icsum.org.my€¦ · international journal of china studies volume 2 number 3 december 2011 issn...

International Journal of China StudiesVolume 2 Number 3 December 2011 ISSN 2180-3250

Foreword 551

Articles

China’sNewWaveofAggressiveAssertivenessintheSouthChinaSea 555Carlyle A. Thayer

SouthChinaSeaIssueinChina-ASEANRelations: 585AnAlternativeApproachtoEasetheTensionShen Hongfang

ClashingAmericanImagesofanEmergentChinaand21st-Century 601China-ASEANRelations:2001-2008Renato Cruz De Castro

AmericanPerspectiveversusChineseExpectationonChina’sRise 625Jinghao Zhou

DevelopmentofJapan-ChinaRelationssince1972 647Kazuyuki Katayama

Cross-StraitEconomicIntegrationintheRegionalPoliticalEconomy 681Min-Hua Chiang

Book Review

IanStorey, SoutheastAsiaandtheRiseofChina:TheSearchforSecurity》 701reviewed by Kuik Cheng-Chwee

TheInternational Journal of China StudiesisatriannualacademicjournaloftheInstituteofChinaStudies,UniversityofMalaya,Malaysia.Thejournalisabstracted/indexedinEconLit,e-JEL,JEL on CD,International Political Science Abstracts,Ulrich’s Periodicals Directory,Ulrichsweb Global Serials Directory,Bibliography of Asian Studies,International Bibliography of the Social Sciences,Reference Corporation’s Asia-Pacific DatabaseandNLB’s ISI(Index to Singapore Information).

Website:http://ics.um.edu.my/?modul=IJCS

Institute of China Studies

International Journal of China StudiesVolume 2 Number 3 December 2011 ISSN 2180-3250

EditorsEmile Kok-Kheng Yeoh Ngeow Chow Bing

International Journal of China StudiesFocus: South China Sea and China’s Foreign Relations

Focus:South China Sea andChina’s Foreign Relations

《

IJCS 2-3 cover 20-11-11.indd 1 11/20/2011 10:36:39 AM

Notes for Contributors

Submission Notes

1. Manuscripts submitted forpublication in the International Journal of China StudiesshouldfocusoncontemporaryChinaandherrelationswithothercountriesandregions,inthecontextofregionalandglobaldevelopment,andmorespecifically,issuesrelatedto the political, social and economic development, trade and commerce, foreignrelations, regional security and science, medical and technological development ofcontemporaryMainlandChina,Taiwan,HongKongandMacau.

2. Amanuscriptsubmittedshouldbeanoriginal,unpublishedworknotunderconsiderationforpublicationelsewhere.

3. Allmanuscriptsunderconsiderationforpublicationwillberefereedviaadoubleblindreviewingprocess.

4. ThecontentsofapublishedarticleintheInternational Journal of China StudiesreflecttheviewoftheauthororauthorsandnotthatoftheeditorsofthejournalortheInstituteofChinaStudies,UniversityofMalaya.

5. Theeditorsofthejournaldonotacceptresponsibilityfordamageorlossofmanuscriptssubmitted.

6. ManuscriptssubmittedshouldbewritteninEnglishwithMicrosoftWordinTimesNewRomanfont,size12andwith1.5linespacing,andshouldnotexceedfortypages(orinthecaseofabookreview,notexceedingthreepages)inclusiveoftables,chartsanddiagrams,notes,listofreferences,andappendices.Ashortnoteontheauthor,includingname, academic title and highest qualification (e.g., professor, senior lecturer, PhD,MSc,etc.),institutionalaffiliation,fullpostaladdressandinstitutionale-mailaddress,andtelephoneandfacsimilenumbersshouldbeincluded.Inthemulti-authorcase,thecorrespondingauthorshouldbeidentified.Anabstractof100to250wordsandalistofthreetofivekeywordsshouldalsobegiven.

7. CopyrightsofacceptedmanuscriptswillbetransferredtotheInternational Journal of China Studies.

8. Authorsmustobtainpermission to reproduceallmaterialsofwhich thecopyright isownedbyothers,includingtables,charts,diagramsandmaps,andextensivequotingshouldbeavoided.

9. Bookreviewsubmittedshouldfocusonneworrecentpublications,andthebooktitle,author,city/publisher,yearofpublicationandtotalnumberofpagesshouldbeshownabovethereview.

10.Manuscriptsandbookreviewsshouldbesentbye-mailtochinastudies@[email protected],addressedtotheEditorialManager,International Journal of China Studies,InstituteofChinaStudies,UniversityofMalaya,50603KualaLumpur,Malaysia.

Stylesheet1. Checkcarefullygrammarandspellingbeforesubmittingthearticle.2. UseBritishEnglish,butalternate–izespellingispermissible.Alsonotethatabillion

=1,000,000,000andatrillion=1,000,000,000,000.3. Makeheadingsandsubheadingsidentifiable,andtrytoavoidsub-subheadings.

(continued inside back cover …)

International Journal of China Studies (… continued from inside front cover)

4. Alistofreferencesshouldbecompiled,andnotesshouldbeplacedundera“Notes”heading.Notesandthelistofreferencesshouldbeplacedattheendofthearticle.

5. Use full point for decimal and commas for numbers 1,000 and above.A zero mustalwaysprecededecimalslessthan1.

6. Use“percent”,not“%”,exceptintablesandcharts.7. Fordates,useday-month-yearformat(e.g.,1stJanuary2010),andspelloutthemonths

toavoidambiguity.8. Donotuseapostrophesfordecades(e.g.,1990s,not1990’sor’90).9. Forshortphrasalquotations,fullpointsandcommasfalloutsideaclosingquotation

mark.However,wherethequoteisacompletesentence,thefullpointfallsinsidetheclosingquotationmark.

10.Longquotations, ifunavoidable,shouldbe indented,usingnoquotationmarks.Theauthorshouldtakenoteofthecopyrightimplicationsoflongquotations.

11. Useunspacedhyphens,notdashes,inpagesandyearspans,andwriteallpagenumbersandyearsinfull(e.g.,245-246;1997-1998).

12.UseBritish“open”styleforabbreviations,withnofullpointsinthefollowing:Dr,PhD,Ltd,Mr,Mrs,US,EU,m,km,kg,ft,eds,vols,nos,butretainfullpointsined.,vol.,no.,p.,pp.,i.e.,viz.,e.g.,etc.,ff.,et al.,ibid.,op. cit..

13.Usefullcapitalsonlyforabbreviatednames:UN,EU,USA.Onlycapitalizethefirstword and importantwords (verbs, nouns, pronouns, adjectives and adverbs, but notdefiniteand indefinitearticles,prepositionsandconjunctions) inheadingsandbooktitles.Use“State”(exceptinquotationsiftheoriginalisnotsocapitalized)torefertothecentralbodypoliticofacivilgovernmentand“state”torefertoothersensesoftheterm,includingacountryorapoliticalterritoryformingpartofacountry(exceptwhenthetermbeginsasentence).

14.A non-English term or word should be italicized but the s-ending (if added) in itsanglicized plural form should not be italicized, but note that names of institutions,organizations and movements, local or foreign, and names of currencies, local orforeign, should not be italicized. Quotations from books or direct speech in a non-English language and set in quotation marks (followed by an English translation insquarebrackets) shouldnotbe italicized.Quotations translatedby the authorof themanuscriptintoEnglishshouldbesoindicated.

15.UsetheAPA/ACSstyleforin-textcitationwithlistofreferencesatendoftext,withcommas,e.g.,(Lin,1998:24),forin-textcitation,andinlistofreferences:Shleifer,AandR.Vishny(1994),“PoliticiansandFirms”,Quarterly Journal of Economics,Vol.109,pp.995-1025;Steiner, Jürg (1974),Amicable Agreement versus Majority Rule: Conflict Resolution in Switzerland,rev.ed.,ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress;Moscovici,Serge(1985),“InnovationandMinorityInfluence”,inSergeMosco-vici,GabrielMugnyandEddyvanAvermaet(eds),Perspectives on Minority Influence,Paris:MaisondesSciencesdel’HommeandCambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,pp.9-51.Thetitleofabookorarticleetc.inanon-EnglishlanguageshouldbeshownintheoriginallanguageoritsRomantransliterationandfollowedbyatranslationintoEnglishinsquarebrackets.NotethatthetitleofabookorjournalwhichisinitalicsintheoriginallanguageoritsRomantransliterationshouldnotbeitalicizedintheEnglishtranslationunlessanEnglishtranslationofthebookorjournalhasbeenpublished.

TypesetbyIvanFooAhHiang

PrintedbyUniversityofMalayaPressUniversityofMalaya,LembahPantai

50603KualaLumpur,Malaysia

IJCS 2-3 cover 20-11-11.indd 2 11/20/2011 10:36:39 AM

InternationalJournalofChinaStudies

Editor EmileKok-KhengYeoh

DeputyEditor NgeowChowBing

EditorialManager SusieYieng-PingLing

EditorialBoard EmileKok-KhengYeoh LeePohPing NgeowChowBing ChanSokGee LionelWei-LiLiong FanPikShy JoanneHoi-LeeLoh LingTekSoon AssociateEditorialandAdvisoryBoard

UzielNogueira BrianBridgesIDB-INTAL (Rtd) Lingnan UniversityGregorBenton DavidMcMullenCardiff University University of CambridgeKateHannan MarkHayllarUniversity of Wollongong City University of Hong KongIm-SooYoo SamuelC.Y.KuEwha Womans University National Sun Yat-sen UniversitySuzanneOgden ShipingHuaNortheastern University University of LouisvilleJuanJoséRamírezBonilla PíoGarcíaEl Colegio de México Universidad Externado de ColombiaFujioHara ZhuangGuotuNanzan University Xiamen UniversityMichaelJacobsen OoiCanSengCopenhagen Business School Copenhagen Business SchoolLiAnshan LongDenggaoPeking University Tsinghua UniversityJohnDonaldson GeraldChanSingapore Management University University of AucklandKwok-TongSoo WendyBeekesUniversity of Lancaster University of LancasterMutahirAhmed KamarudingAbdulsomadUniversity of Karachi University of GothenburgKarenRenKangyu MarioArturoRuizEstradaBeijing Foreign Studies University University of MalayaKongXinxin AndreasSusantoChinese Academy of Science and Atma Jaya Yogyakarta UniversityTechnology for Development

IJCS 2-3 prelims_contents 20-11-1 1 11/20/2011 1:45:50 AM

International Journal of China Studies,Vol.2,No.3,December2011

(Focus: South China Sea and China’s Foreign Relations)

©InstituteofChinaStudies Firstpublishedin2011

COPYRIGHT

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, copied ortransmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying,recording or otherwise, without written permission from the publisher. Under theCopyrightAct 1987, anypersonwhodoes anyunauthorized act in relation to thispublicationshallbeliabletoprosecutionandclaimsfordamages.

The International Journal of China Studies is a triannual academic journal ofthe Institute of China Studies, University of Malaya, Malaysia. The journal isabstracted/indexed in EconLit, e-JEL, JEL on CD, International Political Science Abstracts, Ulrich’s Periodicals Directory, Ulrichsweb Global Serials Directory,Bibliography of Asian Studies, International Bibliography of the Social Sciences,Reference Corporation’s Asia-Pacific DatabaseandNLB’s ISI (Index to Singapore Information).

Website:http://ics.um.edu.my/?modul=IJCS

Manuscriptsforconsiderationandeditorialcommunicationshouldbesentto:

TheEditorialManager,International Journal of China StudiesInstituteofChinaStudies,UniversityofMalaya50603KualaLumpur,Malaysia

Tel: +(603)79565663Fax: +(603)79565114E-mail: [email protected], [email protected]


《

InternationalJournalofChinaStudiesVol.2,No.3,December2011

Contents

Foreword 551

Articles

China’sNewWaveofAggressiveAssertivenessinthe 555SouthChinaSeaCarlyle A. Thayer

SouthChinaSeaIssueinChina-ASEANRelations: 585AnAlternativeApproachtoEasetheTensionShen Hongfang

ClashingAmericanImagesofanEmergentChinaand 60121st-CenturyChina-ASEANRelations:2001-2008Renato Cruz De Castro

AmericanPerspectiveversusChineseExpectationon 625China’sRiseJinghao Zhou

DevelopmentofJapan-ChinaRelationssince1972 647Kazuyuki Katayama

Cross-StraitEconomicIntegrationintheRegional 681PoliticalEconomyMin-Hua Chiang

BookReview

IanStorey, SoutheastAsiaandtheRiseofChina: 701TheSearchforSecurity》reviewed by Kuik Cheng-Chwee


InternationalJournalofChinaStudiesVol.2,No.3,December2011

Contributors

DrMin-HuaChiang江敏華,VisitingResearchFellowatEastAsianInstitute,NationalUniversityofSingapore.Email: [email protected]

Dr Renato Cruz De Castro, Professor, International Studies Department,De La Salle University, Philippines; holder of the DrAurelio CalderonProfessorialChairofPhilippine-AmericanRelations.Email: [email protected]

DrKazuyukiKatayama片山和之,MinisterandDeputyChiefofMission,JapaneseEmbassyinBelgium.Email: [email protected]

Dr Kuik Cheng-Chwee郭清水, Senior Lecturer, Strategic Studies andInternational Relations Program, National University of Malaysia (UKM),Bangi,Malaysia.Email: [email protected]

Dr Shen Hongfang沈红芳, Professor, Faculty of International RelationsandResearchSchoolofSoutheastAsianStudies,XiamenUniversity,China;SeniorResearchFellow,CenterofSoutheastAsianStudies,under thejointdirectoryoftheStateMinistryofEducationandXiamenUniversity,China.Email: [email protected]

DrCarlyleA.Thayer,EmeritusProfessor,SchoolofHumanitiesandSocialSciences, University of New SouthWales at theAustralian Defence ForceAcademy,Canberra,Australia.Email: [email protected]

Dr Jinghao Zhou周景颢,Associate Professor of Contemporary China,Hobart andWilliamSmithColleges,NewYork,UnitedStatesofAmerica.Email: [email protected]


Foreword 551InternationalJournalofChinaStudiesVol.2,No.3,December2011,pp.551-553

FOREWORD

China: Foreign Relations and Maritime Conflict

TheSpratlysandParacelsdisputes,beingthemajormilitary-relatedsecurityproblem in the relations between China and some member states of theAssociationofSoutheastAsianNations(ASEAN),canbeseenasoneofthemajorchallengesposedbyChina’sascendanceintheglobalarenainrecentdecades, in particular within the context of the changing China-ASEANrelations. Over the recent decades, China’s highly remarkable economicexpansionhasmadethecountrythecentralfocusoftheworld.TheemergenceofChinabeganwitheconomicreformsincethelate1970s,andovertherecentdecadesChinahasgainedsubstantialglobalinfluenceinboththepoliticalandeconomicspheres.Thishascreatedawiderangeofopportunitiesaswellasrisksespeciallyforherimmediateneighbours,theASEANmembercountries.In terms of opportunities, with a large and fast growing market, Chinahas become the global buyer of goods and services from other countries,includingthemembercountriesofASEAN.Thisisbecauseoftheneedforrawmaterialstosustaintherapidgrowthofthecountry’seconomyespeciallyinthemanufacturingsector.

The phenomenal rise of China as an economic power, as well as herheightenedpoliticalandmilitarycloutthathasbeengrowingintandemwiththis,inevitablybroughtforth,bothregionallyandglobally,increasingconcernoverwhethersheisposingathreattoregionalstabilityandprosperity,andifso,inwhatway.Despitealsobeingviewedasathreat,Chinaismoreoftenregardedasanopportunityforhertradepartners.Infact,asageneralpolicyorientation, whatever her ultimate strategic concerns are, China has beenuntiringlyreassuringherneighboursinthisregionthathergrowinginfluenceinAsiaand theworldarena–her“peaceful rise” (heping jueqi和平崛起)orevenmorecarefully,“peacefuldevelopment” (heping fazhan和平发展)–isathreattonoonebutabenefitforall,andwiththeformalizationinthe1990softheframeworkofherforeignrelationswiththesurroundingcountries(zhoubian guanxi周边关系)as“zhoubian shi shouyao, daguo shi guanjian, fazhanzhong guojia shi jichu, duobian shi wutai周边是首要,大国是关键,发展中国家是基础,多边是舞台”(“relationswiththesurroundingcountriesareprimary;thosewiththegreatpowersarethekey;thosewiththedevelopingcountriesare the foundation;multilateral relationsarearenas”),heroverall

IJCS 2-3 combined text 18-11-11.551 551 11/18/2011 12:43:46 AM

552 Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh

foreignpolicyisguidedbytheprincipleofmulin fuli睦邻富里(inharmonywithneighboursandprospertogether)andherdiplomaticrelationswithherneighbouringcountriesareguidedbytheprinciplesofmulin,fulin,anlin睦邻,富邻,安邻(inharmonywithneighbours,prospertogetherwithneighbours,andassuringtheneighbours)andyi lin wei ban,yu lin wei shan以邻为伴,与邻为善(tobepartnerofneighboursanddogoodtoneighbours).

Nevertheless, on the part of her immediate neighbours in East andSoutheastAsia, diplomatic manoeuvres of this overshadowing giant couldnot probably be seen but through the smoky prism of realpolitik, whereintheprimaryalignmentresponseofstatesisoftenabidtobalanceagainstapotentialoractualpowerorconstellationofpowerduetothefearofbeingdominatedordestroyedbythelatter,oralternatively,tobandwagonwiththisrising, stronger power to gain from the benefits the latter makes possible.WhilewiththeestablishmentoftheASEAN-ChinaFreeTradeAreain2010encompassingatotalpopulationof1.9billion,Chinahasset tobecomeanevenmoreformidablepivotalpowerinthevibrantSoutheastAsianregionintheyearstocome,andtheeconomicwell-beingofcountriesbigandsmallinthisregionisnowverymuchtiedtoChina’sriseasaneconomicpowerandtheengineofgrowthintheregion,itisstillinevitablethatmanyintheregionwouldseethisAsiangiant’seconomicascendanceoverthelastthreedecadesandtheconcomitantexpansionofher“softpower”,ifleftunchecked,tobeamajorproblemnotonlytothedevelopingcountriesintheregionbutalsototherestoftheworld.OnthepartofChina,geopolitical,probablymorethaneconomic rationale, is dictating her continued emphasis on Sino-ASEANrelations,includingtheformationofACFTAaspartofhermulin youhao睦邻友好(goodneighbourlinessandfriendship)foreignpolicy.

Ontheotherhand,onemostnotableaspectofChina’sforeignpolicythathasoftenbeenperceivedbytheUSandotherWesternpowersasprovocativeisherglobalsearchforenergyintermsofitsperceivedroleinacceleratingtheglobalarmsraceandthepolicytowardsdictatorialregimesacrosstheglobefromSoutheastAsiatoAfrica.TheglobalfinancialcrisisseemstohaveturnedintoanopportunityforChinatointensifyherglobalquestforpetroleumandother natural resources as while the Chinese economy is equally sufferingfromthecrisiswithslowergrowth,unlikemanyothercountries,herbankingsystemisnotasbadlyaffectedbythecrisisandhenceisstillabletoextendcreditstoenterprisestosupportthemajorprojectsofthegovernment.WhileChina’spresentforeignpolicyseemstoemphasizecooperationandstabilityinordertopromoteherownsecurity,developmentandwealth,herescalatingdemandforenergyresources–hencetheimportanceoftheSouthChinaSeawhichisrichinpetroleumreserveandmarineproduce–istodaynolongersolelyamatterofherowndomesticconcern,but is increasinglyacquiringnewdimensionsthathaveapowerfulinfluenceonherinternationalpolitico-


Foreword 553

economicrelations.Intermsofgeopolitics,theSpratlysalsooccupyahighlyimportantstrategicposition–thekeytothecontroloftheSouthChinaSeaandcriticalhubinChina’ssearoutetransportconnectionwithEastAsia,WestAsiaandtheIndianOcean.Asmore than70percentofChina’s importofpetroleumisthroughtheStraitofMalaccaandSouthChinaSea,thecontroloftheSpratlysisstrategicallyimportantforensuringasafesearoutepassageforChina

Thus inviewof the increasingworld attentiondrawn towardsChina’sforeignpolicy,militarybuild-upand international relations, inparticular intheEastandSoutheastAsian region themain flashpointsofwhich includethehigh-profiledisputesovertheownershipoftheislands,atolls,reefs,caysandisletsintheSouthChinaSeawhichbesidesholdingrichoceanresourcesin their surroundingwatersoccupyahighly important strategicposition intermsofgeopolitics,beingthekeytothecontroloftheregionalwatersandthecriticalhubinthesearoutetransportconnectionbetweenEastAsiaandSoutheastAsia,WestAsiaand the IndianOcean, theeditorialboardof theInternational Journal of China Studieshasdecidedtoputtogetheraselectedsetof relatedpaperssubmitted to the journal,after thedueprocessofpeerreviewing, toproduce this issueof IJCSwitha special focuson theSouthChina Sea disputes in particular and China’s foreign relations in general.WhileallthepapersinthisissueofIJCSfocusinvariouswaysontheimpactoftheriseofChinaontheregionalandglobalgeopoliticalconfigurationandinternationalrelationsamidsttherecentescalatingtensionintheSouthChinaSea,readerswillnotfailtonoticethediverseperspectivesexhibitedbythesedifferentpapersthatreflectwelltheconsistentapproachofthejournalwhichcontinuestocherishthenotionsofacademicfreedomandimpartiality.

Dr Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh楊國慶Editor

InternationalJournalofChinaStudiesDirector

Institute of China Studies, University of Malaya


554 Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh


China’s New Wave of Aggressive Assertiveness in the South China Sea 555InternationalJournalofChinaStudiesVol.2,No.3,December2011,pp.555-583

China’sNewWaveofAggressiveAssertivenessintheSouthChinaSea+

Carlyle A. Thayer*UniversityofNewSouthWales

Abstract

Duringthefirsthalfof2011ChinabegantoaggressivelyassertitssovereigntyclaimsintheSouthChinaSeabyinterferingwiththecommercialoperationsofPhilippineandVietnameseoilexplorationvesselsoperating in theirEx-clusiveEconomicZones.Chinaalsoundertooktodemonstrateitsjurisdictionby enforcing a unilateral fishing ban and by deploying civilian vessels indisputedwaters.ThisstudyexaminesthedriversbehindChineseassertivenessandhighlightstheimportanceofenergysecurityandsovereignty.Thearticleconsiders in detail the impact of Chinese assertiveness in the South ChinaSea on its bilateral relations with Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam,and the responses by these claimant states particularly in presentations tothe Shangri-La Dialogue.The article concludes by exploring the utility ofmultilateraldiplomaticeffortstowardsreducingtensionsthrougharegionalcodeofconduct.

Keywords: South China Sea, Chinese assertiveness, ASEAN, UNCLOS, code of conduct

JEL classification:F51, F52, F59, N45

1.Introduction

In2009and2010theSouthChinaSeaemergedasapotentialregionalhotspotasaresultofanincreaseinChineseassertivenessinpressingitssovereigntyclaims. During this period China imposed its annual unilateral fishing banwithunusualvigourtargetingVietnamesefishingcraftinparticular.1Vietnam,asChairmanoftheAssociationofSoutheastAsianNations(ASEAN),useditspositiontointernationalizethisissue.TheUnitedStatesrespondedtolobbyingbyVietnamandotherconcernedregionalstatesbyraisingtheSouthChinaSeaissueat theShangri-LaDialogueinSingaporeandat the17thASEAN


556 Carlyle A. Thayer

RegionalForummeetinginHanoi.TheSouthChinaSeaquicklyemergedasanotherirritantinSino-Americanrelations.

ByOctober2010,thetensionsthathadarisenearlierintheyearappearedtohaveabated.Chinaresumedmilitary-to-militarycontactswiththeUnitedStates suspended in response to arms sales toTaiwan. China andASEANrevived the moribund Joint Working Group to Implement the Declarationon Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). These and otherdevelopmentsledtheauthortoconcludethatthereweregroundsforcautiousoptimismthatsomeprogresscouldbemade inmanagingSouthChinaSeatensions.2This assessment appeared to beborne out by testimony inApril2011 given byAdmiral Robert Willard, Commander of the US PacificCommand,that thePeople’sLiberationArmyNavy(PLAN)hadadoptedalessaggressivestanceinthePacific.3

Eventsduringthefirsthalfof2011havewitnessedapatternofbehaviouronthepartofChinathathasnotbeenseenbeforeandthishascontributedtoariseinregionaltensions.Inparticular,Chinabegantoaggressivelyinterfereinthecommercialoperationsofoilexplorationvesselsconductingseismictest-inginwatersclaimedbythePhilippinesandVietnam.DiplomaticprotestsbybothstateswereroutinelydismissedbyChina.Thisarticleassessesdevelop-mentsaffectingthesecurityoftheSouthChinaSeainthefirsthalfof2011.

Followingthisintroduction,thisarticleisorganizedintosixparts.Section2providesbackgroundtorecentdevelopments.Sections3,4and5considerChina’s relationswithMalaysia, thePhilippinesandVietnam, respectively.Section6reviewsofficialstatementsmadebykeydefenceministersat theShangri-LaDialogue.Section7offerssomeconclusions.

2.Background

TherearetwomajordriversthatexplainChinesebehaviour:sovereigntyandhydrocarbonresources.

InMay2009ChinaprotestedsubmissionsbyMalaysiaandVietnamtotheUnitedNationsCommissiononLimitsofContinentalShelfbyofficiallysubmittingamapofChina’sclaims.ThismapcontainedninedashlinesinaU-shapecoveringanestimatedeightypercentormoreofthemaritimeareaoftheSouthChinaSea.HavingstakeditsclaimChinabegantodemonstratethatithadlegaljurisdictionovertheSouthChinaSea.ChinathereforechallengedanyandallassertionstothecontrarybythePhilippinesandVietnam.

RecentannouncementsofjointoilandgasexplorationbythePhilippinesandVietnamwereviewedinBeijingasachallengetoChina’stolerance.4Forexample, inFebruary2011,ForumEnergy,anAnglo-Canadianconsortiumbased in theUnitedKingdom,concludeda two-year surveyofoil andgasresourcesintheSouthChinaSea.PresidentBenignoAquinoIIIthenawarded


China’s New Wave of Aggressive Assertiveness in the South China Sea 557Figure1China’sOfficialNine-DashLineMap

Source:China’ssubmissiontotheUnitedNationsCommissionontheLimitsoftheContinentalShelf,7May2009.



HuÕ

Vinh

h µ n é iH¶i phßng

R1 ch gi¸

NhaTrang

LAOS

CAMBODIA

THAILAND

Thanh hãa

§ . Cån cá

§ . Phó quÝ

§ . Phó quèc

§ . Thæchu

§ . B1ch long vÜ

Cµmau

§ µn½ng

Qui nh¬n

Phan thiÕtTp. Hå ChÝMinh

Vòng tµuCÇn th¬

§ ¶o H¶i Nam

(Trung Quèc)

C«n ®¶o

C HINA

§ . Lý s¬n

Q. § . Hoµng sa§ . Hoµng sa

§ . Ling c«n

47/01

41

42

48/05

B&48/95

5052/97

VTMarea

46-CN46/02

46/07

PM3 CAA

45 38

37

43

44

51

34

35

36/03

39

40/02

32

26

27

31

33

§ BSCL-01

§ BSCL-02

§ BSCL-03

§ BSCL-04

102/10102-TB

103

106-HR

106/10

107/04

108/04

MVHN-02

MVHN-01KT

111/04

105-110/04

104-109/05

112

VBB2005

100-101/04MVHN

MVHN-02KT MVHN-03KT

22/03

11-2/09

12-CS

12/1012-D

20

21

28

29/03

15-1/0515-2/10

25

16-1/11

17

18

19

16-1-TG

15-2/01-HSD

09-109-209-2/09

09-2/10

15-1-ST

16-209-3-DM

10/11

10&11-1 GC

09-3/11

13/03

11-2-RD&RDT

03

04-104-2

04-3

114

113113/09

115

116 117

118

141

142

01-HN01/97-HXN

02/97-TL&DD

01/10

02/1015-2-RD

06-1

05-1-DH05-1/04

05-2/10

05-3/10

06/94

07/03

05 (HT&MT)

130

127

128

129

131

144

121

120

119

122

143

145

146

136/03

132

133

134

135

123

124

125

147

148

149

152

126 150

151

153

158

154

155

156

157

159

160

200

h¶i l

ý

200h¶i lý

125

126

148

149

k h u v ù c k h ¶ o s¸ t ®Þa c h Ên PK-10H×nh 1

C

M

Y

CM

MY

CY

CMY

K

Thayer-Viet-biendong-map-PP tai Page 1 9/2/2011 10:20:50 PM

Figure2Vietnam’sOilExplorationBlocks

Source:VietnamNationalOilandGasGroup(PetroVietnam).

Site of Binh Minh 02 incident148


China’s New Wave of Aggressive Assertiveness in the South China Sea 559

ForumEnergyanexplorationcontract toexploreforgas in theReedBankarea.5VietnamawardedServicesCorporationandCGGVeritasofFrancealicensetoconductseismicsurveysoffitscoast.6

According to Song Enlai, chairman of China National Offshore OilCorporation’s (CNOOC) board of supervisors, China looses about twentymillion tons of oil annually or about forty per cent of its total offshoreproductionduetotheactivitiesofcountriesintheSouthChinaSea.CNOOChasplanstoinvestUSthirty-onebilliondollarstodrilleighthundreddeep-waterwellsintheEastSea,YellowSeaandSouthChinaSeawiththeaimofproducingfivehundredmilliontonsofoilby2020.

On 7 March 2011, Chinese Foreign MinisterYang Jiechi stated thatChina’s foreign policy would serve the country’s economic development.China then warned against any oil exploration in waters it claimed in theSouth China Sea.7 In early May, China announced that it would step upmaritimepatrolsbyatleasttenpercentinthefaceofincreasingincursionsintoits territorialwaters.Chinesemediareportedthataroundonethousandrecruits would be added to China’s marine service to raise the total to10,000.8

ThatsamemonthChina launchedamegaoilandgas-drillingplatformtobeusedby theCNOOCin theSouthChinaSea.The rig freesChinaofdependence on foreign-owned contractors for deep-sea drilling. The rig iscapable of exploring waters up to 3,000 metres in depth, a capability thatneitherthePhilippinesnorVietnampossesses.9Chinesesourcesindicatedthatthe rigwouldbeginoperations in theSouthChinaSea inJulyand therebyenableChinatoestablishamajorpresenceinthearea.

On27May, thePhilippines’DepartmentofForeignAffairssummonedChinese officials to convey its concern about the planned location of themegarig.PhilippinesofficialsaskedtheChinesediplomatstheexactplannedlocationofthenewoilrigandstatedthatitshouldnotbeplacedinPhilippineterritoryorwaters.

3.China-Malaysia

InJune2009Malaysia’sPrimeMinisterDato’SriNajibTunRazakpaidastatevisittoChina.InApril2011,DeputyPrimeMinisterTanSriMuhyiddinYassinwent toChina topreparefor thereturnvisitofPremierWenJiabao(whowasalsoscheduledtovisitIndonesiaatthesametime).DeputyPrimeMinisterMuhyiddinmetwithVicePremierLiKeqiangon18April.Lireiter-atedChina’spositionthatdisputesintheSouthChinaSeashouldberesolvedonabilateralbasis.HepressedMuhyiddinforbilateraltalksontheSpratlyIslandsissue.MuhyiddinagreedandalsoofferedtorelayChina’srequestforbilateraltalkstootherASEANmembers,particularlytheclaimantstates.11



PriortoPremierWen’svisitthemediareportedthathewouldsignagree-mentsrelatedtotelecommunicationsandinfrastructureconstructionandthattheSpratly issueswouldnot figureprominently.China’sAssistantForeignMinisterHuZhengyouobserved,forexample,“TheSouthChinaSeaproblemisanoldone.Ithinkthatwhentheleadersofbothnationsmeettheywon’tdeliberatelytrytoavoidit,butaswebothunderstandeachother’sstance,thiswon’tbeamajorissue”.12

AfterhisreturntoMalaysiaMuhyiddinrevealedthatoverlappingclaimstotheSouthChinaSeawouldbediscussedbetweenPrimeMinisterDatukSeriNajibTunRazakandPremierWen.According toMuhyiddin,“Malaysia isoftheopinionthatdiscussionswithChinaontheissueofoverlappingclaimsshouldbecarriedoutafterofficialshavecomeupwithabasicframeworkontheclaimsbasedonfacts, lawandhistory”.Hefurtherstated,“WebelievenegotiationsamongtheASEANclaimantsareimportant.Buttherewillbeacasewheretheoverlappingclaimsinvolvethreecountries,sodiscussionswillhavetobemorethanbilateral”.13

Before setting out on his trip, Premier Wen gave an interview toMalaysianandIndonesianjournalists.Whenhewasasked,“whetherChinawouldhold talkson jointdevelopment in thesecontested islandsand reefswith Malaysia and other relevant countries that have cross claims withChina?”,PremierWenreplied:

ChinaremainscommittedtotheDeclarationonConductofthePartiesintheSouthChinaSea.Wetakethepositionthatterritorialdisputesovermaritimerights and interests should be peacefully addressed and resolved by thecountriesconcernedthroughbilateralchannels.

Wedisapproveofreferringbilateraldisputestomulti-lateralforumsbecausethatwillonlycomplicatetheissue.YouhaverightlymentionedthatalthoughChinaandMalaysiahavesomedisputesoverthementionedislandandreefsintheSouthChinaSea,thesedisputeshavenotimpededoureffortstohavepeacefulco-existencebetweenthetwocountries.

Secondly,ItotallyagreethatthecountriesconcernedcanandshouldhavejointdevelopmentofresourcesintheSouthChinaSeabecausethisisintheinterestofregionalpeace in theareaanditalsoserves the interestsofallclaimantcountries.14

PremierWenvisitedMalaysiafromApril27-28anddiscussionswithPrimeMinisterNajibmainlyfocusedoneconomicandeducationalissues.

4.China-Philippines

AccordingtothePhilippinesDepartmentofForeignAffairs,ChinaincreaseditspresenceandactivitiesintheSpratlyIslandsinthefourthquarterof2010.15



This increased presence led to six or seven major incursions into watersclaimedbythePhilippinesinthefirstfivemonthsof2011.16ThePhilippineshas not yet officially released the list but from statements by governmentofficialsthefollowinglistappearsindicative:

♦ Incident 1. On 25 February, three Philippines fishing vessels, F/V JaimeDLS, F/V Mama Lydia DLS and F/V Maricris 12, were operating inthewatersoffJacksonAtollonehundredandfortynauticalmileswestofPalawan.AccordingtoareportpreparedbytheArmedForcesofthePhilippines(AFP),thefishingvesselswereapproachedbyaJianghu-VClass missile frigate, Dongguan 560, which broadcast over its marineband radio, “This is Chinese Warship 560. You are in the Chineseterritory.Leavetheareaimmediately”.Thenthefrigaterepeatedlybroad-cast,“Iwillshootyou”.17Asthefishingvesselsbegantowithdraw,theChinese frigate fired three shots that landed 0.3 nautical miles (556meters) from F/V Maricris 12. The F/V Maricris 12 left the area butthenreturnedthreedayslatertorecoveritsanchorthatitcutinitshastydeparture. The F/V Maricris 12 spotted three Chinese fishing vesselsexploiting marine resources in the area. The Philippine governmentreportedly did not file a protest with the Chinese Embassy over thisincident.18TheChineseAmbassadortothePhilippines,LiuJianchaolaterdeniedthatanyChinesevesselhadfiredonFilipinofishermen.19

♦ Incident 2. On 2 March, two Chinese white-painted patrol boats, No. 71 andNo. 75, orderedMVVeritas Voyager, aForumEnergyPlc surveyvessel operating in the Reed Bank area off Palawan Island, to leaveand twicemanoeuvredclose inwhatappeareda threat to ram theMVVeritas Voyager.20ThesurveyshipwasFrench-ownedandregisteredinSingapore.

The Philippines responded by dispatching two OV-10 aircraft to in-vestigate. The Chinese boats departed without further incident. ForeignAffairsUndersecretaryErlindaBasiliolodgedaprotestwithChineseCharged’Affairs,BaiTian,on4March.Accordingtoonereportthenote“raisedfourpointstoprovethatReedBankisnotpartofthedisputedareabyprojectingeighty-fivenauticalmilesfromthebasepointinthenorthernpartofPalawanandnotfromtheKalayaanIslandGroup(KIG).ChinaquestionedthisduringameetingwiththePhilippines,butdidnotreplyinadiplomaticnote”.21

Aftertheincident,thePhilippinesannouncedatemporaryhalttoseismictestingandorderedthePhilippineNavyandPhilippinesCoastGuardtoescortthesurveyshipwhen testing resumed.22Later,PresidentAquino instructedthe Philippine Coast Guard to provide security for oil and gas explorationactivitiesintheKIG.23



On 5April, the Philippine Mission to the United Nations submitted aletter inresponsetoChina’sNotesVerbalesof7May2009(CML/17/2009andCML/18/2009) restating thePhilippines’claim to sovereigntyover theKalayaan Island Group, adjacent waters and geological features (relevantwaters, seabed and subsoil).24 China responded on 14April with a NoteVerbale to theUnitedNations thataccused thePhilippinesof invadingandoccupying“someislandsandreefsofChina’sNanshaIslands…TheRepublicofthePhilippines’occupationofsomeislandsandreefsofChina’sNanshaislandsaswellasotherrelatedactsconstitutesaninfringementuponChina’sterritorialsovereignty”.25TheChineseNoteVerbalealsoarguedthatonthebasis of domestic legislation “China’s Nansha Islands is fully entitled toTerritorialSea,EEZ[ExclusiveEconomicZone]andContinentalShelf”.26

♦ Incident 3. On 6 May, a Chinese marine vessel with a flat bed was sighted inAbadSantos(Bombay)Shoal.27

♦ Incident 4. On 19 May, the AFP claimed that two Chinese jet fighters allegedlyflewintoPhilippines’airspacenearPalawanon11May.ThisinitialreportwasneverconfirmedandappearstheleastsubstantiatedofthesixorsevenincidentsofreportedChineseincursions.28

♦ Incident 5. On 21 May, Chinese Marine Surveillance ship No. 75 and Salvage/ResearchShipNo.707wereobservedheadingtowardSouthernBank.29

♦ Incident 6. On 24 May, Filipino fishermen reportedly witnessed a China MaritimeSurveillancevesselandPeople’sLiberationArmyNavy(PLAN)ships unloading steel posts, building materials and a buoy near LikasandPatagislands,nearIroquoisReef-AmyDouglasBankonehundrednauticalmilesoffPalawan.30ThefishermenreportedtheirsightingtotheAFPthenextday.NavyHeadquartersinManilaorderedashiptoverifythesightingbutbadweatherdelayeditsarrivaluntil29MaybywhichtimetheChineseshipshaddeparted.Localfishermenremovedthesteelpollsandhandedthemovertoauthorities.

TheAFPreportedthisincidenton27May.FourdayslatertheDepartmentof ForeignAffairs summoned the Chinese Charge d’Affaires to seek aclarification of the incident. On 1 June the Philippines conveyed “seriousconcerns”inaNoteVerbaletotheChineseEmbassy.Thenotestated,“Theseshipsreportedlyunloadedbuildingmaterials,erectedanundeterminednumberof posts, andplaced a buoynear thebreaker of the IroquoisBank”.31TheChineseEmbassy responded,“The reported ‘incursionofChinese ships’ isnottrue…It’sonlyChina’smarineresearchshipconductingnormalmaritimeresearchactivitiesintheSouthChinaSea”.32SpeakingonaTVforumthatsameday,DefenseSecretaryVoltaireGazminobserved,“It’salarminginthesensethattheintrusionsareincreasing.Theyarestakingclaimontheareas



wherewedonothaveapresence.Theywanttohoisttheirflagsotheycanclaimthearea”.33ForeignAffairsSecretaryAlbertdelRosariochargedthat“anynewconstructionbyChina in thevicinityof theuninhabitedIroquoisBankisaclearviolationofthe2002AssociationofSoutheastAsianNations(ASEAN)-ChinaDeclarationontheConductofParties(DOC)intheSouthChinaSea”.34

During2011,PresidentAquinolobbiedhisASEANcolleaguestouniteasabloconadetailedcodeofconductandproposedthataunifiedpositionontheSouthChinaSeadisputeamongtheASEANclaimantstateswasthebestwaytoapproachChina.

On8March,PresidentAquinopaidanofficialvisittoIndonesiawherehemetwithPresidentBambangSusiloYudhoyono.Atajointpressconferenceafter their talks, PresidentAquino expressed his support for Indonesia’sleadership role asASEAN Chair. PresidentYudhoyono said Indonesia asASEAN Chair would bring the Spratly Islands issue to the forthcomingASEANSummitandEastAsiaSummit.PresidentYudhoyonoexpressedhishopethattheSouthChinaSeacouldbecomea“zoneofpossibleeconomiccooperation”. PresidentAquino replied, “With regard to joint exploration[in thearea], that isanideathathasbeenproposedafewdecadespastbutperhapsweshouldcontinuethetalkswithotherclaimantcountries.Thereisnoroomforunilateralactioninthatparticularregion”.35

On1June,PresidentAquinopaidanofficialvisittoBruneiDarussalamfor discussions with Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah.According to PresidentialCommunicationsOperationsSecretaryHerminioColomaJr.,thetwoleadersexpressed their desire to maintain peace and stability in the South ChinaSea throughamultilateraldialogueamong theASEANcountries,claimantcountries andChina.Clomaquoted theSultan as stating “it’s best to havegoodrelationswithChina”.36

PresidentAquino told the reporters covering his visit: “We governourselvesthere[SpratlyIslands/KIG].InsteadofonecountryhasabilateralagreementwithChinaandtheotherhasadifferentbilateralagreementwithChina.Let’scometogetherasabody.Whydowehavetofightorincreaseallofthesetensionswhenitprofitsnobody?”37Aquinoalsorenewedhiscallfortheimmediateadoptionof theimplementingguidelinesontheDOC.38Thefollowingday,12June,EduardoMalaya,aspokespersonfortheDepartmentofForeignAffairs, called for a “morebindingCodeofConduct ofPartiesin the South China Sea” in response to Chinese intrusions into Philippinewaters.

During his state visit to Brunei PresidentAquino revealed that thePhilippines was preparing to file a complaint to the United Nations inresponse toChinese intrusions into its territory.According toAquino,“WearecompletingthedataonaboutsixtoseveninstancessinceFebruary.We



willpresentitto[China]andthenbringthesetotheappropriatebody,whichnormallyistheUnitedNations”.39TheAquinoAdministrationissupportingtwolegislativemeasuresinresponsetoChina’sassertivenessintheSpratlyIslands.TheHouseofRepresentativeisdrawingupthePhilippineMaritimeZonesbill todelineate thePhilippines’maritimezones,while theSenate isconsideringtheArchipelagicSeaLanesbill.40

On 28 March, General Eduardo Oban, chief of theArmed Forces ofthePhilippines,announcedthat thePhilippineshadincreasedairandnavalpatrolsintheSouthChinaSeaandhadplanstoupgradeRancudoAirFieldonPag-Asa(Thitu)islandandrepairbarracks.41TheAFPwasallocatedUSonehundredandeighty-threemilliondollarsinfundsfromtheCapabilityUpgradeProgram to purchase two offshore fast patrol boats, long-range maritimeaircraft, surveillance and communication equipment including air defenceradartobetterprotectitsterritory.42PresidentAquinohadearlierreleasedUStwohundredandfifty-fivemilliondollarstothearmedforces.

ThePhilippines recently acquired theUSCoastGuardCutterUSCGCHamilton, which is expected to enter service during 2011 and then com-mencepatrollingdisputedwatersintheSouthChinaSea.43ThePhilippinesalso expects to take delivery of three new Taiwan-manufactured Multi-PurposeAttack Craft in 2012.44 In May, a Philippine navy study recom-mendedtheacquisitionofsubmarinesasa“deterrentagainstfuturepotentialconflicts”.45

The Philippines defence and military agencies are drawing up a newdefence strategy in response todevelopments in theSouthChinaSea.Thenewstrategywould focusonboth internalsecurityoperationsandexternalterritorialdefence.AFPchiefGeneralObansaidthemilitarywasplanningtosetupacoastwatchsystemonthewesternseaboardinthenexttwotothreeyears to monitor and secure maritime borders and natural resources.46 InJune,itwasreportedthatthePhilippinesEmbassyinWashingtonwasinthemarketforexcessdefenceequipmentfromtheUSunderitsForeignMilitarySales(FMS)programmeincludingoneormorepatrolships.47ThePhilippinesalsoannouncedanewUStrainingprogrammeforitsnavalforcestoenablethemtobettercarryouttheirmissionofprovidingsecurityforoilexplorationactivitiesintheSouthChinaSea.48

On14May,PresidentAquinoandseveralmembersofhisCabinetflewouttotheUSSCarl VinsonaircraftcarrierintheSouthChinaSeaasitheadedtowards the Philippines.The aircraft carrier made a “routine port call andgoodwillvisit”accompaniedbytheUSSBunker Hill,USSShilohandUSSGridley.49Infact,thevisitbythecarrierwasareaffirmationofthealliancerelationship on the eve of an official visit by China’s Defence MinisterGeneralLiangGuanglie.LiangpaidanofficialvisittothePhilippinesfrom21-25May fordiscussionswithhis counterpartDefenseSecretaryVoltaire



Gazmin.ThetwoministersagreedtoholdregulardiscussionstopromotetrustandconfidenceandfindcommongroundonterritorialdisputesintheSpratlyIslands.Ajointstatementdeclared,“bothministersexpressedhopethattheimplementingguidelinesofthe2002DeclarationofConductwouldsoonbefinalizedandagreedupon,thatresponsiblebehaviorofallpartiesintheSouthChinaSeaissuewouldhelpkeeptheareastablewhileallpartiesworkforthepeacefulresolution…Bothministersrecognizedthatunilateralactionswhichcouldcausealarmshouldbeavoided”.50

WhenDefenceMinisterLiangmetwithPresidentAquinoSouthChinaSea issueswerediscussed ingeneral, but the latter refrained fromdirectlymentioning the Reed Bank incident and the reported intrusion of ChineseaircraftintoPhilippineairspace.51PresidentAquinoalsotoldGeneralLiangthatmoremaritimeincidentsindisputedareasoftheSouthChinaSeacouldspark a regional arms race.52 Immediately after the defence ministers metSunYi,DeputyChiefofPoliticalSectionattheChineseEmbassyinManila,announcedthatChinalookedforwardtoan“accelerateddialogue”withthePhilippines to resolve the dispute in the South China Sea. “It’s a bilateralissue.Werepeatedlysaid thatandwebelieveit’sabilateral issue,”SunYistated.53

On4June,theDepartmentofForeignAffairsissuedastatementrevealingithadlodgedaprotestwiththeChineseEmbassytwodaysearlieroverthe“increasingpresenceandactivitiesofChinesevesselsincludingnavalassetsin the West Philippines Sea (South China Sea)”. The note stated, “TheseactionsofChinesevesselshamperthenormalandlegitimatefishingactivitiesoftheFilipinofishermenintheareaandunderminesthepeaceandstabilityoftheregion”.54

China responded on 7 June with a statement by Foreign Ministryspokesperson, Hong Lei: “Chinese vessels were cruising and carrying outscientificstudiesinwatersunderChina’sjurisdictionandtheiractivitieswereinlinewiththelaw…ChinaasksthePhilippinesidetostopharmingChina’ssovereigntyandmaritimerightsandinterests,whichleadstounilateralactionsthatexpandandcomplicateSouthChinaSeadisputes.ThePhilippinesshouldstoppublishingirresponsiblestatementsthatdonotmatchthefacts”.55

Liu Jianchao, ChineseAmbassador to the Philippines, responded tocomplaintsbythePhilippinesgovernmentforthefirsttimewhenhemetwithreportersinManilaon9June.TheambassadorstatedthatChinahadnotyetstartedtodrillforoilintheSpratlyIslands.“We’recallingonotherpartiestostopsearchingforthepossibilityofexploitingresourcesintheseareaswhereChinahasitsclaims”.56InresponsetoaquestionhowChinawouldreactifcountrieswentaheadandcontinuedtoexplorewithoutBeijing’spermission,theambassadorsaidChinawouldusediplomaticmeanstoassert itsrights.”Wewillneveruseforceunlessweareattacked,”hesaid.Liangalsocon-



firmed to reporters thatChinese forces tookaction tokeep theexplorationvesselfromReedBank.“That’spartofourexerciseofjurisdiction.It’snotharassment,”heclaimed.57

In response to Chinese assertiveness, PresidentAquino launched anewinitiativecallingfor theSouthChinaSea tobecomeaZoneofPeace,Freedom, Friendship and Cooperation (ZOPFF/C). Aquino explained“whatisourisours,andwithwhat isdisputed,wecanworktowardsjointcooperation”.58HedirectedtheDepartmentofForeignAffairstopromotetheZOPFF/Cconceptthroughsustainedconsultationsanddialogue.

AccordingtotheDepartmentofForeignAffairs,theZOPFF/Cprovidesa framework for separating the disputed territorial features that may beconsideredforcollaborativeactivitiesfromnon-disputedwatersintheWestPhilippinesSea (SouthChinaSea) in accordancewith international law ingeneralandUNCLOSinparticular.59AdisputedareacouldbeturnedintoaJointCooperationAreaforjointdevelopmentandtheestablishmentofmarineprotected area for biodiversity conservation.Areas not in dispute, such asReedBankthat liesonthePhilippines’continentalshelf,canbedevelopedexclusively by the Philippines or with the assistance of foreign investorsinvitedtoparticipateinitsdevelopment.

5.China-Vietnam

In December 2008, China and Vietnam agreed to commence bilateraldiscussionsonmaritimeissueswithfirstprioritygiventodevelopingasetof“fundamentalguidingprinciples”asaframeworkforsettlingspecificissues.Theseconfidentialdiscussionsbeganinearly2010andfivesessionswereheldduringtheyear.AccordingtoVietnameseForeignMinistrysources,VietnamandChina agreed to settle their differences “throughpeacefulnegotiation”and“refrainfromanyactiontocomplicatethesituation,violenceorthreatofuseofviolence”.60

Significantly, Vietnam and China agreed to bilateral discussions onmatters thatdidnotaffect thirdparties, suchas thewatersat themouthoftheGulfofTonkin.VietnamwantedtoincludetheParacelIslandsinbilateraldiscussionbutChinarefused.VietnamandChinaalsodifferedonthequestionofmultilateralnegotiations.AccordingtoVietnam:

IssuesthatarerelatedtoothercountriesandpartiesliketheSpratlyIslandscannotbe settledbyVietnamandChina; they require theparticipationofother concerned parties. For issues that are not only related to countriesthatbordertheEastSeasuchasmaritimesafetyandsecurity,theymustbenegotiatedandsettledbyallcountriesthatsharethiscommoninterest.61

ChinaandVietnamheldtwofurtherworking-levelroundsofdiscussions.AttheseventhandmostrecentroundonAugust1,aVietnamesespokesperson



notedthat“thetwosidesreachedpreliminaryconsensusonsomeprinciples”andthattheeighthroundofdiscussionwouldbeheldlaterintheyear.62

During the eight months of 2011, China and Vietnam exchanged fivehigh-level visits. In February 2011, immediately after Eleventh NationalCongress of the Vietnam Communist Party, the new Secretary General,NguyenPhuTrong,dispatchedaspecialenvoy,HoangBinhQuan,toBeijing.Quan met with Hu Jintao, President and General Secretary of the ChineseCommunistParty,andbriefedhimontheoutcomeofthepartycongress.QuanalsoextendedaninvitationtoHuandotherChinesepartyandstateleaderstovisitVietnam.Inreturn,HuextendedaninvitationtoSecretaryGeneralTrongtovisitChina.63IndeferencetoChina,TrongwillvisitBeijingfirst.

InApril, Senior Lieutenant General Guo Boxiong, vice chairman ofChina’s Central Military Commission, visited Hanoi at the invitation ofGeneralPhungQuangThanh,MinisterofNationalDefence.Lt.Gen.GuowasalsoreceivedbyPrimeMinisterNguyenTanDungandpartySecretaryGeneralNguyenPhuTrong.PrimeMinisterDung“proposed the twosidestalk and seek fundamental and long-lasting measures that both sides areabletoacceptfortheEastSea[SouthChinaSea]issue…”64ThejointpresscommuniquéissuedaftertheconclusionofGuo’svisitoutlinedanumberofcooperativemilitaryactivities,includingincreasingthescopeofjointnavalpatrolsintheGulfofTonkin,butnomentionwasmadeoftheSouthChinaSea.65

ImmediatelyafterGeneralGuo’svisit,VietnamhostedameetingoftheheadsofthegovernmentdelegationsonboundarynegotiationsbetweenChinaandVietnam(18-19April).Thesediscussionswereheldatdeputyministerlevel.China’sForeignMinistryreportedthatthetwoviceministerspledged,“to properly handle maritime disputes through friendly consultations andexploresolutionswithapositiveandconstructiveattitude”.66AVietnamesespokespersonrevealedthat“thetwosidesagreedtheywillsignanagreementonthefundamentalguidelinestosettlethemaritimeissues”butnegotiationsarestillcontinuingandnodatehasbeensettosigntheagreement.67

The fourth high-level meeting took place in Singapore in June on thesidelines of the Shangri-la Dialogue and involved the two defence minis-ters, Liang Guanglie and Phung Quang Thanh. This meeting took placeunder the shadow of the 26 May cable-cutting incident. Minister Thanhexpressed the concernofVietnameseparty and state leaders overwhat hetermed a “pressing incident” and then offered the conciliatory commentthat“Sometime,regrettablecaseshappenwhicharebeyondtheexpectationof both sides”.68 Minister Liang replied that China did not want a similarincident to occur in the future. He noted in particular that the People’sLiberationArmywasnotinvolvedintheincident.Fourdayslaterasecondcable-cuttingincidentoccurred.



InJune,VietnamdispatchedasecondspecialenvoytoBeijing,DeputyMinister of ForeignAffairs Ho Xuan Son who met with his counterpart,ZhangZjijun.AjointpressreleaseissuedattheconclusionoftheirtalksonJune25stated,interalia,thetwosides“laidstressontheneedtosteerpublicopinionalongthecorrectdirection,avoidingcommentsanddeedsthatharmfriendshipandtrust…”69

On11May,theHaikouMunicipalGovernment,Hainanprovince,issuedanannouncementimposingChina’sannualunilateralfishingbanintheSouthChinaSeafrom16May–1Augustostensiblytoprotectdwindlingfishstocksduring the spawning season.Vietnam immediately issued a verbal protest:“China’sunilateralexecutionofafishingbanintheEastSeaisaviolationofVietnam’ssovereigntyover theHoangSa [Paracel]archipelago,aswellas the country’s sovereignty and jurisdiction over its exclusive economiczoneandcontinentalshelf…”70VietnamalsoprotestedthedeploymentofaChineseFisheryAdministrationVessel,Leizhou44261,topatrolinthewatersaroundtheParacelIslandsfrom5-25May.Vietnamaccusedthepatrolboatof“causingdifficultiesfornormalfishingactivitiesconducedbyVietnamesefishermenintheirtraditionalfishinggroundandmakingthesituationatseamorecomplicated”.71

VietnameselocalauthoritiesreportedthearrivalofChinesefishingboatsinVietnamesewaters ingreaternumbers that in thepast.TheheadofPhuYen Province Border Guard Headquarters stated that, “every day betweenone hundred and twenty and one hundred and fifty fishing boats of ChinawereoperatedwithinwatersfromDaNangCitytotheTruongSa[Spratly]Archipelago…PreviouslyChinesefishingboatshaveviolatedourwaters,butthiswasthefirsttimethereweresomanyboats”.72Thenumbersreportedlyrosetotwohundredonsomeoccasions.VietnamesefishermenformedfishingteamsoffivetotenboatsforprotectionbecauseofintimidationfromlargerChinesecraftthatsometimesusedweaponstothreatenthem.TheVietnamesegovernmentiscurrentlyconsideringaproposalbytheMinistryofAgricultureand Rural Development to build ten fishery patrol boats at a total costestimatedatUSonehundredandtwomilliondollars.

AlthoughVietnamesefishermenvowedtodefythebantheVietnamesepresshasnotreportedanymajorincidentsofharassmentordetention.73On1June,however,itwasreportedthatChinesemilitaryvesselsthreatenedtousetheirgunsagainstaVietnamesefishingboatoperatinginwatersneartheSpratly archipelago.74A more serious incident took place on July 5 whenarmed Chinese naval troops reportedly beat the skipper of a Vietnamesefishingboat,threatenedthecrew,andthenforcedtheboattoleavecontestedwatersneartheParacalIslands.75

On26May,threeChinaMaritimeSurveillanceshipsaccostedtheBinh Minh 02, aVietnamese seismic survey ship operating in Block 148, in an



incidentthatlastedthreehours.ChinaMaritimeSurveillanceshipNo.84cutacabletowingseismicmonitoringequipment.76ThenextdayVietnamlodgedadiplomaticprotestwithChina’sAmbassadorclaimingthattheactionsoftheChinaMaritimeSurveillanceshipsviolatedinternationallawandVietnam’ssovereignty.77 Vietnam also sought compensation for the damage caused.TheBinh Minh 02returnedtoportforrepairsandresumeditsoilexplorationactivitiesaccompaniedbyanescortofeightships.78

Somenewsmedia erroneously reported that thiswas the first instanceinwhichtheChinesehadcutthecableofaVietnameseexplorationvessel.AccordingtoDoVanHau,aseniorPetroVietnamofficial,“Whenweconductseismicsurveyanddrillingoperations,the[China]haveaeroplanesflyingovertosurveyouractivities,theyharassuswiththeirvessels,andinextremecasestheycutour[exploration]cables”.79TheVietnamesepressreportedthatwhenVietnameseconducedcontinentalshelfsurveysin2008,“ChinesevesselsalsocutVietnameseships’surveycables…andfurtherobstructedVietNamfromconductingoilandgasexplorationintheEastSea…”80

China responded to Vietnam’s protest on 28 May with the followingstatement:“WhatrelevantChinesedepartmentsdidwascompletelynormalmarinelaw-enforcementandsurveillanceactivitiesinChina’sjurisdictionalarea”.81 Vietnam retorted on 29 May, “the area where Vietnam conductedexploration activities situates entirely in the exclusive economic zone andthe two hundred nautical mile continental shelf of Vietnam in accordancewiththe1982UnitedNationsConventiononLawoftheSea.Itisneitheradisputedareanor is it anarea ‘managedbyChina.’Chinahasdeliberatelymisledthepublicintothinkingthatitisadisputedarea”.82Chinarespondedin kind: “the law enforcement activities by Chinese maritime surveillanceshipsagainstVietnam’sillegallyoperatingshipsarecompletelyjustified.WeurgeVietnam to immediately stop infringement activities and refrain fromcreatingnewtroubles”.83

On9June,accordingtoVietnam’sMinistryofForeignAffairs,asecond“premeditated and carefully calculated” incident occurred when Chinesefishing boat No. 62226 equipped with a “cable cutting device” snared thecableoftheViking IIseismicsurveyshipoperatinginsurveyBlock136-03inthevicinityofVanguardBank(TuChinh).84Viking IIisregisteredinNorwayandwasoperatingundercharterwithPetroVietnam.85TwoChinaMaritimeSurveillanceshipsandotherChinesefishingcraftcametoassistthedistressedfishingboat.AccordingtoNguyenPhuongNga,theofficialForeignMinistryspokesperson,“China’ssystematicactswereaimedatturninganundisputedregionintooneofdispute,tocarryoutitsambitiontomakeChina’snine-dashlineclaimareality”.86

EarliertheViking IIhadbeeninvolvedinseparateincidentson29Mayand 31 May in which Chinese boats – the Fei Sheng No. 16 and Vessel



No. B12549 – attempted to approach its rear deck and interfere with itsoperations. Security escorts with the Viking II successfully blocked theirapproaches.87

Chinese authorities claimed that the Viking II incident occurred whenarmed Vietnamese ships chased Chinese fishing boats from the Wan-an(Vanguard)Bank.OneoftheChineseboatsbecameentangledinthecableoftheViking IIshipoperatinginthesamearea.TheChineseboatwasdraggedformorethananhourbeforetheentanglednetcouldbecut.AccordingtotheChineseForeignMinistryspokesperson,HongLei,“TheVietnameseshipputthelivesandsafetyoftheChinesefishermeninseriousdanger”.VietnameseForeign Ministry officials lodged a protest with Chinese Embassy on theafternoonoftheincidentandannouncedthat theVietnamNationalOilandGasGroupwouldbeseekingcompensationfordamages.88

On 9 June, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung responded to growingdomestic pressure by making an unusually strong statement in defence ofnational sovereignty. Dung said: “We continue to affirm strongly and tomanifestthestrongestdeterminationofalltheParty,ofallthepeopleandofall thearmyinprotectingVietnamesesovereigntyinmaritimezonesofthecountry”. Dung also reaffirmed “the incontestable maritime sovereignty ofVietnam towards the twoarchipelagos, theParacelandSpratlys”.89On thesame day, President Nguyen Minh Triet, visiting Co To island off QuangNinhprovincenear theChinaborder,stated thatVietnamwas“determinedtoprotect”itsislandsand“wearereadytosacrificeeverythingtoprotectourhomeland,ourseaandislandsovereignty”.90

On 9 June, after the ChineseAmbassador to the Philippines calledon Vietnam and the Philippines to cease oil exploration and after Chinaannounced it would be conducting routine naval exercises in the WesternPacific,91 Vietnam raised the stakes by announcing a live-fire exercise.Vietnam’sNorthernMaritimeSafetyCorporationissuedanoticethattwolivefiringexerciseswouldbeheldon13JuneinthewatersnearHonOngIsland.Theexerciseswouldlastforatotalofninehoursandbeconductedduringtheperiodeightam-noonandsevenpm-midnightlocaltime.Thenoticefurtherdeclared,“Allvesselsare to refrain fromengaging inactivities in theareaduringthelive-fireperiod”.92HonOngIslandislocatedapproximatelyfortykilometresoffQuangNamprovinceincentralVietnam.

Vietnam’sForeignMinistrycharacterizedthelive-firingexercisesas“aroutine annual training activity of theVietnam navy in the area where theVietnamnavyregularlyconductstraining[activities]thatareprogrammedandplannedannuallyforunitsoftheVietnamPeople’sNavy”.93Vietnamdidnotspecifyhowmanyshipswouldbeinvolved.Thefirstphaseoftheexerciseinvolved coastal artillery while the second part of the exercise involvedmissilecorvettesfiringtheirdeckgun.



On11June,theGlobal Times,anEnglish-languagenewspaperpublishedby theChineseCommunistParty,editorialized thatVietnam’sconductofalive-firingexerciseswasthe“lowestformofnationalismtocreateanewen-mitybetweenthepeopleofthetwocountries.Hanoiseemstobelookingtodissipatedomesticpressureandbuckupmoraleathome,whileatthesametimefurtherdrawing in theconcernof internationalsocietyover theSouthChina Sea dispute”.94The editorial stated that China has “never sought topoliticallyblackmailsmallercountries.ButwhenasmallcountryturnsthataroundandtriestoblackmailChina,theChinesepeoplewillontheonehandfeelratherangry,whileontheotherhandfinditquiteamusing”.Inconclu-sion,theeditorialopined“IfVietnaminsistsonmakingtrouble,thinkingthatthemoretroubleitmakes,themorebenefitsitgains,thenwetrulywishtoremindthoseinVietnamwhodeterminepolicytopleasereadyourhistory”.

China’s new wave of aggressive assertiveness provoked a patrioticresponseamongstudentsandawidersectionoftheVietnamesecommunity.Using Facebook and other social networking site they mounted elevenanti-China demonstrations in Hanoi commencing Sunday 5 June when anestimated three hundred Vietnamese gathered near the Chinese Embassy,Onthesamedayacrowdestimated“atnearly1,000”to“severalthousand”gathered inHoChiMinhCity.95On the followingweekend, 12 June, twohundred demonstrators took to the streets of Hanoi while another threehundredmarchedinHoChiMinhCityinarepeatofthepreviousweekend’sprotests.96The protestors held placards reading “Down with China,” “TheSpratlys and Paracels belong to Vietnam” and “Stop Violating Vietnam’sTerritory”. Police intervention prevented a third demonstration from beingheldinHoChiMinhCitywhilepeacefuldemonstrationscontinuedinHanoiontheweekendsof19and26June.OnthefollowingtwoweekendsthepoliceintervenedandbrokeupthedemonstrationsbydetainingprotestersnodoubtfollowinggovernmentinstructionstofulfilVietnam’scommitmenttoChina“to steer public opinion”. No demonstrations occurred on Sunday 31 July.Despitepolice intervention theanti-Chinaprotests continued thereafterbutwithreducednumbers.On18AugusttheHanoiPeople’sCommitteeissuedadirectiveorderingahalttopublicdemonstrations,whenacrowdofnearlyfiftyprotestersdefiedthisbanonthefollowingweekend,thepoliceintervenedonceagainanddetainedfifteenactivists.97

During early June, growing enmity between nationalists in China andVietnam spilled over into cyberspace.According to Nguyen Minh Duc,director of the Bach Khoa Internetwork Security Centre, more than twohundredVietnamesewebsitesweresubjecttocyberattacks.AmongthesitesaffectedwerethoseoftheministriesofAgricultureandRuralDevelopmentandForeignAffairswherehackers succeeded inpostingChinese flagsandslogans.98



6.Shangri-LaDialogue

ManyofthemajorincidentsintheSouthChinaSeainthefirsthalfof2011occurred prior to the annual meeting of the Shangri-La Dialogue held inSingaporefrom3-5June.DefenceMinistersraisedSouthChinaSeaterritorialdisputes in all plenary sessions at the dialogue. Malaysia’s Prime MinisterDato’SriNajibTunRazak,whogavetheopeningkeynoteaddress,offeredtheupbeatassessmentthat“ASEANandChinawillsoonbeabletoagreeonamorebindingcodeofconducttoreplacethe2002DeclarationonConductintheSouthChinaSea”andthat“overlappingclaimsintheSouthChinaSea…have generally been managed with remarkable restraint”. He then offeredthisinsightintoMalaysia’spolicy:“IremainfullycommittedtothecommonASEANpositionintermsofourengagementwithChinaontheSouthChinaSea, I am equally determined to ensure our bilateral relationship remainsunaffectedand,infact,continuestogofromstrengthtostrength”.99

USSecretaryofDefenseRobertGates,whilenotmentioningtheSouthChina Sea specifically, stated the well-known position that the US had a“nationalinterestinfreedomofnavigation…”Healsostressedtheimportanceof customary international law as a guide for “the appropriate use of themaritime domain, and rights of access to it”.100 China’s Defence Ministerputonrecordhiscountry’scommitment“tomaintainingpeaceandstabilityinSouthChinaSea”.Henotedthat,“atpresent,thegeneralsituationintheSouthChinaSearemainsstable”.101

Incontrast,Vietnam’sDefenceMinisterspokeindetailabout thelegalbasisforactivitiesatsea“tofacilitatecooperationfordevelopmentanddeteractionsthatriskourcommoninterests,regionallyandnationally”.MinisterThanh specifically raised theBinh Minh 02 cable-cutting incident that hadraised “considerable concern on the maintenance of peace and stability intheEastSea”.Heendedhisremarksonthisincidentwiththesewords:“Wetrulyexpectnorepetitionofsimilar incidents”.102Fourdays laterasecondcable-cuttingincidentoccurreddespiteGeneralLiang’sprivateremarkscitedabove.

The Philippine Secretary of National Defence, Voltaire Gazmin, re-portedlywatereddowncommentson theSouthChinaSea inhisdraft textbeforedelivery.103Hisaddressbeganbydeclaringthat,“maritimesecurityisoneofourforemostconcerns”.Inanobviousreferencetothe2MarchReedBank incident Gazmin stated that the actions by other states “make… thePhilippinesworryandconcerned.Theseactionsnecessarilycreateinsecuritynotonly to thegovernmentbutmoredisturbingly toordinarycitizenswhodepend on the maritime environment for their livelihood”. He then gavedetails of recent incidents involving Chinese vessels without mentioningChinabyname.104



Malaysia’s Defence Minister Datuk Seri DrAhmad Zahid Hamididrewattention todisputes in theSouthChinaSea–geopolitics,SeaLinesofCommunication, securityandcompetitionoverpetroleumresources.Hearguedthatthe2002DOCneededtobe“supportedbyactualactivitiesthatcanpromoteconfidencebuildingamong the claimants” and suggested that“claimant countries in the South China Sea work towards identifying andrealizingactualconfidence-building(CBM)activitiesthatwouldhelpalleviatesomeofthetensioninthearea”.105

7.Conclusion

China’saggressiveassertionofsovereigntyovertheSouthChinaSeainthefirst half of 2001 has raised the security stakes for SoutheastAsian statesandallmaritimepowersthatsailthroughthesewaters.EnsuringthesecurityoftheSouthChinaSeaisnowaninternationalissuethatmustbeaddressedmultilaterallybyallconcernedstates.

Three major incidents mark the new wave of Chinese aggressiveassertiveness. On 2 March Chinese patrol boats operating within thePhilippine’sKalayaanIslandGroupapproachedaPhilippineseismicsurveyship inwatersoffReedBankandordered it to leavethearea.On26May,threeChinaMaritimeSurveillanceshipsaccostedaVietnamesestate-ownedoil explorationvesseldeepwithinVietnam’sdeclaredExclusiveEconomicZone (EEZ). The vessel was ordered to leave the area after a Chineseshipdeliberately cut its submerged surveycable.Andon9 June, a secondVietnameseexplorationvesselwasaccostedbyChineseboatsleadingtoanallegedsecondcable-cuttingincident.

In May 2009, when Malaysia andVietnam filed a joint submission totheUnitedNationsCommissionon theLimitsofContinentalShelf,Chinalodged a protest accompanied by a map.The Chinese map contained ninedashmarksinaroughU-shapecoveringvirtuallyalloftheSouthChinaSea.Chinaclaims“indisputablesovereignty”overtheSouthChinaSea.Yetithasnevermadeclearthebasisofthisclaimdespitetwodecadesofentreatiesbyregional states. It is unclear what it is that China is claiming. Does Chinaclaimsovereigntyoveralltherocksandfeatureswithinthesedashmarks?OrisChinaclaimingtheSouthChinaSeaasitsterritorialwaters?

Somemaritimespecialistsspeculate thatChina’sclaimisbasedon theninerocksitoccupiesintheSpratlyarchipelago.Inotherwords,Chinaclaimsthat therocksare infact islands in international lawand thusattracta twohundrednauticalmile(threehundredandseventykilometers)EEZ.This isalegalfiction.Islandsmustbeabletosustainhumanhabitationandhaveaneconomicfunction.Rocks,whichdonotmeetthesecriteria,cannotclaimanEEZorcontinentalshelf.



China’sdashmarkscutintotheEEZsthathavebeendeclaredbyVietnamandthePhilippinesTheseEEZsarebasedfirmlyininternationallaw.Bothstateshavedrawnstraightbaselinesaroundtheircoastsandthenextendedtheirclaimfromthesebaselinesseawardouttotwohundrednauticalmiles.UndertheUnitedNationsConventiononLawoftheSealittoralstateshavesovereigntyover thesewaters in termsof exploitationof natural resourcessuchasfisheriesandoilandgasdepositsontheoceanfloor.

In November 2002, China and ASEAN reached agreement on aDeclarationonConductofPartiesintheSouthChinaSea.Thiswasanon-bindingdocumentinwhichthesignatoriespledgednottouseforcetosettletheir sovereignty disputes. The DOC, which contains numerous proposedconfidence-buildingmeasures,hasneverbeenimplemented.

Chinese assertiveness in pushing its sovereignty claims in the SouthChina Sea in 2009 and 2010 provoked an international backlash. SouthChina Sea disputes featured prominently at theASEAN Regional ForumandattheinauguralASEANDefenseMinistersMeetingPlusin2010.Chinawas outmanoeuvred diplomatically and sought to limit further damage byagreeing to revive the heretofore-moribundASEAN-China Joint WorkingGroup to Implement the Declaration on Conduct of Parties. This workinggrouphadbeenstalledoverChina’sinsistencethatterritorialandsovereigntyclaimscouldonlybesettledbilaterallyby thestatesconcerned.ChinaalsoobjectedtoaclauseinthedraftguidelinestoimplementtheDOC,drawnupbyASEAN,thatmentionedASEANmemberswouldgatherfirsttoworkouta commonpositionbeforemeetingwithChina. In July2011,ASEANandChina finally reached agreement on the guidelines to implement the DOCafterASEANquietlydroppedtheoffendingclause.106

According to an assessment by a veteran commentator: “Hard-headedstrategistsinSoutheastAsiaknowthatadoptingtheimplementingguidelinesishardlyaconstraintonChina’sincreasinglyaggressivebehaviorintheSouthChinaSea.TherealrestraintonChinaisthepresenceoftheU.S.NavyandtheneedtohavestableU.S.-Chinarelations.”107

ASEAN,underthechairmanshipofIndonesia,hasbeenpushingChinatoupgrade theDOCintoamorebindingCodeofConduct.Someregionaldiplomats are hopeful that an agreement can be reached by the tenthanniversaryoftheDOCinNovember2012.ThisisunlikelytobeachievedunlessASEANmaintainsitsunityandcohesionandadoptsacommonstance.Itisclearthereare“nervousNellies”amongitsmembers.

In the early to mid-1990s, when China began to occupy rocks in theSpratlysincludingthecelebratedMischiefReef,securityanalystsdescribedChinesestrategyas“creepingassertiveness”and“talkandtake”.Theeventsduring the firsthalfof2011arebestdescribedasaggressiveassertiveness.ChinaappearstobepayingbackVietnamforitsroleininternationalizingthe



SouthChinaSeawhenitwasChairofASEAN.ChineseactionsintheReedBankareaaredesignedtoexposeambiguitiesintheUS-PhilippinesMutualSecurityTreatyoverwhetherornottheKalayaanIslandGroupiscoveredbythistreaty.

ASEANandtheinternationalcommunity,bothofwhichrelyontransitthrough the South China Sea, must diplomatically confront China over itsaggressiveassertiveness.TheyshouldbringcollectivediplomaticpressuretobearonChinatofaithfullyimplementtheguidelinestoimplementtheDOCadoptedbetweenASEANandChinainBaliinJuly2011.ASEANshouldalsoseekendorsementforitsdiplomaticpositionattheEastAsiaSummittobeheldinNovember2011.

Meanwhile,boththePhilippinesandVietnamshouldcontinuetoenhancetheircapacitytoexertnationalsovereigntyovertheirEEZs.TheirweaknessonlyinvitesChinatoactmoreassertively.On11June,NguyenPhuongNga,spokesperson for the Ministry of ForeignAffairs, responded to a questionaboutapossible role for theUnitedStatesandothercountries in resolvingSouthChinaSeadisputes,byreplying,“Maintainingmaritimepeace,stabilitysecurityandsafetyintheEasternSeaisinthecommoninterestsofallnationswithinandoutside the region.Everyeffortby the internationalcommunitytoward peace and stability in the Eastern Sea is welcome”.108 It is in theinterestoftheUnitedStatesanditsalliesaswellasIndiatoassistbothnationsincapacitybuilding in theareaofmaritimesecurity.At thesametimethis“coalitionoflike-mindedstates”shouldbackASEANinitseffortstosecureagreement on a code of conduct for the South China Sea. If China is notforthcoming,ASEANmembersthemselvescoulddrawupaTreatyonaCodeofConductintheSouthChinaSea,andafterratification,openittoaccessionby non-member states along the lines of theASEANTreaty ofAmity andCooperationandtheSoutheastAsianNuclear-FreeWeaponsZoneTreaty.

Notes+ This isa revisedversionofapaperoriginallydelivered to theConferenceon

MaritimeSecurityintheSouthChinaSea,sponsoredbytheCenterforStrategicandInternationalStudies,Washington,D.C.,20-21June2011.

* Dr CarlyleA.Thayer is Emeritus Professor in the School of Humanities andSocial Sciences, University of New South Wales (UNSW) at theAustralianDefence ForceAcademy (ADFA), Canberra,Australia. ProfessorThayer waseducatedatBrown,receivedanMAinSoutheastAsianStudiesfromYaleandaPhDininternationalrelationsfromtheAustralianNationalUniversity(ANU).HejoinedtheUNSWin1979andtaughtfirstinitsFacultyofMilitaryStudiesattheRoyalMilitaryCollege-DuntroonbeforetransferringtotheacademicstaffatADFA(1985-2010).ProfessorThayer’scareerincludesvisitingappointmentswiththeDepartmentofPoliticalandSocialChangeatANU(1992-94);theAsia



PacificCenterforSecurityStudiesinHawaii(1999-02);andDeakinUniversityas theiron-siteacademicco-ordinatorat theCentreforDefenceandStrategicStudiesattheAustralianDefenceCollege(2002-04).ThayerhasbeenhonouredbyappointmentastheC.V.StarrDistinguishedVisitingProfessorattheSchoolofAdvancedInternationalStudiesatJohnsHopkinsUniversity(2005)andtheInaugural Frances M. and Stephen H. Fuller DistinguishedVisiting ProfessoratOhioUniversity(2008).Heistheauthorofover400publicationsincludingSoutheast Asia: Patterns of Security Cooperation (2010). <Email: [email protected]>

1. Theauthorhasdiscussedthesedevelopmentsindetail,see:CarlyleA.Thayer,“RecentDevelopmentsintheSouthChinaSea:ImplicationsforPeace,StabilityandCooperationin theRegion”, inTranTruongThuy(ed.),The South China Sea: Cooperation for Regional Security and Development – Proceedings of the International Workshop Co-organized by the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam and the Vietnam Lawyers’ Association, 26-27 November 2009, Hanoi, Vietnam,Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban The Gioi, 2010, pp. 125-138; and CarlyleA. Thayer,“RecentDevelopmentsintheSouthChinaSea:ImplicationsforRegionalPeaceandProsperity”,paperpresentedtothe2ndInternationalWorkshopontheSouthChinaSea:CooperationforRegionalSecurityandDevelopment,co-sponsoredbytheDiplomaticAcademyofVietnamandtheVietnamLawyers’Association,NewWorldSaigonHotel,HoChiMinhCity,12-13November2010.

2. CarlyleAThayer,Recent Developments in the South China Sea: Grounds for Cautious Optimism?,RSISWorkingPaperNo.220,Singapore:S.RajaratnamSchoolofInternationalStudies,NanyangTechnologicalUniversity,Singapore,14December2010.

3. Quoted inAgenceFrance-Presse, “ChineseNavyLessAssertive in2011:USadmiral”,12April2011.

4. KaviChongkittavorn,“DifferencePerceptionsofaRisingChina”,The Nation,6June2001.

5. “Aquino to Raise Joint South China Sea Oil Probe toASEAN”, Zamboanga Today Online,12March2011.

6. Reuters,“VietnamAccusesChinaofHarassingAnotherBoat”,9June2011.7. AureaCalica,“PalaceinNoHurrytoFileChinaProtest”,The Philippine Star,

21May2011.8. UnitedPressInternational,“VietnamAllegesHigh-SeasInterference”,10June

2011.9. Michael Richardson, “China Brings Out the Big Rig in Energy Race”, The

Australian Financial Review, 1 June 2010, and Michael Richardson, “ChinaStepsUpDrilling,Intimidation”,The Japan Times,1June2011.

10. PiaLee-Brago,“ChinaBuildinginPHLWaters;DFASummonedEnvoy”,The Philippine Star,2June2011.

11. Bernama,“TalkstoRevolveClaimsoverSpratlys”,New Straits Times,19April2011.

12. Reuters,“ChinaEyesEnergy,BankDealswithMalaysia,Indonesia”,21April2011.



13. “NajibandChinesePremiertoDiscussTerritorialClaims”,The Star Online,26April2011.

14. “PremierWenShowsGreatInterestinChina-MalaysiaTies”,The Star Online,27April2011.

15. MaxDeLeonadEstrellaTorres,“BusinessStepsIntoEndSpratlysRow”,ABS-CBNNews,3June2011.

16. Jerry E. Esplanada and Tara Quismundo, “Abide by UN Pact, China Told”,Philippine Daily Inquirer,3June2011.

17. TessaJamandre,“ChinaFiredatFilipinoFishermeninJacksonAtoll”,ABS-CBNNews,3June2011.

18. Aurea Calica, “PHL to Take Chinese Incursions to the United Nations”, The Philippine Star,4June2011.

19. JimGomez,“ChinaWarnsNeighbors:StopOilSearchinSpratlys”,AssociatedPress,9June2011.

20. BritishBroadcastingNews(BBC)News,Asia-Pacific,“PhilippinesHaltsTestsafterChinaPatrolChallenge”,8March2011;NicholasHeathandDanielTenKate, “Vietnam Says Chinese Boat Harassed PetroVietnam Survey Ship”,BloombergBusinessweek,9June2011;AureaCalica,“PalaceinNoHurrytoFile China Protest”, The Philippine Star, 21 May 2011; andTessa Jamandre,“China Fired at Filipino Fishermen in JacksonAtoll”,ABS-CBN News, 3June2011.TheSampaguitagasfield in theReedBankisestimatedtocontainbetween3.4trillionto twentytrillioncubicfeetofnaturalgas;“CarpsamongtheSpratlys”,The Economist,10March2011,onlineedition.

21. TessaJamandre,“ChinaFiredatFilipinoFishermeninJacksonAtoll”,ABS-CBNNews,3June2011

22. AFP,“ChinaStakesClaimonDisputedIslandsafterSpats”,9March2011,andAureaCalica,“PalaceinNoHurrytoFileChinaProtest”,The Philippine Star,21May2011.

23. “CoastGuardtoSecureOilExplorationinKalayaanIslandGroup”,GMANewsTV,19April2011.TheKIGcontainsninegeologicalfeatures:Balagtas(IrvingReef), Kota (Loaita), Lawak (Nanshan), Likas (WestYork), Pag-asa (Thitu),Panata (Lankiam), Parola (Northeast Cay), Patag Island (Flat Island is alsoconsideredapartoftheSpratlys)andRizal(CommodoreReef).

24. Philippine Mission to the United Nations, letter to the Secretary General ofheUnitedNations,11-00494,No.000228,NewYork,5April2011.Seealso:AFP,“PhilippinesProtestsChina’sSpratlysClaimatUN”,13April2011;TessaJamandre,“PHLProtestsChineseMapClaimingSpratlyIslands”,GMANewsTV,13April2011;andJerryE.Esplanada,“PHRunstoUNtoProtestChina’s‘9-DashLine’SpratlysClaims”,Philippine Daily Inquirer,15April2011.

25. QuotedbyTessaJamandre,“ChinaAccusesPHof‘Invasion’”,ABC-CBNNews,19April 2011, andTeresa Cerojano, “Beijing Counters Manila’s UN Protest,Says Philippines ‘Started to Invade’ Spratlys in 1970s”,Associated Press, 19April2011.

26. The Chinese Note Verbale specifically mentioned the Law of the People’sRepublicofChinaonTerritorialSeaandContiguousZone(1992),theLawon



theExclusiveEconomicZoneandtheContinentalShelfofthePeople’sRepublicofChina(1998)aswellasthe1982UNConventiononLawoftheSea.

27. TessaJamandre,“ChinaFiredatFilipinoFishermeninJacksonAtoll”,ABS-CBNNews,3June2011.

28. “Chinese Jets Intruded into PH Space –AFP”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 20May2011;“TwoUnidentifiedAircraftSeenoverSpratlys–AFP”,GMANewsTV,21May2011;“AFPValidatesKalayaanIslandsAircraftSightingIncident”,PhilippineInformationAgencyPressRelease,23May2011;andJimGomez,“China,PhilippinesWarnRivalsonSpratlys”,The China Post,24May2011.

29. TessaJamandre,“ChinaFiredatFilipinoFishermeninJacksonatoll”,ABS-CBNNews,3June2011.

30. Jun Pasaylo, “China Surveillance Ships Roam Phl Waters”, The Philippine Star,1June2011;SimoneOrendain,“PhilippinesSeeksAnswersaboutLatestSouth China Sea Incident”, Voice ofAmerica News, 1 June 2011; KatherineEvangelista,“PhilippinesMilitarytoActwithDiplomacyoverSpratlysDispute–DefenseChief,Philippine Daily Inquirer,1June2011;JohanaPaolad.Poblete,“PhilippinesPreparingIssuesforUNaboutChina‘Intrusions’”,Business World,2June2011reports;“ChinaDenies‘Invasion’ofSouthChinaSea”,ABS-CNNews,2June2011;AFP,“PhilippinesGov’tProtests toChinaoverOilPlansinSouthChinaSea”,The China Post,2June2011;andJerryE.EsplanadaandTarraQuismundo,“AbidebyUNPact,ChinaTold”,Philippine Daily Inquirer,3June2011.

31. QuotedbyGMANews,“DFAConveysProtesttoBeijingoverChineseVessels”,GMA News TV, 4 June 2011. See also: Pia Lee-Brago, “China Building inPHLWaters;DFASummonedEnvoy”,The Philippine Star,2June2011.TessaJamandre, “China Fired at Filipino Fishermen in JacksonAtoll”,ABS-CBNNews,3June2011reportednoNoteVerbalewasgiventotheChineseCharged’Affairesatthe31Maymeeting.

32. GMANews,“DFA:StrongerSeaCodetoPrevent‘RepeatofMischiefReef’”,GMANewsTV,2June2011,and“ChinaDeniesIncursionintoWestPhilippineSea”,The Philippine Star,3June2011.

33. Dona Z. Pazzibugan, “Chinese Intrusions in PH-Claimed Parts of Spratlys‘Alarming,’SaysGazmin”,Philippines Daily Inquirer,2June2011.

34. PiaLee-Brago,“ChinaBuildinginPHLWaters;DFASummonedEnvoy”,ThePhilippineStar,2June2011.

35. QuotedbyAdiantoP.Simamora,“SBY,AquinoAgreeonTalksoverSpratlys”,The Jakarta Post,9March2011.

36. ReginaBengco,“PeaceinSpratlysIsAllTheyWant”,Malaya.Com,2June2011;Shirley Escalante, “Philippines, Brunei Push for Dialogue to Settle SpratleyIslands Dispute”,Australia Network News, 3 June 2011 and “China DeniesIncursionintoWestPhilippineSea”,The Philippine Star,2June2011.

37. Johanna Paola d. Poblete, “Philippines Preparing Issues for UN about China‘Intrusions’”,Business World,2June2011.

38. “AdoptionofTerritorialGuidelinesUrged”,Manila Bulletin,2June2011.39. Johana Paola d. Poblete, “Philippines Preparing Issues for UN about China

‘Intrusions’”,Business World,2June2011;AmitaO.Legaspi,“PalacePrepares



Spratlys Incursions Report”, GMA News TV, 3 June 2011; and Jim Gomez,“PhilippinesPlansNewUNProtestasChinaDeniesAggressiveActsinSpratlyIslands”,AssociatedPress,3June2011.

40. GMANews,“DFA:StrongerSeaCodetoPrevent‘RepeatofMischiefReef’”,GMANewsTV,2June2011.

41. JaimeLaude,“AFPtoMaintainPresenceinSpratlys”,The Philippine Star,29March2011.

42. Jon Grevatt, “Philippines to Invest USD183 million in Defence of SpratlyIslands”,Jane’s Defence Weekly,30March2011;Reuters,“PhilippinesStepsUpPresenceinSouthChinaSea”,28March2011andAssociatedPress,“Philippinesto BolsterWatch in Disputed Spratlys”, Bloomberg Businessweek, 28 March2011.

43. “Philippines Set to Deploy New Patrol Ship to Kalayaan Islands”, Manila Bulletin, 14April 2011, andAFP, “Philippines to Boosts Spratly Patrols”,Channel NewsAsia, 15April 2011. The USCGC Hamilton, a Weather HighEndurance Cutter, was renamed the BRP Gregorio del Pilar and will be thelargestshipinthePhilippinenavy;MarichuA.Villanueva,“KeepingPhlNavyafloat”,The Philippine Star,16May2011.

44. Reuters,“PhilippinesSaysWillSpend$255minonMilitaryHelicopters,Boats”,13April2011.

45. KatherineEvangelista,“PhilippinesEyeSubmarinestoBoostNavy”,Philippine Daily Inquirer,17May2001.

46. ChinaDeniesIncursionintoWestPhilippineSea”,The Philippines Star,3June2011.

47. MichaelLimUbac,“PhilippinesShopsforUSMilitaryGear”,Philippine Daily Inquirer,5June2011.

48. ShirleyEscalante,“PhilippinesIncreaseSecurityforOilExploration”,AustraliaNetworkNews,28April2011.

49. ChristineO.Avendano,DonaPazzibuganandJeromeAning,“PalaceSeesNoTerrorBacklashagainstAquinoVisittoShip”,Philippine Daily Inquirer,16May2011.

50. Quotedby“China,PHAgreetoHoldRegularTalksonSpratlys”,ABS-CBNNews,23May2011;ChristineO.AvendanoandDonaZ.Pazzibugan,“PeacefulSpratlys Resolution Reaffirmed”, Philippines Daily Inquirer, 24 May 2011;Simone Orendain, “Philippines, China Support Discussion on South ChinaSea”,VoiceofAmericaNews,24May2011;JimGomez,“China,PhilippinesWarn Rivals on Spratlys”, The China Post, 24 May 2011; and Jim Gomez,“China,PhilippinesDefenseChiefsDiscussSpratlys”,AssociatedPress,4June2011.

51. WillardCheng,“Philippines,ChinaOKSouthChinaSeaDialogue”,ABS-CBNNews,23May2011.

52. AFP,“PhilippinesWarnsofArmsRaceinSouthChinaSea”,24May2011,andWilliamB.Depasupil,“PhilippinesWarnsofArmsRaceinSouthChinaSea”,Manila Times,25May2011.

53. Pia Lee-Brago, “China Welcomes Dialogue to End ‘Nansha’ Dispute”, The Philippine Star,25May2011.



54. “Statement of the Department of ForeignAffairs on the Presence of ChineseVesselsintheWestPhilippineSea(SouthChinaSea)”,4June2011.

55. QuotedbyXinhua,“ChinaRejectsPhilippine’sAccusationonSouthChinaSeaissue”,7June2011;AFP,“ChinaSaysPhilippinesHarmingItsMaritimeRights”,ABS-CBNNews,7June2011;Reuters,“ChinaScoldsPhilippinesoverDisputedWaters”,8June2011.



58. Quoted in “A Rules-Based Regime in the South China Sea by:Albert F. DelRosario,SecretaryofForeignAffairs”,PublicInformationServiceUnit,7June2011.

59. AmitaO.Legaspi,“PalacePreparesSpratlys IncursionsReport”,GMANewsTV,3June2011.

60. “Answer from Vietnam Ministry of ForeignAffairs Spokesperson NguyenPhuong Nga to Questions by Greg Torode – South China Morning Post”,December2010;see:GregTorodeandMinnieChan,“ChinaRefusestoYieldonParacels”,Sunday Morning Post[HongKong],12December2010.

61. Ibid.62. “Vietnam, ChinaAgree to Resolve Sea Dispute through Peaceful Means”,

VietnamNewsAgency,3August2011.63. “ChinesePresidentVowstoFurtherTieswithVietnam”,Xinhua,18February

2011, and “China’s Hu Jintao Invites Nguyen PhoTrong”,Voice ofVietnamNews,19February2011.

64. “PartyLeader’sMeetingwithChineseGeneral”,VietnamNewsAgency,14April2011.

65. Li Qiong, “China, Vietnam Issue Joint Press Communiqué on CMC ViceChairmanGuoBoxiong’sVisittoVietnam”,Xinhua,17April2011.

66. “VietnamesePrimeMinisterNguyenTanDungMeetswithChineseViceForeignMinisterZhangZhijun”,MinistryofForeignAffairsofthePeople’sRepublicofChina,20April2011.

67. QuotedinAgenceFrancePresse,“Vietnam,ChinaVowtoWorkonDisputedSeaPact”,21April2011,andDeutschePresse-Agentur,“VietnamandChinaPledgetoSettleSouthChinaSeaDisputes”,20April2011.

68. “EastSeaIncidentaPressingIssue:VietnameseDefenseMinister”,Thanh Nien News,4June2011.ChinesenewsmediadistortedMinisterThanh’sremarksbyreporting thathe agreed to “resolveheirdifferencesover theSouthChinaSethroughbilateralefforts,andthatnothirdpartyshouldbeallowedtointerfereinsucheffortsorusetheissuetoharmthebilateralrelations”,see:“ChineseDMMeetswithVietnameseCounterpartinSingapore”,Xinhua,4June2011.

69. Ministry of ForeignAffairs, “Viet Nam-China Joint Press Release,” June 26,2011.<http:www.mofa.gov.vn/en>(Accessed27June2011)

70. “VietnamOpposesChina’sFishingBaninEastSea”,VoiceofVietnamNews,14May2011.

71. “ChineseShipViolatesVietnam’sSovereignty”,VietnamNewsAgency,13May2011.



72. “Chinese Fishing Boats Violate Vietnam Waters; Gov’t Mulls Patrol Boats”,Thanh Nien News,29May2011.

73. Deutsche Presse-Agentur, “Vietnam Defiant on First Day of Chinese FishingBan”,16May2011.

74. AnDienandMinhHung,“EastSeaUndercurrents”,Thanh Nien News,10June2011.

75. “Vietnam:ChineseSoldiersAttackFishermen,”AssociatedPress,13July2011.76. “BaoCaoSuCoTauTruongQuocCatCapThuDiaChanCuaTauBinhMinh

02 Vao Luc 5H58’ Ngay 26/05/2011”, and Reuters, “Vietnam Says ChineseBoatsHarassedOilExplorationShip”,27May2011.The incident tookplace116nauticalmilesofftheDaiLanhCapeonthecoastofPhuYenprovinceat12degrees48’25”northlatitudeand111degrees26’48”eastlongitude.

77. “VNCondemnsChineseIntrusion”,VietnamNewsAgency,28May2011.78. DeutschePresse-Agentur,“VietnamStandsGroundinSeaDispute,Surveyship

Takes Up Work”, 6 June 2011;Agence France Presse, “Vietnam complainsto China as sea tensions rise”, 9 June 2011; and Nicholas Heath and DanielTenKate,“VietnamSaysChineseBoatHarassedPetroVietnamSurveyShip”,BloombergBusinessweek,9June2011.

79. BenBlandandKathrinHille,“VietnamandChinaOilClashesIntensify”,The Financial Times,27May2011.

80. “National,WorldSecurityCloselyLinked:Minister”,Viet Nam News, 7 June2011.VietnamesesourcestoldtheauthorthereasonVietnamdidnotprotestthe2008incidentwasbecausetheVietnamesesurveyvesselwasoperatingbeyondVietnam’sEEZ.

81. QuotedinReuters,“ChinaReprimandsVietnamoverOffshoreOilExploration”,28May2011.

82. “VietnamDemandsChinaStopSovereigntyViolations”,Thanh Nien News,29May2011.

83. QuotedbyHuyDuong,“ThePhilippinesandVietnamattheCrossroad”,Manila Times,9June2011.

84. Ian Timberlake, “Sea Spat Raises China-Vietnam Tensions”,Agence FrancePresse, 9 June 2011. Talisman Energy Inc., a Canadian company based inCalgary, announced inApril 2011 that it would conduct a major seismicprogrammein thisarea;NicholasHeathandDanielTenKate,“VietnamSaysChineseBoatHarassedPetro-VietnamSurveyShip”,BloombergBusinessweek,9June2011.

85. Reuters,“VietnamAccusesChinaofHarassingAnotherBoat”,9June2011.86. QuotedbyUnitedPressInternational,“VietnamAllegesHigh-seasInterference”,

10June2011.87. AnDienandMinhHung,“EastSeaUndercurrents”,Thanh Nien News,10June

2011.88. Ian Timberlake, “Sea Spat Raises China-Vietnam Tensions”,Agence France

Presse,9 June2011, andReuters, “ChinaAccusesVietnam inEscalatingSeaTensions”,10June2011.

89. InterviewwithThanhNienquotedbyAgenceFrancePresse,“VietnamPMSaysSeaSovereignty ‘Incontestable’”,9 June2011, andDeutschePresse-Agentur,“Vietnam’sTopLeadersAddFiretoSouthChinaSeaDisputes”,9June2011.



90. DeutchePresse-Agentur,“Vietnam’sTopLeadersAddFiretoSouthChinaSeaDispute”,9June2011.

91. BenBlanchardandMichaelMartina,“ChinaSaystoHold‘Routine’NavyDrillsinWesternPacific”,Reuters,9June2011.

92. Bao DamAnToan Hang Hai Mien Bac (Northern Maritime Safety Corpora-tion), “Ve viec ban dan that tren vung bien Quang Nam”, So 107/TBHH-CT.BDATHHMB,9June2011.<http://www.vms-north.vn>

93. QuotedbyJohnRuwitch,“VietnamWelcomesInternationalHelpasSeaDisputeEscalates”, Reuters, 11 June 2011. See also: Margie Mason, “Vietnam PlansLive-FireDrillafterChinaDispute”,AssociatedPress,10June2011;AgenceFrancePresse,“VietnamtoHoldLive-FireDrillasChinaRiftGrows”,10June2011;andDeutschePresse-Agentur,“NavyOfficialSaysLive-FireDrillsWellinsideVietnam’sTerritory”,11June2011.

94. Quoted byAssociated Press, “Chine Communist Party Newspaper CautionsVietnam”,11June2011.

95. “ChineseAggression in the South China Sea Persists, Says Vietnam ForeignMinister”,IB Times,9June2011;Reuters,“VietnamAccusesChinaofHarassingAnother Boat”, 9 June 2011; and Ian Timberlake, “‘Facebook Effect’ StirsVietnam-ChinaTensions”,AgenceFrancePresse,10June2011

96. Deutsche Presse-Agentur, “Vietnamese Demonstrate against China as SeaDisputesHeatsUp”,12June2011;Reuters,“VietnamAllowsSecondAnti-ChinaProtestinHanoi”,12June2011;andAgenceFrance-Presse,“ProtestersRallyaheadofVietnamFireDrills”,The Standard,13June2011.SomeVietnameseuniversitieswarnedtheirstudentsnottotakepartinanti-Chinademonstrations.A notice at the Industrial University in Ho Chi Minh City, for example,threatened toexpelstudentswho tookpart inanti-Chinademonstrations;see:JohnRuwitch,“VietnamAllowsSecondAnti-ChinaProtestinHanoi”,Reuters,12June2011.

97. “VietnamIssuesUltimatumtoAnti-ChinaProtesters,”DeutschePresseAgentur,18August2001,andMarianneBrown,“VietnamSecurityForcesDetainAnti-ChinaProtesters,”VoiceofAmericaNews,21August2011

98. AFP,“VietnamComplainstoChinaasSeaTensionsRise”,9June2011,andIanTimberlake,“Vietnam toHoldLive-FireDrillasChinaRiftGrows”,10June2011.

99. Dato’ Sri Najib Tun Razak, KeynoteAddress, The 10th IISSAsian SecuritySummittheShangri-LaDialogue,3June2011.

100.RobertM.Gates,“EmergingSecurityChallengesintheAsia-Pacific”,The10thIISSAsianSecuritySummittheShangri-LaDialogue,4June2011.

101.Liang Guanglie, “China’s International Security Cooperation”,The 10th IISSAsianSecuritySummittheShangri-LaDialogue,5June2011.

102.PhungQuangThanh,“RespondingtoNewMaritimeSecurityThreats”,The10thIISSAsianSecuritySummittheShangri-LaDialogue,5June2011.

103.Confidential source who spoke with Secretary Gazmin at the Shangri-LaDialogue.

104.VoltaireGazmin,“RespondingtoNewMaritimeSecurityThreats”,The10thIISSAsianSecuritySummittheShangri-LaDialogue,5June2011.



105.Bernama, “Comprehensive Efforts Needed to Ensure Regional MaritimeSecurity”,The Star Online,5June2001.

106.As of this writing the guidelines have not been released.According to aconfidentialsourcewhoattendedtheASEANrelatedmeetingsinBali,thenewguidelinesstate,“ThepartiestotheDOCwillcontinuetopromotedialogueandconsultationsinaccordancewiththespiritoftheDOC.”Privateemailreceived22July2011.

107.BaryWain,“ASouthChinaSeaCharade,”The Wall Street Journal,21August2011.

108.QuotedbyJohnRuwitch,“VietnamWelcomesInternationalHelpasSeaDisputeEscalates”,Reuters,11June2011.

ReferencesGates, Robert M. (2011), “Emerging Security Challenges in theAsia-Pacific”,

presentationtothe10thIISSAsianSecuritySummittheShangri-LaDialogue,4June.

Gazmin, Voltaire (2011), “Responding to New Maritime Security Threats”,presentationtothe10thIISSAsianSecuritySummittheShangri-LaDialogue,5June.

LiangGuanglie(2011),“China’sInternationalSecurityCooperation”,presentationtothe10thIISSAsianSecuritySummittheShangri-LaDialogue,5June.

NajibTunRazak,Dato’Sri(2011),KeynoteAddressatthe10thIISSAsianSecuritySummittheShangri-LaDialogue,3June.

Phung Quang Thanh (2011), “Responding to New Maritime Security Threats”,presentationtothe10thIISSAsianSecuritySummittheShangri-LaDialogue,5June.

Thayer,CarlyleA.(2010),“RecentDevelopmentsintheSouthChinaSea:ImplicationsforPeace,StabilityandCooperationintheRegion”,inTranTruongThuy(ed.),The South China Sea: Cooperation for Regional Security and Development – Proceedings of the International Workshop Co-organized by the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam and the Vietnam Lawyers’ Association, 26-27 November 2009, Hanoi, Vietnam,Hanoi:NhaXuatBanTheGioi,pp.125-138.

Thayer, Carlyle A. (2010), “Recent Developments in the South China Sea:Implications for Regional Peace and Prosperity”, paper presented to the 2ndInternationalWorkshopontheSouthChinaSea:CooperationforRegionalSecurityandDevelopment,co-sponsoredbytheDiplomaticAcademyofVietnamandtheVietnam Lawyers’Association, New World Saigon Hotel, Ho Chi Minh City,Vietnam,12-13November.

Thayer,CarlyleA(2010),“RecentDevelopmentsintheSouthChinaSea:GroundsforCautiousOptimism?”,RSISWorkingPaperNo.220,Singapore:S.RajaratnamSchoolofInternationalStudies,NanyangTechnologicalUniversity,Singapore,14December.


South China Sea Issue in China-ASEAN Relations 585InternationalJournalofChinaStudiesVol.2,No.3,December2011,pp.585-600

SouthChinaSeaIssueinChina-ASEANRelations:AnAlternativeApproachtoEasetheTension+

Shen Hongfang*XiamenUniversity

Abstract

Therising tension in theSouthChinaSeasince2009almostoverturns thesound political and economic relations established between China and theASEANstates since1997.Betterhandlingof the issue to ease the tensionof territorial disputes in the South China Sea is thus the key to good-neighbourlinessamongChinaandASEAN’sclaimingstates.TheASEAN-China Declaration of the Conduct of Parties (DOC) signed by China andtheASEAN countries in 2002 has not reached its purpose of promoting apeaceful, friendly and harmonious environment in the South China Sea.Instead, the past decade has witnessed numerous clashes between thesovereignty-claimants. Hence, the South China Sea has actually becomea potential “battlefield” if consultations or negotiations among the partiesconcerned have not been effectively or well handled.This paper describesthecurrentoverlappingsovereigntyclaimsofrelatedpartiesaroundtheSouthChinaSea,introducesthemainstreamopinionsinmainlandChinatowardthiscritical sovereignty issue, and discusses the evolving academic viewpointsof the Chinese scholars on the South China Sea’s territorial disputes,and attempts to seek an alternative approach to handle these complicatedsovereigntydisputesandraisessomeproposalsforthispurpose.

Keywords: China, ASEAN, South China Sea (SCS), diplomacy, sovereignty


1.Introduction

The tension in the South China Sea (SCS) among China and theASEANclaming states over sovereignty has drastically escalated since 2009, andhasalmostoverturnedthesoundpoliticalandeconomicrelationsestablishedbetweenChinaand theconcernedstates since1997.Hitherto, the relations


586 Shen Hongfang

wereusuallydescribedas“the“thegoldenageofpartnership”.1Therefore,betterhandling the issue so as to ease the tensionof territorial disputesofSouthChinaSeaamong thesovereignty-clamingstates is thekey togood-neighbourlinessamongChinaandASEAN’sclaimingstates.

The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS) created anumber of guidelines concerning the statues of islands, the continentalshelf,enclosedseas,andterritoriallimits.However,theguidelineshavenotsolved the territorial jurisdictionaldisputes,butaddedcomplications to theoverlapping claims in the South China Sea.Among those relevant to theSouth China Sea are: (1)Article 3, which states that “every state has therighttoestablishthebreadthofitsterritorialseauptoalimitnotexceeding12 nautical miles”. (2)Article 55-75 define the concept of an ExclusiveEconomicZone(EEZ),whichisanareaupto200nauticalmilesbeyondandadjacenttotheterritorialsea.TheEEZgivescoastalstates“sovereignrightsfor the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing thenaturalresources,whetherlivingornon-living,ofthewaterssuperjacenttotheseabedanditssubsoil…”(3)Article76definesthecontinentalshelfofanation,which“comprisestheseabedandsubsoilofthesubmarineareasthatextendbeyonditsterritorialseathroughoutthenaturalprolongationofitslandterritorytotheouteredgeofthecontinentalmargin,ortoadistanceof200nauticalmiles…”ThisisimportantbecauseArticle77allowseverynationorpartytoexercise“overthecontinentalshelfsovereignrightsforthepurposeofexploringitandexploitingitsnaturalresources.”(4)Article121statesrocksthatcannotsustainhumanhabitationoreconomiclifeoftheirownshallhavenoexclusiveeconomiczoneorcontinentalshelf.2Thus,itcanbeseenthattheestablishmentoftheEEZcreatesthepotentialforoverlappingclaimsintheSouthChinaSea.Claimscouldbemadebyanynationthatcouldestablishasettlementontheislandsintheregion.

TheASEAN-ChinaDeclarationoftheConductofParties(DOC)ontheSouth China Sea signed by China andASEAN countries in 2002 also hasnot reached its purpose of promoting a peaceful, friendly and harmoniousenvironmentintheSouthChinaSea.Instead,thepastdecadehaswitnessednumerous clashes between China andVietnam, China and the Philippines,Taiwanand theVietnam,Vietnamand thePhilippines, thePhilippines andMalaysia,andMalaysiaandBrunei.TheSouthChinaSeahasactuallybecomepotential “battle field” if consultations or negotiations among the partiesconcernedhavenotbeeneffectivelyorwellhandled.

Afterabriefdescriptionon thecurrentoverlappingsovereigntyclaimsofrelatedpartiesaroundthesea,thispaperthenintroducesthemainstreamopinions of the Chinese people in mainland China toward this criticalsovereignty issue, followed up by a discussion on the evolving academicviewpointsoftheChinesescholarstowardtheSouthChinaSea’sterritorial


South China Sea Issue in China-ASEAN Relations 587

disputes,alongwiththedevelopmentofthesituationintheregion.Fromtheacademicperspective,thispaperalsoattemptstoseekanalternativeapproachto handle the complicated sovereignty disputes, and raise some proposals.FirstistheestablishmentofaneffectivemechanismforthisparticularissuewithintheframeworkofASEAN-ChinaStrategicPartnershipforPeaceandProsperity,withanaimtodevelopacodeofconductwithbindingguidelinesfor actions related to fishery, transportation, oil exploration, etc. Second,bilateral and multilateral dialogues are needed in mitigating tensions overSouthChinaSea,andEastAsiaSummit(EAS)canplayanimportantroleinthisrespect.Third,emphasisshouldbeputonsettingasidedisputesforjointmaintenance of maritime security, and the governments concerned shouldpledgenottoseekunilateralbenefitfromsecuritycooperation.

2.MainActionsofSovereignty-ClaimingStatesinthisNewRoundofTensionofSouthChinaSeaDisputesandtheReasons

2.1.MainActionsofSovereignty-ClaimingStatessince2009

TheSouthChinaSeahaslongbeenadisputedregionwithoverlappingclaimsofsovereigntyrightsbyfivecountriesandsixparties,basedonreasonsasdifferentascentury-oldprincipleofdiscovery,200-mileexclusiveeconomiczone (EEZ), geographic proximity, effective occupation and control, andvitalinterest.

Asmatteroffact,UNCLOSaddedevenmorecomplicatingandcontra-dictoryfactorstothesolutionofterritorydisputesintheSouthChinaSea.

TheCommissionon theLimitsof theContinentalShelf (CLCSor theCommission), abodysetbyUNCLOS toaccept submissionsofclaimsbytheCoastalStatesParties (CSP) todefine theouter limitof extendedcon-tinentalshelf.3

Due to the approaching deadline (13th May 1999) of claiming outercontinentalshelves(OCS)designedbytheCommissionontheLimitsoftheContinentalShelf,thetensionintheSouthChinaSeabetweenChinaandtheASEAN’sclaimingstateshasbeenincreasingsince2009.4

On6thMay2009,MalaysiaandVietnammadeajointsubmissionrelatingtoanareaintheSouthoftheSouthChinaSea.On8thMay2009,VietnammadeasubmissiononitsownrelatingtoanareanearthecentreoftheSouthChinaSea.Previously,VietnamhadinvitedBruneitomakeajointsubmissiontogetherwithMalaysia.On12thMay2009,BruneihadmadeasubmissiontotheCLCStoshowthatadisputedareaoftheSouthChinaSeaisalsosituatedbeyond200nauticalmilesfromthebaselinefromwhichBrunei’sterritorialseaismeasured,butBruneihadnotprotestedMalaysiaandVietnam’sjointsubmission.5


588 Shen Hongfang

WhileIndonesiaisnottechnicallyaclaimantstate,ithasaclearinterestintheissue,especiallyasthe“nine-dottedline”map,fromwhichtheChineseclaimisbasedupon,actuallyincludesthewateraroundtheNatunaIslands.Inaninterview,IndonesianPresidentSusiloBanbangYudhoyono,claimedthatasthechairofASEANthisyear,oneofhistopprioritieswouldbetomakeprogressovertheSouthChinaSeadisputesbybringingChinaintomultilateraltalks.However,Indonesia“hasnottakentheactiontosubmitclaimstoCLCS.Sincethe1990s,Jakarta“hassoughtclarificationoverChineseclaims,buthassofarfailedtoreceiveanunequivocalresponse.”6

ThePhilippineshasnotmadeasubmissiontoCLCSforanyareaintheSouthChinaSea.Thereasonfornotmakingsuchasubmissionisto“avoidcreatingnewconflictsor exacerbatingexistingones.”ThePhilippineshasnotprotestedimmediatelyeitherVietnam’sownsubmissionorMalaysiaandVietnam’sjointsubmission.7Nevertheless,on16thFebruary2009,thefinalversionofabillthatdeterminesPhilippine’sarchipelagicbaselineswasgivenapproval by a legislative committee. The bill placed the disputed islandsin the South China Sea – Scarborough Shoal and Kalayaan Island Group–undera regimeof Islandsof theRepublicof thePhilippines,while theywerealsoclaimedbytheother threeparties,Vietnam,China,andChineseTaipei.8On10thMarch2009,theformerPresidentGloriaMacapagal-Arroyosignedthebill.

AkbayanpartymemberandacademicDrWaldenBellohasalsomadealegislativeproposal(HouseResolutionNo.1350)officiallynamingtheregionthe“WestPhilippineSea” inorder to strengthen thePhilippine’sclaims tothesecontroversialwatersandthenaturalresourcesfoundwithin.9On10thJune2011, theAquinogovernmenthas apparentlymade it settleddoctrinetouse“WestPhilippineSea”torefertothewaterswestofthecountryviaastatementofMalacañangthroughChina’sAmbassadortothePhilippinesMrLiuJianchao刘建超.10

On7thMay2009,ChinamadeimmediateobjectionstotheVietnamesesubmissionandVietnamese-MalaysianjointsubmissionstoCLCF.Itprotestedthat theseactions infringeduponChinesesovereignty,sovereignrightsandjurisdiction in the South China Sea. China has not made any submission.According to one analyst, “the reason for this is clear: it is impossible tojustifyChina’sU-shapeddottedlineusingUNCLOS’sscientificcriteriafortheouterlimitsofthecontinentalshelf.”Atthesametime,ChinahaspresentedtheU-shapedlinetotheUNbody“inthecontextofmaritimedelimitation”toshowChinesesovereigntyovertheSouthChinaSea.11InresponsetotheactiontakenbythePhilippinelegislature,theChineseForeignMinistryissuedstatementsreiteratingtheChinesesovereigntyovertheHuangyanIslandandNanshaIslands.AnyothercountrythatmakesterritorialclaimsonHuangyanIslandandNanshaislandsisthereforetakingillegalandinvalidaction.12In



addition,ChinahassentitspatrolboatstotheSouthChinaSeatosafeguardtheinterestsofChinesefishermen.

During the 10th IISSAsia Security Summit of Shangri-la Dialogueheld in Singapore on 5th June 2011, General Liang Guanglie梁光烈, theMinisterofDefenseinrepresentativeofChinesegovernmentagainreiteratedtheconsistentChinesegovernmentpolicy toward theSouthChinaSea.Hesaid that China is committed to maintaining peace and stability in SouthChinaSea,andhasbeenactivelykeepingdialoguesandconsultationswithASEANcountriesinimplementing2002DeclarationontheCodeofConductonSouthChinaSea,andacknowledgedthesettlementoftheterritorialandjurisdictionaldisputesbypeacefulmeansthroughfriendlyconsultationsandnegotiationbysovereignstatesinvolved.13

2.2.OtherMajorFactorsforthisRoundofTension

In addition to the factors mentioned above, several factors adding to thetensionareillustratedasfollows:

2.2.1. South China Sea has become important route for trade and commerce, hence safety of transportation has become very important

In the context of the driving forces of economic globalization and EastAsianregionalization,theregionasawholehasbroughtforthahigherrateof economic growth through FDI and international trade in the latest twodecades.EspeciallyalongwiththeboomingofvariousFreeTradeAgreements(FTAs)andRegionalTradeAgreements(RTAs)withinandwithouttheregion,theshippingrouteofSouthChinaSeaisbecomingmoreandmoreimportantforglobaltradeandcommerce.Thusfor,overhalfoftheworld’sshippingbytonnageandthehalfoftheworld’soiltankertrafficsailthroughthesewatersevery year, intra-Asian trade is now valued at around $1 trillion.14TakingthepastdecadeoftotaltradevaluebetweenASEANandChinaforexample,it has increased from US$395.2 hundred million in 2000 to US$2,927.8hundred million in 2010, according to Chinese official figures, with anincrease of almost 6.4 fold.15 Many of the Chinese andASEAN memberstates’importsandexportsaswellasthegoodsfromotherwesterncountriesaremostlikelytotakethesearoute.AlongwiththerobustnessofEastAsianeconomicgrowthandeconomicintegration,maritimepiracyhasalsobecomeanissueintheSouthChinaSeasince1990s.Accordingtotheannualreportof internationalMaritimeBureau,altogether therewere239reportedpirateattacksin2006,ofwhich88attacksoccurredintheSouthChinaSea.16Thepirateattackshavedecreasedduetothemeasurestakenbythegovernmentsintheregion.However,thesafetyoftheshippingrouteisnodoubtstillamatterofparamountimportant.


590 Shen Hongfang

2.2.2. Rich marine resources, both living and non-living, are exploited under unregulated, unreported and even illegal state actions that cause serious problems

SincetheSCSclaimersinSoutheastAsiamakeclaimsusingthe200-sea-mileEEZasthelegalbase,theconsequencesareindeedserious.Clashesbetweendifferentgroupsoffishersandbetweenallegedillegalfishermenandmaritimelaw enforcement forces occur regularly in the area. The alleged illegal,unregulatedandunreportedfishingandoilexplorationamongclaimershavebeencausingseriousproblems in theSouthChinaSeanotonlyformarineenvironmental protection, but also for the harmony of the neighbouringcountries around the South China Sea.As the fisheries have been over-exploitedandcatcheshavedeclinedover theyears,even though theSouthChina Sea is one of the world’s most productive fishing grounds.As SamBatemanpointedout,“inalargepart,thisisduetothelackofagreedlimitstomaritimejurisdiction,”which“…hascontributedtooverfishingthrougha‘beggarthyneighbor’approach.”17

Asia’s vibrant economic growth also has increased substantially thedemandforenergy.Moreandmorecountries in theregionhavebecomingconscious of energy security as their energy self sufficiency has beendecliningforyears.Oildepositshavebeenfoundinmostofthelittoralstatesof theSouthChinaSea, theoil reservesof the areahasbeen estimated atabout7.0billionbarrelsofoilwhileoilproductionintheregionisaround2.5 million barrels per day, with Malaysia so far being the most activeproduceramong theclaimant states. Inaddition, theSouthChinaSeaalsocontainsrichhydrocarbonresources.AccordingtotheestimatesbytheU.S.GeologicalSurvey, about 60%-70%of the region’s hydrocarbon resourcesare natural gas. Many hydrocarbon fields have been explored by Brunei,Indonesia,Malaysia,Thailand,VietnamandthePhilippines.18Asearlyasin1998,morethan1000oilwillswerealreadydugbythecountriesaroundtheSouthChinaSeaincooperationwithmanywesternoilcompanies.Thefigureisnowexpectedtorisetoabout2000.However,Chinahasnotdugasingleoilfielduptotoday.

2.2.3. Cold War mentality of “China threat”

Thethirdandmostimportantfactoristhatthecoldwarmentalityof“Chinathreat”isnotdisappearingbutescalating.

IstillrememberaquestionIraisedinmyinterviewwithawell-knownscholar16yearsagoin1995whenIwasaVisitingProfessoratAteneodeManilaUniversityofthePhilippinesatthattime:“WhatcouldChinadotoimprovetheSino-Philippinebilateralrelations?”TheanswerIreceivedwas



that“ChinashouldexpandtradeandincreaseinvestmentinthePhilippines.”“China does not have such an image.” On the contrary, “the outflow ofFilipino-Chinesemerchantsinvestingintheirancestralhomehadcausedtheshortage of Philippine investment becoming much more severe.” Sixteenyears have passed while China’s economy has been rapid growing. Chinahopes to become a more responsible actor in the region, wishing to sharecommon prosperity with its neighbours through expanding trade, outwardinvestment and foreign assistance to the Philippines and some other lessdevelopedASEAN member states. Ironically, the “China Threat” theoryhasnotdisappearedbutsomehowhasbecomemoreentrenched.Hence,thequestionremainswhetheraprosperousChinaorapoorChinawillbenefittheregionaswellastheworld?

Infact,somepropagandamachinesareoverestimatingChina’seconomicandmilitarypower.AlthoughChina’sGDPintotal isrankedthesecondintheworld,theGDPpercapitaofChinaisstillfarbehindmanymiddle-levelincomecountries.Morethan20millionChinesepeoplearestilllivingunderthepoverty line,and thedisparitybetweenruralandurbanareas,EastandWest,inlandandcoastalregionsisverylarge.Inaddition,duetothedifferentwayofmeasurementusedinthecalculationofeconomicsize,somerenownedeconomists,includingNobelLaureatesJosephE.StiglitzandPaulKrugman,have reached theconsensus thatChina’seconomicgrowth rateprobably isonly half of what is officially calculated.19 The past years have also seentheprogressofChina’sdefenseandmilitarymodernization.However,suchprogressiswithinthelegitimateneedofself-defense.20

Therefore, thesayingof“China’srising”iswrong.IthasalreadybeenrectifiedbyChineseacademiccommunityas“China’speacefuldevelopment”instead of “China’s rise”. China has promised again and again to followunswervingly the path of peaceful development that is fundamentallydifferent from the path of colonial expansion that some countries used totake historically. The path taken by China ensures common interests andwin-winsituationswiththerestoftheworld,andwillbringbenefitssharedbyallnations.21

2.2.4. US engagement in AsiaFinally,theintensityofUSengagementinAsiainrecentyearshasaddedatenseatmosphereintheregion.

Amid heightening tensions in the South China Sea, US Secretary ofStateHillaryClintonmadeanimportantstatementaffirmingUSengagementinAsiaatASEANRegionalForuminJuly2010.Addressingreportersafterattendingthe17thministerialmeetingoftheAssociationofSoutheastAsian


592 Shen Hongfang

Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, Clinton declared, “The United States,likeeveryothernation,hasanationalinterestinfreedomofnavigation,openaccesstoAsia’smaritimecommons,andrespectforinternationallawintheSouthChinaSea.WesharetheseinterestswithnotonlyASEANmembersandASEANRegionalForumparticipantsbutwithothermaritimenationsandthebroaderinternationalcommunity.”22

ChineseofficialswereatthebeginningalarmedbytheUS,especiallythelattermadeitsintentioninsuchahigh-profilemanner,butsoonrealizedthatClinton’spositionwasprobablyaresultofcoordinatedactionwithsomeoftheconcernedAsiannations.Inotherwords,theUSwasurgedbytheofficialsfrom the Philippines, Malaysia, andVietnam to remain as a balancer.TheSouthChinaSeaclaimantstateswanttheUSto“continuetohaveasizablemilitarypresenceintheSouthChinaSeasoastoweighinmuchmoreheavilyontheSouthChinaSeadisputes.”23

Chinese officials and academics have always cautioned the US not toinvolve itself in the South China Sea issue, publicly or in private. Mostrecently,theChineseviceForeignMinisterCuiTiankai崔天凯toldforeignmediabeforeattendingthefirstroundoftheChina-USconsultationsoftheAsia-Pacificaffairson22ndJune2011,that“theU.S.isnotaSouthChinaSeaclaimantstate,soshouldstayawayfromthesedisputes.”Healsosaid:“IthinkthatsomeSouthChinaSeaclaimantstatesareactuallyplayingwithfirewiththehopethattheU.S.canbeofhelp.SomeAmericansthinkthattheycanhelpthesituation,weappreciatethisgesturebutthisattitudeoftenonlymakesthingsmorecomplicated.”24

3.MainstreamChineseOpinionstowardtheRecentTensionof SouthChinaSea’sTerritorialDisputes

Along with the intensified situation in the South China Sea, a lot of dis-cussions and arguments are taking place in China not only among theacademics but also in the general public. Like the other claimant states,China’sdomesticpublicopiniontendstobemorenationalisticontheissueoftheSouthChinaSea.

A public debate erupted in China over this question: Should ChinaofficiallyupgradetheSouthChinaSeatoa“coreinterest,”placingitonparwithTibet,TaiwanandXinjiang,sothatmilitaryinterventionisjustified?ThewebsiteofthePeople’s DailypostedasurveyaskingreaderswhetheritwasnownecessarytolabeltheSouthChinaSeaa“coreinterest”.AsofJanuary2011, 97 per cent of nearly 4,300 respondents said “yes”.25 The Internetsurvey that I conducted on my own also showed that regardless of age orgender,InternetuserstendtoarticulatestrongnationalisticvoicestodefendChina’ssovereigntyintheSouthChinaSea.



3.1.PerspectivesofMilitaryScholars

Westernmediahavealreadypaidattentiontothehard-linepositionofChina’smilitary toward South China Sea territory disputes. There was actually anargumenthow to respondClinton’s statementof “national interests” in theSouthChinaSea.Usingtheterms“coreinterest”or“indisputablesovereignty”Chineseseniormilitaryofficersweighedinonthedebate.Earlierintheyear,Chinesemilitaryofficials reportedly told theirAmericancounterpartsonatleasttwooccasionsthattheSouthChinaSeawasa“coreinterest”presumablyonaparwithTaiwanandTibet.26

TheChinesemilitaryfindsithardtotoleratemilitaryexercisesofsomeclaimantstateswithoutsidepowersintheSouthChinaSeainwhichChinaistheunspokentargetoftheexercises.ThesuddenchangesofatmosphereintheSouthChinaSea,causedbytheactionstakenbysomeclaimantstatestosubmittheirclaimstotheCLCS,nodoubtssetoffanewupsurgeofstrongnationalisminChina.Somevoicesevensuggestedthatitistherighttimetoadoptnecessarymeasuresto“teachsomecountriesalesson”,and“Chinaislegallyentitledtotakemilitaryactiontorepeltheinvaders”.

AlmostallofChineseseniormilitaryofficialssharethesamecommonfeeling–“todefendthemotherlandisthesoleresponsibilityofthemilitary.”AsapopularChinesesayinggoes,“ifpeopledonotattackus,wewillnotattackthem,ifweareattacked,wewillcertainlycounterattack.”Nevertheless,the military is under the control of the Communist Party in China. ThemilitaryhastolistentothePartyandobeytheorderoftheParty.

MrHanXudong韩旭东,anarmycolonelandascholarattheNationalDefenseUniversity,arguedthata“low-intensityarmedconflict”mightoccurintheSouthChinaSeainthenearfutureifChinadecidesthatthepeacefulmeanstostopillegaloccupationoftheislandsintheseabytheclaimantstateshasfailed,27despitethefactthat“China’scomprehensivenationalstrength,especiallyinmilitarycapabilities,isnotyetenoughtosafeguardallofthecorenationalinterests.Inthiscase,it’snotagoodideatorevealthecorenationalinterests.”28 Mr Zhang Zhaozhong张召忠, a well-known military analystandalsoaprofessoratNationalDefenseUniversity,consideredthatthebesttimeofsolving the territorydisputesand torecoverChina’ssovereignty intheSouthChinaSeabypeacefulmeanshasalreadypassed,anddiplomaticnegotiationswillleadtonowhere.29Healsoexpressednoconfidenceinusinginternationaljudicialprocesstoresolvetheconflicts.30ZhanghasmaintainedthatwhileChinahopestoresolvethedisputeinpeacefulmanner,onemusthavethecouragetousetheswordifitisreallyinneed.31

ScholarsfromtheprestigiousInstituteofMilitarySciences(orAcademyofMilitarySciences)havealsoappearedinthemediainChinatoassertChina’ssovereignty over the South China Sea. In March 2009, LuoYuan罗援, a


594 Shen Hongfang

researcherattheInstituteandamajorgeneralofthePeople’sLiberationArmy,warnedotherclaimantstatesnottomisconstrueChina’srestrainasChina’sweaknessinthearea.HeadvocatedforthestrategicexpansionofChinaintotheseaandconstructionofa“blue-water”navy.32 InJune2011,Luo,nowaffiliatedwiththeResearchSocietyonMilitarySciences,whichissponsoredbytheInstituteofMilitarySciences,contendedthatChinahasbeena“victim”in theSouthChinaSea for too long.China’spatienceand toleranceof theactivitiesoftheclaimantstateswillnotbeforever,andtheclaimantstatesinSoutheastAsiashouldstoptryingChina’spatience.33

3.2.PerspectivesofCivilianScholars

Chinesescholarsworkinginthecivilianinstitutionsalsooffertheiropinionsand analyses on the South China Sea during this recent round of tensionbetweentheclaimantstates.

ManynewsarticleshavebeenreportingthatinreturnofHillaryClinton’scharacterizationofUS“nationalinterest”intheSouthChinaSea,theChinesegovernmentadoptstheterm“coreinterest”.Tracingthesource,itappearedfirst in a populist Chinese newspaper, the English-language edition of theGlobal Times.AfterMrsClinton’sstatements,itpublishedanangryeditorialthatlinkedtheSouthChinaSeatoChina’scoreinterests–“Chinawillneverwaiveitsrighttoprotectitscoreinterestwithmilitarymeans.”34

An articlewrittenbyMrDaiBingguo戴秉国, amemberofStandingCommittee of Chinese Communist Party, posted on the website of theDepartment of ForeignAffairs before the end of 2010 has broadenedthe definition of the term by saying that China has three core interests:maintainingitspoliticalsystem,defendingitssovereigntyandpromotingitseconomicdevelopment.35Duetothetensesituationintheareaatthattime,thearticlehas stirredup somestrongnationalism inChina, and thepublicopinion has taken the South China Sea and all other sovereignty disputesas fallingunder“core interests”.Arguably, the term“core interest”has theconsequenceofmakingthesituationevenmorecomplicated.

The Chinese government inclines to use the term of “indisputablesovereignty” instead of the term “core interest” as its official policy, andclaims that “China has indisputable sovereignty” over virtually the entireSouth China Sea, a view which is shared by Taiwan. Both sides of theTaiwanStraits recognizebasically the legalstatusofChina’sdotted line intheSouthChinaSea,andscholarsfrombothsideshaveexpressedformanytimesdesirestocooperateontheissue.Isupposethereasontoadopttheterm“indisputablesovereignty”insteadof“coreinterest”ismainlytoexpressthegoodwillofChina’s“goodneighbour”diplomacy,butitisbynomeanslessassertive.



ManyscholarsholdtheviewpointthatwhiletheChinesegovernmenthasadoptedaconciliatoryandflexibleattitudetotheissueofterritorialdisputesintheSouthChinaSea,withanaimtomaintaingood-neighbourlyrelationswith SoutheastAsian countries since earlier 1980s, what it has receivedfrom this policy has been constant provocations and hostilities from theclaimantstates.Anear-consensusamongthesescholarsisthatChinahastodosomethingmorepro-activeontheissueoftheSouthChinaSea,insteadofcontinuingthepresentpoliciesof“shelvingthedisputesandworkingforjointdevelopment”andofpeacefulsettlementofthesedisputesinaccordingwiththeUNCLOS.Therearestrongvoicestobeheardthat“theterritorialdisputes have never been shelved. Joint exploration or development ontheSouthChinaSeabetween the claimant stateshasnotbeen started, butresources, especially oil and hydrocarbon, have been continuously carvedup”whileChinahasnotbeganasingleoperationintheclaimedterritory.36More than twentyyearsofChina’scommitment togood-neighbourpolicy,the situation in the South China Sea has not become any less messy.As“joint development” has become quite impossible in the present situation,the Chinese can only take the measure of “active presence, moderatedevelopment”intheSouthChinaSea.

Thepracticeofcooperatingandworkingtogetherbysomeclaimantstatesinthisnewroundtensionraisesanewquestion:whetherterritorialdisputesarenowtobesolvedthroughASEAN?Moreimportantthanthis,thedisputesintheSouthChinaSeaarealsoteachingalessontotheChinesegovernment:thatChina’seconomic“helpinghand”intheregionwillnotlowerthetensionsandhostilitiesresultingfromthedisputesandwillnotsolvethesedisputes.

4.Conclusion:AnAlternativeApproachtoReduceTensioninthe SouthChinaSea

LikeotherSoutheastAsianclaimantstates, theChinesegovernmentisalsounderthepublicpressureregardingtheSouthChinaSea.IfChinagaveawaymoreterritorytoforeignstates,thenationalhonourwouldbeunderattackandthepeopleandthemilitarywouldquestionthelegitimacyofthegovernment.Itisoftheoutmostimportancethatthegovernmentisnotconsideredbythepeopleorthemilitaryasinternallyorexternallyweak,whichinturncouldhaveseverepoliticalconsequences.

China’s South China Sea policy at the moment has not changedmuch, as General Liang pointed out in his speech at the 10th IISSAsianSecurity Summit during 3rd-5th June 2011. The core of China’s policyhas been characterized by Mark Valencia as “Three-No” strategy: “no” tointernationalization of the conflict, “no” to multilateral negotiations and“no”tospecificationofChina’sterritorialdemands.37Withthedeteriorating


596 Shen Hongfang

situationintheSouthChinaSea,thereisaninclinationonthepartofChinatobemorepro-active to resolve the complicated issueof theSouthChinaSea,oratleasttoeasethetension,hereandnow,andnotleaveittothenextgeneration.Tomyunderstandingandsurvey,Chinawillfirmlyinsistthefirst“no”,butwillallowsomeroomofflexibility inexecutingthesecond“no”andthethird“no”.Withanaimtoreducethetensionandtoturnthedisputedseaintoazoneofpeace,freedom,friendshipandcooperation,Imakesomesuggestionshereasanalternativeapproach.

4.1.AnEffectiveMechanismIsNeededToBeEstablishedwithinthe FrameworkofChina-ASEANPartnership

Sincethe2002ASEAN-ChinaDeclarationoftheConductofParties(DOC)in the South China Sea is neither a legally binding agreement nor an en-forceabledocument,it“hasfailedtoprovideanymechanismorproceduretoensurethatthepartiescomplywiththeirobligationtorespecttheprovisionsofthisdeclaration.”Thejointworkinggroupthathasbeensetuptomanagethe dispute and monitor DOC’s implementation has “failed to make anyconcreteprogresssofar.”38Therefore,aneworgan(ormechanism)shouldbe established with acceptable rules and regulations, so as to develop theconfidence,andtoactasamediatorforhandlingtheconflictswhenclashes,conflictsordisputesappear.However,theneworgan(ormechanism)mustbewithintheframeworkofChina-ASEANPartnership,butincludeChineseTaipei.

4.2. Setting Up the Official Track of Multilateral Dialogues within EastAsianSummit

The official track of multilateral dialogues aiming at turning the disputedsea intoazoneofpeace, freedom, friendshipandcooperationcouldbesetupwithintheframeworkofEastAsianSummit,whichnowincludestheUSandRussia,called“TenPlusEight”.Butmultilateraldialoguesdonotmeantheinternationalizationoftheissue.Thetaskofthetrackistoprovidesomeconstructivesuggestionsthroughmultilateralexchangesandinteractions,andnotengageinanyalliancetargetingathirdparty.

4.3.StartingAllKindsofJointExplorationintheDisputedArea

DrRommelC.Banlaoiwrotethat“…asaninterimmeasure,thePhilippinesandChinashallseriouslystarttalkingaboutjointdevelopmentintheSouthChinaSea.RatherthandeterminingwhichcountrieshaveownershiporrightstothedisputedterritoriesintheSouthChinaSea,thePhilippinesandChina



shouldopentheirchannelsofcommunicationtocandidlyconsidertheideaof jointdevelopmentsothatwhentheycelebratetheannualanniversaryoftheirtiesinthefuture,theywillsharecommonaccomplishmentsratherthanexchangeharshwords.39

Setting aside disputes for all kinds of joint exploration is now veryneeded. Sadly, the joint marine seismic undertaking (JMSU), agreed bytheArroyo administration with China, has been accused by the PhilippineCongressasoneofthecrimescommittedbyherduringherpresidency.

4.4.Bilateral-levelNegotiation

Lastbutnotleast,territorialdisputesoftheSouthChinaSeahavetobesolvedonthebasisofbilateral-levelnegotiation.

Unlike economic cooperation and EastAsian regionalization in whichChina hopes thatASEAN will play the role of the “hub” while China iswilling to be one of the “spokes”. China’s goodwill toward theASEANcountriesincludeitswillingnesstoletASEANhavetheleadingroletoplayin regional economic affairs and in bringing “common development andprosperity” toASEAN member states amid the tide of regionalization.40Sovereigntyiscloselyrelatedtonationalism,andallpartiesintheconflictaredriven inpartbynationalismandthebelief in the indisputablesovereigntyof the “mother country”. What China has been said about or accused of,concerningnationalismand sovereignty, couldalsobe applied to theothernations in the region.Manyparties ina territorialdispute feel thepressurefrom their own people, especially in the Internet age, not to concede anypieceof territory.This internalpressuremakescompromiseshard toreach.However, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has set a goodexampleinsolvingtheterritorialdisputesbetweenmembercountries(China,Russia,Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan)bybilateralbordertalks.

Notes+ AnearlierversionofthispaperwaspresentedattheInternationalConferenceon

“TheSouthChinaSea:TowardaRegionofPeace,CooperationandProgress”,jointly organized by the Foreign Service Institute of the Ministry of ForeignAffairsofthePhilippines,theNationalDefenseCollegeofthePhilippinesandtheDevelopmentAcademyofVietnamon5th-6thJuly2011,atDusitThaniHotelinMakati,MetroManila,thePhilippines.Theauthorwouldliketoindicatethatthispaperrepresentsherpersonalviews,notthoseoftheinstitutions.

* DrShenHongfang沈红芳isProfessorattheFacultyofInternationalRelationsand Research School of SoutheastAsian Studies, Xiamen University, FujianProvince,China.ShenalsoholdsafullpositionofSeniorResearchFellowatthe


598 Shen Hongfang

CenterofSoutheastAsianStudies,underthejointdirectoryoftheStateMinistryofEducationandXiamenUniversity,China.<Email: [email protected]>

1. SeePalanca(2007).2. http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm3. TheCSPscanmakeafullorpartialsubmission,orajointsubmission.TheCSPs

canalsosubmittheirpreliminaryinformationindicativeoftheouterlimitsoftheextendedcontinentalshelf.Objectionstosubmissionscanalsobemade.

4. Rothwell(2008:195).5. DuTran,“MaritimeBoundariesandtheSpratlys:ChinaCausesConcern”,Opinion

Asia,29thJune2009.<http://opinionasia.com/Chinamaritimeboundaries>6. EvanA.Laksmana,“JakartaEyestheSouthChinaSea”,The Diplomat,Centre

for Strategic and International Studies, 23rd February 2011. <http://www.csis.or.id/Publications-OpinionsDetail.php?id=825>

7. DuTran,“MaritimeBoundariesandtheSpratlys”.8. MailaAger, “Bicam OKs Baseline Bill”, The Philippine Daily Inquirer, 16th

February2009.<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20090216-189576/Bicam-OKs-baseline-bill>

9. DrWaldenBelloisaretiredprofessorfromtheUniversityofthePhilippinesandhewasalsoa formerco-directorofSouthFocus, anNGObased inBangkok,Thailand.

10. Dona Pazzibugan and Norman Bordadora, “It’s West Philippine Sea: Gov’t,AFP Use It Now to Refer to Disputed SpratlyAreas”, The Philippine Daily Inquirer,11thJune2011.<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/13833/%E2%80%98it% E2%80%99s-west-philippine-sea%E2%80%99>

11. DuTran,“MaritimeBoundariesandtheSpratlys”.12. http://baike.baidu.com/view/2210290.htm13. TengkuNoorShamsiahTengkuAbdullah,“ChinaSupportsMalaysia’sProposal

toShareEconomicActivitiesinSouthChinaSea”,Sinchew Daily,6thJune2011.<http://www.mysinchew.com/node.58304>

14. NgEngHen,“BuildingStrategicConfidence:AvoidingWorst-CaseOutcomes”,andDato’SriNajibTunRazak,KeynoteAddressatthe10thIISSAsianSecuritySummit, The Shangri-la Dialogue, 3rd-5th June 2011. <http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2011/>

15. Shen(2010).16. Wu(2009:100).17. Bateman(2009:31).18. http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/schina.html19. Shen(2009).20. China’s latest defensewhite paper reiterated that “China adheres to a defense

policy that is pure in nature” and “whether at present or in the future, nomatterhowdeveloped itmaybe,Chinawillneverseekhegemonyormilitaryexpansion.”Adopted fromLiangGuanglie, “ABetterFuture throughSecurityCooperation”, speech atThe 10th IISSAsia Security Summit, Singapore, 5thJune 2011 <http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2011/speeches/fourth-plenary-session/general-liang-guanglie-english/>.



21. Ibid.22. Quoted in CarlyleA. Thayer, “The South China Sea: China’s ‘Indisputable

Sovereignty’ VersusAmerica’s ‘National Interest’”, China-US Focus, 23rdJune 2011. <http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/the-south-china-sea-china%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Cindisputable-sovereignty%E2%80%9D-versus-america%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Cnational-interest%E2%80%9D/>

23. JoshuaKurlantzick,“AvoidingaTempestintheSouthChinaSea”,Expert Brief,CounciloftheForeignRelations,2ndSeptember2010.<http://www.cfr.org/china/avoiding-tempest-south-china-sea/p22858>

24. HuangChao,“SomeCountriesArePlayingwithFire;HopefullytheUnitedStatesDoesNotGetBurned”,Dong Fang Daily东方早报,23rdJune2011.<http://www.dfdaily.com/html/51/2011/6/23/621546.shtml>

25. Question:SouthChinaSeaisChina’s‘CoreInterest’?<http://www.peopleforum.cn/viewthread.php?tid=83118>

26. CarlyleA.Thayer,“TheSouthChinaSea”.27. HanXudong,“TheSouthSeaMayBecomeanAreaof‘Low-IntensityArmed

Conflict’”, Outlook Magazine瞭望周刊, 13th June 2011. <http://www.lwgcw.com/NewsShow.aspx?newsId=21296>

28. “Question: South China Sea Is China’s ‘Core Interest’?” <http://www.people forum.cn/viewthread.php?tid=83118>

29. “ZhangZhaozhong:China-NorthKoreanBorderIsProblematic”,Strong China Net强国网, 4th May 2011. <http://www.chnqiang.com/article/2011/0504/mil_43555_7.shtml>

30. “Dangers in theSouthSea:ZhangZhaozhongSurprisesAnyone, It IsUselessEvenMakingaCaseattheUnitedNations”,Strong China Net强国网,6thJune2011.<http://www.chnqiang.com/article/2011/0621/mil_46222.shtml>

31. “Zhang Zhaozhong: Big Changes in the South Sea, China Must UseArms toRetaketheSouthSea”,Strong China Net强国网,24thJune2011.<http://www.chnqiang.com/article/2011/0624/mil_46377_5.shtml>

32. “LuoYuan:SettingasideDisputeDoesNotMeanChinaIsWeak”,Xinhua News 新华网,13thMarch2009.<http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2009-03/13/content_11002833.htm>

33. “Major General LuoYuan on the South Sea: Do Not Test China’s Patience”,Phoenix News凤凰网,15thJune2011.<http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/special/nanhaizhengduan/content-3/detail_2011_06/15/7029497_0.shtml>

34. Edward Wong, “China Hedges over Whether South China Sea Is a ‘CoreInterest’”,The New York Times,30thMarch2011.<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/ 03/31/world/asia/31beijing.html?partner=rss&emc=rss>

35. http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2011-01-10/1456627649.html36. Li(2010)andGuo(2009).37. Quoted in Niklas Swanstrom, “Conflict Management and Negotiations in the

SoutheastSea:TheASEANWay?”,pp.107-108,The South China Sea Virtual Library<http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/Swanstrom.pdf>.

38. PanchaliSaikia,“SouthChinaSeaDisputes:FlawedNegotiations,anAnalysis”,Eurasia Review: News and Analysis, 20th March 2011. <http://www.eurasia review.com/south-china-sea-disputes-flawed-negotiations-analysis-30032011/>


600 Shen Hongfang

39. Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Word War in South China Sea:A Diplomatic Crisis inPhilippine-ChinaRelations?”,The Philippine Star,10thJune2011<http://www.philstar.com/nation/article.aspx?publicationSubCategoryId=200&articleId=694871>.TheauthoristheexecutivedirectorofthePhilippineInstituteforPeace,ViolenceandTerrorismResearch(PIPVTR)andamemberoftheBoardofthePhilippinesAssociationforChineseStudies(PACS).HeisalsotheauthorofthebookSecurity Aspects of Philippines-China Relations.

40.Thedefinitionof“hubandspokestructure”ineconomicsmeansthatthespokesare the smaller investment vehicles while the hub is considered the centralinvestmentvehicle,inwhichinvestmentsfromthespokespooltheirassetsintoonecentralvehicle.

ReferencesBateman,Sam(2009),“GoodOrderatSea in theSoutheastChinaSea”, inShicun

WuandKeyuanZou(eds),Maritime Security in the South China Sea: Regional implication and International Cooperation,Burlington:VT:Ashgate,pp.15-34.

Li,Jinming李金明 (2010),“NanhaiFengyun:DongtaiyuQushi南海风云：动态与趋势”[ThestormysituationoftheSouthChinaSea:developmentandtrend],Shijie Zhishi世界知识[Worldaffairs],Vol.11,pp.14-20.

Guo,Yuan郭渊(2009),“Hezuo:JiejueNanhaiWentiteBiyouzhiLu合作：解决南海问题的必由之路”[Cooperation:theonlywaytosolvetheissueofSouthChinaSea],Zhongguo Bianjiang Shi Di Yanjiu中国边疆史地研究[China’sborderlandhistoryandgeographystudies,Vol.19,No.2,pp.127-135,150.

Palanca,Ellen(2007),“Philippines-ChinaRelations:‘GoldenAgeofPartnership’”,inLaiHongyiandLimTinSeng(eds),Harmony and Development: ASEAN-China Relations,Singapore:WorldScientificPublishing,pp.149-154.

Rothwell, Donald R. (2008), “Issues and Strategies for Outer Continental ShelfClaims”,The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law,Vol.23,No.2,pp.185-211.

Shen,Hongfang沈红芳(2009),“AReviewofResearchesonTotal-factorProductivityinEastAsianEconomicGrowth”,Journal of Xiamen University (A Bimonthly for Studies in Arts & Social Sciences),GeneralSerialNo.191,No.1,pp.60-66.

Shen,Hongfang沈红芳(2010),“China-SoutheastAsianEconomicRelationsinthe21stCentury:EvolvingFeaturesandFutureChallenges”,International Journal of China Studies,Vol.1,No.1,pp.25-45.

Wu, Shicun (2009), “Commentary:A Regional Perspective on South China SeaPassageSecurity”,inShicunWuandKeyuanZou(eds),Maritime Security in the South China Sea: Regional Implication and International Cooperation,Burlington,VT:Ashgate,pp.99-107.


Clashing American Images of China and China-ASEAN Relations 601InternationalJournalofChinaStudiesVol.2,No.3,December2011,pp.601-623

ClashingAmericanImagesofanEmergentChinaand21st-Century

China-ASEANRelations:2001-2008+

Renato Cruz DeCastro*DeLaSalleUniversity

Abstract

This article examines the clashing images of an emergent China amongAmerican China Watchers. In the early years of the 21st century, theseAmericanChinaWatchersdismissedtheimageofChinaasamilitarythreatto the US. Instead, they observed that China uses its growing economicresourcesandmultilateraldiplomacytoenhanceitsrelationswiththeASEANmember-states.Eventually,theyperceivedChina’semergenceasaconstraintonAmericanpoliticalandeconomicinterestsinSoutheastAsia.TheydepictedChinaaspervasivelyinfluentialandapplyingsoft-powertoengagetheUSinazero-sumgameintheregion.However,thisimageisnegatedbyacontrastingviewthataccentuatesthelimitsofChinesediplomaticgambit.Inconclusion,thearticlelinkstheseclashingimagestoBeijing’sforeignpolicyobjectivesinSoutheastAsia,andWashington’sstrategyofhedgingagainstanychallengethatanemergentChinaposes.

Keywords: China’s emergence, China’s charm offensive, China-US relations, perception in international relations

JEL classification:F53, F59, N45, Q34

1.Introduction

AmajorissueincontemporaryEastAsiaisChina’semergenceasaregionaleconomicpower.Inlessthanthreedecades,Chinawasabletotransformitscommandandslow-growingautarkiceconomyintoadynamicmarket-orientedonethathasbecometheworld’smostformidableexportingjuggernaut.ThePeople’s Republic of China (PRC) is now a major player in the globaleconomy,thedrivingforcebehindtherapidrecoveryofEastAsianeconomiesafter the 1997Asian financial crisis, and an influential regional power.


602 Renato Cruz De Castro

Currently,itusesitsboomingeconomytodispensecommercialopportunitiesandeconomicassistancetothememberstatesoftheAssociationofSoutheastAsianNations(ASEAN)andtodrawthemgraduallyintoitspoliticalorbit.These countries have realized again soon enough that China’s burgeoningeconomygreatlybenefits them.Atpresent, regional tradeflourishesdue tothehugeChinesemarketforindustrialcomponents,rawmaterials,food,andother consumer exports. Thus, a vigorous economic relationship has beenestablishedbetweenChina’simportgrowthanditsincreasingexportstoitsneighbouringstates.Thesedevelopments,inturn,havetransformedChinaintoaninfluentialgreatpowerinSoutheastAsia.

ThisturnofeventshascausedconcernsinWashingtonD.C.Giventhesheer size of China’s economy, its growing trade, and expanding overseasinvestments and Official DevelopmentAssistance (ODA) with SoutheastAsian countries,American China Watchers have warned that ChineseinfluencehaspervadedSoutheastAsia,inmuchthesamewaythatAmericaninfluencehasspreadinCentralAmericaand,toalesserdegree,intheAndeanregionofSouthAmerica(DeSantis,2005:23-36).Indeed,ChinahasbecomeamajoruncertaintytoUSforeignpolicyinEastAsiaandapowerfulnationwiththe“greatestpotentialtocompetemilitarilywiththeU.S.”(AbramowitzandBosworth,2003:15;Connetta,2006:8).WhiledisagreeingoverChina’slong-tern intention and the future of US-China relations, mostAmericanChinaWatchersbelievethat“managingtheriseofChinaconstitutesoneofthe greatest challenges facing the United States in the early 21st century”(Scott,2007:158-166).

This article explores thedifferent and clashing imagesof an emergentChinaand its increasinglycooperative relationswith theASEANmember-statesamonganumberofAmericanChinaWatchers.Itaddressesthispivotalquestion:InthelightofChina’semergence,howdosomeAmericanChinaWatchersviewChina’semergenceasaneconomicpowerinEastAsia,andenhanced China-ASEAN relations? Other specific questions follow: HowdoesChinatry to improveitsrelationswith theASEANmember-states?IsChina’s charm offensive underminingAmerican influence and prestige inSoutheastAsia? Historically, how doAmerican China Watchers view thisdevelopment?Whatare theirdifferentandclashingperceptionsonChina’semergence and China-ASEAN relations?What is the relationship betweentheseclashingviewsandUSforeignpolicyvis-à-vistheChinachallengeinSoutheastAsia?

2.ImagesandPerceptionsinInternationalRelations

Sincethestartofthe21stcentury,manyAmericanChinaWatchersareen-gagedinaperennialandintensedebateonhowWashingtonshouldviewand


Clashing American Images of China and China-ASEAN Relations 603

respondtoBeijing’sgrowingeconomicandpoliticalcloutinSoutheastAsia.TheyareunanimousinarguingthatChina’sincreasingregionalinfluenceisavalidforeignpolicyconcernfortheUS.TheboneofcontentioniswhetherornotChinahastheintentionandcapabilitytochallengetheUS’shegemonicpositioninSoutheastAsia.SomeregardChinaasaformidablechallengetoAmericaninterestsinthispartoftheworld.OthersbelievethatChinaisaconservative, ifnot a constructive regional statusquopower.A fewarguethecountryitisnotpowerfulenoughtochallengetheUSandmay,infact,evolveintoanAmericanpartneroradefactoally.TotheseAmericanChinaWatchers,“China,afterdecadesofexertingonlymodestinfluenceinAsia,isnowamoreactiveandimportantregionalactor.”(Saunders,2008:127)Thus,theyallsharethebeliefthatChinaisapowertocontendwithinSoutheastAsiathatpotentiallycanbeeitherapartnerorachallengetotheUS.

Byfocusingonperceptions,thisstudyassumesthatcurrentforeignpolicydebates,recommendationsandpositionsonChina’semergenceinSoutheastAsiaare indicativeofhowAmericanChinaWatchersviewtheworld.Thisperceptualanalysisconsiderssuchvariablesasmotivation,mindset,images,andinstitutionalaffiliationamongothers.Asamethodology,theperceptualsystemwhichbuildsmentalrepresentationintheformofimages(ormindset)throughtheuseofpsychologicalmechanism,orcategorizationhasbeenfoundtoinfluencepolicyrecommendationorpositionofscholars,analysts,andevengovernmentofficials(Kulma,1999:76).Themostprominentsourceoftheseimagesistheirpublishedworks.

Intheir1961workThe Foundations of International Politics,HaroldandMargaretSprouthighlightstheimportanceofperceptionintheformulationofpolicyand inpolicydebates.These twoPrincetonscholarsexplored thepsychologicalenvironmentthatconsistsofideasderivedfromtheindividuals’perceptionofconditionsandeventsinterpretedinthelightoftheirconsciousmemoriesandsub-consciouslystoredintheirknowledge(SproutandSprout,1963: 46-47).The psychological environment may or may not correspondclosely to reality but it affects policy recommendations in two ways: (1)mayperceivewhatdoesnotexistormayfail toperceivewhatdoesexists;and(2)sincewhatisperceivedisinterpretedinthelightofpastexperience,individualswithdifferentbackgroundsmayinterpretquitedifferentlythesameperceivedobjectsorevents(ibid.:48).

AnotherclassicworkontheroleofperceptionininternationalrelationsisRobertJervis’sPerception and Misperception in International Politics.Inhisbook,Jervisarguesthatitisoftenimpossibletoexplaincrucialdecisionsandpolicieswithoutreferencetothedecision-makers’beliefsabouttheworldand imagesofothers (Jervis,1976:28). Interestingly,hepointsout that inpolicydebates,itisgenerallyusefulnottoaskifanyoneisright;butusuallyitisbemorefruitfultoaskwhypeopledifferandhowtheycometoseethe



worldastheydo(ibid.:29).Healsocontentsthatdifferingperceptionsaretherootcausesofmanyinter-statedisputes.Frequently,whenactorsdonotrealizethis,theymisunderstandtheirdisagreementsandengageinanendlessdebate(ibid.:31).

Sincethelate1990s,therehasbeenaplethoraofworksontheperceptualdimensionofUS-Chinarelations.AmongthemareMichaelG.Kulma’s“TheEvolutionofU.S. ImagesofChina:APoliticalPsychologicalPerspective”(Kulma,1999:162-188),AndrewBinghamKennedy’s“China’sPerceptionsof U.S. Intentions toward Taiwan: How Hostile a Hegemon?” (Kennedy,2007: 268-287), Biwu Zhang’s “Chinese Perceptions ofAmerican Power,1991-2005”(Zhang,2005:667-686)andQinYaqing,“AResponsetoYongDeng:Power,Perception andCulturalLens.” (Qin, 2001: 155-158).Theseworksshareacommonalityofideas.First,allemphasizethefollowingideas– international relations are notoriously rife with misperceptions and US-Chinarelationsarepronetomisperceptionsandmisunderstanding(Kennedy,2007:286).Chinaand theUS tend tomisperceiveeachother’spowerandcapabilityandthisfactmatterssignificantlyintheirbilateralrelations.Third,in tackling the environmental factors in international relations, there is abasicbeliefinMargaretandHaroldSprout’saphorismthat“whatmattersishowdecision-makersimaginethestate’spowertobe,nothowitactuallyis”(Zhang,2005:668).

3.China’sCharmOffensiveinSoutheastAsia

Withitslongcivilizationandcentralgeographiclocation,ChinahasalwaysconsidereditselfasagreatpowerinEastAsia.Now,itisinapositiontochal-lengethedominantpowerintheregion–theUS–givenitsconsiderablemili-tarycapabilityandrapideconomicgrowthinthepasttwodecades.However,it doesnotdare confront theUShead-on soonor in the immediate future.China’sconcentratesoneconomicdevelopmenttoensureitscomprehensivesecurity, without subordinating its efforts to meet direct challenges fromany superpower (Ong, 2002: 179).China’smainpressing security concernismaintainingitsdynamiceconomicrelationswithJapan,SouthKorea,theUSandtheASEANstates.Beijing’sbaselinegoalsincluderapideconomicgrowth, continuous pursuit of economic liberalization, globalization, andsocialliberalization,politicalconsolidation(forthecommunistparty),andtheupkeepofacredibleandmodernmilitaryforcedirectedagainstTaiwan.AllthesearedirectedtowardsdevelopingitsregionalinfluenceandcertainlynottochallengetheUSonaglobalscale(Overholt,2008:124).

Despite itscooperative relationswith theUS,mostChinese regard theworld’s sole superpowerasa threat to theirnational securityanddomesticstability (Scott, 2007: 158). This distrust stems from Washington’s tacit



support of the status quo in the Taiwan Straits and its alleged agenda ofsubvertingthefewremainingsocialiststatesintheworldthroughaprocessof“peacefulevolution”(Ong,2002:116).Thisdeep-seatedsuspicionoftheUSisexacerbatedbyincreasedAmericanmilitarypresenceinSoutheastAsiaasaresultoftheBushAdministrationwaronterrorafter9/11.Repeatedly,Chinahasarticulatedtheneedforanewworldorderthatismultipolarratherthanunipolarasadefensivemeasuretowhatitperceivesasastructuralthreatfrom the region’s dominant power. More importantly, it uses its structuralpowertofosteraregionalorderwhichallowsSoutheastAsiastatestofreelysidewitheitherofthetwopowers(ChinaandtheUS)withoutmakinganyfirmcommitmenttoanyofthem(Odgaard,2007:54).Usingitsprowessinthefieldsofsecurity,production,andfinance,Chinamaintainsasituationof“unstablebalancing”inEastAsiawithoutdirectlychallengingAmericanpre-eminenceintheregion(ibid.:54).Tocarryoutthisdiplomaticgambit,Chinaco-optstheSoutheastAsiancountriesbyprovidingthemside-paymentsandinstitutionalvoicethroughitsrapidlygrowingeconomy;andbysupportingcooperativeandintegrativeprojectsintheregion.

Duringthe5thChina-ASEANsummitinNovember2001,Beijingofferedits SoutheastAsian neighbours a free-trade deal that could be establishedin the next few years. The following year, during the 6th China-ASEANsummit,thetwosidessignedtheFrameworkAgreementonChina-ASEANComprehensiveEconomicCooperation,pavingthewayfortheformationofaChina-ASEANfreetradezoneby2010.Since2005,ChinaandtheASEANstateshaveloweredtheirtariffsonmorethan7,000products.1Consequently,China-ASEANtradehasgrownrapidly.Theirtwo-waytradevolumein2006amountedtoUS$160.8billion,whichtranslatesintoa23.4percentincreasefromthe2005tradelevel.2ChinaandtheASEANarenowthefourthbiggesttrading partners. In July 2007, China and the 10ASEAN member-statessignedtheASEAN-ChinaAgreementonTradeandServices,whichprovidesforcooperationinhigh-technologyservices,energy,andconstruction,andfortheeventualestablishmentofacomprehensivefree-tradeareainEastAsia.

Chinaboosteditseconomictieswithalmostallof theSoutheastAsianstates including traditional US allies such the Philippines,Thailand and tolargeextent,Singapore.WithweakeningglobaldemandforASEANexports,andtheUSyettorecoverfromthecurrenteconomicrecession,ASEAN-Chinatrade relations are expected to intensify. During the 2008 China-ASEANBusiness and Investment Summit in Nanning,ASEAN economic officialsindicatedtheirintentiontodeepentheirtradetieswithChinatoreducetheireconomies’ relianceon theexportmarketsof theUS,WesternEurope,andJapan.3 TheASEAN countries hope that China’s domestic demand willincreaseeventuallyandthus,providesomeleverageonthesluggishgrowthin the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)



market.Earlyin2007,economictiesbetweenChinaandtheASEANstateswere acknowledged during a seminar conducted by the China-ASEANBusinessCouncilinBeijing.Thegatheringnotedthatoverthepast15years,bilateral economic and trade relations between China andASEAN havedevelopedrapidlyandthemechanismforcooperationbetweenthetwosides“hasbeenoperatingbetter andbetter”.4 Itwas alsopredicted thatASEANexportgrowthwouldbestimulatedbyEastAsiancountries likeChinaandJapan,andnotbylong-haulmarketssuchasWesternEuropeandtheUnitedStates.SoutheastAsianeconomistsnowlabelChinaasan“economicpowerthatshouldbebestviewedasabusinesspartner,notacompetitor,giventhewideroomithasforexpansionintradeandinvestmentrelations”.5

Chinaalsodispensesside-paymentstothesmallerASEANstates,throughthe framework of theAPT process and multilateral arrangements. Chinesediplomats consider theAPT as the “main channel of EastAsian regionalcooperation”signifying its relative importancevis-à-visother regional fora(Moore,2004:118).ThroughtheAPT,thePRChasconsolidateditsbilaterallinkswiththeASEANcountries.IthasdonatedUS$1milliontotheASEANDevelopmentFund,andcommittedtotrain8,000ASEANprofessionalswithinfive years. It will also administer and finance a series of agro-technologytrainingprogrammesforASEANmember-statesorganizationin2007.6Duringthe2007ASEAN-Chinasummit,Chinahintedthatitwillfavourablyconsiderestablishingeconomicandtradezoneswithsoundinfrastructureandcompleteindustrialchains inanumberofASEANcountries thatwillbe linkedwithitsowneconomiczonesalongitscoastalareas.ChinahasalsoprovidedtheASEAN member-states US$750 million in loans and has invested heavilyin their major infrastructure projects. In 2007, Chinese companies signeda US$2.8 billion contract to build coal-fired electric plants in Indonesia,significantlyoutbiddingotherforeigncompanies.7InthePhilippines,Chinahas agreed to finance and construct the US$450 million North Luzon railproject while Chinese agricultural technology is developing the country’shybrid rice and hybrid corn as Manila seeks to develop self-reliance andsufficiency in food production and supply.8 Since 2002, China has alsoextendedeconomicassistanceandinvestmentstoCambodia,Laos,Myanmar,Thailand,andVietnamthroughtheframeworkoftheGreaterMekongSub-Region(GMS).9Duringthe2003ASEANSummitinBali,ChinaproposedtorevitalizethemoribundBrunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-PhilippinesEastAsianGrowthAreas (BIMP-EAGA) through technical and capital assistance foritsprojects,forstrengthenedsocio-economicrelations,andintensifiedtraderelationswiththesub-regionalgroup.

ChinaalsointeractswithitsSoutheastAsianpartnersinseveralregionaleconomic fora. The notion that regionalism elsewhere benefits membereconomies,andthefearofdamagetodomesticeconomicinterestsifaccess



toforeignmarketssimilar tothatenjoyedbycompetitorsisnotnegotiated,are the primary reasons behind China’s enthusiasm for regional economicarrangements.Mostprominent among themare theAsia-PacificEconomicCooperation (APEC),ASEAN plus Three (APT), Shanghai CooperationOrganization(SCO),theBoaoForumforAsia(BFA),andtheTumenRiverArea Development Programme. For China, this means that each regionalforumhasaslightlydifferentpoliticalandeconomicdynamic.But theyallserveChina’sforeignpolicygoals.Withdomesticeconomicgrowthextremelydependent on the regional economy, Chinese leaders see regionalism as amechanismbywhichcountriescanworktogethertoaddressthevagariesandinstabilityoftheworldeconomy.Likewise,theyviewregionalismasawayof responding to the forces of globalization.As a form of multilateralism,regional groupings could advance China’s national security concerns bycounter-balancing the US’s financial and military power, which remainsrelativelyuncheckedsincethecollapseoftheSovietUnionin1991.

4.PromotingChina’sVisionofRegionalSecurity

Another means by which China applies its stratagem of unstable powerbalancing is undermining indirectly the US’s well-established system ofalliancesandforward-deployedforces inAsia.Specifically,Chinadebunksthebasis(theso-calledChinathreat)ofthesealliancesandtheirobsoleteColdWarmentalmode.ThisbecametooapparentwhenChinaannouncedits“NewSecurityConcept”(NSC)in1998.Premisedoncooperativeandcoordinatedsecurity,theNSCpresentsapatternofdiplomatic-defenserelationshipwithcountriesthatareneitheralliesnoradversariesofChina.AccordingtoBeijing,thenewconceptissuitedtoapost-ColdWarenvironmentcharacterizedbypeaceanddevelopmentbutthreatenedbynon-traditional(non-state)securitychallenges,e.g.,transnationalcrimes,internationalterrorism,etc.

Chinahasconsistentlypromotedthisconceptinitsconductofregionaland international security affairs. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO)basicallyincorporatesChina’sapproachinaddressingnon-traditionalsecurity challenges such as terrorism, separatism, extremism, and drugtrafficking(InformationOfficeoftheStateCouncilofthePeople’sRepublicof China, 2006: 87). In 2006, the country hosted the 6th meeting of theCouncil of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization where China and themember states signed a friendly, long-term, “good-neighbour” agreementto enhance their cooperation in economic, trade and security matters.10Furthermore, through theASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Beijing hashosted or helped finance and organized various symposia and workshopson counter-terrorism, non-traditional security challenges, and the non-proliferationofweaponsofmassdestruction inChinaand invariousparts



of SoutheastAsia. China also assisted Indonesia in dealing with the avianinfluenzaepidemiclastyearandthisyear,anditannouncedthatitwouldhostaChina-ASEANsymposiumonthepreventionandcontrolofhumaninfectionwith pathological avian influenza. It will also conduct training courses onreconstructionandmanagementofdisaster-hitareasforASEANofficialsandexpertsthisyear.

The establishment of the EastAsia Summit (EAS) in December 2005was the culmination of China’s efforts to advance its NSC in the region.Malaysia initiated the formationof theEAS,butwithChina’s support andactiveencouragement.Theopportune timingof thesummitbodedwell forChina’s emergence as a regional power in EastAsia.This was manifestedduringthe2ndEASinCebuCity,PhilippinesinJanuary2007,whenChinatookcentrestagedespitethepresenceoftheUS’salliesandfriends,namelyAustralia, Japan and to a certaindegree, India.Apart from signing severaleconomicagreementswithASEANmember-states,Chinapushedforregionalcommunity-buildingandeconomicintegration.

5.JumpingontheASEANBandwagon?

Another means by which China unbalances the US’s strategic clout andinfluence inEastAsia ismultilateralconsultationwith the region’ssmallerstates. China was earlier averse to regional groupings, fearing that thesegroupingscouldbeusedbysomecountriestopunishandconstrainthePRC.During the second half of the 1990s, Beijing was actively involved in theARF.ItquicklyadjustedtoARF’sincrementalstylebyusingitssoft-powerapproachincontaininginter-statedisputes.IndealingwiththeARF,Beijinghasemphasizedthefollowingnorms(Haacke,2003:137):(1)participatingonanequalfooting;(2)reachingunanimitythroughconsensus;(3)seekingcommongroundwhilereservingdifferences;and(4)proceedinginanorderlyand incremental manner. Consequently, China was able to protect its owninterests in theARF and promoteASEAN conventions as the underlyingframework for cooperation in regional security affairs. In more concreteterms, Beijing prevented theARF from being used as a means to balanceandrestrainChina;boostedASEAN’sleadershiproleintheregionalforumbyconstrainingtheUSandJapan;andeffectivelyprojectedtheimageofthePRCasagoodneighbour.

Beijing has also become pragmatic in managing its territorial disputeswith theASEAN states over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Though thePRCstillclingstoitshistoricclaimsovertheseislands,itiswillingtosettlethis thorny issue through peaceful means, based on international law. In2002,afterfouryearsofintensivenegotiations,ASEANandChinasignedacodeofconductaimedatdemonstrating“restraint”intheSouthChinaSea.



Significantly,thefinaldraftincludedmostofthetextproposedbyASEANandlittleofwhatwaspresentedbyChina.Intheaftermathofthe2ndEASsummit,ChinaexpressedconfidencethatASEANandChinawouldsoonbeable toagreeonactivitiesandprojectsenvisionedby the2002Declarationon the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.11A clear indication ofthe relaxation of tension in the Spratlys was the conduct of the TripartiteAgreementforJointMarineSeismicSurveybythreeclaimantstates–China,thePhilippines,andVietnam.Thesurveyinvolvedathree-phaseprogrammeofdata-gathering,consolidationandinterpretationofabout11,000kilometersof 2D seismic data on the South China Sea. The initial phase ended inNovember 2005, the second phase began in 2007, and the project wascompleted in June 2008. The undertaking served as a module of regionalcooperation,andamajormovethatcouldbuildtrustandconfidenceamongtheclaimantstates.

Alsoduringthe2ndEASsummit,ChinaannounceditshostingofChina-ASEAN workshop on peace-keeping in the later part of 2007, to promotedefensecooperation,understandingandconfidenceamongthearmedforcesofChina and theASEANstates.12The activitywas considered the first ofits kind between the two sides, and another important defense exchangeprogramme aligned with the China-ASEAN regional security seminarregularly held in Beijing since 2003.At the same event, China mentionedtheimportanceofthePeople’sLiberationArmy’sNavy(PLAN)shipvisitstoASEAN ports on friendly calls in fostering friendship and mutual trust.AlongwithotherongoingsecurityandmilitaryexchangeprogrammeswiththeASEANstates, thisproposal couldbe interpretedasChina’sgambit tomarginalize and eventually exclude the US from regional security affairs.ThisinitiativemarkedaradicaldeparturefromBeijing’spositioninthe1990s,whenitavoidedanysecuritydialoguewithASEANmember-states,letalonewiththeirarmedservices.

6.FirstImage:FromaMilitarytoaMulti-DimensionalChallenge

DuringtheColdWar,AmericanChinaWatchersconsideredChinesepowerintermsofitscoerciveelement.TheyweretakenabackwhenBeijingbeganusingitssymbolic,intellectual-ideological,economicandculturalresourcesin its charmoffensive inSoutheastAsia in the late1990s and in the early21stcentury.BecauseoftheUS’sengagementintheKoreanWarintheearly1950s,Americanpolicy-makers,academics,andanalystsgenerallyperceivedChina in substantially strategic terms. Consequently, they overlooked therapidgrowthoftheChineseeconomyinthelate1990s,andthedevelopmentandrefinementofChinesediplomaticapparatus(Lampton,2007:115).ThisrealizationofChina’s“charmoffensive”impresseduponthemthecentrality



ofeconomicprowessandsoft-powerinChina’sforeignpolicy.Furthermore,withChina’sactive involvement inglobalaffairs, therewasa feltneedforWashington to engage Beijing in its own game of charm offensive (ibid:116).

Accordingly, China has been using its growing political clout andincreasing economic resources in a patient, low-key, and highly effectivemanner. It has greatly improved its historically problematic relations withtheSoutheastAsianstatesbytakingamorecooperativeapproachtoresolveterritorialdisputes,providinggenerousODApackages,andforgingfree-tradeagreements.American observers have also noted former President Bush’sand his close advisers’ obsession with the counter-insurgency campaign inIraqandAfghanistan,thedecliningimageoftheUSabroad,andthepreviousadministration’s perceived inattention and neglect of EastAsia. ObservingtheintellectualfrenzyinWashingtontriggeredbythedecipheringofChina’scharmoffensiveinSoutheastAsia,The Economistnotedin2005:

InSoutheastAsia,Chinahasskillfullypositioneditselfasacentralplayer,to the extent thatAmericansarebeginning to feel leftout.OnDecember14 in Kuala Lumpur the first EastAsian Summit will be held, involvingthetenmembersoftheAssociationofSoutheastAsianNations(ASEAN)plusChina,Japan,SouthKorea,Australia,NewZealandandIndia.WithnoAmericanleadersinvited,thereisnodoubtthatChinawillbethestaroftheshow.Itspositionwillbebolsteredbyasurgingeconomythatisgeneratingtrade surpluses with China for severalAsian countries. In contrast to therecord trade deficit between China andAmerica that is fueling so muchAmericanfearofaloomingChinathreat.13

Inthelate1990sandearly21stcentury,manyAmericanChinaWatcherstendedtoviewChinaprimarilyasaregionaleconomicandmilitarypowerposingthegreatestuncertaintytotheUS(Scott,2007:127).Theirfocuswas“China’sgrowingdefenseexpendituresandthemodernizationofthePeople’sLiberationArmy (PLA)” which presents the US with far-ranging potentialchallenges(ibid.:124).InThe United States and a Rising China: Strategic and Military Implications,theauthorsviewChina’semergenceasprimarilyamilitarychallengetotheUS(Khalilzadet al.,1999).CommissionedbytheRandCorporation, thisstudyarguesthat theChineseforeignpolicygoal iscomprehensivenationalpowertoraiselivingstandardofthepopulation,andsetthetechnological-industrialbaseforastrongmilitary(ibid.:xi).ItclaimsthatChina’seconomicmodernizationisalignedwithmilitarymodernization.Itisprojectedthatby2015,Chinawillbecomeaformidable(military)power–onethatmightbelabeledamulti-dimensionalregionalcompetitorthatcanexerciseseadenialagainsttheUSNavyandthreatenUSoperatinglocationsinthewholeofEastAsiawithitslong-rangestrikecapabilityamongothers



(Cliff et al., 2007). It further asserts that China will eventually pursue itsterritorialclaimsintheSouthChinaSeaandtheSpratlys,protectitsbusinessinterests and ethnic Chinese population in SoutheastAsia, and securedeferencefromitsless-powerfulneighbours.(ibid.:27-36).

TheconstructofanemergentChinaasamilitary threat to theUSanditsneighbouringstates,however,wasmodifiedinthesecondhalfofthefirstdecadeof the21stcentury.ThisnewimageprojectsChinaasapatientbutconfident actor using its soft-power instruments to expand its influence inSoutheastAsiainparticularandintheglobaleconomyingeneral(Garrison,2005:25).ItrecognizesBeijing’ssubtleandadroitdiplomaticgambitstoallythe fears and concerns of the less powerfulASEAN states by establishingmutually beneficial political, economic, and cultural ties with them. ThisrepresentationcastsChina’spolicyofpeacefulemergenceasa“sophisticatedneo-mercantilist approach” in competing for power that has been alteredby globalization (ibid.: 25). Thus, China’s charm offensive or soft-powerdiplomacyisnotseenasaninherentorimmediatethreattoUSinterestsinSoutheastAsia although it can potentially destabilize the regional and theglobal economic systems in the future (ibid.: 25). Furthermore, this viewregards China as neitherAmerica’s friend nor an enemy. However, it canthreatenAmericaninterestintheneartermperiod.Hence,theUSiswarnedtoremainvigilantandnottolabelitsrelationwithChinaassimplyhostileorfriendly(ibid.:30).

Hugh De Santis’s 2005 article contends that an emergent China willutilize itseconomicpowerandmultilateraldiplomacy toalter the strategiclandscape of EastAsia at the expense of the US (De Santis, 2005). Heobserves that China is now a global manufacturing hub and its regionallyintegratedeconomicpowersupportsitsgeo-strategicambitions.TheChina-ledSoutheastAsianeconomicintegrationweakenstheUS-centredhub-and-spokeframeworkofEastAsiansecurityandforcesWashingtontosharepowerwithBeijingintheAsia-Pacificregion(ibid.:31-32).HealsodeplorestheBushAdministration’s obsession with the war on terror, and its utter neglect ofChina’sexpansionofinfluenceinSoutheastAsia(ibid.:23).

Inhis2007article,JinH.Pakaffirms thatChinausescooperativeandmultilateraldiplomacy to transform infamous imageas amilitary threat toSoutheastAsianstates.This,accordingtoPak,subvertsAmerica’sbilateralallianceswhileWashingtonremainsenmeshedintheMiddleEastandCentralAsia(Pak,2007).China’suseofsoftpowerjibesitsgrandstrategy–whichis based on the adroit combination of force and diplomacy.As such, itactuallydoesnotrepresentafundamentalbeliefinthevirtuesofcooperativediplomacy. He predicts two possible outcomes for China’s soft-powerdiplomacyorcharmoffensiveinSoutheastAsia:(1)thePRCcansucceedinformingaregionalsecurityorganizationinwhichitplaysahegemonicrole,in



whichsuchadevelopmentcouldseriouslydilutetheUS’sregionalinfluence,especially if theUSdoesnotprioritizeSoutheastAsia;and (2)Chinamayencounter serious domestic and external challenges that can jeopardize itsstrategic goals and cause it to revert to more forceful, bilateral forms ofdiplomacy,includingmilitarycoercion(ibid.:57).

The January 2008 U.S. Congressional Research Service study alsoenvisages China’s practices of soft-power diplomacy or charm offensivewillexpanditseconomicandpoliticalcloutinSoutheastAsia.Itassertsthat“China’s growing use of soft-power in SoutheastAsia has presented newchallenges to U.S. foreign policy in the region”.14 The study argues thatChinawields“powerintheregionthroughdiplomacyand,toalesserextent,drawsadmirationasamodelfordevelopment,foritsancientculture,andanemphasis on ‘sharedAsian values’”. It observes that “along with offeringeconomic inducements,Chinahasallayedconcerns that itposesamilitaryoreconomicthreat,assureditsneighboursthatitstrivestobearesponsiblemember of the international community, and produced real benefits to theregion through aid, trade and investment”15. The study acknowledges thatChina has shifted away from hard power to soft power and its increasingpowerandinfluencewilleventuallyconstrainUSinterestsintheregion.

TheAugust 2008 U.S. Congressional Research Service study furtherreinforces this image of China wielding soft-power to undermine USinfluenceandinterestsinSoutheastAsia.16Itarguesthat“China’sinfluenceandimagehavebeenbolsteredthroughitsincreasinglyopenandsophisticateddiplomatic corps as well as through prominent PRC-funded infrastructure,public works, and economic investment projects in many developingcountries”.17With its increasing wealth, expanding economic ties, and so-phisticateddiplomaticmoves,Chinaprojectstheimageofanemergentbutbenign and non-threatening power. The study also admonishesAmericanpolicy-makers that Beijing’s soft-power diplomacy is more effective thanthatofWashingtonsincetheformer’soverseasactivitiesandinvestmentsareconducted by strong, well-funded state-owned companies.18 Consequently,major Chinese government activities attract more international attentionand give a “hard” edge to PRC soft power.19 In comparison, the US haslittle to match such centrally directed activities, particularly in the wakeof years of US budget cutbacks in high-profile US international publicdiplomacyprogrammes.Furthermore,itraisesthepossibilitythateventually,“China’scharmoffensivewillbeameansofbuildingtheso-called‘BeijingConsensus’,agroupofauthoritarianstateswithmarketeconomiesthatcanchallengethe‘WashingtonConsensus’,composedofliberalmarketeconomiesgovernedbydemocraticregimes.”20

Joshua Kurlantzick’s Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World comprehensively explains China’s soft power and



sophisticated diplomacy to transform its image and international relations(Kurlantzick, 2007). Chinese statecraft or charm offensive has changedpeople’sperceptionofChinaasathreattothatofabenefactor(ibid.:5).Thistransformation was caused in large measure by soft power, which enabledChina to become a “great power”. The book also discusses the history ofChina’s charm offensive that began soon after Beijing felt the backlash ofinitiallyusinghardpowertointimidateitsSoutheastAsianneighbours.Thesecountries condemned China’s aggressive behavior and strengthened theirsecurityrelationswithWashington.Torectifyitsmistake,Chinafocusedonbuildingitsglobalsoftpower.

ToKurlantzick,China’scharmoffensiveaimsto:(a)transformChina’simageintoabenign,peacefulandconstructiveactorininternationalaffairs;(b)obtainthenecessaryresourcestofuelitseconomy;and(c)buildaringofallieswhowillshareBeijing’svaluesofnon-interferenceindomesticaffairsandauthoritarianrule(ibid.:39-42).HeobservesthatChinauseseconomicresources,culturaltools,andmigrationtopushitscharmoffensiveallovertheworld.HenotesthatWashingtonisunmindfulhowChinaexertsitsinfluenceand thatAmerican public diplomacy apparatus was adversely affected bybudgetcutsand lackofCongressionalsupport in the1990s. Inconclusion,hefocusesatransformedChinaexpandingitspreeminentpowerinSoutheastAsia,andevendevelopingitsspheresofinfluenceinotherpartsofworld,likeCentralAsiaandAfrica(ibid.:236).

These aforementionedworksdismiss the imageofChina as amilitarychallenge to the US and its neighbouring states. Instead, they picture apeaceful and cooperative China wielding soft power in SoutheastAsiawith theUSunintentionallyabettingChinese influence in the region.TheyportrayChinaasposingamulti-facetedchallengetotheUSwhileprojectinga “benign self-image”. This benign representation is reflected by China’saccommodating foreign policy based on active participation in regionalorganizations, providing significant amount of ODA packages, extendingeconomic opportunities to its neighbouring countries with its increasingaffluentmarket,andconsolidating itseconomicandpolitical relationswiththeSoutheastAsianstates.

All thesestudiesarecriticalof theheavy-handedpoliciesandconfron-tational anti-terrorism rhetoric of the Bush administration after 9/11 thathavealienatedanumberofAsianstates.TheyalsomentiontheconsiderableerosionofAmericanpoliticalanddiplomaticcloutintheregionbecauseofthe ongoing and protracted US counter-insurgency campaigns in Iraq andAfghanistan. To sum up, they uphold an image of China wielding its softpower thathasbecomemoreapparentand intense incontrast toAmerica’sdiminishingstatureandinfluenceinSoutheastAsia.



7.SecondImage:VisualizingtheLimitsofanEmergentChina

Nevertheless, some China Watchers have rejected the alarmist image thatChina has become powerful and influential in SoutheastAsia at the US’sexpense.TheyseeChinaasafarmorecomplexthreattoAmericaninterestsand power in the region. They contend as well that China’s political andeconomiccloutisbesetbytheUS’smorepotentcomprehensivepower,theSoutheastAsiacountries’generaldistrustofChinesepowerandinfluence,andbyChinesedomesticproblems.ThissecondimageofChinathatchallengesAmericanforeignpolicycannotmerelybelikenedtothatoftheformerSovietUnioncompetingforglobaldominanceandleadership.Albeititsincreasingpower, China still wrestles with enormous domestic problems, remainsdistracted by internal reforms and development, and appears reluctant tochallengeWashington at present and in thenear future.Thus, it projects afumblingChinathatcannotactuallychallengeAmericaninterestevenintheshort-termperiod.

Hence,thesecondimagepresentsaChinathatishardlyapeercompetitoroftheUS.Internally,itsleadershipispreoccupiedwithensuringthesurvivalofthepartyandtheregime.Externally,itisstilldistrustedbyitsneighbouringstatesandsomeofitsdiplomaticandpoliticalventuresarefrowneduponbyAsiansocieties.AsoneAmericanscholarquips:“TheriseofChinesepowergeneratesglobalresponsesthatBeijingcannotfullycontrolandthatmaynotbeinitsinterests.”(Lampton,2007:115)ThisimageconsidersChinaasanoutsider in thesuper-power league.Althoughconsidering thatChinacouldbecome a superpower in the future, the view acknowledges that it mightfail tobecomeoneif itmakesthewrongdecisionor it isoverwhelmedbydomesticchallenges.

Dr Phillip C. Saunders’ “China’s GlobalActivism: Strategy, Driversand Tools” examines China’s emergence in the light of the second image(Saunders,2006).SaundersacceptstheoutlookthatChinahascommitteditswealthof resources to improve its relationswithkeycountriessince2001.In doing so, China has expanded its influence in many parts of the world(ibid: 28). The country has also taken advantage of opportunities createdbyWashington’spreoccupationwiththewaronterrorandtheunpopularityof some of its policies (ibid.: 28). Saunders also recognizes that China’spragmaticandnon-ideologicalapproachtobilateralrelationsprovidessomestateswithanalternativeorleverageagainstdependenceonWashington.This,accordingtohim,reducesAmericaninfluenceinmanycountries(ibid.:28).

Saunders contends, however, that China’s current activism in globalaffairs is not aimed at challenging the US since it is primarily driven bydomestic forces. These domestic forces include: (a) China’s anxiety overUS strategic efforts to contain or subvert China; and (b) its desire for



uninterrupted access to international markets and resources.According tohim,insituationswhereeconomicandstrategicinterestsclash,theChinesepoliticalleadershipwouldusuallycompromisethelatertoenabletheeconomytogrow(ibid.:28).EconomicfactorsmattermoretoChina.Thisisthereasonwhy Beijing has been accommodating to Washington since 2001. In hisconclusion,SaundersdrawsapictureofakindandgentleChina,andnotesoptimisticallywhile“China’sglobalinfluencewillincrease,ChinawillstilloperatewithintheframeworkofglobalinstitutionsestablishedbytheUnitedStates”(ibid.:30).

BronsonPercival’sThe Dragon Looks South: China and Southeast Asia in the New CenturyoffersafreshandveryinsightfullookatChina’semer-gence and relationswith theUSand theASEANmember-states (Perceval2007).PercivalrejectsoutrighttheimageofChinabentonchallengingtheUSwhiletheSoutheastAsiancountriesarecaughtinthemiddleandforcedto choose between the two strategic competitors. He also dismisses thenotionthattheBeijing-Washingtonrelationshipisazero-sumgame,inwhichanygain forChinabecomesa loss for theUSandvice versa (ibid.: 145).Convincingly,heargues that the twogreatpowershave theirownspecificspheresofinfluenceinSoutheastAsia,buttheycooperateandrelyontheirmixofforeignpolicyinstruments.

ToPercival,China,theSoutheastAsiacountriesandtheUSarelinkedinacomplexsystemoftradingrelations.Inactuality,ChinaandSoutheastAsiaare involved in the processing trade managed largely byAmerican-ownedtransnational corporation. Products produced by China and SoutheastAsiacountries are usually exported to the US market. Moreover, theAmericanmarketremainsthemostimportantforthesecountries.Moreover,theUSandChinawielddifferentformsofinstrumentsothatwhilethey“sitside-by-side,theyseldombumpupagainsteachother”(ibid.:145).SincetheUSpossessesoverwhelming military power, China dares not challenge theAmericanmilitaryprowess.Instead,itpersistentlyquestionstherelevanceoftraditionalsecurity, and belies the assumption that China poses a military threat toSoutheastAsia. Percival also maintains that as a continental state, ChinaloomsasthepredominantexternalinfluenceinSoutheastAsia,whiletheUS,astheleadingnavalpower,remainsasecurityguarantorofthedemocraciesofmaritimeSoutheastAsia(ibid.:147).Inhisconclusion,hearguesthattheseeminglyUS-ChinacompetitionforpowerandinfluenceinSoutheastAsiaissimplisticandmisleading.Accordingtohim,thesetwopowersarepartofthefourmajorexternalparticipants(alongwithJapanandIndia)engagedinanelaborateandcomplicatedSoutheastAsiandance(ibid.:148).

This second image is likewise reflected in the Rand Corporation’sdetailedcasestudyonChina’semergenceandtheEastAsianstates’responsestothisdevelopmentfrom2006to2007(Medeiroset al.,2008).Thisstudy



depictsChinaasaregionalpowerplayercaughtupinacomplicated/tragicCatch-22 situation.As the country expands its involvement and influenceinEastAsianeconomyandsecurity,itcorrespondinglyincreasesitsroleinAsianaffairs.China’semergencehasbroughtchanges toUSalliancesandsecurity partnership inAsia. Its influences, too, is pervasive that ChinesepreferencesandinterestshavetobefactoredintheforeignpolicydecisionsofsomeSoutheastAsiastates.Nevertheless,thestudyconfirmsthatthemoreChina expands its regional power and influence, themore theseSoutheastAsian countries consolidate their economic and security relations with theUS(ibid.:xv).

ThestudyalsoacknowledgesthatboththeUSandChinaarejockeyingforpowerandinfluenceinEastAsia.However,itisnotazero-sumgameasregionalresponsesdonotinvolvechoosingbetweenthetwopowers.Instead,thesestateshaveforgedsecuritytieswithotherregionalpowerslikeJapan,India,andAustralia.SmallerEastAsian/Pacificpowersappearasdynamic,activeandtoacertaindegree,craftyplayersthatconfidentlyengageChinawhileenjoyingsecuritycommitmentsfromtheUS.Thesestatesalsowidentheirmanoeuvringroombypositioningthemselvestobenefitfromtheirtieswithbothbigpowers(ibid.:xv).TheRANDstudydepictsaChinastrugglingtogainanoffensiveinfluencethatcouldmarginalizetheUSinSoutheastAsia.Again, themoreChinaasserts itself, themorethesesmallerpowerspursuestabilitythroughanAmericaninvolvementintheregion.Inthisregard,thestudyterselynotes:“China’sdiplomaticoverreachesinAsiainrecentyearshave prompted occasional backlashes and a further embrace of the UnitedStates”(ibid:232;Medeiros,2009).

China’s Rise: Challenges and Opportunities,publishedbythePetersonInstituteforInternationalEconomicsandCenterforStrategicandInternationalStudies,alsocaststhesecondimageofanemergentChina(Bergstenet al.,2008).Thiscomprehensivestudypresentsanaffluent,benign,andcooperativeChinaviewedwithsuspicionanddistrustbyitsneighbours.Chinacontinuesto cultivate soft power through its actions and policies (ibid.: 214). It notonly extends substantive overseas financial and infrastructural assistance,but sends its doctors and teachers to other countries, provides educationalopportunities in China for international students, and promotes its cultureabroad.Accordingly, China has succeeded in influencing smaller states inSoutheastAsia,Africa,andelsewhere,andthishasenhancedthefoundationofChina’ssoftpowerovertime(ibid.:215).Significantly,thestudyindicatesthatChinahighlightsnon-militaryaspectofitscomprehensivepower,aswellasitspositiverelationshipswithvirtuallyallofitsneighbours.

Thestudy,however,observesthatEastAsiaisgenerallywaryofChina’semergence. In fact, countries in the region are circumspect of theultimateimplicationofChina’stransformationasaneweconomicpowerhouse.China



has territorial disputes in East and South China Sea, and lingering borderproblemswith IndiaandKorea.ConcernedcountriesarestillapprehensiveabouttheirunresolveddisputeswithChina(ibid.:221).Thestudy,inaway,equatesChinatothelate19thcenturyBismarkianGermanycharacterizedasacontented,affluent,andrelativelybenignpower.Nevertheless,itwasregardedwithdistrustandsuspicionbyneighbouringstatesbecauseofwhatitmightdowithitsincreasingpowerinthefuture.

8.ClashingImagesofanEmergentChina

China’s emergence in EastAsia and its improved relations with SoutheastAsian states have caught the attention ofAmerican ChinaWatchers. Sincetheearlyyearsofthenewmillennium,China’sincreasingtrade,investmentandODAlinkageswithASEANstates,madepossiblebyitsrapideconomicgrowthanddevelopment,havebroughtmutuallybenefitstothemainlandanditsneighbours.Furthermore,China’snewandcooperativediplomacyhasbeenwidelyappreciatedinSoutheastAsia.Hence,someAmericanChinaWatchersuphold the imageofanemergentChina thatposesaseriouseconomicandpoliticalchallengetoAmericaninterestsinSoutheastAsia.TheyregardChinaasarivaloracompetitoroftheUSastheformeroffersmoreopportunitiesfortrade,investments,andevenregionalintegration.Thus,SoutheastAsiancountriesaredrawn toChina’seconomicandpoliticalorbit.ProponentsofthisfirstimageofChinahaveraisedtheissueoftheUS’sneglectofSoutheastAsiabecauseofitspreoccupationwithIraqandAfghanistan.

AnothergroupofAmericanChinaWatchers,however,rejectsthisimageof a powerful and threatening China. Instead, they envisage an emergentChinawhosecapabilitiesareactuallyfinite,afledglingregionalpowerthatisremotelycapableofchallengingtheUSforregionalleadershiporhegemony.ThissecondimageprojectsChinaasanactiveplayerinregionalaffairswhosediplomatic moves are sometimes undermined by its neighbouring states’inherent distrust of Chinese power and intention. It likewise accentuatesChina’s mercantilist foreign policy, domestic problems, bad governance,and rigid adherence to a one-party system.These factors tarnish its charmoffensive and overall global reputation.Although the SoutheastAsiancountriesacceptChineseeconomiclargesseandopportunities,theyshrewdlymaintain strong political and military ties with competing powers in theregionliketheUS,Japan,andevenIndia.Inaddition,thissecondimageofChina affirms that theUShas latent reservesof soft power and still holdscomprehensivepowerintheregion.ItprojectsafumblingbutneverthelessabenignChina.

The existence of these two clashing images of an emergent China intheUScanbelinkedtothreefactorsinAmericansocietyandgovernment.



ThefirstisthepropensityoftheAmericanpublic,themedia,andcertainUSgovernment sectors to look foranewgeo-strategiccompetitor in thepost-ColdWarera.ShapedbytheColdWarfromthe1940stothelate1980s,thisnational predisposition thrives due to these ideological assumptions aboutChina (Overholt, 2008: 236): (1) China today is simply a continuation ofMao’sChinathatwasaggressive,revolutionary,andexpansionary;(2)becauseitisruledbyacommunistparty,21stcenturyChinamustbeimperialisticandmilitaristicastheSovietUnion;and(3)theemergenceofrisingpowersinthepastinevitablytriggeredviolentdisruptionsintheinternationalsystem.Theprevalenceof thesebeliefs inpost-ColdWarAmericanpolityalsoexplainsthegrowingcorpusofChinesethreatliteratureintheUSsincethelate1990s(Scott,2007:116-120).

The second factor that fuels this clash of images is the cognitivedissonanceamongAmericanChinaWatchersonthenatureandimplicationsof China’s emergence in EastAsia. Based on the historical lessons of theWorldWarIIandtheColdWar,ithasbeenassumedthatanyrisingpowernecessarily constitutes an automatic strategic/military challenge to the US.Sinceitisanemergingpower,thenChinaislikelytobecomearisingmilitarypowerthatwillgeo-strategicallychallengetheUSinthenearfuture.NotingtheSovietUnion’scollapsein1991,theChinesepoliticalleadershiphastakenadifferentpathinitspursuitofcomprehensivesecurity.Beijinghasrealizedtheriskofadoptingaclear-cutdevelopmentstrategybasedona“strongarmy,richcountry”model.Instead,Chinaconcentratesoneconomicdevelopmentandseeksapeacefulenvironment inwhich itcanpursuedomesticreformsandexpandtradingandinvestmentopportunitieswithmanystatesaspossible(Ong, 2002: 180). Beijing intends to develop its comprehensive nationalpower in the long run. However, it regards economic power as a crucialelementbeforeitcanconstitutetheindustrialandtechnologicalbasenecessarytosupportamodernmilitarycapabilityrobustenoughtodeteranywould-beaggressor(ibid.:179).However,despiteBeijing’spragmaticandcooperativeapproachinitscurrentdiplomaticgambitinEastAsia,publicopinionpollsuniformlyrevealthatAmericanshavemorenegativeviewsofChinathandomostotherpeople(Lampton,2007:117).Thus,theUSappearstougherandmoresuspiciousofChinathanotherstates.Consequently,bothcountriesvieweach other with deep mutual ambivalence, if not mounting distrust (Scott,2007: 127). This generates the conflicting images of an emergent ChinaamongAmericanChinaWatchers.

ThetwoclashingimagesofanemergentChinacanalsobelinkedwithWashington’s current policyvis-à-visBeijing–hedging.FacedbyChina’sincreasingpoliticalandeconomiccloutintheearly21stcentury,theUShasdecidednottoconfrontnorcontainthelatterbuttoadoptaproactivehedgestrategy to manage China’s capabilities and influence its intentions. The



hedgestrategyassumesthatamongthenewpowers,Chinahasthegreatestpotential to compete militarily with the US in the future.21 This strategy,however,doesnotconsiderChinaasan immediate threator aSoviet-stylerival.Rather,itseesChinaasinchingitswaytoadirectconfrontationwiththeUS.Therefore,itprescribesthatWashingtonopenlycommunicatetoBeijingthattheUSintendstoremainadominantPacificpowerandthatChinacanill-affordaminiaturearmsraceorageo-politicalrivalrywiththeUS.22ThestrategyalsorequirestheUStotightenitsbilateralalliancesacrossAsia,limitChinese influenceamong itsallies, andsteerChinaaway from thepathofconfrontationwiththeUS.

This strategy is primarily a reaction to China’s diplomatic gambit ofpeacefulemergenceinEastAsia.Sincethelatterpartofthe1990s,Beijinghas reassured SoutheastAsian states that China’s emergence need not befeared–thatnoChinathreatactuallyexists.Timeandagain,itstressesthattheriseofChinaisanopportunityformutualeconomicbenefit,andforthedevelopmentofastrongerregionalAsianpositionvis-à-vistheUS(Morton,2007: 1-2). Seemingly, many EastAsian states now consider China as anessentialeconomicpartnerandanon-threateningandconstructivepoliticalactor in the region. Consequently, China has succeeded in recasting itstraditionalimageasamilitarythreatinEastAsia.TheBushAdministrationthenbelievedthatitcouldnotforceitsAsianallies(exceptJapan)tochoosebetween the US and China as this move would not serveAmerica’s long-term regional interests. It adopted the hedge strategy in recognition of acomplicated,multi-faceted,anddynamicgeostrategicgameinwhichChinaplaystheroleofapatientplayerreadytoengagetheUSinbothcooperativeandcompetitiverelations.

Thehedgingstrategy,however,isfraughtwithparadoxes.Forexample,while Washington’s policy vis-à-vis Beijing is generally pragmatic andcooperative,aChinesethreatperceptionstilllingersinsomequartersoftheUS government, specifically in the Department of Defense.The strategy’score objective is to integrate China into the current international system.However,thepolicyalsoprovidesforthestrengtheningofUS-Japansecurityrelations,therevitalizationofAmericanbilateralalliancesinEastAsia,andthedeploymentofadditionalairandnavalunitsfromtheAtlanticintothePacificOcean.Theseareclear-cutmilitarymeasuresintendedtobalanceandnottoenticeanemergingpower.ThesetwoimagesofChinapresentamajordilemma inAmerican foreign policy in an era of unipolarity – whether toconsideranemergentpowerasathreatorachallengetoAmericaninterestsandleadershiportotreatitasapartnerinmanagingtheinternationalsystem.Washington’spolicyvis-à-visBeijing,inaway,fuelsadebateonthesetwoclashingimagesofanemergentChina.



9.Conclusion

Since the beginning of the 21st century, China’s emergence as a regionalpower and its improved political and economic relations withASEANstates have preoccupied manyAmerican ChinaWatchers.Apparently, theyhaverejectedthetraditionalimageofChinaasamilitary/ideologicalthreatto the US. Instead, they have depicted China as using its economic andpolitico/diplomaticresourcestogeneratesoftpowerforitscharmoffensiveinSoutheastAsia.Still,theseAmericanChinaWatchersaredividedintotwocamps:onecampseesacraftyandopportunisticChina that relieson soft-powerandmultilateraldiplomacytoundermineAmericanpolitico/diplomaticpositioninSoutheastAsiaandadvancesitsownstrategicinterests.TheothercampclingstotheimageofadefensiveandfledglingChinathatappliesitssoft-powerdespitediplomaticbacklashes,onwaryneighbouringstates,whichareundertheshadowofamorepowerfulhegemon–theUS.

The first image depicts a strong and threatening China that is incre-mentallychallengingtheUSinterests.Thesecondimagepicturesarelativelybenignandpossiblycooperativeemergentpower.ThesetwoimagesofChinaand the intense debate they unleash can be traced back to theAmericansociety’s ideological assumptions about Beijing, the general propensity oftheAmericanstatetoseekpotentialfoesorfriendsinaunipolarworld,andmore significantly, Washington’s current policy of hedging against China.AsWashington continues this hedging policy, these clashing images of anemergentChinawillendureamongAmericanChinaWatcherswayintothemid-21stcentury.

Notes+ ThisarticlewaswrittenbytheauthorwhilehewasavisitingscholaratArizona

StateUniversityin2009.* Dr Renato Cruz De Castro is currently a full professor on the faculty of the

InternationalStudiesDepartment,DeLaSalleUniversityandtheholderoftheDrAurelioCalderonProfessorialChairofPhilippine-AmericanRelations.HeearnedhisBAandtwomastersdegreesfromtheUniversityofthePhilippines,andhisPhDfromtheGovernmentandInternationalStudiesDepartmentoftheUniversity of South Carolina as a Fulbright Scholar in 2001. He has written60 articles on international relations and security which have been publishedin a number of scholarly journals and edited works in the Philippines, SouthKorea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Germany, the United Kingdom and theUnitedStates.Hisarticleson international relationsand international securityhavebeenpublishedbyArmed Forces and Society, Issues and Studies,Asian Perspective, Contemporary Southeast Asian, Asian Survey, Tamkang Journal of International Affairs,Views and Policies: Taiwan Forum,Journal of Security



Sector Management, Asian Affairs: An American Review, Pacific Affairs, andtheKorean Journal of Defense Analysis.HiscurrentresearchinterestsareUSforeignpolicyinEastAsiaafter9:11,contemporarytrendsanddevelopmentsinPhilippine-USSecurityRelations,andtheimpactofChina’semergenceonUSforeignpolicyinEastAsia.<Email: [email protected]>

1. CarlosH.Conde,“ChinaandASEANSignBroadTradeAccord”,International Herald Tribune,15thJanuary2007.

2. XinhuaNewsAgency,“10thChina-ASEANSummitOpensinCebu”,CEIS9,14thJanuary2007.

3. OxfordAnalytical,“SoutheastAsia:RegionLookstoChinaasOECDSlows”,Oxford Analytical Daily Brief Service,31stOctober2008.

4. BritishBroadcastCorporation,“Pan-BeibuGulfEconomicCooperationSeminarDiscussesChina-ASEANTies”,BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific,3rdApril2007.

5. Beverly T. Natividad., “RP Must ‘Hook Fortunes” with Booming China”,Business World,2ndMarch2007.

6. “ChinaforIntensifyingStrategictieswithASEAN”,The Hindustan Times,12thJanuary2007.

7. Yaroslav Trofinov and Paul Beckett, “Singapore Prime Minister Urges U.S.BolsteritsTieswithAsia”,Wall Street Journal,18thApril2007.

8. XinhuaNewAgency,“Roundup:China-PhilippineRelationsSeefullDevelop-ment”,XinhuaNewsAgency-CEIS,14thJanuary2007.

9. “ChinaWinsHeartsinSoutheastAsia”,The Jakarta Post,5thFebruary2007.10.BritishBroadcastingCorporation,“HKPapercarriesExcerptofWhitePaperon

China’s2006Diplomacy”,BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific,26thJanuary2007.11. BritishBroadcastingCorporation,“ChinesePremier,PhilippinePresidentExpress

‘Satisfaction’ withASEAN Ties”, BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 16th July2007.

12.British Broadcasting Corporation, “Wen JiabaoAnnounces Plan for China-ASEANPeacekeepingWorkshop”,BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific,14thJanuary2007.

13. “Aphorisms and Suspicions – China’s World Order”, The Economist, 19thNovember2005,p.24.

14.ThomasLum,WayneM.Morrison,andBruceVaughn,“China’s‘SoftPower’inSoutheastAsia”,CRSReport for Congress,4thJanuary2008.

15. Ibid.16.ThomasLumet al.,“ComparingGlobalInfluence:ChinaandU.S.Diplomacy,

ForeignAir, Trade, and Investment in Developing World”, CRS Report for Congress,15thAugust15,2008.

17. Ibid.18. Ibid.:2.19. Ibid.:20.20. Ibid.:8-11.21.NeilKing,“ConflictInsurance:AsChinaBoostsDefenseBudget,U.S.Military

HedgesitsBets”,Wall Street Journal,20thApril2006.22. Ibid.



References

Abramowitz,MortonandStephenBosworth (2003), “Adjusting to theNewAsia”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.82,No.4,July/August,pp.119-131.

Bergsten,FredC.et al.(2008),China’s Rise: Challenges and Opportunities,Washing-ton,DC:PetersonInstituteforInternationalEconomicsandCenterforStrategicandInternationalStudies.

Cliff,Rogeret al.(2007),Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Anti-Access Strategies and Their Implications for the United States, Santa Monica, CA: The RandCorporation.

Conetta,Carl(2006),“DissuadingChinaandFightingtheLongWar”,World Policy Journal,Vol.23,No.2,Summer,pp.1-10.

DeSantis,Hugh(2005),“TheDragonandtheTigers:ChinaandAsianRegionalism”,World Policy Journal,Vol.22,No.2,Summer,pp.23-36.

Garrison,JeanA.(2005),“China’sPrudentCultivationof‘Soft’PowerandImplica-tionsforU.S.PolicyinEastAsia”,Asian Affairs: An American Review,Vol.32,No.1,Spring,pp.25-30.

Haacke,Jurgen(2003),ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Develop-ment and Prospects,LondonandNewYork:RoutledgeCurzon.

InformationOfficeoftheStateCouncilofthePRC(2006),China’s National Defense in 2006,Beijing.

Kennedy,AndrewBingham(2007),“China’sPerceptionsofU.S.IntentionstowardTaiwan:HowHostileaHegemon?”,Asian Survey,Vol.47,No.2,March-April,pp.268-287.

Khalilzad,Zalmyet al.(1999),The United States and a Rising China: Strategic and Military Implications,SantaMonica,CA:TheRandCorporation.

Kulma, Michael G. (1999), “The Evolution of U.S. Images of China:A PoliticalPsychology Perspective of Sino-American Relations”, World Affairs, Vol. 162,No.2,Fallpp.76-88.

Kurlantzick,Joshua(2007),Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transform-ing the World,NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress.

Lampton,DavidM.(2007),“TheFacesofChinesePower”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.86,No.1,January/February,pp.115-127.

Medeiros,EvanS.et al.(2008),Pacific Currents: the Responses of U.S. Allies and Security Partners in East Asia to China’s Rise, Santa Monica, CA: The RandCorporation.

Medeiros,EvanS.(2009),China International Behavior: Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification,SantaMonica,CA:TheRandCorporation.

Moore,ThomasG.(2004),“China’sInternationalRelations:TheEconomicDimen-sion”, in Samuel S. Kim (ed.), The International Relations of Northeast Asia,Lanham,MD:RowmanandLittlefield,pp.101-134.

Morton,DirkRichard(2007),“BecomingaGoodNeighborinSoutheastAsia:TheCaseofChina’sTerritorialDisputeintheSouthChinaSea,1989-2006”,DoctoralDissertation,OldDominionUniversity.

Odgaard,Liselotte(2007),The Balance of Power in Asia-Pacific Security: U.S.-China Policies on Regional Order,NewYork,NY:Routledge.



Ong,Russell(2002),China’s Security Interests in the Post-Cold War Era,London:Curzon.

Overholt,WilliamH.(2008),Asia, America, and the Transformation of Geopolitics,NewYork,NY:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Pak,JinH.(2007),“China’sPragmaticRiseandU.S.InterestsinEastAsia”,Military Review,Vol.87,No.6,November/December,pp.56-69.

Perceival,Bronson(2007),The Dragon Looks South: China and Southeast Asia in the New Century,Westport,CT:Praeger.

Qin,Yaqing (2001), “A Response toYong Deng: Power, Perception and CulturalLens”,Asian Affairs: An American Review,Vol.28,No.3,Fall,155-158.

Saunders,PhillipC.(2006),“China’sGlobalActivism:Strategy,Drivers,andTools”,InstituteforNationalStrategicStudiesOccasionalPaperNo.4,Washington,DC:NationalDefenseInstitute.

Saunders, Phillip C. (2008), “China’s Role inAsia”, in David Shambaugh andMichaelYahuda (eds), International Relations of Asia,Lanham,MD:RowmanandLittlefieldPublishers,pp.127-149.

Scott,David(2007),China Stands Up: The PRC and the International System,NewYork,NY:Routledge.

Sprout,Harold andMargaretSprout (1963),Foundations of International Politics,NewYork,NY:D.VanNostrandCompany.

Zhang,Biwu(2005),“ChinesePerceptionsofAmericanPower,1991-2004”,Asian Survey,Vol.45,No.5,September-October,pp.667-686.


American Perspective versus Chinese Expectation on China’s Rise 625InternationalJournalofChinaStudiesVol.2,No.3,December2011,pp.625-645

AmericanPerspectiveversusChineseExpectationonChina’sRise

Jinghao Zhou*HobartandWilliamSmithColleges

Abstract

AccordingtoPewGlobalAttitudessurveyreleasedinJuly2011,mostofthesurveyparticipantssaythatChinaeitherwillreplaceoralreadyhasreplacedtheUnitedStatesas theworld’s superpower.China’semergenceasagreatpowerhasbecomeinevitable.US-Chinarelationswillprofoundlyimpactontheentireworld. Inorder topromoteglobalpeaceanddevelopment,whileshiftingthebalanceofworldpower,somequestionsneedtobescrutinized:How doAmericans view China’s rise? Where is China heading? Will theUSandChinagetalong?How theUSandChinawork togetheronurgentinternational issues? This paper will look intoAmerican perspective onChina’sriseandChina’sexpectationfromvariousangles,findthesimilaritiesand differences betweenAmerican perspective and China’s expectation insome major areas of economy, military, ideology, and foreign policy, andattempttofindarealisticwaytoimprovetheChina-USrelations.

Keywords: China, Chinese foreign policy, Chinese politics, China-US relations, America


1.Introduction

As early as 1993 David Shambaugh foresaw that China would become asuperpower in the early twenty-first century.1 China has already surpassedthe Japanese economyandhasbecome the second largestworld economy.The Economist predicts that China will overtake the United States as theworld’s largest economy within the next ten years.2 Former US SecretaryofStateHenryKissingertoldCNNinJune2011thattheCommunistnationposesa“bigchallenge”fortheUnitedStates.3Apparently,US-Chinarelationswill profoundly impact on the entire world.4 The issue of improving the


626 Jinghao Zhou

relationshipbetweenChinaandtheUShasbecomethemostimportantsubjectinthetwenty-firstcentury.

According toAaronFriedberg,oneof themostauthoritativeAmericananalystsofChina’sforeignpolicy,therearethreemaincampsincontemporaryinternational relations theorizing: liberalism, realism, and constructivism.However,eachofthethreetheoreticalschoolsisdividedintotwovariants:“oneofwhichisessentiallyoptimisticaboutthefutureofUS-Chinarelations,theotherdistinctlypessimistic.”5Theprevalentopinion in theUSis thatarisingChinahasreshapedtheexistingglobalorderandchallengedtheworldleadershipoftheUS.Americanpessimisticinternationaltheorysuggeststhatthis timeperiodof therelationshipbetweentheUnitedStatesandChina isthe worst after the Jet flights collision over Hainan Island in 2000.AaronL.Friedbergpointsout that“HuJintao’svisitmaymark theendofaneraof relatively smooth relations between the US and China.”6 The Chinesegovernment insists that the responsibility for the difficulties in China-USrelationsdoesnotliewithChinaanditisuptotheUStoimproverelationsbetweenthetwocountries.AmpleevidencesuggeststhattheUSispreparingalongcoldwarwithChina.8

AlthoughbothAmericanoptimisticliberalsandpessimisticrealistshaveoffered constructive opinions on the current status of US-China relations,they have paid less attention to the issues of what caused such a difficultrelationship and how to improve US-China relations. This paper attemptsto examine the main factors that affect US-China relations, analyze thedifferences between Western and Chinese perspectives on China’s rise,and explore remedy to improve US-China relations.This paper will arguethattheconflictsbetweenthetwonationsarenormalwhileChinaisrising,because theconflictsarederived fromdifferentperspectives.Theconflictsarereal,buttheymightmakethetwonationsmorecautiousindealingwiththeirrelations.Thus,theUSmustbeconfidentofitsleadingpositionintheinternational society in order to appropriately manage China’s rise in thetwenty-firstcentury.

2.TheUSRemainstheWorldSuperpower

WhileChinaisrising,thevoiceofAmericanmainstreamstilldoesnotbelievetheUS is inevitablydeclining.9Thomas J.Christensen, the formerDeputyAssistant Secretary of State for EastAsian and PacificAffairs, points outthatmediahas“oftenexaggeratedChina’sriseininfluenceandthedecliningpowerof theUnitedStates.”10However, someargue thatAmericanpeoplehaveheardallthesestoriesofAmericandeclinebefore,butthistimeisforreal.11USdebtshavereachedanotherrecordhighof$14trillionanditwill


American Perspective versus Chinese Expectation on China’s Rise 627

reach15trillionbyMay2011.EveryAmericansharesalmost$46,000debt.12About$4.4trillionamong$14trilliondebtswasheldbyforeigngovernmentsthatpurchaseUSsecurities.Thisreasonablyraisesaquestion:whoownstheUS?13ThemountingdebtisacancerofthenationwhichcoulddragtheUSdownifthegovernmentcannotgraduallyreducethedebts.

AmericanpeopleincreasinglyfeelthatChinaiscatchinguptotheUS.According to a survey conducted by the Washington-based Pew ResearchCenterforthePeopleandthePressin2011,about47percentofparticipantssayChina,nottheUS,istheworld’stopeconomicpower,while31percentofparticipantscontinuetonametheUS.Theresultofthesurveyobviouslycontradicts the reality, but it reflects thatAmerican people feel anxiouswithChina’sgrowingpowerandinfluence.USofficialshaveadmittedthatChina’sriseisasourceofanxiety,astheyworryaboutthattheUSisatriskoffallingbehind inaglobalbattlefor influencewithChina.14SecretaryofStateHillaryClintonhaswarnedthattheUSisstrugglingtoholditsroleasgloballeader.15

TheUnitedStatesdoesnotwant tobe thenumber2 in theworld.Themajority ofAmericans are not happy that China will become the largesteconomy,supersedingtheUnitedStates.16BothoptimistsandpessimistsholdmixedfeelingswithChina’srise,viewingChinaasaneconomiccompetitorandpoliticalrival.17ThomasFriedmanpointsoutthat“Chinaisathreat,Chinaisacustomer,andChinaisanopportunity.”18Generally,realistsbelievethattherelationshipwillbasicallybestableandpeaceful,19butpessimisticrealistsalwayssuggest that“risingstatesusuallywant to translate theirpowerintogreaterauthorityintheglobalsysteminordertoreshapetheexistingglobalorderinaccordance.”20Theybelievethatsincethestartoftheworldfinancialcrisisin2008,ChinahasbeguntostandupbytakingassertivestrategytowardtheUS.21TheyquestionwhetherChinaisdepartingfromDengXiaoping邓小平’sforeignpolicyoftao guang yang hui韬光养晦(hidebrightnessandcherishobscurity)towardtheUS.

Elizabeth Economy, director forAsian Studies at Council on ForeignRelations,notesthattheconsensusoftheDengerabegantofrayandBeijingbegantoexpanditsinfluencetotherestoftheworld.22InASEANmeetingin2010,ChineseforeignministerYangJiechi杨洁篪 toldSoutheastAsiancounterparts that “China is a big country and other countries are smallcountries, and that is justa fact.”23Chinaclaims that theSouthChinaSeawasacoreinterestofthenationandopposeanyattempttointernationalizethe South China Sea issues. China’s assertive approach has stirred anxietyacrossAsia.24Asaresult,someofChina’sneighbouringcountries,suchasIndia,Indonesia,Japan,andVietnam,areworkingmorecloselywiththeUSasabalancetotheexpansionofChina’sinfluence.JohnLee,aforeignpolicy


628 Jinghao Zhou

specialist,warnsthatChinaislosingfriendsworldwideandChinamaybetheloneliestrisingpowerinrecenthistory.25

Nevertheless,ChinaholdsdifferentviewpointsonwhyChina’srelationswithneighbouringcountriesaredeteriorating.Accordingto2011 Pacific Blue Book publishedby the InstituteofAsia-PacificStudiesof theAcademyofSocialSciencesinJanuary2011,allproblemswithitsborderingcountriesarenottheresultsofChina’snewforeignpolicybutderivedfromtheactionoftheUSreturningtoAsia.ChinaviewsthattheUnitedStatesseekstocontainChina’sriseandattempts toblockit.TheUSclaimsthat itstillhasavitalroleinhelpingtomanagethischangingbalanceofpowerinSoutheastAsia.26HillaryClintonpointsoutthattheUShasanationalinterestinthefreedomof open access to the South China Sea.27 The majority ofAsian countrieswelcomethepresenceoftheUSSeventhFleetinAsia.28IfboththeUSandChinaclaimcoreinterestintheregion,thepotentialforconflictbetweenthetwonationsismuchgreater.

SomeprominentAmericanscholarsarepessimisticonChina’sriseforalongtime.Asearlyas1997,RichardBernsteinandRossMunrointheirbookThe Coming Conflict with ChinaarguedthatwarbetweenChinaandtheUSwasadistinctivepossibility.In2005,RobertD.KaplannotedthatwhetherornottherewillbeaSino-Americanwarisnolongeraquestion.TheremainingquestionishowtheUnitedStatesshouldfightChina.29DavidGordonrecentlyobservesthattheUS“isheadingintoamoreconflict-riddenworld,withU.S.-China tensions at its core.”30 John Mearsheimer warned that “The UnitedStates and China are likely to engage in an intense security competitionwithconsiderablepotentialforwar.”31Thus,SusanL.Shirk,formerdeputyassistantsecretaryforChinaintheBureauofEastAsia,suggeststhat“ChinaneedstoreassuretheUnitedStatesthatChina’sriseisnotathreatandwillnotchallengeAmerica’sdominantposition.”32

IsitinevitableforarisingChinatothreatentheUSandtheWest?TheanswerdependsonhowtheUSviewsChina’sriseandhowviewsitself.Thereality is that theUSremains themostpowerfulcountry in theworld,andChinadoesnothavepolitical,militaryandeconomicpowertochallengetheUSregardlessofChina’sintention.Tobesure,whiletheChineseeconomyisgrowing,itisverynormalforChinatoexpanditsinfluenceabroad,becausethenatureofcapitalistoseekforprofitsthroughinvestingnomatterwhereitinvests.Asaresult,theUSisunavoidablyfacingchallengesfromtheChineseeconomy.Competitionisthehealthysymptomofmarketeconomy.China’srise will not necessarily create the same scenarios of World War I and II.Militaryconflictisnotinherentinanation’srise,andtheUnitedStatesinthetwentiethcenturyisagoodexampleofastateachievingeminencewithoutconflictwiththethendominantcountries.33Hopefully,China’sperformancewillbebetterinthetwenty-firstcentury.



3.TwoDifferentPerspectives

Conflictsbetween theUSandChinaare real,but theywillnotnecessarilyturn into a war. Instead, the conflicts would remind both sides that theyshouldmorecarefullyexaminethedirectsourceoftheconflicts–differentperspectives–inordertofindacommongroundtopeacefullyco-exist.Mostscholarsagreethattheconflictbetweenthetwocountriesmainlyincludetheirpoliticalincompatibility,economiccompetitionandmilitarycompetition,buttherearedisagreementsonwhatisthefundamentalconflictbetweenthetwocountries.

3.1.PoliticalIncompatibility

Acountry’sforeignpolicyistheextensionofitsinternalpoliticalsystem;andpoliticaldifferencesbetweenthetwocountriesfundamentallyaffectUS-Chinarelations.ThenatureofChina’sforeignpolicytowardtheWestisnotrootedinthegrowingeconomicpowerofChina,butisfundamentallydrivenbythenatureofChinesepoliticalsystem.ThecurrentChinesesocietyisunstable.Chinesesocietyisfullofpeople’sdissatisfactionsbecauseofserioussocialinjusticeandgovernmentcorruption.Arecentsurveyshowsthatonlysixpercent of Chinese people see themselves as happy, despite the government’seffortstoimproveChinesesenseofhappiness.34People’sdissatisfactioncouldsparkoffsocialviolenceanytime.TheChinesegovernmentfeelsverynervouswithpeople’sdiscontent.ThisexplainswhyChineseinternalsecurityspendingexceedsdefensebudgetin2011.35

China’s rapid economic growth has generated other changes in allsocialaspects,butitdoesnotmeanthatChinahasdepartedawayfromthecommunist political system.At thepresent time,China still adheres to theone-partysystem;MarxismisChineseofficialideology;ChineseeconomicsiscalledsocialistmarketeconomywithChinesecharacteristics;andChinesemedia is strictly subject to censorship.All these indicate that the socialistsystem is still present.36Although China is no longer a typical Leniniststate,Chinaremainsunchangedinitspoliticalnature.37WhatchangefortheCommunistPartyofChina(CPChereafter)inthepost-Maoeraarenotthepoliticalsystembutonlyeconomicmeasuresandpoliticalstrategies.GabriellaMontinolaobservesthat“Nearlyalloftheformalaspectsofdemocracyareabsent,notably,individualrightsoffreespeechandpoliticalparticipation,aviablesystemofcompetitionforpoliticaloffice,andasetofconstitutionallimitsonthestate.”38It is tooearly toarguethat theCPCisdeadandthatChinaisonthewaytowardanalternativemodelofdemocracytotheWest.39At present, the main schools of political thoughts, including neo-Maoism,neo-liberalism, andneo-Confucianism,are intensivelydebatingapproaches


630 Jinghao Zhou

ofreformingChinesesocialandpoliticalsystems.ThedirectionofChinesepoliticalsystemisreallyuncertain.

InAmerican viewpoint, one of the reasons for the current difficult bi-lateralrelationsisthatin2010theChinesegovernmentnegativelyrespondedto Nobel Peace Prize Committee’s decision to honor Chinese politicaldissident Liu Xiaobo刘晓波. Liu was put in jail after the crackdown ofTiananmenSquareIncidentandwasreleasedinearly1991,buttheChinesegovernment arrested him again after Liu wrote the Charter 08, whichcalls formoderndemocracyandanend to theCommunistParty’spoliticaldominance.40TheChinesegovernmentbelieves that theNobelPeacePrizeCommittee’sdecision is anattempt todeny the legitimateChinese judicialjudgement and undermine the Chinese political system.41 The ChinesegovernmentdefiedtheNobelPeacePrizedecisionbycontinuingtojailLiuand forbiddinganymembersofhis family to attend theNobel ceremoniesinOslo.Duringtheceremony,thepresidentoftheNobelCommitteeplacedLiu’sNobeldiplomaandmedalonanemptychairwhereLiuwassupposedtohavebeensitting.Onecommentatornotesthat“Therecouldbenoclearerevidence of the fundamental differences between China’s political systemandAmerica’s than the empty chair that represented Liu on the Nobelstage.”42Apparently,thepoliticalstandpointsbetweentheCPCandWesterngovernmentscannotbecompromised.

Americans view the Chinese political system as directly counteringthecorevaluesof theWest, and they seeno fundamentalway for the twocountries to co-exist.Americans will never trust a communist system thatdenies basic freedoms to its own people.43 Thus, especially to idealists, atransitiontodemocracyisacrucialstepnotonlytoChina’sfuturesuccess,butalsotothefutureofChina-USrelations.44However,theChinesegovernmenthas insisted that China’s development must come with “socialism withChinesecharacteristics”,theso-called“Chinamodel”or“BeijingConsensus”.ChineseofficialmediahaspersistentlyarguedthatitiswrongfortheWesttoimposeitswaysonothercultures.

EveniftheChinesepoliticalsituationisnotgettingworse,whichismostlikely,theCPCwillcontinuetopostponefundamentalpoliticalreform.Thepolitical and ideological battle between the two nations will be inevitable.The US does not have any other choice but to do business with China.Practically,Westernpoliticalleadersoftentakerealisticapproachesandpushasidepoliticaldisagreementsinfavourofmaintainingthecrucialeconomicrelationship, because many Westerners see the economic ties between thetwo nations as a means of binding them together. Idealists define ChinesepresidentHuJintao’sstatevisittotheUnitedStatesassa“trademission”.45Theagendaof the2010summit indicates thatChina’spolitical issueisnotWashington’stopconcern.DuringthejointpressconferencePresidentObama



emphasizedthedifferenthistoricaltraditionandculturalsystemwhichsoundstodefendChinesepoliticalsystem.Obviously,theObamaadministrationtookasoftattitudetowardChina’spoliticalissueinsteadofmakingtheChinesegovernmentangry.

The CPC remains powerful and there is no other opposition party inChina to compete with the CPC.The total numbers of the party membershavecontinuedtoclimb,almostreaching80million,althoughthemajorityofthepartymembersusethedang piao党票(thetitleofpartymember)forprofessionaladvancementinsteadofanystrongcommitmenttothecommunistbelief. Under this circumstance, it is best for China to reform its politicalsystemwithinthecurrentpoliticalsystemandcontinuetousetheCPCasthemainvehicletodriveChinatowardthefuture.Thus,politicalreforminChinawillbea slowprocess. In this sense,China’s road towarddemocratizationmightbedifferentfromthenormalpatternofWesternsocieties.GordonWhitenotesthat“manyofthecurrentproposalsforrapidandradicaldemocratizationare fraught with wishful thinking, and many of the assertions about thepunitivecomplementaritiesbetweendemocracyandsocio-economicprogressaresimplisticandmisleading.”46AftertheJasmineRevolutionintheMiddleEast,theCPCwilltakeitmorecautiouslyinapproachingpoliticalreforminordertomaintainsocialstability.

3.2.EconomicCompetition

The intensive economic competition may constitute one of the biggestbarriers to thebilateral relations.China is the fastestgrowingeconomy intheworldwithanaveragegrowthrateofninepercentayearoverthepastthree decades, about five times faster than the US.While someAmericananalystsbelieve thatahealthyChineseeconomy isvital to theUS,othersarguethatChina’sgrowingeconomicpowerwillthreatenUShegemonyduetothefollowingreasons.

China holds almost $1 trillion US government bonds, but it lags farbehindotherAsianandEuropeancountries indirect investment in theUS.While Chinese companies invested only $791 million in US companies in2009,SouthKoreancompaniesinvested$12billion,Japanesefirms$264.2billion,Germanfirms$218billion,andBritishcompanies$453billion.47

The US trade deficit with China continues to increase. China’s goodsexportstotheUSwere$229.2billion,whileUSgoodsexportstoChinawere$55.8billion,with theUS tradedeficit ingoodsat$173.4billion in2010.TheUStradedeficitwithChinaisexpectedtohit$270billionin2011.48TheUStradedeficitwithChinacausestheUnitedStatestolose2.4millionjobstoChina.ThefearoflosingjobshasbeenoneofmajorreasonsfortheUStobeskepticalofChina.49


632 Jinghao Zhou

The trade imbalance stems in part from the undervalued Chinesecurrency.TheUSaccusesChinaofartificially lowering thecostofgoodsit exports and helps to attract foreign companies to locate production inChina. The US believes that it hurtsAmerican exports and damages thefinancialrecoveryaroundtheworld.AlthoughtheUSTreasuryrefrainedinFebruary2011fromlabellingChinaacurrencymanipulator,itwarnedthattheyuan is still substantiallyundervalued,and thus,“more rapidprogressisneeded.”50

The Chinese government has placed trade barriers to restrict foreigninvestors and unfairly disadvantages foreign competitors. For examples,Chinaprovidesillegalsubsidiestotheproductionofwindpowerequipmentand censored Google and forced it to shut down China-based Internetsearchengine.TheChinesegovernmentalsoputrestrictionsonsomeexportproducts,suchasrareearthminerals,toenhanceitspowertoinfluenceglobalprices.51Consequently,moreclean-energytechnologycompaniesaremovingoperationstoChinatosavecosts.52

However, the Chinese government claims that all these arguments arewithout legitimate basis. First of all, China’s GDP does not represent thepowerofChina’seconomy.AlthoughChina’stotalGDPisthesecondlargesteconomy in theworld, itsGDPpercapita isonlyabout$4500,onlyaboutatenthoftheUS’s,rankingbelowhundredintheworld.53ChinawillhavetotakealongtimetocatchupwiththeUS.54TheAsianDevelopmentBankalreadypredictedthatthatChina’sgrowthratesinthenexttwodecades“willbeonlyalittlemorethanhalfofwhattheywereinthelast30years.”55

China is only theworld’s low-costworkshop for assemblingproducts,soithasitsgreatlimits.Chinacouldnotcontinuetodevelopitsindigenousindustrywithoutadvancedtechnology.Chinajustbegantobuildaneconomythat relies on innovation rather than imitation.56 In addition, China facesserious challenges. One of the challenges is environmental degradation.Sixteenof20mostpollutedcities in theworldare inChina; airquality inthree quarters of Chinese cities falls below the standard; and one third ofChineselandisaffectedbyacidrain.Chinaisoneofthemajorsourcesforglobalwarming.China’scoal-firedpowerplantsfallasacidrainonSeoul,SouthKorea,andTokyo.AccordingtotheJournal of Geophysical Research,much of the particulate pollution over LosAngeles originates in China.57Chinahastospend$170billionayeartofixtheenvironmentalproblemsanditisexpectedtospendmoreintheyearstocome.58

Regarding the currency exchange rates, according to the Chinesegovernment,itistheUS,notChina,thataimstomanipulatecurrencypolicy.TheUSallowedthedollartofall23percentfromitsearly2002peakagainstalloftradingpartners.Bycontrast,in2010China’scentralbankhasissueda statementpledging to increase currency flexibility.Chinahas already let



itscurrencyriseagainsttheUSdollarfrom8.27yuanforeverydollarto6.6yuanbyFebruary2011.59

3.3.ArmsRace

While China is rising, the military dimension becomes more important toUS-China relations.There is a growingdebate in theUnitedStateson thefutureoftheChinesemilitarydevelopment,concerningwithChina’smilitarycapabilitiesandintentions.60InDecember2010,U.SdefensesecretaryRobertGates visited China and concluded that China’s military development willchallengetheUSmilitarypowerinAsiaandmaychallengethecapabilityoftheUSmilitaryoperationsworldwide.

InAmericanview,Chinahasthefastestgrowingmilitarybudget.In2010,thedefensebudgetwas532.115billionyuan(about78billionUSD),andisexpectedtohit601billion(9.1billionUSD)in2011.Chinahasmaintainedanannualaverageincreaseindefenseexpenditureof12.9percentsince1989.61China’s military development lacks transparency, so US officials remainlargelyinthedarkaboutChina’slongtermgoals.62

China has accelerated its military modernization, including foreignpurchasesandindigenousproductionofhigh-technologyequipment.63First,ChineseJ-20fifth-generationstealthfighterhasreachedaninitialoperationalcapabilityandmaycontestUSairsupremacywiththeF-22.64Second,Chinahasdevelopedananti-shipballisticmissile–theDF-21D.AmericanmilitaryexpertspointoutthattheDF-21DisdesignedtosinkAmericansuper-carriersand affect US support for its Pacific allies.65 Third, “China is developing“counter-space”weaponsthatcouldshootdownsatellites.GregorySchulte,deputysecretaryofdefenseforspacepolicy,pointsoutthat“theinvestmentChina is putting into counter-space capabilities is a matter of concern tous.”66

The recent South China Sea sovereignty issue has intensified China’srelationsnotonlywithsomeAsiancountries,suchasVietnam,Philippines,andMalaysia,butalsowith theUS. InJuneof2011,Chinaurged theUSto stay out of South China Sea dispute, and warned that US involvementmaymakethesituationworse.67ChinahasclaimedtheentireSouthChinaSea as its “core interest” and declared that China will consider launchingapre-emptivenuclearstrikeif thecountryfinds itselffacedwithacriticalsituationinawarwithanothernuclearstate.AnAmericanmilitaryofficersuggeststhatChinesemilitaryambitionshowsthat“China’simperialismisonfulldisplay.”68

China’s military development has drawn concerns from the US andalso caused alarm in many of itsAsia-Pacific neighbours who fear theconsequences of a strong Chinese military. InAmerican viewpoint, since


634 Jinghao Zhou

thereisnoobviousthreattoChina,whyhasChinaacceleratedtheprocessofmilitarymodernization?69InChineseviewpoint,however,anation’spowermustbesupportedbyitsmilitarypower.Asmajorpowersriseeconomically,militarymodernizationusuallyfollows.Technologyandscienceisthemaindrivingforceofdevelopingmilitarypowerinthetwenty-firstcentury.ItisnecessaryforChinatomodernizeitsmilitaryforcebecauseChinesemilitarylagsfarbehindtheUSandtheEuropeancountries.ItisnotChina,buttheUS,thathasthelargestdefensebudgetintheworld,accountingfor47percent of the world’s total military spending.There are about 154 countrieswithUStroopsand63countrieswithUSmilitarybasesand troops.70TheChinese defense minister Liang Guanglie told Robert Gates that China isnot an advancedmilitary country andChinaposesno threat to the rest oftheworld.

RegardlessofwhetherChina’smilitarydevelopment is a threat to theUS, the reality is that neither the US nor China is able to dominate eachother.Amilitaryclashbetweenthemwouldexhaustbothcountries.71Chinesevice-foreignministerCuiTiankai崔天凯hasmadesimilarcomments that“Idon’tthinkanyoneintheAsia-PacificregionhastheabilityofencirclingChina, and I do not think that many countries in theAsian-Pacific wouldbecomepartofthatcircle.ChinaandtheUSdon’thaveanyotherchoicesbuttoworktogether.”

4.BuildingMutualTrustandUnderstanding

AlthoughtheUSandChinaholddifferentperspectivesonChina’srise,thetwonationsare interdependentduring theageofglobalization.Tobesure,noneofbothsideswantstobedependentontheother,butneithersidecanaffordasplit.72 In thepast threedecades, theUSandChinahaveachievedprogressincooperationineconomic,trade,andotherfields,includingmilitarycooperationinthreeareas:exchangeofantiterrorisminformation,preventionofnuclearproliferation,andthehostingofsix-partytalksontheNorthKoreanuclearprogram.Atpresent, theAfghanistanwar isnotyetover, al-Qaidaterrorismremainsactive,andtheissueofnuclearproliferationisstillintheair. The two nations will continue to work together in all these areas.Allthesesuggestthatthetwoeconomicgiantsaremorelikelytofindacommongroundtoco-exist.

However,ifthetwogovernmentsdonotcompromisedifferentperspec-tives,acoldwarbetweenthetwonationsispossible,butthecoldwarwillinevitablydamagetheinterestsofbothcountries.WhenHenryKissingerwasinterviewedbyFareedZakariafromCNNinJune2011,hemadeitclearthatanotherColdWarisnottheanswer.73DuringthesummitofChinaandtheUSinDecember2010,PresidentBarackObamaandHuJintaotriedtodownplay



differencesandvowedstrongercooperationbetweenthetwocountries,butitisimpossibletoquicklyovercomethesenseofmistrustandsolvestructuralproblemsthroughastatedinner.

HenryKissingerinhisbookOn Chinasuggeststhat“Thebestoutcomein theAmerican debate would be to combine the two approaches: for theidealiststorecognizethatprinciplesneedtobeimplementedovertimeandhencemustbeoccasionallyadjustedtocircumstance;andforthe‘realists’toacceptthatvalueshavetheirownrealityandmustbebuilt intooperationalpolicies.”ThisrecommendationcanbealsoappliedtoChina’sside.

Firstofall,theUSandChinashouldfindarealisticwaytopreventthebilateralrelationsfromgettingworse.Bothsidesshouldacceptthedifferencesbetweenthetwocountries.TheChinesegovernmentdoesnotwanttoseetheWest apply universal values to China, norWestern support ofTibetan andTaiwanese independentmovement, nor the sale ofweapons toTaiwan.Bycontrast,theUSdemandssomechangeinChina,includingreformingChinesepolitical system, increasing Chinese individual and religious freedoms,improvingmarketeconomy toensureequalcompetition,expandingcitizenparticipation,andmakingtransparentmilitarydevelopment.Obviously,thereis an “increasing unwillingness of Washington and Beijing to understandeach other’s viewpoints.”74This suggests that both sides need to patientlyandgraduallynarrowthegapbetweenthetwoperspectives.Inpoliticalarea,China’spoliticalreformisnecessarybutitcouldnotinovernightcompletelychangethesystem.AlthoughitispropertocriticizeChinaforitshumanrightsviolations,theUSshouldnotignorethesubstantialprogressChinahasmadesince1978.75Ineconomicarea,protectionismwouldharmbothnationsbutactiveengagementisthebestwaytominimizetheconflicts.Inmilitaryarea,although the US has reasons to take China’s recent military developmentcautiously,ChinesemilitaryforceremainsadecadebehindtheUnitedStates.76ChinaisnotanexistentialchallengetotheUnitedStates.77IftheUSkeepsitsconfidence,itisabletomanageallchallengesfromChina’srise.

Mutualunderstanding iscritical tonarrowing thegapbetween the twoperspectives.Atthepresenttime,the“mistrustofBeijingthroughoutAsiaandinWashingtonispalpable.”78ItiswidelybelievedthatmostAmericansnotonlydistrustbutalsodespiseChina.79DuringtheUS’smid-termelectionin2010,manycandidatesplayedtheChinacard,runningadvertisementsonUStelevisionsagainstChina.Similarly,BeijingdoesnotsharemanyofthesameinterestsastheUnitedStatesanditsallies.80AsignificantnumberofChinesepeoplebelievethattheUShasbeentryingtoblockChina’srise.

Mutual understanding is at least partially based on a common valuesystem.TheUSremainstheleaderoftheexistingglobalorder;andthevalueofdemocracycontinuestobethemainstreamoftheexistingglobalorder.Thecorevalueofmoderndemocracy,suchasindividualrights,justice,equality


636 Jinghao Zhou

andcommongood,isthecornerstoneofWesternsocietiesthatguidestheirgovernmentsinmakingforeignpolicy.

On the one hand, from an idealistic perspective, Chinese politicalliberalization isessential tobuildingmutual trust.China iswellpositionedto keep growing for years to come. Question is where China is going. IsChinadepartingawayfromtheWest?Or,isChinaheadingtowardstheWest?AlthoughnobodyknowswhereChinaisheaded,81itisevidentthatChina’sgrowingeconomicpowerdoesnotautomaticallytranslateintopoliticalpowerandinternationalauthority.ItishardtobelievethatChinacouldbecomeaninternationally recognizedworld leaderwithoutacceptinguniversalvalues.Inordertomakepeacewiththeexistingglobalorder,Chinareallyneedstomake well-balanced development between economic growth and politicalliberalizationthroughdomesticpoliticalreform.IfChinabecomesdemocratic,therelationshipbetweenthetwocountrieswillstabilizeand,ultimately,“itwillenterintothedemocraticzoneofpeace.”82

Ontheotherhand,theChineseculturalandhistorytraditionwillaffecttheprocessofChina’sdemocratization.ThisisoneofthemostimportantreasonsfortheformerUSSecretaryofStateHenryKissingerinOn ChinatomakeaboldargumentthatitisimportanttobeginwithanappreciationofChina’slonghistoryinordertoanyattemptunderstandChina’sfutureworldrole.83ChinawashumiliatedbytheWestforacentury,sonationalisminChinaisvery strong.ChineseStateCouncilorDaiBingguo戴秉国 at a JointPressConferenceof theSecondRoundof theChina-USStrategicandEconomicDialogues in 2010 explained that “China’s number one core interest is tomaintainitsfundamentalsystemandstatesecurity;nextisstatesovereigntyandterritorialintegrity;andthirdisthecontinuedstabledevelopmentoftheeconomyandsociety.”84Theoretically,itisthemostimportantfortheCPCtomaintainitscommunistpoliticalsystem;practically,territorialintegrityistheessential issuesamongChina’score interests,especially territorial integrityofTaiwanwithChina.

TaiwanisthemostimportantissuefortheUS-Chinarelationssincetheoutbreak of the KoreanWar.The unification of the mainland withTaiwanis the common will of the Chinese government and the majority of theChinese people. Mainland China will never relinquish this mission underany circumstance. If the Chinese government made a wrong policy onTaiwan,itcouldtriggeranti-governmentmovementathome.IftheUSmadea wrong policy onTaiwan issue, it could hurt the feelings of the majorityof the Chinese people and trigger anti-American nationalism. CharlesGlaser,directorof theInstituteforSecurityandConflictStudiesatGeorgeWashington University, recently suggests that the US should modify itsforeignpolicyandmakeconcessionstoBeijing,includingthepossibilityofbackingawayfromitscommitmenttoTaiwaninordertoavoidawarbetween



theUSandChina.85ItisalsoworthnotingthatitisnotwisefortheCPCtounifyTaiwanbeforechangingthenatureofitspoliticalsystemunlessTaiwanclaims independence, because the political gap between mainland ChinaandTaiwan is huge.TheCPCmight be capableof takingoverTaiwanbymilitaryforcebutitwouldbedifficulttowinthesupportfromthemajorityofTaiwanesepeople.

For the long term, cultural exchange is the key to help in buildingmutual trust and understanding between the two countries. Nevertheless,China’sthreedecadeseconomicdevelopmentisa“single-mindedpursuitofeconomicgrowth.”86WhileChina’s tradesurplushasexceeded$21billionin2010,itsculturalproducttradedeficitisgrowing.Theratioofimportsofculturalproductstoexportswas10:1yearsagoandisbelievedtobemuchhighertoday.87ThisreflectsthattheinfluenceofChinesecultureintheWestis limited.To lower the distrust between China and the US, China shouldrenovate its culture by introducing universal values and world advancedcultures intoChina,but it isuncertain if theCCP iswilling toopenup itspoliticaldomainstofacilitatetheemergenceofamodernizedculture.88TheCPC has recently attempted to revive Confucianism, but the result of thiseffort is uncertain.As a matter of fact, this attempt does not only indicatethattheCPChasexhausteditsculturalresources,butalsoimplythatthere-inventionofChineseculturaltraditionhasbecomedesperatelyurgent.

International relations are directly interacted by governments; the topleaders of both countries are significantly important to making US-Chinaforeignpolicy.Americanpresident’sdecision isdeterminednotonlyby itsdomesticeconomicsituation,butalsobyinfluencesfromcongressandpublicopinion. In this sense, theAmerican president plays a less role in makingforeignpolicy.AfterthecharismaticleaderChairmanMaodiedin1976,thepowerof theCPChasbeendecentralized.AlthoughChina’spolicymakingprocesshasalreadybecomepluralized,thetopleaderoftheCPCstillplaysacriticalroleinmakingforeignpolicyduetothenatureofcommunistpoliticalsystem.ThepoliticalorientationofothertopChineseleadersandtheleadersoftheForeignMinistryalsocontributetoforeignpolicymaking.Therefore,inordertoavoidunnecessarymistakesinforeignpolicymakingprocess,bothcountries’leadersneedtobeopen-mindedandcarefullylistentothevoicescomingfromthinktanksandcommoncitizens.

5.Conclusion

China’seconomicandmilitarypower isgrowing,butChina’s internationalinfluence is still constrained by the stagnation of political system, culturaldeficit, and the low level of comprehensive economic and military power.TheUnitedStatesremainsthedominantpowerintheworld.Theexaggeration


638 Jinghao Zhou

of China’s power is in part derived from psychological impact and mediaexaggeration.TheUnitedStatesmustkeepconfidenceandacceptchallengesfrom the rising power. Different perspectives could generate healthycompetitioninwhichpeoplecanlearnhowtolivewithothersduringtheageof globalization. The disagreements between the two giants will continue.The CPC will maintain its basic attributes of communist political system.Market economic competition continues to be driven by making profits.Both sides will keep defending its national interests through developingtheirmilitarymuscles.Nobodycanstopallthesedisagreementsbutthereisnothingtofeardifferentperspectives,ifbothsidescouldcarefullytreateachother. Overestimating China’s economic and military power would createanxiety;overactingtoChina’srisewouldworsenthebilateralrelations.Themost important thing forboth sides todo is to clearlyunderstandpoliticalisolation, economic protectionism and military confrontation are not thesolution. Realistically, building mutual trust and understanding throughculturalexchangeprogramandpositiveengagementisthebestwaytoreducetheriskofgreatpowerwar.

Notes

* Dr Jinghao Zhou周景颢 completed his Bachelor of Philosophy at NanjingUniversityandMasterofPhilosophyatWuhanUniversityand thencontinuedhis education earning his Master of Divinity in Science at UnionTheologicalSeminary in Virginia and PhD at Baylor University. Dr Zhou is currentlyAssociate Professor of Contemporary China at Hobart and William SmithCollegesinNewYork.HismainresearchinterestsareChinesepolitics,ChineseChristianity, China-US relations, and women’s studies. He is author of threebooks:China’s Peaceful Rise in a Global Context: A Domestic Aspect of China’s Road Map to Democratization (Lexington Books, 2010), Remaking China’s Public Philosophy and Chinese Women’s Liberation: The Volatile Mixing of Confucianism, Marxism, and Feminism(EdwinMellenPress,2006),Remaking China’s Public Philosophy for the Twenty-first Century (Praeger Publishers,2003).HismorethantwodozenarticlesappearinvariousEnglishjournalsandnewspapers,suchasThe Journal of Comparative Asian Development,American Journal of Chinese Studies,Journal of China: An International Journal,Asian Mission,Asian Perspective,Journal of International Women’s Studies,Journal of Religion and Society,In the National Interests,Journal of Church and State and Asia Times.<Email: [email protected]>

1. DavidShambaugh,“Introduction:TheEmergenceof‘GreaterChina’”,The China Quarterly,136(December1993),p.653.

2. “How to Gracefully StepAside”, Economist, 10 January 2011.According totheEconomist, ifyoudoubletheexpectedAmericangrowthfrom2.5percentperyearto5percentperyear,youpushthekeydatebackfrom2019to2022.IfyouslowChina’sgrowthto5percentannually,youdelaytheyearto2028.



Availableat<http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2011/01/china/print>(10February2011).

3. CNNWireStaff,“Kissinger:Chinaposes‘bigchallenge’forU.S.”,CNN.Com,12June2011.Availableat<http://edition.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/06/12/kissinger.china/>.

4. DavidM.Lampton,Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,2002),p.59.

5. AaronFriedberg,“TheFutureofU.S.-ChinaRelationsIsConflictInevitable?”,International Security,Vol.30,No.2(Fall,2005),p.9.

6. AaronFriedberg,“TheNewEraofU.S.-ChinaRivalry”,Wall Street Journal,17January2011.

7. “QuotesoftheDay”,Time,8March2011.8. StephenGlain,“WashingtonIsPreparingaLongWarwithChina”,U.S. News,

31March2011.9. BretStephens,“ChinaandtheNextAmericanCentury:Beijing’sPolitburoHas

NothingonMarkZuckerberg”,Wall Street Journal,21December2010.10. ThomasJChristensen,“TheWorldNeedsanAssertiveChina”,Foreign Affairs,

21February2011.11. Gideon Rachman, “ThinkAgain,American Decline: This Time is for Real”,

Foreign Policy,18,January2011.12. “InternationalFocuson theUnitedStatesBreak the ‘DebtCeiling’Difficult”,

Finance Online.<http://www.finance-ol.com/2011/06/international-focus-on-the-united-states-break-the-debt-ceiling-difficult/>(25June2011).

13. Greg Bocquet, “Who Owns the U.S.?” <http://finance.yahoo.com/banking-budgeting/article/112189/who-owns-the-us?mod=bb-debtmanagement> (28February2011).

14. Elaine Shannon, “China Rising: Small World, Big Stakes”, Time, 20 June2005.

15. DanielDombey,“USStrugglingtoHoldRoleasGlobalLeader”,Politics and Foreign Policy,6March2011.

16. BenjaminI.PageandTaoXie, Living with the Dragon: How the American Public Views the Rise of China(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2010).

17. James Mann, The China Fantasy: How Our Leaders Explain Away Chinese Repression(NewYork:VikingPenguin,2007),p.xii.

18. Thomas L Friedman, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century(NewYork:Picador/Farrar,StrausandGirousx,2007),p.82.

19. AaronFriedberg,“TheFutureofU.S.-ChinaRelationsIsConflictInevitable?”,International Security,Vol.30,Number2(Fall,2005),p.10.

20. FareedZakaria, “TheRiseof aFierceYetFragileSuperpower”,Newsweek, 7January2008.


22. ElizabethEconomy,“TheEndofthe‘PeacefulRise’”,Foreign Policy,December2010.

23. JohnLee,“China’sNationalInsecurity”,Wall Street Journal Asia,21December2010.


640 Jinghao Zhou


25. John Lee, “The End of the Charm Offensive”, Foreign Policy, 26 October2010.

26. FareedZakaria,“TheDangerousChiponChina’sShoulder”,Time,12January2011.

27. WuZhong,“ADaringDeparturefromDeng”,Asia Times,6August2010.28. John Lee, “The End of the Charm Offensive”, Foreign Policy, 26 October

2010.29. RobertD.Kaplan, “HowWeWouldFightChina”,Atlantic Monthly, 28April

2005.30. DavidGordon,“ChineseJuggernaut?China’sRapidGrowthIsaLegitimateWorry

forLeadersinWashingtonandBeijing”,Foreign Policy,March/April2011.31. John Mearsheimer, “The Rise of ChinaWill Not Be Peaceful atAll” <http://

mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/P0014.pdf>(7March2011).32. SusanL.Shirk,China: Fragile Superpower: How China’s Internal Politics Could

Derail Its Peaceful Rise(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2007),p.9.33. HenryA.Kissinger, “AvoidingaU.S.-ChinaColdWar”,Washington Post, 14

January2011.34. “Only6PercentHappy,SurveyFinds”,China Daily,3March2011<http://www.

china.org.cn/china/2011-03/03/content_22041375.htm>(30March2011).35. “China Boosts Spending on Welfare – and on Internal Security, Too”, The

Economist, 10 March 2011 <http://www.economist.com/node/18335099> (30March2011).

36. YanqiTong,Transition from State Socialism: Economic and Political Change in Hungary and China(NewYork:Rowman&LittlefieldPublishers,1997),p.1.

37. RichardBernsteinandRossMunro,The Coming Conflict with China(NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf,1997),p.15.

38. Gabriella Montinola, “Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis forEconomicSuccessinChina”,World Politics,48(1995),p.52.

39. JohnNaisbittandDorisNaisbitt,China’s Megatrends:The Eight Pillars of a New Society(NewYork,NY:HarperBusiness,2010),p.38.

40. CaraAnna, “Contender forNobelPrize inChinesePrison”,The IRRawddy, 7October2010.

41. JohnLee,“China’sNationalInsecurity”,Wall Street Journal Asia,21December2010.

42. MichaelAuslin,“RealismonChinaIsMoreRealistic”,Wall Street Journal Asia,17January2011.

43. Warren Cohen, America’s Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2010),p.287.

44. Quoted in Quansheng Zhao, “American’s Response to the Rise of China andSino-USRelations”,AsiaJournal of Political Science,13(2005),p.14.

45. Ian Johnson, “ForChina,Relief after aSuccessfulTrip”,New York Times, 21January2011.

46. GordonWhite,“DemocratizationandEconomicReform inChina”,AustralianJournal of Chinese Affairs,31(1994),p.82.



47. Kevin Hall, “Think China Has Big Stake in U.S. Business? NotYet”, Miami Herald,18January2011.

48. DavidE.SangerandMichaelWines,“ChinaLeader’sLimitsComeintoFocusasU.S.VisitNears”,New York Times,16January2011.

49. MaryMeghanRyan,Handbook of U.S., Labor Statistics: Employment, Earnings, Prices, Productivity, and Other Labor Data(Lanham,MD:BernanPress,2009),p.205.

50. IanTalleyandTomBarkley,“TreasurySlightlyStepsUpCriticismonYuan’sLevel”,Wall Street Journal,5February2011.

51. JamesT.Areddy,“MovestoStrengthenGripOverSupplyofRare-EarthMetals”,Wall Street Journal,7February2011.

52. WilliamIde,“China’sRareEarthsExportQuotaCutsTriggersConcerns”,VOA News,1January2011.

53. DavidM.Lampton,Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,2002),p.59.

54. JulianBorger,EwenMacAskillandPhillipInman,“ChinaonEqualFootingwithUSasHuJintaoVisitsWashington”,guardian.co.uk,18January2011.

55. Quoted in David Gordon, “Chinese Juggernaut? China’s Rapid Growth Is aLegitimate Worry for Leaders in Washington – and Beijing”, Foreign Policy,March/April2011.

56. Steve Lohr, “When Innovation, Too, Is Made in China”, New York Times, 1January2011.

57. Quoted inJosephKahnandJimYardley,“AsChinaRoars,PollutionReachesDeadlyExtremes”,New York Times,27August2007.

58. Thomas L. Friedman, The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century(NewYork:Farrar,StrausandGiroux,2007),p.235.

59. “ChinaYuanHitsAnotherRecordHighonExporters’Year-EndDemand”,Wall Street Journal,31December2010.

60. JamesR.LilleyandDavidShambaugh(eds),China’s Military Faces the Future(NewYork:M.E.Sharpe,1999),p.3.

61. BatesGill,“ChineseDefenseProcurementSpending:DeterminingIntentionsandCapabilities”,inJamesR.LilleyandDavidShambaugh(eds),China’s Military Faces the Future(NewYork:M.E.Sharpe,1999),p.3.

62. “AGlobal Imperative:AProgressiveApproach toU.S.-ChinaRelations in the21st Century”, 2008 <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/08/china_report.html>(10January2010).

63. “Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security ReviewCommission: One Hundred Eleventh Congress Second Session, November2010”<http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2010/annual_report_full_10.pdf>(5February2011).

64. Adm.JamesLyons,“China’sImperialismonFullDisplay”,Washington Times,11January2011.

65. BillGertz,“ChinaHasCarrier-KillerMissile,U.S.AdmiralSays”,Washington Times,27December2010.

66. KarinZeitvogelandAgenceFrance-Presse,“Chinese‘Counterspace’WeaponryWorriesU.S.”,National Post,5February2011.


642 Jinghao Zhou

67. “ChinaWarnsU.S.toStayoutofSeaDispute”,Reuters,23June2011.68. Adm.JamesLyons,“China’sImperialismonFullDisplay”,Washington Times,

11January2011.69. MichaelAuslin,“RealismonChinaIsMoreRealistic”,Wall Street Journal Asia,

17January2011.70. “U.S. MilitaryTroops and Bases around theWorld”, Department of Defense,

“Base Structure Report, FY 2002” and “Active Duty Military PersonnelStrengths by RegionalArea and by Country, December 31, 2001”, ZoltanCrossman, “New U.S. Military Bases”, 2 February 2002, Monthly Review,2002.Itisavailableonwebpageat<http://www.google.com/search?q=u.s.+military+troops+and+bases+around+the+world&hl=en&biw=1178&bih=461&prmd=ivns&tbm=isch&tbo=u&source=univ&sa=X&ei=2M8DTubEHYzPgAeF_uiKDg&ved=0CBsQsAQ>.

71. HenryA.Kissinger, “AvoidingaU.S.-ChinaColdWar”,Washington Post, 14January2011.

72. ZacharyKarabell,“U.S.-ChinaFriction:WhyNeitherSideCanAffordaSplit”,Time,8February2010.

73. CNNWireStaff,“Kissinger:ChinaPoses‘BigChallenge’forU.S.”,CNN.com,12June2011.<http://edition.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/06/12/kissinger.china/>

74. RanaMitter,“HenryKissingerOffersanEruditeandElegantInsightintotheNewWorldSuperpower”,Guardian,5May2011.

75. JamesA.Dorn,“HowtoImproveU.S.-ChinaRelationsintheWakeofCNOOC”,The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis,Vol.17,No.3(Winter2005),p.63.

76. StefanHalper,“TheChinaThreat,CantheUnitedStatesReallyMakeaPeacefulHand-offofPowertoAuthoritarianChina?”(letter),Foreign Policy,March/April2011.

77. JosephS.Nye, Jr., reply toStefanHalper’s letter“TheChinaThreat:Can theUnited States Really Make a Peaceful Hand-off of Power toAuthoritarianChina?”(letter),Foreign Policy,March/April2011.

78. ThomasJChristensen,“TheWorldNeedsanAssertiveChina”,Foreign Affairs,21February2011.

79. BenjaminI.PageandTaoXie,Living with the Dragon: How the American Public Views the Rise of China(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2010),p.74.

80. MichaelAuslin,“RealismonChinaIsMoreRealistic”,Wall Street Journal Asia,17January2011.

81. ElizabethEconomy,“TheEndofthe‘PeacefulRise’”,Foreign Policy,December2010.

82. AaronLFriedberg,“TheFutureofU.S.-ChinaRelations:IsConflictInevitable?”,International Security,30.2(2005),p.16

83. HenryKissinger,On China(ThePenguinPress,2011).84. “Remarks by State Councilor Dai Bingguo at Joint Press Conference of the

SecondRoundofTheChina-USStrategicandEconomicDialogues”,Ministryof ForeignAffairs of the People’s Republic of China <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t705280.htm>(10January2011).

85. CharlesGlaser,“WillChina’sRiseLeadtoWar?WhyRealismDoesNotMeanPessimism”,Foreign Affairs,March/April2011.



86. ZhaoLitaoandTanSoonHeng,“China’sCulturalRise:VisionsandChallenges”,China: An International Journal,Vol.5,No.1(March2007),p.97.

87. “ChinaFaces‘Huge’CulturalTradeDeficit”,China Daily,19April2006.88. ZhaoLitaoandTanSoonHeng,“China’sCulturalRise:VisionsandChallenges”,

China: An International Journal,Vol.5,No.1(March2007),p.103.

ReferencesAnna,Cara(2010),“ContenderforNobelPrizeinChinesePrison”,The IRRawddy,

7October.Areddy, James T. (2011), “Moves to Strengthen Grip Over Supply of Rare-Earth

Metals”,Wall Street Journal,7February.Auslin,Michael(2011),“RealismonChinaIsMoreRealistic”,Wall Street Journal

Asia,17January.Bernstein,RichardandRossMunro(1997),The Coming Conflict with China,New

York:AlfredA.Knopf.Bocquet, Greg (2011), “Who Owns the U.S.?” <http://finance.yahoo.com/banking

budgeting/article/112189/who-owns-the-us?mod=bb-debtmanagement> (28February).

Borger,Julian,EwenMacAskillandPhillipInman(2011),“ChinaonEqualFootingwithUSasHuJintaoVisitsWashington”,guardian.co.uk,18January.

“ChinaFaces‘Huge’CulturalTradeDeficit”,China Daily,19April2006.Christensen, Thomas J. (2011), “The World Needs anAssertive China”, Foreign

Affairs,21February.CNNWireStaff,“Kissinger:ChinaPoses‘BigChallenge’forU.S.”,CNN.com,12

June2011<http://edition.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/06/12/kissinger.china/>.Cohen,Warren (2010), America’s Response to China: A History of Sino-American

Relations,NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress.Dombey,Daniel(2011),“USStrugglingtoHoldRoleasGlobalLeader”,Politics and

Foreign Policy,6March.Dorn, JamesA. (2005), “How to Improve U.S.-China Relations in the Wake of

CNOOC”,The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis,Vol.17,No.3,Winter.Economy, Elizabeth (2010), “The End of the ‘Peaceful Rise’”, Foreign Policy,

December.Friedberg,Aaron (2005), “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict In-

evitable?”,International Security,Vol.30,No.2,Fall.Friedberg,Aaron(2011),“TheNewEraofU.S.-ChinaRivalry”,Wall Street Journal,

17January.Friedman,ThomasL.(2007),The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first

Century,NewYork:Picador/Farrar,StrausandGirousx.Gertz,Bill(2010),“ChinaHasCarrier-KillerMissile,U.S.AdmiralSays”,Washington

Times,27December.Glain,Stephen(2011),“WashingtonIsPreparingaLongWarwithChina”,U.S. News,

31March.Glaser, Charles (2011), “Will China’s Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not

MeanPessimism”,Foreign Affairs,March/April.


644 Jinghao Zhou

Gordon,David(2011),“ChineseJuggernaut?China’sRapidGrowthIsaLegitimateWorryforLeadersinWashingtonandBeijing”,Foreign Policy,March/April.

Hall,Kevin(2011),“ThinkChinaHasBigStakeinU.S.business?NotYet”,Miami Herald,18January.

Halper, Stefan (2011), “The China Threat: Can the United States Really Make aPeaceful Hand-off of Power toAuthoritarian China?” (letter), Foreign Policy,March/April.

Ide,William (2011), “China’sRareEarthsExportQuotaCutsTriggersConcerns,”VOA News,1January.

Johnson,Ian(2011),“ForChina,ReliefafteraSuccessfulTrip”,New York Times,21January.

Kahn,JosephandJimYardley(2007),“AsChinaRoars,PollutionReachesDeadlyExtremes”,New York Times,27August.

Kaplan,Robert(2005),“HowWeWouldFightChina”,Atlantic Monthly,28April.Karabell, Zachary (2010), “U.S.-China Friction: Why Neither Side CanAfford a

Split”,Time,8February.Kissinger,Henry(2011a),“AvoidingaU.S.-ChinaColdWar,”Washington Post,14

January.Kissinger,Henry(2011b),On China,ThePenguinPress.Lampton, David M. (2002), Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China

Relations,Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.Lee,John(2010a),“TheEndoftheCharmOffensive”,Foreign Policy,26October.Lee, John (2010b), “China’s National Insecurity”, Wall Street Journal Asia, 21

December.Lilley, James R. and David Shambaugh (eds) (1999), China’s Military Faces the

Future,NewYork:M.E.Sharpe.Lohr,Steve(2011),“WhenInnovation,Too,IsMadeinChina”,New York Times,1

January.Lyons,Adm.James(2011),“China’sImperialismonFullDisplay”,Washington Times,

11January.Mann,James(2007),The China Fantasy: How Our Leaders Explain Away Chinese

Repression,NewYork:VikingPenguin.Mearsheimer,John(2011),“TheRiseofChinaWillNotBePeacefulatAll”<http://

mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/P0014.pdf>(7March).Mitter,Rana(2011),“”HenryKissingerOffersanEruditeandElegantInsightintothe

NewWorldSuperpower”,Guardian,5May.Montinola, Gabriella (1995), “Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for

EconomicSuccessinChina”,World Politics,48.Naisbitt,JohnandDorisNaisbitt(2010),China’s Megathrends: The Eight Pillars of

a New Society,NewYork,NY:HarperBusiness.Nye,JosephS.,Jr.(2011),replytoStefanHalper’sletter“TheChinaThreat:Canthe

UnitedStatesReallyMakeaPeacefulHand-offofPowertoAuthoritarianChina?”(letter),Foreign Policy,March/April.

Page, Benjamin and Tao Xie (2010), Living with the Dragon: How the American Public Views the Rise of China,NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress.

“QuotesoftheDay,”Time,8March2011.



Rachman,Gideon(2011),“ThinkAgain,:AmericanDecline:ThisTimeIsforReal,”Foreign Policy,18January.

“RemarksbyStateCouncilorDaiBingguoatJointPressConferenceoftheSecondRoundoftheChina-USStrategicandEconomicDialogues”,MinistryofForeignAffairsofthePeople’sRepublicofChina<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t705280.htm>(10January2011).

Ryan, Mary Meghan (2009), Handbook of U.S. Labor Statistics: Employment, Earnings, Prices, Productivity, and Other Labor Data, Lanham, MD: BernanPress.

Sanger,DavidE.andMichaelWines(2011),“ChinaLeader’sLimitsComeintoFocusasU.S.VisitNears”,New York Times,16January.

Shambaugh,David(1993),“Introduction:TheEmergenceof‘GreaterChina’”,The China Quarterly,136,December.

Shannon,Elaine(2005),“ChinaRising:SmallWorld,BigStakes”,Time,June20.Shirk,SusanL.(2007),China: Fragile Superpower: How China’s Internal Politics

Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Stephens,Bret(2010),“ChinaandtheNextAmericanCentury:Beijing’sPolitburo

HasNothingonMarkZuckerberg”,Wall Street Journal,21December.Talley,IanandTomBarkley(2011),“TreasurySlightlyStepsUpCriticismonYuan’s

Level”,Wall Street Journal,5February.Tong,Yanqi(1997),Transition from State Socialism: Economic and Political Change

in Hungary and China,NewYork:Rowman&LittlefieldPublishers.White,Gordon(1994),“DemocratizationandEconomicReforminChina”,Australian

Journal of Chinese Affairs,31.Zakria,Fareed(2008),“TheRiseofaFierceYetFragileSuperpower”,Newsweek,7

January.Zakria, Fareed (2011), “The Dangerous Chip on China’s Shoulder”, Time, 12

January.Zhao, Litao and Tan Soon Heng (2007), “China’s Cultural Rise: Visions and

Challenges”,China: An International Journal,Vol.5,No.1,March.Zhao,Quansheng(2005),“American’sResponsetotheRiseofChinaandSino-US

Relations”,Asian Journal of Political Science,13.Zhong,Wu(2010),“ADaringDeparturefromDeng”,Asia Times,6August.Zeitvogel, Karin and Agence France-Presse (2011), “Chinese ‘Counterspace’

WeaponryWorriesU.S.”,National Post,5February.


646 Jinghao Zhou


Development of Japan-China Relations since 1972 647InternationalJournalofChinaStudiesVol.2,No.3,December2011,pp.647-679

DevelopmentofJapan-ChinaRelationssince1972

Kazuyuki Katayama*JapaneseEmbassyinBelgium

Abstract

Sincethenormalizationofdiplomaticrelationsin1972,Japan-Chinarelationsexperiencedthreeperiods:a“heiwa yuko”(peaceandfriendship)era;a“seirei keinetsu” (politically cold, economically hot) era; and an era of “senryaku teki gokei kankei”(mutuallybeneficialrelationsbasedoncommonstrategicinterests). Japan and China are perpetual neighbours, neither of which cansimplyrelocate,andcannotbutseekawin-winsituation.For thatpurpose,this article argues the importance to manage bilateral relations based onthe followingprinciples: first, their relationsshouldbeguidedbycommoninterests,notdrivenbyemotions;second,sensitiveissuessuchaspasthistory,TaiwanortheEastChinaSeadisputesmaysometimesshaketheirrelations,whichrequiresthemtopursueanewthinking;third,awiderangeoffrankand candid communication networks between the governments, businesssectors,academiaandindividualsisnecessary;fourth,Japan-Chinarelationsarenotonlyconfined tobilateralpurposes,but shouldalsocontribute to anewframeworkforAsiaandtheworld;andfifth,bothgovernmentsneedtoaddresstopublicdiplomacy,acoretargetofwhichistheyounggeneration.Japan’s relationship with the US and China determined Japan’s destiny inearly20thcenturyanditstillremainsvalidnow.Japan’sdiplomaticoptionisnot“USorChina,”but“USandChina.”TheUSremainsthemostimportantpartner for Japan, while Japan should and can cooperate with China on abilateral,regionalandglobalbasis.

Keywords: Japan-China strategic relationship, the US factor, diplomacy


1.Introduction

This article reviews the development of Japan-China relations since thenormalizationofdiplomaticrelationsin1972,andsuggestsadesirablefuturerelationship.


648 Kazuyuki Katayama

At the beginning, the article briefly reviews international as well asdomestic factors that encouragedbothnations to realize thenormalization,andhowtheyenjoyedaperiodof“peaceandfriendship”untilthelate1980s.ThenthearticleexamineshowtheJune4TiananmenIncidentandthecollapseofBerlinWallchangedstrategiccircumstancessurroundingbothnationsinthe late1980sand the1990s.The Japaneseperception towardsChinaalsochangednegativelyasJapandeclinedandChinareemergedduringthatperiod.Politicaldisputesalsoinfluencedbilateralrelations.PrimeMinisterKoizumi’sregularannualworshiptotheYasukuniShrineduringhispremiershipcreatedadecisivefactorinworseningbilateralpoliticalrelations.Thearticlestudieshow those factors led toaviciouscycle in the trans-centuryperiod thougheconomicinterdependencewasfurtherdeepened,whichwascalledaperiodof“politicallycold,economicallyhot.”

After Koizumi stepped down,Abe initiated a new China policy. Thesuccessive cabinets, including the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)-ledgovernmentsince2009,havebasicallyfollowedthisguidingprinciple.Thearticleanalyzesthenewstageofawin-winbilateralrelationship,characterizedbya“mutuallybeneficialrelationshipbasedoncommonstrategicinterests,”andproposesthatthisstrategicrelationshipshouldbecomeabasisforfuturebilateralrelations.Inpromotingamutuallybeneficialrelationshipbasedoncommon strategic interests, the article advises that both Japan and Chinaneed to treat politically sensitive issues in a clever and restraint manner.Theyincludethepasthistory,theTaiwanissue,andalsotheEastChinaSea,especiallytheSenkaku/DiaoyudaoIslandsissue.

TheUSandChinaaretwomostimportantcountriesforJapan.Japan’srelations with those two states determined Japan’s destiny in early 20thcentury.Japan’smishandlingofChinacausedseriousconflictwiththeUSandresultedinthePacificWar,whichfinallybroughtaboutacatastrophicfailureforJapan.ThearticlefinallysuggeststhebestoptionforJapaninitsrelationswithChina,takingintoconsiderationtherelationswiththeUS,whichremainsthemostimportantpartnerforJapan.

2.Normalizationin1972

Theyear1971isrememberedbyJapaneseastheyearoftwo“NixonShocks”.One was economic and another was political shock. OnAugust 15, 1971,PresidentNixondeclaredunilaterallythattheUSgovernmentwouldimposea10percentimportsurchargeandstoptheconvertibilityoftheUSdollartogold,thusputtinganendtotheBrettonWoodssystem.AnotherNixonshockwasdirectlyrelatedtoChina.DrKissinger,Assistant toNixonfornationalsecurityaffairssecretlyvisitedBeijingviaPakistanfromJuly9to11,1971.1AfterhispreparatoryworkwiththeChineseside,boththeUSandChinese


Development of Japan-China Relations since 1972 649

governments announced on July 15 (US time) that Nixon would make avisit to China at an appropriate time before May 1972 at the invitation ofPremierZhouEnlai for thediscussionof thenormalizationof thebilateralrelationshipandexchangingviewsonissuesofmutualconcern.2HisvisittoChinaasthefirstforaUSPresidentwascarriedoutonFebruary21-28,1972.ThenotificationofNixon’sChinavisittotheJapanesegovernmentcameoutalmostat thesame timeas thepublicannouncementwasrememberedasabitterlessonforJapanesediplomacynotonlyfromtheviewpointofseriousstrategicshiftcomingfromPresidentNixon’svisittoChina,butalsofromapsychologicalshockthatJapanwasignoredoratleastnonchalantlytreatedbytheUS.Itmaynotberealistic,however,toanticipatethattheUSwouldconsult this kind of critical strategic shift of its foreign policy with JapancloselyinadvanceaseventheStateDepartmentwasnotinformedindetail,either, and became a “victim” of Dr Kissinger’s secret China diplomacy.3

Fearfulof leaks,DrKissingerdidnot involve theUSStateDepartment inthenegotiationprocessofShanghaiCommuniqué,andasaresult theStateDepartmentwasnotallowedtoreaditsdraftuntiltwenty-fourhoursbeforeitwastobereleased.4

There had been movements towards normalization between Japanand China since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in1949.However,thosemovementscouldnotmaketheJapanesegovernmentmove to thedirectionofnormalizationbecauseof international aswell as,to a less degree, domestic reasons. Nixon’s China visit, however, changedthe situation. Kakuei Tanaka won the presidential election of the LiberalDemocraticParty(LDP),bydefeatinghisopponentTakeoFukudaandwasaccordingly appointed prime minister in July 1972. Tanaka held a pressconferenceonJuly5,statingthatthebasicissueofJapan-Chinarelationshipwastonormalizerelationsthroughgovernmentalconsultationsandthatthetimehadcome.5Tanaka,accompaniedbyForeignMinisterOhiraandChiefCabinetSecretaryNikaido,visitedChinaat the invitationofPremierZhouEnlaionSeptember25-30,1972.BothgovernmentsfinallyreachedagreementonthenormalizationofofficialrelationsbyissuingaJointCommuniquéonSeptember29.

Therehadbeenseveralmainissuestoberesolvedbetweenbothgovern-mentsbeforethenormalization.Withregardtothehistoricissue,theJapaneseside referred to the responsibility for the serious damage that it caused inthepasttotheChinesepeopleanddeeplyreproacheditself.6RegardingtherepresentationofChina,theJapanesegovernmentacceptedthegovernmentofthePRCasthesolelegalgovernmentofChina.7

ThestatusofTaiwanwasanothersensitiveissue.TheChinesegovernmentreiterateditspositionthatTaiwanisaninalienablepartoftheterritoryofthePRC.8 Japan maintained its basic position that it was not in a position to



judge the legal status of Taiwan any more since the former renounced allrights, titles and claims over the latter as a result of having accepted theSan Francisco PeaceTreaty, which came into effect in 1952. In consistentwith theprinciple, theJapanesegovernmentstated that it fullyunderstandsand respects the standof theChinesegovernment and firmlymaintains itsstanceunderArticle8of thePotsdamProclamation.9Regarding thePeaceTreatybetweenJapanandRepublicofChinaenteringintoforceonAugust5,1952,whichthegovernmentofthePRChadclaimedinvalid,therewasnoreferenceintheJointCommuniquéof1972.However,ashavingagreedwiththeChinesesideinadvance,OhirastatedinthepressconferenceinBeijingaftersigningtheJointCommuniquéthatasaresultofthenormalizationofdiplomaticrelationsbetweenJapanandChina,itwastheinterpretationoftheJapanesegovernmentthatthePeaceTreatybetweenJapanand“RepublicofChina”hadlostitsstandingimplicationsandhadexpired.10

The Chinese government declared its renouncement of war reparationdemand to Japan.11 The legal position of the Japanese government on theissuewasthatithadbeenalreadyresolvedasaresultoftheconclusionofthePeaceTreatybetweenJapanandthe“RepublicofChina”in1952,12whichthegovernmentofthePRCcouldneveraccept.ThoughtheJapanesegovernmentmaintaineditsbasiclegalpositionontheissue,Ohira,athispressconference,referredtothisissuethattakingintoconsiderationthegreatdamagethattheChinesepeoplehad received through theunhappyJapan-ChinaWar, Japanshould appreciate frankly and appropriately the Chinese renouncement ofwarreparationsonJapan.13LatertheJapanesegovernmentdidnotseemtofocusonthedifferenceofinterpretationsbetweenthetwogovernmentsbutjust referred,whennecessary, that issues regardingwar reparationbetweenJapanandChinahavenotexistedanylongersincetheissuanceoftheJointCommuniqué in 1972, when normalization of diplomatic relations wasrealized.

TherewereseveralfactorswhichmadetheJapan-Chinaofficialrelation-ship come to fruition more than six years ahead of the US that finallynormalizedwithChinain1979.Firstofall,JapanandChinawereconfrontedwith thecommonneighbouringenemy, theSovietUnion.Second,Nixon’sChinavisitassuredJapanthattheUSgovernmentwouldnotobjectJapan’sdiplomatic step for normalization with China. Third, atonement feelingsamongJapanesepublictowardstheChineseresultingfromthewarwereverystrongingeneral.Theso-called“friendlypeople”inJapanhadworkedhardforpeaceandfriendshipexchangesbetweenthepeopleinbothcountriesandhadpavedthewayfornormalizationfromagrassrootslevelforalongperiodoftimebeforenormalization.MostJapanesepublic,intellectuals,massmediaaswellasmanypoliticiansandthebusinesscommunityalsosupportedandencouragednormalizationwithChina.Fourth,Tanaka’spolitical leadership



alsocontributedtoanearlierrealizationofnormalization.Fifth,TaiwanwasacolonyofJapanforfiftyyearsuntiltheendofWWIIandpro-TaiwanJapanesepoliticianswerenotfew,butJapan’srelationshipwithTaiwan,differentfromUScase,wasmainlyeconomic,notmilitary.

After Mao Zedong passed away and the “Gang of Four” was arrestedin 1976, Deng Xiaoping, a reformist, finally revived and came to the realforceagainin1978afterupsanddowns.HenavigatedChinatowardsanewdirection by adopting an openness and reform policy at theThird Plenumof the11thPartyCongress inDecember1978,14whichdeterminedChina’scourse afterwards.15 Though China’s economic status in the world stillremainedsmall,strategiccircumstancessurroundingJapanandChinadidnotalterfundamentallyuntiltheendofColdWarandtheTiananmenIncidentin1989.ThePeaceandFriendshipTreatywassignedonAugust12,1978andenteredintoforceonOctober23,1978.ChinahadcriticizedthattheSovietUnionwasseekinghegemony.JapanconsidereditsrelationswiththeSovietUnion and watered down the hegemony clause.That was the main reasonit took six years for negotiations to be concluded.The subsequent shift ininternationalrelationsremindsusofthefamouswordsbyBritishstatesmaninthemid-19thcentury,LordPalmerstonthatwehavenoeternalalliesandnoperpetualenemiesandournationalinterestsareeternalandperpetual.16

JapanandChina, ingeneral,developedandpromotedastablebilateralrelationship through the rest of the 1970s and 1980s though politicallydifficult and sensitive questions sometimes occurred, including the issuesoftheSenkaku/DiaoyudaoIslands,17thehistorytextbooksusedatJapanesehigh schools,18 prime minister’s worship at theYasukuni Shrine,19 and the“Kokaryo Dormitory” case.20 In fact, the leaders of both Japan and Chinawisely handled the questions so that both countries could maintain peaceandfriendlyrelationsinthe1970sandthe1980s.Sentimentalsloganssuchas “nicchu yuko sese daidai” (Japan-China friendship for generations) and“ichii taisui”(JapanandChinaareseparatedonlybyaverynarrowsea)wereprevalent among governments and people. It could be said that the periodbetween the1972normalizationand the1989Tiananmen Incident and thecollapseofBerlinWallwasa“peaceandfriendship”period.

3.ViciousCyclesinTrans-CenturyPeriod

The world faced a dramatic shift of East-West relations in the late 1980s.Japan and China were not allowed to be outsiders in this historic globalstructuralchange.Theyear1989wasanunforgettableyearforbothJapanandChina.MikhailGorbachev,theSovietleader,visitedChinainMaytorestoreSino-Sovietnormalrelations.Itwasthefirsttimesince1959thatatopSovietleadervisitedChina.21TheendofColdWarandSino-Sovietrapprochement



hadbroughtaboutanewstrategiccircumstanceintheregionalaswellasintheglobalpolitics.

ThedemocracymovementbrokeoutinBeijingandothercitiesaroundChina.22Themovement,however,endedwithcrackdownbythegovernmentas an “anti-revolutionary rebellion” on 4 June 1989. Chinese leaders wereconvinced that China took a right choice in contrast with the Soviet case.The Soviet Union hastened political reform too quickly before realizingeconomicreformandfinallycollapsed,whereasChinahastakenitseconomicreform first and succeeded in making China progress and stable under thestrong Communist Party leadership. Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyangwasdismissedbecausehe“supportedtheturbulenceandmadeamistakeofsplitting Party” and was replaced by Jiang Zemin, then party secretary ofShanghaimunicipalcommittee.However,theParty’sbasiclineofeconomicdevelopmentthroughreformandopennesspolicywasfirmlymaintained.23

TheArchG7SummitinParisadoptedPoliticalDeclarationonChinaonJuly15,1989andcondemnedtheviolentrepressioninChinaindefianceofhumanrights,butatthesametime,anticipatedthattheChinesegovernmentwould create conditions to avoid their isolation andprovide for a return tocooperation based on the resumption of movement towards political andeconomicreformandopenness.24Japan,asaneighbouringcountrywithaclosehistoriclinkthatcouldreceivealargerandmoredirect impactfromChina,echoedwesternnationsincondemningthehumanrightssituationsinChina.Atthesametime,however,itstressedontheimportancetoencourageChinatocontinuetotakearoadofmodernizationthroughreformandanopennesspolicyandtoengageitintheinternationalcommunity.TheisolationofChinawastheleastdesirableoptionforJapan.ItwasbecauseofthisprinciplethatPrimeMinisterToshikiKaifuvisitedChinainAugust1991asthefirstpoliticalleaderamongwesterndevelopednationssincetheJune4Incident.

TheShowaEmperorpassedawayonJanuary7,1989andtheShowaErawasreplacedbyHeiseiEra.Sixty-fourcalendaryearsofShowa(1926-1989)couldbedividedintotwoperiods:prewarmilitarismandpostwarpacifism.DuringtheShowaEra,prewarandalmostthreedecadesofpostwarperiodsare characterized as an unhappy period in long history of Japan-Chinabilateralrelations.Theyear1992markedthe20thanniversaryofdiplomaticrelations,andanunprecedentedeventwasplannedassomethingsymbolicforpromotingfriendshipandgoodwillrelationsinthenewera:avisittoChinabyTheirMajesties,EmperorandEmpress.ThenewEmperorAkihito,bornin1933,becamethefirstemperorenthronedunderthenewpeacefulconstitution.TheJune4Incident,however,createdabarrierforrealizingEmperor’sChinavisitfortheJapaneseside.TherewereviewsamongsomeJapanese,especiallyconservativesandrightists,thatitwasprematuretopromoteEmperor’svisitto China. The Japanese government carefully and patiently waited for the



prevailing situations to improve and finally decided that the Emperor andEmpress would make an official visit to China on October 23-28, 1992.25Hisvisitwasagreatsuccess.China’shospitalitywasperfect.TheEmperor’sspeechat thewelcomingbanquetonOctober23hostedbyPresidentYangShangkunattheGreatHallofthePeopletouchedtheChineseparticipants.26

TheChinesegovernment recognized that theEmperor’s speechonhistoricissues was a further step forward that included a strong sense of remorsethough it may not be an apology.27 The Japanese government as well asthepublic, especiallyForeignMinistryofficials, including the author,whoaccompaniedtheEmperorandbecameamemberofthehistoricmissionwerefilledwiththeeuphoriathattheEmperor’sChinavisit,whichtheybelievedwas necessary to be made sooner or later at an appropriate matured time,wasinfactfinallycarriedoutalmostperfectly.Theyalsobelievedthatanewforward-looking Japan-China relationship was about to start. The reality,however,wasnotsosimpleandeasy.

Since the June 4 Incident, the Chinese government further stressedpatrioticeducationfortheyouthtodisseminatetheideathatitistheCCPthathasplayedacoreroleinfightingwithwesternimperialism,especiallyJapanesemilitarism,andregainedChineseprideandgloryaftermorethanonehundredyears of humiliation.As communist ideology almost completely lost itsattractivenessamongpeople,theCCPneededalegitimacytoconvincepeoplethat a present stable and prosperous Chinese society could not have beenachievedwithoutitsleadership,andonlytheCCPcanprovideitspeoplewiththeassurance thatChinawillkeepgrowingandprospering.When theCCPappealstopeople’snationalism,Japanwouldbeindangerofbecomingamainscapegoat.Second,internationalstrategiccircumstanceshavefundamentallyalteredasaresultoftheendofColdWar.RussiadoesnotposeagreaterthreattoJapanandChina.Third,theChineseeconomyexpandedalmost10percentannuallyinaveragesince1978whenreformandopennesspolicywasadopted.Chinesepeoplehadmoreconfidencefortheirfuture,whereasJapansufferedfromlong-termeconomicdifficultiesafterthebubbleeconomywasburstintheearly1990s.TheJapanesesystem,whichhadfunctionedeffectivelyandmadegreatcontributionstotheJapanesemiracleingoodolddays,didnotseemtoworkastheyhad.AgrowingnumberofJapanesewerelosingconfidenceintheirfuture.WarmsentimentsthathadprevailedamongbothnationstowardseachothergraduallydisappearedandnationalismsofJapanandChinatendedtocomeintoconflictmoreeasilyanddirectly.

The standout event symbolizing the changing atmosphere was JiangZemin’s state visit to Japan in November 1998 to commemorate the 20thanniversary of Peace and Friendship Treaty. Jiang realized a hand-over ofHongKongfromtheUnitedKingdomtoChinapeacefullyandsuccessfullyonJuly1,1997.HongKongwasasymbolofwesterncolonizationandChina’s



humiliatingmodernhistory.Therefore,itsreturntoChinaunderJianghelpedhimtostrengthenhislegitimacyasaChineseleader.JiangmadeanofficialvisittotheUSfromlateOctobertoearlyNovemberin1997.HestartedhisvisitbystoppingatPearlHarbor,HawaiitoremindtheAmericanpeoplethatChinaand theUS,asallies, foughtwith thecommonenemy,JapanduringWWII. InhismeetingwithClinton,both leadersagreedonthebuildingof“constructivestrategicpartnership.”Thefollowingyear,ClintonvisitedChinaonJune23–July3,1998withoutvisitinganyothercountry,includingUSalliesinAsiasuchasJapanandtheRepublicofKorea.Itwasunprecedentedthat theUSpresidentmadeaforeignvisit toanysinglecountryforsuchalongperiodoftime.

President Jiang’s visit to Japan was conducted under such offensiveChinesediplomaticatmosphere.Inotherwords,Chinadidnotstronglyfeelthat itwasnecessary tocompromisewithJapan.Thiswas the firstofficialvisit byaChinesepresident to Japan.Hisvisit,whichhadbeenoriginallyscheduledinSeptember,waspostponedtoNovemberduetolargefloodingin China that he had to tackle. Consequently, a visit to Japan by KoreanPresidentKimDaeJungprecededJiang’svisit.KimvisitedJapaninOctober1998 and in the Joint Declaration issued on October 8, Japanese PrimeMinister Keizo Obuchi expressed his deep remorse and heartfelt apologyto theKoreanpeople for tremendousdamageand suffering that Japanhadcaused.28KimacceptedObuchi’sfrankandforward-lookingstatement inaverypositivemannerandhighlyappreciatedtherolethatJapanhasplayedforthepeaceandprosperityoftheinternationalcommunityunderthepostwarPeaceConstitution.29

It was unfortunate that the Japan-Korea Joint Declaration becameChina’sbaselineinconsideringhowthepasthistoryissuewastobewrittenintheJapan-ChinaJointDeclaration.Intheformer’scase,KorearespondedtoJapan’sapologybyaccepting itwithsincerityandhighlyappreciatingapeacefulroadJapanhastakenafterthewar,whereasinthelatter’scase,Chinaonlyfocusedonhistoricissuesandshowednoclearinterestonfuture-orientedbilateral relations. In the Japan-China Joint Declaration (JCJD) issued onNovember26,regardingthepasthistoryissue, theJapanesesideexpresseddeepremorsefortheseriousdistressanddamagethatJapanhadcausedtotheChinesepeoplethroughitsaggressionagainstChina.30However,theJCJDdidnotcontainanexpressionof“apology”.Jiangrepeatedthehistoryissueonvariousoccasionsduringhisvisit,includingmeetingswithObuchi,alectureatWasedaUniversity,apressconferenceandfurthermoreevenontheoccasionofthewelcomingbanquethostedbytheEmperor.NotonlynationalistsandrightistsbutalsoamajorityofordinaryJapaneseandthemassmedia,inotherwords,theJapanesemainstreamthathadhadwarmsentimentstowardsChinacametobealittlebitfedupwithstatementsonthepasthistoryrepeatedby



the Chinese president.31 Jiang’s state visit to Japan thus is remembered asa disaster for the bilateral relationship.The bilateral relationship graduallybecame characterized as a conflict of nationalisms, and was in danger ofenteringintoaviciouscircleunlessbothcountriesmanagedwisely.

Japan’s ODA to China became another target. Japan started its ODAto China in 1979. Since then for thirty years until 2008, Japan provided atotalamountofapproximatelyUS$35billion:¥3.2trillionyenloan,¥147.2billiongrantaid,and¥150.5billiontechnicalassistance.32Japan’sODAhasbeen spent on large-scale infrastructure constructions such as highways,airports,seaports,powerplantsandprojectsinsectorsofmedicineandtheenvironment,andplayedanimportantrole inhelpingChina’sdevelopmentand modernization. However, especially since the late 1990s, a necessityto review Japan’s ODA to China was often pointed out in Japan for thefollowing reasons. First, the necessity to keep providing China with ODAwaschallengedbecauseJapanexperiencedalostdecadeandsufferedfromsevereeconomicandfiscalconditionsinthe1990s,whereasChinaachievedarapideconomicgrowthduringthesameperiod.Second,JapanbecamemorecriticalaboutChina’scompliancewithJapan’sODACharter,whichcallsforfullattentiontomilitaryexpenditures,democratizationandbasichumanrightsandfreedoms.Third,China,oneof thebiggest recipientsofJapan’sODA,alsoprovideditsaidtothirdcountriesforpoliticalandeconomicpurposes.Fourth,ChinawasreluctanttomakepublicityeffortswithinthecountryonJapan’sODA.And fifth, as a result ofChinese economicdevelopment, itspriorityagendahasshiftedfrominfrastructureconstructionsincoastalareastoprojectsfornarrowinggapbetweencoastalareasandinlandregions,andglobalissues,etc.Asaresultofthereviewprocess,anewODAplantoChinawasdrafted, and Japan’sODA toChinawasgradually reduced inamount.Newyenloanprojectsfinallyendedin2007fiscalyear.

Junichiro Koizumi replacedYoshiro Mori and became the 87th primeminister inApril 2001. He used the slogan of “structural reform with nosacred cow” and enjoyed 1,980 days premiership, which ranked the thirdlongestafterEisakuSato(2,798days)andShigeruYoshida(2,616days)inpost-war Japanese political history. Koizumi approached a rising China ina very positive manner, that is, as a challenge and opportunity rather thana threat. He delivered this message in his speech in front of Zhu Rongji,ChinesePremier,titled“AsiainaNewCentury:ChallengeandOpportunity”attheBoaoForumforAsia,HainanIsland,onApril12,2002.33Koizumi’sapproachtothepasthistoryissuewasalsoverycandidandhedidnothesitatetoadmitJapan’smistakesinthepast.HevisitedBeijingonOctober8,2001and spoke to thepress after visiting theMarco PoloBridge,where Japan-Chinawarbrokeouton July7,1937.At theAnti-JapaneseWarMemorialnearbyhestronglyfelt thecrueltyofthewarandwatchedvariousdisplays



in the memorial with a heart-felt apology and regret towards the Chinesevictims.34 However, Koizumi’s only action that China could never acceptwashisworshiptotheYasukuniShrineeachyearduringhisterm.Inspiteofcontinuingexpansionofbilateraleconomicrelations,politicaldevelopmentbetweenJapanandChinawasverylimitedanddeadlockedduringKoizumi’sterm. Though he remained in power for five years and five months, hecouldnotvisitBeijinganymore.TheChinesegovernment leadersdidnotvisit Japanduringhis term, either.Thiswasunprecedented in thebilateralrelationship.TheJapan-Chinarelationshipatthattimewasoftendescribedas“seirei keinetsu”or“politicallycold,economicallyhot.”

TheworseningoftheJapan-Chinarelationshipwasacceleratedbyaseriesof events.FiveNorthKorean refugees, including a little girl, attempted toseekasylumatJapaneseConsulateGeneralinShenyang,LiaoningProvinceon May 8, 2002, but they were blocked by the Chinese security guardsinside the area of the consulate general.The video scene was broadcastedbyJapaneseTVnewsprogrammes,35whichcreatedstrongcriticismamongthe Japanesepublicagainst theForeignMinistryof Japan for its failure toensureconsularimmunitiesandtoprotecthumanrightsaswellasanegativeimageoftheChineseauthorities.Chinesecitizenswerereportedtobekilledand injured by Japanese chemical weapons abandoned during WWII inQiqihaer,HeilongjiangProvince,inAugust2003.36AJapanesecompanyinOsaka organized a tour to Zhuhai, Guangdong Province for its employeesinSeptember 2003, and someof themwere arrested there for grouppros-titution.37 In October, a performance of Japanese students and teachers atXibeiUniversityinXian,ShaanxiProvincewasmisunderstoodbyChinesestudentsasridiculingthem,whichstimulatedChinesenationalismandcausedanti-Japanesedemonstration.38Anti-JapanesebehaviourbyaChineseaudienceatAsiaFootballCupinsummer2004alsoreflectedtheworseningsentimentsof many Chinese towards Japan.39A Chinese submarine’s interference inJapan’sterritorialseaoccurredinNovember2004.40Aworldwidecampaignfor acquiring permanent membership of the UN Security Council by theJapanesegovernment triggered strongoppositionbyChina, and finally ledto large scale anti-Japanese demonstrations in big cities such as Beijingand Shanghai.Their actions became escalated to the extent that they evenattackedfacilitiesofJapaneseEmbassyinBeijingandConsulateGeneralinShanghaiinspring2005.41Aweeklymagazine,Shukan Bunshun42reportedon December 27, 2005 that a Japanese officer of the Consulate Generalof Japan in Shanghai committed suicide on May 6 the previous year afterbeingblackmailedbyanofficeroftheChineselocalpublicsafetyauthoritiesregardinghisinappropriaterelationswithaChinesehostessatakaraoke-bar.TheForeignMinistryofJapanreleasedapressannouncementon thiscasethat therewas aviolationof theViennaConventionofConsularRelations



bytheChineselocalauthorities.43TheChinesegovernmentarguedthattheJapanesegovernmentmusthaveanotherintentioninhighlightingtheincidentoneandhalfyears later,whichtheChinesegovernmentexpressedastrongresentment.44 The perception of the Japanese general public toward Chinaworsenedaccordinglyasaresultoftheabove-describedevents.TheCabinetOffice(formerPrimeMinister’sOffice)oftheJapanesegovernmentregularlyconductsanopinionsurveyondiplomacyeachyear.Accordingtothesurveyin 1980, 78.6 per cent Japanese answered that they had intimate feelingstowardsChina, andonly14.7per cent said that theydidnot feel intimacytowardsChina,while in2005 the formerdeclined to32.4percentand thelatterincreasedto63.4percent.45

4.Win-WinRelationsBasedonCommonStrategicInterests

ShinzoAbe became prime minister in September 2006. In recognition ofpasthistory,Abehadbeenregardedasamorefirmlyprincipled,rootedandconservativepoliticianthanKoizumi.Infact,Abe,inhispolicyspeechattheDietstatedthathewouldfurtherpromote“assertivediplomacy”.Therefore,Abe’s approach to China, including theYasukuni Shrine issue was a bitsurprising and unexpected. He announced his ambiguous strategy on theYasukuni issue: not to confirm whether he would visit or had visited theYasukuniShrine.Infact,underthisprinciple,hedidnotworshiptheYasukuniShrineduringhisterm.TheChinesegovernmentacceptedAbe’sambiguousstrategy.ThenhemadeasurprisingannouncementthathewouldvisitChinainOctober2006.ItwasthefirsttimeforaJapaneseprimeministertochooseChina as the first country to visit after assuming a post. Japanese primeminister’svisittoBeijingfinallyresumedforthefirsttimeinfiveyears.Abe’sChinavisitwascalledavisitto“breakice”bytheChineseside.Thus,seirei keinetsu or a politically cold, economically hot period under the Koizumigovernmenthadfinallypassedaway.

TheJointPressStatement46wasissuedduringAbe’svisittoBeijingonOctober8.BothsidesconfirmedthatJapan-Chinarelationshavebecomeoneoftheirmostimportantbilateralrelations.Thisexpressionwasfirstadoptedorally by Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa in 1992, but it was written inthe document for the first time. Both leaders shared the view that the twocountrieswould strive tobuild amutuallybeneficial relationshipbasedoncommon “strategic” interests.47 In the past, China preferred expressionssuchas“peace,”“friendship”and“goodwill”withneighbouringcountries,includingJapan.Furthermore,JapanhadnotbeenregardedbyChinaasafullyindependentactorininternationalpolitics,astheformerhadbeenobedienttotheUSforeignpolicyfromChina’sviewpoint,andcouldnotbedescribedasa“strategic”partner.Chinastartedtousetheexpression,“strategicdialogue”



in2005forthetitleofavice-foreignministerlevel’sregularmeetingbetweenthetwogovernments,butthejointstatementduringAbe’sChinavisitwasthefirstoccasiontodescribetheJapan-Chinabilateralrelationshipasstrategic.Thejointpressstatementalsoincludedotherpositiveelements.TheJapaneseside emphasized Japan’s peaceful path more than 60 years after the war,which was highly appreciated by the Chinese side. Both sides reaffirmedfacilitationofdialogueandconsultationinordertomaketheEastChinaSeaa “SeaofPeace,Cooperation andFriendship”.They also agreed to start ajointresearchofhistorybyJapaneseandChinesescholars.ThusAbe’svisitpavedawayforanewbilateralrelationshipthatwouldbeguidedbystrategicrather than emotional considerations. Here “common strategic interests”includebilateral,regionalandglobalareasthatwouldcreatemutualbenefitstobothsidesandpromoteawin-winrelationshipsuchas thepromotionofeconomic and people-to-people exchanges, the settlement of disputes in apeaceful,cooperativeandcreativeway, therealizationofnuclear-freezoneoftheKoreanPeninsula,thedeepeningofEastAsianeconomicintegration,anti-terroristcooperation,andenergysecurityandclimatechange.

Abe’svisitwasfollowedbyWenJiabao’svisit toJapaninApril2007.His visit was called a visit to “melt ice”. Chinese premier’s visit was thefirst time since October 2000. The concrete cooperation package includedvariousprogrammes,suchasthelaunchingofthe“Japan-ChinaHigh-LevelEconomic Dialogue”, which was to be co-chaired by the Japanese foreignminister and Chinese vice premier and attended by main economic andfinance-relatedministersofboth sides todiscussmacro-economy,bilateraltrade and investment, energy and the environment, as well as regionaland global economic coordination and cooperation. The first meeting washeld in Beijing in December 2007. Wen made a speech48 in the JapaneseDiet onApril 12, delivering a very positive message to Japanese politicalleaders and people. With regard to the past history issue, he spoke thatthe Japanese government and leaders officially admitted aggression, andexpressedtheirdeepremorseandapologiestothedamagedcountries,whichtheChinesegovernmentandpeoplehighlyappreciated.RegardingChinesedevelopment,hesaidthattheJapanesegovernmentandpeoplehaveprovidedsupport and assistance to Chinese modernization, which Chinese peoplewould never forget. Hu Jintao made a state visit to Japan in May 2008 toconsolidate thenewbilateralrelationshipbyissuingtheJointStatementon“ComprehensivePromotionofaMutuallyBeneficialRelationshipBasedonCommon Strategic Interests”, followed by a “Joint Press Statement on theStrengtheningExchangeandCooperation”,which includes70actionplansinvariousfields.49TheJointStatementwasregardedbybothgovernmentsasoneamongfourimportantbasicpoliticaldocumentsregulatingJapan-Chinarelationssincenormalization.Thethreeotherprecedingdocumentsare:the



Joint Communiqué for diplomatic normalization in 1972, the Peace andFriendshipTreatyin1978,andtheJointDeclarationonBuildingaPartnershipofFriendshipandCooperationforPeaceandDevelopmentin1998.

ThegeneralelectionsoftheHouseofRepresentativesinJapanwereheldonAugust30,2009andtheDPJ, the largestopposition,gaineda landslidevictory,whichgained308seatsoutof480,whiletherulingLDPdeclinedto119from300.ThiswasthefirsttimefortheLDPtodropfromthestatusofthelargestpartyintheHouseofRepresentativessinceitsfoundingin1955,andalsothefirsttimetostepdownfromtherulingpartyexceptforaperiodofaroundayearduring1993and1994.YukioHatoyama,headoftheDPJ,wasappointedprimeministerandorganizedanewcabinetonSeptember16incoalitionwithSocialDemocraticPartyandthePeople’sNewPartybecauseDPJmembersalonedidnotreachthemajorityintheHouseofCouncilors.Hatoyamacontributedanarticleentitled“ANewPathforJapan”totheop-edcolumnofThe New York Times.50HestressedthattheJapan-USsecuritypactwill continue tobe thecornerstoneof Japanesediplomaticpolicy,butaddedthattheeraofUSunilateralismmaycometoanend.HesetupJapan’sdiplomaticagendainpursuingitsnationalinterestwhencaughtbetweentheUS,which is fighting to retain itspositionas theworld’sdominantpower,andChina,which is seekingways tobecomedominant.Heargued for thecreation of an EastAsian community as Japan’s long-term foreign policytarget. In his first meeting with Hu Jintao at NewYork on September 21,bothleadersconfirmedthepromotionofmutuallybeneficialrelationsbasedoncommonstrategicinterestsasaguidingprincipleevenundertheJapanesenew government.51 Hatoyama, however, resigned in June 2010 becausehisdriftpositiononFutenmaUSMarineCorpsBaseinOkinawacreatedasuspicionandevendistrustoftheUSgovernment.NaotoKansucceededhimandbecamethesixthprimeministerinthelastfiveyears.HetriedtoimproveJapan-US relations and also maintained the basic policy on Japan-Chinarelations,butdidnottakeanyoutstandinginitiativebecause,inadditiontoaweakdomesticpoliticalbasisaftertheDPJlostseatsintheelectionsofHouseofCouncilors inJuly2010,hewassopreoccupiedwithdamagecontroloftheworsenedSino-JapaneserelationshipresultingfromthecollisioncaseofaChinesefishingboatwithJapaneseCoastGuardvesselsneartheSenkakuIslands that occurred in September 2010 and also with East Japan GreatEarthquakerelatedaffairs.

5.TheUSandJapan-ChinaRelations

TheJapan-USrelationshipremainsthecornerstoneofJapan’sforeignpolicyand the most important bilateral relationship for Japan. Japan’s greatestdiplomatic failure in the early Showa era, or from the 1930s to 1945 was



that it conflicted seriously with the US regarding the “China issue”.Asearly as the 1920s, a Japanese journalist understood this point. ShigeharuMatsumoto,whohadbeen theShanghaibureauchiefofThe Domei Tsusin(Domei NewsAgency) in the 1930s, recalled in his memoir that he hadreached understanding during his study in the US in 1925 that the mainissueifwarweretobreakoutbetweentheUSandJapanwasChinaastheUS would never allow Japan to take so many liberties and dominate theChinesemarket.52HerecognizedthattheChinaissuewasacoreofJapan-USrelations, that is tosay,Japan-ChinarelationsareanothersideofJapan-USrelations.Relationswith theUSandChinawere, andalsoare Japan’s twomostimportantrelations,astheyaretwosidesofthesamecoin.Thissituationremainsthesameinthe21stcentury.

Chinesepeoplestillholdambivalentsentiments towardsJapan, that is,a mixture of inferiority and superiority complexes. China has a traditionalethno-centralism.ChineseuseseveralexpressionsonJapanwhentheylookdownonit.Atypicaloneis“xiao riben”(smallJapan).ChinasufferedfromWestern aggression more than a hundred years since the OpiumWar.Thehumiliationresultingfrominvasionsbywesternpowers,particularlybyJapanleftdeepscarstoChinesepeople.MindlessspeechesbyJapanesepoliticiansandprimeministers’worshiptotheYasukuniShrine,wherefourteenClassAcriminalsareenshrined,remindChinesepeopleofalackofdeepremorseforthepastbyJapan.ThereisasuspicionanddistrustofJapan.AstheChineseeconomy grows at a rapid speed, Chinese self-confidence also becomesstronger.ChinesearerecoveringfromatraumaofJapaneseaggressionbutitisstillnotcomplete.Insum,alackofmutualtrustbetweenbothgovernmentsandpeopleremainsaseriousproblem.

TheUS-Chinarelationshipisusuallyguidedbystrategicconsiderations,in other words, it is based on mutual interests, while the Japan-Chinarelationshipisheavilyaffectedbyemotion.TheauthorwasinBeijingwhenNATOmistakenlybombedtheChineseEmbassyinBelgradeinMay1999,and saw furiousChinese studentsprotestedandpelt theUSEmbassywithstones.JustafterGeorgeBushJr.becamePresident in2001, theUS-ChinarelationshipworsenedwhenUSandChinesemilitary aircraft crashednearHainanIsland.USmilitarysalestoTaiwanbecameanotherunstablefactor.The Sino-American relationship, however, returned to normal situationsafter9/11asifnothinghadhappened.Theauthorcouldhardlybelievethatarecoverywouldoccur insuchashortperiodifsimilar incidentsoccurredbetweenJapanandChina. Itwouldsurely takeamuchlonger timetohealthedamage.ThereasonisthattheUS-Chinarelationshipisbasedonstrategicconsiderations,whiletheJapan-Chinarelationshipwasanemotionally-drivenrelationship.



6. Japan and China Need to Overcome Difficulties

There are three thorns, i.e., three main obstacles which could easily harmor destabilize the Japan-China political relationship and consequently thewholerelations:thehistoricissues;theTaiwanissue;andtheEastChinaSea,especiallytheSenkaku/Diaoyudaoissue.

First, regarding the past history issue, inappropriate statements occa-sionally made by Japanese politicians, including cabinet members, help toconvinceChina that ithasagoodreason todoubt thesincerityofJapaneseontherecognitionofJapan’saggressiontoChinabeforeandduringWWII.However,thereisaperceptiongap.TheJapanesegovernmenthasrepeatedlyexpresseditsbasicpositiononthewaronvariousoccasions.53ItisneedlesstosaythattheJapanesegovernmentshouldbemindfulaboutthepasthistoryissuesothattheyshouldnotharmthefeelingsofChinesepeople.However,an increasingnumberofJapanesefeel thatChinaexaggeratesspeechesandactions made by a very small number of rightists who are rather isolatedfromJapanesesocietyasiftheywererepresentingtheJapanesemainstream.DuringtheKoizumiadministration,theJapan-Chinarelationshipenteredintopoliticaltroubles,andthemainreasonwashisregularworshiptotheYasukuniShrine.TheYasukuniShrinehastwoaspectsthatJapaneseleadersmustbearinmind:itssensitivityforneighbouringnations,especiallyChinaandKorea;andthenecessitytocommemorateandhonortheJapanesesoldierswhodiedinwar.Itisnaturalthatgovernmentleadersrespectthosewhodevotedtheirlives to theirowncountry.TheUShasArlingtonNationalCemetery,whileChina has the Memorial for the People’s Heroes in Tiananmen Square intheir own capitals. However, for historic reasons, Japanese leaders shouldbeprudent.Theyshouldthinkofawaysothatthefeelingsofthepeopleofneighbouring countries and also of the Japanese who lost family memberscanberespectedatthesametime.Itshouldbeemphasized,however,thattheYasukuniissuehaslittletodowitharevivalofmilitarismorultra-nationalism.Thismay result fromaperceptiongapbetween JapanandChina regardinghistory.WWIIwasthePacific(anti-American)warforJapan,butitwastheanti-JapanesewarforChina.Japantriestoapproachhistoryasobjectivelyaspossibleandthegovernmentpreferstoleavethejudgmentofthecharacterofthewarforhistorians’academicresearch,whiletheChinesegovernmenttendstoseehistoryaslessonsforthepresent.Japanesecustomrequirespeoplefeelsolemnlyand respect thedead regardlesshowheor shewas treatedbeforedeath.AsforChinese,evilisevil,a“badguy”isa“badguy”evenaftertheydie.ChinaoftencomparesGermanandJapaneseattitudesvis-à-vispasthistory,sayingthatGermanyhasgainedtrustfromneighboursthroughtheveryclearpositionfirmlytakenandexpressedonhistoricmisdeeds,whileJapanisstillreluctant todo so.The Japanese side,however,doesnotnecessarilyacceptsuchanargument,claimingthatwhatwasconductedbyJapanandGermany



during thewar has different characters, and is not appropriate for a simplecomparison.NaziGermany’smassacreofJewishpeopleinessencehadnothingtodowiththewaritself,whilethebrutalbehaviourofJapanesesoldiersmainlyresulted froma lackofdiscipline in theexecutionof thewar.Furthermore,theJapanesegovernmenthassincerelyresolvedthewarreparationissuesbyconcluding multilateral or bilateral peace treaties with relevant nations. Ontheotherhand,Germany,havingbeensplit into twoafter thewar,chose topayreparationstoindividualswithoutconcludingpeacetreatieswithrelevantcountries.54China’spoliticalstanceisthatJapan’saggressionwasinitiatedbyahandfulofmilitarists,andthatthevastmajorityofJapanesepeopleare,likeChinesepeople,thevictimofthewar.Consensusontheevaluationofthewar,however,hasnotbeenreachedinJapan.Chinacriticizesthefact thatJapandoesnotsquarelyreflectonthehistory.JapancomplainsthatChinadoesnotfairlyevaluatesixtyyears’ofapeacefulroadJapanhaspursuedafterWWII,andsometimesusesthehistoryissueforpoliticalpurposes.

Second,theTaiwanissueisalsoaverysensitiveissuebetweenthetwocountriesasisthecaseinUS-Chinarelationshipbutnotexactlyinthesameway.Whenbothcountriesnormalizeddiplomaticrelationsin1972,theJointCommuniquésays:“TheGovernmentofChinareiterates thatTaiwan isaninalienablepartoftheterritory.TheGovernmentofJapanfullyunderstandsand respects this stand of the Government of China.” The Japanesegovernmentusedanexpression“fullyunderstandsandrespects” insteadof“recognizes”,becauseJapanisnotinapositiontodeterminethelegalstatusofTaiwan,asovereigntyoverwhichJapanhadalreadyrenouncedasaresultof accepting the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Based on this principle, theJapanesegovernmenthasmaintainedverycarefulandrestraintapproachesindealingwithTaiwanpolicy.Japandoesnotsupport“TwoChinas”or“TaiwanIndependence”. No single Japanese incumbent cabinet member has evervisitedTaiwansincenormalizationandJapanhasnotyetreceivedvisitsoftheincumbentTaiwanesepresident.55ItisunderstandablethatChinastillholdsconcerns over the development of Japan-Taiwan relations because Taiwanhad been a former colony of Japan for fifty years andTaiwanese of oldergenerationlikeLeeTeng-huireceivededucationundertheJapaneseruleandtheirmentalityseemstobeclosertoJapaneseratherthantomainlandChinese.TheJapanesegovernmentshouldcontinuetobeawareof thesensitivityoftheTaiwan issue. However, China’s suspicion that Japan still has politicalmotivestoexpanditsinfluenceoverTaiwanisunrealisticandentirelywrong.SinceMaYing-jeouof theKMTwaselectedpresident in2008after eightyears’ChenShui-bianadministrationledbytheDemocraticProgressiveParty(DPP),relationsacrosstheTaiwanStraitshavebeenimproved.Itisnecessaryto examine closely how the development of the cross straits relations willaffectJapan-ChinarelationsaswellasJapan-Taiwanrelations.



Third, the East China Sea related issues, especially the issue of theSenkaku/Diaoyudao Islands. The official position of the Japanese govern-ment is that there exists no issue of territorial sovereignty to be resolvedconcerning theSenkaku Islands,because there isnodoubt that the islandsareclearlyaninherentterritoryofJapaninlightofhistoricalfactsandbasedoninternationallaw,andindeedtheislandsarenowunderthevalidcontrolof Japan.56 However, China also claims sovereignty over the islands.57

Territorialdisputescouldeasilystimulatenationalismofbothsides.AChi-nesefishingtrawlerenteredJapan’sterritorialseaneartheSenkakuIslandson September 7, 2010.58 It did not obey the instruction by the JapaneseCoast Guard and further collided with two Japanese patrol vessels. Thecaptain of the trawler was arrested and taken by the coast guard, togetherwithother fourteencrewmembers, for investigation.Thecasewas sent tothe Japan’s public prosecutor’s office for obstructing the enforcement ofpublic duties. The fourteen crew members were released with the trawleronSeptember13,and theprosecutor’soffice inNaha,OkinawaPrefecturefinallyreleasedthecaptainbysuspendingthelegalprocedureonSeptember24.59 During and after the incident, the Chinese government, as well asthe public strongly protested against the Japanese government’s action, bytakingcountermeasuressuchaspostponementofaseriesofexchangesandmeetings,includingthesuspensionofacabinetministerlevelexchange,andasubstantialembargoofrareearthsexporttoJapan,ofwhichChinaaccountsfor 97 per cent of the world’s supply.60 The Chinese government furtherrequested apology and compensation even after the captain was released.Anti-Japanese demonstrations took place in Chinese cities such as Xian,Chengdu,Zhengzhou,andWuhan,61whileanti-Chinesedemonstrationswerealso organized and implemented by protesters in Japan in a more modestanddisciplinedmanner.Bothsidesshouldnottrytostimulatenationalismofbothnationals,andshouldnotlosetheirgreatercommonstrategicinterests.This issue should be treated in a cool and restrained manner, otherwise, itwouldtakealongertimeforbothcountriestorecoverthedamageandreturntoanormaltrack.WithregardtoChina’smilitarymodernization,Chinahasincreaseditsmilitarybudgetwithadoubledigitforthelast22consecutiveyearsuntil2009.Chinahasastrongpreferencetocreateaircraftcarriers,bywhich its navy tries to expand the power projection capability in the EastandSouthSeaandevenbeyondthat.Chinesenavyhasbecomeactiveintheregion.Chinaneedstoexplainclearlyitsintentionstoneighbours,includingJapan,otherwisea lackof transparencyandunclear intentionof itsactionscouldleadtounforeseensituationswithJapanthatseeksformore“normal”sovereignstate,includingdefensepolicy.62

TherearenegativeandpositivescenariosonthefutureofJapan-Chinarelations. The traditional communist ideology has almost entirely lost



attractiveness among the Chinese people. Making people rich and societyprosperousremainsthemostimportanttaskfortheCCP.TheysaythatChinaisimplementing“socialistmarketeconomy”.ItcouldbeinterpretedasastatecapitalismorcapitalismunderthestrongleadershipoftheCCPbureaucraticrule.Any policy will be acceptable as long as the CCP can maintain itspolitical control over China and Chinese society can prosper. There is apotential contradictionbetweenmarket economyandpolitical dictatorship.ThemarketeconomycanbeimplementedregardlessoftheexistenceoftheCCP.Therefore, theCCPwouldfacea legitimacycrisissooneror later. Itsfinal card is nationalism, in other words, to remind Chinese people that itis theCCPthatrecoveredanationalprideandglorybydefeatingJapaneseimperialismandputtinganendtooverhundredyears’humiliationbywesternpowers since Opium War in 1840-1842. It seems that the CCP itself hasbeenkeenlyawareofthepossibleconflictsbetweeneconomicandpoliticalsystems unless well prepared in advance, and tries to seek a soft landing.Nowthecentripetalforceisnotideologybutnationalism.ItmeansthattheCCP needs to emphasize the role of the CCP in the process of defeatingJapanandfoundinganewChina.JapanmightcontinuetobeascapegoatfortheCCP tomaintain itspowerand legitimacy.That isanegativescenario.But what is dangerous of this approach is that the modern history tells usthat anti-Japanese movements and anti-government movements are bothsidesofthesamecoin.Intheageofglobalizationwiththedevelopmentoftelecommunications and information technologies, including the internetandmobilephones, it hasbecomemoreandmoredifficult for theCCP tocontrol people, and it cannot use anti-Japanese movements as a politicalcardtoexertitspoliticalpressureonJapanasthemovementmightbecomebeyondthegovernmentcontrolandcreateanunexpectedpoliticalandsocialturmoil,whichthegovernmentneverwantstosee.Apositivescenarioshouldbe sought.As China becomes wealthy and Chinese people recover theirconfidence and play a more important role in the region as well as in theworld,itispossiblethatChinesecomplexsentimentstowardsJapanwillbesoftenedandtheywilltreatJapanmorecoollyandobjectively.Bothcountrieswillbeabletostrengthentobuildaconstructiverelationshipbasedonmutualtrustandcommoninterests.Therearesignsforthepositivescenario.AfamousyoungChinesemoviedirector,LuChuanshotamovieofNanjingIncident,titled“Nanjing! Nanjing!”,in2008.ThemovieattractedahistoricalnumberofChineseaudiencesafteritwasscreenedinearly2009.WhatwasdifferentfromtheformermoviesandTVdramasdescribingJapan-ChinawarperiodwasthatJapaneseactorswereusedtoplayJapanesesoldiers,whospokeandbehaved in natural andnativeways, and a Japanese soldier played amainpartofthestory.Inthepast,JapanesesoldierswereplayedbyChineseactorsandcaricaturedasstrange,badandcruelcharacters.Inthismovie,however,



therearebadandgoodJapanesesoldiers.Theychangefromordinary,gentlepersonswhoplaywith localchildrenandmiss theirfamily left inJapantoabnormal soldiers who conduct cruel killings, depending on the situation.The Japanese soldier, the leading character of the movie, finally commitssuicideafter releasingChineseprisonersdue tomajormental strain.Thereare splits in the evaluation on the movie among Chinese, but the Chinesegovernmenttookitasoneofthetenmoviesworthwatchingontheoccasionof60thanniversaryof theirnational foundation.Theauthor interprets,andhiscounterpartintheChinesegovernmentandacademiabasicallyagrees,thatoneofthebackgroundsforafundamentalchangeoftheportrayalofJapanesesoldiers in themovie is thatmoreChinesehavebeenable tofaceup toanunhappybilateralhistoryinalessemotionalandmorebalancedway,astheyarebecomingricher,moreconfidentinChina’scurrentandfuturestatus,andovercomingcomplexsentimentstowardsJapan.

7.Conclusion

Sincethenormalizationofdiplomaticrelationsin1972,Japan-Chinarelationsexperienced a “heiwa yuko” (peace and friendship) era in the first twodecades and a “seirei keinetsu” (politically cold, economicallyhot) era foralmostadecadefromthelate1990suntil2006.Japan-Chinarelationsthenhavewelcomedaneraof“senryaku teki gokei kankei”(mutuallybeneficialrelationsbasedoncommonstrategicinterests)since2006.AsAsosaid,JapanandChinaareperpetualneighbours,neitherofwhichcansimplyrelocate.63

It isnecessary tomanageJapan-China relations looking towardsa forwarddirectionbasedonthefollowingprinciples.

First, bilateral relations should be guided by common interests, notdrivenbyemotions.Japan-Chinarelationsaretooimportanttobeinfluencedbytemporaryemotionalfeelings.Inotherwords,theyshouldbuildmaturedrelationsbasedoncommonstrategicinterestsratherthanemotionalrelationsdrivenby“like”or“dislike”.Bothcountriesneedtoseeka“plus-sum”,nota“zero-sum”relationship.Onlywin-winsituationsbasedoncommoninterestscan ensure stable bilateral relations. Second, nevertheless, sensitive issuessuchaspasthistory,TaiwanortheEastChinaSeadisputesmaysometimesshakeJapan-Chinarelations.Withregardtothehistoricissue,Japanshouldsquarely face up and firmly maintain the basic position that through itscolonial rule and aggression in thepast, Japan caused tremendousdamageandsufferingtothepeopleofmanycountries,particularlytothoseofAsiannations,andexpressadeepremorseandheart-feltapology.China,atthesametime,needstoappreciatepositivelyJapan’sconsistentpositionasapeacefulcountrysincetheendofthewar,andwelcomeandsupportitsincreasinglyactive role in theworld. Japan isnotwhat itused tobebeforeandduring



the war, and China has also risen from being a sleeping lion to a leadingpowerhouse.Bothgovernmentsandpeopleshouldnoticethattheyarealreadyin anewagewhere they themselves aswell as surrounding circumstanceshavechangedandanewthinkingisrequired.Third,intheeraof“friendship”,bothcountries,especiallyJapan, tended tobeself-restrained indialogue inordernottocreatetensions.However,strategicrelationsmustbesomethingwhichallowsbothsidestoexchangeviewsinafrankmanner.Awiderangeof frank and candid communication networks between the governments,business sectors, academia and individuals is necessary for promotingrelations based on trust and respect in the true sense of the word. Fourth,Japan-China relations are not only confined to bilateral purposes, but alsoshouldcontributetotheestablishmentofanewframeworkforAsiaandtheworld.Fifth,agovernment-to-governmentrelationshipiscriticallyimportantbutalsolimitedandcannotcoverallaspectsofJapan-Chinawideanddeeprelations.Especiallyasaresultofinformationtechnologydevelopmentssuchasmobilephonesandinternet, ithasbecomemoreandmoreimportantforbothgovernmentstoaddresstopublicdiplomacy.Theyounggenerationisamaintargetastheyarethesourceoffutureleaders.Morefrequentandlargeexchanges of youth in both countries are essential to deepen and widen acorrectunderstandingwithoutmutualprejudice.

Almost four decades have passed since Japan and China normalizedofficialrelationsin1972.Itisindeedamazingtoseehowmuchthebilateralrelationshiphasbeenwidenedanddeepenedduringthatperiod.Totalbilateraltradevolume,excludingHongKongin2008amountedtoUS$266.6billion,whichrankedthelargestamongJapanesebilateral tradesand24.7percentlarger than Japan-US trade volume. Japanese companies in China employdirectlyorindirectly9.2millionChineseworkers.64Thereareapproximately22,700JapaneseenterprisesoperatinginChinaasoftheendof2006.65Thenumber of Japanese who visited China in 2007 reached around 4 million,whilethenumberofChinesewhowenttoJapaninthesameyearwasaround1.21 million.According to the winter 2008 air flight schedule, 635 totalcarriers including297 Japanese and338Chinese carriers flied everyweekbetween18Japaneseand22Chineseairports,andthenumberofpassengersin 2007 reached 7.37 million.66 There were 125,417 Japanese citizensregisteredtoJapaneseEmbassyandConsulatesGeneralinChina,includingHong Kong in 2007, which accounted for 11.8 per cent of total Japaneseregisteredoverseas.ChinesecitizensregisteredtotheJapaneseImmigrationAuthoritiesaslong-termresidentsamountedto606,889asoftheendof2007,whichsurpassedKoreancitizensandhavebecomethelargestforeigngroupin Japan for the first timesince1959when theauthorities started tocountregisteredforeigners.Around90,000ChinesestudiedinJapan,while18,000



JapanesestudiedinChinain2008.AsofFebruary2008,332pairsoflocalgovernmentsinbothcountrieshaveestablishedsistercityrelations.67Thosetrends will continue in the future, and Japan-China relations will be morecloselyinterconnected.Nowthetimehascomeforbothstatestobeabletomakethebestuseoftheadvantageasneighbours.

Japan’srelationshipwiththeUSandChinadeterminedJapan’sdestinyin early20th century.This still remainsvalidnow.Theworst andgreatestfailureofJapanesediplomacyandmilitaryinearlyShowaeraisthatJapan’sChinapolicyseriouslyconflictedwiththeUStotheextentthatthebilateralrelationshipbecameimpossibletorecoverandmaintain,andledtothePacificWar. How to keep an appropriate distance and closeness with China is animportantbutdifficulttaskforJapanesediplomacy.NowitseemsthatmanyJapanese are confused and embarrassedby anew situationwhere they aregoingtoencountera“strongChina”forthefirsttimeinmorethanahundredyears since the first Japan-China War in the late 19th century. China wasdominantinEastAsiantributalsystembeforetheOpiumWar.Infact,Chinaoccupiedaround30percentofglobalGDPafewhundredyearsago.68TheJapaneseEmpireadvancedintoa“weak”Chinafromthe late19thcenturytotheearly20thcentury.NowEastAsiahasenteredanunprecedentednewperiodwhentwo“strong”Asiannationsaredestinedtocoexist.TheJapaneseperception towards China often swings between positive and negativedirections.Japanneedstotakeawell-balancedapproachtowardsChinabasedoncommonstrategicinterestsratherthanswingingsentiments.Publicsupportis essential to diplomacy. It is, however, dangerous if diplomacy is drivenby temporarypublic enthusiasm,becausediplomacy is a cool and realisticprofessionalartforcoordinatingnationalinterestswithforeignstatesthoughimportantforeignpoliciesneedtobepoliticallyauthorizedwiththetrustofthepeoplethroughelections.

Japan’s diplomatic option is not “US or China”, but “US and China”.Having said that, theUS remains thebest and strongest partner for Japan.Both countries share common values such as democracy, freedom, humanrightsandmarketeconomy.Inaddition,thesecurityrelationshipwiththeUSisacornerstoneofJapan’s foreignpolicyand is indeedcritical for Japan’ssurvival.On theotherhand,JapandoesnotsharebasicvalueswithChina.Furthermore,Chinaposesuncertainty toJapan.However, itdoesnotmeanthat Japan should become “anti-China” or confront China. Japan needs tomaintain and strengthen the relationship with the US on one hand, and atthesametimetherearevariousareaswhereJapanandChinashouldandcancooperatewitheachotheronabilateral,regionalandglobalbasisfromtheviewpointofcommonstrategicinterests.ThisisthemostrealisticandwiseoptionforJapanesediplomacy.



Notes

* DrKazuyukiKatayama片山和之 isMinisterandDeputyChiefofMissionoftheJapaneseEmbassyinBelgium.HeobtainedhisBachelorofLawfromKyotoUniversity,MasterofArtsfromHarvardUniversityandPhDfromtheUniversityof Malaya. He also studied in the Chinese University of Hong Kong, BeijingLanguages Institute andPekingUniversity.As a Japanese careerdiplomat, heservedinHongKong,Beijing,WashingtonDCandKualaLumpur.MorethanathirdofhiscareerwasfocusedonChina,includingfour-timeworkexperiencesinBeijingandtwiceattheChinadeskinTokyo.Hewasalsoinchargeofeconomicaffairs,exportcontrol,energysecurity,publicrelationsaswellasculturalaffairsin the Ministry of ForeignAffairs in Tokyo and the overseas missions. HiscurrentmissionintheembassyistofollowBelgianandBelgo-JapaneseaffairsandJapan’scooperationwithNATOaswellasinternaladministration.<Email: [email protected]>

1. HenryKissinger.Diplomacy.NewYork:Simon&SchusterPaperbacks,1994,p.726.

2. Kazankai. Nicchu Kankei Kihon Shiryoshu 1949-1997 (Basic Documents ofJapan-ChinaRelations1949-1997).Tokyo:Kazankai,1998,p.873.

3. GeraldL.Curtis.U.S. Policy toward Japan from Nixon to Clinton: An Assessment.Tokyo:JapanCenterforInternationalExchange,2000,p.8.

4. HenryKissinger.Years of Renewal.NewYork:Simon&Schuster,1999,p.84.5. Mainichi Shimbun,July6,1972.6. PreambleoftheJointCommuniquéstates:“TheJapanesesideiskeenlyconscious

oftheresponsibilityfortheseriousdamagethatJapancausedinthepasttotheChinesepeoplethroughwar,anddeeplyreproachesitself.”

7. Article2oftheJointCommuniquéstates:“TheGovernmentofJapanrecognizesthatGovernmentofthePeople’sRepublicofChinaasthesolelegalGovernmentofChina.”

8. Article 3 of the Joint Communiqué sates: “The Government of the People’sRepublicofChinareiteratesthatTaiwanisaninalienablepartoftheterritoryofthePeople’sRepublicofChina.TheGovernmentofJapanfullyunderstandsandrespectsthisstandoftheGovernmentofthePeople’sRepublicofChina,anditfirmlymaintainsitsstandunderArticle8ofthePotsdamProclamation.”

9. Article8ofPotsdamDeclarationonJuly26,1945,whichJapanhadaccepted,statesthat“thetermsoftheCairoDeclarationshallbecarriedoutandJapanesesovereigntyshallbelimitedtotheislandofHonshu,Hokkaido,Kyushu,Shikokuandsuchminorislandsaswedetermine.”TheCairoDeclarationonNovember27, 1943 refers to Taiwan that “all the territories Japan has stolen from theChinese,suchasManchuria,Formosa,andthePescadores,shallberestoredtotheRepublicofChina.”


11. Article 5 of the Joint Communiqué states: “The Government of the People’sRepublic of China declares that in the interest of the friendship between theChineseand the Japanesepeoples, it renounces itsdemand forwar reparationfromJapan.”



12. Article11ofthePeaceTreatybetweenJapanandtheRepublicofChinastatesthatissuesarisingoutoftheexistenceofthestateofwarbetweenJapanandtheRepublicofChinashallberesolvedinaccordancewithrelevantprovisionsofSanFranciscoPeaceTreaty.Article14(b)oftheSanFranciscoPeaceTreatystatesthattheAlliedPowerswaiveallreparationsclaimsoftheAlliedPowersandtheirnationalsarisingoutofanyactionstakenbyJapananditsnationalsinthecourseoftheprosecutionofthewar.


14.Thepublicannouncementon the resultof theThirdPlenumof the11thPartyCongress,passedonDecember22,1978stressedontheconstructionofsocialistmodernization, and economic and technological revolution as the next partymission.

15. Deng Xiaoping changed the tone of economic development from politicaldogmatismtopragmaticapproach.His“cattheory”ispopularfordescribinganewapproach.Heissaidtohavespoken:“Itdoesnotmatterifacatisblackorwhite,solongasitcatchesmice.”

16. SpeechtotheBritishHouseofCommonsonMarch1,1848.17. InApril 1978, approximately 100 to 200 Chinese fishing boats suddenly

enteredtheterritorialseaoftheSenkaku/DiaoyudaoIslands,overwhichJapanhas exercised its control and both nations claim the sovereignty.The Chinesegovernment later explained it was accidental, and the boats all left the area.NobuyukiSugimoto,theformerconsul-generalinShanghaiandJapaneseChina-handdiplomatwhowasworkingatChinaDivisionoftheForeignMinistry,wroteinhisbookthatJapan’sCoastGuardfoundoutthatthefishingboatshadreceivedinstructionsviaradiofromnavalbasesinYantai,ShandongProvinceandXiamen,FujianProvince.(杉本信行(Sugimoto,Nobuyuki).大地の咆哮Daichi no Hoko(Cry from Earth).Tokyo: PHP, 2006, pp. 62-63) Deng Xiaoping, in his pressconferenceinTokyoonOctober25,1978duringhisvisittoJapanforexchangingdocumentsofPeaceandFriendshipTreatysaidthatitwouldbeappropriatetoputthisissueasidetemporarilyoreventenyearsasthenextgenerationwouldbe wiser than the current generation. (Asahi Shimbun, October 26, 1978)TheJapanesegovernment, however,maintains theposition that no territorial issueexistsbetweenJapanandChinaasitisclearthatthe SenkakubelongstoJapanhistoricallyaswellasfromtheviewpointofinternationallaw,andinfactJapanphysicallycontrolstheislands.

18. TheJapanesemediareportedinJune1982thattheMinistryofEducationforcedtextbook publishing companies to revise the expression on Japan-China Warfrom“aggression”to“advancement”inhistorytextbooksforseniorhighschools.The Chinese government started to criticize a month later. The initial reportby themediaproved tobe incorrect, butKiichiMiyazawa, then chief cabinetsecretary issued a statement onAugust 26, 1982, promising that the JapanesegovernmentwouldlistentocriticismsbyAsianneighboursearnestlyandcorrectasappropriate.Theissuethusstartedtocalmdown.

19. ElevenoutoffifteenpostwarprimeministershadvisitedtheYasukuniShrineunder theprivate titleorwithoutmakingclear theircharacterof thevisituntil



Nakasonecarriedouttheofficialvisitin1985.FourteenClassAcriminalswereenshrinedtotheYasukuniShrinein1978,andtheChinesegovernmentstartedto strongly oppose prime minister’s visit regardless of its character, officialor private since Nakasone’s worship. Since then only two incumbent primeministers,HashimotoandKoizumivisited the shrine.EmperorhasnotvisitedtheshrinesinceClassAcriminalsprovedtobeenshrined.

20. The Kokaryo Dormitory was at Kyoto and originally provided for ChinesestudentsduringWWII.After thewar, itwas registeredunder thenameof the“RepublicofChina”in1961,butwhenCulturalRevolutionstartedinmainlandin1966,conflictsoccurredbetweenresidentssupportingtheCCPandtheChineseNationalistParty(KMT).Therefore,thegovernmentofRepublicofChinasuedthoseCCPsupporters,requestingthevacationofthedormitoryin1967.However,asaresultofnormalizationofdiplomaticrelationsbetweenJapanandChina,alegalstatusofthe“governmentofRepublicofChina”inJapanwasdisputedwithregardtoownershipofthedormitory.Severaljudgmentsweredoneincourts,butalegalsettlementisnotyetcompleted.

21. NikitaKhrushchev,FirstSecretaryoftheSovietCommunistPartyandPremier,visitedChina inSeptember1959onhiswayback from the firstUSvisit.Heleft China on the third day of a planned seven days visit as Sino-Soviet splitworsened.In1960,hedecidedtopullSovietexpertsfromChina.

22. June 4 Incident is a series of demonstrations for pro-democracy and anti-corruptioninitiatedbystudentsandintellectuals,andsupportedbycitizensinandnearTiananmenSquareaswellasmaincities inChina,whichwas intensifiedbythedeathofHuYaobang,theformerGeneralSecretaryoftheCCPonApril15,1989.However,martiallawwasdeclaredonMay19,andthemilitaryfinallycleared Tiananmen Square on June 4. Zhao Ziyang, General Secretary wasdismissed for his pro-demonstrations approach. The number of dead remainsunclearthoughtheChinesegovernmentofficiallyannouncedthattherewere319killedintheincidentbutnodeathsinthesquare.TheChinesegovernmentwasconfrontedwithstrongcriticismsfromtherestoftheworld,butithasmaintaineditspositionthattheincidentwasananti-revolutionaryrebellion.

23. ThedecisionsweremadeattheFourthPlenaryof13thPartyCongressheldinBeijingonJune23to24.ThiswasthefirstofficialmeetingoftheCCPsinceJune4IncidentthoughanirregularPolitburoEnlargementMeetingwasconvenedonJune19to21.

24. Website of Foreign Ministry of Japan. (May 15, 2009, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/ economy/ summit/ 2000/past_summit/15/e15_e.html)

25. PrimeMinisterKiichiMiyazawa’sStatementonAugust25,1992regardingVisittoChinabyTheirMajesties,EmperorandEmpress.

26. Regardinghistory,Emperorspokethatinthelonghistoryofbilateralrelations,there was an unhappy period when Japan gave a great suffering to Chinesepeople,whichhedeeplydeplores.

27. QianQichen.Waijiao Shiji(TenStoriesofaDiplomat).Beijing:BeijingZhishiChubanshe,2003,p.195.

28. Article2oftheJointDeclaration.(June5,2009,http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/korea/joint9810.html)



29. Article3oftheJointDeclaration.(June5,2009,http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/korea/joint9810.html)

30. Japan-China Joint Declaration on Building a Partnership of Friendship andCooperationforPeaceandDevelopment,November26,1998.

31. AkihikoTanaka.Asia no Naka no Nippon(JapaninAsia).Tokyo:NTTShuppan,2007,p.288.

32. Website of Foreign Ministry of Japan. (May 15, 2009, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/data/gaiyou/odaproject/aisa/china/index)

33. PrimeMinisterKoizumispokeattheforum:“SomeseetheeconomicdevelopmentofChinaasathreat.Idonot.IbelievethatitsdynamiceconomicdevelopmentpresentschallengesaswellasopportunityforJapan.Ibelievearisingeconomictideandexpansionof themarket inChinawill stimulatecompetitionandwillprovetobeatremendousopportunityfortheworldeconomyasawhole…IseetheadvancementofJapan-Chinaeconomicrelations,notasahollowing-outofJapaneseindustry,butasanopportunitytonurturenewindustriesinJapanandtodeveloptheiractivitiesintheChinesemarket.Ourintegratedeffortsforeconomicreforminbothcountriesshouldadvancethewheelofeconomicrelations.”

34. 飯島勲 (Iijima, Isao),実録小泉外交 Jitsuroku Koizumi Gaiko (DocumentaryKoizumiDiplomacy).Tokyo:NihonKeizaiShimbunShuppansha,2007,p.36.

35. A Japanese journalist, who had been informed of the attempted asylum inadvance,shotthesceneatthesite.

36. Forty-fourChinesecitizenswerereportedtogetinjuredbyabandonedJapanesechemicalweaponsatQiqihaeronAugust4,2003,outofwhomapersonwasdead.(XinhuaNewsAgency,March18,2006)

37. ChineseForeignMinistryexpressedastrongresentmenttotheJapaneseEmbassyinBeijingonSeptember29.(Mainichi Shimbun,September29,2003,Yomiuri Shimbun,October9,2003)

38. Several hundreds of Chinese students marched in the city for requesting anapologyfromtherelevantJapanese.ChineseForeignMinistryrequestedtotheJapaneseEmbassyinBeijingtotakeappropriatemeasures.Theuniversitydecidedtofire theJapaneseteacherandremovethethreestudentsfromtheuniversity.(Asahi Shimbun,October31,2003,People’s Daily(Japaneseedition),November1,2003.)

39. ThefinalgameofAsiaFootballCupwasheldinBeijingonAugust7,2004andJapandefeatedChinaby3to1.Atthestadium,Japan’snationalanthemwasnotheardbecauseofheavybooing,Japan’snationalflagswereburntdown,Japanesesupporterscouldnotleavethestadiumforafewhoursafterthegameforsafetyreason,andanEmbassycarforDeputyChiefofMissionwasattackedandhaditswindowbroken.(Yomiuri Shimbun,August8,2004)

40. A Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Forces plane found a nuclear submarineinterferingJapan’sterritorialseainOkinawaonNovember10,2004.TheChinesegovernmentexpressedaregret,explainingthatitoccurredforatechnicalreason.(WebsiteofForeignMinistryof Japan (May20,2010,http://www.mofa-go.jp/ mofaj/press/kaiken/gaisho/g_0411.html))

41. The Chinese government expressed sympathy and regret but insisted that theChinesesidewasnotresponsiblefortheincident,andJapanshouldsquarelyface



history.(WebsiteofForeignMinistryofJapan(May20,2010,http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/china/j_kogi01.html)

42. Shukan Bunshun(WeeklyBunshun),January5and12,2006.43. PressReleasebyForeignMinistryofJapanonDecember31,2005.(Websiteof

ForeignMinistryofJapan,February16,2010,http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/17/ris_1231a.html)

44. Press Conference by Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Qing Gang onDecember30,2005.(WebsiteofForeignMinistryofChina,February16,2010,http://sf.chinaconsulatesf.org/chin/gxh/wzb/fyrbt/dhdw/t228826.htm)

45. 外交に関する世論調査 Gaiko ni Kansuru Yoron Chosa (Public Survey on Diplomacy) in 1980 and 2005, conducted by Cabinet Office (former PrimeMinister’sOffice).(http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey)

46. There are Japanese and Chinese texts. English provisional translation is alsoavailableinthewebsiteofForeignMinistryofJapan.(May10,2009,http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint0610.html)

47. The author worked for the Japanese Embassy in Beijing from 1997 to 1999,andremembers that in theprocessofnegotiationwithChinesecounterpartfordraftinga jointdeclaration tobe issuedon theoccasionofChinesePresident,JiangZemin’sofficialvisittoJapaninNovember1998,theChinesesideneverpreferredusingtheword“strategic”initsrelationswithJapaninspiteofthefactthatthisexpressionwasusedinitsrelationswithgreatpowerssuchastheUSandRussia.

48. WebsiteofForeignMinistryofChina.(January7,2010,http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/gjhdq/gj/yz/1206_25/1209/t310780.htm)

49. WebsiteofForeignMinistryofJapan.(January7,2010,http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint0805.html)

50. The New York Times,August27,2009.51. ForeignMinistryofJapan.OutlineofJapan-ChinaSummitMeeting,September

22,2009.(October1,2009,http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/china/visit/0909_sk.html)

52. ShigeharuMatsumoto,Shanghai Jidai(ShanghaiPeriod),Vol.1.Tokyo:Chuoko-ronsha,1974,pp.18-19.

53. ThefollowingareexamplesofwhathasbeenwrittenorspokenbytheJapanesegovernmentandleadersonthepasthistoryissue:

“The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the seriousdamage that Japan caused in thepast to theChinesepeople throughwar, anddeeplyreproachesitself.”(JointCommuniquéoftheGovernmentofJapanandtheGovernmentofthePeople’sRepublicofChina,onSeptember29,1972)

“Inthelonghistoryofrelationshipbetweenourtwocountries,therewasanunfortunateperiod,inwhichmycountryinflictedgreatsufferingsonthepeopleofChina.Ideeplydeplorethis.”(SpeechbyHisMajestytheEmperorofJapanatawelcomingdinnerhostedbyChinesePresidentYangShangkun,onOctober23,1992)

“Japan …, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendousdamageandsufferingtothepeopleofmanycountries,particularlyto thoseofAsiannations.Inthehopethatnosuchmistakesbemadeinthefuture,I(Prime



Minister Murayama) regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts ofhistory,andexpresshereonceagainmyfeelingsofdeepremorseandstatemyheartfeltapology.”(StatementbyPrimeMinisterMurayamaontheoccasionof50thanniversaryoftheendofWWII,onAugust15,1995)

“The Japanese side iskeenlyconsciousof the responsibility for the seriousdistress and damage that Japan caused to the Chinese people through itsaggressionagainstChinaduringacertainperiodinthepastandexpresseddeepremorse for this.” (Japan-China Joint Declaration on Building a PartnershipofFriendshipandCooperation forPeaceandDevelopment,onNovember26,1998)

“IlookedattheexhibitionswithheartfeltapologyandcondolencestothoseChinesepeoplewhoweresacrificedduringJapaneseaggression.”(PrimeMinisterKoizumi’sinterviewaftervisitingtheMemorialMuseumfortheAnti-JapaneseWarinBeijingonOctober8,2001)

54. According to the Foreign Ministry of Japan, both Japan and Germany havesincerely responded to thepasthistory issue.Butat thesame time, JapanandGermany are completely different in what occurred during the war, and howtheyresolvedtheissueafterthewarunderrespectivesituations.JapanresolvedtheissuessuchaswarreparationthroughbilateralandmultilateralpeacetreatiessuchasSanFranciscoPeaceTreaty,whichwasagenerallyacceptedway.Forexamples,throughSanFranciscoTreaty,JapanpaidreparationstothePhilippines(US$550 million), Vietnam (US$39 million) and International Committee oftheRedCross(ICRC)(£4.5million).Japanalsoabandoneditsassetsoverseas(US$23.681billion).Throughbilateral treaties, Japan paidUS$200million toBurmaandUS$223million to Indonesia. (Websiteof theForeignMinistryofJapan (May 21, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/taisen/qa/03. html))Germany,whichhadbeendividedintotwoafterthewar,couldnotsolvetheissuein the same manner. Germany, therefore, provided individual compensations.ThusJapanandGermanywereindifferentsituations,andit isnotappropriatetosimplycompareandevaluatethetwocountries’approach.(ForeignMinistryofJapan.Past History Questions and Answers,May21,2010,http://www.mofa.go.jp/ mofaj/area/taisen/qa/10.html)

55. TheJapanesegovernmentdidnotpermitLeeTeng-hui’svisittoJapanwhilehewasPresident.AsofJanuary2010,hevisitedJapanfivetimes,butonlyafterheresignedinMarch2000,i.e.,inApril2001,December2004-January2005,May-June2007,September2008,andinSeptember2009.

56. Ministry of ForeignAffairs of Japan, Recent Developments in Japan-China Relations: Basic Facts on the Senkaku Islands and the Recent Incident.Tokyo:MinistryofForeignAffairsofJapan,October2010,p.7.TheSenkakuIslandsarenotincludedintheterritorywhichJapanrenouncedundertheSanFranciscoPeaceTreaty.TheywereundertheUSadministrationasapartofOkinawauntil1972when they returned to Japan.Chinaexpressednoobjection to the statusoftheislandsunderUSadministration.Infact,itwasnotuntil1970,whenthepossibilityofpetroleumresourcesonthecontinentalshelfsurroundingtheislandscame to surface, that China began to claim the sovereignty over the SenkakuIslands.



57. ChinaclaimsthattheDiaoyuIslandshavebeeninitsterritoryeversincetheearlyperiodoftheMingDynasty(1368-1644),andJapanillegallytookovertheislandsassubsidiaryislandsofTaiwanin1895aftertheShimonosekiTreatywassignedasaresultofChina’sdefeat in theSino-JapaneseWarof1894-1895. It insiststhatSanFranciscoTreatywasunlawfulandillegitimateandOkinawaReversionAgreement between Japan and the US in 1971 was a blatant infringement onChina’s territorial sovereignty. The Chinese government has been resolvedlyfightingoveritssovereigntyrightsasitbelievesthatJapancontinuesitsunlawfuloccupationoftheislands.(ChinaDaily,October12,2010)

58. WebsiteofMinistryofForeignAffairsofJapan.(October19,2010,http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/ asia-paci/china/r-relations/major_e.html)

59. DeputyofOkinawaDistrictPublicProsecutor’sOfficemadeapressconferenceon September 24, explaining that the Chinese captain was released becausehisactionwasnot takenbasedonawellpreparedplanbut forescaping fromthe chase of the Japanese coast guard, and the prosecutor’s office also tookintoconsiderationapossible impactof thecaseonJapanesenationalsaswellas future Japan-China relations. (Yomiuri Shimbun, September 24, 2010) Thespokesmandenied apolitical decisionwasmade for the captain’s release, buta “consideration” on “future Japan-China relations” is extraordinary for thepublicprosecutor’sofficeasadecisionfactorandsomesuspectthatitindicatesapossiblehighlypolitical instructionwasdelivered to theprosecutor’soffice.NaotoKan,primeminister,however,repliedinNewYorkonSeptember24thatitwasadecisionmadesolemnlybythepublicprosecutor’sofficethattookintogeneralconsiderationscharactersofthecaseandrelevantlawsandregulations.(Yomiuri Shimbun,September25,2010)Thushedeniedapoliticalpressurebythegovernmenthighprofilestothepublicprosecutor’soffice.

60. TheChineseauthoritiesdeniedtheembargoofrareearths thoughthecustomsauthoritiesdidnotauthorizetheexportofrareearthstoJapanforcertainperiodafterthecasetookplace.

61. TheChinesegovernmentexpressedunderstandingonChinesepeople’srighteousindignation but at the same time pointed out that the government would notsupportirrationalandillegalactionstoexpresspatriotism.(Pressspokesperson,MrMaChaoxu’s remarksonOctober16,2010,http://www.fmprc.gov. cn/chn/gxh/tyb/fyrbt/t761694.htm)

62. “National Defense Program Guidelines for Fiscal Year 2011 and Beyond”approvedby the JapaneseSecurityCouncil and theCabinetonDecember17,2010 warns that “China is steadily increasing its defense expenditure. Chinais widely and rapidly modernizing its military force, mainly its capability forextended-range power projection. In addition, China has been expanding andintensifying its maritime activities in the surrounding waters. These trends,together with insufficient transparency over China’s military forces and itssecuritypolicy,areofconcernfortheregionalandglobalcommunity.”(WebsiteofJapan’sMinistryofDefense,June14,2011, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline /2011 /index.html)

63. Remarks “My Personal Conviction regarding Japan-China Relations” byTaroAso, Prime Minister of Japan at the reception to commemorate the 30th



anniversary of the conclusion of theTreaty of Peace and Friendship betweenJapanandthePeople’sRepublicofChina,atGreatHallofthePeople,Beijing,on October 24, 2008. (September 9, 2009, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/address0810.html)

64. BoXilai,thenChineseCommerceMinister’sstatementinPeople’s Daily,April23,2005.

65. Chinese Trade Statistics 2007.66. Ministry of ForeignAffairs of Japan, Japan and China: Building a Mutually

Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests.Tokyo:MinistryofForeignAffairsofJapan,2009.

67. StatisticsbyCouncilofLocalAuthoritiesforInternationalRelations(Japan).68. Speech by Dai Bingguo, State Councilor of China atASEAN Secretariat in

JakartaonJanuary22,2010.(WebsiteofForeignMinistryofChina,February5,2010,http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/gxh/tyb/ zyxw/t653376.htm)

References

EnglishLanguageSources

Baker,JamesA.(1995),The Politics of Diplomacy,NewYork:Putnam.Bergsten, C. Fred et al. (2008), China’s Rise: Challenges and Opportunities,

Washington,DC:Peterson Institute for InternationalEconomicsandCenter forStrategicandInternationalStudies.

Burr,William(1999),The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow,NewYork:TheNewPress.

Bush,RichardC.(2010),The Perils of Proximity: China-Japan Security Relations.Washington,D.C.:TheBrookingsInstitution.

Bush,RichardC.andMichaelE.O’Hanlon(2007),A War Like No Other – The Truth About China’s Challenge To America,Hoboken:JohnWiley&Suns,Inc.

Calder,KentE.(2009),Pacific Alliance: Reviving U.S.-Japan Relations,NewHaven&London:YaleUniversityPress.

Emmott,Bill(2008),Rivals: How the Power Struggle between China, India and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade,London:PenguinBooks.

Fishman,TedC.(2005),China Inc.: How the Rise of the Next Superpower Challenges America and the World,NewYork:Scribner.

Halper,Stefan(2010),The Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century,NewYork:BasicBooks.

He,Yinnan(2009),The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and German-Polish Relations since World War II,NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Jacques,Martin(2009),When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order,NewYork:ThePenguinPress.

Kang,DavidC.(2007),China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia,NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress.

Khalilzad,ZulmM.et al. (1999),The United States and a Rising China: Strategic and Military Implications,SantaMonica:RAND.

Kirby,WilliamC.,RobertS.RossandGongLi(2005),Normalization of U.S.-China Relations,Cambridge:TheHarvardUniversityAsiaCenter.



Kissinger,Henry(2011),On China,NewYork:PenguinBooksLtd.Lam,PengEret al.(2006),Japan’s Relations with China: Facing a Rising Power,

NewYork:Routledge.Lee,PohPing(2005),Facing the Dragon: Asean and Japan, and the Rise of China,

Selangor:PenerbitUniversitiKebangsaanMalaysia.Mann,James(2007),The China Fantasy,NewYork:Viking.Mearsheimer,JohnJ.(2001),The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,NewYork:W.W.

Norton&Company,Inc.Nye,JosephS.,Jr.(2011),The Future of Power,NewYork:PublicAffairs.Nye, Joseph S., Jr. (2004), Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics,

Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress.Platt, Nicholas (2010), China Boys: How U.S. Relations with the PRC Began and

Grew,Washington,D.C.:NewAcademiaPublishing.Ross, Robert S. et al. (2008), China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of

International Politics,NewYork:CornellUniversity.Shirk,SusanL. (2007),China: Fragile Superpower,NewYork:OxfordUniversity

Press.Sutter,RobertG.(2008),Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold

War,Maryland:Rowman&LittlefieldPublishers,Inc.Sutter,RobertG.(2009),The United States in Asia,Maryland:Rowman&Littlefield

Publishers,Inc.Sutter,RobertG.(2010),U.S.-Chinese Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present,

Maryland:Rowman&LittlefieldPublishers,Inc.

JapaneseLanguageSources

呉軍華(Go,Gunka)『中国　静かなる革命』(ChugokuShizukaNaruKakumei)日本経済新聞出版社　2008

本田善彦 (Honda,Yoshihiko)『人民解放軍は何を考えているのか』 (JinminKaihogunWaNaniOKangaeteirunoka)光文社　2008　

細谷千博(Hosoya,Chihiro)『日本外交の軌跡』(NihonGaikoNoKiseki)日本放送出版協会　1993

井上寿一 (Inoue, Toshikazu)『アジア主義を問いなおす』 (Asia Shugi OToinaosu)筑摩書房　2006

五百旗頭真 (Iokibe, Makoto)編『戦後日本外交史（新版）』 (Sengo NihonGaikoshi)有斐閣　2006

関志雄(Kan,Shiyu)・朱建栄(Shu,Kenei)編　『中国の経済大論争』(ChugokuNoKeizaiDaironso)　勁草書房　2008

関志雄(Kan,Shiyu)『チャイナ・アズ・ナンバーワン』（ChinaAsNo.1）　東洋経済新報社　2009　

片山和之 (Katayama, Kazuyuki)『ワシントンから眺めた中国』 (WashingtonKaraNagametaChugoku)東京図書出版会　2003

川島真(Kawashima,Shin)『中国の外交：自己認識と課題』(ChugokuNoGaiko:JikoNinshikiToKadai)山川出版社　2007

霞山会(Kazankai)　『日中関係基本資料集　１９４９年-１９９７年』(NicchuKankeiKihonShiryoshu1949Nen–1997Nen)　財団法人霞山会　1998



小原雅博 (Kohara, Masahiro)『東アジア共同体：強大化する中国と日本の戦略』 (HigashiAsiaKyodotaiKyodaikaSuruChugokuToNihonNoSenryaku)日本経済新聞出版社　2005

松本重治(Matsumoto,Shigeharu) (Shang-haiJidai:JournalistNoKaiso)(Vol.1)　中央公論社　1974道上尚史(Michigami,Hisashi)『外交官が見た「中国人の対日観」』(Gaikokan

GaMitaChugokujinNoTainichikan)　文藝春秋社　2010宮本雄二 (Miyamoto,Yuji)『これから、中国とどう付き合うか』 (Korekara,

ChugokuToDouTsukiauKa)日本経済新聞出版社　2011中嶋嶺雄 (Nakajima, Mineo)『中国：歴史・社会・国際関係』 (Chugoku:

Rekishi・Shakai・Kokusaikankei)　中央公論社　1982岡田実(Okada,Minoru)『日中関係とＯＤＡ：対中ＯＤＡをめぐる政治外交史

入門』(NicchuKankeiToODATaichuODAOMeguruSeijiGaikoshiNyumon)日本僑報社　2008

関山健 (Sekiyama, Takashi)『日中の経済関係はこう変わった：対中国円借款30年の軌跡』 (Nicchu No Keizai Kankei Wa Ko Kawatta Tai ChugokuEnshakkan30NenNoKiseki)高文研　2008

清水美和 (Shimizu,Yoshikazu)『「中国問題」の内幕』 (Chugoku Mondai NoUchimaku)　筑摩書房　2008

清水美和 (Shimizu,Yoshikazu)『「中国問題」の核心』 (Chugoku Mondai NoKakushin)　筑摩書房　2009

進藤榮一 (Shindo, Eiichi)『東アジア共同体をどうつくるか』 (HigashiAsiaKyodotaiODouTsukuruKa)筑摩書房　2007

城山秀巳 (Shiroyama, Hidemi)『中国共産党「天皇工作」秘録』 (ChugokuKyosantoTennoKosakuHiroku)文藝春秋社　2009

田中明彦 (Tanaka,Akihiko)『アジアの中の日本』 (AsiaNoNakanoNihon)ＮＴＴ出版　2007

田中均 (Tanaka,Hitoshi)『外交の力』(GaikoNoChikara)日本経済新聞出版社　2009

谷口誠(Taniguchi,Makoto) (HigashiAsiaKyodotaiKeizaiTogoNoYukueToNihon)岩波書店　2004渡辺利夫(Watanabe,Toshio)『新脱亜論』 (ShinDatsuaRon)　文芸春秋社

　2008

ChineseLanguageSources

楚树龙(Chu,Shulong)编《中国外交战略和政策》(China’sForeignStrategyandPolicy)Beijing:时事出版社2008

贺雄飞 (He, Xiongfei)《中国为什么不高兴：中华复兴时代知识分子的文化主张》(WhyChinaIsNotHappy:CulturalOpinionofIntellectuals in theAgeofChina’sRenaissance)Beijing:世界知识出版社2009

黄大慧(Huang,Dahui)《日本大国化趋势与中日关系》(Japan’sPowerBuilding-upandSino-JapaneseRelationship)Beijing:社会科学文献出版社2008

黄大慧(Huang,Dahui)编《中日友好交流三十年文化教育与民间交流卷》(The30thAnniversaryofFriendlySino-JapanCommunicationCultural,EducationalandFolkCommunication1978-2008)Beijing:社会科学文献出版社2008

『上海時代：ジャーナリストの回想』（上）

『東アジア共同体：経済統合のゆくえと日本』



小原雅博(Kohara,Masahiro)《日本走向何方》(WhereJapanGoes)Beijing:中信出版社2009

李岚清(Li,Lanqing)《突围》(BreakSiege)Beijing:中央文献出版社2008刘江永 (Liu, Jiangyong)《中日关系二十讲》(20 Lectures of Sino-Japanese

Relations)Beijing:中国人民大学出版社　2007刘江永 (Liu, Jiangyong)《当代日本对外关系》(Contemporary Japanese Foreign

Relations)Beijing:世界知识出版社2009牛军(Niu,Jun)编《后冷战时代的中国外交》(China’sDiplomacyinthePostCold

WarYears)Beijing:北京大学出版社2009裴华(Pei,Hua)编《中日外交风云中的邓小平》(DengXiaopinginSino-Japanese

DiplomaticRelations)Beijing:中央文献出版社2002钱其琛(Qian,Qichen)《外交十记》(TenStoriesofaDiplomat)Beijing:世界知识

出版社2003秦亚青(Qin,Yaqing)编《国际体系与中国外交》(InternationalSystemandChina’s

Diplomacy)Beijing:世界知识出版社2009尚书 (Shang, Shu)《美日同盟关系走向》(Trends for the US-JapanAlliance

Relations)Beijing:时事出版社2009宋晓军(Song,Xiaojun) (UnhappyChina:TheGreatTimes,GrandVisionandOurChallenge)Nanjing:江

苏人民出版社2009唐家璇 (Tang,Jiaxuan)《劲雨煦风》(HeavyRainandWarmWind)Beijing:世界

知识出版社2009陶文钊(Tao,Wenzhao)何兴强(HeXingqiang)《中美关系史》(AHistoryofChina-

USRelations)Beijing:中国社会科学出版社2009王泰平(Wang,Taiping)《风月同天:话说中日关系》(WindandMoonintheSame

Sky:StoriesaboutSino-JapaneseRelations)Beijing:世界知识出版社2010王海涛 (Wang,Haitao)《日本改变中国》(JapanChangesChina)Beijing:中国友

谊出版公司2009王锦思 (Wang, Jinsi)《日本行，中国更行》(China&Japan)Qingdao:青岛出版

社2010王新生(Wang,Xinsheng)编《中日友好交流三十年政治卷》(The30thAnniversary

ofFriendlySino-JapanCommunicationPolitics1978-2008)Beijing:社会科学文献出版社2008

王逸舟(Wang,Yizhou)编《中国对外关系转型30年1978-2008》(TransformationofForeignAffairsandInternationalRelationsinChina,1978-2008)Beijing:社会科学文献出版社2008

王逸舟(Wang,Yizhou)谭秀英(TanXiuying) (SixtyYearsofChina’sForeignAffairs:1949-2009)Beijing:中国社会科学出版

社2009吴建民(Wu,Jianmin)《外交案例》(CaseStudyinDiplomacy)Beijing:中国人民

大学出版社2007徐万胜(Xu,Wansheng)编《冷战后的日美同盟与中国周边安全》(TheJapan-US

AllianceandtheSecurityEnvironmentaroundChinainthePost-ColdWarEra)Beijing:社会科学文献出版社2009

颜声毅(Yan,Shengyi)《当代中国外交第二版》(ContemporaryForeignAffairsofChina)Shanghai:复旦大学出版社2009

等《中国不高兴: 大时代、大目标及我们的内优外患》

编《中国外交六十年: 1949-2009》



游博(You,Bo)《崛起中的中日关系》(RisingRelationsofChinaandJapan)Beijing:世界知识出版社2009

张季风(Zhang,Jifeng)编《中日友好交流三十年经济卷》(The30thAnniversaryofFriendlySino-JapanCommunicationEconomy1978-2008)Beijing:社会科学文献出版社2008

GlossaryAbe Shinzō 安倍晋三Asahi Shimbun朝日新聞Dōmei Tsūshinsha 同盟通信社en(yen)円/圓FukudaTakeo福田赳夫HatoyamaYukio鳩山由紀夫Heisei平成heiwa yuko平和友好ichii taisui一衣帶水KaifuToshiki海部俊樹KanNaoto菅直人KoizumiJunichiro小泉純一郎Kokaryo光華寮Kyōto 京都Mainichi Shimbun毎日新聞MiyazawaKiichi宮澤喜一Mori Yoshirō 森喜朗Naha-shi那覇市nicchu yuko sese daidai日中友好世世代代Obuchi Keizō 小渕恵三Ōhira Masayoshi 大平正芳Okinawa-ken沖縄県Ōsaka 大阪Satō Eisaku 佐藤榮作seirei keinetsu政冷経热Senkaku Shotō 尖閣諸島senryaku teki gokei kankei戦略的互恵関係Shimonoseki Jōyaku 下関条約Shōwa 昭和Shukan Bunshun週刊文春TanakaKakuei田中角榮Tōkyō 東京WasedaDaigaku早稲田大学YasukuniJinja靖国神社Yomiuri Shimbun読売新聞YoshidaShigeru吉田茂


Cross-Strait Economic Integration in the Regional Political Economy 681InternationalJournalofChinaStudiesVol.2,No.3,December2011,pp.681-700

Cross-StraitEconomicIntegrationintheRegionalPoliticalEconomy

Min-Hua Chiang*NationalUniversityofSingapore

Abstract

TherecentlysignedEconomicCooperationFrameworkAgreementbetweenTaiwanandChinaisnotonlyaresultoftheintensifyingeconomicrelationshipacrosstheStraitbutisalsotofurthersecuretheconnectionbetweenthetwosides.Taiwanenjoysshort-termeconomicbenefitsbutECFAfavoursChina’spoliticalintentionsinthelongerterm.Moreover,puttingcross-Straiteconomicintegrationintoaregionalcontext,Taiwanislikelytojointhecurrentwaveof “China-centred” regionalization. China’s gravity in regional economicintegrationhasbeengreatlyenhancedsubsequenttotherecentlysignedtradeagreementswithSoutheastAsiancountries,HongKong,MacaoandTaiwan.China’sexpansionofpowerinEastAsiacouldposeachallengetothestatusquointheregionandAmericaninterestsinparticular.HowtheUSrespondstoChina’s increasingdominanceintheregionaleconomyiscriticalfor thefuturedevelopmentofeconomicintegrationinEastAsia.

Keywords: cross-Strait relation, US-Asia economic relations, regional economic integration in East Asia

JEL classification:F13, F15, F53, F59

1.Introduction

There are two aspects to the evaluation of the progress of economicintegration between Taiwan and China. One is the investigation of tradeandinvestmentrelationshipsandtheotherisviatheanalysisofinstitutionalinteractions between the two sides. Over the past two decades, trade andinvestment relationships betweenTaiwan and China have been prosperouseventhoughthereisnofreetradeagreementtopromoteit.ThedriverbehindthecloserTaiwan-Chinaeconomicintegrationhasbeenmostlybasedonthebusinessinterestsofentrepreneurs,eachside’snationaleconomicdevelopment


682 Min-Hua Chiang

policyandtheglobaleconomicsituation,ratherthananyarrangedeconomiccooperativemechanismbetweenTaiwanandChina.

The lagging development of institutionalized cross-Strait economicrelationshasimprovedsincethecurrentTaiwanesePresident,MaYing-jeou馬英九, took office in 2008. The recent improvement in government-to-governmentcooperationoncross-Straiteconomicaffairsincludestheeasingof the RMB-NTD conversion business in Taiwan, cross-Strait securitiesinvestment, the ceiling on Mainland-bound investment in Taiwan, thepermitting of Mainland capital to invest in Taiwan’s stock market, directflights between the two sides and the opening up of Taiwan to Chinesetourists. Representative of the progress in institutionalized cross-StraiteconomicrelationswasthesigningoftheEconomicCooperationFrameworkAgreement (ECFA) in June 2010. It was a historical moment becauseTaiwanandChina,whohavebothclaimed themselves tobe theonly legalgovernmentofChinaanddeniedformalrecognitionofeachother,committedthemselvestotrimmingtariffandcommercialbarriers.AlthoughECFAisaproductofintensifiedcross-Straiteconomicrelations,italsoplaysanactiveroleinsecuringthefutureconnectionbetweenTaiwanandChina.Indeed,theestablishment of more measures of economic cooperation across the Straitwasnotsurprisingasbothsideshavevigorouslysoughttoimproverelationsafter theKuomintang國民黨 (KMT) regainedTaiwanpresidency in2008.ContrarytoPresidentChenShui-bian陳水扁’sera(2000-2008),wherehisstrong“Taiwanconsciousness”waslessfavouredbyChina,PresidentMa’semphasis on Chinese ethnicity and Chinese identity won much of China’sapplause.Withthesame“OneChina”principle1inmind,thetwosidesfoundroomtocooperate,especiallyineconomicaffairs.

Until June 2010, the most noticeable measure on ECFA was the earlyharvestprogrammewhichhastakeneffectsinceJanuary1st2011.AccordingtotheECFAearlyharvestprogramme,Chinawilllowertariffson539items,which accounted for 16 per cent of China’s total imports from Taiwan in2009.Meanwhile,Taiwanwilllowertariffson267items,whichaccountedfor11percentofTaiwan’stotalimportsfromChinain2009.TheitemsthatChinaopensup toTaiwan range fromagriculturalgoods tomanufacturingproducts such as petrochemicals, machinery, transport equipments andtextiles.However,TaiwanopensupnoagriculturalgoodstoChinaandthemanufacturingitemslistedintheearlyharvestprogrammearequitelimited.AsChinaeliminates tariffsonalmost twiceasmanygoodsasTaiwan, theeconomicbenefitsfavourTaiwanmorethanChina.Onthetradeinserviceslistedontheearlyharvestprogramme,Chinaalsoopensupmoreofitsservicesector for Taiwanese entrepreneurs to invest in on the mainland, such asbanking,securitiesandfutures,insuranceandbusinessservices.2Taiwanesecompanieswillbeallowedtoconductawidervarietyofbusiness inChina


Cross-Strait Economic Integration in the Regional Political Economy 683

than vice versa. In January 2011, the Cross-Strait Economic CooperationCommittee (ECC), composedof officials from theStraitsExchangeFoun-dation (SEF) and theAssociation for Relations across the Taiwan Straits(ARTS), was formed to promote, oversee and carry out the economicagreement.ItwasdecidedduringtheECC’sfirstmeetinginFebruary2011toestablishsixworkinggroups,includingthoseontradeingoods,tradeinservices, dispute settlement, investment, industrial cooperation and customcooperation,inordertocompleteECFA-relatedfollow-upnegotiations.3

The establishment of an economic cooperation mechanism has impli-cationsnotonly forTaiwanandChinabutalso for the futuredevelopmentof regional economic integration. Given China’s economic significance interms of GDP, trade volume, foreign investment and foreign reserves, andTaiwan’sroleasanimportantforeigninvestorandhightechnologyproducerintheregion,thesigningofECFAindeedhasitsstrategicimportanceintheregion.BothJapanandSouthKoreaexpressedtheirconcernovercompetitionwithTaiwanesemanufacturedproductsintheChinesemarketafterECFAwasinitiated.4Inaddition,thesigningofECFA,thoughastepforwardinregionaleconomicintegration,alsosignifiesastructuralmodificationintheregionalpolitical economy.The regional production network has experienced greatchangessinceChina’semergenceinrecentdecades.SomesmallereconomiesinAsiahavebeendisplacedbyChinafromtheirtraditionalexportmarkets,owingtotheswitchofForeignDirectInvestment(FDI)fromtheseeconomiestoChina.Theyhavethensoughtacloser tradingconnectionwithChinaaswellaswitheachother.5ForChina, itssigningofFTAswithneighbouringcountriesseemstofirmlyconsolidateitscommercialrelationswiththeAsianeconomies.Puttingthecross-Straiteconomicrelationshipwithinthischangingregionalcontext,thispaperarguesthatTaiwanisactuallyfollowingthewavetowardsa“China-centred”regionalization.Theconventional“China-centred”regionalizationconceptwouldbefurthersupportedbythedifferentsortsofFTAbetweenChina,HongKong,MacaoandSoutheastcountries.Thisraisesan important question as to whether this “China-centred” regionalizationwould challenge US influence in the region. In contrast to China, the UShas been less involved in EastAsia’s economic integration process. ThedecreasingweightoftradewiththeUSinTaiwan’sandotherAsiancountries’total foreign trade signifies the more remote relationships between the USandEastAsia.

Theorganizationofthispaperisasfollows.Itbeginswithanoverviewof the cross-Strait economic relations.Although China needed investmentfromTaiwanforitsinitialeconomicgrowth,asthisdivisionoflabouracrosstheStraitbecamemature,TaiwanfounditselfunabletobreakitseconomicconnectionwithChina.TherecentlysignedECFAwilldeepen theexistingproductionnetwork across theStrait andmake the island’s economy more


684 Min-Hua Chiang

dependent on China. Both China and Taiwan’s strategic consideration forECFA will also be discussed. In general, Taiwan enjoys more economicbenefits in the short term but ECFA will be in favour of China’s politicalpurposeinthelongerterm.Finally,thesigningofECFAsymbolizesTaiwan’slegitimateentryintothe“China-centred”regionalizationandfurtherenhancesChina’s gravity within regional economic integration. China’s signing offree trade agreements, including theECFAwithTaiwan,CEPAwithHongKongandMacaoandtheChina-ASEANFTA,signifiesthatfutureeconomicrelationshipswith theseeconomiesare tobeguaranteed.Owing toChina’slarge economic size, potential consumption power and manufacturingcapability, the“China-centred” regionalizationwill surelyposeachallengeto the US. How the US will respond to this China-centred regionalizationis critical to the future development of Taiwan-China relations as well asregionaleconomicintegration.

2.OverviewofCross-StraitEconomicIntegration

Cross-Strait economic contact was initiated even before the Taiwanesegovernment had approved it. China’s figures show that, before 1988, thecumulativeamountrealizedbyTaiwaneseinvestmentsinChinahadalreadyreachedUS$22million.ItthenjumpedrapidlyinoneyeartoUS$160millionin1989.6Duringthattime,Taiwan’soutwardinvestment,whetherinChinaorinSoutheastAsia,wastoplayadefensiveroleinretainingexportmarketsforTaiwanesefirmssincethedomesticinvestmentenvironmentwasworsening.After1990,Taiwanese investment inChinasurged tounprecedented levelsas Taiwan’s investment regulations regarding mainland China began to beprogressivelyloosened.By1993,accordingtoTaiwan’sMinistryofEconomicAffairs(MOEA),thegeographicaldistributionofTaiwaneseinvestmenthadalreadychangedsignificantlyfromSoutheastAsiatoChina.Thegeographicalproximity,similarcultureandlanguageandtheoverseasChineseconnection(guanxi關係)alsoattractedTaiwanese investment tomainlandChina.TheAsianfinancialcrisisin1997promotedanotherrushofTaiwaneseinvestmentinChinawhere the impactof thecrisiswas lessserious.After2000,whileinvestment in otherAsian countries such as in Singapore and Hong Kongcontinuedto increaseslightly, investment inotherSoutheastAsiacountriesdecreased noticeably. However, investment in China still grew swiftly andmassively.From2000to2005,Taiwan’stotalinvestmentinChina(excludingHong Kong) was 12 times larger than the investment in the combinedSoutheastAsia countries (Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,Thailand,andVietnam).

As shown in Figure 1, in 2001, Taiwan’s investment in China wasUS$2,784millionwhichaccountedforaround39percentofTaiwan’stotal



outwardinvestment.Butin2010,Taiwan’sinvestmentinthemainlandwasUS$14,618 million, accounting for 84 per cent of Taiwan’s total outwardinvestment.Although Taiwan began to invest in the mainland later, itsenormousinvestmenthasmadeitpossibleforittocatchupwithotherleadingforeign investors in China in a short time.According to figures from thePRC’sMinistryofCommerce,in2010theisland’sinvestmentwasUS$6.7billion.About6.3percentoftotalFDIinChinawasfromTaiwan,whichalsomade it thesecond largest foreign investor inmainland,onlybehindHongKong(seeTable1).

Inaddition,Taiwan’sinvestmentinChinahastraditionallyconcentratedonthemanufacturingsector.Thelargeamountofmanufacturinginvestmentin China not only constituted the principal Taiwanese investment on themainlandbutTaiwan’soutwardinvestmentinmanufacturingisalmostallinChina.From1991to2010,about86percentofTaiwan’sinvestmentinChinawasinthemanufacturingsectorwhereastheservicesectortook12percentofTaiwan’s total investmenton themainland (seeFigure2).TheMOEA’sfiguresalsoshowthatin2010,90.7percent(US$10.8billion)ofTaiwan’soutwardinvestmentinthemanufacturingsectorwasinChinawhereasonly9.3percent(US$1.1billion)ofTaiwan’smanufacturinginvestmentwasinothercountries.

AmongthedifferentmanufacturingsectorsinvestedinChina,electronic parts and componentsandcomputers, electronic and optical productswere

Figure1Taiwan’sInvestmentinChina,2001-2010

Source:MonthlyReport2010,InvestmentCommission,MOEA,Taiwan.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

16,000

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

%

US$

mill

ion

In Taiwan's total outward investment (%)

Taiwan's investment in China (US$million)


686 Min-Hua Chiang

Table1Top10FDIinChinain2010

Ranking FDIOrigin Amounts(US$billion) As%ofTotalFDI

1 HK 67.5 63.9 2 Taiwan 6.7 6.3 3 Singapore 5.7 5.4 4 Japan 4.2 4.0 5 US 4.1 3.9 6 SouthKorea 2.7 2.6 7 UK 1.6 1.5 8 France 1.2 1.1 9 Holland 1.0 0.9 10 Germany 0.9 0.9

Total 95.6 90.5

Source:MinistryofCommerceofthePRC.

Figure2Taiwan’sInvestmentinChinabyIndustry,1991-2010

Source:MonthlyReport2010,InvestmentCommission,MOEA(inChinese).

0.3% 0.2%

86.1%

12.4%1.1%

Services

Others

Agriculture

Mining&Quarrying

Manufacturing



themain areas invested inbyTaiwanese firms,which tookabout19.6percent and 17.7 per cent of Taiwan’s total manufacturing investment on themainland, followed by electrical equipment (10.4 per cent), fabricated metal products (6.7percent)andplastic products (5.8percent)(seeTable2).This is different from two decades ago when traditional manufacturingsectorsalso tookan importantpartofTaiwan’s total investment inChina.7AnotherfeatureofTaiwan’smanufacturinginvestmentinChinaistheshiftfrom labour-intensive industries led by small- and medium-sized firms tocapital-andtechnology-intensivelargeenterprises.Theincrease in thesizeof each investment project clearly demonstrates this tendency.As Table 3shows,theinvestmentamountsforeachinvestmentwasUS$0.74millionandincreasedtoUS$18.8millionin2010.TheriseinvalueofeachinvestmentprojectsuggeststhatmanylargeTaiwaneseenterpriseswithgreaterfinancialresourcesbegantoinvestinChina.

Table2SectoralDistributionofTaiwan’sManufacturingInvestmentinChinain2010

Sectors % Sectors % Sectors %

Electronicparts 19.6 Basicmetal 3.0 Wearingappareland 1.1andcomponents clothingaccessories

Computers,electronic 17.7 Manufacturingnot 2.8 Medicalgoods 0.8andopticalproducts elsewhereclassified

Electricalequipment 10.4 Textilesmills 2.7 Beverages 0.7

Fabricatedmetal 6.7 Pulp,paperand 2.0 Woodandbamboo 0.4products paperproducts products

Plasticproducts 5.8 Motorvehiclesand 1.9 Furniture 0.5 parts

Machineryequipment 4.9 Chemicalproducts 1.5 Petroleumand 0.3 coalproducts

Chemicalmaterial 4.7 Othertransport 1.5 Printingand 0.3 equipment reproductionof recordedmedia

Non-metallic 4.6 Leather,furand 1.4mineralproducts relatedproducts Total 100

Food 3.1 Rubberproducts 1.4



688 Min-Hua Chiang

TheexpansionofinvestmentinChinadeepenedtheproductionnetworkbetween the two sides and therefore induced Taiwanese exports to China.During the past decade, trade between Taiwan and China has progressedevenmoresignificantly.AsshowninTable4,in2001,accordingtoTaiwan’sofficialfigures,Taiwan’simportsfromChinawasaboutUS$5,904millionandonlyaccountedforabout5.5percentoftheisland’stotalimports.However,itenlarged6timesandaccountedfor14.3percentofTaiwan’stotalimportsin2010.Taiwan’sexportstoChinaalsoincreasedfromUS$4,895.3millionin2001 toUS$76,935million in2010, and about28per cent ofTaiwan’stotalexportsweredesignatedforthemainland.IfexportstoHongKongareincluded,Taiwan’stotalexportstoChinaareover40percentoftheisland’stotalexports.ExportstothemainlandandHongKongtogetheraccountedfor

Table3Taiwan’sManufacturingInvestmentinChinabyCasesandAmounts,1991-2010

Numberof InvestmentAmount AmountsperCase Cases (US$1,000) (US$1,000)

1991 235 173,058 736.41992 262 246,382 940.41993 8,432 2,955,618 350.51994 810 886,492 1,094.41995 409 998,576 2,441.51996 322 1,115,905 3,465.51997 7,756 3,902,660 503.21998 1,124 1,830,689 1,628.71999 422 1,166,098 2,763.32000 692 2,384,246 3,445.42001 879 2,513,959 2,860.02002 2,517 6,077,594 2,414.62003 3,084 6,807,514 2,207.42004 1,284 6,284,971 4,894.82005 901 5,281,921 5,862.32006 774 6,649,291 8,590.82007 652 8,765,998 13,444.82008 401 8,761,185 21,848.32009 404 5,892,078 14,584.42010 576 10,840,822 18,820.9




Tabl

e4

Trad

eR

elat

ions

hips

bet

wee

nTa

iwan

and

Chi

na,2

001-

2010

US$

mill

ion;

%

Ta

iwan

C

hina

Im

ports

from

Chi

na

Expo

rtsto

Chi

na

Impo

rtsfr

omT

aiw

an

Expo

rtsto

Tai

wan

A

mou

nts

As

%o

fTai

wan

’s

Am

ount

sA

s%

ofT

aiw

an’s

A

mou

nts

As

%o

fChi

na’s

A

mou

nts

As

%o

fChi

na’s

tota

lim

ports

tota

lexp

orts

tota

lim

ports

tota

lexp

orts

2001

5,

903.

85.

54,

895.

33.

925

,497

.1

11.3

5,

039.

92.

020

02

7,96

8.3

7.0

10,5

26.7

7.

827

,344

.0

11.2

5,

001.

71.

920

03

11,0

17.5

8.

622

,890

.3

15.2

38

,082

.5

12.9

6,

589.

62.

020

04

16,7

91.5

10

.0

36,3

49.0

19

.9

49,3

64.2

12

.0

9,01

3.8

2.1

2005

20

,093

.1

11.0

43

,643

.3

22.0

64

,759

.6

11.6

13

,547

.8

2.3

2006

24

,782

.3

12.2

51

,808

.2

23.1

74

,655

.1

11.3

16

,558

.7

2.2

2007

28

,014

.1

12.8

62

,416

.4

25.3

87

,140

.6

11.0

20

,739

.5

2.1

2008

31

,390

.5

13.1

66

,883

.0

26.2

10

0,98

5.9

10.6

23

,480

.4

1.9

2009

24

,422

.6

14.0

54

,248

.1

26.6

10

3,32

5.0

9.1

25,8

85.7

1.

820

10

35,9

52.1

14

.3

76,9

35.4

28

.0

85,7

06.0

8.

520

,466

.3

1.7

Not

e:

All

the

abov

efig

ures

do

noti

nclu

deT

aiw

an’s

trad

ew

ithH

ong

Kon

g.

Sour

ce:

The

Bur

eau

ofF

orei

gnT

rade

,MO

EA,T

aiw

an,f

orT

aiw

an’s

trad

ew

ithC

hina

;GTI

-Wor

ldT

rade

Atla

sfo

rC

hina

’str

ade

with

Ta

iwan

.


690 Min-Hua Chiang

about27percentofTaiwan’sGDP.Thehighexports toChinaalsomeantTaiwanmaintaineditstradesurplusandcontributedtoitsenormousforeignexchange reserves. In 2010 for example, Taiwan’s trade surplus vis-à-vis China and Hong Kong was about US$77 billion but Taiwan’s total tradesurpluswasaroundUS$23billion.IftherewerenotradesurpluswithChina,includingHongKong,TaiwanwouldnotbeabletofinanceitsimportsfromJapanandSouthKoreaanditstradebalancewouldbeindeficit.8

The typical pattern of Taiwanese investment in China is to importintermediate and capital goods from Taiwan and export finished goodsto developed countries, mainly the US. Hence, most of Taiwan’s exportsto China were driven by Taiwanese enterprises investing in China forprocurementpurposes.In2010,forexample,around44percentofTaiwan’sexportstoChinawereelectronicmachineryand18percentwasopticalandphotographic related products.9 Meanwhile, as part of China’s total exportvolumes,Taiwaneseenterprisesonthemainlandalsoplayanimportantrole.AccordingtotheTop 200 Exporting Companies in ChinaissuedbythePRC’sMinistryofCommerce, in2009,amongthe top10exportingcompanies inChina,7ofthemwereTaiwanenterprises’childrencompanies.Inparticular,Taiwaneseownedfirms,QuantaComputer,FoxconnandCompal,werethethreeleadingexportingcompaniesinChina.TheselargeTaiwaneseexport-orientedcompaniesareregisteredin thirdplacesandmeanthat theofficialfiguresconcerningTaiwan’sinvestmentinChinaisratherlow.

In brief, cross-Strait relations in trade and investment over the pastdecadesshowanasymmetricdependenceofChinaonTaiwan’sinvestmentinmanufacturingtosupportitsexport-driveneconomicdevelopment.WhatTaiwanhasgainedinreturnistheexpandingeconomiesofscalethatlowerscostsinordertokeeptheirproductscompetitiveintheinternationalmarket.Although China needed investment fromTaiwan initially for its economicgrowth,whenthisdivisionoflabouracrosstheStraitbecamemature,Taiwanfound that it could no longer break its economic connection with China.TaiwanneedsexportstoChinatosustainitseconomicgrowth.Inotherwords,China’s dependence on Taiwan’s investment finally resulted in Taiwan’sreliance on trade with China. The intensified economic integration finallybroughtaboutaninstitutionalizedeconomicrelationship.

3. China: A Political Look from Taiwan Strait to across the Pacific Ocean

TheprincipalmotivationbehindChina’ssigningupofECFAispoliticalandChineseleadershavenothiddentheirwishesforunificationwithTaiwaninseveralpublic speeches. In fact,Beijinghas activelypromotedcross-Straitcommercial expansion as part of an “embedded reunification” strategy



since the leadershipofDengXiaoping鄧小平.10ChineseVice-MinisterofCommerce, Gao Hucheng高虎城, has mentioned that the agreement wasanarrangementmadeunderthepreconditionof“oneChina”andthe“1992consensus”.11InJanuary2011,aChinesegovernmentspokeswomanfurtherstatedthatrelationsbetweenthemainlandandTaiwanwillnotbeimprovedifthe“1992Consensus”isnotobserved.12DuringChina’sNationalPeople’sCongress in March 2011, Premier Wen Jiabao溫家寶 highlighted in agovernmentworkreport thatChina“…willadhere to themajorprinciplesand policies for developing relations between the two sides of theTaiwanStraitsandpromotingthepeacefulreunificationofourmotherlandinthenewsituation”.13Infact,“OneCountry,TwoSystems”hasbeentheprincipalofPRC’spolicytowardsTaiwanandChinahasnotchangedthis.Theminimalamount of economic benefit for China could foster Taiwanese economicdependency and further advance China’s political agenda of unificationwith Taiwan.14Apart from the political intention, economically, ECFAwouldensurethecontinuedinflowofTaiwan’sinvestment,whichhasbeenimportant tosupportChina’sexport-driveneconomyasalreadymentioned.Sincethe1990s,Taiwan’smanufacturinginvestmentinChinahassuccessfullyintegratedthemainlandintotheregionalproductionnetwork.ThefacilitationofTaiwan’s investment to themainlandwill behelpful forChina’s furtherindustrializationanddevelopment.Moreover,Taiwanisasmalleconomywithonlyapopulationof23million.ItsdomesticmarketisnotsoattractiveforChineseentrepreneurs.InducingTaiwan’sfinancialcapitalintothemainlandisthereforemoreessentialthanaskingTaiwantoopenupitsmarket.

Attheregionallevel,ECFAservedasastepforwardinChina’sgrowingeconomicconnectionwiththeregion.AfteritsaccessiontotheWorldTradeOrganization (hereafter WTO) in 2001, China moved quickly to developits free trade tieswithother economies.Themost significantwas itsFTAwithASEANcountries,namelyASEAN+1in2002.In2004,theAgreementonTradeinGoodsoftheChina-ASEANFTAwassignedandenteredintoforce inJuly2005.InJanuary2007, the twopartiessignedtheAgreementonTradeinServices,whichenteredintoeffectinJulyofthesameyear.InAugust2009,thetwopartiessignedtheAgreementonInvestment.UnderthisAgreement,the6originalASEANmembers(Brunei,Indonesia,Malaysia,thePhilippines,SingaporeandThailand)andChinahadtoeliminatetariffson90percentoftheirproductsby2010.Theremainingfourcountries(Cambodia,LaoPDR,MyanmarandVietnam)willfollowsuitby2015.In2003,Chinasignedthe“CloserEconomicPartnershipArrangement”(CEPA)withHongKongandMacaorespectively.AsitoffersabetterdealthanChina’sWTOcommitments,CEPAstrengthenedHongKong’sroleasaplatformfordoingbusinessinChina.SupplementarymeasuresofCEPAweresignedfrom2004to2009.Inaddition,ChinaconcludedFTAswithSingaporeandNewZealand


692 Min-Hua Chiang

in2008.Meanwhile,Chinaisalsolookingforexpandingitseconomictieswith Japan and South Korea viaASEAN+3. Some regard China’s FTAstrategyasanintegralpartofits“peacefulrise”policywhichaimstoescalateChinese influence in the region politically and economically. FTAs withneighbouringcountrieswouldnotonlyeasethe“Chinathreat”concernsbutalsosafeguardforeignrawmaterialimports.15

Infact,marketforceshavesincealongtimebeenintheleadingpositiontodirectEastAsia’seconomicintegrationandChina’sincreasingFTAshavealsobeensupportedby itsgrowingeconomicandcommercial tieswith itsneighbouring countries. China has already replaced the US to become thelargestexportdestinationforASEAN,Taiwan,HongKong,JapanandSouthKorea.At the same time,China also seeks the expansionof its exports toneighbouringcountries.Chineseleadershopethat,withcontinuedprogressin FTA, Chinese products can penetrate into more countries and thereforeminimizetheimpactofdependenceonWesternmarkets.16Especiallyaftertheglobalfinancialcrisisin2008,theslowdownofWesterncountries’demandmademanyAsiancountriesrealizetheimportanceofexportdiversification.Comparedwith theUS’sexports,China’sexports to Japan,Taiwan,SouthKorea,HongKongandASEANweregreaterintermsofabsoluteamount.

From1991topresent,Chinahaskeptanannualeconomicgrowthrateabove8percent.Whentheglobalfinancialcrisisdamagedmanyeconomiesaroundtheworld,China’seconomy,althoughitwasalsohitbythedeclineofglobaldemand,stoodrelativelyfirm.17Since2010,China’seconomyhassurpassedJapanastheworld’ssecondlargestintermsofGDP,onlybehindtheUS.18 In termsof tradeand investment,Chinahasbeensignificantnotonlyattheregionallevelbutalsointheworld.Itwasalsooneofthemostattractiveinvestmentdestinationsintheworld.In2009,WTO’sfiguresshowsthatChinawasthelargestexporterandsecondlargestimporterintheworld,onlybehind theUS,unless theEuropeanUnion is treatedasa singleunit.Owing to its large exports, China has the world’s largest current accountsurplusandownsathirdofworld’scurrencyreserves.

Evenwithoutmassiveoutwardinvestmentinothercountries,thusfurtherestablishingaregionalproductionnetwork–justasJapanhaddonesobeforeit – China, with its huge economic size and recent progress in FTAs withmajor economies in EastAsia, has also strengthened its significant role inconnecting the regional economies. By contrast, the US’s role in regionaleconomic integration has diminished to some extent. China’s deepeningeconomicengagementwithAsianeconomies,togetherwithitshugeeconomicsize, population and influence in world affairs, signifies that China willinevitablyplayadominatingroleintheregionalpoliticaleconomy.China’srisingeconomicdominanceintheregionisalsoposingachallengetotheUSpresenceinEastAsia.



4.Taiwan:StandingwiththeGianttowardstheChina-CenteredRegionalization

IncontrasttoChina’sincreasingeconomicopennesstoTaiwanoverthelastdecade,theTaiwanesegovernmentshowedmorehesitationinopeningupitseconomytoChina.However,theuncontrollablerisingeconomicinterchangesforced Taiwan’s government to legalize the economic relationship withChina.19SeeingtheunavoidablerisingeconomicinteractionacrosstheStrait,the establishmentof amore formerly legalizedeconomic relationshipwithChinabecameurgentforTaiwan.DifferentfromChina,Taiwan’swillingnessto sign ECFA with China was therefore not to promote the cross-Straiteconomic relationship. But rather, it was more a passive reaction by thegovernmenttotheuncontrollableever-closerrelationshipwiththemainland.

Ma’sadministrationtookECFAasbeingcomparabletoanFTAandasameanstopromotetheisland’seconomicgrowth.Ononehand,Taiwanhasbeenexcludedfromthegrowingfreetradeagreementsinrecentyearsbecauseof China’s pressure. Prior to ECFA, Taiwan had only signed FTAs with afewcountriesinCentralandSouthAmerica(Panama,Honduras,Guatemala,NicaraguaandSalvador)whichaccountedforasmallproportionofTaiwan’sexternal trade. This worried the government, especially when the FTAbetweenChinaandASEANtookeffecton1January2011.ASEAN’sfurthertrade negotiations with China, Japan and South Korea to formASEAN+3is believed by the government to further diminish Taiwan’s economicsignificance in the region.As a result, the threat of marginalization in theregionpushedTaiwan’sgovernment aswell asTaiwanese entrepreneurs topursueaneconomicagreementwithChina,Taiwan’smostimportanttradingpartner. On the other hand, a sustained economic prosperity subsequent tothedeepenedeconomicrelationshipbetweenTaiwanandChinamayhelptheKMTtoretainthePresidencyin2012.AlthoughTaiwan’seconomicsuccessin the past might not have been directly linked to the KMT’s economicpolicy,20theDemocraticProgressiveParty(DPP)’sinabilitytofurtheradvancetheisland’seconomicdevelopmentduringChen’spresidency,anditsfailuretoprovideacrediblealternativetotheECFA,providetheKMTmuchroominpromotingECFA.

AccordingtotheTaiwanesegovernment’sestimates,economically,ECFAwouldraiseTaiwan’seconomicgrowthratebetween1.65percentand1.72per cent and increase total employment by about 2.5~2.6 per cent, that is,approximately26,000newjobswillbecreatedafterECFAtakeseffect.21Withjust over 1.3 billionpopulation, China’s domestic market is not only hugebutalsorapidlygrowing.Manyforeigninvestorsfounditdifficulttoenter.Taiwan,with itssimilar linguisticandculturalbackground, itscloserandalegalizedeconomicrelationshipwithChina,islikelytocatchtheattentionofforeigninvestorswhowillwant tocooperatewithTaiwaneseentrepreneurs


694 Min-Hua Chiang

intheChinesemarketorsettingupR&Dcentresontheisland.AsChina’seconomyisexpectedtobeprosperousinthefollowingyears,Taiwan,duetoitsgeographicproximitywithChina,anditsstrongconnectionwithmainland,hasthepotentialtobecomealogisticscentreintheregion.

Nonetheless, as China is still not an essential export market for finalgoods, Taiwan’s dependence on the mainland for its export-led economicgrowthhasitslimits.In2009,forexample,theexportofgoodsandservicescontributed to60.5percentofTaiwan’seconomicgrowth rate.22AlthoughChina isTaiwan’s largestexportdestination,Taiwan’sexports toChinaarebasedon theirproductionnetwork. In2010,about50percentofTaiwan’sexportstoChinawereelectricalmachineryandopticalinstruments.EuropeanUnioncountriesandtheUnitedStatesarethemainexportmarketforChina.In2010,thesetwomarketsaccountedfor38percentofChina’stotalexports.Most of the exports from China to the US and EU are final goods. TheincreaseordecreaseofChina’simportsfromTaiwanisthereforedependantontheEUandUSdemandforfinalgoods.

Although it seems that ECFA would enable Taiwan to gain moreeconomic benefits than China gets from Taiwan, Taiwan’s position at thenegotiating table with China will weaken in the future.The reason is thatthe release of economic privileges from China will mean that the island’seconomy will increasingly depend on the mainland rather than vice versa.ThestrongeconomiclinkwithChinasignifiesapowerfulimpactonasmalleconomy such as Taiwan’s, if there are any changes to China’s economy,includingChina’seconomicpolicieschangesandeconomicfluctuationcausedbyglobalfinancialturmoilorbusinesscycles.

Comparing Taiwan and China’s main trading partners (see Table 5),Taiwan was China’s 5th importer and China was Taiwan’s largest exportdestinationin2010.However,mostoftheimportsfromTaiwanareindustrialgoodswhicharehighlysubstitutablebyother industrialgoodsfromJapan,SouthKoreaandsomeASEANcountries.ThisiswhyECFAmadeJapaneseandKoreanmanufacturersfeelthreatenedasahighpercentageofKoreanandaconsiderableshareof Japaneseexports toChinaoverlapwith those fromTaiwan.Therefore,ifthereisanydisagreementbetweenTaiwanandChina,ChinacanswitchitsimportsourcesfromTaiwantoJapanandSouthKorea.ItwouldbedifficultforTaiwantofindasubstitutemarketforitsexportofsemi-industrialgoods,originallydesignated formanufacturing firms inChina intheshortterm.Meanwhile,contrarytothemainland’shugedomesticmarket,TaiwanisnotakeyexportmarketforChina.In2010,TaiwanwasChina’s11thlargestexportmarket.China’sexportstoTaiwanonlyaccountedforlessthan2percentofChina’stotalexports.TheopeningupofTaiwan’smarkettoChinaisthusnotreallyessentialforChinabutTaiwaneseimportsfromChinaareimportant.ChinawasTaiwan’ssecondlargestimportsource.In2010,14.2



percentofTaiwan’stotalimportwasfromChina.Inbrief,TaiwandependsonChinaforexportsmuchmorethanChinadependsonTaiwan.ECFApromotesthetradebetweenthetwosidesandatthesametimedeepensTaiwan’stradedependenceonthemainland.

Moreover, the Taiwanese government’s expectation that China willallowTaiwan’snegotiationofFTAswithother countries isdoubtful.Eventhough the cross-Strait relationship has much improved in recent years,Taiwan’s“appearance”ontheglobalstageisstillasensitiveissueforChineseleaders.SoonafterTaiwansignedECFAwithChina,bothSingaporeandthePhilippinesexpressed their interests innegotiatingFTAwithTaiwan.23ButtheChinesegovernmentcontinuedtoobjecttoforeigncountriessigningfreetradeagreementswiththeisland.Furthermore, theUSarmsalestoTaiwanandtheuncertaintyofTaiwan’spoliticalclimateafterthe2012presidentialelectionwillalsomakecontinuousprogressofECFAandTaiwan’sFTAwithothercountriesuncertain.

5.ConcludingRemarks

Cross-Strait relations in trade and investment over the past decades haveshown an asymmetric dependence of China on Taiwan’s investment inmanufacturing to support its export-driven economic development. WhatTaiwan has in return are expanding economies of scale that lowers costsinorder tomaintainthecompetitivenessof itsproducts in theinternationalmarket.Although China initially needed investment from Taiwan for its

Table5TaiwanandChina’sMainTradingPartnersin2010(percentage)

China Taiwan

MainImport MainExport MainImport MainExport Sources Destination Sources Destination

1 Japan(12.7) EU27(19.7) Japan(20.8) China(27.8)

2 EU27(12.1) US(17.9) China(14.2) ASEAN10(15.4)

3 ASEAN10(11.1) HK(13.8) ASEAN10(11.5) HK(13.1)

4 SouthKorea(9.9) ASEAN10(8.8) US(10.0) US(11.6)

5 Taiwan(8.3) Japan(7.6) EU27(8.4) EU27(10.4)

6 US(7.3) SouthKorea(4.4) SouthKorea(6.4) Japan(6.5)

Total 61.4 72.2 71.4 84.8

Source:GTI-WorldTradeAtlas.


696 Min-Hua Chiang

economic growth, when this division of labour across the Strait becamemature,Taiwanfoundthatitcouldnolongerbreakitseconomicconnectionwith China. In other words, China’s dependence on Taiwan’s investmentfinallyresultedinTaiwan’srelianceontradewithChina.

ContrarytotheconventionalthinkingthatChina’ssigningofECFAisforpoliticalpurposeandTaiwanhasmoreeconomicconcerns,thispapershowsChina’s economic consideration and Taiwan’s political reason. Politically,ECFAservesChina’sreunificationpurposewithTaiwanandthecurrentrulingpartyKMTwouldalsobenefitfromittowinthepresidentialelectionin2012.Fromaneconomicperspective,ECFAwouldensurethecontinuedinvestmentfrom Taiwan to China, which is an essential element for China’s furtherindustrial upgrading.As Taiwan’s domestic market is limited, the openingupofTaiwan’smarketisnotimportantforChina.Inthelongterm,aclosereconomicrelationshipwouldhavemorepotentialimpactonTaiwanthanonChina,due to theirdifferenteconomicsizes.Taiwan’spoliticalsovereigntywill also be undermined. In addition, the signing of ECFA symbolizesTaiwan’slegitimateentryintothe“China-centredregionalization”processandfurtherenhancesChina’sgravityintheregionaleconomicintegration

ECFAwouldallowTaiwan togoastepcloser toChina,economicallyandthenpolitically,whichalsomeansastepawayfromtheUnitedStates.But contrary to the resistance to deepening the relations with China byTaiwan’soppositionparty,theObamaadministrationintheUShasgenerallywelcomed the economic engagement between the two sides as it will behelpfulinreducingthetensionintheTaiwanStraitandbenefittheregion’sstability.AmericanofficialsnotonlyrespondedpositivelytothesigningofECFAbutevencalled for furtherexchangesbetweenTaiwanandChina.24Prior to theconclusionofECFA,Washingtonreconfirmeditscommitmenttoaone-Chinapolicybasedon the threeUS-Chinacommuniquésand theTaiwanRelationsAct.25

In fact,America’s response on ECFA was not surprising. The US haslong been excluded from the regional economic integration. In contrast toChina,whichhas signedFTAsor quasi-FTAswith themain economies inEastAsiainrecentyears,theUShasonlysignedanFTAwithSingaporein2004.Theonly regional free tradeagreementnegotiation that involved theUSwastheFreeTradeAreaoftheAsiaPacific(FTAAP).In2009,PresidentObama announced the US’s intention to enter into negotiations for a freetrade agreement withAsia-Pacific, known as theTrans-Pacific Partnership(TPP)Agreement,withtheobjectiveofshapingahigh-standard,broad-basedregionalpact.TheUShasdemonstrateditsdesiretoincreaseitsengagementinAsiabyenteringintotheTPPtalksbutitisstillprematuretoassumethatTPP can be successfully negotiated.26 In addition, the current members innegotiationoverTPPwiththeUS(Brunei,Chile,NewZealand,Singapore,



Australia, Malaysia, Peru, United States, and Vietnam) are not importanttradingpartnersforAmerica.ThepotentialeconomicbenefitsarethereforenotsignificantandthefinalapprovaloftheTPPbytheUSCongressisuncertain.The “high quality” issue in TPP, such as agriculture, intellectual propertyprotection,services,labourandtheenvironment,arealsopossibletobarrierstosomeardentfreetraders.

EventhoughitseemsthatChinaengagesmoreinEastAsia’seconomicintegrationthantheUS,theincreasingtradebetweenChinaandtherestoftheregiondidnotdiverttradefromAmerica.TheUSandEuropeanUnioncountriesstillactasthemajordestinationoffinalproductsforChina.In2010,EUandtheUSwereChina’stwolargestexportdestinations,andaccountedfor 19.7 per cent and 17.9 per cent of China’s total exports respectively.China’seconomicopeninguphasenlargedtheoriginalregionalproductionnetwork but it has not changed the US-Asia commercial relationship.TheoriginalUS-AsiasupplyanddemandrelationshipthatcausedtheAmericantradedeficitstillremainsthesame.TheonlythingthathaschangedisthatthetradedeficitwithJapanandtheNIEshasbeenreplacedwithatradedeficitwithChina.

The trade agreements with Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, andASEANmay not only strengthen China’s existing trade relationship with thembut also amplify China’s importance in the regional trading bloc. SinceChina’seconomicforceisbasedonforeigninvestmentwithexport-orientedproduction, the “China-led” regionalization is therefore vulnerable to theexternal environment. Therefore, in the short term, the trade agreementsprivilege small economies by consolidating their connection with China.ChinaisunabletochallengeUSdominanceatthismoment.However,inthelongterm,itishighlypossiblethata“China-led”Asiawillbeonthecollisioncoursewith theUS-ledWest forglobaleconomic leadership.Howwill theUSrespondtoChina’scurrentrisingdominanceintheregionaleconomyiscriticalforthefuturedevelopmentofeconomicintegrationinEastAsiaandglobaleconomicstability.

Notes

* DrMin-HuaChiang江敏華isVisitingResearchFellowatEastAsianInstitute,NationalUniversityofSingapore.ShewasawardedadoctorateinInternationalPoliticalEconomywithdistinction(Trèshonorableavecfélicitations)fromtheUniversitéPierre-Mendès-France inGrenoble,France in2008.Before joiningEAI, she was involved in the research project “The Current Situation in theSouthChinaSeaRegionandTaiwan’sNewStrategicThinking”attheInstituteofInternationalRelations,ChengchiUniversity.ShethenjoinedtheTaiwanExternalTradeDevelopmentCouncilwhereshewasresponsibleforIndonesianmarketresearch.ShewaslaterinvolvedinTaiwanandglobalservicesectors’research


698 Min-Hua Chiang

when she was at the Commerce Development Research Institute. Her currentresearchinterestsincludeeconomicintegrationbetweentheUSandEast-Asia,Taiwan’seconomicdevelopment,globalimbalanceandUShegemony.<Email: [email protected]>

1. That political agreement is: There is one China and Taiwan is part of Chinaandbothsidescanexpresstheirdifferentmeaningon“OneChina”,whetheritisoneChinaunderKMTorCPCleadership.This isalsoreferredtoas“1992Consensus”asitisclaimedtoresultfrompoliticaldiscussionsbetweenthetwosides(Taiwan-basedStraitExchangeFoundationandChina-basedAssociationforRelationsacrosstheTaiwanStrait)inHongKongin1992.However,somepro-TaiwanindependencepoliticiansopposethisprincipalandarguethattherewasnosuchpoliticalagreementbetweenTaiwanandChinain1992.

2. Inthefinancialsector,TaiwanesebanksareallowedtoconductRenminbi(theChinese currency, hereafter RMB) business on the mainland after 2 years ofbusinessoperationinChina,whichissuperiortotheWTOtreatment(requiring3yearsofoperationand2yearsofprofits).Inthenon-financialservicessectorslisted in the early harvest programme, except for professional services andaccounting,auditingservices,whichareequaltoWTOtreatment,theotheronesaresuperiortotheWTOtreatment.Taiwaneseservicessupplierswillbeallowedtosetupwholly-ownedenterprisesinChina.The9servicesitemsTaiwanopenstoChinaarebasicallyequivalenttothosethatChinahasagreedtoopen,exceptforconventionandcommunicationservices.

3. “FirstCross-Straitco-opcommitteemeetsinTaiwan”,China Daily,22February2011,<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-02/22/content_12060834.htm>(accessed5May2011).

4. However,JapanandKorea’sreactionregardingECFAwasdifferent.Japanesebusinesses took Taiwan as a short-cut to successfully enter into ChinesemarketafterECFAwasputintopracticewhileKoreanentrepreneursurgeditsgovernmenttosignatradeagreementwithChina.“TaiwanchallengestoKorea,Japan”, Asia Times online <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/LG22Cb01.html>(accessed29March2011).

5. Emerging Asian Regionalism: A Partnership for Shared Prosperity,AsianDevelopmentBank,December2008,pp.58-66.

6. ThefiguresareselectedfromTaiwanAffairsOfficeofStateCouncil,PRC.7. In1991,foodandbeverageprocessingaccountedfor15.8percentofTaiwan’s

total manufacturing investment in China while 18.4 per cent was in plasticproducts,22percentwasintextiles,gourmetandfootwearand25.8percentwasinelectronicandelectricalappliances.SeeMin-HuaChiang(2010),Taiwan in the Web of US Hegemony 1949-2005,VDMPublishingHouseLtd.,Saarbrücke,Germany,p.195.

8. JapanandSouthKoreaareTaiwan’stwomajortradedeficitssources.In2010,TaiwanhadUS$33.9billion tradedeficitwithJapanandUS$5.4billion tradedeficitwithSouthKorea.

9. FigurescalculatedfromGTI-WorldTradeAtlas.10.ChristopherM.Dent,“TaiwanandtheNewRegionalPoliticalEconomyofEast

Asia”,The China Quarterly,No.182,June2005,p.400.



11. Li Ching-Lieh, “ECFA must guarantee free-trade agreements”, Taipei Times,12 August 2010 <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/ 2010/08/12/2003480148>(accessed5May2011).

12. “Chinese spokeswoman stress importance of 1992 Consensus to improvingCross-Strait relations”, Spokesperson’s remarks, TaiwanAffairs Office of theState Council PRC, 12 January 2011 <http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Spokes personRemarks/201103/t20110316_1788627.htm>(accessed4May2011).

13. “Report on theWork of the Government”, delivered at the Fourth Session ofthe Eleventh National People’s Congress, 5 March 2011 <http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/2011NPCWorkReportEng.pdf>(accessed4May2011).

14.2010 Report to Congress of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission,November2010,U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice,pp.145-146.

15.PashaL.Hsieh,“TheChina-TaiwanECFA,GeopoliticalDimensionsandWTOLaw”,Journal of International Economic Law,Vol.14,No.1,p.132.

16.ChinaFTANetwork.17. In 2009, the economic growth rate was -3.9 per cent in EuroArea, -5.4 per

centinJapan,-2.5percentintheUSand-2.2percentindevelopingcountries,excludingChinaandIndia.China’seconomicgrowthratewas9.2percent.TheWorld Bank, Global Economic Prospect: Crisis, Finance and Growth, 2010,Washington,p.3;IMF,WorldEconomicOutlookDatabase,April2011.

18. In2010,China’sGDPwasvaluedUS$5.87trillion,USwasUS$14.67trillionand Japan’s was US$ 5.46 trillion. IMF, World Economic Outlook Database,April2011.

19.AsChinaisbecomingmoreopentotheglobaleconomy,China’sFDIpromotionpolicy and the opening up of the US market to China’s products are morepowerful than theTaiwangovernment’sunilateral restrictionson tradingwithandinvestinginthemainland.Asaresult,theTaiwanesegovernmentcouldonlyopenitseconomicdoortoChinasubsequenttothisunavoidableclosereconomicrelationshipwithChina.

20. Generally, Taiwan’s development can be characterized by three principalinfluences. The first is the considerable contribution of private enterprises totheeconomicboom.Thesecondinfluenceistheappropriatestatepolicy.Thosescholarswhoemphasizedthestatearguedthattheexploitationofcomparativeadvantage in Taiwan as well as in other Newly Industrializing Countries(hereafter NIC) was through the governments’ industrial planning. From thestatistviewpoint,astronggovernmentwasthekeytorapidgrowthasthestate’sautonomouspowerfacilitatesthenationalgrowthstrategyandpreventspolicydistortionduetooppositionfromdomesticinterestgroups.Thirdly,somearguethattheinternationaleconomicenvironmentplayedanevenmoreimportantroleinshapingTaiwan’seconomictransformation.Externalinfluences,includingtheJapanesecoloniallegacy,USaidattheinitialstageofpost-wardevelopmentandsubsequenteconomicdependenceontheUSandJapan,areallindispensabletoTaiwan’seconomicsuccess.

21.Ministry of EconomicAffairs, Taiwan <http://www.ecfa.org.tw/index.aspx>(accessed2April2011).


700 Min-Hua Chiang

22.Taiwan Statistical Data Book 2010,CEPD,Taiwan,Table3-9b,p.66.23. “Philippines,SingaporeFTAs to followECFA”,The China Post<http://www.

chinapost.com.tw/business/asia/asian-market/2010/05/21/257419/Philippines-Singapore.htm>(accessed30March2010).

24. “USPraisesECFA,WantsMoreDialogueacrossTaiwanStrait”,China Times,15January2011<http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?cid=1101&MainCatID=&id=20110115000088>(accessed3April2011).

25. “President Ma pleased with US praise for ECFA accord”, The China Post,21 January 2011 <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/foreign-affairs/2011/ 01/21/288462/President-Ma.htm>(accessed27April2011)

26.RussellSmith,“Trans-PacificPartnership:ACurrentPolicyAssessment”<http://www.safehaven.com/article/20085/trans-pacific-partnership-a-current-policy-assessment>(accessed5May2011).

ReferencesAsianDevelopmentBank (2008),Emerging Asian Regionalism: A Partnership for

Shared Prosperity,December.BreslinS.(2004),“GreaterChinaandthePoliticalEconomyofRegionalisation”,East

Asia,Vol.21,No.1,Spring,pp.7-23.Chang,T.(2004),“WhyisEconomicIntegrationUnlikelyinGreaterChina?”,paper

presented at theAnnual Meeting of the Midwest Political ScienceAssociation,PalmerHouseHilton,Chicago,Illinois,April15.

Chiang,Min-Hua(2010),Taiwan in the Web of US Hegemony 1949-2005,Saarbrücke,Germany:VDMPublishingHouseLtd.

Crane,G.T.(1993),“ChinaandTaiwan:NotYetGreaterChina”,International Affairs,Vol.69,No.4,October,pp.705-723.

Deng,P.(2000),“Taiwan‘sRestrictionofInvestmentinChinainthe1990s”,Asian Survey,Vol.XL,No.6,November/December,pp.958-980.

Dent,ChristopherM.(2005),“TaiwanandtheNewRegionalPoliticalEconomyofEastAsia”,The China Quarterly,No.182,June,pp.385-406.

Fukasaku,K.(1992),“EconomicRegionalisationandIntra-IndustryTrade:Pacific-Asian Perspectives”, OECD Development Centre, Working Paper, No. 53,February,pp.1-58.

Hsieh,PashaL.(2011),“TheChina-TaiwanECFA,GeopoliticalDimensionsandWTOLaw”,Journal of International Economic Law,Vol.14,No.1,pp.121-156.

Ikenberry, G.J. (2004), “American Hegemony and EastAsia Order”, Australian Journal of International Affairs,Vol.58,No.3,September,pp.353-367.


Book Review 701InternationalJournalofChinaStudiesVol.2,No.3,December2011,pp.701-705

BookReview

IanStorey,Southeast Asia and the Rise of China: The Search for Security,LondonandNewYork:Routledge,2011,362pp.+xv.

One of the key issues occupying the attention of scholars of InternationalRelations andAsian Security in the 21st century is the astounding rise ofChina as a great power.Against this backdrop, there have been numerousstudiesfocusingonthesources,manifestationsandconsequencesofChinesegrowing power in the international system. Many of these studies havesoughttoexaminetheperceptionsandresponsesofotherstates–particularlythesmallercountriesalongChina’speriphery–vis-à-visBeijing’sgrowingeconomicandmilitarymight.GivenSoutheastAsia’sgeographicalproximityaswell as its closehistorical and socioeconomic tieswith theAsiangiant,itisnotsurprisingthatalargenumberofarticlesandbookshavechosentofocusonthemembercountriesoftheAssociationofSoutheastAsianNations(ASEAN), attempting to address how and why these smaller states havereactedtoChina’sgrowingpowerthewaytheyhave.

The book under review, which is about China’s evolving relationshipswith eleven SoutheastAsian states (the tenASEAN countries and EastTimor)since1949,isthelatestandawelcomeadditiontotheexistingbodyof literatures.Ashighlightedby its subtitle, thebook focusesprimarilyonthe security dimension of SoutheastAsia-China relations, although it alsocovers the political and economic interactions between the two sides.Theauthorjustifieshisfocusbynotingthat“thesecurityimplicationsofChina’srisingpowerhasbeenaconstantpreoccupationforthecountriesofSoutheastAsia.”(p.2)

Storey’s book makes important contributions to the scholarship onSoutheastAsia-China relations andAsian security, in at least three majorareas.

First,thiswell-researchedbookprovidesacomprehensiveandsystematicanalysisofthedevelopmentofSino-SoutheastAsianrelationsasaninstanceofasymmetricpowerrelationsinthecontemporaryinterstatesystem.Whilethere is no shortage of work on this phenomenon, few have approachedthe subject as thorough and as painstakingly as Storey did in this volume(exceptions include Bronson Percival’s 2007 The Dragon Looks South).Storey’sbook is comprehensivenotonly in termsof its scope (security aswellaspoliticalandeconomicinteractions,asnoted),butalsointermsoftime


702 Kuik Cheng-Chwee

span(bothColdWarandpost-ColdWarperiods)andgeographicalspread(all11SoutheastAsianstates).

It is systematic in its analysis and presentation. In trying to scrutinizethe dynamics of Sino-SoutheastAsian relations in an orderly manner, theauthorhaschosentofirstly, tracetheevolutionof theasymmetricrelationsattheregionallevel(thefocusofPartI),beforemovingontoanalyzingtherespective bilateral ties between China and each of the 11 smaller states(Parts II and III). The first part, which consists of three chapters, offersa chronological overview of the development of China-SoutheastAsianrelations since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)in October 1949 until October 2010.The chapters show how the relationshavebeentransformedfromoneplaguedbymutualaversionduringmuchoftheColdWarperiodchieflyduetoideologicaldifferencesandthe“overseasChinese” problem (Chapter 1), to one characterized by “engagement andhedging”inthe1990s(Chapter2)and“charmoffensive”inthefirstdecadeof the 21st century (Chapter 3). In these pages, Storey systematicallyanalyzeshowChina’scarefullycalculatedmovesalongwithSoutheastAsianstates’responsesandreappraisalinthelightofaseriesof“gamechanging”processes since the early 1990s – such as the end of the Cold War, theAsian financial crisis of 1997-1998, the growing intra-regional trade, theproliferationofmultilateralinstitutionsintheAsia-Pacific,andtheperceivedUS’preoccupationwithits“waronterror”post-September11–haveledtothe transformation and institutionalization of relations between China andASEANasaregionalgroupingoverthepasttwodecades.TowardstheendofPartI,theauthorprovidesabriefanalysisonhowthefrictionintheSouthChinaSeasince2007hasaffectedtherelations.

Thediscussionontheseregionaldynamicsoffersusefulmacroinsightsto better analyze the bilateral interactions between China and the smallerSoutheastAsiancountries,whicharethefocusofPartsIIandIIIofthebook.The secondpart consistsof fivechapters (Chapters4-8),whichdetails thePRC’srelationswitheachofthefivemainlandSoutheastAsianstates,namely,Vietnam, Thailand, Burma/Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia. The third part(Chapters9-14)completesthecirclebylookingintoChina’stieswitheachofthesixmaritimeSoutheastAsiancountriesofIndonesia,Malaysia,Singapore,thePhilippines,Brunei,andEastTimor.

Thisbringsus to thesecondcontributionofStorey’sbook.That is,byfocusingonbilateralismandbydevoting a chapter-length analysis to eachof the bilateral ties, the book helps to fill a gap in the exiting literatures,which,byandlarge,havetendedtostudySino-SoutheastAsianrelationsonaregional-orASEAN-widebasis.Whiletheregionalapproachhasthevirtueofunderscoringcertaincommoncharacteristicsandoverarchingconcernssharedbymostorallofthesmallerstates,itnonethelesshasitsownlimitations.For


Book Review 703

instance,itmayleavetheincorrectimpressionthatthereisa“common”or“united”policyamongtheSoutheastAsianstatesvis-à-visChina.Itmayalsoobscure thenuancedapproachesandperceptionsheldby thesmallerstatestowardtherisingpower.

Incontrast,focusingoneachofthebilateralinteractionsbetweenChinaandindividualSoutheastAsianstates–anapproachadoptedbyStorey–notonly allows a more refined way of highlighting the distinctive patterns ofeachofthebilateralties(ranging,forinstance,fromcyclicaltensions,specialrelationstoinstrumentaldeference),butitalsoenablesthetaskofcomparingthe similarities and differences across the smaller states’ policies towardcertain aspects of Sino-SoutheastAsian ties in a sharper manner. Storeyhimselfhasobservedthat,despitethegrowthofmultilateralismintheAsia-Pacific,“bilateralinteractionhasbeenthemostimportantfacetofinter-staterelations.”(p.1)

The author’s detailed and fascinating analyses in each of the country-based chapters duly highlight how different SoutheastAsian states hadperceivedandreactedtosomeissuesinsubtlydifferentways.Theseinclude:thelegaciesoftheirhistoricaltieswithChina,thegeopoliticalmeaningsofanincreasinglymightyPRC,theimpactofChina’seconomicrise,thepreferredapproachto“manage”thegiant-next-door,aswellastheroleofbalanceofpower and regional multilateral institutions.Although the author may nothavedealtwitheachoftheseissuesineachofthecountrychapters,hisfocusonbilateraldynamicshasprovidedvaluableinsightsastohowandwhythesmallerstateshavecometocopewiththeirgiantnorthernneighbourthewaytheyhave.

Thethirdcontributionofthebookisthat,ithasunequivocallyidentifiedarangeofkeycausalfactorsshapingthesmallerstates’policiestowardtherisingpower.Theauthoridentifieshisexplanatoryvariablesattheoutsetbystating that:“Inexaminingstate responses to thePRC,account is takenofexternalstimuliaswellastheinfluenceofdomesticpoliticalandeconomicfactors.” (p. 2) Throughout the country chapters in the book, the authorhighlightsandanalyzeshowavarietyofexternalanddomesticfactorshavedriven the SoutheastAsian states’ policies. In his final analysis, Storey, aSeniorFellowattheInstituteofSoutheastAsianStudies(ISEAS),concludesthat “each of the 11 countries took a different path in their relations withChina”, because of “an eclectic mix of elite perceptions, state ideology,geography,securityconcerns,economicaspirationsandresponsestochangesinthegeographicalenvironment.”(p.286)

Future studies could build on Storey’s work to further explore – oncomparative basis – how external and internal factors have interacted toshape the individual SoutheastAsian countries’ perceptions of China,their prioritizations of “national” interests and policy instruments, and



their eventual decisions vis-à-vis Beijing. Comparing the differences andsimilaritiesacrossthestates’responseswillhighlightarangeofthemesthatare of crucial policy importance. They are, inter alia, the smaller states’relativeperceptivityaboutChina’scharmdiplomacyandeconomicstatecraft,theirrespectiveviewsontheefficacyofengagementpolicy,theirindividualstanceabouttheinstrumentalityofUSpresence,theirpreferredapproachtomanagetheSpratlysdisputes,etc.Theseareallcrucialpolicyquestionsforanalystsandpolicymakers,not leastbecauseof therecentdevelopments intheSouthChinaSea.TheconvergenceanddivergenceoftheSoutheastAsianstates’viewsontheseissueswillnotonlyaffectthestates’respectiverelationswith themajorpowers, theywill alsohave importantbearingson regionalinstitutionalbuildingandregionalorder.

My main disagreement with the book is its conceptualization andoperationalization of the term “hedging”.As a matter of fact, Storey isprobablyoneoftheearliesttousethetermtodescribeSoutheastAsianstates’strategic responses toward China, along with C.P. Chung (2002 & 2004),butbeforeEvelynGoh(2005&2006),C.C.Kuik(2008&2010),andJohnCiorciari(2009).InachapteranalyzingSingapore’sChinapolicyinabooktitledThe China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality (co-editedbyhimandHerbertYee),Storey(2002:219)describestheASEANstates’responsesas“ahedgingpolicy”thatis“designedtomaintainthebalanceofpowerintheAsia-PacificregionandprovidealimiteddeterrenceagainstthePRC.”Inthepresentbook,Storeydeploystheterminvariousplaces.Forinstance,onpage2,herefershedgingaspoliciesthatareaimedat“safeguardingagainstamoreassertiveorevenaggressiveChina”.Elsewhere,onpage47,heusesthe termas “aprudentmeasureof strategic insurance shouldChina fail torespondpositivelytoSoutheastAsiaovertures”.Onpage30,hewritesthat“inanuncertainstrategicenvironment, theUnitedStates’militarypresenceunderpinsregionalstabilitybyactingasacounterweight toa risingChina.Byhedging,theASEANstatescouldkeeptheirstrategicoptionsopenagainstthe possibility of a future security threat from the PRC.”Along the sameline,henotesthatthestates“hedgedbyactivelysupportingacontinuedU.S.militarypresenceand,insomecases,strengthenedtheirairandnavalforces.”(p.62)

These conceptions and operationalizations of hedging are correct butincomplete, for four reasons: (i) the conceptions did not fully reflect thetwo-pronged nature of the behaviour – hedging is not a single-directionalact of safeguarding against certain dangers, but an act that entails twosets of opposite and counteractive approaches aimed at minimizing allperceived risks while simultaneously still trying to maximize all possiblebenefits;(ii)theconceptionsdidnotspecifyhowhedgingisdistinguishablefromandrelatedtootherformsofstatestrategies,suchas“balancing”and


Book Review 705

“bandwagoning”asdiscussedonpage47–ishedging“partially-balancing”,“partially-bandwagoning”, and/or somewhere in between the full-fledgedversionofthetwostrategies?(iii)intermsofoperationalization,onecanarguethatthe goalsofthesmallerstates’hedgingbehaviourarenotnecessarilyjusttosafeguardagainsttheriskofanaggressiveChina,butrathertosafeguardagainstmultiple and all potential risks thatmaystemfrom theproblemofuncertaintiesintheinternationalsystem–theseinclude,butnot limitedto:thestrategicrisksofaretreatingUSasthekeyproviderofregionalsecurity,the political and military risks of entrapment, the economic risks of beingexcludedfromahugemarket,theeconomicandpoliticalrisksofbecomingtoodependentonacertainactor,aswellasthelong-termgeopoliticalrisksofantagonizinganeighbouringgiant;and(iv)alongthesamelineofreasoning,one can also argue that the means of hedging are not confined to militarytoolsofstatecraft(USmilitarypresenceandthestates’ownarmament),butalsoincludenon-militarystatecraftlikemultilateralinstitutions,geopoliticalcoalitions,economicpartnerships,etc.Differentconceptionsofthetermwouldleadanalyststofocusondifferentvariablesindescribingandexplainingthesmallerstates’hedgingbehaviour.

Thesenotwithstanding,Southeast Asia and the Rise of Chinashouldberecognized as an important and thoughtful work. It should be an essentialreading for everyone who wishes to have a better understanding of thedynamicsofSoutheastAsia-Chinarelations.Thisbook,alongwithStorey’searlierscholarlywritingsandpolicyanalyses,hasestablishedhimasoneoftheleadingauthoritiesonthesubjectmatter.

Dr Kuik Cheng-Chwee郭清水Senior Lecturer

Strategic Studies and International Relations ProgramNational University of Malaysia (UKM)


706 Kuik Cheng-Chwee International Journal of China StudiesVolume 2 Number 2 August/September 2011 ISSN 2180-3250

《

SpecialIssueReform,GovernanceandEquity:ExploringtheSociopoliticalImplicationsofContemporaryChina’sTransformation

IntroductionReform,GovernanceandSociopoliticalChangeinContemporaryChina 123Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh

HistoricalProemDevolutioninChineseHistory:TheFengjianDebateRevisited 135David L. McMullen

Governance,DemocracyandDecentralizationModernizationandtheSino-VietnameseModel 157Brantly WomackChina’sGrassrootsDemocracy:DevelopmentandAssessment 177Huang Weiping and Chen JiaxiCommunityPartyBuildinginUrbanChina 213Ngeow Chow Bing

Social Change, Power Configuration and Global GovernanceBeyondtheOlympics:Power,ChangeandLegacy 243Brian BridgesLeadershipDisplacementandtheRedesignofGlobalGovernance:TheRaceofChinaandIndia 259Solomon CohenTheTransformationofChina’sAgricultureSystemandItsImpactonSoutheastAsia 289Phoebe Luo Mingxuan, John A. Donaldson and Qian Forrest Zhang

Social Stratification, State and the Civil SocietyEfficiency,Valueandthe21st-CenturyDevelopmentalState:TheTransitionofChina 313Jay WysockiRethinkingtheRural-UrbanDivideinChina’sNewStratificationOrder 327Qian Forrest ZhangTowardsChina’sUrban-RuralIntegration:IssuesandOptions 345Zhong ShengThePoliticsofElectronicSocialCapitalandPublicSphereinChineseLalaCommunity: 369ImplicationsforCivilSocietyChin-fu HungTheMountainsAreHighandtheEmperorIsFarAway:AnExaminationofEthnicViolenceinXinjiang 389David O’BrienStratification,SocialActionandMorphogenesis:StructuresandAgentsin 407ContemporaryChina’sSocialTransformation407Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh

PolicyCommentsandResearchNotesGovernanceofSmallBusinessesinChina:AnInstitutionalPerspective 507Yongqiang Li, Anona Armstrong and Andrew Clarke

BookReviewMediaandDissentinChina:AReview–JohanLagerkvist, After the Internet, Before Democracy: 525Competing Norms in Chinese Media and Society》reviewed by Joseph Tse-Hei Lee

Index 533


C

M

Y

CM

MY

CY

CMY

K

UM logo greyscale.pdf 9/27/2011 9:27:47 PM


Book Review 707

International Journal of China Studies

Volume 2 Number 1 April 2011 ISSN 2180-3250

ArticlesExpectationsandAdaptation:China’sForeignPoliciesina 1ChangingGlobalEnvironmentJörn-Carsten Gottwald and Niall DugganTechnicalEfficiencyofCommercialBanksinChina: 27DecompositionintoPureTechnicalandScaleEfficiencyChan Sok-GeeTaiwan-ASEANEconomicRelationsinthe 39ContextofEastAsianRegionalIntegrationZhao HongExternalSectorDevelopmentIndex: 55TheCaseofChineseandASEANEconomiesMario Arturo Ruiz EstradaExploringFinancialCooperationbetween 71ChinaandASEANCountriesunderCAFTARen KangyuResearchNotePerceptionofReform:“ChinaModel”asAffirmation? 99Ling Tek SoonBookReviewStefanHalper,TheBeijingConsensus:HowChina’s 117AuthoritarianModelWillDominatetheTwenty-FirstCentury》reviewed by Ngeow Chow Bing

《


C

M

Y

CM

MY

CY

CMY

K

UM logo greyscale.pdf 9/27/2011 9:27:47 PM
