ideas matter chinas peaceful rise choo

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O R I G I N A L P A P E R

Ideas matter: Chinas peaceful rise

Jaewoo Choo

Published online: 10 November 2009# Springer-Verlag 2009

Abstract Illuminating on the power transition theory, realists are more than

convinced of potential structural conflicts in both economic and security realms

due to Chinas rise. They see China as a dormant source of challenges to American

preeminence, economic policies of the west as evident in the recent negotiation

discourses (e.g., G-20 and G-8 meetings), the

western

norms of diplomacy (e.g.,Washington consensus) in developing countries including in Africa, and security

concerns of its neighboring states. However, China will be able to avoid this claimed

inevitability by abiding to peaceful ideas deeply embedded in New Security

Concept, peaceful rise theory, peaceful development and a harmonious world

doctrine. This paper argues that China will be able to rise peacefully because of the

efficacy of practicing liberalism and constructivism at large in its diplomacy. China

is increasingly and genuinely embracing shared norms and institutions, gradually

gravitating East Asian regional order to its favor in the form of power constellation.

Introduction

China still draws a great deal of debate in both academic and policy-making circles

on how it will test its accrued and enhanced comprehensive national power (Ross

and Zhu 2008; Zhao 2007; Legro 2007; Waldron 2005; Harris 2005). The debate

centers on two mutually reinforcing questions. First, it is often related to a seemingly

immortal issue: whether China will become a threat or a peaceful force as it ascends

to the status of a powerful state (Glaser and Medeiros 2007). Regardless of the

consequences, China will eventually have to reaffirm the value of power it

Asia Eur J (2009) 7:389404

DOI 10.1007/s10308-009-0241-3

J. Choo (*)

Kyung Hee University, 1 Seocheon-dong, Kiheung-gu, Yongin, Gyeonggi-do, South Korea

e-mail: [email protected]


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aggregates for expanding national interests. From a (neo-) realist perspective,

China is predestined to exercise its power to alter the status quo. On the contrary,

liberalists argue that Chinas enmeshment into the world system will allow China to

appreciate the obsoleteness of war and the value of cooperation. In a similar vein, the

second question asks Chinas potential impact on the evolutionary discourse of theexisting order: whether it will, as a revisionist power, subvert the extant order or try

its utmost effort to preserve the status quo (Johnston 2003). Indeed, there have been

numerous scholarly works full of uncompromising and paralleling views regarding

the prospective intent behind Chinas use of its power (Kang 2005). They fail to

reach a consensual conclusion because realism remains the most compelling general

framework for understanding international relations and therefore, the premises for

most of International Relations theories.

One prominent shortfall in these approaches underlies in that they exclusively

confine the premises of their analysis to that of realism. Realism defines power as anends in itself to expand influence. While adapting to this premise, liberalism figures

it prominently to be otherwise in diplomacy as cooperation driven by shared

common values and interests will be pervasive with growing economic interdepen-

dence and role of international institutions. What is not accounted in their analyses is

so-called the ideas of nation or how a nation thinks it will use its power. It is

critical to observe it because it is such ideas that will determine the direction of a

nations intent in exercising power and not vice versa. Ideas, often defined as beliefs

held by individuals, influence policy when the principled or causal beliefs they

embody provide road maps that increase actors

clarity about goals or ends

meansrelationships (Goldstein and Keohane 1993).

Either out of principled or causal beliefs, ideas function as guides for national

behavior because they structure peoples views about the fundamental nature of

human life and the morality of practices and choices (Goldstein and Keohane

1993). Hence, ideas are a condition for reasoned discourse, and when reasons

are required, ideas become important. Intent may not likely to precede and

shape ideas. Rather, it is ideas that shape agendas and offer reasons for

proposed courses of action. In return, the demand for reasons can profoundly

shape the outcomes. Regardless of the process by which ideas are selected,

known as causal pathway, Goldstein and Keohane assert that ideas can affect

policy outcomes, albeit the degree of influence may vary with the paths

selected. There are three causal pathways whereby ideas can be claimed to

influence policy outcomes. One pathway limits choice for alternative strategies

because it is based on individual preferences. Another one lies in that, since

ideas affect strategic interactions, they would contribute to attain more efficient

outcomes by coordinating efforts from all participants in the discourse. The

other pathway reflects a lasting influence on politics as ideas are incorporated

into the terms of political debate. It basically highlights the institutionalization

process of ideas in politics because socially constructed sets of ideas would

constrain public policy.

Ideas are, therefore, critical to the clarity of debate on Chinas ascendency.

Then, in what perspective should we see power? What kind of power has been in

practice by the Chinese in recent years? Legro puts power in its own best

perspective. He claims that power is merely a tool, and the purpose of the use is

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consequential. Hence, in relation to this study, since power does not determine

ideas nor do power transitions among states inevitably lead to conflict, as

assumed by Legro, ideas about the use of tools could considerably vary (Legro

2005). As collective national ideas endure in constant struggle to determine the

degree of a states integration into the extant world order, they needed to beproperly examined and explained before predicting the structural impact of a

nations power trajectory. In light of his view, simply because a nation has power,

its action course is not predetermined. Whether this state will be benign or harmful

to others in its power exercise is to be determined by how it will think to use its

power. Its action will be dependent on its ideas, and therefore, it is the

transformation of ideas that matters and how the collective ideas of nation,

especially the great powers, work out would mean it will work out as sources of

change (Legro 2005). On this basis, Legro concludes power trajectory will not

shape the world politics.

It entails profound implications against power transitiontheory, a long-standing empirical study on the behavioral pattern of a rising power

against an existing hegemon.

Understanding ideas behind the use of power as a political instrument becomes a

critical prerequisite to the debates of Chinas rise. It is, in large part, because power

is the ability to influence the behavior of in accordance with ones own ends

(Organski 1958). On the international level, power aspect is therefore embedded

in every relationship. Accordingly so, the kind of relationship that states have

with one another can serve as a platform of choices for the kind of power that

will be exercised (Organski 1958). When equipped with power to exercise, stateshave a number of instruments of power (e.g., wealth, resources, manpower, arm,

and diplomatic skills) and a set of methods of exercising power (e.g., persuasion,

rewards, punishment, or force). With these instruments and methods available,

states with power have two choices of exercising its power. One is exercising

positive power, an ability to make another state do what it wants. The other is

negative power, that is, to prevent another nation taking action considered

undesirable. According to Organski, it is often the case thatmuch of the power on

the international level consists of negative power (Organski 1958).

The objective of this article is to analyze how Chinas peaceful rise will be

facilitated by Chinese ideas of peace and exercising negative power. The paper will

be structured as follows. Section II will probe Chinese ideas of power utilization,

focusing on the aspects of the conceptual framework by which Chinese power

exercise is guided. Given this framework of analysis, section III will proceed to

examine how China has developed and shaped the ideas of peace for its foreign

policy. Chinese ideas are not a fixed and immutable attribute, rather an evolutionary

one. Section IV presents some studies on the effects that Chinese practice of ideas of

peace and negative power exercise. Conclusions of the study are presented in

Section V.

Chinas idea of power utilization

Chinas ever-increasing power through economic development and enhanced

military power program is challenging the landscape of the current international

Chinas peaceful rise: ideas matter 391


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politics.1 Chinas changing profile and rising international status already questions

the potential impact on international structure. One byproduct of the debates on such

impact with negative connotation is the China threat theory (Roy 1994). Another one

attempts to thwart it with such counterarguments as peaceful rise (heping jueqi)

(Zheng 2005), peaceful development (heping fazhan) (Kang and Gung 2007) andharmonious world (hexie shijie) (Yu 2007; Xu 2007). Mainstream argument

presented by these two contrasting schools of thought revolves around the future

discourse of Chinese utilization of its ever-growing national power (Johnston 2003).

It simply arises out of uncertainty as to how China will exercise its power in the

future. In other words, such uncertainty stems from difficulties in understanding

Chinas ideas of utilizing its power. Without proper understanding of China s ideas,

it will be difficult to define the attributes of Chinese intention. Will China be, for

instance, assertive to revoke the status quo and displace it with what it has advocated

over the past years (i.e., multipolar world) (Shih 2005) or will it use power to benefitworld development and prosperity?

There is no immediate answer, and such debates will continue to perpetuate as

long as realism remains the most compelling general framework for understanding

international relations (Walt 1998). Unless the fundamental premises of liberalism,

constructivism, and institutionalism is emancipated from that of realism in their

explanation of empirical outcomes (i.e., causally consequential, Barnett and

Duvall 2005), no matter how hard they try to offer alternative views on the prospect

1 That a state becomes mindful of its military power as a resultant discourse of economic success is a well-

known political axiom because of the incrementing needs to better secure and further advance its growing

national interest based on expansion (Gilpin 1995). China is no exception, and it is actively pursuing

modernization of military, one of the four Chinese modernization goals set at the beginning of reform

policy adopted in 1978. Pundits are interested in Chinese military modernization program for their interest

in not only learning the intent and purposes of Chinese military capability enhancement efforts but also the

political consequences and ramifications. The interrelation of Chinas economic development and military

enhancement efforts had a peculiar pattern in the first 10 years (19781988) of the reform and open-door

period. Reform initiatives in the military during this period largely focused on restructuring of Chinese

military budget and personnel for the cost factor involved in realizing military professionalism and

modernization (Wang 1995). In the name of military reforms and concentration on economic

development first, significant cuts and reductions were made instead. Demobilization, for instance, was

initially adopted with a goal to retire half of the total 4.3 million armed forces by 1986. It failed, however,

with only 40% opting for retirement at the end of 1986 (Wang 1995). At one point, Chinas defense

budget in 1981 was down to 5.4 billion yuan or almost 25% from the 1979 level (Wang 1995). A further

reduction was witnessed in 1985 when Chinas military expenditure represented about 10.5% of total

national expenditures, dropping from 14% in 1983. After 1989, military budget was soon recovered,

ironically, with the end of the cold war. Military budget has, thereafter and to date, consistently recorded a

double-digit growth. Moreover, reduced manpower was to be replaced by more sophisticated and

advanced high-tech weaponry systems and weapons. Beijing claims that the intention and purpose of such

an increase in military spending are to improve already-backward Chinese military welfare system. On the

contrary, foreign pundits would disagree with their observation on Chinese military procurement program

as it has been aggressive with purchasing weaponries conducive to the service of greater forwarddeployment strategies that are presumed to be beneficial to the protection of Chinese national interests. A

great analytical work on the interrelation of Chinese economic development and military modernization

efforts is available by Feigenbaum. In his work, he does an excellent job in relating China s interests in

securing overseas energy resources for sustainable economic reasons of China to the promotion of Chinese

military modernization goal (Feigenbaum 1999). Hence, the concerns on the interrelation of Chinas

economic success and military modernization aspiration are shared by a growing cohort of China threat

theorists.

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of Chinas rise, the question of Chinas idea of power will also remain inconclusive.

The reason is simple: the future is unknown, and the past is one of a few viable

sources of reference for prediction. Given the validity of empirical studies as a

legitimate tool of analysis in the studies of International Relations theory, realists

will hardly be convinced of Chinas highly propagated benign ideas of power(Mearsheimer 2006). On the contrary, liberalists, by their observation on the Chinese

discourse of deepening integration and interdependence, will oppose to see China as

a source of instability (or conflict). Liberalist perspectives are underscored by

constructivist approaches which emphasize the impact of ideas. As interests and

identities of states are a highly malleable product of specific historical processes,

such discourse will reflect and shape beliefs and interests and establish norms of

behavior. Hence, the sources of change matter to constructivist, and so, to the study

of Chinas ideas of power. A series of engagement activities by China underlines

such sources of change, a consequence of socialization and learning process. Hence,it seems socialization is effectively at work for China as it becomes more

accommodating to norms and institutions (Harris 2001).

If China continues its social learning efforts and becomes more integrated into the

world system, Chinese idea of power will become much easier to perceive and

hence, predictable. Moreover, rise in such transparency will undermine the chances

for misperception or misunderstanding associated with negative aspects of Chinas

rise. After all, in the paradigm of constructivism, power does not determine ideas,

and the outcome of power will depend on ideas. If this were to happen as a result of

socialization, for instance, power transition theory will inevitably lose its grounds(Legro 2005). Conversely, ideas determine power. They manipulate the destiny of

power. They can exploit it in accordance to the nature of the idea. If ideas of power

adhere to the notion of material forces, the essence is to influence or harm others. If

they are detached, they will allow states to seek common identity and interests.

Hence, ideas can control the nature and character of power.

From this perspective, a rising power does not always necessarily seek conflicts

with others, especially if it does not see power as an absolute means to achieve

national interests. States can meet the demand of expanding interests due to their rise

by accommodating the status quo and seeking greater cooperation. It will be feasible

once they adapt to institutions, norms, rules, and structure based on their common

ideas (values), identity, and interest. From Chinese perspectives, the liberalism

argument is significantly supplemented by their desire to maintain a peaceful world

conducive to the interests of world development and prosperity. States, therefore,

must decide on the ideas for power when the expansion of their power demands for

more space and resources. It is particularly the case whereby states are in power

transition and are confronted with the extant hegemone who wants to contain them

to preserve its preeminence.

In determining the ideas for power, states are usually inclined to be subjective and

judgmental about the capacity and capability of their own power as well as those of

others. Regardless, when states are in the midst of power transition with direction

unknown, they will be judged by their action discourse. The only available clues for

others to sense the possible direction of power transition may be inferred from

perceived ability to sustain and lead development of direction (Zhao 2007). Hence,

ideas behind their desired direction will be judged and so will be their desire to



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expand influence. The expansion of interest/influence does not necessarily mean

altering the status quo. It might be done within their own limits of influence against

checks from the extant powers. Otherwise, it would mean challenging the existing order.

If they go beyond this boundary, states may pursue this end either independently, or by

relying on others for the needed help. If they conceive themselves to be powerful enoughto go head-to-head against the existing hegemonic power who wants to preserve the

status quo and contain challenges from a rising power, the two parties are bound for

conflict unless there is a compromise (Goldstein 2007).

If a state cannot independently match the powerful, it will have to seek an

external source of help. In this case, the state in expansion and the outside helpers

must possess shared interests to form any kind of coalition or even alliance to go

against the powerful. Here the interests are simple: whether they will gain benefits

from all this or not. Once they are able to find shared interests, there has to be a

certain degree of trust and confidence met by the two parties before committing tothe pursuit of these interests. If trust and confidence are absent, their commitment

will be questionable, fragile, and untrustworthy. Hence, if the rising power lacks

power to act independently but has the desire to preserve or change the status quo, it

will have to take the initiatives to seek ways to strengthen the commitment from

potential partners. Whether the ideas of a rising power are to change or preserve the

status quo, its confidence-building efforts to realize either end will require a great

degree of perseverance as it will be under constant checks from the existing

hegemon. To the rising power, therefore, potential partner states will be critical to the

winning cause of realizing one end or the other that it pursues primarily because of theirstrategic functionality: either as a source for hedging strategy against the hegemon for

the balance of power purposes or a source that can help alter the structural balance.

In East Asia,2 China is simply overmatched by the powerful such as the USA and

Japan in military and economic terms, respectively. Under the circumstances, it is

not ready to challenge the status quo. It has yet to make an explicit move for a

coalition against either. Instead, it prefers to preserve the status quo. The Chinese

preference has been substantiated by the emphasis on the exercise of restraints on

action (tiaoguang yanghui),constraints of choices (yousuo zuowei), and respon-

sibleness in implementation (fu ziren) in its external relations (Tang and Gries

2002). Such a prudent way of power exercise gives rise to Chinas identity to be

dual. One is the self-claimed developing country status. In this way, China simply

can discard its ability to influence the outcome of international affairs. The other one

is the assertion as a political and military pole, if not an economic one or a hegemon

in terms of its comprehensive national power. This notion positions China with a

certain degree of influence in a collective way (e.g., UN) on the outcomes of

political, diplomatic, and partially military developments in world affairs. Given

Chinas dual identity, building a premise for the understanding of its ideas of power

is extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible. At this particular stage, we can infer,

based on the words of the will rendered by the Chinese leadership, that Chinas ideas

of power is to preserve the status quo.

2 Here, East Asia denotes ASEAN+3 states, namely ten Southeast Asian states and the three Northeast

Asian states China, Japan, and South Korea.

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Chinese ideas are underscored by the conception on its own power capacity and

international status, which can also be inferred from the aforementioned preferences

by China. They are basically to exercise power within its own limit only for the

cause of peace and stability. It is to be done in a responsible manner. As it is well

aware of its own limits, China will do what it can do best within its own capacityand ability (yousuo zuowei). Hence, it will use its power as a means to fulfill critical

prerequisites for modernization goals and to materialize them for peaceful

ascendancy.

Elaborating Chinas peace ideas

Ever since the introduction of China threat theory in the early 1990s, a theory

determining Chinas prospective status as a threat to world order based on power

trajectory and realist thinking (Roy 2003), China has been persistent in exercising

negative power with such countering ideas as peaceful rise, peaceful develop-

ment, and a harmonious world (Suettinger2004). The peace ideas embedded in

all these peace theories has two features. First, it is the quintessential of open-door

policy, the embodiment of the irrefutable premise of peaceful (external) environment

for economic development. The idea confers with the supremacy of economic

interest in Chinese foreign policy. Secondly, it is the approach to facilitate such an

idea involving evolutionary changes in diplomatic means and strategies. Riding the

seemingly sufficient peaceful and stable currents of todays world, China hasincreasingly accentuated the importance of dialog and cooperation as one of the most

viable means to preserve it. Military means, however, is still regarded as one last

strategic resort exclusively for territorial conflicts (Whiting 2001).

Chinas idea of peace is further elaborated by the notion of harmonious world.

It is basically an end form of the evolved composite of all the intentions, purposes,

and visions laid out by prior policies of New Security Concept, peaceful rise,

and peaceful development. Against China threat theory, China first delivered a

security framework known as New Security Concept (Xin anquan guan) in 1996.

China has since then given a high priority to (multilateral) dialog and negotiation in

order to realize its promotion on a diplomatic way of solving international conflicts

(Finkelstein 1999). It envisions such beliefs that peaceful solution over differences in

interest with others can serve the relationship aspect of power in a peaceful manner.

Hence, ideas behind the Concept are articulated in such terms as mutual trust,

mutual benefit, equality, and cooperation. They are mutually reinforcing: mutual

trust implies the precondition of the concept while mutual benefit is the goal;

equality guarantees the efficacy of the Concepts practice; and cooperation is the

way of practicing the Concept (Ni and Chen 2003). Hence, China believes that the

right practice of the Concept is a novel strategy to its aspiration to ascend peacefully

as it will naturally be accompanied by negative power exercise in its external

relations relying on persuasion and rewards instead of force and coercion. Thus, the

Concept also gives rise to multilateralism in Chinese diplomacy and consequently,

the inception of peaceful rise theory.

The core theme of Chinese peaceful rise theory fundamentally lies in the Chinese

long understanding of the causal linkage between peace and development. That is,



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peace guarantees development and development is secured by peace. This school of

peace and development has remained the philosophical underpinning of Chinese

foreign policy since the opening of China in 1978 (Yu 2005). It emancipated China

and its leaders from long-held obsession from and fear of another world-scale war as

a result of the intensification in the structural conflicts between the two formersuperpowers, i.e., the USA and the U.S.S.R. It also dampened the role of ideology as

a major determinant of Chinese foreign policy. Furthermore, it offered sound

rationale for Chinas need to modernize and therefore, the need to improve relations

with the West. On this basis, the logic behind the school of peace and development

was pronounced significantly in the early phase of the opening period from 1978 to

the late 1980s. The effects were evidenced in the evolutionary discourse of Chinese

foreign policys strategic shifts. While the advancement of relationships with the

western countries was strongly called for in the early 1980s, efforts were made to

promote relations with neighboring states at the wake of economic sanctionsimposed by the West following the Chinese brutal suppression of the Tiananmen

incident in June 1989.

Admittedly, the shift was mainly driven by Chinese search for an alternative

source of technology and investment needed to sustain their modernization efforts in

lieu of the western sources. One noteworthy implication of such adjustment,

however, lies in the value and faith the Chinese leadership had in the linkage

between peace and development even in the most pressured circumstance. That

development in China needs to prevail was accentuated not only for the fate of

economic reforms and open-door policy but also for the stability and peace in thenation as well as in the external environment. To relieve itself from the strain of

sanctions from the West, China turned to those located in its periphery (e.g.,

Singapore, Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan, and even Israel). Improvement in

relationship was a critical prerequisite to fulfill before they were available as an

alternative choice for needed investment and technology. Consequences of such

diplomatic endeavors enabled the structure of Chinese foreign relations to mature in

a much more comprehensive and balanced manner, thereby laying a foundation for

omni-directional diplomacy (quanfangwei waijiao) that was to be pursued

thereafter (Hsiung 1995). It resulted in crystallizing Chinese foreign policy to be

interest-driven thereby paving the way for peaceful rise theory against the China

threat theory.

Chinas peaceful rise theory was first introduced in 2003 as an end in its search

for better opportunities for engagement, confidence building, and reassurance

throughout the 1990s. Although China had sought hard for such opportunities, it

was not too successful, in large part because its regional behavior was often found to

be in stark contradiction with its peace rhetoric as in peace and development.

Chinas regional behavior displayed in the seizure of leaf islands in South China Sea

and the missile test and military exercise in the Taiwan Strait, all concurring in

19951996 naturally intensified regional states concerns over the prospect of

Chinas growth (Glaser and Medeiros 2007; Roy 2003). Consequently, such

militaristic endeavors by China only further validated the essence of China threat

theory (Ross 2000). Against this background, Chinas peaceful rise was delivered

with an aim to thwart or wither the outside worlds fear on the impact of Chinas

growth (Zha 2005). To realists, Chinas deliberate policy adjustment was not

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received well in large part because it failed to justify the ensuing military build-up

programs such as Blue Navy program to enhance its offensive and forward

deployment capacity against contingencies in the Taiwan Strait (Hua 1997; Waldron

2005). Chinas persistent military modernization efforts are perceived as Chinas

adherence to reliance on all means including a military one to secure its territorialintegrity along the Strait and therefore, to prevent Taiwan from going independent

(Whiting 1997). Realists claims were confirmed by Chinas passing of the Anti-

Cessation Law in 2005 when Taiwan decided to hold a referendum on the question

of Taiwans independence at its presidential election. The Law justified military

measures against Taiwans independence attempt. In light of the premises of

peaceful rise theory, the Law was perceived to be self-contradictory and self-denial.

Realizing this loophole, Beijing leaders in 2005 would rename the peaceful rise

theory to peaceful development.

Ideas behind peaceful development were introduced by President Hu in a speechto the Chinese audience earlier in August 2004. Peaceful development theory made

its international debut during Hus visit to England in November 2005. In his speech,

Hu claimed Chinas development to be peaceful because of its inherent character;

peaceful, opened, and cooperative (Renmin ribao (Peoples Daily) 11 November

2005). The White Paper on Chinas Road to Peaceful Development, released by

General Administration of Press and Publication of the Chinese State Council in

December 2005, explains the essence and the implications are in exact lines with

those of peaceful rise theory (Kang and Gung 2007). According to the White

Paper, perspectives of Chinas road to peaceful development are pronounced inthree ways of combining internal and external elements: unifying Chinese

domestic development and opening to the outside world; relating Chinas

development to that of the world; and integrating Chinese peoples fundamental

interests to the common concern of world people. In sum, the White Paper

emphasizes, Chinas own development promotes world peace and development,

and by relying on itself and adhering to reform efforts, it creates a winwin

situation for coprosperity and perpetual peace thereby enhancing the prospect for

a harmonious world.

Soon after, Chinas peace policy would regain its poise. A series of actions taken

by China following the outbreak of 1997 Asian financial crisis including the WTO

negotiations, SARS crisis in 2003, and the 2002 North Korean nuclear crisis would

all exhibit substantial maturity in Chinese handling of multilateral negotiations,

engagement, and confidence-building process. A large degree of multilateralism,

responsibility, and cooperation was proved effective at large in Chinese diplomacy.

With much confidence gained from these practices and subsequently entailing

enhanced national image as a responsible state, China was able to raise its policy to a

higher plane in the concept of a harmonious world. The concept was originally

drawn from that of a harmonious society. Domestic aspect of the concept was

premised on Chinas long recognition on the need to harmonize its society in order

to effectively solve the socioeconomic side-effects of rapid development (i.e., the

rising gap in income distribution and the levels of development by regions, and

social unrest potential). The realization of such a society is now regarded as a critical

prerequisite to Chinas long-term development goal known as the creation of

xiaokang (a well-off) society by 2020.



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Since China has long treated its foreign policy as a means to serve its economic

interests, its foreign policy is also expected to make contributions to the realization

of a harmonious society. Following this logic, a harmonious society concept was

naturally articulated in foreign policy terms with views to combine domestic and

foreign policies, Chinas development with that of the surrounding regions and theworld, respectively. By this set of combinations, it is emphasized that the directions

and goals of Chinas rise can only be peaceful (Yu 2007). It is primarily because

preservation of an external environment conducive to Chinas development requires

contributions from not only China but also others, especially from those most

concerned with Chinas growth (Yu 2007). The imperatives for harmonization are

out of both internal and external appreciation. Domestic attributes of harmonious

world were extended to the foreign policy goals. On this basis, a strand of

harmonious society concept was articulated in international context in the White

Paper on Harmonious World released by the Chinese government in 2006. TheWhite Paper delivered a list of strategic concepts perceived to be conducive to the

realization of harmonious world. These concepts are founded in such ideas as

peace, opening-up, cooperation, and harmony and win-win. Each of them is

matched as the core value, essence of idea, basic principle, and strategy of

pursuit in todays Chinese foreign policy. These ideas, when properly practiced,

will allow such familiar terms as development, responsibility, multilateralism,

and mutual benefit to function as a matching set of guidelines to the concepts in

Chinese harmonious world policy for years to come.

In the pursuant discourse of Chinese peace ideas, China adheres to the practice ofdialog and cooperation. Hence, China strives to be a constructive player in forging a set of

common interest with concerned nations based on common values (Yu 2007). By sharing

its power, the White Paper claims that China can help others build the capacity for

self-development and engage in common development. Through exchanges and

dialog, common interest and mutual tolerance can override the differences in interest

and lack of trust, thereby reducing the chances for misgivings and misunderstanding in

interstate relations. Manifestations of such diplomatic endeavors have emerged in some

of the key regional decision-making process (e.g., ASEAN+3, East Asian Summit, and

Chiang Mai Initiative, in which the USA is excluded and Japan has positively

responded (Cheung 2008). Whether Chinas leading role in these regional decision

mechanisms can have an overriding effect on the rivalry with Japan in advancing

regional integration process requires further observation. However, the prospect is not

too bleak. Growing dependency is one positive factor. For instance, China became

Japans largest trading partner and investment destination in 2005 and 2008,

respectively. It has necessitated greater compliance with global economic trends (e.g.,

globalization and regionalization) for the two regional economic giants.

Chinese peace diplomacy has transformed China into an influential regional actor

from a mere super-sized nation. Transformation is expedited by significant growth in

Chinas appeal and attractiveness, which are consequences of Chinas consistent

practice of cooperation and dialog. It is a result of Chinas persistent practice of

negative power based on soft power. To many East Asian regional states, peace and

development question is now unthinkable without taking China into consideration

and also vice versa. As many sarcastically claim, Chinas threat to the world lies in

Chinas failure to develop (Wang 2007; Shambaugh 2004/05). Hence, Chinas

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success with peaceful rise will lead China to become more lenient and adaptable to

international norms and institutions. Through this socialization process, China will

become more of a rational actor, and its commitment to peace will be upheld with

responsibility.

Consequential evidence: power constellation

With much power aggregated through the success of economic reforms during the

past 30 years, China has also been able to share its power in the form of negative

power exercise, a way of exercising power in a peaceful manner in preventing

another state from taking action considered undesirable through persuasion and

rewards. Chinese negative power exercise has been further facilitated by the growth

in its soft power. While the growth in its hard power has been visible and noticeablein many areas, Chinese soft power, admittedly, has yet to grow to match the scale

and strength of hard power. Chinese soft power is however rapidly meeting all the

prerequisites through the development of ideational means, e.g., ideas, identity,

institutions, and other means to appeal Chinas peace ideas (Cho and Chung 2008).

Despite the extant imbalance in the growth of soft and hard power, a power-

aggregated China of both soft and hard power represents a dynamic force in East

Asia (Gill and Huang 2006). It will be a force large enough to have an impact on the

outcomes of regional order development and structural development in particular. In

the age of globalization and transnational relations, soft power, defined by Nye asattractive power as opposed to coercive power (Nye 2004), is perceived to be a

preferred choice to many including China as a choice of tool to influence others.

From functional aspect of positive and negative power, hard power is in alliance

with the former and soft power the latter. Hence, Chinas preference to exercise

negative power is basically in line with its current drive to improve and rely more on

its soft power in sustaining peaceful external environment.

As a result of negative power practice coupled with the extension of soft power,

Chinese influence has been appealing to, and well received by, the regional states.

Such appeals come from China not being assertive or aggressive with its growing

influence. Consequently, favorable views on Chinas rise are burgeoning among the

East Asian states. Such views are, in turn, already having influence on the behavior

of the regional states in that they have positive effects on the Chinese concerns of its

rise. For instance, the scale of regional equilibrium is slowly tipping in Chinas

favor. The rise in favorable Chinese views can be attributed to the development of

several major factors in the regional relations due largely to Chinas proactive and

open engagement with the regional states. First, persistent Chinas reform efforts

demonstrated the validity of China opportunity theory (zhongguo jihuilun),

Chinas role theory (zhongguo zuoyonglun), and Chinas contribution theory

(to the world development; zhongguo gongxian lun). Second, burgeoning economic

opportunities in China give rise to the intensification of the regional dependency. To

most of the regional states, China is the largest export market and investment

destination. Third, there is a growing recognition by China of the economic strategic

values of the regional states as a valuable source of technology transfer, investment,

natural resources, markets, and others alike.



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Fourth, economic interdependency is effectively showing a spill-over effect in the

political realm. Its growth leads states to realize their shared concerns in other areas

giving rise to political consensus-building opportunities. The mainstream argument

of the Chinese school of development and peace, hence, is being widely accepted.

Fifth, cooperation at the regional level requires multilateral approaches, which inturn are proceeded with institutional foundations. To facilitate cooperation, it takes

power sharing practice on the part of the powerful. China has been active of such

practice in its regional relationships and in forging multilateral economic cooperation

venues at the regional level. Chinas power-sharing endeavor has positively affected

the views of regional states on the Chinas rise question as evidenced in their

growing favoritism and reduced pessimism. Although they are still concerned with

the prospect on the growth in Chinese influence in a realist sense, however, the

regional states are being attracted to China by its reassurance championed by its

ever-active practice of norms of compromises and institutionalism. Consequencesare now evidenced in gradual process of power constellation of the regional states to

China, and it is indeed comparable to the traditional way in which the regional order

was shaped in the premodern era.

Traditionally and historically, East Asian order in the past evolved around a strong

powerful regional state, i.e., power constellation (Pedersen 2002). According to

Pedersen, power constellation is a natural consequence of power sharing with smaller

states by the powerful against an extant hegemone (e.g., USA). An order was forged

with the powerful at the center and the peripheral states clustering to it. For most part

of East Asian history, East Asian world order was founded on tribute system. Thetribute system was a constellation of the neighboring states to the powerful. Some

constellated for their own interests and others attracted by the benevolence of the

powerful. Hence, traditional Asian way of international order did not impose or coerce

others to join any form of structural union, but rather attracted others to be part of the

union through the appeals of the powerful nations hard power and soft power. From

this perspective, power sharing and ensuing constellation occurred through diffusion

of ideas, or ideational process, exemplified by the merit of the powerful (Jones and

Smith 2007). This process was consolidated with the commitment of the powerful

demonstrated in benevolent and benign conduct of foreign endeavors. Chinese

civilization was not imposed on, but was rather adopted and pursued by the

surrounding nations. International order centered on China, or for that matter Chinese

tribute system, was in large part sustained by Chinese benevolence and merits. When

China turned violent and belligerent, power aggregation would disperse in all

direction, sometimes resulting in balancing or hedging against China.

In todays world, power constellation around China is at work again.

Constellation by regional states is a result of their changing perception on China,

and thereby growing confidence and trust in China. The opening of China in 1978

meant the opening of the contacts and exchanges with the neighboring states. It gave

these states and China an opportunity to enhance their mutual understanding and

undermine their suspicions on the communist China in relation to their national

security. To further convince them of Chinas peaceful rise, China has consistently

displayed rigorous efforts in conceptualizing, if not theorizing, peaceful rise,

peaceful development, and harmonious world, and applied them to the practice

of various confidence-building measures. While China restrains itself in exercising

400 J. Choo


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positive power in the discourse of power aggregation, it instead exhibits power

sharing by embracing norms of compromises and regional institutions. One salient

example is underscored in the fact that China became the first non-ASEAN state to

sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN in 2003. Moreover, China

plays a leading role in a number of multilateral security mechanisms (e.g., ASEANRegional Forum, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and Six-party Talks).

Reciprocally, a new manifestation has emerged in the level of confidence and trust

of the neighboring states in China. They are now much more comfortable in dealing

with China especially in the field of security cooperation. Chinas rise, therefore, is

now being reckoned as a resultant source of dilemma to the regional states in the

presence of another regional power, i.e., the USA (Medeiros 20052006).

A sense of dilemma is quickly and widely spreading in the region as the regional

states are increasingly indulging in their felt benevolence of China. Merits generated

by Chinese cooperative endeavors and peace diplomacy today could be translatedinto such modern western terminologies as trust, confidence, dependency, and

respect (Kang 2003). Chinas proactive pursuit of multilateral approaches to

international conflicts and interests has also improved Chinas image as a responsible

state and seemingly convinced the regional states of the validity of its peace theories.

To prove these theories lasting and capitalize the favorable trends in the power

constellation process, it now must further enlighten the regional states about the

direction it navigates with incrementing power. China has long propagated its

unwillingness and unpreparedness to be a hegemon for domestic socioeconomic

constraint reasons. However, it is still not too convincing to many regional statesespecially the powerful. They are skeptical for their beliefs in the inherent nature of a

rising power. Regardless, and against its will, China will be perceived and assumed

to become, at least, a regional power. Hence, China must be wise in utilizing its

power and regional power status in order to secure lasting international

environment and achieve sustainable economic development.

Conclusion

Chinas ideas of peace have persevered through the attack from the school of China

threat. Chinas peaceful rise will be facilitated by these ideas of peace embedded in

Chinese peace theories because ideas are critical in that they represent national will

and views. Although the weight of their impact on the outcome of foreign policy or

the causal relationship between a given policy and the ideas that inform it (Higgot

1994), is difficult to quantify, the source of these ideas seem to matter. It is

manifested not only in the interest of China and the regional states but also in the

influence of emerging perception of Chinas peace diplomacy of like-minded public.

Chinas ideas of peace as shared beliefs that also operate as strategies maximizing

interests undermine support for alternative interpretation of reality. Non-peaceful

approaches or measures are therefore significantly discounted in Chinese conduct of

diplomacy towards the neighboring states and vice versa.

As observed in this article, peace ideas are well conceptualized and observed in

Chinese foreign policy. Theoretical conceptualization of Chinese peace ideas

embodies national will and views and no longer represents those of a single political



14/16

figure simply because ideas are a product of social learning. In other words, China is

now undergoing a great deal of ideational process of existing norms, rules, and

institutions in relation to its peace ideas and ideas of exercising its power. This is

well confirmed by the most explicit conclusion of Chinas lessons from social

learning with multilateralism, globalization, and regionalization. China now sharesthe beliefs in the causal relationship of its active engagement to its economic

modernization interests and world peace and prosperity.

Accordingly so, Chinas diplomatic practice has, in recent times, demonstrated

significant restraints. For example, China retrenched from being a fervent advocate of

a multipolar world order. Chinas exercise of power towards a new international order

is naturally perceived to be provocative to the interest of the existing hegemon who

wants to preserve its preeminence in the status quo. Although it has not totally

relinquished on this idea, however, China has rather been silent about it because it

would otherwise give more leeway for the reinforcement of China threat theory. Therevival of realist China policy would mean containment becoming a preferred strategic

choice with a significant negative impact on Chinas economic modernization

pursuits. It would be so because such a strategic calculation on Beijings part

constrains China from going public about new international order in recent official

policy documents. Whether the effect of constraint is temporary is not clear. However,

it is safe to assume that as long as Chinese foreign policy objectives are dictated by the

interests of economic modernization, the central theme of Chinese ideas of peace (and

power) is to accommodate the current world peace and order (Hughes 2005).

The dividends of Chinas practice of peace theories or negative power exercisebased on growing soft power are witnessed in the growth of confidence and trust of

the regional states in Chinas rise. The consequence is manifested in their

constellation to China. Regardless if the constellation was out of their will or not,

their growing dependency in security and economic realms vis--vis on China is

leading them into such direction. As interdependency continue to grow, coupled with

Chinas determined practice of peace ideas, the regional order will be shaped and

developed in a manner that was once valid in the premodern period in a similar way

the tribute system had evolved. In this discourse, China will have to abide itself to

the practice of power sharing to materialize peace and stability thereby paving the

way for a possible resurrection of Sinocentric regional order. The world must realize

that the regional order is already moving into this direction, however gradual it may

seem. For a proper understanding of this trend and China s ideas of peace, it has to

emancipate itself from realism or liberalism. It must realize that East Asian order

does not evolve by western theories but live by eastern philosophy.

Acknowledgment The author is grateful to anonymous reviewers, and Brigid Gavin, Zheng Yongnian,

Tang Shiping, Renato Cruz De Castro, Yong Nam Cho, and Jae Ho Chung for their helpful and

constructive comments and suggestions.

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