IT ARCHITECTURE FOR HOMELAND SECURITY'

Gerald S. MetzNorthrop Grumman Corp.

Red Bank, NJ

ABSTRACT

A common theme in the 911] Commission Report is theneed to improve how information is shared among the di-verse public andprivate-sector agencies that play a role inour emergency services, public health and safety, law en-forcement, transportation, intelligence and national de-fense. The report makes the case for a paradigm changefrom "Need to Know" to "Need to Share" in the interestof better serving public safety and the public good. Thispaper describes the problem and how a "Network-Centric" service oriented architecture like the one beingdevelopedfor the military by the Defense Information Sys-tems Agency (DISA) supports information sharing acrossthe homeland security community as well as our nation'smilitary branches.

INTRODUCTION

Sharing information is a daunting technical and organiza-tional task, even when done within the boundaries of asingle enterprise. In large corporations or governmentagencies, a Chief Information Officer (CIO) typically as-sesses the organization's needs for managing and movinginformation, and defines a cohesive infrastructure of hard-ware, software and data communications elements, whichmight be called an information technology (IT) architec-ture, to meet those needs in a unified way. Sharing infor-mation effectively among the diverse parts of such largeenterprises is challenging enough. Figuring out how tomove information across the external boundaries of di-verse organizations, presumably for the common good, isformidable. The technical issues are easier to solve thansocial and organizational issues, because each organizationhas its unique reasons to be protective of its information.

Consider the diverse players who have a role in homelandsecurity. They share no single, common mission. There isno one CIO to resolve technical issues in a uniform way.There is no way of knowing who has what information andwho needs that information, and more importantly there isno incentive for one organization to invest in making itsinformation available to others.

These political realities and challenging environment pro-vide the context for this discussion of IT architecture. Theorganizational obstacles to sharing data have to be over-come through policy adjustments and cooperative ar-

rangements; the IT architecture has to enable those agree-ments by ensuring that each participant's security, privacy,need-to-know, and other concerns can be addressed.

An IT architecture to enable interoperability among thediverse contributors to our homeland security addresses adifferent set of needs from those of a large corporation or"enterprise," for we are talking about exchanging informa-tion among many diverse enterprises. Technology alonecannot motivate decision-makers to support the IT needsof stakeholders outside of their respective organizations,but it can be instrumental in disarming those barriers thatdiscourage information sharing. For that to happen, our ITexperts have to understand and provide technical solutionsto the real and varied institutional issues that impede therelease of information. The IT architecture should not onlyaddress those institutional concerns in a way that is techni-cally convincing, but in a way that gives non-technicaladministrators confidence that they can authorize the ex-change of sensitive or valuable information with otherswithout compromising their own organizations' interests.

INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES

Sharing information across organizations for the commongood seems like a good idea, until you try to do it. Gettingapproval from Northrop Grumman to publish this paper isa small case in point. After first presenting a business casefor why we should contribute this paper, the author had tosubmit the paper for reviews to make sure that it doesn'tdisclose proprietary information or infringe on anyone'sintellectual property, and also that no information con-tained in this paper might violate federal restrictions on theexport of technology. These reviews are appropriate andnecessary in our commercial environment, much as thosewho work in health care are obligated by law to safeguardthe privacy of patient information. Law enforcement offi-cers are trained to safeguard evidence for potential use incourt, and to hold information close to the vest in generalto avoid compromising the effectiveness of investigations.Facility managers who identify security vulnerabilities anddevise ways to mitigate them can't allow potential attack-ers to know about those vulnerabilities or how they're pro-tected. Those in the Department of Defense (DoD) andother federal agencies who handle sensitive informationare trained to classify it as "Secret" or "Top Secret" and to

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keep it locked up in an approved safe. Yet as the 9/11Commission put it, "Even the best information technologywill not improve information sharing so long as ... per-sonnel and security systems reward protecting informationrather than disseminating it.""i

Sharing information across organizational boundaries re-quires people who have the vision to see the value andhave the willingness to make the effort, even when it ap-pears to directly benefit someone else. It calls for people atsenior levels who are willing to invest some personal andpolitical capital to build "win-win" partnerships with theirpeers in other organizations. Then, these working relation-ships have to develop into standardized operational proce-dures, supported by formal or informal agreements. Withonly a small amount of perseverance, this author did re-ceive approval from Northrop Grumman to publish thispaper, illustrating that it can be done.

TECHNICAL NEEDS

The primary technical challenge in being able to share in-formation across so many diverse, independent organiza-tions is the very fact that they are independent. Since thereis no single CIO, there is no unified approach. No two or-ganizations have the same requirements, budgets or priori-ties. Each organization values and protects its independ-ence, and so any IT architecture designed to enable themto interoperate must acknowledge and support their inde-pendence. "Enterprise" approaches generally don't dothis. Despite these technical challenges, this same diversityoffers a vast sea of opportunities for win-win exchanges ofinformation that promise to enrich each other's under-standing of situations.

What follows is an overview of the kinds of issues thatneed to be addressed to accomplish this vision of beingable to share even sensitive information, with appropriatesafeguards, so that all of the stakeholders in homeland se-curity have a better understanding and awareness of thewhole situation and everyone's role in it.

Secure Inter-Networking: The 9/11 commission's callfor "a paradigm change from 'Need to Know' to 'Need toShare"' does not diminish the importance of protectingsensitive information. Each participating organization haspolicies, often required by law, that constrain the release ofinformation. This calls for technology that enables eachorganization to retain control of what information gets re-leased, and to whom.

The standard IT first line of defense is to build a privatenetwork for an organization (its "intranet"), with a "fire-wall" around it to keep unauthorized people out. "Need toshare" calls for ways to exchange information with author-ized external parties, so we need inter-networking strate-gies that enable us to make reliably controlled exceptions:

* Exporting, with appropriate authorization, infor-mation from computers within one organization'sintranet to computers on external networks

* Similarly, providing a way to request and receiveinformation from known, trusted sources outsideof the organization's intranet

* Ensuring that these inter-network capabilities arehighly available, especially during a disaster whenpublic networks are congested or damaged

Interoperability of Computers and Software: Thanks tothe Internet's mature and widely accepted standards fordata communications, applications have ways of exchang-ing messages over the network regardless of what kind ofcomputer they run on. There are other obstacles to makingapplications compatible with each other though, includingchoice of programming language and operating system.The use of Web services extends the Internet's strategy forinteroperability into the applications themselves to solvethese remaining barriers.

Beyond that, there is the matter of interoperability betweensimilar applications from competing vendors. Agencieswill continue to make independent purchasing decisions,each on its own schedule and budget. In order to be ableto share information with each other, each agency needs itsapplications to be compatible with what the others are us-ing. Meanwhile, the vendors would rather try to "capturemarket share" than be interoperable with their competitors.

Consistency of Information Content: Organizationssuch as police, fire and EMS, because of their diverse op-erational requirements, do not share common vocabularyfor describing the same incident.

* Similar applications, such as incident managementsystems, might not have comparable informationcontent and capabilities.

* Agreement among applications on data format andsemantics is needed. In the long term, workinggroups or standards organizations can help withthis. Meanwhile, in the near term, we need toolsto resolve semantic differences.

Scalability: Some designs work well on a small scale, butslow down or fail entirely when they grow beyond somelimit. The IT architecture for homeland security (HLS)must anticipate and support this shift from "need to know"toward "need to share," offering the ability to add users,computers, agencies and application features potentially ona national scale without degrading the existing ones.

Extensibility: Extensibility is the ability to introduce newcapabilities easily. Terrorists are, by definition, alwayschanging their tactics. As soon as we learn to defend

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against one sort of attack, terrorists devise a new one. Wecan't afford to build every new capability from scratch orto allow the system to grow in complexity as we add ormodify capabilities. New capabilities have to be easy andeconomical to develop, be easy to add with little or no in-tegration, and be easy and inexpensive to deploy widely.

THE ROLE OF ARCHITECTURE

Architecture is the catalyst, not the content. When architectYoshio Taniguchi set out to design the new home for NewYork City's Museum of Modern Art (MoMA), his objec-tive was to facilitate encounters between the works of artin MoMA's collection and the people who would visitthem. This called upon the architect to identify and under-stand the unique needs of displaying diverse works ofmodern art as well as the needs of the visiting public, andthen to provide an environment that would encourage thepeople and the art to interact. Taniguchi would have norole in selecting the art itself. Taniguchi's task was to de-sign the environment for displaying MoMA's collection,and to anticipate what might be required to accommodatefuture museum acquisitions in an art form that is experi-mental and evolving by definition. As if this weren't chal-lenging enough, he also had to satisfy aesthetic expecta-tions, for as an art museum, the building itself is expectedto be a work of art.

As with buildings, an IT architecture doesn't specify whateach application does or how it works. It describes the en-vironment in which applications will operate, enables ap-plications to carry out their respective tasks, and providesservices designed to enhance their ability to interact witheach other and with their users. That environment must begeneric and flexible, making it easy to introduce new ca-pabilities as new needs arise. Our needs and expectationsfor the things we want computers to do for us continuouslygrow in scale and complexity. Computer architecture mustcontinuously evolve to meet these growing expectations.This includes finding new ways to manage and avert in-creases in complexity. Complexity is the enemy of reliabil-ity, budget, and the ability to get something workingquickly and to maintain it throughout its life cycle.

Specific objectives for this HLS architecture are:

* to meet the unique and diverse needs of the home-land security community and its computer applica-tions,

* to facilitate and encourage interaction among di-verse users and their computer systems, and

* to avoid or mitigate "system of systems" complex-ity issues.

Managing Complexity: "Divide and conquer" is a gen-eral approach to reducing complexity that can take on

many forms. A good architecture identifies and isolatessmall, well-bounded parts of the larger problem in discretemodules. Each module keeps all its complexity to itself,and presents the result to the rest of the system on a sim-ple, well-understood interface. By carving out parts of theproblem and solving each separately, we hide these smallchunks of complexity from the rest of the system. This hasa number of benefits:

* Hiding the details of each separable part of theproblem within its own "black box" allows otherparts of the system to ignore those issues and fo-cus on their own respective responsibilities.

* Black boxes make it possible to upgrade or replacethe solution to one component part of the problemwithout any impact on the rest of the system.

* When one component is improved, other parts ofthe system that use it inherit the benefits of theimprovement.

A classic architecture to illustrate "divide and conquer" isthe Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Reference Modelfor data communications networks, illustrated in Figure 1.

Each layer in this "stack" of services has a well-definedand well-bounded role in how networks deliver messagesand documents. It's called a "stack" because each layeruses the services of the layer below, performs the value-added functions allocated to that layer, providing a richerservice to the layer above it while hiding its implementa-tion details, as well as all the complexity below it, from thelayers above.

Applications, sitting at the top layer of this protocol stack,can use the network to send and receive messages ordocuments without needing to know or care about howthey get delivered. It is this layered architecture that makesit possible to rip out a local area network's "Cat-5"Ethernet wiring and replace it with a new wireless LAN (aPhysical Layer change), with no impact whatsoever on thesoftware that uses the network.

Promoting Collaboration: The architecture cannot makepeople decide to collaborate, but it can and must removethe technical obstacles that impede the sharing of informa-tion. It must also offer solutions to the issues that makedecision-makers reluctant to authorize the release of in-formation. In the community of organizations engaged inhomeland security and defense, the architecture has toprovide for the protection of sensitive information, andmust do so in a way that gives the leadership in those or-ganizations confidence that the information will be han-dled in accordance with their policies and intent.

The architecture must address the various interoperabilityissues, or at least make them easy to overcome. It must

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offer strategies to enable different applications to exchangedata, and to understand each other's data. Standardswould be a big help; but in the absence of standards, appli-cations will need tools that enable them to translate anduse data from external sources.

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7. Application

Word-processing E-mail Alarm MonitoringAir Traffic Control ...

Responsible for meeting all the users' needs andexpectations.

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Responsible for establishing, synchronizing,5. Session maintaining and terminating communication ses-

sions between systems using the Transport'I nrntnr'nl

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13. Network Responsible for addressing and routing "packets"

of data using the Data Link layer. Provides cross-I vo~~~~~~l,iffrnn thr4^eniroon4n rAnli-,nr-l

Wireless Cat-5 Coax Fiber Microwave Satellite

1. Physical ..

The means of physically interconnecting com-puters, switches and routers.

Figure 1. The Responsibilities of Each OSI Layer

A SERVICE-ORIENTED ARCHITECTURE FORHOMELAND SECURITY

In 2003 John Stenbit, the CIO of the Department of De-fense (DoD), outlined his vision for a "Net-Centric DataStrategy"'." His metaphor for the vision is that "the net-work is the computer." The premise is that it doesn't mat-ter where data reside on the network; and it doesn't evenmatter if all the components of an application reside on thesame computer, as long as the application components andthe data can find each other on the network. The resultingNetwork Centric Enterprise Services (NCES) architecturenow being developed by the Defense Information ServicesAgency (DISA) is all about sharing data by posting itsomewhere on the network and then advertising it for otherapplications to find and use.

The DoD looks to its NCES architecture as the way tomove information quickly and effectively from intelli-gence-gathering applications to decision-making applica-tions to engagement applications, creating a seamless flow

of information from actionable intelligence to decisive ac-tion. Northrop Grumman has been developing network-centric services and promoting their use within the DoDsince before the 2003 memorandum on NCES. In January2004 we began an independent research and developmentproject to show how NCES concepts can be applied tohomeland security. The Stevens Institute of Technologyindependently recommended using the NCES approach topromote regional information sharing for homeland secu-rity in a 2004 report to the Port Authority of New Yorkand New Jersey.lv Applying the DoD concept to the civil-ian environment, however, is not a simple cut-and-pasteexercise. The applications are different; the civilian usercommunities have different needs and expectations; andunlike the DoD, there is no single CIO to orchestrate thedesign and implementation.

In practice, NCES defines a suite of application-layer ser-vices that are built upon the commercial success of theInternet. The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) is inthe process of doing for the application layer what the OSIaccomplished with its stack of data communications proto-cols. The W3C is developing standards for how applica-tions interact with other applications over the network.Like the OSI Reference Model, these protocols work onany computer, with any operating system and with applica-tions written in any programming language. For example,the W3C has specified:

XML (Extensible Markup Language) - a text-based data format that is compatible with any kindof computer and available to applications writtenin any programming language.

SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol) - themeans by which one application can ask anotherapplication to provide a service. SOAP messagesare written in XML.

WSDL (Web Services Description Language) - aprotocol for one computer to tell another computerabout a service that it provides and how to use it.A WSDL document, also written in XML, definesa set of related services and tells a programmerhow to construct SOAP messages to use each ser-vice.

UDDI (Universal Description, Discovery and In-tegration) - a directory service that enables appli-cations to register the services that they offer, andapplications that need a service to look up whereon the network to find it and how to connect to it.Metaphorically speaking, a UDDI directory pro-vides "yellow pages," "white pages" and "greenpages" directories for network services.

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OWL (Web Ontology Language) -provides aformal structure for establishing semantic consis-tency to enable Web applications to understandand interpret each other's content.

SAML (Security Access Markupprovides a standard, XML-basedpassing security tokens that defineand authorization rights.

Language)-approach forauthentication

Simplifying the Application Layer: The W3C specifica-tions for SOAP, WSDL and UDDI, supporting the applica-tion layer of the OSI stack of protocols, are the toolsneeded to construct network-centric, service-basedapplications. All three protocols use XML, the data formatdeveloped for the "web" that can be used with all types ofcomputers, operating systems and programming lan-guages. These W3C tools make it possible to assembleapplications using software modules that are distributedacross the network. An application can receive a notifica-tion from one computer, ask another computer to contrib-ute additional information, and invoke a software serviceon yet another computer to aggregate the information andtake some action based on plans hosted on yet anothercomputer.

A Business-to-Business Example: On-line banking isone of the many conveniences offered by the World WideWeb. Bank web sites offer customers access to their ac-count information and various transactions forms using aWeb browser. A leading investment bank's web site goesa step further in customer service. It gives customers theability to securely enter their account access informationfor other institutions' web sites. They then uses Web ser-vices provided by the other banks, with the customer'sauthorization, to prepare a single portfolio report that de-scribes all of the customer's investments - their ownmerged with the customer's investments at the other insti-tutions.

Dividing and Conquering the Application Layer: LikeYoshio Taniguchi's new museum, the environment at theapplication layer is intended to encourage the interactionof a collection of independently developed pieces. Thisapplication-layer architecture, illustrated in figure 2, isloosely organized into three levels: NCES Core EnterpriseServices (CES), Integration Services, and Specialized Ser-vices. Web services are the independent components thatdivide and conquer the complexity of, and encourage theinteraction among homeland security applications.

Core Enterprise Services

Core services are services that every application is likelyto need. These are things that might be taken care of bythe operating system on an individual computer, such ashow to store and retrieve data, or how two applications

communicate with each other. In this architecture where"the network is the computer," we need network servicesto perform these operating-system services. The "CoreEnterprise Services" concepts from NCES are reused forthis architecture. Remember that this is about architecture,so each of the following describes a category or collectionof services, not a particular service.

Traffic-Event-Notification Alarm FilteringMap Services ...

Responsible for implementing application-specific tasks, and making those implemen-tations available for reuse in other applica-tions.

Service Discovery SecurityMessaging Mediation CollaborationUser Assistant Storage ApplicationEnterprise Service ManagementResponsible for providing applications withgeneralized services, such as those pro-vided by the operating system of an individ-ual computer.

Figure 2. Dividing and Conquering the Application Layer

Service Discovery: Services that enable applica-tions to find information or services on the net-work using known directory and registry assets.NCES will implement a simplified discovery ser-vice that uses UDDI as its underlying implementa-tion. (Note: this author would have preferred thatthe DoD use the commercial standard UDDI di-rectly rather than wrapping an additional, non-standard layer on top of it.)

Enterprise Service Management: Services formaintaining the health and status of network re-sources and for managing the network addressesof users and services.

Information Assurance/Security: Services thatprovide for the security, integrity and continuity ofinformation and who has access to it, including:

* Authentication: verifying that users andinformation services on the network arewho or what they say they are (e.g. pass-word, signature and certificate services)

* Authorization: managing what informa-tion and services a particular user has beengranted access to (Note: This is not ad-dressed in the NCES security service aspresently defined.)

* Encryption: making data unreadable whileen route from source to destination.

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Mediation: Services that figure out and convert(translate, merge, correlate, rename, etc.) informa-tion from the offered form into a form that is us-able by its recipient.

Messaging: Services that support the exchange ofinformation among users and machines on thenetwork. NCES will use WS-Eventing as its mes-saging service specification, with a broker (server)to provide scalability.

Collaboration: Services that enable users to worktogether, interacting through shared applications ornetwork services (e.g. chat, online meetings, etc.)

User Assistant: Automated capabilities that learnand apply user preferences and patterns to enhanceusers' productivity.

Storage: Network services for storing and retriev-ing information. NCES will use "Web-based Dis-tributed Authoring and Versioning" (WebDAV). Itis a set of extensions to the HTTP protocol that al-lows users to collaboratively edit and manage fileson remote web servers.

Application: "Housekeeping" services that sup-port the network-services environment by config-uring and maintaining application services andmaking them available to applications.

Integration Services

Bridges: These are services that interconnect simi-lar services that use different standards and/or pro-tocols. For example, the Army's Publish and Sub-scribe Service (PASS) was developed before WS-Eventing, which DISA later selected as their pre-ferred protocol. Then there's the language-specific Java Messaging Service (JMS). A bridgethat accepts both service implementations can beused to resolve those differences.

Service Brokers: Enterprise services must scalewell, supporting large and small configurationsequally well. Yet an application that contributesvaluable data to an enterprise may not be able toaccept responsibility for enterprise-wide distribu-tion of its data. In such cases, a separate brokercan be used to provide the needed scalability

Legacy Support: In this context, a "legacy" ap-plication is any application that does not use thisarchitecture. Adapter services are needed to ac-quire and normalize information from legacy ap-plications, to make that information available forsharing. An adapter is specialized code that ex-changes data with an application using its native

interface, and then exposes the application's datato the network using Web services. NorthropGrumman has developed adapters for the UnitedStates Army to provide backward compatibilitybetween legacy applications and a newer service-oriented system of systems.

Specialized Services

Finally we come to the information services that help meetspecific needs of homeland security applications, includingapplications used for training, planning, detecting, re-sponding, and recovering from a crisis. Shared informationpromotes consistency from planning to training to execu-tion. Shared services provide opportunities to integratethese applications seamlessly, and the ability to leverageexisting services when building a new application or capa-bility reduces cost and schedule. The following are exam-ples of specialized services that may be useful to supporthomeland security applications:

Traffic Event Notification: Having informationabout the operational status of the transportationinfrastructure is important in the management ofany emergency.

Alarm Filtering: As new automated-sensor sur-veillance systems are deployed on a large scale,their effectiveness depends upon the ability toavoid false alarms. Rule-based filters are neededto recognize any routine, benign occurrences thatmay be mistaken for alarm conditions.

Map Services: Geographic Information Systems(GIS) technology plays a growing role in emer-gency management. Shared map services will fa-cilitate the sharing of geospatial (map-related)data, and will promote a common understandingand awareness of those situations that require acoordinated response.

CONCLUSION

In spite of the many well-supported recommendations inthe 9/11 Commission's report concerning the importanceof improving how we share information, reward systemscontinue to discourage sharing information beyond theboundaries of one's own organization. We continue to betrained to withhold information as a rule and release it onlyin special cases. When in doubt, information is not shared.

Recent success stories in the field of public safety andtransportationv can serve as models for information sharingin HLS. The Integrated Incident Management System(IIMS) is one example. Developed with US Department ofTransportation funding and managed by the New YorkState Department of Transportation, it implements the"Common Incident Management Message" standards,

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known as IEEE-1512 vito enable the eight participatingagencies listed below to notify each other of scheduled andunscheduled highway incidents, contributing to improvedsafety, reduced congestion, improved mobility, and in-creased efficiency and productivity.

* New York State Department of Transportation* New York City Department of Transportation* New York City Police Department* New York City Fire Department/EMS* New York City Department of Sanitation* New York City Department of Environmental Pro-

tection* Metropolitan Transportation Authority - New

York City Transit* New York City Office of Emergency Management

The Transportation Operations Coordinating Committee(TRANSCOM), serving major highway routes in thegreater New York - New Jersey - Connecticut area, is an-other success story. In an implementation that predates theIEEE- 1 512 standards, TRANSCOM uses traditional ITtechniques to collect and disseminate information abouttraffic incidents among its seventeen member agencies.TRANSCOM's Board of Trustees consists of the chiefoperating officers of each member agency, a structure thataddresses in a formal and very effective way the need forcooperation and executive-level concurrence on how theirinformation is managed and shared.

The same capabilities and practices that transportation au-thorities use to manage everyday planned and unplannedincidents such as lane closings and motor vehicle accidentswill prove invaluable in the ability to respond to catastro-phic public safety incidents. The awareness, habits andskills developed through everyday exchange and use ofeach other's information in the course of routine opera-tions are key to making these practices available and use-ful should there be a major, large-scale incident.

The Regional Information Joint Awareness Network(RIJAN) is a vision by John P. Pazckowski, the New Yorkand New Jersey Port Authority's director of operations andemergency management. RIJAN's mission would be to dofor homeland security what the IIMS and TRANSCOMhave done for transportation.

Northrop Grumman has been a leader in the use of net-work services to make the mission-critical informationsystems that our armed forces take to war interoperable.The same technology offers solutions to the technical chal-lenges described in this paper, to support interoperabilityamong the diverse civil and military agencies that secureand defend our homeland. A unified national strategy forinteroperability in homeland security is needed. Our hope

implemented, will validate the approach, and will be ex-tended nation-wide.

ACRONYMS

Acronym DefinitionCES Core Enterprise ServicesCIO Chief Information OfficerDISA Defense Information Systems AgencyDoD Department of DefenseDoT Department of TransportationEMS Emergency Medical ServicesHLS Homeland SecurityIEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics

EngineersIIMS Integrated Incident Management SystemIT Information TechnologyLAN Local Area NetworkNCES Network-Centric Enterprise ServicesOSI Open Systems InterconnectionOWL Web Ontology LanguageSAML Security Access Markup LanguageSOA Service Oriented ArchitectureSOAP Simple Object Access ProtocolTRANSCOM Transportation Operations Coordinating

CommitteeUDDI Universal Description, Discovery and

IntegrationW3C World Wide Web ConsortiumWebDAV Web-based Distributed Authoring

and VersioningWSDL Web Services Description LanguageXML Extensible Markup Language

'Revision to a paper by the same title in The McGraw-HillHandbook ofHomeland Security ed. David Kamien, July 2005

The 9111 Commission Report, chapter 3, Counter terrorismEvolves, p. 88

Department ofDefense Net-Centric Data Strategy. John P.Stenbit, DoD CIO: memorandum ofMay 9, 2003

i Securing the Port ofNew York andNew Jersey: Network-Centric Operations Applied to the Campaign Against Terrorism.Stevens Institute of Technology, September 2004

v Sharing Information between Public Safety and TransportationAgenciesfor Traffic Incident Management. National CooperativeHighway Research Program (NCHRP) Report 520. Transporta-tion Research Board of the National Academies;WASHINGTON, D.C., 2004V' Guide to the IEEE 1512Tm Family ofStandards. StandardsInformation Network, IEEE Press, April 2004

is that regional networks for HLS such as RIJAN will be

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