. The mission expresses its appreciation and gratitude to the Honourable Minister of Agricultureand Co-operatives, the Permanent Secretary and the Under Secretary (Development) of MOAC, theProject Co-ordinator (PC), staff of the Project Co-ordinating Unit (PCU), participating departments,NGOs, Swaziland Development and Savings Bank (SDSB) staff, and Central Co-operative Union(CCU), and last but not the least the farmers the mission met in the project area.

B. Evaluation Methodology and Process

31. The evaluation methodology used reflects the Eight Key Questions. The context for thesequestions is explained and elaborated upon in Appendix 1.

32. The Eight Questions used are:1) Relevance: To what extent were the design features and interventions proposed relevant to the

needs of the target group?2) Funding: Was the project able to access requisite funding for implementing the activities that

were initially defined ?3) Equipment: Was the project able to procure the equipment and services required for effective

implementation of the activities proposed under the project?4) Staffing: Was the project able to engage the staff, with the requisite skills, required for effective

implementation of the project activities?5) Cost Effectiveness: Were the interventions, equipment and services cost effective (unit costs &

timeliness in delivery) compared to costs stated in the project documents and norms used forsimilar interventions in the private sector?

6) Equity: Have the interventions addressed the targets of the project in poverty alleviation in termsof households, gender, and geography?

7) Impact: What is the impact generated by the project on project beneficiaries compared withinitially defined targets?

8) Sustainability: To what extent will the project interventions be sustained after the projectcompletion specifically with regard to operation and maintenance of infrastructure and delivery ofsupport services?

33. A participatory approach in conducting evaluations is of essence, especially so when no dataare provided about project effects and impact. Swazi stakeholders were thoroughly involved in theevaluation process. First, the mission together with PCU staff conducted two participatory workshops,one at the outset and one at the end of the mission. The PCU Project Coordinator should be praisedfor undertaking all logistics arrangements and chairing in these workshops. Much learning took placethrough interactive discussions. The mission, with the component managers and project staff in thefirst workshop: (i) reviewed implementation progress against the physical targets set; (ii) sought thedata that show effects and emerging impact at the community and farm level; (iii) explored causes tovariations in performance; and (iv) sought solutions to the underlying causes.

34. Staff from MOAC, representatives of MEPF, NGOs, and SDSB attended these workshops.Representatives of farmer organisations, NAMBoard and micro-finance institutions attended the

8

second workshop. Group discussions were combined with plenary sessions. Substantive interactionstook place.

35. The mission provided a structure, tested in workshops in other countries, for recordingparticipants’ statements. The first workshop used eight indicators of performance (relevance, staffingfunding, equipments, cost-effectiveness, equity, impact and sustainability) and the participants rankedthe performance of each project component by region. Group Rapporteurs presented their group’sfindings. Plenary discussions followed.

36. Second, the mission, assisted by the CSO and the MOAC M&E unit, undertook a purposivesample survey of farm households in sites with project interventions, representing four agro-ecological zones to determine livelihood trends and impact of project interventions.

37. Third, moreover, the mission undertook extensive field visits. During its field visits the missionobtained further information with which to validate or revise ranking of performance provided in thefirst workshop and the severity of the constraints. Mission members visited community-basedorganisations, NGOs, micro-credit organisations and marketing channels. The Irrigation Engineervisited all the irrigation schemes built/being built under the project.

38. During the second workshop, this information was presented to the participants to permit themto agree or disagree with the findings of the mission. Issues and recommendations on all componentswere discussed. The cross cutting issues relating inter alia to the co-ordination, budgeting, limitedcapability to reach the target group, and funding procedures and procurement were presented. Twospecially constituted synthesis group composed of mission members, the PC, component managers,NGOs, farmer representatives and staff representing the regions then reviewed the recommendations,prior to endorsement in plenary discussion.

C. Project Objectives and Components

39. The Project aims at improving the incomes and food security of Swaziland’s disadvantagedsmallholder families, particularly women on Swazi Nation Land (SNL). It sets out to improveincomes of smallholders and standards of living of disadvantaged smallholders on SNL. To this end, itwould: (i) assist the Government in its overall efforts to achieve food self-sufficiency; (ii) strengthenthe institutions already supported under the Swaziland Credit and Marketing Project (SCMP); and (iii)address constraints to raised productivity in rainfed crop production and the livestock sub-sector,particularly the need to introduce new systems of production that will reduce the number of cattle inthe range. Finally, the project seeks to develop grassroots institutions to achieve the project objectives.The four major project components are: (i) crop production including irrigation; (ii) livestockproduction; (iii) credit; and (iv) institutional strengthening. The project had allocated approximately30% of total costs for crop production including irrigation, 24% for livestock production, 15% forcredit and 31% for institutional strengthening. Some 5 000 households would receive the fullcomplement of inputs and services. Other families on SNL would benefit from general extension andadaptive research services.

D. Project Area

40. The project area consists of the SNL areas, which make up 60% of the country and 70% of itspopulation. It was intended to include all the four agro-ecological zones. Support for agriculturaldevelopment particularly in terms of adaptive research and small scale irrigation development, wouldbe directed to the lowveld and those parts of the middle and highveld where the irregular rainfall

9

pattern is a major constraint to agricultural production. Yet it will be seen (below) that the projectduring implementation ended up with widely scattered interventions.

E. Projects Costs, Financing and Implementation Arrangements

41. The total project costs for the seven-year disbursement period were estimated at E 31 million(USD 8.4 million, including physical and price contingencies). The foreign exchange costs of theproject comprised 63% of the total base costs, equal to USD 5.2 million. Physical and pricecontingencies were estimated to be 12% of project base costs.

42. The IFAD loan of USD 6.9 million would cover 83% of total project costs. Government ofSwaziland /SDSB/NAMBoard would finance USD 1.5 million, of which USD 0.8 million would betaxes and duties. Beneficiaries would contribute about USD 0.1 million reflecting their downpayments for loans received under the line of credit and labour input for irrigation development andconstruction of GMDA.

43. IFAD would meet all foreign exchange costs. In addition, it would provide local cost financingof the equivalent of USD 1.7 million representing 74% of local costs. The Government /SDSB orother Swazi agencies would cover staff salaries, and part of the other local costs including those of theNGOs.

44. Responsibility for the implementation of each component would be assigned to the relevanttechnical department or agency. The project would seek to direct existing services to meet specifictarget group needs. It would provide any necessary incremental support for this purpose. TheDepartment of Agriculture would be responsible for the dryland and irrigated crop productionprogrammes, for extension and adaptive research services. Small-scale irrigation development,responsibility for which is split between three MOAC units, would be rationalised. Relevant servicesof these sections would be reorganised in Small-scale Irrigation Section within the Department ofAgriculture. The Departments of Veterinary Services and Co-operative Development, respectively,would be responsible for the livestock production and co-operative development component. Groupdevelopment would be undertaken by NGOs or entities under the auspices of the PCC. SDSB wouldbe responsible for credit and the NAMBoard / Nokwane market for input supply and producemarketing.

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CHAPTER III

OVERALL IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS

A. Overview

45. Participatory processes are still at its infancy in Swaziland. In contrast to experienceselsewhere, decentralisation, participation and devolution of control local electorates are yet to beconsidered as the processes that drive rural development. The current governance structures inSwaziland do not yet provide a favourable environment for a rapid evolution of these processes. Theconstraints faced by this project need to be understood in this context.

46. Yet, it should be recognised that the project has played an important role in improving thehuman resource capabilities. It has provided long-term and short-term training to the staff members.Praiseworthy are the training programmes in the livestock sector that were focused on women. Thesetraining programmes had modules on small stock development (pigs and poultry) though dependentcompletely on commercial inputs. This training has helped in developing small poultry and piggeryunits by women, bringing them substantial financial benefits. The micro-irrigation schemes, althoughof limited coverage, implemented by the NGOs, are performing satisfactorily. The project hasprovided adequate equipment and transportation facilities to the top and middle level officials. Theproject design focussed on the control of tick-borne diseases and foot and mouth disease.Implementation in this area has been satisfactory.

47. The implementation phase was beset by several difficulties. Participatory processes were notwell articulated in the SAR. Policy makers received little written guidance and a proper start upworkshop was not organised that could have addressed issues and reduced ignorance. The institutionalcontext was not present for project implementation to take off. Learning by doing how to designinterventions suited to the needs of the resource poor households who represent IFAD’s target grouphas been limited. Lack of willingness and capability of the government to involve NGOs has led topremature ending of the collaboration between them. There was inadequate implementation capacity,at the level of line departments, to directly implement some project activities – especially small-scaleirrigation development. The credit component, which is vital to resource poor households, did not takeoff. The efforts to develop drought resistant varieties of crops for rain–fed farmers remained at theadaptive research stage.

48. The African Development Bank is the Cooperating Institution (CI). Supervision by the CI hasbeen insufficient in its analysis of issues. The CI has not sought to develop a strategy to guide theproject towards achieving its objectives as set out in the Appraisal Report (paras 79 and 80).Consequences have been dire: (i) less than expected coverage under the irrigation development sub-component; (iii) no development of grassroots institutions; and (iii) minuscule investment in smallstock and dry land farming that are vital to resource poor households.

49. IFAD funds have been mostly directed to fund the regular activities of the line departmentswith little or no specific attention to IFAD’s target group. The impact of the project on IFAD’s targetgroup has been quite coincidental.

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B. Project Financial Management and Procurement

(1) Financial Progress

(a) Disbursement status50. IFAD appraised the project early in 1993. Its Executive Board gave its approval in April 1993;the loan became effective on 29 April 1994. Total project costs are US$ 8.56 million, of which theIFAD loan represents SDR 5.1 million (USD 6.9 million). The balance (USD 1.7 million) representsthe amount provided by the Government of Swaziland and beneficiaries. The closing date wasforeseen to be on September 23, 2001 but was extended to March 31, 2002.

(b) Trends in disbursements51. IFAD’s cumulative disbursement as of 2 May 2001 was SDR 2 694 499, or 47% of the totalallocation of SDR 5 100 000 (Information from IFAD, Table 2).

Table 2: Disbursements by Category and Balance of the IFAD loan (May 2, 2001)

Category Allocation(SDR)

Disbursement(SDR)

Balance (SDR) Balance as a% of Total

Civil works incl. Construction and materials 420 000 166 831 253 169 40Vehicles and equipment 1 120 000 633156 486 844 57Consultant Services, Training and Studies 1 530 000 954 430 575 570 62Incremental credit 510 000 521 290 -11290 102Incremental Operating costs 640 000 119 980 520 020 19Recovery of Project Preparation Advance 180000 99 268 80 732 55Unallocated 700 000 0 700 000 0Authorised Allocation – Special Account 0 199 544 -199 544TOTAL 5 100 000 2694 499 2 405 501 53

52. The actual rate of disbursement has been much lower than the projected rate. It was lowest in1999, but improved substantially in 2000 (Figure 1). The project was provided with technicalassistance for a period of two years to help the PCU to put in place systems and procedures forfinancial management.

53. The AfDB operates with different and not reconcilable data. The data provided by AfDBprovides a different picture. It indicates a lower disbursement of merely SDR 2.02 million,representing 40% of the IFAD loan amount.

Figure 1: Comparison of Actual Rate with Projected Rate of Disbursement

0

5

10

15

20

25

1994/95 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Year

Perc

enta

ge o

f Dis

burs

emen

t

Actual Rate ofDisbursement

Projected Rate ofDisbursement

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(c) Issues related to finance54. Three issues related to finance are apparent. First, the accounting system is inadequate. Themission was unable to find any ledgers with details of disbursement by category, component and bywithdrawal application. The Project Accountant did not even have the details of the balance availablefor disbursement during the remainder of the project life. The TA has been ineffective in assisting theProject to design the systems and procedures. The situation was compounded by staff turnover: theProject Accountant trained by the TA left and a new Project Accountant was appointed. Moreover, theCI does not provide quarterly statements indicating the balance available for disbursement under theloan. Supervision Mission Aide Memoires do not contain any information on the financial status ofthe project.

55. Second, per design the MOF would open a project account into which it would deposit aninitial amount of E 450 000 to cover the costs of the first three months of implementation. Theaccount was to be replenished on a quarterly basis and in advance.8 But this system was not adopted.As a result, the project had to depend on budget releases from the consolidated government account.The project had to wait for the approval of the appropriation bill for the release of project funding –which takes about three to four months at the beginning of the financial year. During these periods,the project for funding must rely on interim warrants. Budget allocations are not based on the projectwork plan submitted by the project but are based on the allocations from Ministry of Finance.

56. Third, the budgeting process in the project was top-down reflecting the government’straditional budgeting system. The SAR had indicated that decentralised budget preparation would beadopted wherein the beneficiaries would be provided with an opportunity to participate and influencethe planning and budgeting process.9 But the SAR did not elaborate on the processes to be employedand the project did not initiate the budgeting process by ensuring that community/group needs wouldbe reflected. Beneficiaries, project implementers - and the mission – fail to ascertain the investmentsmade by the project at each community/group level. Project implementers cannot assess costeffectiveness of the interventions. Communities/groups do not know the cost of development worksundertaken in their localities.

(2) Procurement

57. The project design indicated that the Government procurement procedures were satisfactory toboth IFAD and the CI and would be followed under SADP.10 But procedures are excessivelycomplicated for smaller procurements. For any procurement above E 5 000 up to USD 50 000, thePCU has to obtain three quotations and seek authority to spend from the tender board in the MEPF.This means that if the Irrigation Section wants to buy pipes costing E 6 000 (about USD 750), thePCU will have to obtain approval of the tender board. Procedures are unpractical to follow in a projectsetting and easily cause non-justified delays.

58. In 1995, the PCU signed contracts with the Women’s Resource Centre (WRC) and theSwaziland Farmers Development Foundation (SFDF) for E 140 816 and E 60 902 respectively, forundertaking micro-scheme development. The project has made partial payments towards thesecontracts. The WRC has received E 12 999.35 and the SFDF E 18 227. The balance remains unsettledsince 1997. Both the mid-term review and the supervision mission Aide Memoires are silent aboutthis issue.

59. The non-payment of NGOs and the absence of a well designed procedure to engage the NGOsto implement project activities contributed to the decision by NGOs to disengage themselves. The CI

8 (c) Under Loan Conditions and Assurances of the SAR.9 Para 170 of the SAR.10 Para 151 of the SAR.

13

neither provided a step-wise procedure to be followed in such procurement, nor facilitated the processby seeking a dialogue with the stakeholders to find practical solutions to the claims by the NGOs to bepaid for services rendered.

60. The CI has remained too passive and this has had negative effects for NGO involvement. ThePCU sent two proposals to the CI on 7 July 1999 to engage SFDF and WRC to develop four and sixmicro-schemes respectively. The supervision mission Aide Memoire of December 2000 rejected theseproposals stating that the contract amount for the new proposals exceeded 15% of the initial contractamount. 11 CI expressed it reservation on the high cost of irrigation development but did not suggestways and means to resolve this issue. The irony of the situation is that despite not receiving theprevious contract payment, the NGOs accepted undertaking new works, but the CI rejected this,despite the consent given by PF. The mission is of the view that the CI considered the new contractswith NGOs as an extension of the old contract and imposed the restriction that the contract amountshould not exceed 15% of the original contract amount. In the end, the NGOs lost interest in workingfor the project. A large part of the intended irrigation component was excluded from the project.

C. Project Management Capability

(1) Design

61. The project design set out to support activities, to be implemented by individual departments ofMOAC or of agricultural sector agencies. Six features were incorporated to ensure smooth co-ordination both with Swazi Agencies and donors. They were: (i) a high level PCC; (ii) a PCU actingas secretariat to the PCC; (iii) mechanisms for programming and budgeting to ensure that each agencyoperates within the framework of a co-ordinated plan; (iv) Co-ordination committees at the regionallevel to ensure provision of services to the beneficiaries; (v) workshops to secure research andextension linkages; and (vi) the Horticultural Campaign Committee which provides a forum for co-ordination with other projects such as Church Agricultural Projects and the Commercial AgricultureProduction and Marketing Project.

62. The regular departments of MOAC and other agencies, SDSB, NAMBoard and CCU wouldimplement project funded activities using their existing staff, following their normal financial andadministrative procedures. The PS of MOAC would give policy direction and have the overallresponsibility for ensuring that the project meets its set objectives. The PCU would provide overallco-ordination of implementation with responsibilities for consolidating the project annual workprogramme and budget, budgetary control, accounts, procurement and disbursements, and monitoringand evaluation.

63. The PCC would provide overall policy direction and ensure coordinated delivery of the severalcomplementary activities that are essential to increase smallholder production. The PS of MOACwould chair the PCC. The PCU would be the secretariat for the PCC. The PCC would be made up ofheads of participating departments and senior level representatives of the MEPF, SDSB, NAMBoard,CCU, NGOs, USAID and Christian Agricultural Mission (CAM). The PCC would have the right toco-opt such other members, as it considered necessary for the conduct of its business; and to formexecutive sub-committees on a standing or ad-hoc basis as required.

64. It was expected that the PCC would meet regularly. It would be responsible for resolvingbureaucratic and financial impasse and for monitoring project implementation. Moreover, PCC wouldexercise budgetary and financial control through its review and approval of the annual workplan and 11 Para 2.34 of the aide Memoire of AfDB Supervision Mission during the period December 11-21, 2000.

14

budget for each component. The PCU would be headed by a PC (a senior national officer) assisted bya Project Accountant and by a small complement of professional, technical and support staff drawnprincipally from the existing cadre of MOAC personnel. 12 The PCU would not have the directresponsibility for implementation and the scope of its duties is reflected in its limited but professionalstaff establishment.

(2) Performance

65. The Project established a Project Co-ordination Unit (PCU) with a PC, Counterpart Project Co-ordinator (TA), Project Financial Advisor/Financial Controller (TA), Project Accountant, Economistand Secretary. All necessary equipments and vehicles have been procured. A contract was signed withAGGMARK Ltd on 12th July 1994 to provide counterpart Project Co-ordinator for a period of ninemonths. Trelyn Consultants provided an Accountant to the PCU for two years. The original NationalProject Co-ordinator and the Accountant who started up the project were transferred in October 1997.The current Project Co-ordinator and Accountant were appointed. The National Monitoring andEvaluation Officer was sent for higher training during August 1998.

66. A Project Co-ordinating Committee (PCC) was established. It met three times during the firstyear of the project. The PCC was to be chaired by the PS and the Heads of the Department were toparticipate. This did not happen. The project subsequently established a system of monthly meetingsat the PCU level. These were attended by the component managers, rather than Heads ofDepartments, and were chaired by the Under Secretary (Development). Though the PC has directaccess to the PS and the Minister to get policy decisions cleared, the project was unable to achieveinter-departmental co-ordination without the participation of the Heads of Departments. The RegionalCo-ordination Committees and the Horticultural Committee envisaged in the design did not function.

67. The project was always late in submitting the project progress reports, and the annual work planand budget. The CI supervision mission report of May 1995 found that the PCC involvement had beeninadequate. Each sub-component was being implemented in isolation and independent of otheractivities leading to fragmented, not well coordinated project activities. Subsequent supervisionmissions never followed to seek improvements.

(3) Issues

68. Inadequate co-ordination: Two factors contributed to inadequate co-ordination. First, theproject work plan and budget preparation was component driven contrary to the design expectations.Each component had a set of activities indicated in the appraisal report. Budgets were accordinglyprepared. The needs and priorities of communities and their organisations did not become startingpoints for preparing the budget. The communities did not prepare the budgets with facilitation from amultidisciplinary team. Instead component managers unilaterally decided upon expenditureallocations. Once work plan and budgets were prepared component-wise, the component heads sawlittle value addition in co-ordination at the level of headquarters. Second, at the regional level, theproject design set out to establish a Regional Co-ordination Committee headed by the SeniorExtension Officer. This committee was also unable to function, as all the regional level componentheads were not under the administrative control of the Senior Extension Officer. The regional levelofficials were not involved in preparing the project work plan and budget to ensure co-ordinatedservices to the community / farmer organisations. Regional Development Team meetings were notused to ensure co-ordination at the field level; this was another missed opportunity.

12 Para 163 of the SAR.

15

69. Project management capacity: Four factors impact the management capacity at the PCUlevel. First, the project was established as a small unit with only three staff. But no capacity was builtat the PCU level to co-ordinate the activities of the NGOs and to set out a process for communityinstitution development and weave the activities of the components into the priorities of thecommunity institutions. In addition, due to lack of a technical team, though envisaged in the Projectdesign, the PCU could not facilitate the farmer associations on technical and financial viability andsuggest cost effective interventions. Second, the project technical assistance became ineffective. Stafftrained by the TA were replaced: replacements had to learn by trial and error without any training.Third, the project staff are drawn from the MOAC cadre and consider that their compensation levelsdo not match the project workload. Fourth, the component heads were required to undertake theproject activities in addition to their regular work. They found little difference between the regularwork being undertaken by them and the project activities. Project activities became an appendage ofthe regular department work.

70. Rigidity implementing project activities: The project design established a set of activities forimplementation. The project implementers were not well informed. They has not understood thatproject activities could be adjusted to reflect the priorities of the participatinghouseholds/communities. A farming community in Sipovu was interested in getting a small bridge toaccess markets and the agricultural fields. But the project was unable to respond to the community'srequest: it was felt that no project allocations were available for such activities. The participants in thefinal stakeholders’ workshop quoted many other instances of inflexibility. The CI did not attempt toexplain to the project implementers the ways and means of introducing flexibility into project design.

71. Inadequate incentive structure to work in a project setting: There has been considerabledebate within different ministries implementing development projects on providing salary top-up tothe project staff. This issue is now being discussed at the level of Ministry Public Service andInformation. The Project staff feel that they are putting in more effort than their counterparts in thegovernment and should be suitably rewarded. The present PC is at a lower grade than the previousone. Providing a special salary and allowances structure to project staff seconded from governmentdepartments is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, better salaries are likely to attract talent andbetter allowances would enthuse staff to undertake more fieldwork. On the other hand, as long as thepositions are filled without open competition, this system is likely to breed favouritism.

72. Thwarted attempt towards developing sustainable farmer organisations: The currentproject design had provided an initial framework for introducing innovations so as to developsustainable farmer organisations. To wit, NGOs would be used for group development. Theframework, though not well articulated, could have been adjusted during the course of implementationbased on the experience in participatory development in other countries. The project initiallycontracted NGOs for micro-irrigation scheme development but with the unresolved dispute overcontract payments, NGOs withdrew. The project was neither assisted in settling the payment disputewith NGOs nor to come up with an alternative framework for developing farmer organisations. Theproject’s intention of developing farmer organisations in the irrigation schemes promoted underSADP and SCMP was thwarted (see above).

73. Limited support from the CI: The programme has been without guidance and an effectivestrategy. Since 1996, the CI has been conducting biannual supervision missions. Prior to this thefrequency of the supervision missions was only annual. The Aide Memoires of the CI indicate simplerecording of performance as against the appraisal targets. Efforts of the supervision missions to set outthe issues and recommendations to address these issues with clearly articulated implementation stepsare not evident. In addition, strategy development and adjusting the project activities based on theexperience gained in participatory development internationally over the last decade and lessonslearned from implementation experience have been neglected. To this date, the issues of NGOinvolvement in micro-irrigation and group development, non-payment of contract amount to NGOs,constraints to deliver credit to the target group through SDSB, financial management, the flow of

16

funds and procurement issues remain unresolved. In addition, the CI does not furnish its detailedsupervision mission reports to the PCU.

D. Project Design Weaknesses

74. Overall, design features have been inadequate. First, the processes to develop communityinstitutions/farmer organisations as the core of development architecture have not been articulated.The sectoral interventions were not based on the assessed needs and priorities of theseinstitutions/organisations. Second, small stock development (pigs and poultry), as preferred by theIFAD target group, was ignored. Third, processes for engaging the NGOs, including selection,contracting and payment procedures were not spelt out. Fourth, the risks of involving only a singlefinancial institution – the SDSB – to deliver credit to resource poor households (given the experiencein the earlier SCMP) were not explored. Fifth, the capacity and the need for direct execution ofirrigation works by the Irrigation Section were not analysed: the limited capacity and the residualoption of contracting irrigation works to private contractors was not made clear.

E. Targeting

(1) Design

75. The project design identifies four categories of homesteads on the basis of cash or resourceendowment, homestead labour, and associated farming practices. They are: (i) cash/resource rich,labour rich; (ii) cash /resource rich, labour poor; (iii) cash/resource poor, labour rich; and (iv)cash/resource poor, labour poor.13 It was suggested that the target group for the project could be foundin the latter two categories. Due to labour shortages and lack of cash to finance inputs, thesehomesteads plough and plant late, and are unable to practice timely weeding. Their yields and outputsdo not cover self-consumption needs, let alone produce a surplus. The design also indicates that atypical poor SNL family would have a land allocation of between 0.5 ha and 1.0 ha. It also indicatesthat the above characteristics are usually found in homesteads headed by women where there is noincome from off-farm sources. Physically, these are manifested in two important visiblecharacteristics: condition of the homestead (roof is thatched or without fencing) and the familyploughs late.

76. The core poor homesteads would constitute the central focus for additional resource support interms of irrigation, credit, and specific effort of adaptive research to generate low input technologyand accessibility to markets. The project’s other components (extension, support to animal health andlivestock marketing) would reach a wider spectrum of farmers in SNL.

(2) Performance

77. In the absence of a plan to operationalise the targeting criteria set out SAR, the projectmanagement considered all farmers on SNL as poor. The component heads went ahead withimplementing the project activities with no focus on the target group. The mission’s field observationsindicate that most households who do not own cattle comprise the bottom poor. Such households aremore likely to invest in small stock as this represents known skills. However, the income accruedfrom vegetable crop and small stock development remains under the control of women.

13 Para 62 of the SAR.

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(3) Issues

78. The project design did not set out a plan to operationalise the targeting criteria to selecthouseholds to benefit from the project. It did not even specify an area with concentration of targetgroup households or establish a methodology to identify such areas with concentration of target grouphouseholds. The project allocated 24% of the funds for cattle development catering to farmers who donot fall within the target group criteria. The situation is worsened by inadequate emphasis on smallstock development (poultry and pigs), which are the activities preferred by the Cash/Resource andLabour Poor households. Even the Mid-Term Review did not assess the performance of targeting. Itdid not give guidance on sharpening the poverty focus.

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CHAPTER IV

IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS BY COMPONENT

A. Irrigation Development

(1) Design

(a) Scheme development, rehabilitation and reorganisation79. The project was to construct new small and micro-scale irrigation schemes as follows:

1) Expansion of SCMP Small-Scale Schemes. Two existing schemes with surplus water(Ntamakuphila and Engofelweni) were to be expanded by 5 ha each, to make use of water deliveryinfrastructure already provided. A total of 25 additional farmers would benefit, with an averageholding of 0.4 ha.2) Other Small-Scale Schemes. About 75 ha of small-scale irrigation schemes were to bedeveloped or rehabilitated. These were to be located in 6-8 separate sites and would average about 10ha per scheme, to be operated by farmers in holdings of up to 0.4 ha maximum. Thus, at least some190 farmers would benefit.3) Micro-Schemes. One hundred hectares of new, intensive smallholder irrigation schemes ofaverage size 1 ha were to be developed. These were to be used by women and unmarried men,primarily for vegetable production. The average holding per beneficiary would be 0.05 ha and a totalof 2000 farmers would thus benefit from the schemes.

80. Thus a total of 185 ha of irrigation were to be developed or rehabilitated. The work on small-scale schemes was to be carried out by the MOAC Irrigation Section, using contractors or forceaccount. The work on micro-scale schemes, including design and construction, was to be carried outby contracted NGOs under the supervision of the Irrigation Section.

81. In addition, the project was to ‘consolidate and reorganise’ another 257 ha of existing schemesto promote farmer-management. There was no clear indication of which schemes were intended forconsolidation and reorganisation, but it seems likely that they were intended to be those rehabilitatedor expanded under SCMP (these schemes are now generally referred to as the ‘old IFAD schemes).14

Paragraph 142 of the Appraisal Report clearly indicated that the work was to be undertaken bycontracted NGOs.

(b) Targeting and site selection82. The target group for the irrigation component was to conform to that defined for the project as awhole, i.e. homesteads with less than 1 ha of arable land for rainfed cropping and with few if anycattle. Women-headed homesteads were to be favoured. Priority for new development was to be givento micro-schemes and to gravity fed irrigation. Requests for assistance were to come from thebeneficiaries, who were to first form a farmers’ association with a constitution. There should be noabsentee farmers. Land allocation was to have already been made by the Chief with acceptableagreements reached with respect to land tenure (including the rights of women and youths).Associations were to agree to participate in construction (by providing labour, even if constructionwork was to be contracted out) and to bear future operation, maintenance and replacement costs.

14 These schemes were mostly developed in the 1970s, prior to IFAD’s involvement in Swaziland. They didhowever receive treatment under the SCMP.

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(c) Plot size and allocation83. Plot sizes were to be manageable by typical resource-poor and labour-poor homesteads, withina range of 0.02-0.05 ha on the micro-schemes and 0.02-0.4 ha on other schemes. Allocation of largerplots would be permitted only in “extremely special circumstances where families are larger”.Moreover, in the case of the two schemes that were to be expanded, the farmers would be entitled toincrease the size of their plots only if there was evidence that their existing plots were fully utilised. Inthe allocation of plots, priority was to be given to women-headed families, particularly single mothersand youths (i.e. unmarried men), who have no customary rights to arable land.

(d) Cost of physical works84. The total estimated cost of the above irrigation development, excluding beneficiary labourcontribution but including contractor’s overheads, was USD 0.47 million, equivalent to USD 2 540per ha or USD 212 per homestead. The beneficiary labour contribution was estimated at USD 243 perha.

(e) Institutional and logistical support85. The project was to support the reorganisation of MOAC’s three irrigation services (theIrrigation Section, the Land Use Planning Section and the Land Development Service) into a singlenew centre – the Small Scale Irrigation Unit (SSIU) – to undertake responsibility for theimplementation of the sub-component. Technical assistance (TA) was to be provided, in the form ofan internationally recruited Irrigation Engineer for a period of two years from Project Year 1 (PY1), toassist with the reorganisation and establishment of the new unit, as well as performing the followingfunctions:

1) assisting the local counterpart in an advisory capacity;2) assisting in establishing a functional planning, design, construction and supervision group for

continuing scheme identification, feasibility studies, contract administration and construction;3) assisting in promoting beneficiaries farmers’ organisation and management of small-scale

irrigation schemes;4) providing technical guidance on the allocation of water resources and availability of water to meet

the requirements of individual schemes; and5) providing support for technical studies that may be required by other financing agencies.

86. The TA irrigation engineer was expected to have “extensive experience” in an administrativeposition. Provision was made for two senior MOAC staff to undergo overseas post-graduate trainingcourses, of two years’ duration in Irrigation Engineering and ‘Agro-Hydrology’, respectively.Provision was also made for the local training of irrigation technicians and construction foremen, aswell as for annual one-day orientation workshops for two farmers’ representatives from each farmer’sassociation. SSIU staff were to deliver training (unspecified) to local extension workers duringreconnaissance surveys, to be completed “early in the project life”.

(2) Performance

(a) Scheme development, rehabilitation and reorganisation87. The evaluation mission visited a total of 21 irrigation schemes, including: eleven schemes thathave received or are about to receive assistance under the project; three micro-schemes that had beendeveloped under the project by the SFDP; six of the ‘old IFAD schemes’; and one other. 15 The salientfeatures of the schemes are shown in Appendix 3.

88. The mission observed the following from these visits:

15 The Old IFAD Schemes are the ones that had received assistance under SCMP.

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1) Twelve small-scale irrigation schemes have received attention from the project to date, includingone of those intended for expansion (Ntamakuphila). The total irrigable area of these schemes atfull development will be some 214 ha. However, even though substantial work has been done onsome of these schemes, none of them is yet fully operational. Physical works have not yet beenstarted on four of the schemes (Sankolweni, Vukane Bomake, Mandlakhe and Ngwempisane –representing 51.5 ha) despite inception having taken place as far back as 1994. Work on Lesibovu(17 ha) has only recently started. Compared with the ‘without project’ situation, the incrementalarea developed/rehabilitated and brought into operation/production at the time of the field visitsappears to be less than 10 ha, compared with the target of 85 ha.

2) Three micro schemes, amounting to a total of about 4.5 ha, have been completed by SFDF and areoperational. A further three micro schemes totalling 3-4 ha are reported by the Irrigation Sectionto have been completed (possibly by Women Resource Centre), but the mission did not visitthese.

3) The six ‘old IFAD schemes’ are in a sorry state: they are all in urgent need of rehabilitation andreorganisation; Kalanga is for the time being closed, owing to its failure to meet its electricitybills; and Mashobeni was abandoned by its then users three years ago. Of a total irrigable area of138 ha in these schemes, only an estimated 49 ha are presently operational.

89. Thus, the sum total achieved to date is less than 10 ha of small-scale schemes and about 4.5 haof micro schemes, compared with the targets of 85 ha and 100 ha, respectively. Nothing has beenachieved on the intended consolidation and reorganisation of the 257 ha of ‘old IFAD schemes’.Moreover, regrettably, the quality of design and construction work leaves much to be desired. Theapproach to development has also sometimes been top-down (for example, in dictating the installationof a diesel pump when the users prefer electric).

90. The reasons for these disappointing results are thought to be:

1) institutional weakness within the Irrigation Section (there is only one irrigation engineer tocover the whole country and the intended overseas training for two irrigation staff apparentlynever took place);

2) difficulties with procurement of construction materials and the flow of funds, mainly as aresult of the lack of a special account;

3) difficulties in arranging for force-account work through the Land Development Service (whichapparently is poorly equipped);

4) apparent reluctance to contract out for plant hire or construction services (even when the LandDevelopment Service is unable to assist);

5) lack of awareness of the state of project finances and consequent inadequate budgeting (theIrrigation Section had been under the impression that there was a shortage of project funds);

6) failure on the part of the PCU to successfully contract NGOs (the latter were contracted onlyfor 5-6 micro schemes and then not paid; they were not contracted at all for the 257 ha of ‘oldIFAD schemes).

91. However, there are two encouraging points: (i) the schemes have generally been initiated by thefarmer groups, who have unstintingly provided their labour (and a small amount of cash) towardsscheme construction; and (ii) the groups generally appear to be committed to meeting operation andmaintenance costs. The completed micro-scale schemes appear to be functioning well.

(b) Targeting and site selection92. With one notable exception (Lavumisa), targeting has generally been satisfactory. Again withthe exception of Lavumisa and in the case of Mhlangeni, women are in the majority in thememberships of the scheme. They far outnumber men in the memberships of the micro-schemes. The

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case of Lavumisa is cause for concern. This 51 ha sprinkler scheme has not been commissioned sinceit is not yet fully equipped. It was developed together with a 120 ha drip irrigation scheme for sugarcane and a 73 ha drip irrigation scheme for vegetables (which has now apparently been abandoned).The farmers’ association concerned is therefore to benefit from a total irrigation development of 244ha, for which IFAD funds were apparently used to develop the 51 ha plus the underground pipeworkon 73 ha (the details were not available and the facts remain to be confirmed). This does not appear tobe in keeping with project guidelines for targeting.

(c) Plot size and allocation93. With the exception of Lavumisa, allocated plot sizes appear to be reasonably in keeping withexpectations, although the process may be a cause for concern, since the project has not documented‘ownership identity’ of the schemes. Thus, for example, at Lesibovu, which is a multi-purpose co-operative, while there are said to be 65 members, a much smaller number has acquired shares in theirrigation scheme. The scheme may disproportionately benefit influential people. There is little in theway of documentation on file to show that the chief has given his permission for the use of the land onany of the schemes and that the users (particularly women) have security of tenure.

(d) Cost of physical works94. The costs incurred on physical works have apparently not been documented, except in the casesof the micro schemes developed by NGOs (which the project deemed unduly expensive on the basisof ‘FAO norms’ – which have not been provided to the mission for assessment). It is thereforeimpossible to make any objective assessment of cost-effectiveness.

95. However, with regard to the unit costs for the micro-schemes, it must be expected that thesewill be higher than the comparable costs for small-scale schemes, because of economies of scale inthe latter. The mission considers that the technology adopted for the micro schemes is generallyappropriate and (at USD 3 000 per ha) in keeping with expectations.

96. The mission also considers that the technology adopted for the small-scale schemes is generallyappropriate – with the possible exception of the arrangements provided at Nkwene Irrigation Scheme,which involved the construction of a +/-3.0 km pipeline to serve an incremental area of about 13 ha.16

The quality of design and construction has been mentioned above: this has negative implications forsustainability and therefore cost-effectiveness.

(e) Benefits97. There is no doubt that the few developments completed to date are having a significant impacton household incomes and nutrition and that these benefits in most cases will far outweigh the costs.However, this situation will continue only if the present limited market access is maintained orimproved and the schemes are sustainable. Neither is at present guaranteed – and the prospects havenot been improved by the failure to contract NGOs for group development. Marketing is less of aproblem on the micro-schemes, because they are widely dispersed and are generally able to dispose oftheir surplus locally. However, marketing could become a problem on some of the larger small-scaleschemes. It is by no means clear that project support to NAMBOARD to date has yet brought anybenefit to the target group.

(f) Institutional and logistical support98. Institutional and logistical support under the project was predicated on reorganising theirrigation services of MOAC into one service centre. This reorganisation was never carried out.Consequently the TA provided to assist in the process was redundant. Notwithstanding this outcome,the project redeployed the TA to assist in carrying out surveys, designs and construction supervision

16 At, say SZL 100 per linear metre, this could have cost in the region of USD 2 800 per ha, excluding the costof the irrigation system. While this might be an acceptable cost, it would have been reassuring to see somecomparative cost estimates for the alternatives, as well as a viability assessment.

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for small-scale irrigation schemes, leaving the Head of the Irrigation Section to concentrate on hisother (i.e. non-project) duties. Therefore, instead of “assisting in establishing a functional planning,design, construction and supervision group for continuing scheme identification, feasibility studies,contract administration and construction”, the TA filled a gap on a temporary basis.

99. The TA remained in this position for three years and was commended for his devotion to dutyand performance. However, the mission is much less sanguine about what was achieved: essentiallyonly five small-scale schemes were designed over the period (although it is fair to say that other, non-project schemes were designed), and none of these have been completely constructed/installed. Asmentioned, the mission has reservations about the quality of design, and there is no sign of any lastingcapacity building.

(3) The Issues Defined

(a) Capacity for scheme development100. Progress has taken place in terms of installation of buried pipework and the delivery ofsprinkler irrigation systems on schemes such as Lavumisa, Kholwane, Nkwene and Mhlangeni, aswell as the construction of a canal system on 2 ha at Ntamakuphila. Yet, these schemes still lack keyelements (such as pumps or above-ground irrigation systems) that are essential for operation and theycannot therefore be commissioned for use. In some cases, the schemes have apparently been in thisstate of partial completion for more than a year and there is no indication of when the work will becompleted. On some other schemes there has been little progress (other than the supply of somepipework – but no fittings – for the gravity water supply at Ekuthuleni).

101. The main problem seems to be that the Irrigation Section is overstretched, which is exacerbatedby starting the design/construction of new schemes before the current ones have been completed. Theproblem is further aggravated by the difficulties with the flow of funds, and by an apparent preferencefor doing all design and construction work ‘in-house’. Given the presence of numerous irrigationdesign consultants and contractors within Swaziland and in neighbouring South Africa, the IrrigationSection would have probably done better to have contracted out for design, equipment supply andconstruction services. This could also have reduced some of the procurement problems.

(b) Consolidation and reorganisation of existing schemes102. Failure to contract NGOs to assist in the consolidation and reorganisation of the ‘old IFADschemes’ was a serious omission. It appears that some of these schemes have now gone into terminaldecline – which might have been avoided had the NGOs been engaged. It does not make sense toconcentrate project efforts on constructing new schemes whilst existing schemes are collapsing.

(c) Documentation103. There was remarkably little information on file regarding existing and proposed irrigationschemes. As suggested in the evaluation of the SCMP, schemes of 10 ha and more require diagnosticand feasibility work to establish who is involved, how they are registered, what their training needsare, how and where they will market their produce, what the costs are and whether the scheme isviable. The information needs to be assembled in a feasibility report that also contains maps,drawings, calculations and other details of the physical resources of the scheme as well as theproposed intervention. There is also a need to have an agreement between the project and users on filecovering matters such as roles and responsibilities for operation, maintenance and replacement costs.All subproject decisions for irrigation investments greater than, say, 5 ha should be referred to the CI.

(d) Technical assistance104. It is difficult to assess the quality of the TA provided to the Irrigation Section, since the missionreceived conflicting reports of its performance. The PCU was not able to provide copies of CVs forthe individual(s) concerned, nor was it able to provide the dates of the inputs. The mission perused the

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design files and, as mentioned above, was not impressed by the documentation or design calculationsfor the schemes. The value of the TA can perhaps be best judged indirectly. None of the schemesdesigned by him have as yet been fully completed and the weakness of the Irrigation Section remains:there was, apparently, no lasting impact. The TA would probably have served the Irrigation Sectionbetter by training staff in the processes involved in contracting out for services.

(e) Supervision105. The quality of supervision is at issue: given the problems with the irrigation component thequestion must be asked why these were not spotted by successive supervision missions? The answermay lie in the fact that only one supervision mission included an engineer. All irrigationsubcomponents require an engineer to participate in supervision missions, for example to endorsesubproject investment decisions. If there are budgetary constraints to including an engineer insupervision missions, future project designs should concentrate on even lower technology thanemployed on this project – perhaps restricted to micro-schemes.

B. Livestock Development

(1) Design

106. At design, the livestock component and the agricultural extension component were not tospecifically focus on the core poor homesteads. Instead, they were to reach a wider spectrum of SNLfarmers. 17 The emphasis was on disease control and prevention, destocking and education and trainingof farmers and staff. Two interventions were designed for disease control and prevention. They are:(i) completion of 15 km outer border Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) fence on the border toMozambique and vaccination of animals in the buffer zone against FMD; and (ii) reduction of thedipping intervals by researching the partial substitution of some of the dippings with vaccinationsagainst tick-borne diseases, thereby reducing dipping cost; the latter would raise prospects forsustainability, since it is more likely that the reduced cost could be borne by the farmers.

107. Increased off-take from the SNL cattle herd would be promoted through demonstration ofalternative production systems; this translated into finishing of beef cattle in stall feeding on-station attraining and research sites. Design anticipated that 300 farmers from the target group would takecredit for stall-feeding.

108. Support to the Livestock Marketing Unit to develop a marketing information system wasincluded. Training was incorporated as an instrument to lead farmers and professionals on alternativeproduction systems through one-week residential training courses at the VFTC in Mpisi. The aim wasto train 3 600 farmers. On-farm visits as well as study tours to Zimbabwe to study supplementaryfeeding were envisioned. Design acknowledged that there is a veterinary bias in the professionaltraining in Swaziland. To this end, provision was made for training the Veterinary Assistants (VAs)manning the dipping centres in animal production techniques. TA was provided for developing thetraining curriculum.

109. Finally, grassland management activity was included as one of the interventions that shouldhelp reduce the number of cattle on SNL. The GLMDA work was begun in the 1970s under the RuralDevelopment Area Programme (RDAP). It had not been successful; at design it had been understoodthat community involvement was important for success. The aim was to rehabilitate nine existingGLMDAs and to establish three new ones.

17 Para 84 of SAR, vol. I.

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(2) Performance

110. Activities to prevent the Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) are based on well establishedGovernment practices and procedures. Any delays that have occurred can be explained by the generaldelays in project fund flows. Until an outbreak of FMD in the regions of Manzini, Lubombo andHhohho in November and December 2000, Swaziland had been free of the disease for more thantwenty years. It had, in May 2000, obtained status, granted by the World Organisation for AnimalHealth, as a ‘FMD Free Country Without Vaccination’. The fencing work has been efficiently done:28 km and not 15 km (as planned at design) were completed. However, the FMD has only received 6of the 12 allocated motorcycles, and the course in computer training has not been conducted.

111. Five dipping tanks are involved in studies on vaccination against tick-borne diseases. Seventyanimals were vaccinated in 1996. Only one died, although none of the surviving 69 had ever beendipped since 1996. This result suggests that vaccination can be used to reduce the number of dippings.The Epidemiology Unit has requested for a TA to analyse the data gathered and draw conclusions torevise the tick-borne disease control strategy. It is yet to be approved. The mission supports thisrequest.

112. Partial cost-recovery practice had begun in the dips prior to the project intervention owing tofinancial constraints. However, this was discontinued when the project funds arrived: a return wasmade to the ‘Government pays-all’ situation. This is contrary to what is required for a sustainablearrangement, which would need more farmer involvement in payment and management of the dips.The envisioned study tours to neighbouring countries have not taken place.

113. The pilot feeding trials have failed. The mission sees two reasons for this. First, in the best case,with fast growing cattle, which convert cheap feed efficiently, fattening enterprise is only marginallyprofitable. This implies that in average cases, fattening is not profitable. Second, the trials take placeat Government stations where funding is always a constraint and limits uptake by the farmers owingto their non-participation. Involvement of farmers would have resulted in early identification of theissue of inadequate profitability. The funds allocated to purchase motorcycles with the intention ofimproving outreach of extension workers were reallocated to procure a feed mixer, a chaff cutter anda mobile weighing scale for the Government Cattle Stations. This reflects wrong priorities. Decisionswere neither in line with the spirit of the appraisal report nor a participatory on-farm approach toresearch and extension.

114. The Livestock Marketing Unit performs an important task in disseminating price informationby its weekly broadcasting via the radio and through the newspapers. This is so far limited to cattleprices. The Unit has also conducted courses for farmers in grading of cattle. The Unit has completedbuilding three sales yards and expects to complete the remaining three within the life of the project.The Unit manages the sales yard but this operation could be handed over to the farmer groups.

115. The Veterinary and Farmer Training Centre (VFTC) at Mpisi has played a useful role intraining 1511 farmers of whom 1154 or 76% were women. The VFTC has established units forfattening of cattle, dairy production, broiler, egg and pig production with project funds. A clear genderdimension in the interest shown by the farmers was evident. The women are interested in the broiler,egg and pig production, while the men’s interest centre around the cattle fattening and dairy unit. Of212 veterinary assistants in the country, only 97 have been trained. The inability within MOAC torelease then from their duties and inadequate accommodation facilities explain this shortfall. A TA oncurriculum development in Animal Production has been well utilised. But, it is difficult to get teacherswith a good animal production background to train veterinary assistants.

116. The intentions behind the Grazing Land Management Development Areas (GLMDA) arelaudable. It is technically well established that rotational grazing leads to higher grass production.Pasture sites visited show very good stands of grass under fenced conditions. Interaction between the

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extension (or any other facilitating agent) and farmers is critical to motivate the farmers. Currently,three staff have been allocated to this activity. Seven of the nine GLMDA sites targeted forrehabilitation have been completed. Two of the three new sites would be completed by the end of theproject period.

117. In addition, the project has rendered partial support to the Philani Poultry Co-operative SocietyAbattoir, which has a daily slaughter and sale of 1 000 broilers. This is a co-operative of 53 womenpoultry producers that have built an abattoir, initially by the members contributing E 12 000.Subsequently, funding was sourced from an NGO based in the UK to expand the abattoir. The presentIFAD project has assisted with training programmes in management, preparation of business plans,training in marketing and record keeping. A four-day study tour to South Africa was sponsored, tovisit suppliers of equipment and day old chicken. Phones and computers are in place in most offices.But E-mail and Internet use to speed up communication and to source relevant knowledge are notinstalled.

(3) The Issues Defined

(a) Is animal production equal to cattle production?118. The SAR reported that 42.25% of the SNL homesteads did not own cattle.18 The baseline studyconducted for the Mid-Term Review found more than 60% of the homesteads without cattle. Yet, forall practical purposes the appraisal report equated cattle with livestock and no attention was given toother animals – even though non-ownership of cattle might be taken as a proxy for poverty. Further,various sizes of broiler and egg layer poultry units run by women were found in most sites visited bythe mission. An important point is that apart from the training provided to 1154 women farmers, mostof these units have come up with very little project or extension support, indicating a strong intereston the part of the women for poultry production. Women are also interested in pig production and thenumber of pigs in Swaziland from 1991 to 1996 went up by 66% although from a low base of 27 933to 46 35819. Thus the issue is that while the project has put most of its resources into cattle – with aninherent strong gender bias towards men – with no uptake of stall feeding among SNL farmerswomen have taken to poultry and pig production in spite of very limited support from the project.

(b) What role does commercialisation play in reducing cattle numbers? Is stall feedingfeasible?

119. The number of cattle in Swaziland peaked at 752 775 in 1992, and fell to 607 513 in 1993owing to the drought. It increased to 659 666 in 1998, but fell again to 601 693 in 1999. About 82%of the cattle in Swaziland and 95% of the owners are found in SNL.20 There has been a steadyincrease in the number of slaughtered cattle from 42 531 in 1996 to 65 502 in 1999. However, thequestion is whether this is a trend that will continue. Even more important would be to understandwhat is behind this trend. Is it due to a more commercial outlook by SNL homesteads with large cattleherds, or are other factors at play like a greater share of SNL now being used for commercial forest orsugar cultivation, or soil erosion and bush encroachment? What effect does the HIV/AIDS epidemichave on labour availability for herding?

120. Stall-feeding has not succeeded under the project. From simple gross margin calculations it isobvious that stall-feeding is often not profitable, as one kilogram of additional animal gain under mostassumptions cannot pay for the feed, let alone labour and other costs. The mission found evidence thatthe profitable private feedlots operate with imported young animals from South Africa and feed

18 Table 5, p. 6 of working paper II, Vol II.19 P. 33 of the 1997 Annual Statistical Bulletin of the Central Statistical Office, Mbabane.20 Pages 4-6 of working paper II of SAR, Vol II, P. 33 of the 1997 Annual Statistical Bulletin of the CentralStatistical Office, Mbabane and p.18 of the 1999-2000 Annual Report, Central Bank of Swaziland.

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residues from the sugar cane production. However, such a model cannot be easily transplanted to theSNL, as it would imply extra cost for transport of feed.

(c) Can animal production be promoted without a well functioning extension service?121. The evidence does not provide a clear answer. Smallholder poultry and pig production inSwaziland – at the level of the project’s target group – has been adopted in-spite of limited extensionpersonnel and with almost no transport and other facilities for the bottom rung extension staff. Themodel relies heavily on linkages between the producer and the private sector for inputs (day-oldchicken and feed) and outputs, especially the sale of broilers. NAMBOARD also plays an importantrole as a market outlet. While this may be a sustainable model as long as the production is profitableits limitations are that it relies entirely on commercial feed and confined chicken and pigs. Advantageis not taken of local feed or animal resources – which would require the support of an active extensionand research system to explore the possibilities for reduction of production cost. On the marketingside, the Philani Poultry Co-operative Society Abattoir deserves replication. The need at this junctureis capacity building around the concept of poultry and pigs as a tool for poverty alleviation. Itbecomes imperative to start pilot activities at the farm level with the involvement of farmers (women)to explore the possibilities of using of local animal and feed resources to reduce dependence on highcost commercial feed and exotic animals.

(d) Use of modern communication technology122. In-spite of telephones and computers present in most offices, there seems to be no deliberateand constructive policy to use the modern communication technology such as access to Internet. TheMpisi training centre has only one telephone line. It has applied for four, but it should obviously haveInternet in order to access relevant and up-to-date information. Some of the relevant sites are: FAOhomesite: www.fao.org; the South African Journal of animal Science: www.sasas.co.za/Sajas.htmland the NPPHDC: www.poultry.kvl.dk.

C. Crop Development

(1) Design

123. Adaptive Research, Extension and Farm Mechanisation Support are the three sub-componentsof the crop development component. The adaptive research sub-component includes development of :(i) low risk packages for maize production with appropriate inter-cropping; (ii) suitable cottonpackage; (iii) fodder production; (iv) varietal testing on irrigated vegetable crops; and (v) productiontechniques to improve marketable quality and priority would be given to tomatoes. This sub-component was also expected to: (i) refine and adapt varieties from other countries in the region forcultivation in the drier areas; (ii) introduction, testing and demonstration of new varieties of compositemaize, hybrid maize, sorghum, groundnuts, cowpeas, beans and cotton; (iii) establishment of simpleoff-station trials to refine local response curves to nitrogen and phosphate and define optimumprofitability levels; and (iv) evaluation of alternative tillage practices for moisture infiltration, cropgrowth and yield.

124. The Extension sub-component would include: (i) support to development of a polyvalentextension service; (ii) development of extension messages responding to the needs of poorsmallholders; (iii) staff training; (iv) development of 800 extension plots to provide forum forextension contact; (v) field days; and (vi) annual extension research review workshops. The support tothe Farm mechanisation Unit was to assist private tractor owners /operators and to advise tractoroperators in maintaining tractors and records of operation.

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(2) Performance

125. The major focus of the project up until now has been on irrigation schemes and intensivecommercial vegetable growing. In line with this emphasis, the recommended approach to rainfedagriculture in Swaziland has been that of trying to find substitutes for maize wherever rainfall is closeto or below 800 mm/year (somewhere around 40% of the arable land). Thus, the adaptive researchwork in the project has taken two basic directions: i) develop crops designed for irrigation schemes;and ii) develop sorghum, sweet potatoes, cassava, groundnuts, cotton, etc., as somewhat drought-resistant alternatives to maize. And the extension program has dedicated some of its efforts to themanagement and training of farmers in irrigation schemes. The farm mechanisation work has beenmuch more focused on rainfed farming.

126. Performance has not improved greatly from that reported in the previous Mid-Term Review.Adaptive research objectives have been reached in about 30% of the cases. Although some 16varieties of some 10 species of field crops (maize, sorghum, cowpeas, groundnuts, sweet potatoes, andcassava), vegetables (onions and tomatoes), and fruits (avocados and mangos) are now ready to bemultiplied and tried more widely by farmers, none of the seeds of these species have been multiplied.Thus, none of these investigative efforts have benefited more than a handful of farmers.

127. Extension work has reached virtually all of its recent objectives in terms of classroom-basedtrainings and field days conducted, but the impact on farmers’ practices is once again fairly minimal,being restricted almost entirely to the spread of certain varieties of seed material. The farmmechanisation programme could compete with commercial tractors only because it was subsidisingthe service fairly heavily.

(3) The Issues Defined

(a) Inadequate emphasis on rain-fed agriculture128. The project has focused on irrigation and livestock development. This means a very limitednumber of households are reached leaving behind the resource poor households. The primary focusmust be on the rainfed agriculture, which will always be practised by a large majority of Swazifarmers. It is beyond doubt that the Swazi farmers will continue to seek food security by growingmaize, even when they fully recognise that the limited rainfall may allow them a good harvest amere two out of every five years, or even once in five years. It must be recognised that the peopledesire to grow maize: ways to improve the cultivation practices need to be found.

(b) Slow spread of drought resistant crops129. The spread of new drought resistant crops has been very slow. Good varieties of sweetpotatoes and cowpeas have been distributed to very few farmers due to limited seed multiplication.Cotton cultivation has declined in the last two years because of decreased market prices. Seedproducer groups are part of the regular menu of donor supported activities in other countries such asZambia and Zimbabwe: but SADP does not provide such support under SADP. Under research andextension, provision was not made. This weakness in design has contributed to low uptake.

(c) Inadequate extension coverage130. The extension service is understaffed (approximately 140 extension agents in a country withover 80 000 farming households, meaning that each agent would have to reach over 500 households).The transportation facilities available to the extension workers is also limited (less than one in threeextension workers has a motorcycle in two regions visited). In addition, other cost-effectivemechanisms for delivery of extension messages are yet to be found.

28

D. Credit

(1) Design

131. The project design had made provisions to establish a revolving fund with the SDSB to providecredit to the beneficiaries under the project. In this context, the project design comprised twoimportant features. First, attempts would be made to improve the viability of the AgriculturalDevelopment Fund through group lending to reduce transaction costs and increase lending. Second,the project would pay special attention to maintaining high rates of recovery by ensuring that thegroups are cohesive before they become eligible for a loan. Groups would have demonstrated theirability to save up to 25% of the loan amount and operate together for at least one year before they aregranted any loans. It was intended to use NGOs to train group leaders in leadership, group dynamicsand record keeping and savings mobilisation.

132. The sub-loans were to be made available to the beneficiaries as individuals and in groups uponcertification by the beneficiaries. The SDSB was to lend at 17% and borrowers were to contribute25% of the investment costs. Nine months repayment period was indicated for seasonal loans andthree to five years for medium term loans. The procedure was adopted for lending under the projectwith loan sanctioning powers of E 10 000 per borrower for unsecured loans.

133. The project had made an allocation of SDR 510 000 towards incremental credit. The SDSBwould be provided net funds to be disbursed after having used the funds available in the SCMPrevolving fund. Disbursements were expected to be spread over seven years. SDSB was to beprovided funds at the same rate (4%) as that the government borrowed funds from IFAD. Foreignexchange risk was to remain with the government. The spread of 13% was to be apportioned asfollows: 4% to NGOs to cover their operating costs, 7% for SDSB to cover its operating costs andmargin and the balance, 2% to be paid back into the revolving fund. SDSB was to establish a risk fundto settle bad debt using a part of the interest revenues accruing from the credit revolving fund.

(2) Performance

134. SDSB had undergone restructuring assisted by two consultancy companies from 1995 until thethird quarter of 2000. The government appointed a Swazi Managing Director to SDSB on September15, 2000. He is now in the process of reorganising the Bank. A strategic plan has been prepared andhas been accepted by Government. A new capital infusion of E 120 million has been agreed. But theGovernment is yet to approve recapitalisation of SDSB to meet the capital adequacy norms of theCentral Bank. Currently, the SDSB is technically insolvent though it remains liquid. As a result ofthis, SDSB will have to operate under stringent restrictions imposed by the Central Bank. SDSB hasbeen barred from lending and needs approval by the Central Bank to take deposits valued more thanE 10 000. However, the bar on lending is not applicable to loans from the IFAD revolving funds.

135. A subsidiary loan agreement was signed between the MOAC and SDSB as early as 1993/94 toprovide SDR 510 000 for loans to project beneficiaries. But, owing to its preoccupation withrestructuring, SDSB has not participated in the project until recently. Only during the year 2001 did itsubmit a work plan. With the latter, MOAC submitted a withdrawal application during July 2000 forthe entire amount mentioned in the subsidiary loan agreement. SDSB has now received E 5 346307.75, equivalent to SDR 510 000.

136. A statement provided by SDSB indicates that disbursements have been made to the tune of E 1634 986 to farmers. However, SDSB is yet to deliver credit to the farmer groups mobilised under theproject. The responsibility for the inability of SDSB to deliver to project farmers also partly lies withMOAC. The latter has not engaged NGOs to mobilise groups and link them to SDSB. At the same

29

time, SDSB cannot plead its innocence. It had received 24 person months of TA from the project. Inspite of this TA, no SDSB strategy for group lending materialised. It did not request the MOAC toengage NGOs to promote groups while submitting the work plan. To sum up, the current loandisbursement strategy of SDSB is in line with a bank in distress. Its focus is on guaranteed recoverythrough establishing linkages with agencies involved in procuring the produce of farmers such assugar mills. In short, the current situation of SDSB does not favour experimentation in servicedelivery to the resource poor households on SNL.

137. The performance of SDSB with regard to the revolving fund established under SCMP has beendismal. It had received E 2 628573 from IFAD and the balance as at March 31, 2000 was E 3 010635. The SDSB claims that the entire interest earnings were credited into the revolving fund accountand that no administrative expenses were debited. It now proposes to set off E 1 074 080 towardsoutstanding administrative expense and bad debt. As a result, the net revolving fund under SCMPwould shrink to E 1 936 555.

138. A three-tier financial intermediation structure is evident in the rural areas. The first tier consistsof informal women groups (locally called Zenzele groups) undertake savings and credit operations indifferent ways. They operate mostly as rotation savings and credit groups. Home Economics Sectionof MOAC was the patron of these groups. They were trained in leadership skills and maintainingbooks of accounts. The groups undertake savings and credit operations. The Home Economics Sectionobtained a small grant and started giving loans to these groups. The success of this programmeemboldened the Home Economics Section to expand its programme with assistance from a privatebank. Though it started well, it could not succeed – like any other government run credit programme.The second tier consists of micro-finance organisations such as Enterprise Trust Fund (ETF), Co-operative Credit Union (CCU), Imbita, World Vision and Africa Co-operative Action Trust (ACAT).Both ETF and Imbita provide individual loans to farmers within an organisation and are projectfocussed. Discussions with these two organisations indicate their willingness to provide loans to thegroups and leave responsibility of managing them to the members of the group. Imbita in particularhas already established contacts with well performing Zenzele groups. The CCU provides small loansto its member primary societies. It shows a keen interest to expand its credit operation.

139. SDSB represents the third tier of financial intermediation delivering services to better offfarmers who have marketing linkages and are able to provide required collateral and 25% borrowercontribution.

(3) The Issues Defined

(a) Inadequate institutional structures at SDSB to deliver financial service to resourcepoor households

140. SDSB was in distress even at the time of project appraisal. The appraisal report in its WorkingPaper VIII had clearly indicated the problems. SDSB, at the time of appraisal, was unable to give ageanalysis of the loans. Its recovery rates did not provide a full picture of the health of the loan portfolio.The performance of the revolving fund under SCMP is testimony to the level of repayment problemswithin SDSB.

141. SDSB, currently is being restructured, supervised by the Central Bank. In short, it providesloans only to farmers who have marketing linkages and in cases where repayment is assured. It is notgeared to providing loans to the farmer organisations promoted under the project as the transactioncosts to reach such farmers are higher. Farmers who are interested in small working capital loans findit difficult to meet the requirements of 25% contribution and to prove their credit worthiness. TheMid-Term Review had recommended providing project funds to ETF as SDSB did not participate inproject lending despite signing a subsidiary loan agreement. The MOAC did not accept thisrecommendation.

30

(b) Inadequacies in the subsidiary loan agreement142. Two inadequacies in the subsidiary loan agreement signed between the MEPF and SDSB areapparent. First, the subsidiary loan agreement is silent on who would bear the credit risk. Section 2.03of the agreement stipulates that SDSB shall open a subsidiary loan account into which all proceedsfrom the repayments of the sub-loans by borrowers and payments of interest thereon shall bedeposited. It further stipulates that the funds in this account shall be used solely for providing credit tosmallholders and to meet the cost of smallholder credit administration. The interpretation of thisstipulation could be stretched to allow SDSB to charge administrative expenses to the subsidiary loanaccount even when it exceeds interest earnings and also to set off bad debt. This stipulation is not inaccordance with the SAR; the latter states that SDSB would use 7% towards its operating costs andmargins, 4% to NGOs, 4% interest to MOF and 2% back to the revolving fund. It was suggested tocreate a risk fund using part of the interest revenues. 21

143. Second, the subsidiary loan agreement has not indicated the repayment schedule for SDSB torepay the loan to MOF. The subsidiary loan agreement indicates that SDSB will have to pay aninterest to MOF but is silent on the payment modalities.

(c) Inadequate compliance to design features in SAR during disbursement to SDSB144. The Loan Agreement between the Government of Swaziland and IFAD has allocated SDR 510000 towards incremental credit. The SAR had suggested the merging of the two revolving fundswithin SDSB and disbursements to be made only after SDSB has utilised the entire amount in therevolving funds.22 The PCU and the CI did not convince SDSB to provide loans to projectbeneficiaries using the funds available with the SCMP revolving fund. This would have tested thecapacity of SDSB to deliver loans to resource poor households. Instead, oddly the PCU disbursed theentire amount allocated in the SADP for the seven-year project period in one lump sum disbursementto SDSB!

(d) Inadequate strategies to reach resource poor households145. Most of the credit activities in the country are project based. Most of the rural financialinstitutions are yet to realise that resource poor households require funds for a short duration to meetemergency needs. In the absence of such assistance, they withdraw money from their smallenterprise/farming activity that would ultimately become dormant until the household is able to saveenough to restart it all over again. Larger financial institutions with high operating costs such asSDSB will not be able to reach such households. Some NGOs such as ACAT and World Vision, aswell as the Home Economics Section and the Co-operative Department are moving in the direction ofcapacity building of community groups in savings and credit activities. Some of them provide smallloans. Imbita is a specialised micro-finance NGO, which is focused on savings and delivery of credit.The government in the past has been reluctant to use loan funds to assist the NGOs to build up theirmicro-finance activity. However, Government realises that time is now ripe to diagnose the strengthsand weaknesses of the NGOs involved in micro-finance and to engage some of the better performingNGOs to provide financial service to resource poor households.

E. Marketing

(1) Design

146. The IFAD project has intended to address the constraints encountered in SCMP namely : (i)failure of Encabeni (formerly Nokwane) to attract smallholder produce; (ii) absence of Encabenimarket/domestic producer linkages and (iii) lack of well planned and phased production programmes

21 Para 185 of the SAR.22 Loan Conditions and Assurances.

31

for market oriented production. NAMBOARD’s statutory and commercial functions were to beseparated. The Fund had stipulated that this was a condition to be completed by July 31 1993, or at alater date satisfactory to the fund.

147. NAMBOARD was to be strengthened to: (i) co-ordinate project marketing intervention; (ii)comply with its statutory requirements in collecting data on the scheduled produce; (iii) forecast thedemand for horticultural produce for domestic consumption and for potential exports; (iv) publishregular information on production and marketing trends; and (v) recommend additional crops.Moreover, NAMBOARD was to establish a crop development and information section (CDIS).

148. To build capacity in theses areas, NAMBOARD would appoint an economist and ahorticulturist to work closely with the Horticultural Development Adviser (HDA). The HDA wouldbe responsible for: (i) establishing CDIS in NAMBOARD; (ii) drawing linkages between the farmergroups and traders in close collaboration with NGOs, as farmers do not understand the present tradingsystem. Accordingly the NAMBOARD would fund a two year pilot programme during which therepresentatives of the Encabeni agencies would introduce: (i) cash trading; (ii) demonstrate theselection, presentation and packaging of produce to compete with imported vegetables; (iii) organisethe collection of all produce; (iv) demonstrate through trial consignments, sales of produce for whichguaranteed cash prices would be offered; and (v) operate together with NGO staff and farmerassociations in developing a market based approach to production.

(2) Performance

149. NAMBOARD was mandated by parliament to regulate imports as well as to determine levieson scheduled produce (vegetables, maize wheat and wheat products and poultry and poultry products)in conjunction with MOAC. It is required to facilitate procurement of scheduled agricultural productsto meet any shortfall in production for which import permits are issued and the levy at the border iscollected. But, it does not yet have a mechanism to collect data on a scientific basis on localproduction and determine shortfalls to determine the quantum of import. The Horticultural Adviserestablished an information section. But it is based on the data of NAMBOARD’s purchases andimport licences issued. It does not collect data on production and shortfalls. The NAMBOARD is notpublishing any data on production and marketing trends as required in the project. The HorticulturalAdviser’s contribution in establishing new crops, and drawing linkages between the farmer groupsand traders has been limited.

150. NAMBOARD has established a system of procurement of vegetables from the farm gate. Itmanages two depots (Lomahasha and Piggs Peak) in the country. It initially enters into agreementswith farmers and farmer associations for a particular crop indicating the procurement price. Onprocurement from the farmers, NAMBOARD staff directly sells it to major consumers and retailersthrough the two depots. NAMBOARD did separate the statutory and commercial functions for a shorttime. But, as the commercial functions are not financially viable, the separation of these two activitieswas rolled back. The statutory function continues to subsidise the commercial functions. TheNAMBOARD under instructions from MOAC is now in the process of working out joint venturearrangements with a private trader for Encabeni market, which is the hub of vegetable marketing.Encabeni is currently negotiating with Pick n Pay to export baby vegetables to South Africa. Inaddition, Encabeni also has a marketing agent in South Africa to supply vegetables to the EU market;the current export volume is very small.

151. The government has only played a facilitating role in promoting livestock marketing. It hadbuilt sales yards and handed them over to farmers themselves to manage. The private sector is fullyinvolved in marketing of livestock products. The performance of the meat (beef) industry is hamperedby the reluctance of SNL farmers to sell cattle and not by the lack of marketing channels : cattlefarming is not considered as an enterprise but as an instrument of capital accumulation. Non-

32

availability of other potential capital accumulation options (such as land and housing or real estate)aggravates this situation. However, private sector marketing of livestock products (poultry, pigs, goatsand cattle) is vibrant.

(3) The Issue Defined

(a) Ability of NAMBOARD to operate on unequal terms with the private sector152. NAMBOARD continues to have statutory as well as commercial functions and the rationale forthis double function is in doubt. It collects taxes from imports. The commercial operations largelyinclude vegetable marketing and to a small extent meat and poultry. It competes with private sector byoffering better prices using its financial muscle derived from collection of import levy. The net resultis that the levies collected from the imports of scheduled produce do not reach the national exchequerbut are spent on maintaining the loss making commercial activity. At the same time, development ofprivate sector is stifled to the detriment of the interests of the farmers and the consumers.

F. Other Institutional Strengthening Efforts

(1) Drought Early Warning and Contingency Planning

153. The project intended to support the National Early Warning Support Unit (NEWU) whichbecame operational in 1987. At the time of project design, it was anticipated that the FAO support tothe unit would finish by 1993. The project would fund in service training for local staff and formallyestablish contact with regional headquarters in Zimbabwe. The NEWU would develop for eachvulnerable region, social, physical and economical indicators for early warning of the on-set ofdrought. It would define a contingency funding arrangements and instruments to be used toimmediately access such funds at the onset of drought.

154. The Unit is located within the Economic Planning and Analysis Section. It was intended thatthe unit would have a Nutritionist but that post is yet to be created. The Unit produces monthly foodsecurity reports. It acts as a secretariat for the national early warning technical advisory committee,which meets on a quarterly basis. All equipment and training have been provided. But the long-termtraining as agreed in the Mid-Term Review is yet to be provided.

(2) CCU

155. The Project proposed a study be undertaken to prepare a strategic plan for strengthening CCUto ensure that it emerges as a financially strong institution. FINTEC consultants Cairo was selected toundertake this study. The study amongst others proposed internal reorganisation of the CCU,increasing its trading activity, broadening its membership and implementation of several projects.This report was submitted in 1996. The government is not satisfied with the study. It was planned thatthe consultants would return to address the concerns of MOAC. This has not materialised. The CCUis embarking on a restructuring process, assisted by the Enterprise Development Fund. Discussionswith the officials of the CCU indicate that the CCU would be even interested in moving from tradingtowards producing fertiliser and animal feed; there is a need to carefully review benefits and costs ofsuch aspirations since trading – but not production - remains the core strength of CCU.

33

(3) MOAC Reorganisation

156. The project would finance a study building on the work already undertaken, to review MOAC’sorganisational structure to streamline its operations at the Head Office and the field level. The studywould inter alia examine MOAC’s organisation (manpower deployment, extension and cost recovery)to strengthen MOAC’s capacity to implement various programmes and projects.

157. Zimken Management Consultants have been engaged to conduct a study on the reorganisationof MOAC. They have submitted a report in February 2001. This report has been discussed andapproved by the MOAC and forwarded to the Ministry of Public Services and Information. TheMinistry of Public Services Affairs and Information is now in the process of implementing the PublicSector Reform Programme. The MOAC reorganisation would be considered as a part of thisprogramme. The study does not analyse the service delivery approach and the organisationalrequirements to deliver services to resource poor SNL farmers.

G. Monitoring and Evaluation

(1) Design

158. The project design intended to establish proper reporting and monitoring arrangements. Thekey emphasis would be on establishing important parameters. The procedures set out in the SARwould be followed and the Heads of Departments involved in project implementation would agreeand then monitor the programme. The progress reporting would bet set against the annual work planwhile monitoring will be set against appraisal targets. Project reporting and monitoring would be theresponsibility of the PCU, while evaluation would be the responsibility of Economic Planning andAnalysis Section (EPAS). The major thrust of monitoring would be on financial monitoring andphysical progress of all components, which would be carried out against the Annual Work Plans andBudgets. Physical monitoring would be in co-operation with implementing agencies against theirrespective programme budgets. It was also planned to monitor the research trials and stall feedingtrials. The project design expected to achieve beneficiary contact monitoring by systematic analysis ofdata generated with respect to extension visits and uptake of packages.

159. The focus of evaluation would be on impact assessment based on the appraisal targets. The networth calculation would be used for assessing the impact. A baseline survey would be conductedduring the PY1 and this would provide the basis for the evaluation survey at the rate of one every twoyears to assess project impact on beneficiary households. A Mid-Term Review would be conducted in1994 to assess the impact of the project on the beneficiaries and make any recommendations forchanges in the project design.

(2) Performance

160. In October 1994, a two-day Monitoring and Evaluation Seminar was organised with the help ofMananga Management Centre. This included a session on the introduction to the concept of theLogical Framework Approach. The log frame concept is being used in a rudimentary way to reportproject progress. The Monitoring Officer made some attempts to draw tables of component-wiseactivities, outputs and objectives. But these were not co-opted by the Component Managers.Subsequently, a three-month TA was provided to develop the project monitoring and evaluationsystem. Even now, the formats designed by the TA are not being fully used by the ComponentManagers to report progress in project implementation.

161. The project engaged a consultancy company to undertake base line survey. The baseline surveywas conducted in 1996. The baseline survey provides very good details on overall poverty status and

34

farming systems. But it fails to identify the impact points at the community and household level thatneed to be monitored during the subsequent evaluation/impact surveys. The evaluation surveysproposed once in every two years have not been undertaken. The project was required to undertake animpact evaluation study as an input to the Project Completion Report. Actions to initiate the processare yet to be taken.

(3) The Issues Defined

(a) Inadequate emphasis on learning through feedback162. The role of the M&E system is not restricted to progress monitoring and comparing theachievements made by the project vis-à-vis appraisal targets. The system should also generatesystematic feedback from the beneficiaries. Based on such feedback, lessons need to be drawn outwith which to assist in reorienting the project. The project management’s perception with regard torigidity of project activities is one of the main reasons for not installing a M&E system that aids indrawing lessons from implementation experience.

(b) Insufficient emphasis on measurable outcomes to monitor project impact163. The project document did not set out the outcomes that could be measured to assess the projectimpact. It indicates calculating net worth of the project beneficiaries over a period of time as a meansto assess the impact of the project. Collection of data on assets and liabilities to assess the net worth issubject to a large number of assumptions. Such attempt would not provide accurate or meaningfuldata with which to assess changes in IFAD target group well being.

H. Compliance with Loan Agreement and Covenants

164. The loan agreement between IFAD and the government had stipulated two covenants. The firstone pertains to periodic revision of the interest rates. It would be applied to credits to be made out ofthe proceeds of the loan so as to take appropriate measures consistent with the policies of theborrower in order to harmonise the interest rates on credits with the Fund’s policy on relending rates.The second covenant requires SDSB to minimise its costs. Compliance with these covenants was oflittle consequence as the SDSB received project funding only in 2001.

35

CHAPTER V

IMPACT AND SUSTAINABILITY

A. Conceptual Framework

165. Farm households first pursue extensive cultivation practices. They increase area cultivated andadd indigenous small stock units. A second stage of extensification is reached when production isdriven by need of increased cash income as well as by food security concerns. A third stage is reachedwhen improved technology becomes available with which to intensify production, i.e. to counterdeclining productivity, or raise yields on limited resources of labour, arable land and grazing land.Intensification requires additional quantities of labour and material inputs, and higher skills, in shorthigher costs: the process is driven by an improved market access. A fourth stage is reached wheninvestment in livestock assets is being driven more by productivity that reflects size of grazing areaand by the availability of alternative outlets for capital accumulation.

166. Technology demand differs across rural households: it responds to the size of entitlements, theconfiguration of initial assets, food insecurity, risk absorption capacity and relative labour constraints.Moreover, it reflects the farmers’ own perception and assessment about potential spread inproductivity between potential and present practices, and the associated risks of adopting newtechnology.

167. The impact on the target group will be higher: (i) when the distribution of assets of land andlivestock is reasonably equal rather than unequal; (ii) the more research and extension systems makeavailable land, labour and cost saving technology; (iii) the more the land tenure and rentalmechanisms permit the security of tenure to attract investment in land based activity; and (iv) themore efficient are the small farmers in resource use. This framework permits us to analyse, first thecontext for poverty alleviation, second, actual progress and issues, and third the actual potential for,and benefits of, a more effective strategy for poverty alleviation.

B. Overall

168. The project was designed to improve the incomes and food security of Swaziland’sdisadvantaged smallholder families, particularly women on SNL. However, during the course ofproject implementation the food and nutrition security situation in Swaziland has deteriorated.

(1) Nutritional Status of Children in Swaziland

169. Projects still use subjective, non-verifiable and imprecise data to infer impact. There is anincreasing consensus among development practitioners: income based indicators do not capturecritical dimensions of poverty. Instead, the nutritional status of children under five (stunting) is asuperior impact indicator compared to monetised income. On the other hand, a general misconceptioncan be still be found that the height linear growth also children, not only of adults, is linked to geneticfactors. But there is no body of evidence to suggest that growth potentials at childhood differsubstantially across the main ethnic groups. 23 The final height of a person is determined by bothgenetic and environmental factors. The point is vital to understand that the average stature of persons

23 Dr. P. Dasgupta, “An Inquiry into Well-being and Destitution, (1996, Oxford Clarendon Press, pp.83-84)

36

in poor countries is for the most part attributed to poor nutrition and the heavy incidence of infectiousdiseases. Three measures are used to assess the nutritional status. They are: (i) wasting; (ii)underweight; and (iii) stunting (chronic malnutrition). Wasting and underweight incorporates theseasonal dimensions, whilst stunting represents a precise indicator of the debilitating chronicmalnutrition. 24

170. Stunting – measured by height-for-age and reflects linear pre- and postnatal growth. Stuntingreflects the long-term, cumulative effects of inadequate nutrition and/or health and thus refers to‘shortness’ where a child’s linear growth has failed to reach genetic potential as a result of poor dietand disease. Stunting is defined as low height-for-age at less than –2.00 SD from the median value ofthe NCHS/WHO international growth reference. Severe stunting is defined as < - 3.00 SD(ACC/SCN).

171. Nutrition studies over the past 2 decades have consistently identified chronic or long-termmalnutrition (as measured by stunting) as the major problem facing the country. Chronic malnutritionreflected in stunting (height-for-age) is a precise indicator of endemic poverty. According to thenational nutritional survey conducted in the year 2000, 30.2% of children under age five are stuntedwhile those wasted were less than 2%. Under weight, as measured by weight-for-age was found in10.3% of the children.

172. The rate of stunting is higher in rural areas than in urban areas, and was lowest in the companytowns. Stunting rates in Shiselweni region and in the rural areas of Swaziland are higher than thenational average. About 38% of the children under-five in the Shiselweni region were stunted and therate of stunting in the rural areas was 32%. Hhoho region reported the second highest stunting rate.The prevalence of underweight is much lower than stunting but it follows the same pattern. The ruralareas and Shiselweni had higher underweight rates than the national average. The stunting data for theyear 2000 confirm that Shiselweni is the most disadvantaged administrative region with the highestprevalence of malnutrition (Table 3).

Table 3: Prevalence of malnutrition among under-five children, Swaziland, 2000

Category Sub-category Stunted25 Underweight26 Wasted27

Sex Male 31.9 10.6 1.6Female 28.3 9.9 1.0

Region Hhohho 28.2 10.1 2.1Manzini 26.9 9.0 0.6Shiselweni 38.3 12.5 1.5Lubombo 27.9 9.7 0.9Rural 31.9 10.9 1.4Urban 24.0 7.7 0.7Company town 17.7 7.9 1.3

Overall 30.2 10.3 1.3

173. Prevalence of stunting is at its lowest at the youngest ages, i.e., less than six months. During theweaning period, 12-23 months, it is at its highest when about 40% of the children are stunted. Beyond23 months, the stunting rate decreases, but it remains close to 30% until age five (Figure 2).

24 Wasting – is a term used to describe recent events, such as an acute food shortage and/or severe illness, whichhave caused substantial weight loss.25 Under-five children who have height-for-age Z scores below minus 2 standard deviations from the median ofthe reference population.26 Under-five children who have weight-for-age Z scores below minus 2 standard deviations from the median ofthe reference population.27 Under-five children who have weight-for-height Z scores below minus 2 standard deviations from the medianof the reference population.

37

This means that a significant number of children start schooling when they are nutritionallycompromised. The same pattern holds for malnutrition rates as measured by underweight and wasting.The prevalence of underweight is at its lowest at less than six months after which it increasessignificantly until tapers off at the end of the five years

Figure 2: Prevalence of stunting by age

174. In 1983, the prevalence of stunting among pre-school children was 30% with rural childrenshowing higher levels than the children in the peri-urban areas. There were no significant disparitiesobserved by administrative district or agro-ecological zone. Low prevalence rates were also found tobe associated with availability and use of a toilet, source of drinking water, previous sibling deaths,household size, educational level of parents, type of marriage, travel time to the nearest clinic, cropsales and availability of a vegetable garden.

175. The survey in 1995 indicated a very modest decline in stunting rates; 27% of the children underfive years of age were stunted. Over the period 1983 to 1995, the efforts to improve nutritional statusresulted in a decline in the stunting rate by 3%. In contrast, the most recent national survey conductedin 2000 indicates an increase of the stunting rate in the five years between 1995 and 2000. Theprevalence of stunting in 2000 was 30.2% compared to 27% in 1995 (Figure3).

Figure 3: Trends in Stunting 1983-2000

176. The deterioration of nutritional status was the highest in Shiselweni region. The stunting rateincreased from 21% in 1995 to 38.3% in 2000. Nutritional status of children improved marginallyfrom 1995 to 2000 in respect of Hhoho and Manzini whilst the situation was static in case ofLubombo (Table 4).

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

1983 1995 2000Year

Prev

alen

ce (%

)

National Rural Urban

0

1 0

2 0

3 0

4 0

5 0

< 6 6 t o 1 2 1 2 t o 2 3 2 4 t o 3 5 3 6 t o 4 7 4 8 t o 5 9

A g e i n m o n t h s

Prev

alen

ce (

%)

38

Table 4: Comparative Stunting Rates (1983-2000)

Region Year1983 1995 2000

National 30.3 27 41.9Hhohho 31.5 33 37.7Manzini 27.6 27 37.6Shiselweni 32.0 21 54.1Lubombo 30.2 27 39.3Rural 30.3 30 44.4Urban 23.0 20 33.2

(2) Trends

177. The IE commissioned a small survey to collect data on trends. Data were collected from all thehouseholds in four enumeration areas with IFAD interventions. Sites represented all the four agro-ecological zones in Swaziland. Enumeration Area used by this survey is the same as the one used bythe Central Statistics Office for purposes of carrying out the population census. The selection ofthe area was purposive. Enumeration areas with completed irrigation schemes were selected for thepurpose of survey. The Monitoring and Evaluation Officers of the project as well as the MOACassisted in undertaking this survey.

178. A total of 244 households were interviewed. The majority of the heads of household weremarried (61 %), with about 27% widowed. About half of them were not employed, 26.6 % were inskilled employment and 22.1 % in unskilled employment. Close to 50% of the households receivedremittances. Half the households had no cattle, while 18% had more than ten. Only 5% of the samplehad no farming land. The baseline survey identified 13% landless households. The most oftenmentioned income sources were remittances, sale of items within households, crop sales, wages,hawking, and livestock sale. When comparing the situation today with five years ago, 26 of the 48households who sold maize said income from maize sale was increasing. The same applied forincome from marketing of vegetable, pigs, goats, poultry, and cattle. The percentage of householdswho derived income from these sales was very low. Nevertheless, for those who did sell, the majorityof them perceived income from the sales to be increasing compared to five years ago. Perceptionsabout changes in the consumption of vegetables, milk, eggs, and meat were also positive. The numberwho said consumption was increasing was higher than those who said it was decreasing.

179. The socio-economic circumstances of the households involved in the case study are very muchin line with the profile derived from the vulnerability assessment of Holt et. al (1999). 28 Using theRisk Mapping approach, Holt et. al, (1999) divided the country into eight food economy zones (FEZ)based on an assessment of people’s livelihood strategies and their vulnerability to hunger.

180. The proportion of poor households in these eight FEZs ranged from 25% to 60%. Commonfeatures of poor households across the zones were that:

1) Earnings from temporary, seasonal , daily employment usually with better-off neighbours andrelatives represents the major source of income. There is virtually no income from crop andlivestock sales and minimum contribution of these to household consumption.

28 Julius Holt, Kerry Selvester, and the Swaziland Risk Mapping Team, June 1999. Mbabane, Swaziland, Reportof the Swaziland Household Food Economy Assessment and Vulnerability Mapping April - October 1998.

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2) By necessity, their income sources are diversified.3) They cultivate less farmland, anywhere from as little as .25-1.0 hectare to produce from zero to

five bags of maize. It is only in the endowed Highveld maize and cattle zone where the poor areable to produce up to 10 bags.

4) Except for chicken, they own no livestock. It is only in the Lowveld cattle-cotton maize zonewhere the poor may have up to five cattle heads, and the same number of goats.

5) They can not afford inputs (timely traction, cash, labour) resulting in low yields of the staplemaize, making them market dependent for up to 90% of their maize consumption needs.

6) In the drought prone areas, they do not grow cotton (unaffordable of inputs), but they ‘insist’ ongrowing maize.

181. In contrast, the rich households were found to:

1) Derive a major portion of their income from crop and livestock sales. Consequently,employment income was not the primary income source.

2) Farm more land for maize and may receive an average of up to 110 bags in the Highveld maizeand cattle zone.

3) Farm more land for the major cash crop in the Lowveld cattle and cotton zones where the poor donot grow any cotton; for rich households their average yield is 20-30 bales.

182. The adequacy of maize production for household consumption varies by regions (Table 5).Nationally, the homesteads that never produce enough or do not produce represent more than 50%; inShiselweni and Lubombo the proportion is higher than the national figure. Most of Lubombo andShiselweni consist of the drought-prone Lowveld agro-ecological zone.

Table 5: Percentage of homesteads by status of maize production

Status RegionsNational Hhohho Manzini Shiselweni Lubombo

Always enough 9 14 13 6 2Mostly enough 9 10 15 8 3Sometimes enough 26 25 28 24 27

Never enough 44 41 37 52 44Not producing 12 10 7 10 24

Source: C.S.O. Annual survey on SNL 1998/99

183. From this survey, it becomes apparent that the poor do not perceive their lives to be improving.First of all, very few of them identified sale of agricultural produce as an income source. Secondly,even fewer perceive that there has been an increase in income or consumption from the variousagricultural produce. Initially, food utilisation activities were not part of SADP. The Food Technologysub component was incorporated much later than the other activities. Its major thrust has been thetraining of Home Economics Extension Officers and farmers on food processing and the promotion ofcassava and indigenous foods.

184. Due to the scattered nature of the IFAD projects, it will always be next to impossible todetermine their impact on the socio-economic situation of households. For definite charting of theimpact of the project, there need to be reliable indicators that can detect improvements in quality oflife over time. The baseline survey and the subsequent scattered implementation approach adopted bySADP make it difficult to attribute progress or lack of it to any particular development initiativeexcept in the case of completed irrigation infrastructure. Nevertheless, even in this case, theachievement in this subcomponent with regard to extent of land covered under irrigation remainsminuscule.

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(3) Impact of Project Components

185. The Appraisal Report envisaged that approximately 2 200 homesteads would benefit from the185 ha proposed for irrigation development – excluding those who were to benefit from NGO supportto consolidation of the existing irrigation schemes. Based on assumed cropping patterns of greenmaize and cabbage on 0.4 ha plots on new and rehabilitated small-scale schemes, and more intensivevegetable production on 0.05 ha plots on micro-scale schemes, the Appraisal Report estimatedincremental returns to family labour of USD 6-13 per labour day. These were considerably higherthan the estimated incremental returns labour from improved dryland cropping under the project(USD 1.3-3.0), reflecting the high value of vegetable crops compared with the staple food crops.

186. The Appraisal Report considered that plant protection chemicals recommended for vegetableswere of acceptable toxicity levels (although it was unclear what these recommendations were). It alsowas of the view that irrigation design would need to be improved, which would “minimise the salinityproblem”. However, it recognised that intensification of production would lead to increased use ofchemicals and that it would be necessary to regularly monitor surface water for pollution.29 It notedthat farmers and extension staff would be trained in environmental awareness. It also noted that theproposed marketing arrangements would include controls to minimise health hazards – e.g. cholera. Itwas however unclear about how, by whom and at what cost this monitoring, training and controlwould be undertaken.

187. The Appraisal Report noted that the project would particularly benefit women, particularlythose involved in micro-schemes – which the project was to favour the development of. It also notedthat the project would ease labour constraints (a factor that affects the ability of female headedhouseholds to cultivate effectively) by providing credit for tractor ploughing.

188. The irrigation component did much less than expected. Incrementally, it added only 11.3 ha, ofwhich about 4.0 ha were in small-scale schemes and about 7.3 ha are in micro schemes – comparedwith the targets of 85 ha and 100 ha respectively. Nothing has been achieved on the intendedconsolidation and reorganisation of the 257 ha of ‘old IFAD schemes’. However, the micro schemesthat have been developed to date are producing a range of vegetables for home consumption and localmarketing and appear to have a significant impact on household incomes and nutrition. From aconsideration of the costs mentioned above and the indicative crop budgets and representative farmmodel in Appendix 2, these benefits far outweigh the costs. The existing small-scale schemes, such asNtamakuphila, Kholwane and Nkwene produce on a much larger scale for passing trade and furtherafield.

189. The indications from this are that new/rehabilitated schemes will perform well provided theyare physically sustainable and present market access is maintained or improved. But neither of thesetwo preconditions is at present guaranteed. Marketing is less of a problem on the micro-schemes,because they are small, widely dispersed and are generally able to dispose of their surplus locally.The project did not envisage a system of cost recovery for the investments made in the irrigationinfrastructure. The farmer organisations were not developed to take over the responsibility ofoperation and maintenance. As a result, the sustainability of irrigation investments is in doubt.

190. Most of the planned adaptive research has been undertaken on maize, cowpeas, groundnuts,sorghum, tomatoes, cabbage, amaranthus, potatoes, onions, corchora and okra. However, there hasbeen virtually no positive impact yet of all this work on the smallholder farmers’ productivity. Ofcourse, in some cases, the reason for the lack of impact was that the trials were unsuccessful, as in thecase of the sorghum trials, in which bird damage was severe. But in most cases, the fault rests in aninsufficient analytical framework. Little attention was given at time of design to the step-wiseprocesses that are required to move from the stage of adaptive research to widespread dissemination

29 Apparently the risk to groundwater was not recognised.

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and uptake. These steps were neither envisioned nor implemented. In some cases, for instance,experienced personnel left the project, so that no one wrote up the research report or no specificrecommendations were ever formulated. In the remaining cases, in which good quality varieties wereidentified, devoted researchers wrote reports, farmers seemed to approve of the varieties, but theproject failed to find any organisation to multiply the seeds for distribution or sale to the farmers.

191. The livestock component has been relatively successful when compared to other components.Until an outbreak of FMD in the regions of Manzini, Lubombo and Hhohho in November andDecember 2000, Swaziland had been free of FMD for more than twenty years. It had, in May 2000,obtained status, granted by the World Organisation for Animal Health, as a ‘FMD Free CountryWithout Vaccination’.

192. A partial cost-recovery practice was evolving in the dips prior to the project interventionsowing to the government’s financial constraints. However, this was discontinued when the projectfunds arrived and a return was made to the ‘Government pays-all’ situation. This is contrary to what isrequired for a sustainable arrangement, where farmer involvement is necessary in management,investment and cost recovery of the dips. Such a situation does not bode well for developingsustainable dipping practices. An unintended but welcome benefit of the research on alternative tickcontrol strategies is that it has increased the capability of the staff of the Epidemiology Unit toconduct on-farm research.

193. The training programmes conducted by the Livestock Training Centre at Mpisi have helped inupgrading the capabilities of farmers. Even though the SAR did not place any special emphasis ontraining in small stock development, the training centre developed a few modules in pig rearing andpoultry farming. This effort has had a catalytic effect on uptake by the women. These activities atpresent are dependent on commercial inputs and efforts to develop local feed resources are vital forlong-term sustainability of these interventions. However, the income levels of the women undertakingpig rearing and poultry production has increased substantially. The inability of the women to accesscredit has been the main constraint and inadequate working capital has led to closure of a number ofpoultry units.

194. Credit and marketing components were the ones that have had least impact on the project targetgroup. Despite the fact that the project disbursed the entire credit allocation to SDSB, nodisbursements were made to the project beneficiaries. The marketing component never tried todevelop linkages between the private sector and the project beneficiaries but has been trying tocompete with the private sector on unequal terms by giving better prices by subsidising itscommercial operations using the revenues generated from its statutory functions.

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CHAPTER VI

LESSONS LEARNED

A. Achieving Quantifiable and Verifiable Impact at the Level of Resource PoorHouseholds

195. SADP rightly targeted the SNL where most resource poor households live. Poverty inSwaziland has been described as a rural phenomenon. The SAR assumed that the resource poorhouseholds were geographically widely distributed, whilst the target group would be found inhouseholds that were:1) Cash/resource poor labour rich; and2) Cash/resource poor labour poor

196. Households with 0.5 to 1 hectare farm land; where the head was unemployed or unskilled off-farm employment, female; receiving remittances; less than 10 cattle; nobody in employment; nodraught oxen, were going to be targeted.

197. The IE conducted a survey in four representative enumeration areas with IFAD interventions. Atotal of 244 households were interviewed. The majority of the heads of household were married (61%), with about 27% widowed. About half of them were not employed, 26.6 % were in skilledemployment and 22.1 % in unskilled employment.

198. Close to 50% of the households received remittances. Half the households had no cattle, while18% had more than ten heads. Only 5% of the sample had no farming land; the baseline surveyidentified 13% landless households. The most often mentioned income sources were remittances, saleof items within household, crop sales, wages, hawking, and livestock sale.

199. This pattern clearly demonstrates two issues related to identifying resource poor households.First, the entire SNL was regarded as the project area. The project design did not take into account theregional disparities. This resulted in a scattered project implementation increasing logistic andmanagement problems. In turn this contributed to the difficulty of our IE to identify and quantifyimpact of the project. Second, the project provided merely broad or vague guidelines for identifyingresource poor households. As a result, the project funded irrigation interventions appear to have beentargeted to the target group but it in reality reached the better off households. The project design didnot pursue or reflect household survey data that show that some 50% of the households possess nocattle and about 5% have no farmland. The IE is of the view that these categories of households formthe focus target group of IFAD.

200. A three-pronged approach is necessary to identify IFAD target group and to assess impact ofthe project. First, prior to project design, using relevant, valid and low cost data for chronicallymalnourished children under five years, the most vulnerable areas requiring project interventions willhave to be identified. Subsequently targets need to be fixed as a part of the objectives of project toreduce chronic malnutrition. Second, with detailed survey data for these households, projects willhave to design interventions that reach the poorest groups. These interventions are generally low cost /low capital in nature: they increase the risk taking ability of the households by focussing on their corestrengths and solutions that are found at the level of the community, i.e. self help micro projects suchas for improved drinking water for humans. Third, the welfare of the community over a period of timecan be tracked by conducting surveys to collect data on chronic malnutrition. Reduction in these ratesindicates gains in the welfare of the community.

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B. Participatory Processes – Vital for Poverty Alleviation

201. This project design had realised the importance of participatory processes as a vital instrumentto permit resource poor households to articulate their preferences. It had also visualised the need forengaging NGOs to develop farmer organisations. But unfortunately, the project design did not havecommunity mobilisation as a separate supporting ‘integrating’ component that would form the basisfor designing the interventions in other activities, for irrigation, livestock development and adaptiveresearch. Capacity building for participatory development and skills for facilitation of the communityto undertake low cost interventions did not take place. The project developed separate groups for eachactivity and the related services delivered. The project simply and regrettably became a funding agentto the line departments of MOAC to implement activities in the same way as any other departmentactivity.

202. Participation is generally not well understood. Some even regard mere consultation with thebeneficiaries as participation. Four steps are essential to empower resource poor households toachieve participatory development. First, ascertaining the level of interest of the target group inparticipatory development is vital. This includes formulation of a social charter outlining the vision ofthe community with regard to overcoming issues that may relate to health, education, environment,natural resources, women and resource poor. The most important is the social action phase by thecommunity to demonstrate their ability to work together by undertaking activities using their ownresources. Second, capacity building of the project staff, NGO staff and the selected communitymembers is the next important step. It is generally assumed that the NGOs have necessary capacityand capacity building of NGOs is ignored. Capacity building will have to cover both aspects related tocommunity development planning and financial management. The third step involves communityinstitution development and implementation of the interventions; these involve community levelplanning, facilitation of the community to identify low cost options and sustainable solutions,provision of necessary financial resources and implementation of the intervention by the communitythemselves. The fourth step, represents monitoring the progress including financial discipline,evaluating the impact of the project interventions and adjusting the project priorities and interventionsbased on the lessons learned.

C. Supervision

203. The supervision provided by the CI has been inadequate. Most if not all of the persistency ofthe problems encountered can be traced back to poor supervision. Supervising process orientedprojects are not as simple as sector specific projects. The CI needs to use for referral and periodicassistance a core group of consultants with hands-on experience in participatory development andtechnical interventions such as in the case of irrigation. If supervision costs were a constraint, thesavings made by the CI by not including an engineer in the supervision are not comparable to theunproductive investments made in irrigation infrastructure. There is reason both for IFAD PMD andthe CI to reconsider the wider costs of excessive economy in curtailing supervision budgets.All irrigation subprojects of the magnitude proposed under SADP should be subject to ‘no objection’by a competent engineer during supervision, to avoid expensive mistakes of the Lavumisa kind. Thereason why SADP oddly has escaped this requirement is because the irrigation section has directlyimplemented the works – i.e. there was no contractor involved.

D. Project Co-ordination and Management

204. Too much reliance was placed for too long on a Project Co-ordinator drawn from within theranks of MOAC, with little in the way of incentives to good performance – or disincentives to poorperformance. Experience with other projects in the region suggests that a national Project Co-

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ordinator recruited from the private sector might have been more effective. Knowing that his/her jobdepended on it, he or she would have seen that a PCC was essential for effective project managementand would have insisted that the supervision took the issue up at the right time and place.

205. The project used the line departments for direct implementation. Even though the irrigationsection has not capacity to undertake direct implementation, all irrigation works were assigned to itfor direct implementation. As a result, the project had to rely heavily on government procedures forprocurement and funds flow. This has resulted in piece-meal approach to irrigation infrastructuredevelopment. This issue could have been remedied if the project were to engage contractor forimplementation and the irrigation section for supervision. It is essential that the government take upthe role of the facilitator rather than that of the implementer.

E. Technical Assistance Versus NGO and Private Sector

206. This project is yet another example of one that makes a feeble attempt to engage the NGO andprivate sector. Three years and substantial funds were invested in technical assistance for theIrrigation Section without any sign of increased capacity or, indeed, increased levels of agriculturalproduction and incomes. There was and is a dynamic private sector within Swaziland and across theborder in South Africa that could have undertaken the design and implementation of most, if not all,of the schemes targeted. If this had been used, instead of relying on technical assistance, the schemescould have been completed years ago. The same applies to the use of NGOs. Had the IrrigationSection adopted a facilitating role instead of preferring direct implementation it could havesuccessfully contracted NGOs to assist in not only achieving the target of 100 ha of micro-schemes,but also the consolidation and reorganisation of the ‘old IFAD schemes’ – which are now by defaultfalling into disrepair and (in at least one case) being abandoned. The Appraisal Report and LoanAgreement should have been much firmer on the need to involve the NGO and private sector.

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CHAPTER VII

THE FUTURE

A. Introduction

207. Successful broad-based rural development programmes typically progress in three distinctphases. In the first phase capacities are built, structures are set up and quantitative targets to improvethe nutritional status are established. In the second phase, interventions are identified, communitiesare facilitated to identify low cost and sustainable options, interventions are implemented andconstraints emerge in fulfilling the targets. In the third phase, progress is monitored, impact of theinterventions assessed, constraints to achieve impact are analysed; based on the lessons learned,implementation modalities are adjusted to ensure that institutional capabilities are in place forsustainable service delivery.

208. The recommendations are divided into two parts: (i) for the ongoing project; and (ii) any futureproject. These recommendations have been discussed and endorsed in the final workshop.

B. Recommendations for the Ongoing Project

209. The project is due for closure on 31 March 2001. The AfDB vide letter dated 8 November 2000has informed MOAC that the loan account will close on 30 September 2001; thereafter, only eligibleexpenditure properly entered into before this date and winding down activities will be settled fromproject funds. The last date of withdrawal from the loan account will be 31 December 2002. Thismeans that the project can continue to implement its activities beyond another 12 months.

210. The project activities related to group development, credit, irrigation and livestock have beenimplemented in a fragmented manner. Most irrigation schemes implemented under the project remainnon-operational. Activities related to small stock development (pigs and poultry) remain few and farbetween. The ability of the PCU is severely constrained by inadequate co-ordination amongst theHeads of the Departments owing to the lack of a genuine PCC and by the lack of a technical team atthe PCU level to co-ordinate, assist and supervise the activities of the line departments.

(1) Building Project Management Capability

(a) Project co-ordination committee211. It is important that the PCC system is revived headed by the PS and attended by all theDepartment Heads, with the PC acting as secretary. The deliberations at the PCC level will have tofocus on the policy issues. Foremost for policy makers to deal with are: (i) NGO involvement forcommunity mobilisation to reach resource poor households: (ii) making credit available to the targetgroup households; (iii) procurement procedures; and (iv) integrating service delivery to the benefit ofthe resource poor households. The Ministry with the PCC system stakes out policy, whilst the headsof departments assume ownership of the project and its supported activities. PCC meetings should beheld at least once each three months. In addition, the Ministry has a system of fortnightly meetings ofdepartment heads. It is recommended that the PC also be invited to attend these monthly meetings todiscuss the project issues on a regular basis.

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(b) Project management capability212. Generally, managing multisectoral projects requires a core team of professionals at the PCUwhen the activities are implemented outside the government line departments. This project intended touse line departments; hence the PCU had a small staff compliment. It was assumed that the PC wouldonly forward and ensure proper implementation given directions by the PCC. However, there is aneed in this project to strengthen its capacity by employing a community development officer withexperience in working with the NGOs. S/he should be appointed on a contract basis from the private/NGO sector. It is recommended that the cost of employing this person be reimbursed from the IFADloan. S/he will be responsible for reviewing proposals of NGOs and the Home Economics Section,prepare contract documents, and provide required backstopping to the NGOs and Home EconomicsSection.

213. It is also recommended that the PCU officially request IFAD to provide an Irrigation Specialistunder the Technical Assistance Grant (TAG) allocated for implementation support to assist the projectin completing the unfinished irrigation schemes. It is also recommended that the same TAG be used toprovide an engineer to join future supervision missions for the project. The project accounting systemwill have to be improved by employing a local short-term Financial Management Specialist. The CIwill have to provide quarterly reports to the PCU with full details of the disbursement status.

214. Moreover, it is recommended that two project vehicles be allowed special registration so as toallow mobility for the staff to work during weekends/holidays and after office hours. Moreover, themission was informed that the government has approved special allowances to the staff working in theprojects. Hence, it is recommended that the PS of MOAC write to Ministry of Public Service andInformation seeking approval for paying the government approved incentives to the project staff.

(c) Shift from direct implementation to facilitation215. The government should move away from direct implementation responsibility and focus onfacilitation and supervision. Implementation should be undertaken by private contractors/NGOs.

(d) Support to field level staff: training and motorcycles216. It is recommended first that the field level staff be provided with training in leadership, incommunication, in the use of PRA tools to identify farmers’ priorities. Staff need to focus on existinggroups instead of building new groups. These training programmes could also include the componentmanagers and their staff. The Home Economics Section could provide this training with inputs fromexternal resource persons.

217. Second, the PCU stopped supporting long-term training since early 2000, as the project wasexpected to close in March 2001. With the extension of closing date, it is recommended that the PCUbe permitted to process pending long-term training applications.

218. Third, the field level staff are short of transport facilities. It is recommended that motorcyclesbe procured for use by the field level staff of Agriculture and Livestock Department.

(2) Irrigation Development and Support of NGOs

219. The outstanding payments for the NGOs will have to be settled. It is suggested that acommittee consisting of the PC, the Project Accountant, the Irrigation Engineer, and a representativefrom CANGO be established to amicably settle the payment issue and a memorandum ofunderstanding be signed evidencing settlement of the issue.

220. The work plan for the remaining months of the extension of the project must obviously takeinstitutional constraints into account and be based on realistic targets. It would therefore not be

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advisable to embark on any new small-scale schemes when several still remain to be completed: thework involved in the latter is likely to fully occupy the available staff of the Irrigation Section. It isrecommended that the project should now focus on completing and consolidating the following sevensmall-scale schemes (Table 6):

Table 6 : Incremental irrigable area for seven sites

Name of the site Incremental IrrigableArea Approximate (ha)

Ntamakuphila +/-2.0Nkwene 13.5Mhlangeni 15.0Lesibovu 17.0Kholwane 4.6Mgeza 3.0Ekuthuleni 22.0Total 77.1

221. Completion of these seven schemes will result in an achievement of approximately 90% of theAppraisal Report target for small-scale schemes. It is recommended that no further work be carriedout at Lavumisa until details of the group’s present loan repayment commitments and the lease for theexisting 73 ha drip irrigation scheme are known and accepted by the CI and IFAD.

222. However, even this restricted target will place heavy demands on the Irrigation Section, asdesign work apparently remains to be completed on some schemes (e.g. for Ekuthuleni and Mgeza atleast) and may need checking for the other schemes. It is recommended that:

1) The TAG for implementation support should be used to employ a national or regional technicalassistant to assist the Head of Section in completing all outstanding groundwork (designs,procurement of materials, planning/organising construction or alternatively procuring contractors)over a period of 5-6 months, commencing as soon as possible; provision of this assistance shouldbe conditional upon assurance by MEPF that funds will be released from the Consolidated Fundto meet the cost of completion of the schemes.

2) In the case of Ekuthuleni, the scheme design should be obtained from a reputable irrigationequipment supplier on a turnkey basis including supply and installation, following localcompetitive bidding; in view of the topography and proposed use, consideration should be givento drip irrigation, rather than a sprinkler system.

3) As time is of the essence, the CI will need to be prepared to consider the bid evaluation forEkuthuleni and give its approval without delay. It will require technical support for this purpose.It is therefore recommended that the TAG also be used to fund a regionally recruited irrigationconsultant to participate in the next two supervision missions.

223. The situation at the existing schemes visited by the mission indicates that, without support togroup development (including training on production and marketing), most schemes are likely tounder-perform. It is therefore recommended that:

1) NGOs be contracted as soon as possible to initiate group development on the above sevenschemes; it follows, however, that they must first be paid outstanding amounts due.

2) Advantage should be taken of the proposed technical assistance to train NGO staff in simpleirrigation design for micro-schemes; the contracts for the above work should also includeprovision for the development of 3-4 micro-schemes for use as ‘worked examples’.

3) The terms of reference for the proposed irrigation consultant should include support to negotiatingappropriate contracts for NGO services that will ease payment difficulties (including provision for

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advance payments against a bank guarantee), for approval and signature during the nextsupervision mission.

(3) Livestock Development

(a) Small animals as a means of promoting the livelihoods of women and theirfamilies

224. The evidence across IFAD projects is very consistent in showing that women headedhouseholds tend to be poorer than male headed households and their priorities are centred aroundsmall animals, particularly scavenging poultry. Between 40-60% of the SNL homesteads do not owncattle, but do own smaller animals such as poultry, goats and pigs. Even with limited project supportto poultry and piggery, the uptake by the women groups has been high. Therefore, during theremaining project period the following activities are recommended.

(b) Action plan to revitalise poultry units225. The mission visited several women, who had built poultry sheds, but were either empty orrunning below capacity. At the time visit to the comparatively well functioning Philani Poultry Co-operative Society, only 25 of 53 members, were active producers. It is recommended that an inventoryis taken of existing poultry sheds in SNL that are not in production and assess the reasons such asdiseases in the family leading to labour shortages, profitability, marketing constraints, availability ofinputs (day old chicken, feed and medicine). Based on such an inventory, an action plan should beprepared for their revitalisation. A team consisting of members from the Livestock Department andthe Home Economics Section and the SDSB should visit in the near future all small poultry farmers toestablish linkages with extension and credit. On the marketing side, the Philani Poultry Co-operativeSociety Abattoir is a model to follow: the project should attempt to replicate this design in as manysites as possible.

(c) Building capacity for smallholder poultry production226. One critical problem in promoting small animal production is that nationally and internationallyhuman capacity building in that area has been neglected for many years. However, the IFAD PovertyReport 2001 recognises the role of small animals in poverty alleviation in general and in dryland farmsettings in particular. 30 The small animals can help poor families in starting an asset creation processas clearly demonstrated in the IFAD/Danida sponsored Smallholder Livestock project inBangladesh.31 Swaziland should build up human capacity in that area as the model being presentlyapplied in Swaziland is precariously dependent on commercial inputs. The first step would be tocontact the Network for Poultry Production and Health in Developing Countries (NPPADC) torequest its co-operation in planning and conducting a study tour to Bangladesh for three womenpoultry extension workers and one regional level Home Economics Officer. 32 The objective of thevisit will be to get working details of the poultry model applied in Bangladesh, which now servesmore than one million poor women. Upon their return to Swaziland, a representative of the NPPHDCmay be invited to plan human resource development to implement a model suitable for Swaziland.Such capacity development should not be limited to the Department of Veterinary Services, butinvolve producer organisations, NGOs and the University of Swaziland.

227. Concurrently, the Livestock Department will have to initiate a Poultry Sector Study tounderstand the strengths and weakness of all the actors involved in poultry production in Swaziland,comparative advantages of smallholder poultry based on commercial inputs vis-à-vis large 30 See the IFAD homepage www.ifad.org31 There is a substantial amount of information available on the Internet on what is now known as theBangladesh Smallholder Poultry Development Model. www.poultry.kvl.dk is one site.www.husdyr.kvl.dk/htm/php/tune.htm is another.32 Visit Network’s homepage: www.poultry.kvl.dk for details.

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commercial farms and possibilities to reduce production costs by developing semi-intensive systems.It is recommended that a TA with background in commercial as well as semi-intensive smallholdersystem be recruited to undertake this study.

(d) Pigs228. The mission understands that Chinese bilateral assistance is in the pipeline to build a pigbreeding station. This sector also suffers from high dependence on commercial feed. It isrecommended that the MOAC Livestock Department engage the services of the Animal Productionand Health Department, University of Swaziland. The latter would conduct a literature reviewbeginning with information available in the FAO Animal Production Unit and published in the on-linejournal on sustainable livestock-based agriculture: www.cipav.org.co/lrrd and identify cheap feedresources within the country. Trials in the SNL households in collaboration with farmers and piggeryextension officers would have to be set up.

(e) Analysis of the tick-borne disease data, development of a strategy and study tours229. The activities under tick-borne disease were initially started with FAO assistance and continuedwith the SADP assistance. There is now a considerable amount of field-based data, which needs to beanalysed in order to come up with a new, probably reduced dipping strategy. It seems very likely thata much cheaper strategy consisting of strategic dipping and vaccination could be devised which wouldenhance affordability and sustainability. The Epidemiology Unit has prepared terms of reference for astudy to analyse the tick-borne disease data collected under the project. It is recommended that TA forthis activity be recruited immediately.

230. SAR allocated funds for study tours related to control of tick borne diseases. But none havebeen undertaken. It is recommended that the technical staff and some of participating farmers of thesites for the five dipping tanks installed, visit neighbouring countries to update themselves on currenttick control strategies. Visits should cover both private as well as government run farms and schemes.

(f) Livestock marketing231. It is recommended the Livestock Marketing Unit will have to gather and publish prices of notonly cattle, but on all animals. In addition, the sales yards built under the project should be handedover to the farmer organisations.

(g) Computer training232. The training courses on the use of computers for the FMD and Livestock Marketing Unit staffhave not been conducted, even though funds have been allocated in the SAR. These will have to beinitiated without delay.

(h) Modern information technology233. There is a growing body of relevant information available on the Internet and the project – inline with IFAD’s policy – recommends adopting a pro-active policy on the use of modern informationtechnology. The VFTC at Mpisi should receive the four telephone lines it has applied for and beprovided with Internet access and the required training to use the equipment. The GLMDA staff, thePoultry and Pig Extension officers in the Regional Offices, and the FMD, Tick-borne disease andLivestock Marketing Units should be provided with Internet access.

(4) Crop Development

234. Farmers continue growing maize in areas ecologically unfit for sustainable productive maizeproduction. This pattern is driven by the desire to produce maize for self-consumption, whichprovides enough incentive to make economic sacrifices in cultivating maize. Finding ways so that

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farmers can decrease the costs of producing maize, while increasing the benefits is vital in such ascenario.

235. Intercropping of maize with green manure/cover crops (gm/ccs) that will largely control weedswhile providing a good increase in the productivity of subsequent crops decreases the cost of applyingchemical fertilisers and weeding the maize plots. In most cases, the gm/cc’s can be chosen so that theywill provide: (i) edible and marketable foodstuffs such as cowpeas (Vigna unguiculata), scarlet runnerbeans (Phaseolus coccineus) and mung beans (V. radiata); and groundnuts; and (ii) resources thatcould be included in the feeding of cattle or pigs during the winter, such as with lablab beans (Lablabpurpureum or Dolichos lablab) or the velvetbean (Mucuna spp.) or protecting stored maize frominsects with sunnhemp leaves (Crotalaria ochroleuca).

236. Within a period of four or five years, the regular use of these gm/ccs species would bring thesoil organic matter level to the point where no tillage is required. In this case, the tremendous cost ofrenting tractors or ploughing the soil with oxen, not to mention hand hoeing in some instances, wouldbe obviated. Farmers’ ability to plant immediately upon the coming of the first rains increasesproductivity in light-rainfall areas. It is even possible that farmers could plant their maize before therains come, thereby taking advantage not only of the first rains, but also of the nitrogen flush thataccompanies them.

237. The project should continue promoting other crops that could be useful to farmers in rainfedareas because of their drought-tolerance. The introduced varieties of cowpeas, groundnuts and sweetpotatoes seem to be especially popular among Swazi farmers, and should be spread as far and wide aspossible.

238. It is recommended that the Adaptive Research and Extension establish linkages with theexisting Zenzele groups and develop a system of a seed revolving fund for quicker distribution ofdrought resistant crop varieties. It is also recommended that the Adaptive Research conduct field trialsinvolving the farmers in the Zenzele groups to test the gm/ccs. Assistance from the Home EconomicsSection could be taken to identify the Zenzele groups.

(5) Credit

239. The Subsidiary Loan Agreement stipulations are inadequate. The issues related to credit risk arenot referred to. Moreover, repayment of the loan and interest from SDSB to government are notstipulated. This needs to be addressed. In addition, SDSB will only be able to reach the better-offsections of the rural population on account of its lending policy and procedures. It is geared to fundactivities that have marketing linkages. At the same time, given the experience of SDSB inagricultural lending and current state of its health, it is not advisable to push SDSB into another yetunexplored arena of retailing micro-finance. In Swaziland, several micro-finance institutions areevolving with savings as the key instrument to determine the credit worthiness as against collateraland borrower’s contribution. Imbita, World Vision and CCU are some of these institutions. They needto be supported.

240. As a first step in this direction, a study tour of officers from the MEPF, the Central Bank, theSDSB and the Co-operative Department may be arranged to visit Palli Karma Sahyak Foundation(PKSF) in Bangladesh and Small Industries Development Bank of India (National Micro FinanceSupport Programme). It is also recommended that the PCU take up the matter with MEPF andestablish an Expert Committee consisting of members from MOF, Central Bank, SDSB, MOAC andCANGO to: (i) assess the performance of existing micro-finance institutions, evolve accreditationcriteria and develop systems and procedures to start a refinance window for these institutions; and (ii)review the subsidiary loan agreement to address its weaknesses and institute measures to use part ofthe funds released to SDSB to finance micro-finance institutions.

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241. There has been no effort to develop community institutions in the rain-fed areas. It isrecommended that the Home Economics Section identify women groups that have been trained underthe project and empower these women to form about 10 savings and credit groups. In addition, acontract for mobilising 10 savings and credit groups may be given to an NGO (ACAT is suggested) soas to ensure that the project at least develops about 20 groups. The activities would include buildingcapacity of these groups, starting savings and credit activities, providing a small equity grant to betterperforming groups and link them to the Co-operative Department and SDSB/IMBITA/ETF. Relatedactivities such as nutrition education, food processing and monitoring nutritional status of childrenunder five may be included as a part of savings and credit group mobilisation.

242. These groups need to become the focal points for seed multiplication, small stock developmentand testing green manure cover crops. For this purpose the Home Economics Section and the selectedNGO would have to develop the required linkages with research and extension.

(6) Marketing of Horticultural Produce

243. The performance of livestock marketing, which is not controlled by NAMBOARD, indicatesthe emerging strength of the private sector in agricultural marketing in Swaziland. The solution to thecurrent problems of NAMBOARD lies in separating the commercial and statutory functions ofNAMBOARD both operationally and financially to prevent cross subsidisation of commercial activityby the import levies collected. Such separation would give a clear picture with regard to the amount offinancial resources wasted in continuing with the commercial operations in the name of assistingfarmers. The current situation does not indicate that the poorer households stand to benefit in thelonger term by the artificially higher prices offered by NAMBOARD. NAMBOARD, moreover,cannot enforce a policy to stabilise price in the periods of excess supply. It would give a level playingfield to the private sector to develop its strengths in vegetable marketing. Once net financial deficitsare determined, arguments to continue with the commercial activities would become weak.

244. In the medium and long-term, NAMBOARD will have to completely privatise its vegetablemarketing activity. NAMBOARD, using its revenues from the statutory functions, will have toproactively facilitate growth of the private sector in marketing of agricultural produce. Its main rolelies in assessing the import requirements of statutory products and adjusting the import levies toprovide support for the “baby vegetable” production sector to prevent dumping from neighbouringcountries, rather than procuring vegetables at a price lower than the private sector.

(7) Other Institutional Strengthening Efforts

245. Drought Early Warning and Contingency Planning: The current approach to developingforecast on drought focuses on assessing supply of food and not on the capability of the household toacquire food. In order to fine tune the data collection and to develop required drought mitigationstrategies, it is suggested that a post of nutritionist be created within the unit and the SwazilandNational Nutritional Council be included as a member of the Early Warning Technical AdvisoryCommittee. The Council of Ministers of SADC has recommended transformation of the unit into aseparate section with its own budget. The project needs to support implementation of thisrecommendation.

246. CCU: The CCU is on a path of restructuring with the help of Enterprise Development Fund.But the discussions with the officials of the CCU indicate that the CCU would be interested in movingfrom trading to production of fertiliser and animal feed. The mission wishes to caution the CCU onthe need to make a full assessment of: (i) its own institutional strengths and weaknesses to undertakesuch businesses; (ii) its comparative advantage vis à vis private sector; and (iii) techno-economic

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feasibility of the project, before venturing into diverse commercial activities that are not in line withits comparative advantage or core strength.

247. MOAC Reorganisation: Commercialisation of SNL farmers remains the basic premise ofdevelopment, which is questionable. The majority of the SNL farmers farm under rainfed conditionsand have no cattle. These two factors need to be taken into account while formulating thedevelopment strategy. The MOAC will have to gear itself to deliver services to this category offarmers. It is recommended that the MOAC revisit the proposals made in the reorganisation study tolook into the service delivery strategy needed to reach, and provide facilitation and empower theresource poor households on the SNL.

(8) Monitoring and Evaluation

248. The project should immediately initiate actions to locate a consultancy company to undertakean impact assessment study. The PC and the Monitoring Officer should make frequent field visits toascertain the progress in implementation of the project activities and obtain feedback from theprimary stakeholders for taking corrective actions in implementation.

C. Recommendations for Possible Future Projects

(1) Introduction

249. Four factors need attention while developing future rural development strategies for Swaziland.First, a study conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) indicates that anymeaningful poverty reduction strategy needs to address women’s education, health, status and foodavailability. Experiences in Swaziland indicate that community institutions play an important role inbuilding education facilities. There is increasing control of resources by women in case of small stockdevelopment and vegetable production interventions. Savings and credit group development havetaken off with the involvement of NGOs, Co-operative Department and Home Economics Section.The interest of farmers is shifting towards low cost gravity fed systems that are easy to maintain.

250. Second, the land tenure system favours those with privileged access to human and financialresources. At the same time, it restricts investment in land by those with limited resources. Resourcepoor farmers may fear loss of land and also investment made owing to inability to cultivate the land asa result of labour shortage. Or they may be subject to land reallocation by the Traditional Chiefs.These in-built fears drive the rural communities on SNL to invest in cattle, which is a low risk andmobile investment but with low economic returns. Literature published as early as 1991 indicates thatthere are strains in the social framework in SNL areas. These will become more evident as the numberof landless increases along with the pressures to privatise communal lands to satisfy the demand bycommercial companies and entrepreneurial farmers.33 Resolution of issues related to security of tenurebecomes central to any meaningful investment strategy in SNL.

251. Third, the AIDS epidemic has shown its debilitating impact on families as well as oninvestment and production in the rural areas. The average life expectancy in Swaziland is now as lowas 38 years. Sharply reduced manpower supply in rural areas does not bode well for any investmentthat requires a high labour input. The strategy for any future rural development needs to focus oninvestments, where the priorities are determined by the communities and not investment strategiesdesigned and delivered from outside.

33 D.C. Funnel (1991), Under the Shadow of Apartheid: Agrarian Transformation in Swaziland, Aveburyacademic Publishing Group, England.

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252. Fourth, the projects so far implemented in Swaziland suffer from top-down implementationmode with little participation of the communities. Inadequate participation of the communities ismasked by provision of high subsidies. To achieve sustainability, participation of the communitiesneeds to be enhanced.

(2) A Framework for Assisting the Resource Poor on SNL

253. Interventions required to improve livelihood systems of the resource poor households vary fromcommunity to community. Projects with a set of activities that are inflexible will not be able torespond to the requirements and priorities of the community. A system of flexibility will have to beintroduced in the project design. Impact and sustainability are enhanced when the ability of thecommunities to identify constraints, and to prioritise and implement the interventions is strengthened.This will have to be coupled with adequate control by the community over the financial resources forimplementing activities at the community level. Such devolution of financial powers would empowerthe communities. It increases their ownership of interventions.

(3) Selection of Project Areas

254. The project identification will have to be preceded by a desk study to identify the regions andsub-regions with high incidence of poverty. Subsequently, a survey of those selected regions will haveto be conducted to identify the “Sigodzis” with a high concentration of resource poor households. 34

This survey will have to use anthropometric measurements to determine the nutritional status ofchildren under five and body mass index of the mothers in addition to other poverty indicators. Such asurvey will form the baseline for the project area; it can be used to assess the impact of the project byconducting similar surveys subsequently.

(4) Project Contours for Assisting SNL Farmers Undertaking Rain-fed Farming

(a) Initiation of the communities into participatory development255. A social agreement between the project and the “Sigodzi” with the involvement of thetraditional community structures forms the basis for initiating these community groups. The salientfeatures of the social agreement, among other things, would include the undertaking of the communityto: (i) ensure universal enrolment and retention of all primary school children; (ii) resolve all disputesamicably through traditional village institutions; (iii) ensure security of tenure; (iv) contribute (labourand cash) to community development investments; (v) encourage self-help group formation by thewomen for savings and credit; (vi) maintain peace and order; and (vii) select two communityorganisers (a woman and a man) and to nominate them to co-ordinate between the community and theproject.

(b) Focus on self-help not on external funding256. The project team then will have to undertake extensive visits to explain the project concepts tothe households in the “Sigodzis” tentatively selected. The community will have to be sensitised on theselection criteria, the process, and the need for a social agreement and social action to demonstratetheir ability to work together. Promise of any external funding should not be made at this stage. Thecommunity will have to take the lead to approach the project to include the “Sigodzi” in the project,

34 A “Sigodzi” is a community of relatively homogeneous households with common interests below thechiefdom.

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with a resolution passed by the entire community; both men and women above the age of 18 need tosign this resolution.

(c) Involvement of NGOs vital to the success257. Use of NGOs with experience in community development is vital to the success of the project.Each NGO Co-ordinator will be able to work in three to five “Sigodzis” depending upon the numberof households and the proximity of the “Sigodzis”. The NGO contract will have to be performancebased. A set of objectively verifiable outputs would have to be designed to assess the performance ofthe NGOs. Based on such an assessment – on a yearly basis – the contracts of NGOs and their staffwould have to be extended.

258. It is incorrect to assume that the NGO staff will have the capacity to undertake the activitieswithout training. Training needs assessment of NGO staff and the project’s community developmentstaff will have to be conducted. The skill gaps of the NGO/project staff will have to be ascertainedand training programmes need to be organised.

(d) Laying a foundation for a democratic “Sigodzi” development institution259. A management committee formed by conducting a meeting of all community members formsthe foundation of the “Sigodzi” Development Institution. It needs to have representation from existinggroups/clubs within the “Sigodzi” and have the blessings of the Chief. This committee withfacilitation from NGOs will have to design a constitution for the “Sigodzi” Development Institution.

260. Three provisions are vital to ensure participation of women and to provide opportunities to allto become members of the management committee. First, the management committee will have atleast one lady member during the first year. The strength of women will have to increase to 50% ofthe size of the committee in the second year. The women members will not be the relatives of themale management committee members. Second, one of the women members would be the co-signatory to the bank account. Third, election would be conducted for electing the managementcommittee members on an annual basis. The Chairman, the Secretary and the Treasurer would not beeligible for re-election. A minimum cooling-off period of one year would be stipulated to seek re-election. The constitution will have to be approved with these conditions.

(e) Community organisers-vital links for development administration261. The management committee will have to conduct a meeting of the community and select twocommunity organisers (one female and one male) who will become “facilitators”, i.e. represent theinterface between the NGO/Project and the community. The management committee will have todecide on the contributions by the community to these volunteers. These organisers will have to betrained in leadership skills, maintaining books of accounts, etc. They would also become the focalpoint for delivery of other training programmes related to functional literacy, health and hygiene, etc.

(f) “Zenzele” group mobilisation – the basic building block of the “Sigodzi”development institution

262. The “Zenzele” groups would become the basic building blocks at the community level. Theapproach would be to build up “Zenzele” groups consisting of self-selected members and it would befocussed on women. This would help the women to increase their confidence and managerialcapabilities and to increase their standing in the community.

263. Five key elements of “Zenzele” group mobilisation will be:

1) Formation of groups comprising self-selected members.2) Capacity building of the “Zenzele” groups focussed on leadership training, maintenance of books

of accounts, savings mobilisation and credit delivery, and health and nutrition.

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3) Savings would be an entry point – quantum and frequency of savings to be decided by themembers themselves.

4) Internal lending of the group funds – lending would cater both to the emergency consumptionneeds as well as small-scale income generating activities.

5) Project provision of grant equity to help in increasing internal lending ability of the “Zenzele”groups and exploration of options for eventual linkage of the “Zenzele” groups to the formalfinancial institutions such as SDSB, IMBITA and ETF.

(g) “Sigodzi” development institution – social action phase264. Capabilities of the management committee members to run a community institution will haveto be strengthened. A financial resource mobilisation system to develop a Village DevelopmentCorpus will have to be developed. This needs to be followed by a social action plan prepared withfacilitation from the NGOs; the financial resources mobilised by the community will fund itsimplementation. The “Sigodzis” that have successfully completed the activities planned under thesocial action phase would become eligible for assistance under the project. This phase helps theproject understand the ability of community to function as a cohesive unit.

(h) “Sigodzi” development planning265. The “Sigodzi” Development Plan is a plan prepared at the “Sigodzi” level with the involvementof primary stakeholders. The basis of the plan is that it is people centred, it relies on people’sdecision: biases of the planners are ruled out. As the communities get involved in the analysis ofproblems for formulation and monitoring implementation of the plan, through this process theybecome empowered. The “Sigodzi” Development Planning process will have to start in the villagesthat have complied with the following pre-requisites:

1) The Social Action Plan as planned has been implemented.2) The representation of women (leaders of “Zenzele” groups) in the management committees of the

Village Development Institution is not less than 50%.3) 50% of the initial management committee members have retired and new elections have taken

place.4) The “Sigodzi” Development Institution has opened a bank account and has started mobilising

funds in the form of contributions from the members.

266. The plan preparation requires active involvement of all the members of the community. Duringthe pre-planning stage, secondary information about agriculture, credit, market systems, availabilityand access to natural resources, depletion and degradation of natural resources, information ongovernment programmes, land details, etc., would be collected. The involvement of line departmentsduring the initial stages of “Sigodzi” development planning would have three benefits. First, the linedepartments would be sensitised by working in a new development paradigm of partnership with thecommunity to facilitate implementation of the activities by the communities themselves. Second, theproject would be able to tap the technical expertise from the line departments to facilitate thecommunity in participatory planning. Third, involvement during the initial stages of planning wouldhelp in getting support for supervision during the implementation phase.

267. After the collection and analysis of secondary data, the planning process will have to begin inthe “Sigodzi” on a date fixed by the community members. Situation analysis will have to beconducted through participatory processes using different PRA tools. Since the strength of the planlies in it being based on peoples’ decisions, PRAs form the crux of the whole process thatencompasses the community participation.

268. The findings of the PRA will have to be presented at the community meeting. This meetingprovides an opportunity for the primary stakeholders to understand the perspective of differentcategories of households on different issues. During the presentation, problems of the homesteads andthat of the resource poor will have to be identified. Facilitation is vital to guide the community to

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identify suitable cost effective and efficient development actions after analysing the problems. Amultidisciplinary team consisting of Project staff, NGO and the line department staff will have tofacilitate discussions on PRA outputs and help the community to identify the problems and cost-effective solutions. A financial allocation will have to be provided to each of the “Sigodzis” and theywill have to plan within that allocation.

(i) Transfer control over financial resources269. Transferring control over financial resources to the “Sigodzi” Development Institution isimportant to enhance participation and eventually empower the communities. The project will have totransfer the funds required by the “Sigodzi” Development Institution covering costs of activitiesplanned for three months; replenishment should be based on a statement of expenditures. Audit ofaccounts maintained by the “Sigodzis” is important to instil financial discipline coupled withsanctions.

(j) Focus areas for capacity building to facilitate community level plan270. Four focus areas for capacity building are identified based on emerging experiences inSwaziland. They are: (i) micro finance; (ii) small stock development; (iii) green manure crops; and(iv) low cost water harvesting systems.

(k) Monitoring and evaluation271. The participatory planning process outlined above aims not only to provide well targetedfinancial resources for sustainable utilisation of natural resources; a parallel effort is necessary incapability building to develop human resources. Therefore, it is not enough to monitor theperformance and to evaluate only on the basis of financial indicators. Monitoring and impactassessment would have to provide insights into how the loans and investments have helped thecommunity.

272. The project will have to assist the communities to develop systems for monitoring andevaluating their performances. First of all, “Zenzele” groups would be monitored on a monthly basisand evaluated on a quarterly basis. A system of self-evaluation would be adopted. The communitieswill have to be encouraged to evaluate the progress on wider issues such as attitudinal and socialchanges within the communities on health, hygiene, education, malnutrition as measured by stuntingand wasting of children under five years of age.

(5) Rehabilitation of Old irrigation Schemes

273. There is considerable potential for production and marketing of vegetables and there is muchthat could be achieved through the development of small and micro-scale irrigation – the latterproviding an opportunity to attract and assist the poorest sectors of communities. Successfuldevelopment will depend on the identification of markets and on encouraging private sectorparticipation; in this context, the rationale for continuing with NAMBOARD as a parastatalmarketing channel is weak and needs to be revisited.

274. However, data available suggest that some 300 ha are cultivated by existing small-scaleirrigation schemes in Swaziland. If the sample visited by the mission is representative, most of thishectarage is under-performing. It would appear logical to concentrate first on improving theperformance of these schemes – through rehabilitation and group development – before embarking ona specific project for expansion.