identity affirmation and social movement support

European Journal of Social Psychology

Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 38, 935–946 (2008)

Published online 6 November 2007 in Wiley InterScience

(www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.473

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Identity affirmation and social movement supporty

Correspondence to: Bernd Simon, Institut fur-mail: [email protected] article was published online on 6 Novemb

nline only on 18 February 2008; DOI: 10.100resent Address: University of Trier, Trier, Ge

opyright # 2007 John Wiley & Son

BERND SIMON*, ROMAN TROTSCHELz AND DORIT DAHNEChristian-Albrechts-Universitat zu Kiel, Kiel, Germany

Abstract

It is argued that the power of collective identification to mobilize people for collective action such as social movement

support derives at least partly from processes of identity affirmation. The hypothesized identity-affirming function of social

movement support is tested in two laboratory experiments which revolve around collective identity as a supporter of the

peace movement. In Experiment 1, we predicted and found that people who strongly identified with the peace movement

showed more movement support (i.e. made more monetary donations to the peace movement) under conditions of

uncertain as opposed to certain possession of identity as a movement supporter. In Experiment 2, we replicated this

finding, but also found, in accordance with the notion of substitution, that the mobilizing effect of uncertain collective-

identity possession was undermined when an identity symbol was available that could function as a surrogate for more

costly identity-affirming behaviour. Further conceptual and social implications of the identity-affirming function of social

movement support are discussed. Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

‘The ‘‘good’’ thing about the Iraq war is that now our peace movement will be strengthened again.’

(anonymous supporter of the peace movement, March 2003)

In recent years social psychology has made important contributions to a better understanding of collective phenomena

that had long been considered the traditional domain of sociological theorizing and research. More specifically, guided by

the social identity or self-categorization perspective (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell,

1987), social psychological research demonstrated that collective identification is an important determinant of social

movement support. From this perspective, social movement support is the enactment of a particular politicized group or

social category membership, and collective identification operates as the basic social psychological process underlying

movement support (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Accordingly, social psychological research has uncovered the

facilitative role of collective identification in mobilization for political action in various social movement contexts,

including the women’s movement, the older people’s movement, the gay movement, the fat acceptance movement, the

farmers’ movement and right-wing political movements (e.g. De Weerd & Klandermans, 1999; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996;

Simon et al., 1998; for reviews, see Simon, 2004; Sturmer & Simon, 2004; Wright, 2001).

Although the motivation to support a social movement is rarely free from cost-benefit calculations revolving around

more tangible interests of the individual and his or her group (Klandermans, 1997), recent research also indicates that

collective identification possesses a unique mobilizing power over and above such calculative considerations (Simon,

2004; Sturmer & Simon, 2004). In a first attempt to uncover the psychological process underlying the mobilizing power of

collective identification, Sturmer, Simon, Loewy and Jorger (2003) predicted and found that a sense of inner obligation to

Psychologie, Christian-Albrechts-Universitat, Olshausenstrasse 40, D-24098 Kiel, Germany.

er 2007. An error was subsequently identified and corrected by an erratum notice that was published2/ejsp.508. This printed version incorporates the amendment identified by the erratum notice.rmany.

s, Ltd.

Received 10 July 2006

Accepted 21 September 2007

936 Bernd Simon et al.

enact one’s collective identity mediated the relationship between collective identification and social movement support.

Obviously, collective identification entails the obligation to enact one’s collective identity–an obligation that, once

fulfilled, ensures one’s entitlement to that particular collective identity (‘to be is to do and to do is to be’; Simon, 2004, p.

187).

We take this reasoning one step further and argue that the mobilizing power of collective identification derives at least

partly from identity affirmation processes. Similar to their pursuit of individual identities (Emmons, 1996; Steele, 1988;

Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982), people may also aspire to possess the collective identity as a supporter of a particular social

movement. Behaviour or action in agreement with the desired collective identity (e.g. going to a rally or donating money to

the movement) would then serve as a means to affirm one’s identity as a movement supporter.

In this article, we report two laboratory experiments which examine processes of identity affirmation in the context of

the peace movement in Germany. Experiment 1 is a test of our basic assumption that social movement support serves an

identity-affirming function. Experiment 2 further substantiates our perspective by examining an additional implication of

identity affirmation processes pertaining to the role of identity symbols.

EXPERIMENT 1

For a goal to exert a motivating force on someone’s behaviour, the person must not completely or securely have attained

the goal yet (Lewin, 1926). The same should apply to desired identities. In fact, identities are rarely, if ever, achieved

completely or once and for all. Life with its changing circumstances and complex web of social interactions is a constant

source of identity-relevant uncertainties, including self-doubts regarding identity possession as well as lack of identity

recognition by others (e.g. Festinger, 1954; Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999, p. 51). Such experiences then

invigorate a person’s identity affirmation concerns to the extent that he or she defines him or herself in terms of the

respective identity (Gollwitzer & Kirchhof, 1998; Lewin, 1926; Turner et al., 1987).

Applied to the peace movement context, it follows that such affirmation processes should operate to the extent that the

person identifies with the peace movement (i.e. defines him or herself as a movement supporter), but still has to deal with

uncertainties as to whether he or she really possesses this identity—a state Wicklund and Gollwitzer (1982) referred to as

incompleteness. This reasoning also concurs with the self-verification perspective (Swann, 1999; Swann, Rentfrow, &

Guinn, 2002). Although the self-verification perspective has so far been applied primarily to the analysis of identity

processes in the interpersonal domain, its extension to the collective domain would produce comparable predictions.

That is, in the face of identity-relevant uncertainties, people with high collective identification would be expected to

be particularly motivated to verify their collective identity by performing identity-affirming behaviours (e.g. social

movement support).

To test our reasoning, we orthogonally manipulate collective identification with the peace movement and uncertainty of

the possession of this collective identity as two independent variables. As a measure of identity-affirming behaviour,

participants are subsequently given the opportunity to support the peace movement by donating money to it. We thus use

real behaviour as our main dependent variable. We predict an interaction effect such that uncertain as opposed to certain

possession of collective identity increases identity-affirming behaviour, but only when people’s collective identification is

high.

Method

Participants and Design

One hundred and twenty-eight students (66 men, 61 women, 1 missing gender specification; M age¼ 24.53 years,

SD¼ 3.99 years) from various faculties of the University of Kiel participated in the experiment. The design consisted of

two between-subjects variables: collective identification (low vs. high) and uncertainty of identity possession (low vs.

high). Participants were randomly assigned to the four cells of the design, with n¼ 32. Each participant received 8s(approximately 10 U.S.$) for his or her participation.

Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 38, 935–946 (2008)

DOI: 10.1002/ejsp

Identity and movement support 937

Procedure

The experiment was introduced as a study on students’ attitudes towards international conflict resolution and peace

policies. Up to eight persons were invited for each experimental session. Participants were seated at individual computer

terminals in separate cubicles and were told that they would be given a number of questions about their attitudes towards,

and support for, the peace movement. They were also informed that they could communicate with the other participants via

electronic mail and that they would later have a discussion with them about issues related to the peace movement. Each

participant created his or her own user name and then had 3 minutes to exchange short test e-mails with other participants.

Subsequently, the independent variables were manipulated followed by manipulation checks and the measurement of the

dependent variable. All independent variables were manipulated via the computer, and participants entered all their

responses directly into the computer. At the end, participants were fully debriefed and thanked.

Independent Variables

In line with self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), collective identification with the peace movement (low vs.

high) was manipulated by instigating differentiation either between self and ingroup or between self and outgroup. In the

low-identification condition, participants were requested to describe how they differed from ‘a typical supporter of the

peace movement’, whereas in the high-identification condition they were requested to describe how they differed from ‘a

typical opponent of the peace movement’. In both conditions, participants were given 4 minutes to list all differences they

could think of (i.e. self-ingroup or self-outgroup differences, respectively).

Subsequently, uncertainty of identity possession (low vs. high) was manipulated using a forced-choice task.

Participants were presented with a set of four statements from which they had to select those three statements with which

‘you could still agree to some extent, if at all possible, although they may not fully reflect your opinion’. In the

low-uncertainty condition, all four statements reflected a positive attitude towards the peace movement so that completion

of this task raised no doubts about participants’ identity as a movement supporter (e.g. ‘The peace movement can make a

contribution to the maintenance of world peace’). In the high-uncertainty condition, however, all four statements reflected

a critical attitude towards the peace movement so that any selection of statements now raised doubts about one’s identity as

a movement supporter (e.g. ‘As long as one’s own country is not involved in military action, it is not necessary to join the

peace movement’). To further strengthen this manipulation, participants in the high-uncertainty condition were also asked

to indicate whether they had participated in a particular peace demonstration that had allegedly taken place on campus in

the previous year. Because, in reality, no such demonstration had taken place, research participants had to admit their

non-participation in the (fictitious, but plausible) event adding further doubt about identity possession. In the

low-uncertainty condition, participants were asked to indicate whether they supported a rather uncontroversial political

demand of the peace movement (‘Do you consider the right to refuse military service a fundamental right that should be

included in the European Constitution?’).

Manipulation Checks

Collective identification was measured with three items (‘I view myself as a supporter of the peace movement’, ‘I feel ties

with the peace movement’, ‘I identify with the peace movement’). This manipulation check was administered

immediately after the identification manipulation and was repeated with the same items after the measurement of the

dependent variables.

After the uncertainty manipulation, participants indicated how pleasant and how satisfactory the experiment had been

so far. We preferred this admittedly indirect manipulation check to a more direct measurement of perceived uncertainty of

identity possession for both theoretical and methodological reasons. First, the postulated theoretical meaning of

uncertainty of identity possession is that the person has not completely achieved a desired identity yet. Consequently, such

a state should be accompanied by unpleasant feelings of dissatisfaction. Second, we feared that a blunter manipulation

check (e.g. ‘How certain are you about your identity as a movement supporter?’) would very likely reveal the true purpose

of the experiment and thus result in strong demand characteristics, especially in the high-uncertainty condition. Responses


DOI: 10.1002/ejsp


concerning the manipulation check measures were provided on seven-point rating scales ranging from I do not agree at all

(¼ 1) to I very strongly agree (¼ 7).

Dependent Variable

To measure identity-affirming behaviour, the experimenter explained that, before continuing with the experiment, each

participant would be given the opportunity to donate some portion of his or her payment (8s) to support initiatives of the

peace movement especially in poorer countries. If the participant agreed to make a donation, he or she could select a

particular amount from a list of 16 possible contributions ranging from 0.50s to 8s with a constant increment of 0.50s.

Participants were also told that the three most generous donors would receive a pin with the dove of peace. The experiment

was then terminated and participants were fully debriefed. Donors were informed that they could either receive their full

payment of 8s or give their donation to a real peace initiative.

Results

Manipulation Checks

We first averaged each participant’s responses concerning the three collective-identification items, separately for the

measurement immediately after the identification manipulation and for the second measurement at the end of the

experiment (Cronbach’s a¼ .91 and .95, one-factor solutions with eigenvalues> 2.54 and explained variance> 84%).1

We then performed a 2� 2� 2 mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) with identification (low vs. high) and uncertainty

(low vs. high) as between-subjects variables and time (of measurement) as a within-subjects variable (time 1/after UV vs.

time 2/after DV). The expected main effect of the identification manipulation was significant, F(1, 124)¼ 4.23, p< .05.

Confirming an effective identification manipulation, participants in the high-identification condition showed higher

collective identification than participants in the low-identification condition, M(high identification)¼ 3.96, SD¼ 1.59,

M(low identification)¼ 3.42, SD¼ 1.39. In addition, a main effect of time revealed that, across all experimental

conditions, collective identification decreased over time, F(1, 124)¼ 23.31, p< .001, M(time 1)¼ 3.86, SD¼ 1.62,

M(time 2)¼ 3.52, SD¼ 1.50. Finally, although a marginal Identification by Time interaction indicated that the effect of the

identification manipulation decreased somewhat over time, F(1, 124)¼ 2.92, p¼ .09, planned contrasts (one-tailed t-tests)

confirmed that it held up at both time points, ps< .056. All other ANOVA effects were nonsignificant, Fs< 1.

Experiences of pleasantness and satisfaction reported after the uncertainty manipulation were highly correlated,

r¼ .64, p< .001. A 2� 2 ANOVA on the averaged ratings yielded only the expected main effect of the uncertainty

manipulation, F(1, 124)¼ 4.26, p< .05. All other ANOVA effects were nonsignificant, Fs� 1.53, p> .21. Indicating an

effective uncertainty manipulation, participants in the high-uncertainty condition reported less pleasant feelings or

satisfaction than participants in the low-uncertainty condition, M(high uncertainty)¼ 4.73, SD¼ 1.19, M(low

uncertainty)¼ 5.20, SD¼ 1.37.

Donations

A 2� 2 ANOVA on the monetary donations made to the peace movement yielded no main effects, Fs� 1.29, p> .25, but a

marginal Uncertainty by Identification interaction, F(1, 124)¼ 3.11, p¼ .08. As predicted, uncertainty increased

donations only when identification was high, M (high uncertainty)¼ 1.88, SD¼ 2.69, M(low uncertainty)¼ 0.72,

SD¼ 1.73, F(1, 124)¼ 4.21, p< .05. Uncertainty had no effect when identification was low, M(high uncertainty)¼ 0.75,

SD¼ 2.05, M(low uncertainty)¼ 1.00, SD¼ 2.44, F(1, 124)< 1. Viewed from a different perspective, identification

1Given the scale’s high reliability and one-dimensionality, there was no need to decompose the identification construct and to single out particular aspectsof identification (e.g. cognitive salience or affective ties).


DOI: 10.1002/ejsp

Figure 1. Monetary donations to the peace movement as a function of identification with the movement and uncertainty of identitypossession


increased donations when uncertainty was high, F(1, 124)¼ 3.99, p< .05, but had no effect when uncertainty was low,

F(1, 124)< 1 (see Figure 1).2

Discussion

In Experiment 1, we found that uncertain as opposed to certain possession of identity as a supporter of the peace movement

increased monetary donations to the movement on the part of people with high collective identification. This finding

confirms our assumption that social movement support can serve an identity-affirming function. However, a possible

limitation of Experiment 1 is that, for the uncertainty manipulation, we adopted an intrapersonal approach counting

on research participants’ self-generated doubts about their collective identity. In particular, owing to our use of a

forced-choice task, we cannot rule out the possibility of reactance effects (Brehm, 1966). In Experiment 2, where we take

the analysis of identity affirmation among social movement supporters a step further, we avoid this ambiguity by adopting

an interpersonal approach to effect the uncertainty manipulation. The modified approach also allows us to employ an

improved manipulation check.

EXPERIMENT 2

To further substantiate the identity-affirming function of social movement support, we capitalize in Experiment 2 on the

psychological phenomenon of substitution. Substitution is an important hallmark of motivation and goal-directed

behaviour (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). It refers to the possibility that one form of goal attainment can be replaced with

another. For example, when hungry, different kinds of food (e.g. bread and potato chips) are to some degree

interchangeable so that eating one kind of food reduces the motivation to search for and eat the other. Substitution may also

involve symbols, especially in the social domain. Lewin (1926) alluded to the possibility that symbols can interfere with

goal-directed behaviour in that they encourage ‘unreal’ attainment of the goal and thus reduce the energizing tension

2Participants had also been given the opportunity to send out protest e-mails on behalf of the peace movement during the experimental session. Analysis ofthe number of protest e-mails sent out by the participants also confirmed our prediction. The Uncertainty by Identification interaction was significant,F(1, 124)¼ 10.40, p< .01, with the same simple effects as for the donation measure. However, the e-mail measure yielded no effects in Experiment2 and is therefore not discussed further.


DOI: 10.1002/ejsp


system (Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982). Applied to the context of social movement participation, identity symbols, such as

bumper stickers, badges or pins symbolizing membership in or support for a particular movement, should reduce the

psychological need to affirm one’s identity as a movement supporter by way of personally more demanding behaviour. In

short, identity symbols should serve as a substitute for, and thus undermine, more costly forms of movement support (e.g.

monetary donations), even though the latter are often more beneficial to the movement.

To demonstrate the hypothesized interference of (collective) identity symbols, we include possession of an identity

symbol as an additional independent variable in our experimental design. We expect to replicate the mobilizing effect of

uncertainty of identity possession observed in Experiment 1 for research participants who possess no identity symbol.

Possession of such a symbol, however, opens up an alternative, less costly route to identity affirmation and should

therefore undermine the critical effect. Note that this Uncertainty by Symbol interaction should be strongest for, if not

limited to, people with high collective identification because without identification there is no need for identity affirmation.

Method

Participants and Design

Two hundred students (109 men and 91 women, M age¼ 22.48 years, SD¼ 2.56 years) from various faculties of the

University of Kiel participated in the experiment. The design consisted of three between-subjects variables: collective

identification (low vs. high), uncertainty of identity possession (low vs. high) and possession of an identity symbol (no vs.

yes). Participants were randomly assigned to the eight cells of the design, with n¼ 25. Each participant received 8s(approximately 10 U.S.$) for his or her participation.

Procedure

Except for the modifications described below, the procedure was the same as that used in Experiment 1.

Independent Variables

Whereas collective identification was manipulated in the same way as in Experiment 1, we used a modified manipulation

of uncertainty of identity possession. Instead of the forced-choice task, participants in the high-uncertainty condition were

confronted with a second fictitious (but plausible) peace demonstration for which they had to admit their non-participation.

In the low-uncertainty condition, participants responded to a number of questions that ensured answers in the spirit of the

peace movement (e.g. ‘Have you ever argued for a peaceful solution to the conflict in the Middle East?’). Subsequently,

participants received (contrived) social feedback which explicitly questioned or confirmed identity possession. It was

announced that, on the basis of his or her answers to the above questions, each participant would be rated by the other

participants on a continuum ranging from ‘no supporter of the peace movement’ to ‘supporter of the peace movement’.

Each participant was then informed that he or she had randomly been selected to be the first to receive this feedback.

Participants in the high-uncertainty condition received the feedback that the other participants had on average rated them

near the ‘no supporter’ extreme, whereas participants in the low-uncertainty condition received feedback that their average

rating was near the ‘supporter’ extreme.

Finally, we added the manipulation of the possession of an identity symbol (no vs. yes). After the identification and

uncertainty manipulations, participants were instructed to open an envelope which had been placed next to the computer

screen. Half of the participants found an envelope which contained a pin showing the dove of peace (identity symbol),

whereas the remaining participants found an envelope with a neutral pin showing a balloon (no identity symbol). All

participants were then instructed to attach the pins to their shirts or sweaters. It was stated that this was necessary because

they would soon meet other participants for a discussion about peace policies. Before they could continue with the

experiment, participants had to click on a resume button to confirm that they actually wore their pins.


DOI: 10.1002/ejsp


Manipulation Checks and Dependent Variable

Collective identification was measured with four items (‘I view myself as a supporter of the peace movement’, ‘I feel ties

with the peace movement’, ‘My attitude towards the peace movement is absolutely favourable’, ‘I identify with the peace

movement’). This manipulation check was administered immediately after the identification manipulation. However, the

last item was presented again after the measurement of the dependent variable. As for the uncertainty manipulation, we

included two additional items that tapped the perceived agreement between self-perception and others’ perception of the

self (‘I believe the other participants see me as I see myself’, ‘I believe the other participants know how I really am’).

Responses concerning the manipulation check measures were provided on seven-point rating scales ranging from I do not

agree at all (¼ 1) to I very strongly agree (¼ 7). To gauge identity-affirming behaviour, we again used the donation

measure.

Results

Manipulation Checks

We performed a 2� 2� 2 ANOVA on collective identification averaged over the four items presented immediately after

the identification manipulation (Cronbach’s a¼ .84, one-factor solution with eigenvalue¼ 2.77 and 69% explained

variance) with identification (low vs. high), uncertainty (low vs. high) and symbol (no vs. yes) as between-subjects

variables. The expected main effect of the identification manipulation was significant, F(1, 192)¼ 12.56, p< .001.

Confirming an effective identification manipulation, participants in the high-identification condition showed higher

collective identification than participants in the low-identification condition, M(high identification)¼ 4.31, SD¼ 1.27,

M(low identification)¼ 3.67, SD¼ 1.23. All other ANOVA effects were nonsignificant, Fs< 1. We also performed a

2� 2� 2� 2 mixed ANOVA including time (of measurement) as a within-subjects variable on the item that had been

presented a second time at the end of the experiment (‘I identify with the peace movement’). Reconfirming the effective

identification manipulation, the main effect of the identification manipulation was replicated, F(1, 192)¼ 8.14, p< .01,

M(high identification)¼ 4.15, SD¼ 1.32, M(low identification)¼ 3.62, SD¼ 1.28. In addition, a marginal main effect of

time indicated that, across all experimental conditions, identification slightly decreased over time, F(1, 192)¼ 3.22,

p¼ .08, M(time 1)¼ 3.96, SD¼ 1.48, M(time 2)¼ 3.82, SD¼ 1.39. All other ANOVA effects were nonsignificant,

Fs� 2.36, p> .12.

As for the uncertainty manipulation, a 2� 2� 2 ANOVA on the averaged ratings of pleasantness and satisfaction

(r¼ .70, p< .001) yielded only the expected main effect of the uncertainty manipulation, F(1, 192)¼ 11.99, p� .001. All

other ANOVA effects were nonsignificant, Fs� 1.24, p> .26. Indicating an effective uncertainty manipulation,

participants in the high-uncertainty condition reported less pleasant feelings or satisfaction than participants in the

low-uncertainty condition, M(high uncertainty)¼ 4.84, SD¼ 1.32, M(low uncertainty)¼ 5.42, SD¼ 0.99. In addition, a

2� 2� 2 ANOVA on the perceived agreement between self-perception and others’ perception of the self (averaged over

both items, r¼ .56, p< .001) revealed a significant Uncertainty by Identification interaction, F(1, 192)¼ 4.84, p< .05. All

other ANOVA effects were nonsignificant, Fs� 1.50, p> .22. Participants in the high-uncertainty condition perceived less

agreement than participants in the low-uncertainty condition, but only when identification was high, M(high

uncertainty)¼ 2.61, SD¼ 1.30, M(low uncertainty)¼ 3.24, SD¼ 1.30, F(1, 192)¼ 5.86, p< .05. There was no difference

when identification was low, M(high uncertainty)¼ 2.90, SD¼ 1.17, M(low uncertainty)¼ 2.72, SD¼ 1.41, F(1, 192)< 1.

Note that identity as a movement supporter should be incorporated into self-perception only to the extent that the person

identifies with the movement. Accordingly, uncertainty induction concerning this identity increased the discrepancy

between self-perception and others’ perception of the self only for highly identified participants. The observed interaction

thus confirms a successful uncertainty manipulation. At first glance, it may seem odd that we did not observe a similar

interaction for the manipulation check measure tapping participants’ feelings of pleasantness and satisfaction. However,

this observation is in full agreement with other work on self-perception that suggests that affective reactions to feedback

about (non-)possession of desired characteristics are not moderated by self-definition, whereas perceptual or cognitive

reactions are (Swann, Griffin, Predmore, & Gaines, 1987).


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Donations

A 2� 2� 2 ANOVA performed on the monetary donations yielded a significant Uncertainty by Symbol interaction, F(1,

192)¼ 4.72, p< .05, a significant main effect of identification, F(1, 192)¼ 7.65, p< .01, and a marginal Symbol by

Identification interaction F(1, 192)¼ 3.03, p¼ .08. More importantly, these effects were all qualified by the three-way

interaction, F(1, 192)¼ 6.92, p< .01. All other ANOVA effects were nonsignificant, Fs< 1.

As predicted, further analyses revealed that the Uncertainty by Symbol interaction was significant in the

high-identification condition, F(1, 192)¼ 11.53, p� .001, but not in the low-identification condition, F(1, 192)< 1.

Replicating the mobilizing effect of uncertainty observed in Experiment 1, simple-effects analysis for the

high-identification condition showed that uncertainty increased donations when no identity symbol was available,

M(high uncertainty)¼ 3.68, SD¼ 3.38, M(low uncertainty)¼ 1.68, SD¼ 2.58, F(1, 192)¼ 7.28, p< .01. However, also as

predicted, uncertainty lost its mobilizing effect when an identity symbol was available. The effect of uncertainty even

reversed, M(high uncertainty)¼ 1.08, SD¼ 2.00, M(low uncertainty)¼ 2.64, SD¼ 3.27, F(1, 192)¼ 4.43, p< .05.

Viewed from a different perspective, the identity symbol decreased donations in the high-uncertainty condition, F(1,

192)¼ 12.30, p� .001, while it had no effect in the low-uncertainty condition, F(1, 192)¼ 1.68, p> .19 (see Figure 2,

upper panel). There were no effects in the low-identification condition, Fs< 1 (see Figure 2, lower panel).

Discussion

Experiment 2 replicated and extended the findings of Experiment 1. Further corroborating our assumption that social

movement support can serve an identity-affirming function, we again found that uncertain as opposed to certain possession

of identity as a supporter of the peace movement increased monetary donations to the movement on the part of people with

high collective identification. However, as predicted in accordance with the notion of substitution, this mobilizing effect of

uncertainty was undermined, and even reversed, when an identity symbol was available. Viewed from a different

perspective, it appears that, under conditions of high need for identity affirmation (i.e. high identification combined with

uncertain identity possession), identity symbols have a de-mobilizing effect. They seem to induce surrogate identity

affirmation thus reducing the psychological need to perform more costly identity-affirming behaviours (Lewin, 1926;

Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982).

Private versus Public Donations: A Follow-Up Study

It should be noted that participants made their monetary donations in private without sharing their decisions with other

participants. It is therefore not very likely that social pressures to conform to a pro-peace norm, which may have been

prevalent among the student population from which we recruited our research participants, were responsible for our

findings. Still, the possession of individual user names for e-mail exchange at an earlier stage of the experiment together

with the promise that the most generous donors would receive a prize may have introduced some rudimentary sense of

identifiability or ‘publicness’ and thus triggered conformity processes.

To gauge the potential contribution of such processes, we conducted a brief follow-up study varying identifiability of

monetary donations while focusing on the high-identification/high-uncertainty condition, where participants should be

particularly concerned about their public reputation and thus particularly vulnerable to conformity processes. More

specifically, if these processes indeed played a role in willingness to donate money to the peace movement, donations

should vary with identifiability. Participants were again university students. Each participant was paid 6s (approximately

7.50 U.S.$) for his or her participation. All participants underwent the combination of high-identification induction and

high-uncertainty induction following the same procedure as in the main experiment. To manipulate identifiability, half of

the participants were told that donations would be kept absolutely anonymous, whereas the other participants were made to

believe that donations would later be made known to all participants together with the respective donor’s user name. No

prizes were promised for the most generous donations. To check whether we could replicate the de-mobilizing symbol

effect, half of the participants again received the identity symbol whereas the remaining participants were in the control

condition (no identity symbol). The experimental design thus consisted of two between-subjects variables, identifiability


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Figure 2. Monetary donations to the peace movement as a function of uncertainty of identity possession and possession of an identitysymbol, separately for participants with high identification (upper panel) and participants with low identification (lower panel)


and symbol, with n varying between 24 and 27.3 To ensure sufficiently high collective identification, we also included

collective identification—measured with the same four-item scale (Cronbach’s a¼ .90, one-factor solution with

eigenvalue¼ 3.07 and 77% explained variance)—in the design as a quasi-experimental variable based on a median-split

(median¼ 4.5). Collective identification was measured before the manipulation of the independent variables and did not

vary across the four experimental conditions, all Fs< 1.

Although participants acknowledged that the other participants would be better informed about their decisions when

identifiability was high rather than low, F(1, 94)¼ 3.91, p¼ .05, identifiability did not influence their donations. In a

2� 2� 2 ANOVA on the monetary donations, the main effect and all interaction effects involving identifiability were

nonsignificant, Fs� 1.39, p> .24. However, we replicated the symbol effect. Overall, participants with an identity symbol

donated less money (from their payment of 6s) than participants without an identity symbol, F(1, 94)¼ 2.98, p¼ .09, and

3The data from two participants were excluded from the analysis because they failed to comply with experimental instructions.


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the Symbol by Identification interaction, F(1, 94)¼ 4.58, p< .05, revealed that the effect was limited to high identifiers,

M(identity symbol)¼ 1.00, SD¼ 1.66, M(no identity symbol)¼ 2.25, SD¼ 2.34, F(1, 94)¼ 6.34, p� .01. There was no

symbol effect for low identifiers, M(identity symbol)¼ 0.80, SD¼ 1.63, M(no identity symbol)¼ 0.69, SD¼ 0.97, F(1,

94)< 1. The main effect of identification was also significant, F(1, 94)¼ 6.57, p� .01.

In conclusion, concerns about one’s public reputation and associated conformity processes obviously played no role in

participants’ donations to the peace movement. These processes can thus hardly be responsible for the findings of

Experiment 2. Instead, our observation that identity-affirming behaviour was performed also in an anonymous context

confirms that processes of identity affirmation are aimed not only at public appearances, but also at private self-images.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The research presented in this article examined the role of identity affirmation in social movement support. It was proposed

that, similar to the pursuit of individual identities (e.g. Emmons, 1996; Swann, 1999; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982),

people also aspire to possess certain collective identities and therefore engage in identity-affirming behaviour such as

social movement support. In two experiments, we predicted and found that people who strongly identified with the peace

movement showed more identity-affirming behaviour (i.e. donated more money to the peace movement) when confronted

with identity-relevant uncertainties. Examination of the role of identity symbols further deepened our understanding of

identity affirmation processes among social movement supporters. Drawing on the notion of substitution—a general

hallmark of motivation and goal-directed behaviour—we showed that possession of identity symbols can reduce the

psychological need to affirm the desired identity as a movement supporter through ‘real’ behaviour—behaviour that is

usually more costly for the individual person, but also more beneficial to the movement.

Three features of our research deserve further discussion. First, we wish to highlight that we successfully manipulated

strength of collective identification and uncertainty of collective-identity possession as two orthogonal (independent)

variables. In each of our (main) experiments, strength of collective identification was measured twice, the first time before

and a second time after the uncertainty manipulation. But we observed no changes in the strength of participants’

collective identification as a function of the uncertainty manipulation, neither in Experiment 1 nor in Experiment 2. Hence,

the mobilizing effect of uncertainty of identity possession observed in both experiments cannot alternatively be explained

as a mere by-product of inadvertently strengthened collective identification. Second, acknowledging that identity-relevant

uncertainty may have its origin in private experiences (e.g. self-generated doubts) as well as in public experiences (e.g.

other people’s imputations), we employed both intrapersonal (Experiment 1) and interpersonal (Experiment 2) approaches

to uncertainty induction and obtained similar effects on identity affirmation. Together with the observation that

identity-affirming behaviour was performed in public as well as in private (Follow-Up Study), this convergence increases

our confidence in the robustness of the effects reported in this article. At this point, a clarification concerning the

differences between our notion of uncertainty of collective-identity possession and Hogg’s (2000) notion of subjective

uncertainty is in order. While Hogg (2000) is interested in uncertainty as an existential human experience which he sees

connected to a fundamental human motive to reduce subjective uncertainty about the world in general, our notion of

uncertainty is more circumscribed in that it refers specifically to one’s collective identity. Another critical difference is that

Hogg (2000) views collective identity as an important means by which people reduce subjective uncertainty, whereas we

are concerned with collective identity as a goal in itself that people pursue to the extent that collective-identity possession

is important to them, but still uncertain. Despite these differences, the two perspectives are by no means incompatible. In

fact, the more specific uncertainty about the possession of an important collective identity may very well spur the pursuit of

that identity as a (lower level) goal which, once attained, may then serve as a means for attaining the (higher level) goal of

uncertainty reduction in the more general sense as specified by Hogg (2000). The third feature that needs to be discussed

is our use of student samples. Student samples are obviously not representative of the wider population. However, our

goal was the empirical test of theoretically derived hypotheses and not a representative survey, so that sample

representativeness is a less critical methodological issue (Brewer, 2000; Visser, Krosnick, & Lavrakas, 2000). There is also

little need to worry about developmental issues because our samples of German students with mean ages of 24.53 years in

Experiment 1 and 22.48 years in Experiment 2 are closer to the general adult population than are the typical North

American college sophomore samples of laboratory research (Sears, 1986).


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We conclude this article with a conceptual specification and a cautionary note. The specification concerns the origins of

the mobilizing power of collective identity. There is a wide agreement among social psychologists that collective identity

is an important antecedent of social movement participation and other forms of collective action (De Weerd &

Klandermans, 1999; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996; Simon, 2004; Wright, 2001). The implicit assumption often is that

collective identity pushes people towards participation in collective action. The present research strongly suggests that

collective identity may also function as a goal that pulls people to participation in collective action. Note that these are

complementary and not necessarily conflicting views in that collective identity can be the cause of as well as the reason for

collective action. Thus I may participate in collective activities organized by the peace movement because I am already a

supporter or in order to become a supporter. In the first case I already occupy a place or position in the social world which

makes participation for me the natural thing to do. In the second case I am still on my way to that place. While the precise

theoretical and empirical implications of this admittedly subtle distinction still needs to be unravelled in future work, the

research presented in this article clearly suggests that this distinction is both feasible and useful.

Finally, we need to warn against a misinterpretation of our work. Collective-identity affirmation, especially in

combination with the notion of substitution involving identity symbols, may provide an elegant explanation for the

emergence of a ‘bumper sticker society’ without enduring activism. However, this does not imply that, in the final analysis,

all political or collective action consists merely of fleeting and shallow acts of self-presentation or impression management

(cf. Baumeister, 1982; Schlenker, 1980). On the contrary, a psychological mechanism like collective-identity affirmation

opens up the possibility that people not only enact identities that are thrust upon them by their immediate living conditions

(e.g. material interests or common fate), but also actively choose and pursue long-term collective-identity projects that

transcend their immediate self-interests and thus acquire true moral depth.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The research was made possible by a grant from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft to Bernd Simon and Roman

Trotschel (SI 428/15-1).

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