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IBM i Security – Best Practices

Jeffrey UehlingIBM i security [email protected]

Session: 500050 Agenda Key: 24FG

© 2015 International Business Machines Corporation 1

2© 2015 International Business Machines Corporation

Best Practices - Outline

� Physical Security

� Staying Current on Fixes

� System security levels

� System value settings

� Security audit journal

� Resource security

� Network security


Physical Security


Physical Security – a Necessity

• Physical Security, Server• Front panel• Power, cabling• Racks/Storage devices

• Physical Security, Networking • Firewalls, routers, switches, cabling, power• Prevent configuration changes and sniffing equipment• Wireless poses a challenge, secure networks are necessary (WEP, WPA, WPA2 etc)

• Physical Security, Peripherals• Tape drives/cartridges, Printers/output, Fax, etc. • SAN attached DASD

• Mobile Devices


Staying Current on Fixes

� Numerous independent researchers

� Lots of open source so easy to review code and look for issues

� Common OS in many products (Linux, Unix, Windows)– So when a vulnerability is found, it’s likely to be everywhere

� Tools are available to exploit technology (look for holes)– Hacker tools, penetration testing tools, code scanners

� High use technology, like Java, SSL, OpenSSL, is scrutinized

� Vendors are doing more penetration testing thus finding bugs

Security Vulnerabilities

Many security vulnerabilities are being reported… Heartbleed, Bash/Shellshock, Poodle, Ghost, Freak, Bar Mitzvah plus

many, many more!

What’s happening and why so many?


� Java (quarterly updates, you need to stay current)

� OpenSSL

� Web and Application Servers

� Samba

� Networking technology and (infrequently) cryptographic algorithms

� IBM i OS

Security Vulnerabilities – IBM i

IBM i technology areas with multiple (recent) reported vulnerabilities

Typically, Apply the PTF/Fix/Product Update and the vulnerability is fixed,

But, not always as additional actions may be required


� IBM i OS, LIC and Products

� VIOS, IBM i, AIX, Linux partitions

� HMC & Firmware

� 3rd party (vendor) applications

� SAN/Storage, Tape, Printers

� Networking Switches, Firewalls & Routers

� Each and Every Server, Client (including mobile) and HW component

in your Enterprise– Nearly everything includes an OS and/or FW (where there is code, a vulnerability

is a possibility)

Security Vulnerabilities – Not just the OS

Staying Current on Fixes – not just a client and server problemThe vulnerabilities affect most everything in your enterprise


What are the Poodle/Bar Mitzvah Vulnerabilities

� SSLv3 contains a vulnerability that has been referred to as the

Padding Oracle On Downgraded Legacy Encryption (POODLE) attack, which is a man-in-the-middle attack affecting Web

browsers/applications. Bar Mitzvah is similar in that it is present when

the RC4 Algorithm is used in SSL & TLS.

� There is NO fix for SSLv3 or for RC4. Customer must move to TLS and away from RC4

� Applications connecting via SSLv3 to servers are exposed to the

POODLE attack. As applications, servers, and browsers disable the

use of SSLv3, many applications will fail because they don’t support

the more secure and latest technology called TLS (Transaction Layer

Security) or the app is written directly to SSLv3. Same with RC4.

Poodle & Bar Mitzvah – Vulnerabilities with no fix


� Global IBM Core Team (including IBM i representatives)

� xForce (IBM Wide Security Team, vulnerability assessment)– CVSS (vulnerability Scoring)

� Industry Affiliations – Vulnerability Reporting� ICASI (Industry Consortium for Advancement of Security on the Internet)

� FIRST (Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams)

� IT-ISAC (Information Technology - Information Sharing and Analysis Center)

� FS-ISAC (Financial Services - Information Sharing and Analysis Center)

IBM Security Process - PSIRT

Product Security Incident Response Team

PSIRT Process Output:• PTFs/Fixes• Security Bulletin – customer notification of problem and fix


Security Fixes

� IBM i Security PTF Group

� Not all PTFs/Fixes can be added to the Security PTF Group

because of installation requirements!� Java updates� iAccess� Web and Application Servers� Lotus� etc.

� And fixes for areas such as HMC, FW, VIOS, Networking Equipment, Peripherals, Other Platforms, etc.


Customer Awareness of Security Issues

� The “Press”

� IBM Support Center � Typically after a public announcement of a vulnerability

� PSIRT publication of Security Bulletin URLs

� My Notifications (Customer Subscription)� Security Bulletins

� Technotes

� The support for IBM i subscription via “My Notifications” for security bulletins is available.



IBM i Server Security


System Security Levels

System Value: QSECURITY


1. Object Domain Checking

2. Hardware storage protection

3. Parameter validation

System security level 50... Good reasons to run there.

Security levels, why run at a high security level

NOTE: System security level controlled via QSECURITY system value


• System interfaces perform appropriate authority checks but

security exposures exist on this security level (examples will follow)

• *USE required by DSPDTAARA

• *CHANGE required by CHGDTAARA

Security level 30 is NOT a secure security level!

User written programs, running at security level 30,

can gain “write” access to objects with minimal authority

Security Level 30 – Not a secure environment


Program state is compared against object Domain

Programs running *SYSTEM state can access both *USER and *SYSTEM domain.

Programs running *USER state can only access *USER domain objects.

• Security level 30 ALLOWS access regardless of state/domain combination

• Security level 40 and 50 enforce domain checking

Program run state: *SYSTEM or *USER (DSPPGM/DSPSRVPGM)

Object Domain: *SYSTEM or *USER (DSPOBJD)

Object Domain attributes - Object integrity

Every object: *CMD, *FILE, *PGM, etc. has a “domain”Every program has a “state” (*SYSTEM or *USER)


Object Domain, Program StateObject Domain

Program State


Program state is compared against object HSP to determine allowable

access. Every object has a HSP value.

• Security level 30 ALLOWS access regardless of state/HSP combination

• NOTE: Some HSP violations can occur on all security levels

• Security level 40 and 50 enforce HSP checking

Object HSP attributes:

− Allow access from any state (no protection, *USRSPC, *USRQ, *USRIDX)

− Read only in any state (*PGM, *SRVPGM)

− No access in user state (Setting for most objects, 5.3 and prior)

− Enhanced storage protection (5.4 and beyond)

Hardware Storage Protection (HSP) - Object integrity

© 2015 International Business Machines Corporation

MI object overview

Object attributes – Integrity Protection required

20

Encapsulated MI Object header, available to LIC

Associated space, byte addressable area for useby above MI (user and OS) programs.

–Object domain (Most objects are *SYSTEM domain)

–Object owner

–Public authority

–Hardware storage protection setting

–Encapsulated object data

The associated space is used to store operating system and user data for objects, i.e. *CMD,*DTAARA, *JOBD, *USRSPC, *USRPRF, etc.

Encapsulated Data Segment, *FILE, *STMF, etc

John Smith 111-33-5555Jeff Uehling 222-44-6666

LIC Only

LIC Only

OS & LIC


User written programs, running at security level 40 or 50, MUST use system interfaces (commands and APIs) to gain access to the objects.

– Authority checking is enforced by the system interface– Parameter Validation is performed– Object Domain checking is performed

– Object Hardware storage protection is performed

Direct access by user programs to system objects is not allowed at Security

level 40 and 50 due to domain and hardware storage protection attributes.

Authority checking and integrity support at level 40 & 50


This presentation contains programming examples ("Sample Code").

IBM grants you a nonexclusive copyright license to use the Sample Code to generate similar function

tailored to your own specific needs.

The Sample Code is provided by IBM for illustrative purposes only. The Sample Code has not been

thoroughly tested under all conditions. IBM, therefore, cannot guarantee or imply reliability, serviceability, or function of the Sample Code.

The Sample Code contained herein is provided to you "AS IS" without any warranties of any kind. THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NON-INFRINGMENT ARE EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMED. SOME JURISDICTIONS DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES, SO THE ABOVE EXCLUSIONS MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU.

IN NO EVENT WILL IBM BE LIABLE TO ANY PARTY FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, SPECIAL OR OTHER CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES FOR ANY USE OF THE SAMPLE CODE INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY LOST PROFITS, BUSINESS INTERRUPTION, LOSS OF PROGRAMS OR OTHER DATA ON YOUR INFORMATION HANDLING SYSTEM OR OTHERWISE, EVEN IF WE

ARE EXPRESSLY ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.

Disclaimer


Signon as a user with *ALLOBJ special authority

Create a job description object

• CRTJOBD JOBD(QGPL\TEST) USER(QUSER) AUT(*USE)

Display the job description object paying attention to the user.• DSPJOBD JOBD(QGPL/TEST)

Create and call the program using source on following slide.

• CRTBNDC PGM(TESTLIB/TESTPGM1) SRCFILE(QCSRC)

Signon as a user without *ALLOBJ special authority.

Attempt to change the job description object. CHGJOBD JOBD(QGPL/TEST) USER(FRED)

Call the program – Source next slide• CALL PGM(TESTLIB/TESTPGM1)

Display the job description object paying attention to the user.• DSPJOBD JOBD(QGPL/TEST)

Example exposure at security level 30.

JOBD User

“Not authorized to object error.”


#include <mih/rslvsp.h>

#include <mih/setsppfp.h>

#include <string.h>

void main()

{

_SYSPTR jobd_sysptr;char * space_ptr;

jobd_sysptr = rslvsp(WLI_JOBD, “TEST”, “QGPL”, _AUTH_NONE);

space_ptr = setsppfp(jobd_sysptr);

space_ptr=space_ptr +2;

memcpy(space_ptr, “QSECOFR “, strlen(“QSECOFR “));return;

}

After running this program, display the job description object paying attention to the user in the JOBD.

Note the *JOBD object was changed by a user with only *USE authority, to allow jobs to run as QSECOFR.

Change the JOBD User

No authority errors!!!


Signon as a user with *ALLOBJ special authority

Create a data area object

• CRTDTAARA DTAARA(QGPL/TEST) TYPE(*CHAR) VALUE('Test Data') AUT(*USE)

Display the data area object paying attention to the data area value.• DSPDTAARA DTAARA(QGPL/TEST)

Create and call the program using source on following slide.

• CRTBNDC PGM(TESTLIB/TESTPGM2) SRCFILE(QCSRC)

Signon as a user without *ALLOBJ special authority.

Attempt to change the data area object.

CHGDTAARA DTAARA(QGPL/TEST) VALUE(‘JUNK DATA’)

Call the program – Source next slide

• CALL PGM(TESTLIB/TESTPGM2)

Display the data area object paying attention to the data area value.• DSPDTAARA DTAARA(QGPL/TEST)

Example exposure at security level 30

Change DTAARA value

“Not authorized to object error.”


#include <mih/rslvsp.h>

#include <mih/setsppfp.h>

#include <string.h>void main()

{

_SYSPTR dtaara_sysptr;

char * space_ptr;dtaara_sysptr = rslvsp(WLI_DTAARA, “TEST”, “QGPL”, _AUTH_NONE);

space_ptr = setsppfp(dtaara_sysptr);

space_ptr=space_ptr + 3;memcpy(space_ptr, “NEW DATA “, strlen(“NEW DATA “));

return;

}

After running this program, display the data area object paying attention to the data area value.

Note the *DTAARA object was changed by a user with only *USE authority, to a new “string” for the VALUE parameter.

Change the DTAARA value

No authority errors!!!


NOTE: The previous two programs, running on security level 40 or 50, will result in an MCH6801 exception being signaled during the running of the program.

The object access, on 40 & 50, is denied due to Object Domain and Hardware Storage Protectionattributes of the JOBD and DTAARA objects!


NOTE: Lock down system values via SST after setting

System Value Settings


Altered programs are created by modifying a program object in an unsupported way.

Program alterations include:

• Using the system service tools to alter program

• Save the program and modify it offline

Several methods available to alter a program:

• Modifying the program to run in system state

• Modifying the program instruction stream

• Modifying the program validation value

Altered program description


A program altered to run system state can access system

objects and change data on security level 40 and 50.

They run with the same capabilities as OS programs.

Altered programs can:

– Deliberately cause system crashes

– Modify objects so they cannot be recognized by the OS

– Bypass authority checking for objects

– Bypass system audit record creation

– Attack other aspects of system integrity

System state "user" programs, why they are a threat


• QALWOBJRST - Consider value *NONE

• QFRCCVNRST - Consider value 6 or 7

• 6 – for executables without valid digital signatures, recreate the

instruction stream thus removing any patch

• 7 – for all executables, recreate the instruction stream thus

removing any patch (would also remove the digital signature)

• QVFYOBJRST - Consider value 5

• Only allow the restore of programs that are digitally signed

Integrity related system values

Set these system values on your production machine when NOT in the maintenance window – control the restore of a program


• The "RST" interfaces are shipped as PUBLIC(*EXCLUDE). • Only trusted users should be authorized to use the restore interfaces.

• Note: BRMS interfaces are PUBLIC(*USE) but call the system "RST" interfaces which

are PUBLIC(*EXCLUDE)

• Verify the list of users authorized to “SAVE” data

• Protect the use of the system service tools (SST/DST) and

Service related commands (DMPxxx, TRCxxx, etc).

Controlling system interfaces


NOTE: Lock down system values via SST after setting

System Value Settings continued


• QAUDCTL - Audit on/off switch

• QAUDLVL and QAUDLVL2

• QAUDENDACN and QAUDFRCLVL - Use default values

• QCRTOBJAUD - Audit newly created objects

Auditing related system values

NOTE: See chapter 9 and appendix E&F of the security reference .pdf for audit doc


• Create the QAUDJRN audit journal

• Set QAUDCTL to *OBJAUD, *AUDLVL and

*NOQTEMP

• Set QAUDLVL to *AUDLVL2

• Set auditing values in QAUDLVL2 system value.

• Audit sensitive objects via CHGOBJAUD

Turn on audit and save the audit journal receivers. You may need the audit data in the future!

Auditing continued


• Security Audit provides who accesses what object

• A combination of security audit and “data object” journalingprovides the complete audit trail

• Turn on journaling for *FILE and IFS *STMF sensitive objects to get the complete audit of changes, including change to data

• CRTJRNRCV JRNRCV(MYLIB/MYRCV0001)

• CRTJRN JRN(MYLIB/MYJRN) JRNRCV(MYLIB/MYRCV0001)

• STRJRNPF FILE(MYLIB/MYFILE) JRN(MYLIB/MYJRN) IMAGES(*BOTH)

• QSYS/STRJRN OBJ(('/mydir/dir1/stmf1' *INCLUDE))

JRN('/qsys.lib/mylib.lib/myjrn.jrn')

Auditing continued – Data Objects


• WRKSYSVAL SYSVAL(QPWD*)

• Set password composition rule system values

• Min/Max length, required characters, etc

• Consider using enhanced password support (QPWDLVL)

• Case sensitive long passwords (128 characters)

• Use the ANZDFTPWD command to check for default passwords

Password composition system values


• QALWUSRDMN - Consider value QTEMP

• QINACTITV - Set to a reasonable number of minutes

• QINACTMSGQ - *ENDJOB/*DSCJOB

• QMAXSIGN - Consider setting to 3

• QMAXSGNACN - Set to disable device and profile

• QSSL* - Control system SSL parameters

Additional security related system values

WRKSYSVAL SYSVAL(*SEC) for the entire list


Resource Security - Protecting your objects

Resource Security


• Secure sensitive data (*FILE, *STMF, etc)

• Object level authority

• Encrypt “confidential” data

• DB2 field procedures, OS encryption interfaces, etc

• Audit sensitive objects

• CHGOBJAUD (see chapter 9 of security reference .pdf)

• Deploy a Network Security product

• Products built on exit programs available from business partners

• Products enabled “locking down” interfaces (FTP, Telnet, DRDA, etc)

• http://www-03.ibm.com/systems/power/software/i/security/partner_showcase.html

• Secure your sensitive objects with the appropriate level of authority at the object level!

Resource Security – A layered approach


Resource Security - protecting your objects

EDTOBJAUT

Interface to assign objectlevel authorities

Authority List

Public AUT

Owner

Private AUT


• Keep the number of security officers and security administrators to a minimum

• *ALLOBJ, *SECADM, etc. special authority

• Service tool userIDs

• Audit the actions of the Powerful user

• CHGUSRAUD CL command

• *CMD action audit value, *SECURITY, etc.

• Make sure the security officer understands, procedurally, that audit cannot be turned OFF!

Resource Security – Restrict Powerful Users


Protecting your objects with resource security is necessary to protect your data.

– Run at a security level 50

– Secure your confidential data with *EXCLUDE public authority

– Objects that are not security sensitive (public objects) should be protected with *USE public authority. This gives good performance

for read operations on the object.

– Additional authority can be given to users who must change the data but private auts should be used sparingly for best performance.

Resource Security - protecting your objects

CREATE MASK SSN_MASK ON EMPLOYEEFOR COLUMN SSN RETURN

CASEWHEN (VERIFY_GROUP_FOR_USER(SESSION_USER,'PAYROLL') = 1)

THEN SSNWHEN (VERIFY_GROUP_FOR_USER(SESSION_USER,'MGR') = 1)

THEN 'XXX-XX-' CONCAT SUBSTR(SSN,8,4)ELSE NULL

ENDENABLE;

ALTER TABLE EMPLOYEEACTIVATE COLUMN ACCESS CONTROL;

CREATE PERMISSION NETHMO.ROW_ACCESS ON HOSPITAL.PATIENTFOR ROWS WHERE(VERIFY_GROUP_FOR_USER(SESSION_USER,'PATIENT') = 1 AND

HOSPITAL.PATIENT.USERID = SESSION_USER) OR(VERIFY_GROUP_FOR_USER(SESSION_USER,'PCP') = 1 ANDHOSPITAL.PATIENT.PCP_ID = SESSION_USER) OR

(VERIFY_GROUP_FOR_USER(SESSION_USER,‘ACCOUNTING') = 1 ORVERIFY_GROUP_FOR_USER(SESSION_USER,'DRUG_RSRCH') = 1) ENFORCED FOR ALL ACCESS

ENABLE;

ALTER TABLE HOSPITAL.PATIENTACTIVATE ROW ACCESS CONTROL;

– Provides the ability to further control data in a DB2 Table (*FILE object)– Control access at the Row (record) or COLUMN (field) level

Resource Security – Row and Column Access ControlNew in release 7.2

http://www.redbooks.ibm.com/redbooks.nsf/RedpieceAbstracts/redp5110.html?Open


– Manage & secure the encryption keys

– Protect via Master Key support

– Encrypt security sensitive data– 7.1, DB2 Field Procedures to enable Column Level Encryption

– Several vendors have products– Enforcive, Linoma and Townsend Security

– Protect encryption keys. Encrypting data, without protecting the encryption keys, does not protect the data

– Protect encryption keys with a master key

Encrypt sensitive data


– Encryption of data on tape & disk

– SW Encrypted backup. Provides encryption support for tape/virtual tape

via BRMS and tape management APIs (OS option 44)

– HW encrypted backup solutions via TS11x0 & LTO4/5

– SW Encrypted ASP. Provides disk level encryption support for all data

written to disk (OS option 45)

– HW support for Disk level encryption (DS8000 and DS5000 series)

– Encryption key management is required (master keys and data encryption keys)

Encryption of data at “Rest”

http://www.redbooks.ibm.com/abstracts/sg247320.htmlhttp://www.redbooks.ibm.com/redpapers/pdfs/redp4500.pdfhttp://www.redbooks.ibm.com/redbooks/pdfs/sg247977.pdf


Controlling access to the Service Tools is necessary for a secure system.

• Create as few Service Tools User IDs as possible

• Create a Service Tool user with the same privileges as

• QSECOFR (QSECOFR can become disabled)

• Never use QSECOFR Service Tool USERID (save pwd

in a secure location)

Securing Service Tools

• DSPSSTUSR (Display Service Tool User CL command)


Network Security Considerations


Firewall – Building a Secure Network

� Install and maintain a firewall configuration

– A firewall examines all network traffic and blocks those transmissions that do not meet the specified security criteria.


Firewalls:

Intrusion Monitors:

Intrusion

Monitor

Internet

WWW Mail

Development system

H/R System

Corporate

Network

Firewall

Domino

Location: • Outside your internal company network• Makes sense to let firewall filter what it can.

Network-Based Intrusion Detection


What Intrusion Monitors Do:

• Perform "Signature Analysis" or "Pattern Matching"

• Patterns: Looking for known "bad patterns" in IP flow.

• Signature Analysis: Watch for "Trend Deviations" in network usage.

• i.e. When someone successfully connects to a machine, packet activity is quite different when somebody randomly searching for open ports.

• Reaction to suspected malicious behavior:

• Send e-mail or message to pager

• Shutdown network or routers

Network-Based Intrusion Detection


IBM Network Security Protection

• IBM division that produces network security HW & SW

• Network Security HW

• Firewall

• Intrusion Detection and Prevention

• Anti-Virus

• Web Content Filtering

• VPN

• Monitoring/Reporting

• Network Configuration

Network-Based Security Appliances

http://www-03.ibm.com/software/products/en/network-protection/


• External facing network containing interfaces meant to

be available externally:

• Web servers (supporting “external” applications)

• Product information, Sales, etc.

• E-mail servers

• Limited access to the internal “corporate” intranet

What is a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)?


DMZ - Protecting & Isolating your internal network

Internet

DMZ

firewall

firewall


Host Based Intrusion Detection/Prevention

� Enable Intrusion detection support on your host system.– Detect “internal” attacks on your systems

�Real time notification enablement– E-mail, messages, etc. (i.e., pagers, ISV solutions) in addition to IM

records�Numerous intrusion events audited – well-known attacks such as

“Smurf”, “Fraggle”, ACK storms, Address Poisoning (both IPv4 ARP poisoning, and IPv6 neighbor discovery poisoning), Ping-Of-Death and many more….

� “Extrusions” detected – attacks, scans, traffic regualtion anomalies emanating from your host

� IPv6 support�GUI – iNav

– Management of IDS policies– Display of intrusion events as an alternative to viewing the audit

journal


IBM Security Partners – Many listed on the IBM i Security site

• Products that enhance the native security features available in the

operating system

• Many are network based

• Apply additional “security” rules

• Enforcement of the rules

IBM i Security website:http://www-03.ibm.com/systems/power/software/i/security.htmlhttp://www-03.ibm.com/systems/power/software/i/security/partner_showcase.html

IBM Partner Network Security Products


• For remote connections to your IBM i:

• Use Virtual Private Network

• Use TLS/SSL enabled versions of the client

connection applications (Telnet, FTP, iNavigator, etc)

TLS/SSL/VPN connection


• For remote connections to/from your system:

• Use TLS/SSL enabled versions of the client connection applications (Telnet, FTP, etc)

• What is TLS/SSL?

• Similar to a VPN but implemented at the application layer. Only the TLS/SSL enabled application flow

will be encrypted.• A mixture of TLS/SSL enabled and non-TLS/SSL

enabled applications can be run from the system

Secure Socket Layer (SSL) connection & Transaction Layer Security (TLS)


• Only start TCP/IP servers that are needed

• Use secure encryption algorithms

• Prevent applications from using well-known ports

• Turn IP Source Routing off

• Allow IP Datagram Forwarding only when needed

• Don't leave PPP or SLIP lines waiting in answer state

General TCP/IP Security Tips


IP Packet Filtering can be used to PERMIT or DENY based on the packet characteristics

• Source and Destination IP Address

• Source and Destination IP Port

• Protocol

• Packet Direction

• Packet Fragments

IP Network Address Translation (NAT)

• Can be used to hide private network behind a single public IP Interface (address)

IBM i Packet Security


How Do You Use It:

• iNavigator:

• (system)->network->IP Policies->Packet Rules

• Select Rules Editor from context menu.

• Wizards pull down has three selections.

• Many other features...

IP filtering and network address translation...


Client Device (workstation) Security


Client Security

• Most common “client” devices today are:

• Microsoft Windows• Windows XP• Windows 7

• Apple

• Some flavor of LINUX• SUSE, Redhat, and others

• Smart Phones / Mobile


Client Security – What’s required

• Antivirus Software & Client “personal” Firewall

• Norton• McAfee• Panda• Trendmicro• Lot’s of others• Plus many versions of “free-ware”

• Spyware & Adware prevention


Client Security – Antivirus and Client Firewall

• Antivirus Software & Client “personal” Firewall

• Antivirus Software

• Analyze data files or email attachments looking for “known” attacks• “live update” of Antivirus SW loads the latest known attack patterns

• Personal firewall

• Prevents both unwanted inbound and outbound activity (traffic) to/from the network• Most firewalls provide warnings when detected


Client Security – Virtual Private Network Connection

• Many companies require a Virtual Private Network (VPN) connection to access the internal corporate network from external

• VPN Client Software • A VPN provides a secure connection over the internet• Network traffic is encrypted (scrambled) to prevent the ability for someone to view, thus steal, the data

• Two factor authentication • To access the internal corporate network, often times a company will setup and require another form, beyond password, of authentication• Time based keyfob, smartcards, biometrics (finger print scan, etc)


Additional Things to Know


• Many security reporting tools exist for the IBM i

• Run "GO SECTOOLS" from command entry • Run the report generation security tools

• Security tool commands produce reports that can be used to manage security and look for security holes

IBM i Security tools


• Numerous IBM i partners provide additional tools

– Reporting & Monitoring– Security Configuration– Encryption

– Network Security– Authentication/Biometrics

IBM i Security website:http://www-03.ibm.com/systems/power/software/i/security.htmlhttp://www-03.ibm.com/systems/power/software/i/security/partner_showcase.html

IBM i Partners


• Run at security level 50

• Set the security related System Values and lock them down

• Use the Security Audit Journal

• Protect your sensitive objects with object security

• Use Firewalls and intrusion monitors

Summary


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