idealism

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SelfandWorldinSchopenhauer'sPhilosophyChristopherJanaway

Printpublicationdate:1999

PrintISBN-13:9780198250036

PublishedtoOxfordScholarshipOnline:November2003

DOI:10.1093/0198250037.001.0001

Idealism

ChristopherJanaway(ContributorWebpage)

DOI:10.1093/0198250037.003.0006

AbstractandKeywords

DiscussesSchopenhauer'sclaimthathisidealismunitesinsightsofKantandBerkeley,

andcontrastshispositiononthesubject–objectrelationwiththatofFichte.Thequestion

whetherhisidealismissolipsisticisraised.Schopenhauer'sargumentsthatidealismisthe

onlyviablealternativetoscepticism,andthattheexistenceofaworldofobjectsexcept

forarepresentingsubjectisinconceivablearealsocriticallyanalysed.

Keywords:Berkeley,Fichte,idealism,Kant,scepticism,Schopenhauer,solipsism

Notruthismorecertain,moreindependentofallothersandlessinneedofproof

thanthis:thateverythingwhichisthereforknowledge,hencethewholeworld,is

onlyobjectinrelationtothesubject,perceptionoftheperceiver,inaword,

representation.1

PartoftheopeningpageofTheWorldasWillandRepresentation,thisreadslikea

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warningnottoexpectanyarguments,andtosomeextentSchopenhaueristruetothis

warning.Onmanyoccasionshegivesustounderstandthatanyalternativetoidealismis

flatlyinconceivable.Forexample,nearthebeginningofhismostextendeddefenceof

idealism(W2ch.1),whichdoescontainsomearguments,hesaysthat‘“Theworldismy

representation”is,liketheaxiomsofEuclid,apropositionwhicheveryonemust

recognizeastrueassoonasheunderstandsit.’(Although,headds,itisalsonotone

whicheveryone‘understandsassoonashehearsit’.2)Wemaysuspectthatthereisa

propositionlurkingsomewhereofwhichthismightplausiblybeheld,butthatthis

propositionisnot,assuch,anexpressionofidealism.Onthefollowingpageheaccuses

realismofignoringsomethingwhichhedescribesas‘thesurestandsimplesttruth’:

thattheobjectiveexistenceofthingsisconditionedbysomethingwhichrepresents

them,andthatconsequently[folglich]theobjectiveworldexistsonlyas

representation,isnohypothesis,stilllessanauthoritarianpronouncement,oreven

aparadoxsetupforthesakeofargument;rather,itisthesurestandsimplest

truth,recognitionofwhichismadeharderonlybyitsbeingtoosimple,andbythe

factthatnoteveryonehassufficientpowerofreflectiontogobacktothefirst

elementsoftheirconsciousnessofthings.3

Schopenhauerclaimstobesayingsomethingsimpleand(p.141) incontestable.But

thereisa‘simple’truthhereonlyif‘objectiveexistence’and‘objectiveworld’aretaken

asequivalentto‘existenceasobjectforasubject’and‘worldexistingasobjectfora

subject’.Theworldexistingasobjectforasubjectonlyexistsasrepresentation.Butthis

doesnothingtoconvinceusthattherearenot,orcouldnotbe,things(letusnotforthe

momentcallthemobjects)existingindependentlyofsubjectsaltogether.Inexpectingto

gainthisconsequencefromhis‘simpletruth’,Schopenhauerisonceagainbeggingthe

question.Besides,thepresenceoftheword‘folglich’(consequently)intheabovepassage

istroubling.Supposewegrantthatsomethingcanbeobjective,inthesenseofbeingan

objectforasubject,onlyifthereisasubject;itistruethenthatbooksandtablescanbe

objectsforasubjectonlyifthereisasubject.Butitisnota‘consequence’ofthatthat

booksandtablesexistonlyasrepresentations.

TosomeextentwecanexplainSchopenhauer'scomplacencyabouttheidealiststarting‐

pointofhisphilosophyinhistoricalterms.Itisprobablytrueingeneralthatbetter

argumentsarelikelytobeproducedinthefaceofradicalcontroversy,andalthough

manyintheGermanacademiccommunitywereopposedtoidealism,ithadbecomethe

dominanttrendbySchopenhauer'stime,sothatthereadingpublicwouldhavetakenless

convincingthanatmanyothertimesandplaces.Relatedtothisisthefactthat

Schopenhauer'sdefenceofidealismisreallyveryun‐Kantian,showingagainhowwrong

hewastothinkthathewastakinghisdeparturedirectlyfromKantandthatany

interveninglinkswereirrelevant.Kanthadusedtheterms‘representation’,‘subject’,

and‘object’ofcourse,buttheideathatidealismcouldbeprovedmoreorlessby

exhibitingwhatonewascommittedtobyusingthesetermsisalientoKant.Amajor

change,however,wasbroughtaboutbyKarlLeonhardReinhold'sattemptsto

popularizeKantinthe1790s.Reinholdformulateda‘principleofconsciousness’which

reads:‘Representationisdistinguishedinconsciousnessbythesubjectfromboth

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subjectandobject,andisreferredtoboth;’or,inanotherversion:‘Weareallcompelled

byconsciousnesstoagreethattoeveryrepresentationtherepertainsarepresenting

subjectandarepresentedobject,andthatbothmustbedistinguishedfromthe

representationtowhichthey(p.142) pertain.’4Reinholdsawtheprimetaskof

philosophyasbeingananalysisofconsciousness.Onemustisolateconsciousnessand

consideritapartfromitsobjectsinordertodiscernitsnecessarystructure.Whatis

revealed,accordingtoReinhold,isthatforallconsciousnessrepresentationisthe

primitiveconcept,andthatitnecessarilypertainstobothasubjectandanobject.This

objectisdistinctfromrepresentationandfallsoutsidethesubject'sconsciousness

altogether,butthelatterissupposedtoberelatednecessarilytoit.ThatReinholdstill

wantstoretainanessentialdistinctionbetweenrepresentationandobjectsignifiesan

importantdifferencebetweenhisaccountofconsciousnessandSchopenhauer's

superficiallysimilarviewthat‘ourknowingconsciousness...dividesintosubjectand

object,andcontainsnothingbesides’.ButSchopenhauerhereshowshimselfastheheir

ofsubsequentarguments.ForitwasoutofReinhold'sversionofKantianismthatthere

came,withinafewyears,thedevelopmentsmentionedinChapter2:thescepticalattack

(ledbySchulze)ontheweaknotionof‘objects’existinginthemselves,andFichte'sbold

determinationtoavoidthisdifficultybygivingacompleteaccountofexperiencewhich

invokedonlyobjectsthatlaywithintherealmofself‐consciousness.

Thoughhecameonthescenetenormoreyearsafterthesecontroversieswereattheir

height,SchopenhauerwaspersonallyacquaintedwithReinhold,Schulze,andFichte(if

attendingthelatter'slecturescountsaspersonalacquaintance),andwaswellawareof

thewayphilosophyhadprogressedsinceKant.(Itisworthenteringthisreminderagain,

ifonlytocounteracttheimpressionhesometimesgivesthatallthishadhappenedon

anotherplanet.)Themarksofthesedevelopmentsareclearlydiscerniblein

Schopenhauer'sposition,evenwhenhethinksheisreturningdirectlytoKant.Thusitis

apparentlynotopentoquestionforhimthatthestructureofrepresentationshouldbe

thestarting‐pointforanaccountofknowledge.Thereisalsonoquestionthattheanalysis

ofrepresentationisfundamentallyintermsofsubjectandobject.Moreover,aswesaw

fromhisattacksonKantinChapter2,hefindsit(p.143) inconceivablethatthereshould

beadistinctionbetweenrepresentationandobjectofrepresentation.Tobeanobjectis

tobearepresentationforhim:‘object’cannotrefertoanythingexistingoutsidewhatis

presentinthesubject'sconsciousness,and‘representation’isnotatermwhichraises

thequestionofarelationtoanysuchobject.Beyondthis,thethemeofthemutual

dependenceofsubjectandobject,andtheposingofthequestionofwhetherthe

subjectiveshouldbederivedfromtheobjectiveorviceversa—bothpivotalin

Schopenhauer—haveveryexplicitparallelsinbothFichteandSchelling.5Thuspartofthe

inevitabilityofidealismforSchopenhauerliesinthepervadinginfluenceofhisown

immediatepredecessorsontheshapeofphilosophy—aninfluencewhichinmanyrespects

makeshimasmuchofapost‐Kantianidealistastheywere.

Schopenhauerwaspronetotakeawiderviewofhisownplaceinthehistoryof

philosophy(whenhedidsoatall).Andherewedofindhimofferingsomejustificationfor

hisconfidenceinthetruthofidealism.HedeclaresthatDescartesisrightlyseenasthe

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fatherofmodernphilosophy,becausehisscepticismofthesensesrevealedimmediate

subjectiveconsciousnessasthetruefoundationofphilosophy,andthatitwasasan

ultimateconsequenceoftheCartesiantrainofthoughtthatBerkeleyarrivedatidealism.

Thus,forSchopenhauer,idealismcanbedefendedonthegroundsthatitisthe

culminationofpost‐Cartesianphilosophy,and,withinthathistoricalcontext,theonlyform

forphilosophytotake.Thuswefindthefollowingargument:

1.Itisonlyofwhatlieswithinconsciousnessthatthereisimmediatecertainty.

2.Thefoundationsofanybodyofknowledge(Wissenschaft)musthaveimmediate

certainty.

(p.144)

3.Philosophymustconcernitselfwiththe‘firstandoriginal’foundationsof

knowledge.

4.Thereforethebasisofphilosophymustbewhatlieswithinconsciousness.

5.Thereforephilosophyisessentiallyidealistic.6

Giventheassumptionsof‘foundationalism’,steps2and3,andthefamiliarassumptionof

step1(allofwhich,thoughnowsomewhatdiscredited,areobviouslyfarfromuniqueto

Schopenhauer),wecanmaketheinferencetostep4withoutmuchdifficulty.Butthepoint

atissueiswhetheridealismcanbesupportedonthebasisoftheseassumptions;andit

seemsthatitcannot.Forsteps1–4areconsistentwithapositionaccordingtowhich

inferencemaybemadetotheexistenceandnatureofaworldfullyoutside

consciousness.Itcouldbeobjectedthatthispositioncollapsesinevitablyintoscepticism.

Butthenscepticismtooiscompatiblewithsteps1–4,andSchopenhauer,likeBerkeley

andKantbeforehim,wantshisidealismtobeclearlydemarcatedfromscepticism.The

upshotisthatthepresentargumentcannotbesaidtosecureSchopenhauerinhis

conclusionthatidealismistheonlypossiblephilosophicalstandpoint,althoughitdoes

revealsomeofthepresuppositionswhichhelptomakeidealismtheleadingcontenderfor

him.

Atfirstsight,andtotheuntutoredmind,Schopenhaueradmits,realismseemshighly

plausible.Peoplegenerallydotendtothinkthattheworldhasanobjectiveexistence

independentlyofitsbeingpresentedtosomeconscioussubject.But,hethinks,thereare

argumentswhichshowthisviewtobeuntenable.Accordingtooneofthese,itis

contradictorytosupposethatonecouldsuccessfullyimaginetheexistenceofan

objectiveworldwithouttheknowingsubject,becausetheworldthatonewouldthen

imaginewouldexistafterallintheimaginationofaknowingsubject.7Inessence,this

argumentisthesameasoneusedbyBerkeley,8whetherornotSchopenhauer

consciouslytookitfromthatsource.Itisnomoreconvincingineitherauthor.Ofcourse

anythingIimagineexistsassuch‘onlyinmyimagination’if(p.145) oneistalkingin

termsofthecontentofmyimaginings(perhapsamentalpicture,athoughtofsomekind,

oradescription).Butthatinnowayaddressesthequestionofwhetheranyobjectexists

whichcorrespondstothepicture,thought,ordescription.Schopenhaueralsoasserts

that‘everythingwithwhichweareacquainted[kennen]lieswithinourconsciousness’9—

buthereasimilarpointapplies.Thatwemustbeconsciousofsomethinginordertobe

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acquaintedwithitispresumablytrue,butitisaverydifferentthingtosaythatthatwith

whichweareacquaintedlieswithinourconsciousness,eitherinthesenseofbeing

purelymentalorinthatofdependingforitsexistenceonasubjectofconsciousness.

Schopenhauerneverthelessthinksthathisassertionconstitutesadevastatingblowfor

theunsophisticatedrealistoutlook:‘Nevercantherebeanobjectiveexistenceabsolutely

andinitself;indeed,suchathingiscompletelyunthinkable:fortheobjective,assuch,

alwaysandessentiallyhasitsexistenceintheconsciousnessofasubject’.10Thecontext

tellsus,though,thatwearebacktotheproblemsdiscussedabove:first,thatinmaking

‘objective’meanthatwhichisobjectforasubjectSchopenhauerbegsthequestionin

favourofsubject‐dependence;andsecondly,thatbyanequivocationovertwokindsof

subject‐dependence,heillegitimatelyconcludesfromthenecessityofasubjectforany

experiencedcontentthatanythingexperiencedexistsonlyforasubject.

TwootherargumentswhichSchopenhauergivesforidealismareworthmentioning

briefly.Inonehesuggeststhatunlessthespatio‐temporalworldwereaproductofthe

humanintellect,therewouldbenowayofexplainingourbeingsofullyathomeinit.

Indeed,hesaysthatitwouldbeimpossiblefromthestartforus‘tofindourwayabout

in’aworldwhosefundamentalorderdidnotdependonus.11Besidesbeingamere

assertion,thismightbesaidtooverstatethecase.Theconverseisperhapstrue:ifthe

fundamentallawsgoverningtheworldproceedfromus,wecouldnotbutunderstand

thatworld.Butwhileourunderstandinganindependentlyorderedworldisless

probablethanthat,moreisrequiredtoshowittobeimpossible.Furthermore,itmight

bequestionablewhether(p.146) wedounderstandtheworld'sfundamentalorderat

allfully.Schopenhauer'sviewappearstobemotivatedbyanexcessivelysharp

dichotomy:eitherwefullycomprehendtheworld,inwhichcaseitmustsomehow

originateinus,oritisexternaltous,andintheprocessirretrievablyalientoour

understanding.

IntheotherargumentSchopenhauersuggeststhatidealismisasimplertheorythan

realism,onthegroundsthatthelatterpositstwodistinctspatio‐temporalworlds,one

existingpriortobeingapprehendedbythesubject,andanotherexistinginthemindofa

subjectonceapprehensionisheldtohavetakenplace.12Schopenhauermaybethinking

hereofLeibniz'sdoctrineofpre‐establishedharmony,whichhecriticizesonsimilar

groundselsewhere.Leibniz,hesays,‘felttheconditioningoftheobjectbythesubject,

butyetcouldnotfreehimselffromthethoughtofanexistenceforobjectsinthemselves’,

andthuswasledtoassumeaworldofobjectsinthemselves‘exactlythesameasand

runningparallelwiththeworldofrepresentation,connectedtoit,however,notdirectly

butonlyexternally,bywayofaharmoniapraestabilita—obviouslythemostredundant

thingintheworld,sincetheworlditselfneverentersintoperceptionandtheexactly

similarworldinrepresentationtakesitscoursejustaswellwithoutit’.13Schopenhauer

apparentlymakestheassumptionthattherealistviewheisattackingincludesthe

essentiallyKantianpositionthatthespatio‐temporalworldasweexperienceitis

constitutedsolelybyrepresentations.ThisisespeciallyclearinthediscussionofLeibniz,

whosefirstassumptionissaidtohavebeenthatoftheconditioningoftheobjectbythe

subject.Ifwecantakethisidealistpremissasread,thenindeedtheassumptionofa

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furtherspatio‐temporalworldexistingbeyondrepresentationsisproblematic,ifnot

redundant.Butofcourse,anargumentforidealismwhichhastoincludeanassumptionof

idealismisnothighlysatisfactory.

Thus,withoutbeinganachronisticorpatronizing,wecanconcludeourdiscussionof

Schopenhauer'sargumentsforidealismbyremarkingthattheyarepoorarguments.To

someextentthisisexplicableintermsofhisbeliefthat‘Notruthismorecertain...and

lessinneedofproof’.Ineffect,hemakes(p.147) idealismapremissaboutwhichone

mustsayafewencouragingthingsbuttowhichtherewillnotbemuchseriousobjection.

Itisperhapstemptinginthelightofthistosaythatratherthanfindinghimselfconvinced

ofthetruthofidealismbyargument,hetookover,comparativelyunreflectingly,abasic

commitmenttoidealismthatwasprevalentinthephilosophicalclimateofhisday.I

suggestedasmuchearlier.ButinfactSchopenhauerdoesgivetheimpressionthathe

expectsidealism,forallitsallegedobviousness,toberegardedasanunusualposition,

certainlybythegeneralpublic.ThusatonepointheclaimsthatwhileinIndiathebasic

idealistoutlookissomethingofapopulararticleoffaith,inEuropeitisstillregardedas

‘paradoxical’(asituationforwhichheblamesthe‘realism’inherentinJudaism).14The

truthaboutSchopenhauer'sattitudeisprobablythat,followingKant'sleadandrestingto

someextentonKant'sauthority,hefeelshimselfentitledtopresentidealismasthe

legitimate(ifnottheproperlyrecognized)heirofthemodernEuropeantraditionin

philosophy.

Giventhebasicidealistorientation,however,therearestillsomequestionsthatneedto

beasked.DoesSchopenhauersayanythingtoclarifyhisrelationshipswithKantianand

Berkeleianidealism,andwiththeidealismofFichteandSchelling?Doesheanswercertain

chargesthatcanbemadeagainstidealism,inparticularthatitisascepticalsystemof

philosophy,andthatitdeniesthatthereisarealexternalworldatall?Andwhatabout

someofthepointsofdetailwherehedivergesfromKant?Surelyhemustsaysomething

abouttheroleofthethinginitself,which(aswesawinChapter2)hethinksKant

mishandledbygivingitacausalrole.Andhemustexplaintheprinciplesoforganisationby

whichthesubject'sfacultiesaresupposedtoordertheworldofobjects.Inthis,the

expositionanddefenceoftheinternalworkingsofhisowntheory,Schopenhauer'sgrasp

issurerandhiswritingmoreimpressive.

TherearesomeobjectionstoidealismwhichSchopenhauerdealswithbypresenting

themasmisunderstandingsofthatposition.Thefirst(andaccordingtoSchopenhauerthe

‘chief’)objection,isstatedasfollows:(p.148)

Myownpersontooisanobjectforanother,andthereforeistheother's

representation;andyetIknowcertainlythatIwouldbethere,evenwithouthis

representingme.ButallotherobjectsstandtohisintellectinthesamerelationasI

do:consequentlyotherobjectstoowouldbethere,withouttheirbeing

representedbythisother.

ThereplywhichSchopenhauergivesreiteratesanaspectofhisconceptionofthesubject

whichweremarkeduponinChapter4:

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Theanswertothisis:thatother,aswhoseobjectInowregardmyperson,isnot

withoutqualification[schlechthin]thesubject,butinthefirstinstanceaknowing

individual.Thus,ifhewerenotthere,andevenifnootherknowingbeingexcept

meexistedatall,thiswouldstillnotamounttotheremovalofthesubject,inwhose

representationaloneallobjectsexist.ForImyselfamthissubjecttoo,asisevery

knowingbeing.Consequently,intheassumedcase,mypersonwouldbyallmeans

bethere,butonceagainasrepresentation,thatis,inmyowncognition.15

Thusitwouldbeamisunderstandingofidealism,asSchopenhauerconceivesit,tothink

thatitinvolvedlinkingtheexistenceofobjectstotheirbeingpresentedinthe

consciousnessofanyoneindividual.Heisclearlycommittedtothenotionthatobjects

cannotexistunlesstherebesomesubjectforwhomthey‘arethere’.Butwecanseethat

hisfavouredexpression‘Theworldismyrepresentation’isatbestahighlymisleading

wayofputtinghispointif—asweshould—wetakeseriouslytheseremarksaboutthenon‐

identityofsubjectandindividual.

Whateverelsemaybesaidaboutsuchaposition,itisnotsolipsistic.Thisisachargethat

issometimeslevelledatSchopenhauer,soitwillbeappropriatetoexaminehisattitudeto

solipsismhere.Schopenhauerdoesnotusetheterm‘solipsism’assuch,buthedoes

discussitunderthenameof‘theoreticalegoism’:

Butwhethertheobjectsknowntotheindividualonlyasrepresentationare

nevertheless,aswithhisownbody,appearancesofawill;thisis...thegenuine

senseofthequestionabouttherealityoftheoutsideworld:todenythelatteris

thesenseoftheoreticalegoism,which,insodoing,holdsappearancesapartfrom

itsownindividualtobephantoms—aspracticalegoismdoesexactlythesamething

ina(p.149) practicalrespect,treatingonlyitsownpersonasreallyaperson,and

allothersasmerephantoms.

Hisviewofthispositionisthenstatedasfollows:

Theoreticalegoismcanindeedneverberefutedbyproofs:andyetithasnever

beenreliablyusedinphilosophyexceptasascepticalsophism,i.e.forthesakeof

appearance.Asaseriousconviction,ontheotherhand,itcouldonlybefoundin

themadhouse:andassuchitwouldthenneednotsomuchaproofasacure.Soto

thisextentwedonotgointoitanyfurther,butregarditsimplyasthelast

strongholdofscepticism,whichisalwayspolemical.16

AttheendofthesameparagraphSchopenhauercomparessolipsismtoanimpregnable

fortresswhosegarrisoncannevergetouttoattackanybody,andconcludesthat,like

suchafortress,wecansafelypassitby.Thisclearlydisposesofthenotionthat

Schopenhaueropenlyespousessolipsism.Heratherbelievesittobeonlyasceptic'stool,

tobeusedagainstotherpositions,andnotsomethinginwhichasanepersonwould

believe.Inthisheisrighttotheextentthatitispreciselytheabsurdity(ifnotinsanity)of

solipsismwhichgivesititsdevastatingedgewhenusedpolemically.SoSchopenhauer

doesnotsetouttobeasolipsist(hasanyoneeverdoneso?).Thechargemaybe

broughtagainsthimthatinstatingthattheworldismyrepresentation,hispositionmust

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ultimatelyentailsolipsism—butIhavesuggestedthatthiswouldbeamisunderstanding

ofhisclaim.The‘I’thatisinvolvedhereismerelytheself‐conscioussubjectof

representationswhichcannotbeidentifiedwithanyindividualintheworld.Solipsism

mustbeapositionwhichinsomewayrestrictsthecontentsoftheworldbytyingthemto

asingleindividual.TheSchopenhaueriansubjectcannotbeanindividualandsocannot

fulfilthisrestrictingrole.Havingsaidallthis,however,weshouldnoteafurtheraspectof

Schopenhauer'sdismissalofsolipsismintheabovepassage.Incalling‘theoreticalegoism’

theviewwhichdeniesthatanythingexperiencedexternallytothesubjectisan

appearanceofawill,heisalludingtohisownviewthatthewillisthethinginitselfofwhich

everythingisanappearance.Soinamildlycrypticwayheindicatesthatthemadnessin

solipsism(p.150) isitsdenialthatappearancesareappearancesofsomethingexistingin

itself.Hisownidealismmaynotbesolipsistic,buthowwillheavoiditsbecomingmadly

subjectiveinananalogouswayunlesshereliesonsomeargumentfortheexistenceofa

thinginitselflyingbehindappearances?ForallhiscomplaintthatKantisnotaconsistent

idealistbecausehereliesonthethinginitself,wehavehereahintthatwhenitcomesto

thecruxSchopenhauerwilldothesame.

Another‘misunderstanding’ofidealismwhichSchopenhauermentionsisthestubbornly

persistentviewthatidealism‘deniestheempiricalrealityoftheexternalworld’.

SchopenhauertakesJacobitotaskforhisclaimthatourbeliefintherealityofwhatwe

experienceispurelyamatteroffaith,orthattheworldisgiventous‘oncredit’;rather,

theworld‘givesitselftousasthatwhichitis,anddeliversimmediatelywhatitpromises’.

Thedistinctionmustbemade,forSchopenhauer,betweenempiricalandtranscendental

idealism,thelatterbeingthetruekindwhichhehimselfespouses.17Nowwesawin

Chapter2thatKantinsistedonadistinctionbetweentranscendentalandempirical

idealism.Bythelatterhemeanteitherascepticalview,whichdoubtstherealityof

externalobjects(hisexamplewasDescartes'sscepticismofthesenses),oradogmatic

view,whichdeniestheirexistencealtogether(whichhetooktobeBerkeley'sposition).18

GivenSchopenhauer'sprofesseddesiretoincorporatetheBerkeleianviewwithhisown,

however,itisnotimmediatelyclearwhetherhisdistinctionbetweentranscendentaland

empiricalidealismcanbeinterpretedinthesamewayasKant's.

Whatheexplicitlysayswhenheintroducesthedistinctionisthattranscendentalidealism

both(a)‘leavestheempiricalrealityoftheworlduntouched’,and(b)insistsonobjects

beingconditioned,bothmateriallyandformally,bythesubject.Asagainstits

transcendentalnamesake,wemustpresumablyunderstandempiricalidealismtodeny

the‘empiricalrealityoftheworld’.Butwhatdoesthismean?Surelyitcannotmean

denyingthatwhatweexperiencehasanexistenceindependentlyofitsbeing

experienced,formaking(p.151) suchadenialis,asfarasweknow,centralto

Schopenhauer'sownposition.Rather,itmustmeandenyingthatwhatweexperienceis

(ever)therealworld.Thusempiricalidealismisapositionwhichremainsweddedtothe

notionthattheworldissomethingotherthan,andcanneverbeattainedbywayof,our

representations,sothattherepresentationswehavemayaswellbedreamsorillusions.

Inotherwords,empiricalidealismpresupposestranscendentalrealism.Schopenhauer,

onthecontrary,isadamantthatwhatweexperience,whilstcomprisingonly

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representations,istherealworldofspatio‐temporalobjects.Inthisheprovidesaclear

parallelwithBerkeley,whoontheonehandclaimedtosidewithcommonsensein

affirmingtherealityofwhatweimmediatelyperceive,andontheotherarguedthat‘the

thingsimmediatelyperceived,areideaswhichexistonlyinthemind’.19Berkeley'smain

thrustinarguingthuswastodisprovescepticismbyrelocatingtherealworldofordinary

thingswithinthemind,wheretherecouldbeaguaranteethatweexperiencedit.Like

Berkeley,andinthisrespectlikeKanttoo,Schopenhauerissearchingforanidealist

positionwhichwillbeclearlydistinctfrom,andwilldiscredit,scepticism.LikeKant,he

givesthenameof‘transcendentalidealism’tothekindofidealismwhichhethinkswilldo

this.But(inthelightofthediscussionoftheseissuesinChapter2,whichIshallnot

rehearse)wecansaythat,unlikeKant,Schopenhauercorrectlyrecognizesanaffinity

betweentranscendentalidealismandBerkeley'senterprise.

Schopenhaueriscriticalofscepticismmainlyonthegroundsthatthewhole‘dispute

abouttherealityoftheexternalworld’is‘foolish’.Scepticismisoneoftheunfortunate

partnersinthisfolly.Theopposingdisputanthecalls‘dogmatism’,discerningheretwo

species:realismontheonehand,andontheother,idealismasexemplifiedbyFichte,or

bywhathetakesFichte'spositiontobe.Transcendentalidealismshouldbedistinguished

fromallthesepositions,ascanbeseenhere:

Thewholeworldofobjectsisandremainsrepresentation,andforthatveryreason

...ithastranscendentalideality.Butitisnotbecauseofthisalie,oranillusion:it

givesitselfaswhatitis,as(p.152) representation,andindeedasaseriesof

representations,whosecommonbondistheprincipleof[sufficient]reason.Assuch

itisintelligibletothehealthyunderstanding...Onlytothemindtwistedby

sophistriescanitoccurtodisputeabouttheworld'sreality.20

Theunderlyingmistakeofallpositionsthattaketherealityoftheexternalworldtobein

disputeisgivenbySchopenhauerastheirfailuretorealizethatcausalitydoesnot

operatebetweensubjectandobject.Causalityisaprincipleoforganizationamong

objects,andmaybesaid(inSchopenhauer'srevisedKantianaccount,ofwhichmore

below)tobe‘imposed’bythesubjectonitsrepresentations(objects).Butthesubjectis

not,forSchopenhauer,anobject.Itmayberegardedastheoriginofcausalityina

suitablyqualifiedway,butitisnotlinkedtoobjectsbywayofcausalityatall.(Thuswe

havefurtherconfirmationthatSchopenhauerisseriousinhisviewthatthesubjectisnot

apartoftheempiricalworldofobjects.)Dogmaticrealismiswhathecallsanyposition

whichstrivestomakethesubject,oritsstates,aneffectofobjects,while‘Fichtian

idealism’isthepositionwhich‘makestheobjectintotheeffectofthesubject’.21

OnceagaintheassessmentofFichteheregoesbacktothelecturesthatSchopenhauer

attendedin1811–12.HecouldnotunderstandhowFichte's‘I’could‘posit’the‘not‐I’,

unlesswhatwasmeantbythiswasthatitbroughtitaboutcausally.IfthisiswhatFichte

meant,thenSchopenhauerisrighttofindaninstanceofsubject—objectcausalityhere,

andrighttoqueryit.Foralltheabsurdlycomplicated‘determining’,‘acting’,and

‘positing’ofwhichFichtetalkedwassupposedtotakeplaceoutsideofempirical

consciousness.Itwas‘absolute’andapre‐conditionofexperienceratherthanpartofits

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contents.But(echoingtheearlierdiscussionsofKant)thatispreciselywhatrendered

anynotionofcausalityinappropriate.InSchopenhauer'sview,Fichtecouldmaintainthe

semblanceofsayinganythingmeaningfulonlybypresentingtheanticsoftheabsolutein

termsthatwereapplicablesolelytotheempirical.Butwhatinfuriatedhimmostofallwas

theinventionofterminologywhoseobscuritymaskedthetrick(p.153) thatwasbeing

played.(Fichtesaidofthe‘I’,forexample,that‘throughabsolutecreativepoweritposits

itselfasprinciple[Princip],andtherepresentationasprincipiate[Principiat]’.22

Schopenhauerreadthesewordsasscreensfor‘cause’and‘effect’;butnotcontentwith

this,Fichtewentstillfurther:‘Soasnottosaycausalityhecoinswithimpudentdeceitthe

wordPrincipheit.’)Understandably,Schopenhauercannotbesurethathehas

understoodFichteproperly,buttheimpressionwastoremainwithhimthataninstance

ofsubject–objectcausalitywasbeingperpetratedundercloakofdarkness.

MovingonfromFichte,letuslookatwhatSchopenhauerhastosayaboutscepticismand

dogmaticrealism.Both,heargues,proceedfromtheassumptionthatthesubject's

representationscanbedistinguishedfromobjects—somethingthatSchopenhauerhimself

hasstrenuouslydeniedofcourse.Theonethensetsupacausalrelationbetweenobject

andrepresentation,whiletheother(scepticism)acceptsthisbasicframework,butpoints

outtheuncertaintyofanyinferencefromcausetoeffect,andarguesthat,inhaving

presentedtousonlyrepresentationswhicharetheeffectsofobjects,wecanneverbe

certainaboutthenatureoreventheexistenceofobjectsoutsideourown

consciousness.

Schopenhauersometimessuggeststhathehaslocatedhereanextremelywidespread

anddamagingphilosophicalerror.Allpreviousphilosophies,heobserves,have

‘proceededeitherfromtheobjectorthesubject,andtriedaccordinglytoexplainthe

onefromtheother,doingsomoreoverbywayoftheprincipleof[sufficient]reason’.23

Hisownprocedureistobeginfromthenotionofsubjectandobjectascorrelates,each

distinctfromandpresupposingtheother,andconnected,notbyanyformoftheprinciple

ofsufficientreason,butbytherelation‘istherefor’,or‘represents’.Howconvincing,

though,isSchopenhauer'spresentationofthe‘mistake’underlyingthedisputeaboutthe

realityoftheexternalworld?Ifwelookcarefully,heinfactgivestwocharacterizationsof

themistake.Inonethemistakeisthatofassumingwhatwecouldcall‘subject–object

causality’.Butaccordingtotheotherthemistakeisthatofassumingcausalitybetween

objectsand(p.154) representations.Itseemsfairtosaythatsubject–objectcausalityis

amisguidednotionif‘object’istakentomean‘content’asexplainedinChapter4.The

relationbetweenasubjectofmentalstatesandthecontentsofthosementalstatesisnot

oneofcauseandeffect(ineitherdirection),butismoreplausiblycharacterized,asan

initialshotatanyrate,intheSchopenhauerianway.Certainly,thenotionthatmymental

states,ortheircontents,causemewouldbeanoddone.Buttherealistandsceptical

positionswhichSchopenhauerseekstodiscredituse,notthenotionof‘subject–object

causality’,butthatofobjectscausingrepresentations.Thisisonlyillegitimateifallobjects

arerepresentations,andallrepresentationsareobjects.Schopenhauerhasassertedthat

theyare,butwehavenotedtheweaknessofthatassertion,andwemustconcludethat

hisattackonbothrealismandscepticism—andhencehisclaimtobypassthedispute

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abouttherealityoftheexternalworld—arenostronger.Thiskindofargumentbasedon

theillegitimacyofpositingcausalitybetweensubjectandobject,orbetweenobjectand

representation,isnotfoundineitherBerkeleyorKant.Kant,aswesaw,holdsfasttothe

notionofrepresentationsascausedbyexternalthings,eventhoughthereisdeep

unclarityattachedtothisnotionforhim.Berkeley,forhispart,arguesexplicitlythatthere

canbenocausalconnectionbetweenideasandthatonlyaspiritcanbeacause,24so

that,forhim,therecanbenoanalogueofSchopenhauer'spointthatitisonlybetween

objects/representationsthatcausalityoperates.Nevertheless,thereisanoverallpattern

commontoallthreephilosophers,ifweallowKanttoberepresentedbythefirst‐edition

ParalogismssectionthatwassoadmiredbySchopenhauer.Allofthemcanbeseenas

arguingthus:scepticismistobedisarmedbyremovingthegap(thedistinctioneven)

betweentherealobjectandthesubject'sconsciouslyreceivedpresentation.Withoutthis

gaptoexploit,scepticismaboutrealobjectswouldindeedcollapse.ButSchopenhauer's

argumentleavesusfeelingonceagainthattheremayyetbethingsexistingbeyondour

experience(orevenpossibleexperience)ofthem.IfSchopenhauerwantstostipulatethat

suchthingsarenot(p.155) ‘objects’,becausethattermisreservedforthecontentsof

asubject'smentalstate,wesimplyhavetoretractthatterm.Thesenseremainsthatthe

pathwaysarestillopentorealism,orequallyscepticism,aboutthingstranscendingthe

subject'sexperience.

RevertingtoSchopenhauer'scharacterizationoftranscendentalidealism,letusconsider

hisclaimthatobjectsareconditionedbothmateriallyandformallybythesubject.Here

wemayrecallSchopenhauer'sexplicitattempttounifythedoctrinesofhisidealist

forebears:

[Transcendentalidealism]holdsfirmlythatallobject,thatistheempiricallyrealin

general,isdoublyconditionedbythesubject:firstmaterially,orasobjectassuch,

becauseanobjectiveexistenceisthinkableonlyoveragainstasubject,andasits

representation;secondlyformally,inthatthemodeandmanneroftheexistenceof

theobject,i.e.ofbeingrepresented(space,time,causality),proceedsfromthe

subject,ispredisposedinthesubject.ThustothesimpleorBerkeleianidealism,

whichconcernstheobjectassuch,thereisimmediatelylinkedtheKantian,which

concernsthespeciallygivenmodeandmannerofbeinganobject.25

Wehavealreadysaidenoughaboutthe‘Berkeleian’aspectofSchopenhauer'sposition,

the‘material’conditioningoftheobjectbythesubject.Somethingmustnowbesaid

abouttheaspectof‘formal’conditioning,which,thoughoriginatingwithKant,is

transformedbySchopenhauerintoasignifiantlydifferentposition.Inaccordancewithhis

greatadmirationforKant'sTranscendentalAesthetic,Schopenhauertakesoverits

centraldoctrine,theidealityofspaceandtimeasaprioriformsofintuition,and

incorporatesitvirtuallyunchangedintohisownversionofidealism.Thoseargumentsthat

aregivenarerehashesofKant'salmostwithoutexception.26Spaceandtime,then,areto

beseenasnecessaryorganizingprinciplesofobjects(i.e.representations)andashaving

theirorigininthesubjectofrepresentations.Spaceisanaprioriformofoutersense,

timeanaprioriformofbothinnerandoutersense,butthesolesuchformofinner

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sense.Furthermore,aswasthecaseinKant'stheory,animportantfeatureof(p.156)

Schopenhauer'sconceptionofthethinginitselfisthatitisnotgovernedbytheformsof

spaceandtime.

Acommonobjectiontothisnotionofthethinginitself(sometimesreferredtoasthe

‘neglectedalternative’charge)isthat,evenifspaceandtimearesubjectiveformsof

intuition,thereisnothingtopreventthingsinthemselves,thoughunknowntous,from

beingspatio‐temporalaswell.Accordingtotheobjection,itisamistaketothinkthatthe

followingalternativesexhaustthefieldofpossibilities:either(1)spaceandtimebelongto

thingsinthemselvesandourknowledgeofthemisaposteriori,or(2)wehaveapriori

knowledgeofspaceandtime,andspaceandtimearepurelysubjectiveinorigin.The

replythatcanbemadeonbehalfofbothSchopenhauerandKantisthattheexpression

‘thinginitself’istobeinterpretedasequivalentto‘thingconsideredindependentlyofits

conformingtotheformsofourintuition’.Thus,giventhatspaceandtimearetheformsof

ourintuition,toconsidersomethingasathinginitselfistoconsideritasfallingoutside

spaceandtime.27Schopenhauer'sall‐importantconceptionofthethinginitselfcanthus

besafeguardedagainstsuchanobjection.WemaysaythattheSchopenhauerianthingin

itselfisnon‐spatialandnon‐temporal,simplyonthegroundsthatanyspatialortemporal

thingwouldnecessarilybewhatSchopenhauercallsanobject,somethingthatfallswithin

the(possible)experienceofthesubject,andhencenecessarilynotathinginitself.Itis

crucialtorealizethatwheneverSchopenhauertalksofthereal,theempirical,orthe

objectiveworld,hedecidedlydoesnotmeantheworldofthethinginitself;whathe

meansistheworldofobjectsforasubject,theworldasrepresentation.Butthis,

accordingtohim,istheworldwhichnaturalsciencecaninvestigateempirically.Theworld

ofordinaryspatio‐temporalparticulars,andindeed,theworldconsidered‘fromtheother

side’—asitisinitself—isfromtheoutsetaworldbeyondthereachesofempirical

investigationofanysort.(Doubtstillremainsastowhetheranythingthatcannotbe

locatedinspaceandtimecanbecoherently(p.157) conceived—adoubtwhich

Schopenhauer,Ithinkitwillbefound,doesnomoretodispelthanKantbeforehim.)

Inourearlierdiscussion,wesawthatSchopenhaueralignedhimselfwiththosewho

objectedtotheKantiancausallinkbetweenthingsinthemselvesandrepresentationsas

incoherent.Morespecifically,thechargewasthatcausality,asacategoryofthe

understanding,mustbyKant'sownlightshaveapplicationonlytoobjectsofpossible

experience,andthatthingsinthemselves,whichwerenotobjectsofanypossible

experience,couldthereforebethecausesofnothingatall.Toinfertheexistenceofthings

inthemselvesfromtherequirementthatoursensationshaveacausewasthuswholly

illegitimate.Schopenhaueragreeswithallthis,butcommentsshrewdlythatnoneofit

showsthattherearenothingsinthemselves.Schopenhauerdoesofcourseputforward

apositiveaccountofthethinginitself,variousaspectsofwhichwillbedealtwithinwhat

follows.ButoneprincipletowhichSchopenhaueradheresconsistentlythroughoutthat

account—inhisviewsonfreedom,hisdoctrineofthewillasthinginitselfunderlying

naturalphenomena,aswellasinhistheoryofknowledge—isthattherecanbenocausal

interactionbetweenthethinginitselfandanyitemintheworldasrepresentation.(Just

whattherelationbetweenthemis,isaquestionIshallraiseinChapter7.)

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IfSchopenhaueristhusscrupulouslyfreeoftheincoherencehedetectsinKantoverthe

roleofthingsinthemselvesascauses,onecanneverthelessseewhyKantwasdrivenin

thisdirectionbyconsideringthedifficultiesSchopenhauerencountersoverperception.

‘Meresensation’,accordingtoSchopenhauer,cangiveusnoknowledgeofanobjective

world;itisonlywhenthatwhichweareawareofassensationisinterpreted(bythe

understanding)astheeffectofsomecausethatwecanhaveexperience,i.e.awarenessof

anobjectiveworld.Heequatessensationwithourorgansbeingaffected,andsaysthat

thisbeingaffectedwouldofitselfgiveusaslittleexperienceofanobjectiveworldascan

beattributedtoaplantwhenitreceivessuchstimuliaslightandmoisture.Inadditionto

‘merely’sensing,humanbeings(andanimals)haveanunderstanding,whichprojects

backfromthesensationtoanobjectascauseofthesensation.Theobject(p.158) is

thusconstructedbytheunderstanding,thoughnotentirelyfromitsownresourcesbut

inresponsetoasensation.TheaccountinvolvesamajoradaptationoftheKantian

position.AccordingtoKant,experiencearisesonlyoutoftheunificationofparticular

intuitionandgeneralconcept.Schopenhauerdeniesthatcausality,asitoperatesherein

constitutingexperience,isaconcept.Althoughhisaccountrequirestheactivityofthe

understandingtosupplementthereceptionofsensationsandconvertthemintoobjective

experience,theunderstandingisheldtooperateentirelywithoutconcepts.Thefollowing

showshispositionquiteclearly:

[Intuition]wouldneverariseinthefirstplace,unlessthereweresomeeffect

immediatelyknownwhichthusservedasapointofdeparture.Butsuchisthe

effectonanimalbodies.Theyare,tothisextent,theimmediateobjectsofthe

subject:throughthemintuitionofallotherobjectsismediated.Thealterations

whicheachanimalbodyexperiencesareknownimmediately,i.e.sensed,andasthis

effectisinstantlyconnectedwithitscause,thereoccursintuitionofthelatteras

object.Thisconnectionisnotaconclusioninabstractconcepts,anditdoesnot

happenthroughreflection,orvoluntarily,butimmediately,withnecessityand

certainty.28

Thispassageraisesanumberofquestions.First,incallingthebodythe‘immediate

object’ofthesubject,Schopenhauermayinvitethemisunderstandingthatthebodyitself

isbeingputforwardasanobjectofperception—whereasifthebodyhasany‘immediate’

roleinperception,thissurelyliesnotinitsbeingperceivedwithinanygreaterclarityor

absenceofmediatingfactors,orfromgreaterproximity,butrather,initsbeingthebody

oftheperceivingsubject.Thisisnottodenythatonecanperceiveone'sownbody.The

pointissimplythatifmybody‘sensesalterations’asaresultofwhichIcometo

experiencesomespatio‐temporalthing,thenitisthatthingthatistheobjectofmy

perception,andnotinthiscasemybody.Schopenhauerseemstohavebecomeawareof

thepossiblemisunderstanding,however,andrectifiesitsubsequentlybymakingthis

verypoint.29

Themostseriousproblemwiththeabovepassageiswhat(p.159) causesthat‘effecton

animalbodies’whichSchopenhauerequateswithsensation.Schopenhauersaysthatwe

taketheempiricalobjectofexperiencetobethecauseofoursensations.Elsewhere—and

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herewewitnessthematerialisttrendthatwillbethetopicofthenextchapter—heclaims

thatitisamaterialobjectwhichcausesthealterationinoursenseorgans:‘[matter's]

effectontheimmediateobject[thebody](whichisitselfmatter),istheconditionofthe

intuitioninwhichaloneitexists’.30Apparentlythisempirical,andindeedmaterial,object

arisesoutofthetransitionfromsensationtoinferredcausewhichiscarriedoutbythe

subject'sunderstanding.Itexistsonlyinintuition.However,thesensationsupposedly

existspriorto(thoughperhapsnottemporallyso)theoperationoftheunderstanding

whichisconstitutiveoftheobject'sbeingthereforthesubject—sohowcantheobjectbe

thecauseoftheinitialsensation?Kantwouldhavesaidthatthesensationwascausedin

usbyathinginitself,thoughofsuchathingwecouldhavenoknowledge.But

Schopenhauerwillnotallowhimselfthisoption.Ifweassumethatitisnotarealoptionto

saythatoursensationsarenotinfactcausedatall(butthatwemerelycometotreatthe

object‘constructed’ontheoccasionofhavingthesensationasifitwerethecauseofthe

sensation),thenSchopenhauerisingreatdifficulty.Onewayofextricatinghimfromit

mightbetomakeacleardistinctionbetweenempiricalobjectandobjective

representation.IfSchopenhauermadethisdistinction,hecouldholdthatempirical

objectsexistinginspaceandtimepriortoexperiencecausesensationsinus,andthatthe

understanding,inpositingacauseforthereceivedsensation,hasbeforeitanobjective

representation,i.e.onewhosecontentspecifiesaspatio‐temporalobjectwithcertain

causalproperties.ButSchopenhauerrefusestodistinguishinanywaybetweenobject

andrepresentation—aconsciousandprincipledrefusal,aswehaveseenfromhis

definitionof‘object’andfromhisrejectionoftheKantianGegenstandderVorstellungasa

meaninglesshybrid.31Schopenhauerthusseemscommittedtohavingempiricalobjects

asboththepriorconditionsandthe(p.160) consequencesoftheunderstanding's

operationsuponsensations.

Hewouldcontendnodoubtthatthisisperfectlycoherent,providedoneacceptsthe

idealistdoctrinethatempiricalobjectsarerepresentations.Withintheworldas

representation,empiricalobservationcanconfirmtheeffectsofobjectsuponother

objects,includingthehumanorganism;butfromthesubject'spointofview,theobjectis

constructedinresponsetoareceivedsensation,andthisexplainsthenatureofthose

objectsthatconstitutetheempiricalworld.Thus(hisdefencewouldcontinue),provided

wedistinguishthesubjectivefromtheobjectivepointofviewthereisnoproblem.In

explainingthenatureofobjectsweinvoketheirstatusasmentalconstructs,positedas

thecausesofmeresensations;butinreportingmattersofempiricalfactwecanassert

straightforwardlythatobjectscausealterationsinotherobjects.However,theproblems

withthispositionarenotsoeasilydispelled.ForSchopenhauerisapparentlycommitted

totheviewthattheverysameobjecthastworoles:thetableIseeisboththecauseof

meresensationsinme,andamind‐dependentconstructwhichtransformssensationinto

cognitionbyfeaturingasanobjectivementalcontent.Itishardtoseehowthisisany

morecoherentthantheKantianversioninvolvingthingsinthemselvesascauses.

AwiderquestionpromptedbythesamepassageconcernsSchopenhauer'snotionofa

purelyintuitive,non‐conceptualunderstanding.Thedivisionbetweenintuitiveandstrictly

conceptualrepresentationsisamajorthemeforSchopenhauer.Notmakingsucha

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distinctionproperlyissaidtobea‘greatmistake’ofKant's.32Thefollowingpassage

expressesSchopenhauer'sviewsquitewell:‘Thechiefdistinctionamongrepresentations

isthatbetweentheintuitiveandtheabstract.Thelatterareconstitutedbyonlyoneclass

ofrepresentations,namelyconcepts:andthesearethepropertyonearthofhumanity

alone,whosecapacityforconcepts,whichdistinguishesthemfromanimals,hasforalltime

beencalledreason.’33SowhatSchopenhauerwantsisacleardifferencebetween

perceptualawarenessofempiricalobjects,involvingtheir(p.161) spatial,temporal,and

causalorganization,andstrictlyconceptualthought.HethinksthatKantblurredthis

distintionbyinsistingthatonlytheunificationofintuitionandconceptproduced

experience,andbyhisdoctrinethatrepresentationofobjectsrequiressynthesisof

representationsinaccordancewiththeprinciplesofconceptualjudgement.

Schopenhauerexaminesthedifferencebetweenthesetwomodesofcognitionatsome

length.Hemakesacloseconnectionbetweenreason(ourcapacityforstrictlyconceptual

cognition)andlanguage.Thewordsofalanguagedesignate(bezeichnen)concepts,and

conceptualthoughtisinprinciplecommunicablefromonesubjecttoanother.34Only

strictlyconceptualcognitioniscapableofconstitutingknowledge(Wissen).Knowledgein

thissenseisalwaysknowledgethat...,wherethespacecanbefilledbyaproposition

thatexpressesaconceptualthought.Butthereisalsocognition(Erkenntnis)whichisnot

knowledge,andoneofSchopenhauer'sconcernsisthatsuchnon‐conceptualcognitionis

itselfanadequaterepresentationofempiricalreality.Theexperiencedbilliards‐player,he

claims,‘canhaveacompletecognizance[Kenntnis]ofthelawsofimpactofelasticbodies

ononeanother,merelyintheunderstanding,merelyforimmediateintuition,andhedoes

perfectlyadequatelywiththis:incontrast,onlythescientistofmechanics[der

wissenschaftlicheMechaniker]hasagenuineknowledge[Wissen]ofthoselaws,i.e.a

cognitionoftheminabstracto’.35Theadvantagesofknowledgeproperare,accordingto

Schopenhauer,onlyintermsofapplication.Ifonewantstotransmitone'sunderstanding

toothers,orstoreitforwideruse,orhaveitavailabletoguideone'sownfutureactions,

thenitmustbeexpressedinconceptualform.Intuitivecognitioncanbeacomplete

representationofpartsofempiricalreality,butitisrootedtotheparticulartimeand

placeofitsoccurrenceandtotheparticularpercipient.Withoutconceptswewouldbe

thesameasanimalswholiveinaperpetualhereandnow,whilsthavingafullcognitive

graspoftheworldinsofarasitwaspresentedtousinperception.

Thereismuchthatcanbediscussedinthis.Onetroubling(p.162) aspectimplicitinthe

passagejustquotedistheconvictionthatconceptualrepresentations,which

Schopenhauerholdstobeultimatelyderivedfromintuitiverepresentations,caninsome

waycontainnothingmorethanthem.Thisviewismadeexplicitwhenhesaysthat:‘the

differentialcalculusdoesnotreallyextendourcognitionofcurves,andcontainsnothing

morethanthemereintuitionofthemalreadydoes;butitchangesthemodeofcognition,

transformingtheintuitiveintotheabstract,whichissofullofconsequencesfor

application’.36Thismustbewrong—mathematicalpropositionsareanythingbutmerely

usefulwaysofconveyingandstoringwhatanypercipientcanseeorfeeloftheproperties

ofcurved(orother)objects.Whatdistinguishesthemispreciselytheirpropositional

content.

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TwofurtherpointsthatSchopenhauermakesare(1)thatconceptualknowledgeisnot

necessaryforthesuccessfulperformanceofmanyhumanactivities,and(2)thatinmany

casesithindersthem.Examplesillustratingthesecondpointwillafortioriillustratethe

first—ifanyactivityisachievedbestintheabsenceofconceptualknowledge,then

conceptualknowledgeisnotnecessaryforitsachievement.Theillustrationsthat

Schopenhauerprovidesarevariedandvivid:37(a)‘inbilliards,fencing,tuningan

instrument,singing:hereintuitivecognitionmustguidetheactivityimmediately:passing

throughreflectionmakesthemunsure,bydividingtheattentionandconfusingthe

person’;(b)‘savages’(Wilde)or‘primitivepeople’(roheMenschen)canwieldabowand

arrow(andperformmanyotheractivities)withapoiseandprecisiondeniedtothe

‘reflectiveEuropean’;(c)‘Itisofnohelptohavetheknowledgeinabstractooftheangle

atwhichImustapplytherazor,indegreesandminutes,ifIdonothaveintuitive

cognizanceofit,i.e.haveitinmygrasp’;(d)inthecaseofphysiognomy,our

understandingoffeaturesisintutive,notsomethingexpressibleinabstractconcepts;(e)

‘Ifthesingerorvirtuosotriestoguidehisperformancebyreflection,itremainsdead.

Thesameappliestothecomposer,thepainter,eventhepoet.Theconceptalways

remainsunfruitfulinart’.

Thatthereissuchathingas‘knowinghow’,andthatitdoesnotinallcasespresuppose

theabilitytoformulatewhat(p.163) oneknowsinpropositionalform,seemstobe

perfectlytrue.AndnodoubtthereisatendencywhilereadingKanttoforgetthis,andto

treatallcognitionasifitproceededbytheproductionoftheory‐ladenjudgementssuch

asthosemadebythenaturalscientistorthemathematician.TothisSchopenhauer

providesausefulcorrective.(Hisnotionofhavingsomething‘inone'sgrasp’findsalater

echoinHeidegger'snotionofZuhandenheit(‘readiness‐to‐hand’),whichissimilarly

designedtobreakdowntraditionalepistemologicalassumptionsaboutourawarenessof

everydayobjects.38)Buttherearemanyissueswhichcouldbedevelopedoutofthis

discussion.Schopenhauerisclaimingthatperceptionisnon‐conceptual,non‐propositional,

non‐judgemental,non‐language‐dependent,non‐theoretical—andalltheseclaimsneednot

necessarilybetaken(orrejected)togetherasapackage.

Toexaminetheseissuesfurther,letusreturntotheparticularcaseofcausality,which

Schopenhauerdeniestobeaconcept,atleastasregardsitsroleinperception.Heinsists

ondistinguishingsharplybetweenourconceptofcause,whichisaconstituentof

judgementsandhenceofdiscursivepropositionalthought,andourdirectperceptual

awarenessofcausalinteractions.Kantheldthatexperiencerequiresthesubsumptionof

setsofdataundertheconceptcause,butSchopenhauerchargeshimwithnotmakinga

cleardistinctionbetweenwhatwemightcall‘explicit’judgementandtheintuitive

apprehensionofcausalconnection.This,Schopenhaueralleges,ledKanttomakeafalse

claim,namely,thatexperiencerequiresexplicitjudgementsinvolvingtheconceptcause.

ByanexplicitjudgementImeanasubject'soccurrentthoughtthatsomexcausessome

y.OnSchopenhauer'ssideitmustbesaidthatthereisadistinctiontobemadebetween

thisandsomeone'sapprehensionofparticularconnectionsbetweencausesandeffects.

Stickingwiththehackneyedexample,considerapersonwatchingagameofbilliards.This

personperceivesagreatmanyinstancesofcause/effectrelations,andherdoingso

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certainlydoesnotpresupposeanexplicitjudgementthatxcausesyforeachperceived

instance.Themindseems,asitwere,toperceivesimplyinthemedium(p.164) of

causality,muchasitdoesinthatofspaceortime,withoutthenecessityforexplicitcausal

judgements.ThusitisthatSchopenhauermakescausality,anaprioriformofthe

understanding,anon‐conceptualformonaparwithspaceandtime.

ThereareperhapstwopointsthatcanbeputforwardonKant'sbehalf.Itistruethathe

doesnotmakehimselfveryclear,butthereisnoneed(onemightargue)toreadhimas

beingcommittedtoanoccurrentthoughtastheconditionofeachandeveryperceived

causalconnection.Thepointwouldbe,rather,thatthisimmediateperceptual

apprehensionofcause/effectrelationsbetweenparticularobjects,whileadmittedly

distinctfromexplicitcausaljudgement,neverthelesshasasaconditionofitspossibility

theabilitytomakeexplicitcausaljudgementsofthekindwhichSchopenhauerrecognizes

astrulyconceptual.ThesecondpointonKant'sbehalfwouldbetoarguethatsincea

judgementisthecombiningofrepresentationsinsuchawayastomakethemcapableof

referringtoobjects,anyonewho‘apprehends’thegameofbilliardsintheordinarywayis

ipsofactomakingjudgements,anddoingsoaccordingtotheconceptofcause(orcause

andeffect).Schopenhauercanacceptthislastpoint,andsaythatifthatiswhatismeant

byusingconceptsinajudgement,thentheunderstandingusesconceptsintheprocess

ofordinaryperception.Stillthefactremains,though,thatforallKantsays,anexplicit

judgementmustoccureverytimeanyoneperceivesacausalconnection.Theadvantage

ofreserving‘concept’forwhatcanoccurindiscursivejudgementisthatwemakethis

distinctionclear,andtherebyavoidanysuggestionthatthislastclaimisbeingadvanced.

AstotheKantianpointthatthepossibilityofexplicitcausaljudgementsisanecessary

conditionofperceivingcausalconnections,Schopenhauersimplydeniesit.Thismayseem

unwise,asthereisclearlyastrongconnectionbetweentheperceptionofcausal

connectionsandthedisposition(atleast)tomakecausaljudgements,forwhich

Schopenhauerisapparentlyunabletoaccount.However,couldwehopetoshowthatthe

perceptionofcausalconnectionsisimpossibleforabeingincapableofexplicitcausal

judgements?Acatoradogwouldseemtobesuchabeing,andyettheywouldseem

(p.165) tobejustascapableofperceivingcausalconnectionsashumanbeingsare.At

anyrate,ifSchopenhaueriswrongtoseparateperceptionfromexplicitconceptual

judgement,oneoftheseassumptionsaboutcatsanddogsmustberejected.Itisindeed

afeatureemphasizedbySchopenhauerhimselfthat,accordingtohistheory,human

percipientshaveacloseaffinitywithotheranimals;inbothcasestheoperationofthe

understandingyieldsperceptionofaunifiedworldofparticularobjects.

SofarwehavetreatedwithsomesympathySchopenhauer'sclaimthatperceptionis

possiblewithoutexplicitconceptualjudgement.Butshouldwebeinanywayinclinedto

accepthistotaldivorceofperceptionandconception?Isuggestnot.SinceoneofKant's

achievementsiscommonlyheldtobehisrealizationthattheempiricistpictureofthe

passivereceptionofdatarequiredradicalalteration,andthatitwaspreciselythemind's

activejudgingcapacitythathadbeenleftout,thedenialofthenecessityofconceptsfor

perceptionmustseemtodaytobearetrogradestep.Schopenhauerhasnoroomforthe

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arguablytruethesisthatmyperceivingatableorabuildingisdependentonmy

possessionofconcepts,whetheroftheorderoftableandbuilding,orthatofphysical

object.Perceptionmaynotpresupposeanexplicitjudgingforeachperceiving,butitis

neverthelessconceptual,andmaybesaidtohavepropositionalcontent.Ifitdoes,thenit

iscloselylinkedwiththecapacityformakingexplicitjudgementswiththesamecontent.

AccordingtoSchopenhauer,therecanbeentirelyconcept‐freepresentationtothemind

ofaparticularorcollectionofparticulars—aviewthatisopentotheobjectionthat

experienceofparticularsisalwaysofthemasparticularinstancesofsomeconcept.

However,weshouldatleastnotethatSchopenhauer'spositionisnotsimplya

resurrectionofthepre‐Kantianempiricistview.HisisstillaKantianaccount,inthathe

acceptstheapriorinatureofspace,time,andcausalityasorganizingformsofour

perceptionofaworldofobjectiveparticulars.Theseformsarenecessarytoallobjective

experience,andaresubjectiveinorigin,justastheyareforKant.Theyservethesame

functioninprovidingtheconstitutivecriteriaofanything'sbelongingtoobjectivereality;

and,aswithKant,theyapplyonly(p.166) totheworldofobjectsforthesubject,notto

thingsinthemselves.

LetusconcludethepresentchapterwithanassessmentofSchopenhauer'sidealism.I

havesuggestedthathisgeneralargumentsinsupportofidealismarenotverystrong.

Hisattemptstoshowthatrealismiseitherincoherentorredundantarenotveryfully

developed,andtheyareunconvincingastheystand.Hishistoricaljustificationofidealism

astheculminationofpost‐Cartesianphilosophyisanaccuratereflectionofoneimportant

lineofdevelopment,butontheotherhanditdoesnothingtoshowthatscepticismabout

anyrealexternalworldisnot(atleast)aviablealternativetoidealism.Finally,the

suggestionthatidealismexpressesanobvious,evenanaxiomatic,truthhasbeenshown

torestonareadingoftheslogan‘Noobjectwithoutsubject’whichinfactgivesno

supporttothecentralidealistdoctrinethattherealobjectiveworldismind‐dependent.

However,giventheconfidencethatSchopenhauerclearlyreposesintheself‐evidenceof

idealism,alongwithhisviewsaboutitshistoricaljustification,andthefactsasweknow

themaboutthepopularityandinfluenceofidealistviewsinimmediatelypreceding

decades,wecanreadilyunderstandwhyheappearstoexpendcomparativelylittle

energyonconstructingargumentsforidealism.

AsregardsthecoherenceofSchopenhauer'sidealistposition,heclearlyrecognizesthat

objective,empiricalrealitymust,foracoherentidealist,bemind‐dependent.Thecriteria

ofobjectivitymustbeprovidedbyapriorimodesoforganizationamongthesubject's

representations,andnotbyanyrelationthattheymightbeartothemind‐independent

thinginitself.HethusavoidstheincoherencenotedearlierinKant'sposition.However,

bylosingthethinginitselfinitsroleascauseofrepresentations,Schopenhauerhasgreat

difficultyaccountingforourperceptionofobjects.Hisviewsabouttheconstructionof

theempiricalobjectontheoccasionofourorgansbeingaffectedaredisastrouswithout

theassumptionthatthingsinthemselvescausetheaffectionofourorgans.Jacobi's

dictum(citedinChapter2)thusbitesbothways:‘withoutthispresuppositionIcouldnot

enterthesystem,andwiththispresuppositionIcouldnotremaininit’.

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(p.167) ItisclearthatSchopenhauerdoesnotsetouteithertobeasolipsistortobea

sceptic.Thereisnorelativizationoftheworldofobjectstoasingle,individual

experiencingbeing,noranydoubtinprincipleabouttherealityoftheworldofobjects:

theexternalworld‘givesitselftousasitis’.39Thedisputeabouttherealityoftheworld

isfoolishasfarasSchopenhauerisconcerned.HispositionisclearlyakintoKant'shere:

fromboththeirpointsofviewitwouldbeamistaketounderstand‘objectivereality’as

equivalentto‘whatexistsindependentlyofallsubjects’.Thisnotionofrealityleadstothe

transcendentalrealistposition,whichinturngiveswaytoscepticism.However,

Schopenhauer'swayofremovingthegroundforscepticismisbydenyingexplicitlythat

thereisanycausalrelationbetweenobjectandrepresentation.Kantmayhavebeen

muddledabouttherelationbetweenrepresentationsandobjects,asSchopenhauer

charges.ButatleastKantkeptalivethesensethattheremustberoomforsucha

distinctionsomewhere.Incollapsingitcompletely,Schopenhauerleaveslittlesubstance

tohisemphaticclaimthattheempiricalrealityoftheworldofobjectsisnotbeingdenied.

IsuggestedearlierthatSchopenhauerwouldultimatelyhavetosavehisidealismfrom

beingcrazilysubjectivistbyaclearassertionoftheexistenceofthethinginitself.Thishe

doesinfact,afterdevelopingthesubjectivismtosomeconsiderableextent.Forthereisa

sidetoSchopenhauer'sidealismwhichgraduallybecomesapparentashiswork

progresses,andwhichmakeshimvulnerabletothechargeofnotprovidingany

distinctionbetweenrealityandappearance.Thisishistendencytoclaimthatallour

experienceis(oratleastislike)adreamoranillusion.Delightfulpoeticillustrationsofthis

themearetohand(‘Wearesuchstuff|Asdreamsaremadeof,andourlittlelife|Is

roundedwithasleep’40).Schopenhauerfindsthatthebasisofthispervasivethoughtis

theveryrealdifficultyofspecifyinganysurecriterionfordistinguishingdreamsfrom

wakingexperiences.Thissurelyleaveshimopentoakindofscepticalattack,albeit

differentlybasedfromtheonehehaspreviously(p.168) considered.Schopenhauer

reallyseemsinawaytoembracethisconsequence.Herejectsascriteria,first,the

comparativevividnessofwakingexperienceasagainstdreams(forhowarethetwotobe

comparedforvividness,unlessperimpossibileexperiencedatthesametime?),and

secondly,thecomparativecausalcoherenceofwakingexperience(sincedreamscanbe

justascoherentinthisrespect).Theonlycriterionisthefactofwakingup,heconcludes,

withitsexperienceofacleanbreakbetweenthecausalorderofthedreamandthe

causalorderofwakinglife.41ElsewhereSchopenhauerispreparedtoassertthatthe

idealityoftheworld,thefactthatitismereappearance,meansthat‘itmustberegarded,

atleastfromoneside,asrelatedtodreams,andindeedmustbeplacedinthesameclass

asthem’.42Theimplicationherethattheremightbeanothersidetothequestion,apoint

ofviewfromwhichtheworldisnotakintoadream,mustbeunderstoodasanallusionto

Schopenhauer'sdoctrineofthethinginitself.Theworldhas,forhim,anexistenceinitself

beyondanysubject'sexperienceofit,andonlyassuchistrulyreal.Althoughthisstrand

ofthoughthasbeenkeptverymuchoutofsightinthemainwork,itpicksuponceagain

Schopenhauer'searlierinvolvementwiththenotionofahigherPlatonicreality,opposed

tothedreamlikeworldofbecoming,thatwesawinChapter1.

WhatwefindinTheWorldasWillandRepresentationisthatwhenSchopenhauercomes

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toemphasizethenotionofthethinginitself,heisstill,asinhisearliernotes,preparedto

equate‘existingasthesubject'srepresentation’with‘beingakintoadream’,and‘not

penetratingtotheessenceofthingsastheyreallyare’.Furthermore,theleitmotivofthe

veilofmāyāhassurvivedwiththesamesignificance:

TheancientwisdomoftheIndianspronounces:‘Itismāyā,theveilofdeception,

whichshroudstheeyesofmortalsandmakesthemseeaworldofwhichonecan

sayneitherthatitisnorthatitisnot:foritislikeadream,likethesunshineonthe

sandwhichthetravellertakesfromafarforwater...’.(Thesesimilesarefound

repeatedininnumerablepassagesintheVedasandPuranas.)Butwhatallofthese

meant,andwhattheytellof,isnothingotherthan(p.169) whatwearetreatingof

evennow:theworldasrepresentation,subordinatedtotheprincipleofreason.43

HerewemaysenseaseriousclashtowhichSchopenhauerhimselfseemsstrangely

blind.Ontheonehandwehavetheaspirationsthatcrystallizedearlyonaroundthe

notionsofthe‘betterconsciousness’anditsdelusive,painful,empiricalcounterpart;on

theotherhandtheKantiandoctrineofappearanceswhichintranscendentalidealism

(especiallyonSchopenhauer'sreading)supposedlyconstitutereality.Anyhopethat

idealismwillpreservetheempiricalrealityoftheexternalworldseemstopaleinthelight

oftheearlypreoccupationstowhichthemāyāthemeislinked.Idealismassertsthatthe

worldisthesubject'srepresentation;butwhenitsuitshim,ashere,Schopenhauer

treatsthatassertionasequivalenttotheclaimthatthe‘world’withwhichweare

presentedinexperience(aworldobjectiveintheSchopenhaueriansenseofbeing

presentedtousasanobjectofexperience)isanirreparablyinaccuratepictureofthe

worldasitreallyis.ItisasifSchopenhauersetsouttoreproducetheBerkeleianmoveof

equatingtheworldofrealspatio‐temporalthingswithmentalstatesortheircontents,

hopingtherebytoeliminatethegapbetweenrepresentationandobjectsovaluabletothe

sceptic,yetatthesametimeheputsanunbridgeablechasmbetweenthisspatio‐

temporalworldofobjectsandtheworldasitisinitselfbycallingtheformeranillusion.

Tomakemattersworse,heevenattributestoKanttheviewthatincontrastwiththe

thinginitself,‘timeandspace,andeverythingwhichfillsthemandisorderedinthem

accordingtocausallaw,istoberegardedasanunstableandinsubstantialdream

[bestand‐undwesenloserTraum]’.44AtthispointIthinkwearejustifiedinfeeling

exasperationonKant'sbehalf.

Schopenhauerisaloverofparadoxes,andhesometimesseemstogooutofhiswayto

presenthisreaderswiththem.Hispresentationofhisvariousviewsaboutillusionisfull

ofproblems.AndyetIbelievethatifweoverlookthosedifficultiesaboutthenatureof

theempiricalobjectwhichwehavealreadynoted,thereisaninterpretationwhichsaves

(p.170) Schopenhauerfromoutrightcontradictionwhenhesaysthattheworldas

representationisandisnotanillusion.Whatheissayingisroughlythefollowing:

1.Itisnotanillusionthatweexperienceaunifiedworldofparticularspatio‐

temporalobjects,norshouldwebescepticalabouttheexistenceofthisworldor

aboutourexperiencingit.

2.Therealspatio‐temporalworldis,however,mind‐dependent,constitutedby

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representationswhichexistonlyforsomesubject.

3.Butthereis(andindeedmustbe)awiderperspectivefromwhichwecanthink

oftheworldinawayunlimitedbyitsexperienceability.Thisistothinkoftheworld

initself.Theexistenceoftheworldinitselfisnotconditionalonitsfallingwithinthe

formsofitsexperienceabilitybyus.

Thus,asregardsillusion,wemustoperatewithatwo‐tiersystem.Ononelevelwemust

resisttheconclusionthatourrepresentationsaremereillusionstowhichtherealworld

maynotcorrespond.Theyaretherealempiricalworld.Soweshouldnotbe

epistemologicalsceptics—theworld‘givesitselftousasitis’,andoureverydayand

scientificexperienceofitisinorderasitstands.Allthatwehavetosayaboutthethingin

itselffromthepointofviewofepistemologyisthatitmustbeinaccessibletous,butit

mustbetherebecause,asSchopenhauerputsit,itdoesnotmakesensetotalkof

appearanceunlessthereissomethingthatappears.45Ifwerestrictempiricalrealitytoa

singlelimitedperspectiveontheworld,wemustcomprehendthethoughtthatthereisa

worldwhoseexistencetranscendsthatperspective.

Ontheotherlevel,whenSchopenhauersaysthatwhatispresentedtousassubjectsis

akintoadreamoranillusion,hedoesnotdosointhenameofepistemologicalscepticism.

Hispointisthattheempiricalworlditselfisephemeralandrelativeonlytous,andis

thereforenoguidetothehiddenorhigherrealityatthelevelofthe‘initself’.This

supposedlyhigherrealityinhabitsaquasi‐Platonicrealm,andis‘morereal’largely

becauseitiseternallyexistent,notsubjectto(p.171) spatialortemporaldifferentiation,

notcausallyconnectedwiththeempirical,andinsomewayofgreatervaluethanthe

empirical.Wearenotdeceivedinthinkingthattheempiricalworldexistsinthewaywe

generallytakeitto,butwearedeceivedifweputourfaithinitasexhaustiveofreality,

orascontainingwhatisultimatelyvaluableintheuniverse.Itisnotyetclearwhatwe

shouldmakeofhisviewsabout‘ultimatereality’—butthiswillberemediedtosome

extentinsubsequentchapters,wherehispositivedoctrineofthethinginitselfandhis

advocacyofmysticismarediscussed.46

Notes:

(1)W1p.29(3).

(2)W2p.10(3).

(3)Ibid.pp.11–12(5).

(4)Cf.GeorgediGiovanniandH.S.Harris,BetweenKantandHegel,pp.70and99n.29.

IowemyoutlineofReinholdandhisinfluencetothesuccinctaccountinthisbook,pp.9–

32.

(5)e.g.intheWissenschaftslehre(SämtlicheWerke,vol.1,p.218),Fichteassertshis

leadingprincipletobe:‘dasIchsetztsichalsbestimmtdurchdasNicht‐Ich’(theIposits

itselfasdeterminedbythenot‐I),andappendstohisexplanationtheparentheses‘No

object,nosubject’and‘Nosubject,noobject’.Schelling'sSystemdesTranszendentalen

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Idealismusopenswiththeclaimthat‘inknowledge...objectiveandsubjectiveareunited

insuchawaythatonecannotsaywhichhaspriority’,andthenposesasitscentral

questionwhetherphilosophyshouldgiveprimacytothesubjectiveortheobjective

(SämtlicheWerke,vol.3,pp.339–42).

(6)W2pp.10–11(4–5).

(7)Ibid.p.12(5).

(8)PrinciplesofHumanKnowledge,23;ThreeDialogues,200(PhilosophicalWorks,pp.

83–4,158).

(9)W2p.11(5).

(10)Ibid.p.12(5).

(11)Ibid.p.16(9).

(12)W2pp.16–17(9).

(13)VWp.48(51).

(14)Ibid.p.47(50–1).

(15)W2pp.12–13(6).

(16)W1p.148(104).

(17)W2pp.14–15(7–8).

(18)KdrVA491/B519,B274(inthelatterpassage,Kantusestheterm‘materialidealism’

forwhathecalls‘empiricalidealism’intheformer).

(19)ThreeDialogues,262(PhilosophicalWorks,p.207).

(20)W1p.43(15).

(21)W1p.41(13).

(22)HN2p.42.ForSchopenhauer'scomments,seeibid.pp.60,134,143.

(23)W1p.55(25–6).

(24)Cf.ThreeDialogues,239–40(PhilosophicalWorks,pp.189–90).

(25)W2p.15(8).

(26)Cf.ibid.pp.43–6(32–5);PP2pp.47–54(38–45).

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(27)Cf.thediscussionofthe‘neglectedalternative’chargeinH.E.Allison,‘TheNon‐

SpatialityofThingsinThemselvesforKant’,JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy14

(1976),pp.313–21.

(28)W1p.39(11–12).

(29)Ibid.p.49(20).ThispassageisparalleltoVWpp.100–1(121),whichisalater

additionthatisonlypresentinthe1847edition.

(30)W1p.35(8–9).

(31)Cf.VWp.41(41–2),discussedinChapter4above;andW1p.545(44),discussedin

Chapter2.

(32)W1pp.536–7(437),530(431).

(33)Ibid.p.33(6).

(34)Ibid.p.72(40).Paynetranslatesbezeichnenas‘express’.

(35)Ibid.p.92(56).

(36)W1p.90(54).

(37)AlltheillustrationsgivenherearefromW1pp.93–4(56–7).

(38)Cf.BeingandTime,sect.15,entitled‘TheBeingoftheEntitiesEncounteredinthe

Environment’.

(39)W2p.14(7).

(40)Shakespeare,TheTempest,IV,i,oneofmanyliterarypassagesquotedby

SchopenhaueratW1pp.45–6(17).

(41)W1p.45(17).

(42)W2p.10(4).

(43)W4pp.34–5(8).

(44)Ibid.p.523(425).

(45)Cf.W2p.569(486),foranexpressionofthisthought.

(46)Cf.Chapters7and11below.

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