Ideal spectator approachLecture 2

“The hypothesis which we embrace is plain. It maintains that morality is determined by sentiment. It defines virtue to be whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and vice the contrary.” --Hume, Appendix I

Topics today:

Hume’s view of moral judgment His critique of the rationalist

position

Sec. 5: Why utility pleases Why do we morally admire those

qualities that are socially useful? Can’t just be a result of education.

There must be a basis in human nature.

2 possibilities: self-regard or humanitarian concern

Self-regard or concern for others? Moral sentiment can oppose our self-interest Can concern matters that don’t affect our self-

interest far away in space or time fictional

Concern for self and moral concern feel different

Moral sentiment cannot be a form of self-regard

Must be a concern for others

Universal benevolence

Rooted in an innate human capacity for sympathy

Sympathy can take the form of a sentiment of benevolence toward all, a humanitarian concern.

This concern is what drives our moral judgments

Objection

Sympathy leads to more concern for those close to us

Our moral judgments do not vary in this way

Reply

Unequal concern arises from a biased point of view

An impartial consideration of the situation channels benevolence equally toward all

Correct moral judgments express the attitudes of an impartial, sympathetic observer

Role of reason in morality Reason ascertains facts about

what promotes or diminishes pleasure and happiness

So reason plays a role But reason does not make the

moral judgment Moral judgment expresses a

sentiment evoked by consideration of the facts revealed by reason.

1st argument against rationalism

Reason: inductive or demonstrative Inductive: infers facts from observation Demonstrative: works with abstract

mathematical and logical relations. Moral judgments don’t pick out such

facts or relations Hence they are not made by reason

Example: the “crime” of ingratitude

Observable fact: ill will or indifference in the mind of the ungrateful person

This is not a moral fact because it is not always wrong

Abstract relation: contrariety of attitude

Again, this is not always wrong

2nd argument

Reason operates to infer NEW facts and relations

A moral judgment must be based on all the facts of a situation

Hence moral judgments are not made by reason

3rd argument Moral judgments are like

judgments of beauty Beauty is not a quality or feature

we discover in the object Rather, a judgment of beauty is an

expression of a favorable sentiment toward the object

Moral judgments express a similar kind of sentiment

4th argument

Non-human objects can manifest all the relations that obtain in a moral situation.

But we don’t apply morality to the non-human world

Hence morality is not a matter of relations.

5th argument

Reason alone is never a motive to action

Moral judgments can move us to action

Hence reason by itself cannot give us morality