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I. Majority reversed Aust inarguing against anticorruption,

antidistortion, and shareholder-protection interests.

Word Count: 447

Major i ty decis ion penned by Just ice Kennedy

Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation, released a film entitled Hillary:

The Movie(Hillary). It is a documentary which discouraged the election of

then-Senator Hillary Clinton.

Federal law, however, prohibits corporations and unions from using

their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for"electioneering communication." 2 U. S. C. 441b. An "electioneering

communication" is defined as "any broadcast, cable, or satellite

communication" that "refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal

office" and is made within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general

election. 434(f)(3)(A).

Limits on electioneering communications were also upheld in

McConnel v. Federal Election Commn,540 U. S. 93, 203-209 (2003) which

was largely based onAustin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,494 U. S.

652 (1990).Austinheld that political speech may be banned based on the

speakers corporate identity.

Here, the Court was asked to reconsiderAustin and, in effect,

McConnell.

Citizens United raised five points in its arguments but later on waived

the fifth point. However, the Court found that it cannot resolve the case on

the grounds raised by Citizens United without chilling political speech--

speech that is central to the meaning and purpose of the First Amendment.

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In overturningAustin, the majority argued against three governmental

interests posited by the Government: antidistorition interest, anitcorruption

interest, and shareholder-protection interest.

It argued that if the antidistortion rationale were to be accepted, it

would permit Government to ban political speech simply because the

speaker is an association that has taken on the corporate form. Political

speech is indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no

less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather than an

individual.Austinsought to defend the antidistortion rationale as a means

to prevent corporations from obtaining an "unfair advantage in the political

marketplace" by using "resources amassed in the economic marketplace."

494 U. S., at 659. However, as a necessary consequence of the First

Amendment, political speech cannot be limited based on a speakers

wealth or identity.

The BuckleyCourt found the anticorruption interest sufficiently

important to allow limits on contributions but did not extend that reasoning

to expenditure limits. Limits on independent expenditures have a chilling

effect extending well beyond the Governments interest in preventing quid

pro quocorruption. Thus, the anticorruption interest is not sufficient to

displace the speech here in question.

In arguing against the shareholder-protection interest, the Court

reasoned that the potential disagreement of a shareholder with the political

views of the corporation could give the Government the authority to restrict

the media corporations political speech. The First Amendment does not

allow that power. Also, it argued that the statute is both underinclusive and

overinclusive.

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II. Supplementary opinion on judicial restraint and stare decisis

Word Count: 209

by Chief Jus t ice Roberts

Chief Justice Roberts concurred with the majority decision writing a

separate opinion to address the principles of judicial restraint and stare

decisis in relation to its application in the case.

On judicial restraint, the determination of the constitutionality of an Act

of Congress is "the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called

upon to perform." The standard of practice is to refrain from addressing

constitutional questions except when necessary. He affirmed that it is only

because the majority rejected Citizens Uniteds statutory claim that it

proceeded to consider the groups constitutional arguments.

On stare decisis, it is preferred because it promotes stability and a

consistent development of legal principles. However, if adherence to a

precedent actually impedes the stable and orderly adjudication of future

cases, its stare decisiseffect is also diminished. Thus,Austin wasoverruled because first, it was an "aberration" insofar as it departed from

the protections the Court had granted political speech in earlier cases, such

as, Buckley, First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Belloti, 435 U. S. 765 (1978).

Second, the validity ofAustinsrationale was controversial ever since. And

third,Austinis uniquely destabilizing because it threatened to subvert the

Courts decisions even outside the particular context of corporate express

advocacy.

III. Right to speech of individuals includes the right to speak in

association with other individuals

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Word Count: 113

by Ju st ice Scal ia

Justice Scalia argues against Justice Stevens dissent which

purported to show that the decision is not supported by the original

understanding of the First Amendment. The dissent suggested that

because the Framers didnt like corporations, the dissent concluded that

corporations had no rights of free speech.

Scalia acknowledged that the Framers recognized the right to free

speech of individuals. As a corollary, the individuals right to speak includes

the right to speak in association with other individual persons.

Scalia criticized the dissent and pointed out that the First Amendment

is written in terms of "speech," not speakers. Its text offers no foothold for

excluding any category of speaker: individuals, partnerships, associations

or corporations.

IV. Dissent: Electioneering communication by corporate entitites

may be restricted based on anticorruption and shareholder-protectioninterests.

Word Count: 349

by Just ice Stevens

Justice Stevens concurred win the Court's decision to sustain BCRA's

disclosure provisions, but dissented from the principal holding of the

majority opinion.

Steven criticized the majority opinion on two principal points: it

violated the principle of judicial restraint and stare decisis.

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The majority violated the principle of judicial restraint because it

addressed a question not raised by Citizens when it found BCRA 203 to

be facially unconstitutional.

He also argued that the majority violated the principle of stare decisis.

In a long line of cases, the Court had recognized that to deny Congress the

power to safeguard against the improper use of money to influence the

result of an election is to deny to the nation in a vital particular the power of

self-protection. The Buckley Court, for example, recognized the legitimacy

of preventive measures for limiting campaign spending and found the

prevention of corruption to be a reasonable goal of legislation. Yet, the

majority strayed from jurisprudence established over decades.

Steven also argued against the position of the majority relating to

narrower grounds.

First, the majority failed to recognize the possibility of corruption

outside quid pro quo exchanges.

Second, the majority did not place enough emphasis on the

prevention of the "appearance of corruption" in elections. He pointed out

that even Buckley and Bellotti recognized the importance of public

confidence in democracy.

Third, the majority failed to recognize the dangers of the corporate

form recognized in Austin. Steven argued that these entities have perpetual

life, the ability to amass large sums of money, limited liability, no ability to

vote, no morality, no purpose outside of profit-making, and no loyalty. This

makes them dangerous to democratic elections.

Fourth, the majority ignored the rights of shareholders. Because

shareholders invest money in corporations, he argued that the law should

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likewise help to protect shareholders from funding speech that they

oppose.

In sum, Steven would have upheld the constitutionality of BCRA 203

and its restriction against advertising and broadcasting Hillary within 30

days of the primary election on the grounds that the movie was produced

and distributed by a corporate entity.

V. `Dissent in part: BCRA 201 and 311 are also unconstitutional.

Word Count: 121

by Ju st ice Thomas

Justice Thomas concurred with the majority that BCRA 203 is

incompatible with the First Amendment protection to free speech. However

he dissented as to Part IV of the majority opinion stating that the disclosure,

disclaimer, and reporting requirements in BCRA 201 and 311 are also

unconstitutional.

He argues that Congress may not abridge the "right to anonymous

speech" based on the "simple interest in providing voters with additional

relevant information." Thomas argues that the disclosure requirement

endangers donors to blacklisting, threats and retaliation. The Courts

insistence on upholding 201 and 311 will ultimately prove as misguided.

He posits that intimidation tactics that use disclosed donor information pre-

empt citizens exercise of their First Amendment. In effect, persons are

prevented from speaking.