iavwo psg/7-rep ort meeti… · appendix e — air traffic management volcanic ash contingency plan...

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ONAL CIVI

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AL AIRWAYGROUP (IA

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March 2013

ON ORGANI

IAVWO

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OPSG/7-REP

PORT

History of the meeting i-2

The designation and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of ICAO concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.


TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

List of IAVWOPSG decisions ..................................................................................................... . i-4

List of IAVWOPSG conclusions ................................................................................................. . i-5

Agenda Item 1: Opening of the meeting

Place and duration ........................................................................................................................... 1-1

Attendance ....................................................................................................................................... 1-1

Chairman and officers of the Secretariat ......................................................................................... 1-1

Agenda Item 2: Organizational matters

Adoption of working arrangements ................................................................................................. 2-1

Adoption of the agenda .................................................................................................................... 2-1

Agenda Item 3: Follow-up of IAVWOPSG/6 conclusions ......................................................... 3-1

Agenda Item 4: Review of ICAO provisions related to IAVW

Review of the ANP/FASID procedures ........................................................................................... 4.1-1

Amendment 77 to Annex 3 .............................................................................................................. 4.2-1

Review of IAVW-related guidance material ................................................................................... 4.3-1

Agenda Item 5: Operation of the IAVW

Implementation of the IAVW, including the IAVW management reports ...................................... 5.1-1

Improvement and content of all volcanic ash related messages ....................................................... 5.2-1

Issuance of a special air-report related to the smell of sulphur ........................................................ 5.3-1

Updating of the worldwide ash encounter database (including the model VAR) ............................ 5.4-1

Agenda Item 6: Development of the IAVW

Improvement of tools for detecting and forecasting volcanic ash ................................................... 6.1-1

Refinement of volcanic ash deposition information in a suitable aeronautical message .................

6.2-1

Agenda Item 7: Improved notification concerning the release of radioactive

material into the atmosphere ........................................................................................................ 7-1

Agenda Item 8: Matters related to the assessment of the need to provide

information on solar radiation storms and other bio-hazards ................................................... 8-1

i-3 History of the meeting Agenda Item 9: Future work programme ................................................................................... 9-1

Agenda Item 10: Any other business ............................................................................................

10-1

Appendix A — List of participants .............................................................................................. A-1

Appendix B — Basic ANP/FASID provisions related to IAVW ................................................. B-1

Appendix C — Draft amendment to Annex 3, Part I ................................................................... C-1

Appendix D — Draft amendment to Annex 3, Part I ................................................................... D-1

Appendix E — Air traffic management volcanic ash contingency plan template ........................ E-1

Appendix F — Recommendations for aircraft instrumentation for conducting volcanic ash

cloud sampling .................................................................................................... F-1

Appendix G — Proposed guidance for conducting volcanic ash exercised in ICAO regions ...... G-1

Appendix H — Modifications to Doc 9766 .................................................................................. H-1

Appendix I — Proposals for reconciliation of IAVWOPSG/IVATF work programmes ........... I-1

Appendix J — Concept of operations for the IAVW ................................................................... J-1

Appendix K — Tasks to be evaluated by the WMO-IUGG VASAG ........................................... K-1

Appendix L — Procedure in support of collaborative decision and analysis forecasting (CDAF) L-1

Appendix M — Draft amendment to Annex 3, Part II (Corrigendum) ......................................... M-1

Appendix N — Draft amendment to Annex 3, Part I .................................................................... N-1

Appendix O — Terms of reference of the IAVWOPSG ............................................................... O-1

Appendix P — Work programme (deliverables) of the IAVWOPSG .......................................... P-1

19/6/13 Corr.


LIST OF IAVWOPSG DECISIONS

Page

Decision 7/1 — Follow-up of IAVWOPSG/6 conclusions, and IVATF/3 and IVATF/4recommendations ........................................................................................................

3-1

Decision 7/2 — Notation for latitude and longitude in FASID Table MET 3B ....................................4.1-1

Decision 7/25— Volcanic ash advisories in digital format ....................................................................5.2-3

Decision 7/35— Addition of a new deliverable to the work programme of the IAVWOPSG ..............6.1-4

Decision 7/41— Update of the terms of reference of the IAVWOPSG .................................................9-1

Decision 7/42— Update of the work programme of the IAVWOPSG ..................................................9-1

i-5 History of the meeting

LIST OF IAVWOPSG CONCLUSIONS

Page

Conclusion 7/3— Amendment to the IAVW-related regional procedures in the Basic ANP and FASID ....................................................................................................................

4.1-1

Conclusion 7/4— Amendment to Annex 3 regarding inclusion of the requirement for selectedState volcano observatories to send notification of volcanic activity to flight information centres (FICs) .....................................................................................

4.2-1

Conclusion 7/5— Amendment to Annex 3 regarding introduction of a requirement for VAACs tomonitor, where available, relevant ground-based and airborne data to detect the existence and extent of volcanic ash in the atmosphere .........................................

4.2-2

Conclusion 7/6— Guidance material to support VAAC monitoring of relevant ground-based and airborne data to detect the existence and extent of volcanic ash in theatmosphere ............................................................................................................

4.2-2

Conclusion 7/7 Consistency of guidance material relating to phases of the eruption .....................4.3-1

Conclusion 7/8 Training material to support the use of quantitative, satellite-derived, volcanic ash and gas products for operational use by VAACs .............................................

4.3-2

Conclusion 7/9 Guidance material on airborne instrumented measurements of volcanic ashclouds .....................................................................................................................

4.3-2

Conclusion 7/10 Guidance material for conducting volcanic ash exercises in ICAO regions ..........4.3-2

Conclusion 7/11— Inclusion of QMS implementation status in the VAAC Management Reports ....5.1-4

Conclusion 7/12— VAACs areas of responsibility ...............................................................................5.1-5

Conclusion 7/13— Situational awareness for aviation operators ..........................................................5.1-6

Conclusion 7/14— VAAC Best Practices Seminars .............................................................................5.1-8

Conclusion 7/15— Modifications to Doc 9766 concerning the definition of “lead VAAC” ................5.1-9

Conclusion 7/16— Definitions of visible ash and discernible ash for operational use .........................5.1-10

Conclusion 7/17— Development of an IAVW roadmap ......................................................................5.1-11

Conclusion 7/18— Reducing dispersion model output uncertainty ......................................................5.1-12

Conclusion 7/19— Expressing confidence at the time of observation of an ash cloud (T+0 hours) inthe volcanic ash advisory/volcanic ash advisory in graphical format (VA Advisory/VAG) ......................................................................................................

5.1-13

Conclusion 7/20— Evaluation of forecast confidence to meet the needs of volcanic ash relatedsafety risk assessments ...........................................................................................

5.1-14

Conclusion 7/21— Volcanic ash advisory collaborative decision analysis and forecastingprocedures ..............................................................................................................

5.1-15


Conclusion 7/22— Common web page for VAACs .............................................................................5.1-16

Conclusion 7/23— Aerosol observations exchange ..............................................................................5.1-17

Conclusion 7/24— Additional guidance on VONA ..............................................................................5.2-1

Conclusion 7/26— Amendment to Annex 3 related to volcanic ash advisories in digital format(XML/GML) ..........................................................................................................

5.2-3

Conclusion 7/27— SIGMET for a complex volcanic ash cloud ...........................................................5.2-5

Conclusion 7/28— Volcanic ash information beyond T+18 hours .......................................................5.2-5

Conclusion 7/29— Reporting of no volcanic ash ..................................................................................5.2-6

Conclusion 7/30— Standardized international volcano database for VAACs ......................................5.2-7

Conclusion 7/31— Validation dataset for benchmarking current and future satellite-based retrieval schemes ..................................................................................................................

6.1-1

Conclusion 7/32— Scientific investigation into volcanic cloud thickness and stratification ................6.1-2

Conclusion 7/33— Provision of advice on appropriate methods for assessing aviation hazards and risks ........................................................................................................................

6.1-3

Conclusion 7/34— Health risks to aircraft occupants posed by sulphur dioxide and other hazardousgases in the atmosphere ..........................................................................................

6.1-4

Conclusion 7/36 — Use of infrasound data in support of the IAVW .....................................................6.1-6

Conclusion 7/37 Draft concept of operations for the provision of information about the release ofradioactive material into the atmosphere in support of international airnavigation ...............................................................................................................

7-2

Conclusion 7/38 Amendment to Annex 3 related to space weather ..................................................8-1

Conclusion 7/39 Space Weather Impacts on International Air Navigation .......................................8-2

Conclusion 7/40 Draft concept of operations for the provision of space weather information insupport of international air navigation ...................................................................

8-4

— — — — — — — —

Report on Agenda Item 1 1-1

Agenda Item 1: Opening of the meeting

1.1 Place and duration

1.1.1 The seventh meeting of the International Airways Volcano Watch Operations Group (IAVWOPSG/7) was held at the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Asia and Pacific (APAC) Regional Office in Bangkok, Thailand, from 18 to 22 March 2013.

1.1.2 The meeting was opened at 0900 hours by Mr. Yoshiki Imawaka, Deputy Regional Director, ICAO APAC Regional Office who welcomed the participants and stressed the importance of the main tasks of the group and its role in ensuring that the International Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW) continued to meet evolving global and, where appropriate, regional operational requirements.

1.2 Attendance

1.2.1 The list of participants is provided in Appendix A.

1.3 Chairman and officers of the Secretariat

1.3.1 The Chairman of the group, Mr. Peter D. Lechner presided over the meeting during the opening day morning. Due to personal circumstances, Mr. Lechner was required to depart the meeting early. Mr. Nigel Gait and Dr. Andrew Tupper co-chaired the remainder of the meeting.

1.3.2 Mr. Raul Romero, Technical Officer, Meteorology, ICAO Headquarters, Montréal was secretary of the meeting, assisted by Mr. Peter Dunda, Regional Officer Meteorology, ICAO APAC Regional Office, Bangkok.

— — — — — — — —

Report on Agenda Item 2.1 2.1-1

Agenda Item 2: Organizational matters 2.1: Adoption of working arrangements

2.1 Adoption of working arrangements

2.1.1 The meeting adopted appropriate working arrangements.


Agenda Item 2: Organizational matters 2.2: Adoption of the agenda

2.2 Adoption of the agenda

2.2.1 The following agenda was adopted:

Agenda Item 1: Opening of the meeting Agenda Item 2: Organizational matters 2.1: Adoption of working arrangements 2.2: Adoption of the agenda Agenda Item 3: Follow-up of IAVWOPSG/6 conclusions Agenda Item 4: Review of ICAO provisions related to the IAVW (Deliverable 02) 4.1: Review of ANP/FASID procedures 4.2: Amendment 77 to Annex 3 4.3: Review of IAVW-related guidance material Agenda Item 5: Operation of the IAVW (Deliverables 01, 03, 04 and 05) 5.1: Implementation of the IAVW, including the IAVW management reports

(Deliverable 01) 5.2: Improvement of the production processes, format and content of all volcanic ash

related messages (Deliverable 03) 5.3: Issuance of a special air-report related to the smell of sulphur (Deliverable 04) 5.4: Updating of the worldwide ash encounter database (including the model VAR)

(Deliverable 05)

Agenda Item 6: Development of the IAVW (Deliverables 06 and 07) 6.1: Improvement of tools for detecting and forecasting volcanic ash (Deliverable 06) 6.2 Refinement of volcanic ash deposition information in a suitable aeronautical

message (Deliverable 07) Agenda Item 7: Improved notification concerning the release of radioactive material into the

atmosphere (Deliverable 08) Agenda Item 8: Matters related to the assessment of the need to provide information on

solar radiation storms and other bio-hazards (Deliverable 09) Agenda Item 9: Future work programme Agenda Item 10: Any other business

— — — — — — — —


Agenda Item 3: Follow-up of IAVWOPSG/6 conclusions

3.1 The group recalled that, at the sixth meeting of the International Airways Volcano Watch Operations Group (IAVWOPSG/6), it had formulated thirty conclusions and three decisions and that no follow-up action was required on decisions.

3.2 The group noted that it had been expected to consider a number of recommendations emanating from the International Volcanic Ash Task Force (IVATF) which was dissolved in June 2012 – namely IVATF Recommendations 3/2, 3/7, 4/2 to 4/7, 4/9 to 4/11, and 4/17 to 4/24. In this regard, the group noted that, to facilitate follow-up action, a consolidated follow-up table had been prepared which took into account the nineteen concerned IVATF recommendations addressed to the IAVWOPSG for consideration during the intersession period as discussed further under Agenda Items 4, 5 and 6.

3.3 The group was pleased to note that, except for Conclusion 6/23 b) and Conclusion 6/33, action had been completed on all items concerned. With regard to Conclusion 6/23 b), the group noted that discussions to be held under Agenda Item 5.1 will report that work is still underway. With regard to the Conclusion 6/33, the meeting was pleased to note that work is being undertaken by volcanic ash advisory centre (VAAC) Buenos Aires, in collaboration with the research community, and that results are expected to be available by September 2013. In view of this information, the group agreed to keep Conclusions 6/23 b) and 6/33 valid and formulated the following decision:

Decision 7/1— Follow-up of IAVWOPSG/6 conclusions, and IVATF/3 and IVATF/4 recommendations

That except for Conclusions 6/23 b) and 6/33, follow-up action on the IAVWOPSG/6 conclusions, and IVATF/3 and IVATF/4 recommendations proposed for the consideration of theIAVWOPSG, be considered completed.

— — — — — — — —


Agenda Item 4: Review of ICAO provisions related to IAVW 4.1 Review of ANP/FASID procedures

4.1 Review of ANP/FASID procedures

4.1.1 The group recalled that it had been tasked to review the IAVW-related procedures contained in the air navigation plan/facilities and services implementation document (air navigation plan/facilities and services implementation document (ANP/FASID)) at every meeting. The group was invited to review these procedures and propose any additional amendments, as necessary.

4.1.2 The group noted that it was identified that the proposed amendments to FASID Table MET 3B related to Conclusion 6/2 (Report of IAVWOPSG/6, Appendix B refers) used degrees and decimal notation. The group agreed that the notation in FASID Table MET 3B should be consistent with Annex 3 — Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation, Table A2-1 — Template for advisory message for volcanic ash, i.e. that latitude and longitude be given in degrees and minutes in the form Nnnnn or Snnnn Wnnnnn or Ennnnn. Therefore, with respect to FASID Table MET 3B, the group formulated the following decision:

Decision 7/2 — Notation for latitude and longitude in FASID Table MET 3B

That the notation used for latitude and longitude in FASIDTable MET 3B (areas of responsibility of volcanic ash advisory centres) be given in degrees and minutes to be consistent withAnnex 3 — Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation, Table A2-1.

4.1.3 The group also noted that, following the IAVWOPSG/6 meeting, the Secretariat had processed a proposal for amendment to the North Atlantic (NAT), European (EUR) and Middle East (MID) air navigation plans related to an amended area of responsibility for volcanic ash advisory centre (VAAC) Toulouse, consequential to the amended area of responsibility for VAAC Darwin. The amended area of responsibility for VAAC Toulouse has been included for reference in Appendix B.

4.1.4 The group reviewed the IAVW-related regional procedures in Appendix B and formulated the following conclusion:

Conclusion 7/3 — Amendment to the IAVW-related regional procedures in the Basic ANP and FASID

That the Secretariat forward the IAVW-related regional procedures as shown in Appendix B to this report to the ICAO Regional Offices for processing and onward transmission toStates for comments, as necessary, with a view to their earlyinclusion in the Basic ANP and FASID.


Agenda Item 4: Review of ICAO provisions related to IAVW 4.2 Amendment 77 to Annex 3

4.2 Amendment 77 to Annex 3

4.2.1 The group noted that at the IAVWOPSG/5 meeting, during the review of IAVW-related procedures contained in the Basic ANP and FASID, the group had included the flight information centre (FIC) as an air traffic management (ATM) unit (together with the area control centre (ACC)) to receive notification of volcanic activity from selected State volcano observatories (FASID Table MET 3C refers). In this regard, the group noted that Annex 3, paragraph 3.6 (up to and including Amendment 76), only required that the referred information be sent to ACCs. The group agreed to include, in the relevant provisions in Annex 3, that selected State volcano observatories send the notification of volcanic activity also to FICs. Therefore, the group formulated the following conclusion:

RSPP Conclusion 7/4 — Amendment to Annex 3 regarding inclusion of the requirement for selected State volcano observatories to send notification of volcanic activity to flight information centres (FICs)

That the proposal to amend Annex 3 — Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation, Chapter 3, 3.6 and Appendix 2, 4.1, Note 2, given in Appendix C to this report be consolidated with other elements of draft Amendment 77 to Annex 3.

4.2.2 The group noted that the International Volcanic Ash Task Force (IVATF) had considered issues relating to volcanic ash cloud detection. In particular, the IVATF considered the merits of various ground-based, airborne and satellite-based systems and sensors that may be used to sense, remotely or in-situ, the presence of volcanic ash in the atmosphere, including Doppler weather radar, ceilometers, lidar and passive infrared sensors. The IVATF identified technologies and recommended system requirements pertinent to such systems/sensors to support the development or improvement of guidance material contained in the Handbook on the International Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW) — Operational Procedures and Contact List (Doc 9766) and the Manual on Volcanic Ash, Radioactive Material and Toxic Chemical Clouds (Doc 9691). The group noted that Annex 3 (up to and including Amendment 76) only required VAACs to monitor relevant geostationary and polar-orbiting satellite data to detect the existence and extent of volcanic ash in the atmosphere in the area concerned (Annex 3, 3.5.1 a) refers). However, data derived from ground-based and airborne systems/sensors was increasingly being used by the VAACs to extend their observational capabilities to corroborate existing observations and, as necessary, to refine the initialization of the atmospheric dispersion model(s).

4.2.3 With this in mind, the group considered the merits of introducing into Annex 3, 3.5.1, a provision to enable the use of data from relevant ground-based and airborne data where such data might be available. To this end, the group reviewed a proposal to amend Annex 3 and formulated the following conclusions accordingly:

4.2-2 Report on Agenda Item 4.2

RSPP Conclusion 7/5—

Amendment to Annex 3 regarding introduction of arequirement for VAACs to monitor, where available,relevant ground-based and airborne data to detect the existence and extent of volcanic ash in the atmosphere

That the proposal to amend Annex 3 — Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation, Chapter 3, 3.5.1, given in Appendix D to this report be consolidated with other elements of draft Amendment 77 to Annex 3.

Conclusion 7/6 — Guidance material to support VAAC monitoring of relevant ground-based and airborne data to detect the existence and extent of volcanic ash in the atmosphere

That an ad-hoc working group consisting of Australia, France, Germany, United Kingdom (Rapporteur), United States and WMObe tasked to:

a) develop adequate guidance material for inclusion in theManual on Volcanic Ash, Radioactive Material and ToxicChemical Clouds (Doc 9691), to support VAAC monitoring of relevant ground-based and airborne data to detect the existence and extent of volcanic ash in theatmosphere; and

b) report to the IAVWOPSG/8 meeting.


Agenda Item 4: Review of ICAO provisions related to IAVW 4.3: Review of IAVW-related guidance material

4.3 Review of IAVW-related guidance material

4.3.1 The group recalled IVATF Recommendation 4/15 a) regarding an air traffic management volcanic ash contingency plan template to be used by all the ICAO planning and implementation regional groups (PIRGs) for the development of, or update to, volcanic ash contingency plans within their respective regions. The group noted that, while the volcanic ash contingency plan template (Appendix E to this report refers) considered four phases for an eruption (pre-eruption, start of the eruption, on-going eruption and recovery), the Handbook on the International Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW) – Operational Procedures and Contact List (Doc 9766) only included procedures for pre-eruption and eruption phases. At the same time, the manual on Flight Safety and Volcanic Ash (Doc 9974) covered three phases: pre-eruption, start of the eruption and on-going eruption. In light of this information, the group agreed that it was necessary to ensure consistency between the IAVW operational procedures included in Part 4 of Doc 9766 and the content of Doc 9974 and formulated the following conclusion:

Conclusion 7/7 — Consistency of guidance material relating to phases of the eruption

That an ad-hoc working group consisting of Canada (Rapporteur),France, Japan, United Kingdom, United States, IATA and IUGG,be tasked to:

a) review Part 4 of the Handbook on the International Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW) — Operational Procedures and Contact List (Doc 9766) and Flight Safety and Volcanic Ash (Doc 9974) to ensure consistency in the operational procedures pertaining to the IAVW (e.g.phases of an eruption) contained therein; and


4.3.2 The group recalled IVATF Recommendation 3/7 which encouraged the IAVWOPSG to periodically review Doc 9974 and, where necessary, recommend revisions for the consideration of the Operations Panel (OPSP). The group noted that any suggested amendments to Doc 9974 for consideration by the OPSP could be discussed at future meetings.

4.3.3 In a further issue related to guidance material, the group noted that IVATF Recommendation 4/2 invited the IAVWOPSG, in collaboration with the World Meteorological Organization (WMO)-International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics (IUGG) Volcanic Ash Scientific Advisory Group (VASAG), to continue to encourage the development and refinement of suitable training material supporting the operational use by VAACs of quantitative, satellite-derived, volcanic ash and gas products. In this regard, the group formulated the following conclusion:


Conclusion 7/8 — Training material to support the use of quantitative, satellite-derived, volcanic ash and gas products for operational use by VAACs

That the World Meteorological Organization (WMO)-International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics (IUGG) Volcanic AshScientific Advisory Group (VASAG) be invited to address, at its earliest convenience, follow-up work on IVATF Recommendation4/2 pertaining to training material to support the use ofquantitative, satellite-derived, volcanic ash and gas products for operational use by volcanic ash advisory centres (VAACs).

4.3.4 The group also noted IVATF Recommendation 4/3 which called upon the IAVWOPSG to consider including, in the Manual on Volcanic Ash, Radioactive Material and Toxic Chemicals Clouds (Doc 9691), the recommendations in Appendix F of this report refers) pertaining to airborne instrumented measurements of volcanic ash clouds. The group agreed that some further editorial work was necessary and, in this regard, formulated the following conclusion:

Conclusion 7/9 — Guidance material on airborne instrumented measurements of volcanic ash clouds

That the Secretary, after coordination with the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics (IUGG) member, include guidance based on the material in Appendix F to this report regarding airborne instrumented measurements of volcanic ash clouds, in the Manual on Volcanic Ash, Radioactive Material and ToxicChemical Clouds (Doc 9691).

4.3.5 The group noted that IVATF Recommendation 4/22 invited the IAVWOPSG to consider the inclusion, in Doc 9766, of guidance material developed by the IVATF for conducting volcanic ash exercises in ICAO regions and formulated the following conclusion:

Conclusion 7/10 — Guidance material for conducting volcanic ash exercises in ICAO regions

That the Secretary include the guidance material on conductingvolcanic ash exercises in ICAO regions, as given in Appendix G to this report, in the Handbook on the International Airways VolcanoWatch (IAVW) — Operational Procedures and Contact List(Doc 9766).

— — — — — — — —


Agenda Item 5: Operation of the IAVW 5.1: Implementation of the IAVW, including the IAVW management reports

5.1 Implementation of the IAVW, including the IAVW management reports (Deliverable 01)

5.1.1 The group recalled that it had requested the VAAC Provider States to prepare concise management reports to be presented at every meeting of the IAVWOPSG (Conclusion 1/2 refers) for consideration by the group. The group reviewed the management reports presented, noted their contents, discussed issues emanating from them and agreed that they satisfied the intent of Conclusion 1/2.

5.1.2 In this regard the group noted that:

a) VAAC Anchorage – The Anchorage VAAC continues to champion the testing and development of a geospatially enabled VAAC collaboration tool. A tool such as this is integral in achieving the goal of a harmonized global VAAC product and service. The Anchorage VAAC, which is part of the Alaska Aviation Weather Unit (MWO), is undergoing a modernization and movement to a digital aviation database. This will allow for greater consistency in products and services within Alaska. New VAAC-related tools have been developed to better utilize satellite imagery and dispersion model output to create a more streamlined forecast process;

b) VAAC Buenos Aires – During the period August 2011-November 2012 the Buenos Aires VAAC issued 959 Volcanic Ash (VA) Advisories for 7 (seven) volcanoes, which included the Cordón del Caulle event. Two (2) annual SIGMET tests were run during the period July 2011-November 2012, the first on December 2011 and the second on December 2012. The Southern Hemisphere Ash Propagation Exercise (SHAPE) was enforced as a tool to test communications capabilities among the Southern Hemispheres VAACs. It is planned to be run between Buenos Aires VAAC and Toulouse VAAC during the first half of 2013. The National Meteorology Service of Argentina has renewed the Buenos Aires VAAC section on its Internet web site at http://www.smn.gov.ar/vaac/buenosaires/inicio.php?lang=en) to concentrate all general related information (operational and informative) of interest to users, in both English and Spanish languages. The Buenos Aires VAAC contributed to the VAAC ‘Inputs and Outputs’ Modelling Workshop 2012– NCEP, Washington DC, 5-9 November 2012, by submitting a remote delivery presentation on Buenos Aires VAAC Modelling Strategy, Cordón del Caulle 2011-2012 eruption. At a governmental level, a formal Agreement of collaboration was signed between the SEGEMAR (Secretarìa de Minerìa y Geologìa de Argentina) and the SERNAGEOMIN (Servicio Nacional de Geología y Minería de Chile) for the benefit of the BA-VAAC operations;

c) VAAC Darwin – VAAC Darwin issued 1382 volcanic ash advisories during the reporting period, including significant eruptions from Mt Soputan in Indonesia and the end of the pan-hemispheric Cordon Caulle eruption. Considerable progress had been made in progressing backup arrangements with Tokyo VAAC, with three backup tests performed and arrangements expected to be finalized during 2013. VAAC Darwin representatives had visited MWOs in Papua New Guinea and Indonesia, resulting in a substantial improvement in communications between those


offices and the VAAC, and Australia and Indonesia had formed a working group to discuss further improvement in the operation of the IAVW in the region. The group was pleased to note a post-event report by VAAC Darwin on one of the high-level eruptions of Soputan, which identified some specific follow-up actions that had now been completed. VAAC Darwin has also maintained ISO 9001:2008 certification during the reporting period and has continued to develop internal procedures and its competency-based training and assessment;

d) VAAC London – VAAC London took part in 5 volcanic ash exercises during the period and participated in two meetings of the ICAO EUR/NAT Volcanic Ash Exercises Steering Group. Extensive changes and developments have been made to the VAAC London production and dissemination system for volcanic ash products. These include enhancements to the collection and display of satellite observations of volcanic ash, new hardware to run the NAME dispersion model, optimized and more flexible coding, development of new volcanic ash products and distribution of the products via file transfer protocol (FTP) and websites. The new production system came into operational use during mid-2012. Volcanic Ash Advisories in Graphical Format (VAG) from all 9 VAACs are now being received by the SADIS Provider State and being broadcast on the SADIS Satellite Broadcast and FTP server;

e) VAAC Montréal – No eruption affected the area responsibility of VAAC Montréal during the period June 2011 – November 2012. However VAAC Montréal was kept busy with twice-weekly internal exercises, ongoing monitoring of volcanic activity in regions of interest, tests of the collaboration tool with VAAC Anchorage, collaborations with VAAC London, the IVATF meetings, the VAAC Best Practices Workshops and atmospheric transport/dispersion modeling in support VAAC Darwin and VAAC Wellington operations following the Puyehu-Cordón Caulle, Chile eruption in June 2011;

f) VAAC Tokyo – VAAC Tokyo issued 1896 VA Advisories for ten volcanoes in its area of responsibility in this period (from July 2011 to December 2012). VAAC Tokyo is establishing mutual backup operation procedures with VAAC Darwin, and conducted 3 communication tests in this regard. The tests proved that our backup procedures work appropriately. EUR/NAT Volcanic Ash Exercise in Kamchatka in 2013 (VOLKAM13) was implemented from 15 to 16 January 2013. Volcano observatories, ATMCs, ACCs, MWOs and operators from the Russian Federation, Japan and the United States joined in VOLKAM13. VAAC Tokyo, as a regional centre in charge of the Kamchatka peninsula, is also cooperating in this important effort. Outcomes of VOLKAM13 are available at http://www.paris.icao.int/Met/Volc_Ash/docs/Report_VOLKAM13_Deb_VOLCEXSG2.pdf. In February 2014, VAAC Tokyo will update its operational system used to detect ash cloud, predict it and issue advisories. In the same year, the Japan Meteorological Agency plans to launch a geostationary meteorological satellite named Himawari-8 (Himawari means “sunflower” in Japanese) as the follow-on to the MTSAT series and will begin its operation in 2015. The new system will be designed to use Himawari-8 images.;


g) VAAC Toulouse – From June 2011 to Nov 2012, VAAC Toulouse issued 188 VA Advisories/VAGs. When issued for EUR/NAT region, where there is still a specific demand (according to the EUR/NAT ATM volcanic ash contingency plan) for modelled ash concentration charts as supplementary information for users, provided by the meteorological offices collocated with VAACs London and Toulouse, a new method for generating the charts has been implemented by VAAC Toulouse. To provide consistency between the ash concentrations charts and the VA Advisories/VAGs (of which only the latter is required under Annex 3 provisions), two successive runs of the dispersion model are now necessary. Toulouse VAAC has special concerns about the thresholds chosen for the three levels of contamination, not scientifically validated. Future developments in MétéoFrance include the implementation of a 13 dual polarization LIDARs network with a large vertical range (12 km);

h) VAAC Washington – The Washington VAAC maintains a very large operational area covered by many MWOs stretching from the United States/Canada border south into the northern part of South America. During the last operational period, 1211 VA Advisories were issued along with 322 VAGs. In addition, Washington VAAC participated in several international meetings and exercises including 2 exercises in the CAR/SAM Region and 1 in the ASIA/PAC Region. Washington VAAC is also working to produce a quality management system (QMS) and is working with Anchorage VAAC on testing and evaluation of a VAAC collaboration tool; and

i) VAAC Wellington – Operational activity for the Wellington VAAC has been relatively quiet since the Cordon Caulle event in 2011 (covered in the previous management report). Three New Zealand volcanoes had experienced increased alert levels in 2012, although there had been only minor eruptive activity – at Mount Tongariro and White Island – for which a total of 29 Advisory bulletins were issued. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between New Zealand and Australia covering cooperation between the Wellington and Darwin VAACs has been re-negotiated and is expected to be signed by mid-2013. The MoU will include a new arrangement for Wellington to serve as a backup for that part of the Darwin AoR south of latitude 20S. In light of experience during the Cordon Caulle event, and the recent focus on VAAC best practices, Wellington VAAC has completed a review of its resourcing. This has led to industry acceptance of a proposal for additional resources in forecast operations, modelling, development and satellite data retrieval. This arrangement will come into effect on 1 July 2013, placing the VAAC in a much stronger position with respect to capability development and delivering operational services during major events.

5.1.3 In view of the applicability date of 15 November 2012 of a requirement in Annex 3 for the implementation of a properly organized quality system comprising procedures, processes and resources necessary to provide for the quality management of the meteorological information to be supplied to users, the group formulated the following conclusion accordingly:


Conclusion 7/11 — Inclusion of QMS implementation status in the VAAC Management Reports

That the VAACs include in the VAAC management reports to the group information on the status of implementation of a quality system for the provision of meteorological information supplied to users (i.e. volcanic ash advisories and volcanic ash advisories in graphical format), including any achieved Certification in accordance with the ISO 9001:2008 Standard of QMS, any back-up arrangements and whether the QMS is part of an umbrella system for the entire meteorological service provider organization or specific for the VAAC operations.

Note. ― Annex 3 – Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation, requires that a properly organized quality system shall be established and implemented to provide for the quality management of the meteorological information supplied to users. Annex 3 recommends that the quality system established should be in conformity with the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 9000 series of quality assurance standards and should be certified by an approved organization.

VAACs areas of responsibility

5.1.4 The group noted that, while the areas of responsibility of VAACs had a near-global coverage, there were still areas where flight operations were performed that could possibly be affected by volcanic ash but for which there was currently no VAAC coverage. In this regard, the group noted that one such situation was the area north of the VAAC Toulouse and VAAC Tokyo areas of responsibility limiting also on 60° East with VAAC London and on 150° East with VAAC Anchorage. Traffic was increasing in the area concerned due to use of cross-polar and trans-polar routes. According to information provided by the ICAO ATM Section (Source: NAV Canada), an average of thirty-four flights per day were using such routes. Consequently, flights operating in the referred area would not receive volcanic ash advisory information since no VAAC currently maintained watch. The group concurred, in light of the information provided, that it was important to address the lack of coverage of the area described above. In this regard, the group formulated the following conclusion:


Conclusion 7/12 — VAACs areas of responsibility

That, an ad-hoc group consisting of France (Rapporteur), Canada, Japan, United Kingdom and United States

a) develop proposals for volcanic ash advisory centre (VAAC) coverage in the area north of the existing VAAC Toulouse and VAAC Tokyo areas of responsibility limiting also on 60° East with VAAC London and on 150° East with VAAC Anchorage; and


Daily volcano status briefing product

5.1.5 As a follow-up of IAVWOPSG Conclusion 6/7, the group reviewed a progress report on how situational awareness information could best be collated and presented by VAAC Provider States to support the operation of the IAVW, such as in the form of a daily volcano status briefing product. The group appreciated that the development of such a product had continued during the previous eighteen months, and noted that an important safety outcome from the International Volcanic Ash Task Force (IVATF) was that operators should have a strategy and process which captures information in relation to their operations over areas where a large number of active volcanoes exist (Flight Safety and Volcanic Ash (Doc 9974), paragraph 5.2 refers). Fulfilling part of the recommendation is to have the information to support such a strategy, whereby the IAVW structure should facilitate situational awareness. In this regard, products such as the Volcano Observatory Notice for Aviation (VONA) and a proposed “daily summary” are in support of this and indicate a strong alignment of IAVWOPSG and IVATF thinking.

5.1.6 The group noted that, using the interactive information provided by VAAC Darwin, one major operator in the Asia/Pacific Region had developed a threat/action/conditions matrix using a mix of volcano profile information, and an advised threat probability, to determine the necessity for route avoidance. An important aspect of the situational awareness approach is that less experienced operators can assess an overall situation quickly, and could have access to visual and summary materials that lead them towards the formal IAVW-related products governed by provisions in Annex 3 — Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation.

5.1.7 The group agreed that, if a daily volcano status briefing product was globally applied by VAACs and then further supported with a VONA that aids tactical decision making, this would largely meet aviation requirements. This approach aims to integrate the threat posed by heightened volcanic activity into the flight planning process, especially for regions which may already be operationally challenging, for example in high-density airspace. Such an interchange will necessarily lead to better situational awareness and place the VAACs in a good position to positively contribute to a higher quality suite of information. The group noted that for VAACs with numerous volcanoes in their area of responsibility, the workload associated with this proposal may be significant and could pose resource problems. In view of the foregoing, the group recommended that the VAACs continue to develop

5.1-6 Report on Agenda Item 5.1 appropriate approaches for providing situational awareness to aviation for their respective areas of responsibility, and formulated the following conclusion:

Conclusion 7/13 —Situational awareness for aviation operators That in support of operators safety management systems/safety risk assessments:

a) all VAAC Provider States be invited to consider the provision of situational awareness information on volcanic activity relative to their area of coverage and ways it can be proactively obtained and presented in a consistent manner; and

b) an ad-hoc group consisting of Australia (Rapporteur),

France, United Kingdom, United States, IATA, IUGG and WMO further develop concepts related to a) above, and report to the IAVWOPSG/8 meeting.

List of volcanoes that threaten aviation

5.1.8 The group noted that as a follow-up of Conclusion 6/23 b), concerning the development of a list of volcanoes that threaten aviation and are unmonitored or inadequately monitored for the risks they pose, a letter was sent in December 2011 from the Secretary General of ICAO to the President of the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics (IUGG) asking the IUGG to take appropriate action.

5.1.9 In this regard, the group appreciated that such a list of volcanoes would help States to comply with the requirement recently adopted in Amendment 76 to Annex 3 (paragraph 3.6 refers), applicable 14 November 2013, which calls for the monitoring of active or potentially active volcanoes (with appropriate guidance material to be contained in the Handbook on the International Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW) — Operational Procedures and Contact List (Doc 9766)).

5.1.10 It was noted with regard to Conclusion 6/23 b) that the World Organization of Volcano Observatories (WOVO) leadership has submitted a proposal to the International Air Transport Association (IATA) that requested funding to carry out the work of identifying unmonitored or under-monitored volcanoes in terms of the risks they pose and examining ways to improve communications links from field observatories and parent organizations to the VAACs. It was understood that WOVO was awaiting a formal response from IATA on the proposal. In the event that funding support from IATA does not prove possible, the group appreciated that an alternative approach would need to be identified.

5.1.11 The group agreed that Conclusion 6/23 b) remained valid and that the Secretary would reflect this in the IAVWOPSG/7 meeting follow-up table.


Need for a definition of cessation of eruption

5.1.12 The group noted that during the consultation stage with States and International Organizations on Amendment 76 to Annex 3, a comment was received from the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) concerning the lack of a definition for eruption cessation. WMO supported, in principle, the part of the amendment referring to the inclusion of volcanic eruption cessation as required information from State volcano observatories (Amendment 76, Annex 3, Appendix 2, paragraph 4.1 refers), while noting that no definition of what constitutes the cessation of eruption had been provided. In its comment, WMO additionally stated that, in the event of a protracted series of eruptions, a minimum time of no significant eruption should be defined to declare the cessation of the eruption. According to WMO, the question of a suitable length of time should be posed to volcanological experts. The group noted the WMO comments but agreed that the standard referred to above was intended for operational aviation and there was no need at this stage to do further work on the definition of eruption cessation. Therefore the group agreed that VAACs will identify any issues on cessation of eruption, and if needed, will report to the group’s next meeting.

VAAC operational best practices

5.1.13 The group recalled that it formulated Conclusion 6/8 inviting Australia, in conjunction with WMO, to facilitate a workshop for all VAACs in 2012 or 2013 to share, develop and document VAAC best practices, in order to support harmonization of the VAACs’ operating procedures and to mitigate inconsistency for operators. In this regard, the group reviewed a report presented by Australia on the successful VAAC Best Practices process, including the conducting of a series of VAAC Best Practice (VAAC BP) seminars conjoint with meetings of the IVATF. Prior to VAAC BP/1 in February 2012, New Zealand kindly coordinated the compilation of results from a VAAC best practices questionnaire as a follow-up to Conclusion 6/9. These results were analysed and presented at VAAC BP/1, and formed the basis of discussions. The group noted the outstanding work of New Zealand and the open participation of all VAACs in this regard. The group also noted that as a follow-up to Conclusion 6/8, and with the generous financial support of IATA which enabled the active participation of all VAAC managers, three VAAC Best Practices (VAAC BP) seminars were held as follows:

a) VAAC BP/1 — 13 to 14 February 2012, in Montreal prior to IVATF/3,

b) VAAC BP/2 — 12 to 13 June 2012, in Montreal prior to IVATF/4, and

c) VAAC BP/3 — 11 to 15 March 2013, Citeko, Indonesia, in parallel with the 6th International Workshop on Volcanic Ash.

5.1.14 The reports of these seminars are available on the group’s website at: http://www.icao.int/safety/meteorology/iavwopsg/Lists/Workshops/.

5.1.15 The group noted that, during VAAC BP/2, the definition for best practice VAAC analysis and forecasting was agreed as follows:

“VAAC Best Practice is the expert evaluation of the best available sources of meteorological and volcanological information:

a) qualitative and quantitative satellite data;


b) model output;

c) ground- and airborne-based in-situ and remotely sensed observations; and

d) air reports;

using (where possible) collaborative approaches, to derive authoritative, high quality, evidence-based and globally consistent volcanic ash analyses and forecasts.”

5.1.16 In light of the information provided, the group agreed that the best practices approach had proven an effective way to address pressing issues of VAAC consistency and IAVW development. In this regard, the group recommended that the best practice methodology be considered as a future mechanism for use by the IAVWOPSG for issues that need to be progressed urgently, particularly where the active involvement of VAAC managers is required. Accordingly, the group formulated the following conclusion:

Conclusion 7/14 — VAAC Best Practices Seminars

That the group, noting the utility and progress made by the threeVAAC Best Practices Seminars held in 2012 and 2013, inviteICAO, in coordination with WMO, to facilitate further seminars, should the need arise in support of the work of the IAVWOPSGand associated IAVW arrangements.

Definition of “lead VAAC” (or “primary VAAC”)

5.1.17 The group reviewed the report of the ad-hoc group tasked with the follow-up of Conclusion 6/11 concerning the definition of “lead VAAC”. In this regard, the group noted that the report, in addition to Conclusion 6/11, addressed some of the recommendations of VAAC BP/1. The group noted that the report proposed changes to Doc 9766 to:

a) define the roles and responsibilities of the primary VAAC (formerly known as “lead VAAC”);

b) define how the coordination between primary and other VAACs is to take place; and

c) add more flexibility for the VAACs when volcanic ash clouds impact two or more VAAC areas of responsibility.

5.1.18 The report also proposed that examples and illustrations be developed to test the proposed modifications prior to finalizing them, and that they be added to Doc 9766 to help VAAC staff and others better understand the changes.

5.1.19 In this regard, it was noted that the suggested changes offer more flexibility and options to the VAACs when large-scale eruptions occur and volcanic ash clouds extend over great distances and will address, inter alia, one of the greatest challenges for the provision of volcanic ash information, namely consistency and harmonization between the providers of the information (i.e. the VAACs).

5.1.20 In light of the proposals put forward in the report, the group formulated the following conclusion:


Conclusion 7/15 — Modifications to Doc 9766 concerning the definition of “lead VAAC”

That:

a) taking into account the proposed version of the proceduresin Appendix H to this report, an ad-hoc group consisting of Australia, Canada (Rapporteur), New Zealand, UnitedKingdom, United States and IATA develop examples andillustrations for inclusion in draft amendment to the Handbook on the International Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW) — Operational Procedures and Contact List(Doc 9766) that help:

1) identify any inconsistency or deficiency in theproposed version of the procedures; and

2) VAAC staff and others better understand the changesproposed to the procedures; and

b) the Secretary circulate the revised version of theprocedures presented in Appendix H and the follow-up to a) above to the group for review and, if possible, approval if possible by end September 2013; and

c) upon completion of b), the Secretary prepare a revision for inclusion in Doc 9766.

Reconciliation of IAVWOPSG/IVATF work programmes

5.1.21 The group recalled that it tasked an ad-hoc working group under Conclusion 6/14 to ensure that, in light of the IAVWOPSG and IVATF work programmes, each of the matters raised by the International Air Transport Association (IATA) at the IAVWOPSG/6 meeting were adequately covered or clearly allocated to the appropriate forum or working group. In this regard, the group noted that, on 10 November 2011, the member from France, as the Rapporteur of the ad-hoc working group, informed the Secretariat via e-mail that the referred reconciliation was quickly performed and provided proposals which are given in Appendix I to this report.

Definitions of visible ash and discernible ash

5.1.22 The group was aware that IVATF Recommendation 4/10 invited the IAVWOPSG to consider the concepts of visible ash and discernible ash and, if needed, to develop definitions for robust operational use for volcanic ash forecasting and flight planning purposes. In this regard, the group reviewed a report presented by the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics (IUGG) and WMO which contained suggested enhancements to the definitions of the terms visible ash and discernible ash that were proposed at the IVATF/4 meeting in June 2012.

5.1-10 Report on Agenda Item 5.1 5.1.23 The group, after review of the information provided and the suggested definitions, agreed that both the terms visible ash and discernible ash have value for aviation use. The term visible ash is tactically useful to the flight crew while en-route. The term discernible ash would be strategically useful to the VAACs for forecasting the likely presence of volcanic ash in the atmosphere and to the operators for use in flight planning. The group also agreed that the term visible ash should only be used to describe the human-eye observation of volcanic ash and thereby be acknowledged as a purely qualitative definition; in particular it was noted that “visible” should not be considered as a proxy for the widely referenced value of 2 mg/m3. The term discernible ash applies to both qualitative aircraft-related impacts and to in-situ and remote-sensing detection methods, both quantitative and qualitative. If volcanic ash has been observed by the human eye or detected by impacts on/in the aircraft, then it is universally recognized that some form of reactive mitigating action should be taken. Whenever possible, VAACs would primarily use the discernible ash definition to underpin their analysis and production of volcanic ash forecast advisories upon which strategic planning decisions are then taken. It was also be reaffirmed that aircraft reports would continue to be used to help inform an analysis of any given situation. The group considered that further guidance be provided to MWOs on the issuance of SIGMET in light of the new definitions and should be discussed at the next meeting. The group then formulated the following conclusion:

Conclusion 7/16 — Definitions of visible ash and discernible ash for operational use

That:

a) visible ash be defined as “volcanic ash observed by thehuman eye” and not be defined quantitatively by theobserver;

b) discernible ash be defined as “volcanic ash detected bydefined impacts on/in aircraft or by agreed in-situ and/or remote-sensing techniques”;

c) in accordance with agreed VAAC best practice, the“discernible ash” definition be applied to delineatevolcanic ash clouds on volcanic ash forecasts (includingvolcanic ash advisories in graphical format); and

d) the Secretary include the definitions presented in a) and b)above in the Manual on Volcanic Ash, Radioactive Material and Toxic Chemical Clouds (Doc 9691).

Concept of operations for the IAVW

5.1.24 The group reviewed an updated version of the draft concept of operations for the IAVW as provided in the Appendix J to this Report, which is considered a living document that will evolve as the science and technology improves and operational requirements evolve. Prior to the discussion on this concept of operations, the Secretariat advised the group to give careful consideration to the concept of operations for the IAVW in the context of existing ICAO provisions and guidance.


5.1.25 The group was aware that “concepts of operation” for a range of subjects have emerged in recent years or are in the process of emerging within the IAVWOPSG and other ICAO groups (such as the World Area Forecast System Operations Group (WAFSOPSG)). In the context of the IAVWOPSG, draft concepts of operation have emerged relating to the provision of information on volcanic ash clouds, radioactive clouds and space weather. As conceptual documents, the group appreciated that they provide a vision for how existing services may be expected to evolve or how new services may be expected to develop based on evolving or emerging user requirements, so that necessary and appropriate ICAO provisions and guidance can be developed. However, it was recognized by the group that the existing draft concepts of operation have no stature/status in the context of existing ICAO provisions and guidance. While appreciating the extensive work that has been appropriated to the development of the concept of operations for the IAVW, and the others referred to herein, the group noted that the Secretariat had become aware of a misconception within industry that the concepts of operation carry the same status as guidance material in an ICAO manual. This misconception may exist elsewhere in the community. Of course, as the group appreciated, the concepts of operation do not hold any official status as ICAO publications such as Annexes or manuals. While developed by an ICAO group, the concept of operation is specifically designed to assist stakeholders in the aviation community gain a better appreciation of how existing or new services may evolve or emerge in the months and years to come.

5.1.26 The group undertook extensive discussion about the updated concept of operations in light of the Secretariat comments and taking into account its level of maturity. In this regard, while recognizing the important value of the document, the group was of the view that it is not yet finalized because performance requirements still need to be developed, and it contains reference to issues that need to be resolved. The group agreed that, what was missing in the IAVW provisions, is the development of a roadmap where future steps can be documented. It was agreed that it would be wise to use the material included in the draft version of the concept of operations for the IAVW, for the development of an IAVW roadmap in view of the outcomes of ICAO’s 12th Air Navigation Conference (19 to 30 November 2012, Montréal). This approach will help the IAVW to encompass the development called by the Air Navigation Conference of multi-disciplinary approach when dealing in the future with air navigation matters.

5.1.27 In view of the above discussion the group formulated the following conclusion:

Conclusion 7/17— Development of an IAVW roadmap

That an ad-hoc group consisting of Canada, China, France, Germany, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States (Rapporteur), IATA, ICCAIA, and WMO to be tasked to:

a) develop an IAVW roadmap for the provision of information services in support of the aviation system block upgrade (ASBU) methodology to be included in ICAO’s Global Air Navigation Plan, taking into consideration the draft concept of operations for the IAVW as presented in Appendix J to this report; and

b) provide a draft of the roadmap called for by a) above by 29 November 2013 for onward consideration at the IAVWOPSG/8 meeting and the proposed ICAO MET Divisional Meeting in July 2014.

5.1-12 Report on Agenda Item 5.1 Approaches to decrease input uncertainty and to increase model accuracy

5.1.28 The group recalled that, in an effort to improve volcanic ash dispersion forecasts, it had formulated Conclusion 6/28 inviting the VAACs to take into account in their current practices the approaches suggested to decrease input uncertainty and to increase model accuracy. Additionally, the IVATF, through Recommendation 4/17 in the context of enhancement of VAAC products, had invited the IAVWOPSG to continue addressing these issues taking into account the on-going VAAC Best Practices process.

5.1.29 In this regard, the group reviewed information regarding model uncertainty in which it was noted that the reduction of model uncertainty is dependent on the reduction of uncertainty in eruption source parameters, the reduction of uncertainty in numerical weather prediction modelling (which is input to volcanic ash dispersion models) and the improvement of the modelling processes in the dispersion model such as ash removal. It was also noted that to evaluate both dispersion model accuracy and model improvements, it is necessary to compare model output with observations, and that the referred data is available only for a limited number of historical eruptions.

5.1.30 In addition, the group reviewed information regarding a WMO-sponsored VAAC “Inputs and Outputs” Modelling Workshop held at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) headquarters in Washington, DC from 5 to 9 November 2012. The group appreciated that an ad-hoc group established by the referred workshop had started to compile a volcanic eruption observational database for model validation purposes (source terms, satellite data, etc.) with the intent that all VAAC research affiliates would access the database. The database will be created in coordination with experts from the WMO-IUGG Volcanic Ash Scientific Advisory Group (VASAG) and the International Association of Volcanology and Chemistry of the Earth’s Interior (IAVCEI) Commission on Tephra Hazard modelling. The group agreed that further work on this issue should be addressed to the VASAG with the proposed list of tasks to be evaluated provided in Appendix K to this report. Therefore, the group formulated the following conclusion:

Conclusion 7/18 — Reducing dispersion model output uncertainty

That in an effort to improve volcanic ash dispersion forecasts, theWMO-IUGG VASAG be invited to:

a) encourage research to quantify and reduce dispersion modeloutput uncertainty in view of supporting operational decision making within the framework of the internationalairways volcano watch (IAVW);

b) evaluate the list in Appendix K to this report in order to prioritize which task(s) would provide the greatest benefit inmitigating the uncertainty in modelling; and

c) report to the IAVWOPSG/8 meeting.


5.1.31 With regard to increasing model accuracy, the group noted information provided by Canada and the United States concerning the inclusion of a measure of confidence level/indication of uncertainty in the volcanic ash advisory. In this regard, the group was informed that VAAC BP/1 had considered and proposed ways to express a measure of confidence in the volcanic ash advisory/volcanic ash advisory in graphical format (VA Advisory/VAG) at T+0 hours (observed or estimated ash cloud). The report of VAAC BP/2 presented additional ideas on how this might be achieved. Furthermore, IVATF Recommendation 4/17 a) invited the IAVWOPSG to consider, in light of the VAAC Best Practices process, a means to convey uncertainty and confidence in volcanic ash analyses and forecasts. The group discussed the different aspects of the proposal, such as agreement to apply confidence levels (using the remarks section of the VA Advisory template), when and how this could be achieved by the VAACs, where it will be documented as a reference for VAAC staff and users, and if the focus would be in a short- or medium-term objective. In light of the information presented, the group considered working towards the inclusion, in the remarks section of the VA Advisory, of a confidence level at the time of observation of a volcanic ash cloud (i.e. at T+0 hours). The group was also of the opinion that it was necessary to perform an evaluation of forecast confidence to meet the needs of volcanic ash related safety risk assessments. Therefore, the group formulated the following conclusions:

Conclusion 7/19 —Expressing confidence at the time of observation of an ash cloud (T+0 hours) in the volcanic ash advisory/volcanic ash advisory in graphical format (VA Advisory/VAG)

That an ad-hoc working group consisting of members from all the VAAC Provider States(with Canada as Rapporteur) and WMO be tasked to:

a) define the details concerning the inclusion of confidence in VA Advisories/VAGs and possible roll-out strategies to support implementation;

b) decide where information and guidance material for

VAACs and users will be made available; and c) provide the final material to the Secretary by October

2013 for inclusion in appropriate ICAO manuals (Doc 9691 and/or Doc 9766) and posting on the IAVWOPSG website, if necessary.


Conclusion 7/20 — Evaluation of forecast confidence to meet the needs of volcanic ash related safety risk assessments

That an ad-hoc working group consisting of members from all theVAAC Provider States (with Australia as Rapporteur) IATA and WMO, be tasked to:

a) determine the scientific limitations for assigningconfidence to volcanic ash analysis and forecasts;

b) determine an appropriate product(s) based on the outcomes

of a) that will help inform users safety risk assessments; and

c) report progress to the IAVWOPSG/8 meeting.

VAAC London: Operational use of satellite volcanic ash products, and Met Office United Kingdom) civil contingency aircraft and volcanic ash products issued

5.1.32 The group noted information provided by VAAC London on the various types of satellite data available in near-real time for the detection and monitoring of volcanic emissions. In this regard, the group noted the information provided regarding the operational use of the satellite products to show the current extent of the volcanic ash cloud in real time, to validate the forecasts of ash extent and concentration and to help determine the source parameters of the ash plume which are input to the dispersion model.

5.1.33 The group also noted information presented by VAAC London that provided technical details of the instrumented research aircraft operated by the Met Office (United Kingdom) in support of volcanic eruptions in the European and North Atlantic regions.

5.1.34 Finally, the group noted the information provided by VAAC London (collocated with the Met Office (United Kingdom)) regarding the products currently issued to meet the requirements of Annex 3 and support the ICAO EUR/NAT Region’s ATM contingency planning.

Tools for VAACs in support of collaborative decision making

5.1.35 The group recalled that, in support of collaborative decision making, IVATF Recommendation 4/18 had invited the IAVWOPSG to consider the need to develop ICAO provisions concerning collaborative forecasting tools among the VAACs in the production of volcanic ash advisories. In this regard, the group reviewed a report presented by the United States as a follow-up of the said recommendation which proposed procedures and guidelines outlining how the collaborative decision analysis and forecasting process would take place between the VAACs and certain stakeholders during a volcanic event which extends across more than one VAAC boundary.

5.1.36 The group noted a tool called envirocast vision collaboration module (EVCM) which was demonstrated by the United States at IVATF/4 and VAAC BP/2. The tool is for stakeholders to discuss issues concerning a major volcanic eruption in order to support the development of an improved volcanic ash forecast and promote sharing of information. This would allow consensus by sharing information and


expertise on the ash cloud height, horizontal extent, etc. At the end of the process, the operator would receive an enhanced level of information facilitating a more informed operational decision.

5.1.37 The group agreed that not all volcanic events require the use of collaborative decision analysis and forecasting, but in light of related issues highlighted at IAVWOPSG/6, IVATF meetings and the VAAC Best Practices seminars, the group agreed on the development of a collaborative decision analysis forecast process, and the use of tools similar to the one presented. These tools could greatly assist with the collaborative production of VA Advisories/VAGs among the VAACs concerned when volcanic ash crosses or is forecast to cross VAAC boundaries. This process will allow for the regional and global harmonization of volcanic ash products issued by the VAACs, which has been requested by IATA and other stakeholders. The group noted the promising progress made in this area, and noted that further work would help resolve operational implementation issues including software licencing. In this regard, the group formulated the following conclusion:

Conclusion 7/21 — Volcanic ash advisory collaborative decision analysis and forecasting procedures

That an ad-hoc group consisting of the Australia, Canada, France, Japan and United States (Rapporteur) be tasked to:

a) further develop the guidelines and procedures presented in

Appendix L to this report relating to collaborative decision analysis and forecasting for volcanic ash advisories, initiallyonly between the VAACs, for future inclusion in theHandbook on the International Airways Volcano Watch(IAVW) — Operational Procedures and Contact List(Doc 9766); and

b) report on progress to the IAVWOPSG/8 meeting.

Common web page for viewing the output from more than one dispersion model

5.1.38 The group reviewed a proposal to use a common web page for VAACs to provide their model output to each other. In this regard, it was noted that the WMO regional specialized meteorological centres (RSMCs) producing dispersion forecasts for radiological incidents use a common web page to provide their model output to each other and to RSMC product users. This is a convenient way to view dispersion forecasts from more than one centre. Since each RSMC has its own independent, but common look and feel, web page where other centres post their products, the information can always be accessed from one of the sites if another is down. The group agreed to explore this common web page approach as a means for VAACs to share information from dispersion and transport models in support of the development and documentation of VAAC Best Practices. The group agreed that a password protected test website should be set up as a proof of concept and for demonstration purposes. Therefore, the group formulated the following conclusion:


Conclusion 7/22 — Common web page for VAACs

That an ad-hoc group consisting of members from Australia,Canada (rapporteur), France, Germany, United Kingdom and theUnited States be tasked to:

a) investigate the feasibility and usefulness of a volcanic ash advisory centre (VAAC) common web page as a means to share dispersion model outputs amongst the VAACs;

b) develop and test a password-protected, common web page

prototype to post VAAC dispersion model outputs as aproof of concept and for demonstration purposes; and

c) report back to the IAVWOPSG/8 meeting.

Availability of basic meteorological data and data collection and exchange of aerosol data

5.1.39 IVATF Recommendation 4/7 invited the IAVWOPSG, in the context of improving meteorological data gathering during volcanic eruptions, in close cooperation with the WMO and national or regional agencies operating observing platforms, to promote the availability of basic meteorological data as well as data collection and exchange for aerosol data (and their respective contingencies) in accordance with the needs of the IAVW. In this regard, the IVATF suggested that the effort should include a review of ICAO and WMO guidance material on cost recovery for aeronautical meteorological service provision. The group discussed this issue and recognized that it may have wider implications, which would be beyond the terms of reference of IAVWOPSG. The group felt, however, that it would be useful to consider the matter further at a future stage in the context of volcanic ash provisions prior to the development of any recommendations.

5.1.40 WMO informed the meeting of substantial progress in defining and providing suitable meteorological observations in support of the IAVW process. In collaboration with the WMO Global Atmospheric Watch Programme of the Commission for the Atmospheric Sciences (CAS) and the German meteorological service (Deutscher Wetterdienst, DWD), an interactive tool to identify, access and display LIDAR and ceilometer data primarily over Europe, but extending to other parts of the world, was developed and can be viewed at http://www.dwd.de/ceilomap. Also, the sixty-fourth session of the WMO Executive Council (2012) was informed of the need for surface-based remote sensing data, such as weather radars in support of eruption monitoring, and a joint letter by the Secretaries General of WMO and ICAO was addressed to WMO Members and Contracting States requesting the necessary resources to improve and maintain the relevant observing networks, and where necessary, their operational use during a volcanic ash crisis.

5.1.41 Furthermore, the meeting was informed of the WMO “Rolling Review of Requirements” for observational systems under the responsibility of the WMO Expert Team on Observing System Design and Evolution (IPET-OSDE), and invited VAACs and interested States to consult the relevant Observing Systems Capability Analysis and Review (OSCAR) website at http://www.wmo-sat.info/oscar/observingrequirements with a view to informing WMO of any data requirements for the IAVW that currently appear not fully met.


5.1.42 The group discussed this issue and formulated the following conclusion accordingly:

Conclusion 7/23 — Aerosol observations exchange

That an ad-hoc group consisting of members representingIUGG,WMO (rapporteur), France and Germany be tasked to:

a) conduct a review of existing and evolving aerosolobservation capabilities, networks, future plans andassociated applications (e.g., to support the definition ofdiscernible ash), with a view to enhancing data andinformation exchange within the international airwaysvolcano watch (IAVW); and

b) report to the IAVWOPSG/8 meeting on progress with

regard to a) above. Improving communication channels between VAACs and States with active volcanoes

5.1.43 IVATF Recommendation 4/9 b) invited the IAVWOPSG to task the VAAC Provider States, and the World Organization of Volcano Observatories (WOVO) through the IUGG, to take the lead in efforts to:

a) improve communication channels between VAACs and States with active volcanoes; and

b) review and improve related guidance within Doc 9766 accordingly.

In this regard, the group considered that this recommendation had been fully addressed by the group in the discussions already recorded under this agenda item – in particular paragraph 5.1.10 of this Report and that therefore no further follow-up action was required. Development of the VAR

5.1.44 The group recalled that IVATF Recommendation 4/23 invited the IAVWOPSG, in the context of the volcanic activity report (VAR), to:

a) develop a revised ICAO model VAR form based on the comparison and recommendations provided at Appendix F to the IVATF/4 report;

b) develop suitable provisions to enable the introduction of a revised ICAO model VAR form, including associated production and dissemination processes;

c) continue work on establishing a global repository for VAR forms; and

d) explore near-future interactive electronic means for the in-flight completion of the VAR form and provide an outline of a far-future integrated communications concept.

5.1-18 Report on Agenda Item 5.1 5.1.45 The group discussed this recommendation and noted that it was consistent with long-running efforts by the group to improve the operation of the IAVW in this regard. The utility of the VAR form had been discussed at some length in previous meetings. Further discussion on this matter was recorded in paragraph 5.2.14 of this Report.

Information overload during volcanic eruptions

5.1.46 The group recalled that IVATF Recommendation 4/24 invited the IAVWOPSG, in the context of ways and means to reduce or eliminate information overload during volcanic eruptions, and noting the complexities and complementary roles of VAAs, SIGMET for volcanic ash and NOTAM for volcanic ash to:

a) consider what, if any, urgent strategies, additional to enhanced collaborative processes, may be necessary to build consistent, best-practice volcanic ash analysis, forecasting and advice across the IAVW;

b) review, in coordination with the Meteorological Warnings Study Group (METWSG), the future need for VAAs and SIGMET information for volcanic ash; and

c) review, in coordination with the Aeronautical Information Services to Aeronautical Information Management Study Group (AIS-AIMSG), existing provisions in Annex 15 — Aeronautical Information Services concerning NOTAM for volcanic ash, in light of a) and b) above.

5.1.47 The group was also informed by the Secretariat of the work being undertaken by the AIS-AIMSG related to NOTAM for volcanic ash and ASHTAM. In this regard, the group was apprised of the results of a discussion within the AIS-AIMSG/7 meeting (14 to 18 January 2013, Montréal) concerning the NOTAM template for volcanic ash events, arising from the study group’s consideration of AIS-AIMSG/7-SN/9.

5.1.48 The group acknowledged that during discussions on the use of the NOTAM and ASHTAM templates, the AIS-AIMSG had still not come to a position with respect to the disposition of ASHTAM. The group also noted that the AIS-AIMSG was intending to seek the views from those States that customarily issue ASHTAM on a proposition that it be withdrawn and replaced by a standard NOTAM template and guidance – through the formulation of AIS-AIMSG Actions agreed 3/10 (revised), 7/4 and 7/5. In view of this information, the group (IAVWOPSG) considered it prudent to wait for the outcomes from the AIS-AIMSG in this regard, noting that the next meeting of the AIS-AIMSG was intended to be held 4 to 8 November 2013.


Agenda Item 5: Operation of the IAVW 5.2: Improvement and content of all volcanic ash related messages

5.2 Improvement and content of all volcanic ash related messages (Deliverable 03)

Guidance material about VONA

5.2.1 The group recalled that the Handbook on the International Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW) — Operational Procedures and Contact List (Doc 9766), Appendix E, contained the format for volcano observatory notice for aviation (VONA) as part of the strategy to foster the implementation of volcano observatory reporting. In addition, Amendment 76 to Annex 3 formally introduced, as a Recommended Practice, the use of VONA by volcano observatories when sending information to area control centres (ACCs), meteorological watch offices (MWOs) and VAACs. The group agreed that additional guidance in Doc 9766 was necessary to support the use of VONA by volcano observatories. In this regard, the group concurred that the guidance material to be developed should address, inter alia, the means of communication to deliver this information from volcano observatories to ACCs, MWOs and VAACs. In this regard, the meeting noted that the development of regional guidance would also assist States during volcanic ash events and exercises. Therefore, the group formulated the following conclusion:

Conclusion 7/24 — Additional guidance on VONA

That an ad-hoc working group consisting of Australia, IATA,IUGG, Japan, New Zealand and United States (Rapporteur) betasked to:

a) develop additional guidance material on the use of thevolcano observatory notice for aviation (VONA) forinclusion in the Handbook on the International Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW) — Operational Procedures and Contact List (Doc 9766) to support the implementation of Annex 3 – Meteorological Service for International AirNavigation (Amendment 76) provisions in this regard; and

b) submit the guidance material called for by a) to the

Secretary by end September 2013 for inclusion inDoc 9766 accordingly.

Enhancement of VAAs using a risk assessment process to provide support to the operators

5.2.2 Regarding enhancement of VA Advisories, the group reviewed information presented by IATA which discussed various suggested changes to the VA Advisory/VAG to support existing requirements and to best ensure the outcomes from the risk assessment process. The suggested additional requirements were to:

a) express the uncertainty associated with the observed and forecast defined horizontal and vertical extent and the movement of the ash area;


b) routinely include three-hourly time steps in the VA Advisory/VAG which is updated every six hours; agree parameters which act as the event-driven mechanism to trigger the requirement for the VA Advisory/VAG to be updated every three hours;

c) regardless if text or graphic, for the VA Advisory/VAG to be machine readable (VAG geo-referenced);

d) create the VA Advisory/VAG using comma separated variable (CSV) text and/or XML format and distribute it via the AFTN (considering length limitation) and the FTP service;

e) use CSV/XML graphical products to provide an opportunity for the VAAC to provide a more realistic ash area shape as opposed to the more conservative polygon; and

f) develop the proposition to replace the volcanic ash SIGMET with the VA Advisory/VAG.

5.2.3 With regard to the above additional requirements expressed by IATA, the group was of the opinion that it will take time to address all of them, however the group agreed that it would be helpful to consider them in the development of the IAVW roadmap discussed above (paragraphs 5.1.24-5.1.25 refers).

5.2.4 In a related issue, the group was made aware of a recent European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Safety Information Bulletin (dated 11 March 2013) in which there appeared to be confusion concerning the responsibility of the VAACs in respect of the provisions of Annex 3 and regional ATM contingency plans. More specifically, with regard to provision of volcanic ash advisories information in alphanumeric and graphical formats (as required by Annex 3 provisions), and “ash concentration charts” being used as supplementary guidance in the ATM volcanic ash contingency plan in the EUR/NAT Region (not required by Annex 3 provisions). In discussion, the group affirmed that the volcanic ash advisories in alphanumerical and graphical formats, as per Annex 3, Chapter 3 and Appendix 2, remained the globally applicable VAAC-produced guidance, produced in accordance with an evidence-centred process that uses observations, appropriate dispersion model output, and expert judgement as discussed in relation to the VAAC Best-Practices process. The advisories were considered a mature concept, noting also that further enhancements to VAAC output incorporating consideration of confidence levels amongst other refinements were under discussion and that priority was being given to further developments in this regard. The group noted that although the fifty-fourth meeting of the European Air Navigation Planning Group (EANPG/54) had concluded at its meeting in December 2012, that it was inadvisable to discontinue use of ash concentration charts in the western part of the ICAO EUR Region in the near term, as these now formed an essential part of the safety-risk-assessment process for a number of operators, the EANPG Volcanic Ash Task Force reviewing the regional ATM volcanic ash contingency plan agreed to use the outcomes from the IAVWOPSG meeting when considering changes to the plan.

5.2.5 In relation to the use of a digital format for volcanic ash advisory information, the group noted that the use of the extensible markup language/geography markup language (XML/GML) format was also suggested in the follow-up action on Conclusion 6/18 presented by the United Kingdom, which called for the acceleration of the development of the XML/GML format for dissemination of volcanic ash advisory information in coordination with the work of the Meteorological Aeronautical Requirements and Information Exchange Project Team (MARIE-PT). The group noted that prior coordination undertaken by the Secretary of the IAVWOPSG, with the Secretary of the MARIE-PT, indicated that the MARIE-PT was ready to assist the IAVWOPSG on this issue. In fact, it was suggested that the IAVWOPSG had to


first take the decision for the future use of digital format for volcanic ash advisory information, including the VAG. This would allow the MARIE-PT to start the development of the referred digital format. At the same time, appropriate provisions should be included in draft Amendment 77 to Annex 3.

5.2.6 With regard to the suggestion by the ad-hoc group tasked to follow-up Conclusion 6/18 of providing a comma-separated values (CSV) version of the VAG, it was noted that the twenty-first meeting of the Asia and Pacific Planning and Implementation Regional Group (APANPIRG/21) held in Bangkok, Thailand, from 6 to 10 September 2010 had raised a similar suggestion of inclusion of the CSV file of the VA Advisory/VAG (APANPIRG Conclusion 21/47 refers). Recognizing that the earliest opportunity to include such a provision into Annex 3 would now be Amendment 77 (with applicability in November 2016), the group agreed that it would be preferable to simply note that one or more VAACs may choose to make available a CSV file of the volcanic ash advisory information to users on a bilateral basis until such time that the XML/GML format referred to above was fully implemented. In light of the information provided, the group formulated the following decision and conclusion:

Decision 7/25 — Volcanic ash advisories in digital format That the development of a digital format of the volcanic ash advisory, in an XML/GML format, for implementation as part of draft Amendment 77 to Annex 3 — Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation, be endorsed. Note. ― The Meteorological Aeronautical Requirements and Information Exchange Project Team (MARIE-PT) is to be informed accordingly.

RSPP Conclusion 7/26 — Amendment to Annex 3 related to volcanic ash advisories in digital format (XML/GML) That the proposal to amend Annex 3 — Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation, Appendix 2, 3.1, given in Appendix M to this report be consolidated with other elements of draft Amendment 77 to Annex 3.

Possibility of SIGMET being replaced by the VAA/VAG

5.2.7 The group reviewed the follow-up of Conclusion 6/21, presented by United States, which concerned, inter-alia, an assessment on whether or not the volcanic ash advisory information in alphanumerical and graphical formats (VA Advisory and VAG) could be used to replace the volcanic ash SIGMET and the capabilities of the nine VAACs to provide such a service. It was noted that there had been continued discussion on this subject since the previous meeting. A working paper presented at the IVATF/4 meeting in June 2012 developed the idea that there must be a single, defined understanding of a situation, led by the VAAC but with the participation of others in the collaborative decision-making process, and concluded, “The Task Force may further wish to agree that, if the VAACs, States, and airlines have a mutually trusted and consistent understanding of a situation, the issue of whether the resultant advisory information is issued in SIGMET, volcanic ash advisories, or another form becomes relatively trivial. Therefore, high priority should be given to attaining this level of collaboration.”

5.2.8 In this regard, information presented by IATA also addressed the possibility of replacing the volcanic ash SIGMET by the volcanic ash advisory, stating that the benefit would be the reduction to zero of the chance of not having tactical information available.

Report on Agenda Item 5.2 5.2-4 5.2.9 The ad hoc group provided several options on whether it was feasible to replace the SIGMET for a volcanic ash cloud by the volcanic ash advisory information (VA Advisory/VAG). The group recognized there is a need to evolve from current practices; however there was no consensus as to how to progress. In view of the lack of consensus, the group agreed that it would not be productive for the ad hoc group to continue to assess the options, particularly given that this issue has been discussed for several years. The group thanked the ad-hoc group for their effort. Taking into the consideration of issues associated with the provision of SIGMET discussed extensively in previous IAVWOPSG meetings and in the IVATF, the group noted that the best way to address this issue would be in the development of the roadmap on how future information to aviation on volcanic hazards are to be provided in a collaborative way between VAACs and States in their area of responsibility, taking into consideration the requirement of integrating meteorological information into ATM. Thus the meeting noted that Block 0 of the aviation system block upgrades (ASBU) methodology of ICAO recognizes the existing services and that in the development of the roadmap for volcanic information services a proposal will be developed for Block 1 and 3 on the future capabilities to meet the service needs for operators, air navigation service providers (ANSP), and flight crew to avoid volcanic hazards to integrate meteorological information into the ATM.

SIGMET information for large, complex volcanic ash events

5.2.10 The group recalled that the IVATF reviewed various options for the depiction of SIGMET for volcanic ash in graphical format, and formulated IVATF Recommendation 4/20 inviting the IAVWOPSG to further evaluate proposed Option 4 as an interim solution to resolve issues related to SIGMET information for large complex volcanic ash events. In this regard, the group reviewed the follow-up, presented by the United States, of this recommendation. The group recalled that Option 4 was preferred since it represented a simplistic approach in depicting a complex ash cloud. This approach is for the graphical version of the SIGMET to be very detailed in shape and dimension, and then the associated text version is derived from describing the complex figure in seven points or less. The group noted that the member from the United States had considered that, in order to provide information in situations where ash clouds are at multiple flight levels and moving in different directions, there needed to be an allowance for the graphic to include more coordinates and layers than was currently allowed in Table A6-1 of Annex 3 (Template for SIGMET and AIRMET messages and special air-reports (uplink)). The group considered whether the alphanumerical and graphical SIGMET for a (complex) volcanic ash cloud had to contain identical information (e.g. coordinate data) or merely consistent information. In other words, could or should a graphical SIGMET contain less or more information than in the alphanumerical SIGMET? The group noted Annex 3 provisions being enabled under Amendment 76 (applicable 14 November 2013) recommended that the number of coordinates used in a SIGMET should be kept to a minimum and should not normally exceed seven (Note 27 to Table A6-1 refers).

5.2.11 It was noted that not all meteorological watch offices (MWOs) may be in a position to provide a graphical SIGMET. Therefore, users would need to be aware of those MWOs that are able to support this capability and use the information provided in its fullest context. The challenge for the MWO would be to translate complex information from the VAACs into a textual message (SIGMET information) if they are not able to provide a complex graphical product for the SIGMET. However, it was evident that the provision of a complex graphic, and at the same time the compliance with a minimum set of coordinates, could not be done. Thus, if a complex graphical SIGMET was translated into a few coordinates to become the text SIGMET, all users of the SIGMET information would benefit from the strengths of each product. The group agreed that, through appropriate training and guidance material, users could be advised of the differences between the two messages. Therefore, the group formulated the following conclusion:


Conclusion 7/27 — SIGMET for a complex volcanic ash cloud

That an ad-hoc working group consisting of France, Germany,United States (Rapporteur) and IATA be invited to:

a) develop guidance material to be included in the Manual of Aeronautical Meteorological Practice (Doc 8896) and/or regional SIGMET guides on the issuance andinterpretation of SIGMET information for a complexvolcanic ash cloud; and

b) report back to the IAVWOPSG/8 meeting.

Feasibility of the provision of VAA/VAG beyond the current T+18-hour requirement

5.2.12 The group recalled that IVATF Recommendation 4/17 c) had invited the IAVWOPSG, in the context of enhancement of the volcanic ash advisory, to assess the feasibility of providing the VA Advisory/VAG beyond the current T+18-hour requirement. In this regard, the group reviewed the assessment provided by the United States as a follow-up of this recommendation. It was noted that, even though there is no requirement in Annex 3 to do so, VAACs had the capability to run their ash dispersion models out beyond T+18 hours and many did so to satisfy various ACCs, IATA and other customer requirements for long-term planning purposes. However, it was also noted that the current practice of the VAACs was to advise these groups, clearly stating the diminished level of forecast confidence as the volcanic ash cloud disperses in time. Even given the sometimes low confidence at T+72 hours, there was a benefit to certain customer groups receiving such information. Additionally, a VAAC which has a high latitude area of responsibility may have a somewhat higher confidence in model performance as opposed to a VAAC with a lower latitude area of responsibility which may have difficulty with model output. Finally, lack of input data into the models and model performance in strong versus weak steering wind scenarios can also play a role. The group discussed the advantages and disadvantages of a “beyond” T+18 hour approach for the VA Advisory/VAG and agreed with the need to request customer requirements through IATA, IFALPA and other concerned stakeholders. In this regard, the group formulated the following conclusion:

Conclusion 7/28 — Volcanic ash information beyond T+18 hours

That an ad-hoc group consisting of Canada, France, Japan, NewZealand, United Kingdom, United States (Rapporteur), IATA,IFALPA and IUGG be invited to:

a) develop a proposal on the provision of volcanic ashinformation beyond the current T+18 hours timeframe,taking into consideration any constraints and limitations(such as character limitations of AFTN circuits) as well asthe quality of the information (forecast accuracy), in aneffort to meet evolving user requirements; and


Report on Agenda Item 5.2 5.2-6 Special air-reports of no ash

5.2.13 The group reviewed the follow-up, presented by France, of a recommendation arising from the final exercise report for VOLCEX12/01 conducted in the EUR/NAT Region in 2012 (EUR/NAT VOLCEX12/01). The group explored the possibility to introduce an amendment to Annex 3 to report the absence of volcanic ash in an area where volcanic ash was forecast in a volcanic ash advisory. In this regard, the group was aware that there were no provisions in Annex 3 (up to and including Amendment 76) that allowed for special air-reports for “no volcanic ash encountered” to be reported. Instead, Annex 3, Table A4-1 — Template for the special air-report (downlink), only allowed en-route reporting on pre-eruption volcanic activity, or a volcanic eruption, or the presence of a volcanic ash cloud. The group was informed that this issue had been raised during EUR/NAT VOLCEX12/01 where one objective had been to experiment with the use of special air-reports by VAAC Toulouse to improve the quality of VA Advisory/VAG.

5.2.14 The group agreed that in-situ information such as the reporting of no ash could prove valuable for improving the accuracy of VA Advisory/VAG, especially in places where other observations (e.g. satellite) are rare, incomplete or difficult to interpret. On occasions when a set of consistent information indicating the absence of volcanic ash in the same area is received by the VAAC, the forecaster would be in a position to amend the forecast and update the production. The group discussed this proposal, and noted that it closely related to other matters including the utility of the model VAR and the receipt of air-reports on volcanic ash during major events. Accordingly, the group formulated the following conclusion:

Conclusion 7/29 — Reporting of no volcanic ash

That an ad hoc group consisting of Argentina, Australia, Canada, France (Rapporteur), United States, IATA, IFALPA and WMO, in coordination with the Secretary, be tasked to:

a) further assess the feasibility and means to improve reporting of volcanic ash to volcanic ash advisory centres (VAACs), including the reporting of “no volcanic ash” in areas forecast to contain a volcanic ash cloud; and


Standardized international volcano database for VAACs

5.2.15 The group recalled that it had formulated Conclusion 6/20 a) tasking the members from the IUGG and Canada to assist the Smithsonian Institution and VAACs in finalizing a standardized international volcano database by March 2012. In this regard, the group reviewed the information presented by Canada and the IUGG on the progress made. The group noted that following the guidelines developed at the IAVWOPSG/6 meeting, the Smithsonian Institution’s Global Volcanism Program had prepared a draft database for use by VAACs. The draft database was reviewed by VAAC Montréal which proposed some modifications and corrections.

5.2.16 Due to the overwhelming workload at the Smithsonian’s Global Volcanism Program (including the migration of all their data to a different database programme) the group noted that the finalization of the international volcano database for VAACs had unavoidably been delayed and that it would be convenient to solicit feedback from VAACs on the database. Therefore, the group, noting that work is on-going, considered it prudent to review a suggested revised plan and formulated the following conclusion accordingly:


Conclusion 7/30 — Standardized international volcano database for VAACs

That:

a) the members from the IUGG and Canada continue to aid theSmithsonian Institution in finalizing the international volcanodatabase for the VAACs called for by Conclusion 6/20 a);

b) the database referred to in a) be made available to all VAACs,

when finalized, in view of soliciting feedback; and c) upon completion of b), the Smithsonian Institution, through the

IUGG member, provide the Secretary with a link to the databaseand necessary explanatory text, for inclusion in the Handbook onthe International Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW) —Operational Procedures and Contact List (Doc 9766).

Flight planning information dissemination

5.2.17 The group recalled that it had formulated Conclusion 6/17 calling for an ad-hoc working group to review the findings of the investigation into flight planning information dissemination included in Appendix G to the IAVWOPSG/6 report. In this regard, the group reviewed the report of the ad-hoc group presented by the United Kingdom as Rapporteur. The group noted that there were a number of issues highlighted for which resolution was predicated on the outcome of work being progressed through the IAVWOPSG or elsewhere within ICAO. In particular, there were a number of issues that were being addressed by the concept of operations for the IAVW and other work being considered at the IAVWOPSG/7 meeting. Additionally, the group noted that it was apparent from the review of findings from the investigation into flight planning information dissemination that there are issues which extended beyond the terms of reference of the IAVWOPSG and, in some cases, were issues requiring global harmonization/State resolution. Of the issues that are within the purview of the IAVWOPSG or related ICAO groups, there were a number that were going to take some time to resolve.

5.2.18 The group agreed that the ad-hoc working group had completed its assigned task, but that it was important to closely monitor these issues into the future to ensure that relevant matters were brought to the group for further consideration.


Agenda Item 5: Operation of the IAVW 5.3: Issuance of a special air-report related to the smell of sulphur

5.3 Issuance of a special air-report related to the smell of sulphur

5.3.1 The group noted that no papers were submitted on the subject of the issuance of a special air-report related to the smell of sulphur. The group therefore agreed to defer consideration until the next meeting.


Agenda Item 5: Operation of the IAVW 5.4: Updating of the worldwide ash encounter database (including the model VAR)

5.4 Updating of the worldwide ash encounter database (including the model VAR)

5.4.1 The group recalled that IVATF Recommendation 4/23 invited the IAVWOPSG to undertake tasks related to the model VAR. This has been addressed under Agenda Item 5.1 — Development of the VAR. In the context of the updating of the worldwide ash encounter database, the group noted that no papers were submitted on the subject, however the group was informed that IUGG was in the process of updating the worldwide ash encounter database. The group therefore agreed to defer consideration until the next meeting.

— — — — — — — —


Agenda Item 6: Development of the IAVW 6.1: Improvement of tools for detecting and forecasting volcanic ash

6.1 Improvement of tools for detecting and forecasting volcanic ash (Deliverable 06)

Establishment of a validation dataset for benchmarking current and future satellite-based retrieval schemes

6.1.1 The group recalled that IVATF Recommendation 4/4 invited the IAVWOPSG, taking into account that the current best estimate of the minimum satellite detection threshold for ash mass loading was 0.2 g/m2 with a standard error of ±0.15 g/m2 under favourable conditions using the most advanced retrieval methodologies, to task the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics (IUGG) Volcanic Ash Scientific Advisory Group (VASAG) to:

a) support the establishment of a validation dataset for benchmarking current and future satellite-based retrieval schemes; and

b) encourage national and international space-based earth observation programmes to maintain and improve this level of coverage based on the current and future global coverage at infrared wavelengths.

6.1.2 After discussion of this recommendation, the group formulated the following conclusion:

Conclusion 7/31 — Validation dataset for benchmarking current and future satellite-based retrieval schemes

That the World Meteorological Organization (WMO)International-Union of Geodesy and Geophysics (IUGG) VolcanicAsh Scientific Advisory Group (VASAG) be invited to:

a) address, at its earliest convenience, follow-up work on IVATF Recommendation 4/4 pertaining to theestablishment of a validation dataset for benchmarkingcurrent and future satellite-based retrieval schemes and maintenance and improvement of current and future globalcoverage at infrared wavelengths by space-based earth observation programs; and

b) report progress to the IAVWOPSG/8 meeting.

Improving the definition of the three-dimensional geometry of volcanic ash clouds to support the VAACs

6.1.3 The group noted IVATF Recommendation 4/5 which, in the context of improving the definition of the three-dimensional geometry of volcanic ash clouds to support the VAACs, invited the IAVWOPSG to task the WMO-IUGG VASAG to encourage further scientific investigation into volcanic cloud thickness and stratification. After discussion of this recommendation, the group formulated the following conclusion:


Conclusion 7/32 — Scientific investigation into volcanic cloud thickness and stratification


a) address, at its earliest convenience, follow-up work on IVATF Recommendation 4/5 pertaining the encouragement of further scientific investigations into volcanic cloudthickness and stratification; and


Research on volcanic cloud hazards

6.1.4 The group noted that, in the context of future volcanic cloud research, IVATF Recommendation 4/6 invited the IAVWOPSG to task the WMO-IUGG VASAG to continue to engage the wider scientific community in pursuit of the research topics related to volcanic cloud hazards including, inter alia, characterizing of volcanic plumes at/near the source, understanding the evolution of volcanic ash and gas clouds in time and space, analysis of hazard impacts, improvement of observational capabilities globally and improvement of methods for sharing and combining data across sensors and specialties. In this regard, the consensus of the group was that the engagement of the wider scientific community had already been achieved, and easily demonstrated through the many projects going on to support volcanic cloud hazard research. Therefore, the group agreed that it was redundant to pass this recommendation to the VASAG and agreed that the follow-up action of IVATF Recommendation 4/6 be considered as complete.

Global volcanic risks and monitoring capabilities

6.1.5 The group noted IVATF Recommendation 4/9 a), which invited the IAVWOPSG to task the WMO-IUGG VASAG to interact with groups undertaking assessment of global volcanic risks and monitoring capabilities, by providing advice on appropriate methods for assessing aviation hazards and risks. The group, after discussion, formulated the following conclusion:


Conclusion 7/33 — Provision of advice on appropriate methods for assessing aviation hazards and risks


a) address, at its earliest convenience, follow-up work on IVATF Recommendation 4/9 a) pertaining to VASAG interaction with groups undertaking assessment of global volcanic risks and monitoring capabilities, by providing advice on appropriate methods for assessing aviationhazards and risks; and


Hazards posed by sulphur dioxide (SO2)

6.1.6 The group noted that IVATF Recommendation 4/11 invited the IAVWOPSG, in coordination with the VASAG, as part of deliverable IAVWOPSG-04 and, in the context of the hazards posed by sulphur dioxide (SO2) and other hazardous gases in the atmosphere, to progress work on identifying and quantifying any associated health risks to aircraft occupants with a view to enhancing the guidance contained in the Handbook on the International Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW) — Operational Procedures and Contact List (Doc 9766). In this regard, the group noted that deliverable IAVWOPSG-04 refers to the refinement of provisions for the smell of sulphur as a condition prompting the issuance of a special air-report. The group agreed that the health risks to aircraft occupants associated to SO2 is a different issue. The group took note of an emerging requirement for providing assessments of the health risks to flight crew and passengers on aircraft entering an SO2 cloud. The group determined that ICAO, through an appropriate expert group or groups, should determine a clear meteorological/atmospheric chemistry requirement (such as a critical level of SO2 in the atmosphere that would be observed or forecast) that, after passing through the aircrafts ventilation system, could pose a health risk to the aircraft’s occupants. The group recommended that such a requirement should also take into account issues such as instantaneous exposure (to SO2) and accumulated dosage (of SO2). Therefore, the group formulated the following conclusion and decision related to a new deliverable to progress the work related to the hazards posed by SO2 as follows:


Conclusion 7/34 — Health risks to aircraft occupants posed by sulphur dioxide and other hazardous gases in the atmosphere

That, the Secretariat:

a) be tasked to consult with the appropriate ICAO expert group or groups, to determine the thresholds for volcanic gases in the atmosphere that, after passing through an aircraft ventilation system, could pose a health risk to the aircraft’s occupants; and Note. ― An aircraft ventilation system varies from aircraft to aircraft.

b) report on progress to the IAVWOPSG/8 meeting. Decision 7/35 — Addition of a new deliverable to the work

programme of the IAVWOPSG That a new deliverable titled “Health risks to aircraft occupants posed by sulphur dioxide (SO2) and other hazardous gases in the atmosphere” be added to the IAVWOPSG work programme.


Volcanic ash cloud monitoring and forecasting

6.1.7 The group recalled that Conclusion 6/26 had summarized several recommendations made during the IVATF/2 meeting (11 to 15 July 2011, Montréal) concerning the science of volcanic ash cloud monitoring and forecasting – specifically IVATF Recommendations 2/1, 2/2, 2/3, 2/5, 2/8, 2/11 and 2/12. In this regard, the group was pleased to note that, according to the follow-up provided by IUGG, the items referred to in Conclusion 6/26 were expected to be adopted as agenda items in the next meeting of the WMO-IUGG VASAG, to be held in November 2013. Accordingly, the group agreed that the follow-up to Conclusion 6/26 could be considered complete.

Use of infrasound data in support of the VAACs

6.1.8 The group reviewed the follow-up of Conclusion 6/25 presented by France which reported on the progress made in the provision of infrasound data to the VAACs and the extension of the collaboration initiated between the International Data Centre (IDC) of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) and VAAC Toulouse in 2007, and which provided an example of a prototype for notification of significant eruptions to VAAC Toulouse.

6.1.9 It was noted that, from the operational point of view, in a similar way as was developed by the CTBTO, an atmospheric dynamics research infrastructure in Europe (ARISE) group was in the process of prototyping a notification system of possible volcanic activity based on infrasound observations, whereby a script automatically queries the infrasound database (of CTBTO) and issues a bulletin of detections that are found to be possibly associated to volcanic activity (detected signal azimuth matching with the expected azimuth to the volcano). The group was informed that eruptions of Mount Etna in Italy had been used for setting-up and testing the ARISE notification system, and that the experimental detection bulletin was to be sent for information to VAAC Toulouse starting in March 2013. The group was apprised that infrasound observations were dependent on the source mechanism, but also strongly impacted by the nature of the medium in which infrasound waves propagate. Therefore, by quantifying the perturbations due to the propagation, ARISE was expected to help identify and characterize the infrasound events related to volcanic eruptions with an increased level of confidence. The quality of the notification messages for volcanic eruptions was directly dependent on this confidence indicator which may regulate the ratio of false/true alarms in an operational monitoring system.

6.1.10 It was noted that the CTBTO had continuously been expanding the infrasound network of the International Monitoring System (IMS) and, as of January 2013, forty-five stations had been certified and operational worldwide. With IMS data, the International Data Centre (IDC) of CTBTO was reported to be producing automatic and reviewed products on a daily basis which might include volcanic activity. The CTBTO was investigating the possibility of distributing its restricted products to the VAACs in a timely manner to support their mission in the context of the IAVW.

6.1.11 The group noted that the project was proceeding and the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the CTBTO had sent, in February 2013, a letter to the Secretary of the IAVWOPSG to provide the group with up-to-date information about the participation of the CTBTO in the volcanic eruptions detection issue. Welcoming these positive developments, the group agreed to pursuing the development and testing of a prototype real-time “significant” eruption notification system for the VAACs using infrasound data, and formulated the following conclusion:


Conclusion 7/36 — Use of infrasound data in support of the IAVW

That an ad-hoc group consisting of Australia, Canada, France(Rapporteur) and Japan:

a) pursue, in support of the international airways volcano watch(IAVW), the development and testing of a prototype, real-time “significant” eruption notification system for the volcanic ash advisory centres (VAACs) using infrasound data;

b) pursue collaborative work related to a) above between all the

VAACs and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO); and

c) report back to the IAVWOPSG/8 meeting.


Agenda Item 6: Development of the IAVW 6.2: Refinement of volcanic ash deposition information in a suitable aeronautical

message

6.2 Refinement of volcanic ash deposition information in a suitable aeronautical message (Deliverable 07)

6.2.1 The group noted that no papers were submitted on the subject of refinement of volcanic ash deposition information in a suitable aeronautical message. The group therefore agreed to defer consideration until the next meeting.

— — — — — — — —


Agenda Item 7: Improved notification concerning the release of radioactive material into the atmosphere

7.1 The group recalled that it was tasked to assist the Secretariat regarding the development of international arrangements for the monitoring and provision of warnings to aircraft in flight of radioactive debris and toxic chemical clouds released into the atmosphere. Under this agenda item the group reviewed work undertaken on the following issues:

a) the review of the report of the ad-hoc group established by Conclusion 6/29 regarding the provision of information about the release of radioactive material into the atmosphere including, inter alia, the development of a concept of operations; and

b) the review of the report of the ad-hoc group established by Conclusion 6/30 regarding the study on alternative provisions for radioactive cloud information for international air navigation.

Concept of operations for the provision of information about the release of radioactive material into the atmosphere in support of international air navigation

7.2 With regard to the follow-up to Conclusion 6/29, the group reviewed the report of the ad-hoc group presented by Canada as Rapporteur containing, inter alia, draft version 0.3 (December 2012) of a concept of operations for the provision of information about the release of radioactive material into the atmosphere in support of international air navigation. The group noted that the suggested concept of operations was the first stage of defining the services that were needed to complement those already included in Annex 3 — Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation. Implementation and procedures on how to provide these services would come in the next stage. Also, it was noted that the performance requirements and metrics had not yet been determined. While it would have been ideal to define the performance metrics in the concept of operations, the ad-hoc group believed that the performance metrics were not sufficiently mature. The group noted that the draft concept of operations contained an annex which provided detailed information on the procedures between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the WMO Regional Specialized Meteorological Centres (RSMCs) intended to help the understanding of what the RMSC products are about, including their limitations of use for aviation.

7.3 It was noted that, according to the ad-hoc group, the draft concept of operations was a living document that would evolve as technology and operational requirements evolved. Therefore, its overall objective was to provide a baseline for the services to be met in the provision of information for international air navigation on radioactive material released into the atmosphere (i.e. a radioactive cloud) while recognizing that improvements in these services would evolve.

7.4 Moreover, the group noted a series of high-level comments from WMO on the draft version 0.2 (September 2012) of the concept of operations. The group noted that the WMO comments were drawn from experience during the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident caused by a massive earthquake and tsunami in March 2011. In this regard, the group noted that the provision of warnings on radioactive emergencies was clearly regulated by an international framework and coordination by a number of United Nations (UN) organizations, including the IAEA, WMO and ICAO. Subsequent to the Fukushima accident, and noting the existing Annex 3 provisions, the international aviation community had called for additional guidance regarding the issuance and retraction of SIGMET information concerning a radioactive cloud. In this regard, an IAVWOPSG ad-hoc group had been tasked to develop draft guidance material for incorporation in the Manual on Volcanic Ash, Radioactive Material

7-2 Report on Agenda Item 7 and Toxic Chemical Clouds (Doc 9691). However, the group noted that, according to WMO the current difficulties associated with the issuance of SIGMET for a radioactive cloud would have been resolved with the development of guidance material to support their issuance by MWOs, as called for in Conclusion 5/24. Instead, WMO invited the group to note that a separate concept of operations, which does not take into account the existing framework, had been proposed.

7.5 The group noted that WMO was of the opinion that, before proposing how the information service would be provided in future, it was important to assess the existing capabilities and problems and realistically project the likely future capabilities. The group then reviewed the following issues raised by WMO:

a) health hazard versus aircraft hazard;

b) the role of local observation and meteorological authority;

c) limitations of global/regional models; and

d) legal implications and liability issues of the decision support products.

7.6 Moreover, prior to any endorsement of the concept of operations, the group wished to give it careful consideration in the context of existing ICAO provisions and guidance.

7.7 In light of the foregoing, and additional information provided concerning SIGMET for radioactive clouds, the group considered that further work was required before finalizing the draft concept of operations for the provision of information about the release of radioactive material into the atmosphere in support of international air navigation. Therefore, the group formulated the following conclusion:

Conclusion 7/37 — Draft concept of operations for the provision of information about the release of radioactive material into the atmosphere in support of international air navigation

That, an ad hoc group consisting of Australia, Canada(Rapporteur), China, France, Japan, New Zealand the UnitedKingdom, the United States, IATA, ICCAIA and WMO:

a) further develop the draft concept of operations insupport of international air navigation on how best to provide information on the release of radioactivematerial into the atmosphere with a view to having amature proposal in time for the proposed ICAOMeteorology Divisional Meeting (July 2014);

b) assess the provision of information and guidance onradioactive material released into the atmosphere asprovided in Appendices K to P to the IAVWOPSG/6meeting report;


c) consult with the WMO (Task Team on NuclearEmergency Response Activities including theInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)) in order to evaluate the possible role of the WMO RegionalSpecialized Meteorological Centres in the provision ofguidance on the location and movement of radioactivematerial in the atmosphere as identified in the draft concept of operations;

d) review the provisions of ICAO Annex 3 –Meteorological Service for International AirNavigation and the Manual on Volcanic Ash, Radioactive Material and Toxic Chemical Clouds(Doc 9691) regarding radioactive material andproposed changes thereto, as necessary; and

e) report back to the IAVWOPSG/8 meeting.

Provisions for radioactive cloud information for international air navigation

7.8 With regard to the study of alternative provisions for radiological cloud information to replace the radioactive cloud (RDOACT CLD) SIGMET by MWOs, as called for by Conclusion 6/30, the group noted that an alternative had been proposed, by the ad-hoc group, in the draft concept of operations for the provision of information about the release of radioactive material into the atmosphere in support of international air navigation as discussed above. However, there was no consensus within the group on this subject and it was agreed that further work would be needed as the draft concept of operations evolves.

— — — — — — — —


Agenda Item 8: Matters related to the assessment of the need to provide information on solar radiation storms and other bio-hazards

8.1 The group recalled that Conclusion 6/31 had tasked the group members from Australia, New Zealand, United States and IATA, assisted by the Secretariat, to undertake the following actions:

a) develop a high-level user requirement for space weather;

b) place both the user requirement and a draft concept of operations for space weather on the IAVWOPSG website;

c) request comments from States about these two documents; and

d) consolidate the responses, compile a summary of submissions, make modifications to the concept of operations and develop a draft set of requirements.

Development of operational requirements for space weather products

8.2 With regard to the development of operational requirements, the group reviewed a draft set of product requirements as a follow-up of Conclusion 6/31 d). It was noted that the requirements were presented in the form of a proposed amendment to Annex 3 — Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation. The group noted that the proposed amendment did not classify space weather information as an advisory, warning or alert, nor did it include space weather as an element for SIGMET information. Instead, it proposed that space weather information be provided by a template called “Template for notice message for space weather information” (draft Table A2-3). The group also noted that the proposed amendment was intended for international air navigation flight planning purposes to provide operators, air navigation service providers and flight crew with a notice that a geomagnetic storm, solar radiation storm or radio blackout event had occurred or was expected to occur. It was considered that, with this information, the user would then refer to their operational plans and procedures (e.g. safety management system) to determine what course of action should be taken. For example, if a solar radiation storm is expected to degrade radio communications, an operator may choose to plan a flight route that avoids the affected area.

8.3 The group noted that the proposed template included the elements for a space weather aviation colour code. The colour codes presented were in line with the existing colour codes used nationally by the United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The group noted that a mature set of colour codes had not been finalized and that, according to ICAO practices, it is not advisable to include material not yet mature in Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs). After reaching consensus on the deletion of all references to space weather aviation colour code in the proposed Annex 3 template, the group formulated the following conclusions:

RSPP Conclusion 7/38 — Amendment to Annex 3 related to space weather

That the proposal to amend Annex 3 — Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation included at Appendix N to this report be consolidated with other elements of Amendment 77.

8-2 Report on Agenda Item 8

Conclusion 7/39 — Space Weather Impacts on International Air Navigation

That an ad-hoc working group consisting of Australia, Chile, France, Japan, United Kingdom (Rapporteur), United States, IATA, ICCAIA and WMO be tasked to:

a) review the “Space Weather Effects in regard to International Air Navigation” document (available on the IAVWOPSG website) including a retitling to “Space Weather Impacts on International Air Navigation” to ensure that its content supports the proposed amendment to Annex 3 — Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation under Conclusion 7/38 (Amendment to Annex 3 related to Space Weather);

b) study the addition of space weather aviation colour codes to the “Space Weather Impacts on International Air Navigation” document referred to in a) above;

c) provide a final draft of the “Space Weather Impacts on International Air Navigation” document to the Secretary no later than 30 November 2013 with a view to it forming the basis of an ICAO manual supporting potential future provisions on space weather; and

d) prepare a progress report in time for the IAVWOPSG/8 meeting.

Draft concept of operations for space weather information in support of international air navigation

8.4 The group noted that Conclusion 6/31 called for the incorporation of comments from States in a draft concept of operations for space weather presented at the IAVWOPSG/6 meeting. In this regard, the group reviewed an updated version (specifically draft version 2.2, November 2012) of the concept of operations for space weather information in support of international air navigation. It was noted that, during the process to develop the updated version, the authors received more than 800 comments of an editorial nature and approximately 100 substantive comments that fell into eight general categories as follows:

a) bias toward polar operations;

b) characterization of current international space weather products and services;

c) realistic near-term requirement capabilities;

d) NOAA space weather scales;

e) summary of general confidence levels in future forecast products;

f) airspace and global navigation satellite system (GNSS) disruptions;

g) space weather information versus decision-maker matrices; and

h) radiation impacts on human health.


The group noted the consideration given by the ad-hoc group to the comments received.

8.5 The group also reviewed high-level comments provided by the WMO Inter-Programme Coordination Team on Space Weather (ICTSW) on the draft version 2.2 (November 2012) of the concept of operations for space weather. The group was informed that the ICTSW was the WMO technical body in charge of providing technical advice on space weather matters to the WMO Commission for Aeronautical Meteorology and the WMO Commission for Basic Systems. The ICTSW includes experts from nineteen WMO Member States and five international organizations: International Space Environment Service (ISES); International Telecommunications Union (ITU); United Nations Office on Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA); European Space Agency (ESA); and Joint Research Centre of the European Commission (JRC), in addition to representatives of the ICAO and WMO Secretariats.

8.6 The group noted the extensive comments provided by WMO with regard to the concept of operations for space weather relating to:

a) expected accuracy of space weather information;

b) consistency and traceability of requirements;

c) proposed concept of space weather services to aviation;

d) global coordination and interaction with ICAO; and

e) description of the current capabilities.

8.7 It was also noted that WMO suggested that an ad-hoc group be established to further review and modify the draft concept of operations for space weather, taking into account the comments provided, and that the ICTSW was ready to work with IAVWOPSG in an ad-hoc group capacity to assist in this effort.

8.8 Prior to any endorsement of the draft concept of operations for space weather, the group give it careful consideration in the context of existing ICAO provisions and guidance. Moreover, the group noted the information provided by the member from the International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations (IFALPA) regarding a comparison undertaken between versions 1, 2.1 and 2.2 of the draft concept of operations for space weather. In this regard, the group noted that IFALPA requested clarification about the status of the document in line with the considerations outlined in 8.6 above. The group noted the potential confusion about the status of the draft concept of operations for space weather, where it was reported that earlier versions had been referred to and used in several industry meetings, and it may have been believed that the draft concept of operations for space weather had the same status as an ICAO manual which, as the group appreciated, was not at all the case.

8-4 Report on Agenda Item 8

8.9 In view of the foregoing, the group formulated the following conclusion:

Conclusion 7/40 — Draft concept of operations for the provision of space weather information in support of international air navigation

That:

a) the draft concept of operations for the provision of space weather information in support of international airnavigation, version 2.2 of December 2012, as supported in principle by the group, be made available by the Secretary on the IAVWOPSG website by May 2013; and

b) an ad-hoc group consisting of Australia, China, France, Japan, United Kingdom (Rapporteur), United States, IATA, ICCAIA and WMO, assisted by the Secretary, be tasked to review the concept of operations referred to in a) above and propose further changes, as necessary, in time for IAVWOPSG/8 in view of the provision of a final version to the proposed ICAO Meteorology Divisional Meeting (July 2014).

— — — — — — — —


Agenda Item 9: Future work programme

9.1 Terms of reference

9.1.1 The group agreed that minor changes needed to be introduced in the terms of reference of the IAVWOPSG to reflect the introduction of Internet-based services and improvements in the international arrangements for the provision of information to aircraft regarding the release of radioactive material into the atmosphere. Therefore, the group formulated the following decision:

Decision 7/41 — Update of the terms of reference of the IAVWOPSG

That the updated terms of reference, as shown in Appendix O to this report, be endorsed by the group.

9.2 Work programme (deliverables)

9.2.1 The group noted that the changes suggested at IAVWOPSG/6 to the work programme of the IAVWOPSG were endorsed by the Air Navigation Commission.

9.2.2 The group undertook a review of the work programme and proposed changes based on the discussions under Agenda Items 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. On the completion of this review, the group formulated the following decision:

Decision 7/42 — Update of the work programme of theIAVWOPSG

That the work programme (deliverables) of the IAVWOPSG bereplaced with that shown in Appendix P to this report.

— — — — — — — —


Agenda Item 10: Any other business

10.1 Update on research testing of volcanic ash ingestion into an aircraft turbine engine

10.1.1 The group was pleased to be apprised on the on-going activities within the United States in the planning of a research effort to determine the effects of low to moderate concentration levels of volcanic ash on aircraft turbine engine operation, known as the Vehicle Integrated Propulsion Research (VIPR). The group congratulated the United States for this important effort and highlighted that the results would be of paramount value for the international airways volcano watch going forwards.

10.2 Date and venue of the IAVWOPSG/8 Meeting

10.2.1 The group recalled that it is intended that IAVWOPSG meetings be convened every eighteen months and that the meetings be held at ICAO regional offices on a rotational basis to ensure regional participation. Accordingly, the next meeting should be held in September 2014. However, the group noted that a conjoint ICAO Meteorology Divisional Meeting/Fifteenth Session of the WMO Commission for Aeronautical Meteorology (CAeM-XV) was expected to be held at ICAO Headquarters, Montréal in July 2014. Therefore, the group discussed the need and feasibility of holding the IAVWOPSG/8 meeting exceptionally in late February 2014, at a venue to be determined, to provide the group the opportunity to finalize recommendations concerning the international airways volcano watch for consideration by the divisional meeting.

10.2.2 Due to the timescale of the proposed Meteorology Divisional Meeting, the significant follow-up that would be required on the part of the Secretariat and States in the months following the meeting, and recognizing that working documentation for IAVWOPSG meetings is traditionally requested approximately three months in advance of meetings, the group noted that if an IAVWOPSG/8 meeting in February 2014 was not viable, it may not be feasible to convene an IAVWOPSG meeting until 2015, at the earliest.

10.2.3 In view of the foregoing, the group agreed that the eighth meeting of the IAVWOPSG be held, at a location to be determined, in February 2014.

10.2.4 In a related matter, and recognizing the progress achieved by the IVATF through frequent meetings and teleconferences to monitor progress, the group considered the frequency of IAVWOPSG meetings and discussed whether the eighteen-month cycle was sufficient to meet the demands placed on the group. In addition, the group considered the means used to monitor follow-up on conclusions and work progress during the period elapsing between meetings.

10.2.5 In this regard, the group was not able to reach consensus on the frequency of future meetings and therefore agreed to defer consideration until the next meeting. With regard to the means used to follow-up on conclusions and progress work, the group agreed to continue with the currently used practices – i.e. follow-up table, memorandum and electronic communication.

— — — — — — — —

Appendix A to the Report A-1

APPENDIX A

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

ARGENTINA

Ms. Miriam Andrioli Member

Servicio Meteorológico Nacional 25 de Mayo 658 (1002) Buenos Aires Argentina

Tel.: +54 11 5167 6707 Fax: +54 11 5167 6709 E-mail: [email protected]

AUSTRALIA

Dr. Andrew Tupper Member

Regional Director, Northern Territory Bureau of Meteorology P.O. Box 40050 Casuarina NT 0811 Australia

Tel.: +61 8 8920 3801 Fax: +61 8 8920 3802 E-mail: [email protected] Cell: +61 0 417 475 269

Ms. Sue O’Rourke Advisor

Section Head, Meteorological Authority Strategy, Parliamentary, International & Communications Branch Australian Bureau of Meteorology GPO Box 1289, Melbourne VIC 3001 AUSTRALIA

Tel: +61 3 9669 4662 Fax: +61 3 9669 4473 Cell: +61 418 234 138 E-mail: s.o’[email protected] [email protected]

Mr. Emile Jansons Advisor

Manager Darwin Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre Australian Bureau of Meteorology Northern Territory Regional Office PO Box 40050 Casuarina NT 0811


CANADA

Mr. Rene Servranckx Member

Manager VAAC Montréal Operations Branch Canadian Meteorological Centre Environment Canada 2121 North Service Road Trans-Canada Highway Dorval, Quebec Canada H9P 1J3


CHILE

Mr. Reinaldo Gutiérrez Cisterna Member

Jefe Sección de Meteorología Aeronáutica Dirección General de Aeronáutica Civil — DGAC Av. Portales No. 3450, Estación Central Santiago, Chile CP 9170018

Tel.: +562 436 4541 Fax: +562 437 8212 E-mail: [email protected]

A-2 Appendix A to the Report

CHINA

Mr. Liu Peng Member

Engineer Director of Meteorological Department North-East Regional Air Traffic Management Bureau, CAAC 3 Xiacheyan Street, Dadong District Shenyang, Liaoning Province 110043 China

E-mail: [email protected]

Mr. Gu Lei Advisor

CAAC Engineer Aviation Meteorological Centre Air Traffic Management Bureau, CAAC P.O. Box 2272, Shilihe, Chaoyang District Beijing 100122 China

Tel.: +86 10 8792 2097 E-mail: [email protected]

Ms. LAU Sum-yee, Sharon Advisor

Assistant Director (Aviation Weather Service) Hong Kong Observatory 134A Nathan Road Kowloon

Tel : +852 2926 8232 Fax : +852 2311 9448 E-mail : [email protected]

FRANCE

Mr. Philippe Husson Member

Aviation Forecast Deputy Head Dprévi/Aéro/DA VAAC Toulouse Manager METEO-FRANCE 42, avenue Gustave Coriolis 31057 Toulouse Cédex France

Tel.: +33 5 61 07 82 39 Fax: +33 5 61 07 82 09 E-mail: [email protected]

Ms. Nathalie Domblides Advisor

Deputy Head of Cabinet of the Director General Direction générale de l'aviation civile - DGAC 50 rue Henry Farman 75720 Paris Cedex 15

Tel. : +33 1 58 09 42 29 Cell : +33 6 14 65 56 86 E-mail : [email protected]

Mr. Patrick Simon Advisor

IT direction. Aéronautique Météo-France 42 avenue Gustave Coriolis, 31057 Toulouse, Cedex 1 France

Tel.: +33 5 61 07 81 50 Fax: +33 5 61 07 81 09 E-mail: [email protected]


GERMANY

Dr. Dirk Engelbart Section LR 21 Meteorology, Climate Monitoring, Earth Observation, German Meteorological Service (DWD) Robert-Schuman-Platz 1, 53175 Bonn P.O. Box 20 01 00 Germany

Tel.: + 49 228 99 300 4911 Fax: + 49 228 99 300 807 4911 E-mail: [email protected]

JAPAN

Mr. Toshiyuki Sakurai Alternate

Forecaster Japan Meteorological Agency Tokyo Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre 1-3-4 Otemachi, Chiyoda-ku Tokyo 100-8122 Japan

Tel.: + 81 3 3284 1749 (Direct) Fax: + 81 3 3212 3648 E-mail: [email protected]

Mr. Tetsuyuki Ueyama Advisor

Japan Meteorological Agency Tokyo Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre 1-3-4 Otemachi, Chiyoda-ku Tokyo 100-8122 Japan

Tel.: + 81 3 3284 1749 (Direct) Fax: + 81 3 3212 3648 E-mail: [email protected]

NEW ZEALAND

Mr. Peter D. Lechner Member

Chief Meteorological Officer Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand P.O. Box 31 441 Lower Hutt New Zealand

Tel.: +64 4 560 9593 Cell: +64 275 236186 Fax: +64 4 569 2024 E-mail: [email protected]

Mr. Norm Henry Advisor

General Manager National Weather Services Meteorological Service of New Zealand P O Box 722 Wellington New Zealand

Tel.: +64 4 4700 724 Cell: +64 27 5700 724 E-mail: [email protected]

UNITED KINGDOM

Mr. Andy Wells Member

Head of UK Meteorological Authority Civil Aviation Authority K6G5 CAA House 45-59 Kingsway London WC2B 6TE United Kingdom

Tel.: +44 207 453 6526 Fax: +44 207 453 6565 E mail: [email protected]

Mr. Nigel Gait Advisor

International Aviation Manager The MET Office Fitzroy Road Exeter Devon EX1 3PB United Kingdom



UNITED STATES

Mr. Steven R. Albersheim Member

Senior Meteorologist International Aviation Weather Program Leader Aerospace Weather Policy Division (ARS-68) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 800 Independence Ave. SW Washington DC 20591 United States


Mr. Joseph M. Kunches Advisor

Space Scientist NOAA Space Weather Prediction Center 325 Broadway Boulder, CO 80305-337 United States

Tel.: + 303 497 5275 Fax: +303 497 7392 E-mail: [email protected]

Mr. Jeffrey Osiensky Advisor

Acting Chief, Environmental and Scientific Services Division NOAA/National Weather Service 222 West 7th Ave #23 Room 517 Anchorage, AK 99513-7575 United States

Tel.: +907 271 5132 Fax: +907 271 3711 E-mail [email protected]

Dr. Cecilia Ann Miner Advisor

NOAA Volcanic Ash Program Manager 1325 East West Highway, room 13316 Silver Spring, MD 20910 United States

Tel.: +301 713 1726 ext. 144 Fax: +301 713 1520 E-mail: [email protected]

Mr. John Fisher Advisor

Standards Staff Engineer, ANE-111 Rulemaking & Policy Branch Engine & Propeller Directorate Aircraft Certification Service Federal Aviation Administration New England Regional Office 12 New England Executive Park Burlington, MA 01803 United States

Tel.: +781 238 7149 E-mail: [email protected]

Mr. Larry Burch Advisor

Senior Scientist AvMET Applications Inc. 1800 Alexander Bell Drive Suite 130 Reston VA 20191 United States

Tel.: +1 703 284 7330 Mobile: + 1 816 582 1904 E-mail: [email protected]

Mr. Larry Mastin Advisor

U.S. Geological Survey David A. Johnston Cascades Volcano Observatory 1300 SE Cardinal Court, Bldg. 10 Suite 100 Vancouver, WA 98683 United States



IATA

Mr. Graham Rennie Member

Principal Advisor Global Operations Development Flight Operations Qantas Airways Limited Qantas Centre D Wing, Level 1 10 Bourke Rd Mascot 2020, NSW Australia


Mr. Hans-Rudi Sonnabend Advisor

Head of Meteorological Services Lufthansa Systems AG Meteorological Services FRA AF/L-P-MET Am Prime Parc 2 D-65479 Raunheim Germany

Tel: +49 69 696 90362 Mobile: +49 151 589 22475 Fax: +49 69 696 94736 E-mail: [email protected] or [email protected]

ICCAIA

Mr. Stuart Anderson Alternate

Airworthiness Specialist Rolls-Royce plc Whittle House WH20, P.O. Box 3, Filton Bristol, BS34 7QE United Kingdom

Tel: +44 117 9794443 Mobile: +44 787 6313862 E-mail: [email protected]

IUGG

Ms. Marianne Guffanti Alternate

Geologist United States Geological Survey 926A National Center, Reston VA, 20192 United States

Tel.: +1 703 648 6708 Fax +1 703 648 6032 E-mail: [email protected]

WMO

Dr. Herbert Puempel Alternate

Chief, Aeronautical Meteorology Unit World Weather Watch Department World Meteorological Organization 7 bis, Avenue de la Paix, Case postale #2300 CH-1211 Geneva 2 Switzerland


Mr. Ian Lisk Advisor

MET Office, Fitzroy Road Exeter, Devon EX1 3PB United Kingdom

E-mail: [email protected]


ICAO SECRETARIAT

Mr. Raul Romero Secretary

Technical Officer, Meteorology Section Air Navigation Bureau International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 999 University Street Montréal, Québec Canada H3C 5H7

Tel.: +514 954 8219, ext. 7079 Fax: +514 954 6759 E-mail: [email protected]

Mr. Peter Dunda Regional Officer MET International Civil Aviation Organization Asia and Pacific Office 252/1, Vibhavadee Rangsit Road Ladyao, Chatuchak Bangkok 10900 THAILAND

Tel: +66 2 537 8189 ext. 153 Fax: +66 2 537 8199 E-mail: [email protected]

— — — — — — — —

Appendix B to the Report B-1

APPENDIX B

BASIC ANP/FASID PROVISIONS RELATED TO IAVW

FASID TABLE MET 3B

VOLCANIC ASH ADVISORY CENTRES

EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE Column 1 Name of the volcanic ash advisory centre (VAAC). 2 ICAO location indicator of VAAC (for use in the WMO header of advisory bulletin). 3 Area of responsibility for the preparation of advisory information on volcanic ash by the

VAAC in column 1. 4 State where the MWOs and ACCs/FICs are located. 5 ICAO region where the MWOs and ACCs/FICs are located. 6 MWOs to which the advisory information on volcanic ash should be sent. 7 ICAO location indicator of the MWOs in column 6. 8 ACCs/FICs to which the advisory information on volcanic ash should be sent. 9 ICAO location indicator of the ACCs/FICs in column 8. Note― MWOs and ACCs/FICs in italics are situated outside the [AFI,

ASIA/PAC, CAR/SAM, EUR/NAT, MID and NAM] Region

B-2

Name

1

. . .

Toulouse (France)

. . .

M

VOLC

VAA

ICAO

loc. ind.

2

LFPW

MAP OF ARE

CANIC ASH A

AC

Area of resp

3

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Appendix C to the Report C-1

APPENDIX C

DRAFT AMENDMENT TO ANNEX 3 — METEOROLOGICAL SERVICE FOR INTERNATIONAL AIR NAVIGATION

(EIGHTEENTH EDITION — JULY 2013)

. . .

PART I. CORE SARPs . . .

CHAPTER 3. WORLD AREA FORECAST SYSTEM AND METEOROLOGICAL OFFICES

. . .

3.6 State volcano observatories Contracting States with active or potentially active volcanoes shall arrange that selected State volcano observatories, as designated by regional air navigation agreement, monitor these volcanoes and when observing:

a) significant pre-eruption volcanic activity, or a cessation thereof; b) a volcanic eruption, or a cessation thereof; and/or c) volcanic ash in the atmosphere

shall send this information as quickly as practicable to their associated ACC/FIC, MWO and VAAC. . . .

C-2 Appendix C to the Report

PARTII. APPENDICESANDATTACHMENTS . . .

4. STATE VOLCANO OBSERVATORIES . . .

4.1 Information from State volcano observatories Recommendation.— The information required to be sent by State volcano observatories to their associated ACCs/FICs, MWO and VAAC should comprise: . . . Note 2.— The State volcano observatories may use the Volcano Observatory Notice for Aviation (VONA) format to send information to its associated ACCs/FICs, MWO and VAAC. The VONA format is included in the Handbook on the International Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW) (Doc 9766) which is available on the ICAO IAVWOPSG website. . . .

— — — — — — — —

Appendix D to the Report D-1

APPENDIX D

DRAFT AMENDMENT TO ANNEX 3 —

METEOROLOGICAL SERVICE FOR INTERNATIONAL AIR NAVIGATION

(EIGHTEENTH EDITION — JULY 2013) . . .

PART I. CORE SARPs . . .


. . .

3.5 Volcanic ash advisory centres 3.5.1 A Contracting State, having accepted, by regional air navigation agreement, the responsibility for providing a VAAC within the framework of the international airways volcano watch, shall arrange for that centre to respond to a notification that a volcano has erupted, or is expected to erupt or volcanic ash is reported in its area of responsibility, by arranging for that centre to:

a) monitor relevant geostationary and polar-orbiting satellite data and, where available, relevant ground-based and airborne data, to detect the existence and extent of volcanic ash in the atmosphere in the area concerned;

Note.― Relevant ground-based and airborne data includes data derived from Doppler weather radar, ceilometers, lidar and passive infrared sensors.

. . .

c) issue advisory information regarding the extent and forecast movement of the volcanic ash “cloud” to:

1) meteorological watch offices, area control centres and flight information centres serving

flight information regions in its area of responsibility which may be affected; 2) other VAACs whose areas of responsibility may be affected; 3) world area forecast centres, international OPMET databanks, international NOTAM

offices, and centres designated by regional air navigation agreement for the operation of aeronautical fixed service satellite distribution systems; and

4) airlines requiring the advisory information through the AFTN address provided

specifically for this purpose; and

D-2 Appendix D to the Report

Note.— The AFTN address to be used by the VAACs is given in the Handbook on the International Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW) (Doc 9766) which is available on the ICAO IAVWOPSG website.

d) issue updated advisory information to the meteorological watch offices, area control centres,

flight information centres and VAACs referred to in c), as necessary, but at least every six hours until such time as the volcanic ash “cloud” is no longer identifiable from satellite and, where available, ground-based and airborne data, no further reports of volcanic ash are received from the area, and no further eruptions of the volcano are reported.

. . .

— — — — — — — —

Appendix E to the Report E-1

APPENDIX E

AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT VOLCANIC ASH CONTINGENCY PLAN TEMPLATE

FIRST EDITION (AUGUST 2012)


First Edition (August 2012)

E-2 Appendix E to the Report

FOREWORD

This document is an Air Traffic Management (ATM) Volcanic Ash Contingency Plan template which sets out standardised guidelines and procedures for the provision of information to airlines and en-route aircraft before and during a volcanic eruption. Volcanic contamination, of which volcanic ash is the most serious, is a hazard for safe flight operations. Mitigating the hazards posed by volcanic ash in the atmosphere and/or at the aerodrome cannot be resolved in isolation but through collaborative decision making (CDM) involving all stakeholders concerned. During an eruption, volcanic contamination can reach and exceed the cruising altitudes of turbine-powered aircraft within minutes and spread over vast geographical areas within a few days. Encounters with volcanic ash may result in a variety of hazards including one or more of the following:

a) the malfunction, or failure, of one or more engines leading not only to reduction, or complete loss of thrust but also to failures of electrical, pneumatic and hydraulic systems;

b) the blockage of pitot and static sensors resulting in unreliable airspeed indications and erroneous warnings;

c) windscreens rendered partially or completely opaque;

d) smoke, dust and/or toxic chemical contamination of cabin air requiring crew to don oxygen masks, thus impacting verbal communication; electronic systems may also be affected;

e) the erosion of external and internal aircraft components;

f) reduced electronic cooling efficiency leading to a wide range of aircraft system failures;

g) the aircraft may have to be manoeuvred in a manner that conflicts with other aircraft; and

h) volcanic ash deposition on a runway may degrade aircraft braking performance, most significantly if the volcanic ash is wet; and in extreme cases, this can lead to runway closure.

Operators are required by ICAO Annex 6 – Operation of Aircraft to implement appropriate mitigation measures for volcanic ash in accordance with their safety management system (SMS), as approved by the State of the Operator/Registry. The guidelines provided in this document assume that the ICAO requirements regarding safety management systems have been implemented by the operators. Detailed guidance on Safety Risk Assessments (SRAs) for flight operations with regard to volcanic ash contamination can be found in the manual on Flight Safety and Volcanic Ash – Risk Management of Flight Operations with Known or Forecast Volcanic Ash Contamination (ICAO Doc 9974).

This document is an ATM1 contingency plan including its interfaces with supporting services such as aeronautical information service (AIS) and meteorological (MET) services and that the plan therefore primarily addresses the provider States. Distribution of applicable AIS and MET messages related to

volcanic ash are set out in relevant ICAO Annexes– namely Annex 15–

1 ATM is defined “the dynamic, integrated management of air traffic and airspace including air traffic services,

airspace management and air traffic flow management – safely, economically and efficiently – through the provision of facilities and seamless services in collaboration with all parties and involving airborne and ground-based functions.” (Procedures for Air Navigation Services – Air Traffic Management (PANS-ATM, Doc 4444))


Aeronautical Information Services and Annex 3 – Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation. Volcanic ash can also affect the operation of aircraft at aerodromes. Volcanic ash deposition at an aerodrome, even in very small amounts, can result in the closure of the aerodrome until all the deposited ash has been removed. In extreme cases, the aerodrome may no longer be available for operation at all, resulting in repercussions on the ATM system, e.g. diversions, revised traffic flows, etc. Some aircraft types or engine technologies are more vulnerable to volcanic ash contaminants than others; therefore, any specific mitigation measures to be applied would have to take into account any such variance. Considering that a commercial aircraft travels about 150 km (80 NM) in 10 minutes and that volcanic ash can rise to flight levels commonly used by turbine-engine aircraft in half that time, a timely response to volcanic eruptions and volcanic ash in the atmosphere is essential. It is imperative that information on the volcanic activity is disseminated as soon as possible. In order to assist staff in expediting the process of originating and issuing relevant AIS and MET messages, a series of templates should be available for different stages of the volcanic activity. A list of ICAO registered volcanoes ― see the Manual on Volcanic Ash, Radioactive Material and Toxic Chemical Clouds (ICAO Doc 9691) Appendix F ― should be available at the State’s International NOTAM office with volcano name, number and nominal position. In order to ensure the smooth implementation and effectiveness of the contingency plan in case of an actual volcanic eruption, volcanic ash exercises (VOLCEX) should be conducted at a frequency determined by the ICAO Region concerned. This document has been prepared, and is in line with a proposal for amendment to the Procedures for Air Navigation Services – Air Traffic Management (PANS-ATM, Doc 4444) paragraph 15.8 Procedures for an ATC unit when a volcanic ash cloud is reported or forecast ― which is expected to become applicable in November 2014. General considerations during the development of an ATM contingency plan for volcanic ash and anticipated flight crew issues when encountering volcanic ash are provided in Appendices A and B respectively.

— — — — — — — —



TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Terminology 1.1 Areas of Contamination 1.2 Danger Areas 1.3 Phases of an Event 2. Pre-eruption phase 2.1 General 2.2 Originating ACC Actions 2.3 Adjacent ACC Actions 2.4 ATFM Unit Actions 3. Start of eruption phase 2.1 General 2.2 Originating ACC Actions 2.3 Adjacent ACC Actions 2.4 ATFM Unit Actions 4. On-going eruption phase 5. Recovery phase 6. Air traffic services procedures 7. Air traffic flow management procedures APPENDIX A General guidance for the development of an ATM volcanic ash contingency plan

APPENDIX B Anticipated flight crew issues when encountering volcanic ash

APPENDIX C Communication and dissemination of pilots’ reports of volcanic activity

The eventual inclusion of any or all of the optional appendices listed below is to be determined by the appropriate ICAO Planning and Implementation Regional Group.

APPENDIX D Actions to be taken by the meteorological watch offices (MWO) in the event of a

volcanic eruption

APPENDIX E Actions to be taken by the volcanic ash advisory centres (VAACs) in the event of a volcanic eruption

APPENDIX F Recommended actions by States of the operator/registry with regards to aircraft operations in the event of a volcanic eruption


APPENDIX G Example safety risk assessment process APPENDIX H Example table of considerations for planned operations in airspace to/from

aerodromes which may be contaminated by volcanic ash APPENDIX I Example of a hazard log (risk register) APPENDIX J Example AIS and MET products for dissemination of information

— — — — — — — —

Appendix E to the Report E-6 1. TERMINOLOGY

1.1. AREAS OF CONTAMINATION 1.1.1. Information on areas of observed and/or forecast volcanic ash in the atmosphere is provided by means of appropriate MET messages in accordance with Annex 3 – Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation.2 1.2. DANGER AREAS 1.2.1. If it is considered that the volcanic event could pose a hazard to aviation, a danger area3 may be declared by NOTAM; however, this option should only be applied over and in the proximity of the volcanic source. Normally, clearances will not be issued through the danger area unless explicitly requested by the flight crew. In this context it should be noted that the final responsibility for aircraft safety rests with the flight crew. Therefore, the final decision regarding route, whether it will be to avoid or proceed through an area of volcanic activity, is the flight crew’s responsibility. Wherever this document discusses the possible establishment of danger areas, States are not prevented from establishing restricted or prohibited areas over the sovereign territory of the State if considered necessary by the State concerned. 1.2.2. Although it is the prerogative of the provider State to promulgate a danger area in airspace over the high seas, it should be recognized that restrictions to the freedom of flight over the high seas cannot be imposed in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay 1982).

1.3. PHASES OF AN EVENT 1.3.1. The response to a volcanic event that affects air traffic has been divided into four distinct phases in this document ― a Pre-Eruption Phase, a Start of Eruption Phase, an On-going Eruption Phase, and a Recovery Phase― as follows:

a) PRE-ERUPTION PHASE (when applicable): The initial response, “raising the alert”, commences when a volcanic eruption is expected.

1) Appropriate AIS and MET messages may be issued in accordance with Annex 15 and Annex 3 respectively, and disseminated to affected aircraft in flight by the most expeditious means. It should be noted that, sometimes volcanoes erupt unexpectedly without any alert being raised, hence the pre-eruption phase may be omitted.

2 Principally this will include volcanic ash advisory messages (issued by volcanic ash advisory centres) and SIGMET

information on volcanic ash (issued by meteorological watch offices).

3 Depending on the State’s regulation, the area may be established as a “danger area”, “restricted area “or “prohibited area”. Over the high seas only “danger area” may be established.


b) START OF ERUPTION PHASE (when applicable): The start of eruption phase commences at the outbreak of the volcanic eruption and entrance of volcanic ash into the atmosphere and mainly pertains to aircraft in flight. Appropriate AIS and MET messages may be issued as appropriate in accordance with Annex 15 and Annex 3 respectively, and a danger area may be declared by NOTAM. Normally, clearances will not be issued through the danger area unless explicitly requested by the flight crew.

c) ON-GOING ERUPTION PHASE: The on-going eruption phase commences with

the issuance of the first volcanic ash advisory (VAA) containing information on the extent and movement of the volcanic ash cloud following completion of the previous reactive responses. Appropriate AIS and MET messages may be issued as appropriate in accordance with Annex 15 and Annex 3 respectively.

d) RECOVERY PHASE: The recovery phase commences with the issuance of the

first VAA containing a statement that “NO VA EXP” (i.e. “no volcanic ash expected”) which normally occurs when it is determined that no volcanic ash is expected in the atmosphere and the volcanic activity has reverted to its pre-eruption state.

Note: These descriptions are amplified in Chapter 3 of this document.

1.3.2. Although the four distinct phases herein describe actions to be undertaken during an actual volcanic event, they are based on a theoretical scenario. Actual eruptions may not always be distinct with respect to ATM actions to be undertaken. Similarly, an eruption may occur without any pre-eruptive activity, or may cease and restart more than once. Hence, the first observation may be the presence of an ash cloud which is already some distance away from the volcano. It is essential that the contingency planning prepares the ATM system for an appropriate response depending on the actual conditions. Therefore, the “Pre-Eruption Phase” and “Start of Eruption Phase” described in this document are annotated “when applicable” in order to provide for flexibility in the application of the contingency plan in those parts of the world with insufficient volcano monitoring and alerting. 1.3.3. Flight crews are required to report observations of volcanic activity by means of a special air-report (Special AIREP). Arrangements should be put in place to ensure that such information is transferred without delay to the appropriate aeronautical institutions responsible for subsequent action. The communication and dissemination of pilot reports on volcanic activity is described in Appendix C.

2. PRE-ERUPTION PHASE 2.1. GENERAL 2.1.1. Where flight operations are planned in areas that are susceptible to volcanic eruptions, ATS units may expect to receive from flight crews the ICAO Volcanic Activity Report (VAR) form (published in the Procedures for Air Navigation Services – Air Traffic Management (PANS-ATM, Doc 4444) Appendix 1).

Appendix E to the Report E-8 2.1.2. The focus of this phase is to gain early recognition of volcanic events. This phase is frequently characterised by a very limited availability of information on the potential extent and severity of the impending eruption. The priority is to ensure the continued safety of aircraft in flight, and there is therefore a requirement to promulgate information as a matter of urgency. Notwithstanding the potentially limited extent of information available, the pre-eruption phase actions described below should be carried out for every expected eruption.

2.1.3. The initial response, “raising the alert”, commences when a volcanic eruption is expected. Initial awareness of the event may be by means of a Special AIREP/VAR and/or from information provided by meteorological or volcanological agencies. Arrangements in each State between designated volcano observatories, meteorological and air traffic management agencies should ensure that alerting information is provided expeditiously by the most appropriate means to provide continued safety of flight. 2.1.4. Emphasis is placed on raising awareness of the hazard and to protect aircraft in flight. The actions are based on well-prepared, well-exercised contingency plans and standard operating procedures. Aircraft are expected to clear or avoid the volcanic ash affected area based on standard operating procedures. 2.2. ORIGINATING ACC ACTIONS (eruption expected in its own flight information region) 2.2.1. In the event of significant pre-eruption volcanic activity, which could pose a hazard to aviation, an area control centre (ACC)4, on receiving information of such an occurrence, should carry out the following:

a) ensure that appropriate AIS messages are originated in accordance with Annex 15. These must provide as precise information as is available regarding the activity of the volcano. It is imperative that this information is issued by the international NOTAM office and disseminated as soon as possible in accordance with the provisions of Annex 15;

b) when so required by the State, define an initial, precautionary danger area in

accordance with established procedures. The size of the danger area should encompass a volume of airspace in accordance with the information available, aiming to avoid undue disruption of flight operations;

1) if no such procedures have been established, the danger area should be defined as

a circle with a radius of xxx km (xx NM)5. The circle should be centred on the estimated or known location of the volcanic activity;

2) although ATC would not normally initiate a clearance through a danger area, it

will inform aircraft about the potential hazard and continue to provide normal services. It is the responsibility of the pilot-in-command to determine the safest course of action.

c) advise the associated MET service provider(s) in accordance with national/regional

arrangements (unless the initial notification originated from such provider(s)), who will then inform the appropriate air traffic flow management (ATFM) units;

4 Where the term “ACC” is used throughout this document, it is intended to also include all ATS facilities. 5 The size of the area is to be agreed in the region concerned and should be based on local knowledge as regards

the volcano concerned.


d) alert flights already within the area concerned and offer assistance to enable aircraft to exit the area in the most expeditious and appropriate manner. Flight crews should be provided with all necessary information required to make safe and efficient decisions in dealing with the hazards in the defined area. Aircraft that are close to the area should be offered assistance to remain clear of the area. Flights which would be expected to penetrate the area should be re-cleared onto routes that will keep them clear; and

e) immediately notify other affected ACCs of the event and the location and dimensions

of the area concerned. The ACC should also negotiate any re-routings necessary for flights already coordinated but still within adjacent flight information regions (FIRs) and provide any information on potential implications on traffic flow and its capability to handle the expected traffic. It is also expected that adjacent ACCs will be asked to reroute flights not yet coordinated to keep them clear of the area. It should be noted that flight crews may make the decision not to completely avoid the area based on, for example, visual observations; and

f) implement flow management measures if necessary to maintain the required level of

safety.

Note 1. — In order to assist staff in expediting the process of composing the AIS messages, a series of templates should be available for this stage of the volcanic activity.

2.2.2. In addition to sending the relevant AIS messages to the normal distribution list, it will be sent to the relevant meteorological facilities. 2.3. ADJACENT ACC ACTIONS 2.3.1. During the pre-eruption phase, ATC will not normally initiate clearances through a danger area; however, it will inform aircraft about the potential hazard and continue to provide normal services. Adjacent ACCs should take the following action to assist:

a) when advised, re-clear flights to which services are being provided and which will be affected by the area; and

b) unless otherwise instructed, continue normal operations and:

1) if one or more routes are affected by the area, suggest re-routings to the affected aircraft onto routes clear of the area; and

2) maintain awareness of the affected area.

Appendix E to the Report E-10 2.4. ATFM UNIT ACTIONS 2.4.1. The ATFM unit and the associated volcanic ash advisory centre (VAAC) will determine how their initial communications will take place on the basis of bilateral agreements. Upon reception of preliminary information on volcanic activity from the lead VAAC, the ATFM unit should initiate actions in accordance with its procedures to ensure exchange of information in order to support CDM between air navigation service providers (ANSPs), meteorological watch offices (MWOs), VAACs and aircraft operators concerned. 3. START OF ERUPTION PHASE 3.1. GENERAL 3.1.1. This phase commences at the outbreak of a volcanic eruption, with volcanic ash being ejected into the atmosphere. The focus of the processes in this phase is to protect aircraft in flight and at aerodromes from the hazards of the eruption through the collection and use of relevant information. 3.1.2. In addition to relevant actions described under the pre-eruption phase, major activities of the start of eruption phase are: Issuance of relevant AIS and MET messages in accordance with Annex 15 and Annex 3 respectively; as well as provision of information and assistance to airborne traffic. As appropriate, danger areas will be declared via NOTAM. This phase will last until such time as the on-going eruption phase can be activated. 3.2. ORIGINATING ACC ACTIONS (eruption in its own FIR) 3.2.1. The ACC providing services in the FIR within which the volcanic eruption takes place should inform flights about the existence, extent and forecast movement of volcanic ash and provide information useful for the safe and efficient conduct of flights. 3.2.2. If necessary, rerouting of traffic should commence immediately or may be in progress if the alerting time has been sufficient to facilitate activation of the pre-eruption phase. The ACC should assist in rerouting aircraft around the danger area as expeditiously as possible. Adjacent ACCs should also take the danger area into account and give similar assistance to aircraft as early as possible. 3.2.3. During the start of eruption phase, although ATC will not normally initiate a clearance through a danger area, it will inform aircraft about the hazard and will continue to provide normal services. It is expected that aircraft will attempt to remain clear of the danger area; however, it is the responsibility of the pilot-in-command to determine the safest course of action. 3.2.4. During the start of eruption phase the ACC should:

a) ensure that a NOTAM is originated to define a danger area delineated cautiously so as to encompass a volume of airspace in accordance with the limited information available. In determining the area, information on upper winds should be taken into account, if available. The purpose is to ensure safety of flight in the absence of any prediction from a competent authority of the extent of contamination;

b) maintain close liaison with MET facilities, who should issue appropriate MET

messages in accordance with Annex 3;


c) devise and update ATFM measures when necessary to ensure safety of flight operations, based on these forecasts and in cooperation with aircraft operators and the adjacent ACCs using the CDM process;

d) ensure that reported differences between published information and observations

(pilot reports, airborne measurements, etc.) are forwarded as soon as possible to the appropriate authorities to ensure its dissemination to all concerned;

e) begin planning for the on-going eruption phase in conjunction with the aircraft

operators, the appropriate ATFM unit and ACCs concerned; and f) issue appropriate AIS messages in accordance with Annex 15, should significant

reductions in intensity of volcanic activity take place during this phase and the airspace no longer is contaminated by volcanic ash. Otherwise, begin CDM planning for the on-going eruption phase in conjunction with aircraft operators, the appropriate ATFM unit and the affected ACCs.

3.3. ADJACENT ACC ACTIONS 3.3.1. During the start of eruption phase, adjacent ACCs should take the following actions:

a) maintain a close liaison with the appropriate ATFM unit and the originating ACC to design, implement and keep up to date ATFM measures which will enable aircraft to ensure safety of flight operations;

b) the adjacent ACC, in cooperation with the originating ACC and aircraft operators,

should impose as required additional tactical measures to those issued by the appropriate ATFM unit;

c) maintain awareness of the affected area; and e) begin planning for the on-going eruption phase in conjunction with the aircraft

operators, the appropriate ATFM unit and ACCs concerned. 3.4. ATFM UNIT ACTIONS 3.4.1. During the start of eruption phase, depending on the impact and/or extent of the volcanic ash, the appropriate ATFM unit should organize the exchange of latest information on the developments with the associated VAACs, ANSPs, MWOs and operators concerned in order to support CDM. 4. ON-GOING ERUPTION PHASE 4.1. The on-going eruption phase commences with the issuance of the first volcanic ash advisory (VAA) by the lead VAAC which contains information on the extent and movement of the volcanic ash cloud in accordance with Annex 3 provisions.

Volcanic ash advisory information in graphical format (VAG) may also be issued by the VAAC, containing the same information as its text-based VAA equivalent.

Appendix E to the Report E-12 4.2. The VA Advisory/VAG should be used to:

a) prepare appropriate AIS and MET messages in accordance with Annex 15 and Annex 3 provisions respectively; and

b) plan and apply appropriate ATFM measures.

4.3. The volcanic contamination may affect any combination of airspace; therefore, it is not possible to prescribe measures to be taken for all situations. Furthermore it is not possible to detail the actions to be taken by any particular ACC. The following guidance therefore may prove useful during the on-going eruption phase but should not be considered mandatory or exhaustive:

a) ACCs affected by the movement of the volcanic ash should ensure that appropriate AIS messages are originated in accordance with Annex 15. ACCs concerned and the appropriate ATFM unit should continue to publish details on measures taken to ensure dissemination to all concerned;

b) depending on the impact and/or extent of the volcanic ash, the appropriate ATFM

unit may take the initiative to organize teleconferences to exchange the latest information on the developments, in order to support CDM, with the VAACs, ANSPs and MWOs and operators concerned;

c) ACCs and ATFM units should be aware that for the purposes of flight planning,

operators could treat the horizontal and vertical extent of the volcanic ash contaminated area to be over-flown as if it were mountainous terrain; and

d) any reported differences between published information and observations (pilot

reports, airborne measurements, etc.) should be forwarded as soon as possible to the appropriate authorities (see Appendix C).

5. RECOVERY PHASE

5.1. The recovery phase commences with the issuance of the first VA Advisory/VAG containing a statement that “NO VA EXP” (i.e. “no volcanic ash expected”) ― which normally occurs when it is determined that the volcanic activity has reverted to its pre-eruption state and the airspace is no longer affected by volcanic ash contamination. Consequently, appropriate AIS messages should be issued in accordance with Annex 15. 5.2. ACCs and ATFM units should revert to normal operations as soon as practical. 6. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL PROCEDURES 6.1. If a volcanic ash cloud is reported or forecasted in the FIR for which the ATS unit is responsible, the following actions should be taken:

a) relay all pertinent information immediately to flight crews whose aircraft could be affected to ensure that they are aware of the ash cloud’s position and levels affected;

b) request the intention of the flight crew and endeavour to accommodate requests for

re-routing or level changes;


c) suggest appropriate re-routing to the flight crew to avoid an area of reported or forecast ash clouds; and

d) request a special air-report when the route of flight takes the aircraft into or near the

forecast ash cloud and provide such special air-report to the appropriate agencies.

Note 1.— The recommended escape manoeuvre for an aircraft which has encountered an ash cloud is to reverse its course and begin a descent if terrain permits.

Note 2. — The final authority as to the disposition of the aircraft, whether it be to avoid

or proceed through a reported or forecast volcanic ash cloud, rests with the flight crew.

6.2. When advised by the flight crew that the aircraft has inadvertently entered a volcanic ash cloud, the ATS unit should:

a) take such action applicable to an aircraft in an emergency situation; and b) not initiate modifications of route or level assigned unless requested by the flight

crew or necessitated by airspace requirements or traffic conditions.

Note 1.— General procedures to be applied when a pilot reports an emergency situation are contained in Procedures for Air Navigation Services – Air Traffic Management (PANS-ATM, Doc 4444) Chapter 15, 15.1.1 and 15.1.2.

Note 2.— Guidance material concerning the effect of volcanic ash and the impact of volcanic ash on aviation operational and support services is provided in Chapters 4 and 5 of the Manual on Volcanic Ash, Radioactive Material and Toxic Chemical Clouds (Doc 9691).

7. ATFM PROCEDURES 7.1. Depending on the impact and/or extent of the volcanic ash and in order to support CDM, the appropriate ATFM unit should organize the exchange of the latest information on the developments with the associated VAACs, ANSPs, MWOs and operators concerned. 7.2. The ATFM unit will apply ATFM measures on request of the ANSPs concerned. The measures should be reviewed and updated in accordance with updated information. Operators should also be advised to maintain watch for relevant AIS and MET messages for the area.

— — — — — — — —


APPENDIX A

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS DURING THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ATM

CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR VOLCANIC ASH 1. In a contingency plan relating to volcanic ash contamination, certain steps need to be taken to provide a coordinated and controlled response for dealing with an event of this nature. Responsibilities should be clearly defined to ATS personnel. The plan should also identify the officials who need to be contacted, the type of messages that are to be created, the proper distribution of the messages and how to conduct business. 2. ATS personnel need to be trained and be made aware of the potentially hazardous effects if an aircraft encounters a volcanic ash cloud. Some particular aspects include:

a) volcanic ash contamination may extend for hundreds, or even thousands of miles horizontally and reach the stratosphere vertically;

b) volcanic ash may block the pitot-static system of an aircraft, resulting in unreliable

airspeed indications;

c) braking conditions at aerodromes where volcanic ash has recently been deposited on the runway will affect the braking ability of the aircraft. This is more pronounced on runways contaminated with wet ash. Flight crews and ATS personnel should be aware of the consequences of volcanic ash being ingested into the engines during landing and taxiing. For departure, it is recommended that pilots avoid operating in visible airborne ash; instead they should allow sufficient time for the particles to settle before initiating a take-off roll, in order to avoid ingestion of ash particles into the engine. In addition, the movement area to be used should be carefully swept before any engine is started;

d) volcanic ash may result in the failure or power loss of one or all engines of an aircraft;

and

e) aerodromes with volcanic ash deposition may be declared unsafe for flight operations. This may have consequences for the ATM system.

4. The area control centre (ACC) in conjunction with ATFM units serves as the critical communication link between affected aircraft in flight and the information providers during a volcanic eruption. During episodes of volcanic ash contamination within the flight information region (FIR), the ACC has two major communication roles. First and most important is its ability to communicate directly with aircraft en-route which may encounter the volcanic ash. Based on the information provided in SIGMET information for volcanic ash and volcanic ash advisories (VAAs), and working with MWOs, ATS personnel should be able to advise the flight crew of which flight levels are affected by the volcanic ash and the forecast movement of the contamination. Through the use of various communication means, ATS units have the capability to coordinate with the flight crew alternative routes which would keep the aircraft away from the volcanic ash cloud.


5. Similarly, through the origination of a NOTAM/ASHTAM for volcanic activity the ACC can disseminate information on the status and activity of a volcano even for pre-eruption increases in volcanic activity. NOTAM/ASHTAM and SIGMET, together with AIREPs, are critical to dispatchers for flight planning purposes. Operators need as much advance notification as possible on the status of a volcano for strategic planning of flights and the safety of the flying public. Dispatchers need to be in communication with flight crews en-route so that a coordinated decision can be made between the flight crew, the dispatcher and ATS regarding alternative routes that are available. The ACC should advise the ATFM unit concerning the availability of alternative routes. It cannot be presumed, however, that an aircraft which is projected to encounter ash will be provided with the most desirable route to avoid the contamination. Other considerations have to be taken into account such as existing traffic levels on other routes and the amount of fuel reserve available for flights which may have to be diverted to other routes to allow for the affected aircraft to divert. 6. The NOTAM/ASHTAM for volcanic activity provides information on the status of activity of a volcano when a change in its activity is, or is expected to be, of operational significance. They are originated by the ACC and issued through the respective international NOTAM office based on the information received from any one of the observing sources and/or advisory information provided by the associated Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre (VAAC). In addition to providing the status of activity of a volcano, the NOTAM/ASHTAM also provides information on the location, extent and movement of the ash contamination and the air routes and flight levels affected. NOTAM can also be used to limit access to the airspace affected by the volcanic ash. Complete guidance on the issuance of NOTAM and ASHTAM is provided in Annex 15 — Aeronautical Information Services. Included in Annex 15 is a volcano level of activity colour code chart. The colour code chart alert may be used to provide information on the status of the volcano, with “red” being the most severe, i.e. volcanic eruption in progress with an ash column/cloud reported above flight level 250, and “green” at the other extreme being volcanic activity considered to have ceased and volcano reverted to its normal pre-eruption state. It is very important that NOTAM for volcanic ash be cancelled and ASHTAM be updated as soon as the volcano has reverted to its normal pre-eruption status, no further eruptions are expected by volcanologists and no volcanic ash is detectable or reported within the FIR concerned. 7. It is essential that the procedures to be followed by ATS personnel during a volcanic eruption, as well as supporting services such as MET, AIS and ATFM, should be translated into local staff instructions (adjusted as necessary to take account of local circumstances). It is also essential that such local staff instructions form part of the basic training for all ATS, AIS, ATFM and MET personnel whose jobs would require them to take action in accordance with the procedures. Background information to assist the ACC or flight information centre (FIC) in maintaining an awareness of the status of activity of volcanoes in their FIR(s) is provided in the monthly Scientific Event Alert Network Bulletin published by the United States Smithsonian Institution and sent free of charge to ACCs/FICs requesting it.

— — — — — — — —


APPENDIX B

ANTICIPATED FLIGHT CREW ISSUES WHEN ENCOUNTERING VOLCANIC ASH

1. ATS personnel should be aware that flight crews will be immediately dealing with some or all of the following issues when they encounter volcanic ash:

a) smoke or dust appearing in the cockpit which may prompt the flight crew to don oxygen masks (could interfere with the clarity of voice communications);

b) acrid odour similar to electrical smoke;

c) multiple engine malfunctions, such as stalls, increasing exhaust gas temperature (EGT), torching, flameout, and thrust loss causing an immediate departure from assigned altitude;

d) on engine restart attempts, engines may accelerate to idle very slowly, especially at high altitudes (could result in inability to maintain altitude or Mach number);

e) at night, St. Elmo's fire/static discharges may be observed around the windshield, accompanied by a bright orange glow in the engine inlet(s);

f) possible loss of visibility due to cockpit windows becoming cracked or discoloured, due to the sandblast effect of the ash;

g) because of the abrasive effects of volcanic ash on windshields and landing lights, visibility for approach and landing may be markedly reduced. Forward visibility may be limited to that which is available through the side windows; and/or

h) sharp distinct shadows cast by landing lights as compared to the diffused shadows observed in clouds (this affects visual perception of objects outside the aircraft).

2. Simultaneously, ATS personnel can expect flight crews to be executing contingency procedures such as the following:

a) if possible, the flight crew may immediately reduce thrust to idle;

b) exit volcanic ash cloud as quickly as possible. The shortest distance/time out of the ash may require an immediate, descending 180-degree turn (terrain permitting);

c) don flight crew oxygen masks at 100 per cent (if required);


d) monitor airspeed and pitch attitude. If unreliable airspeed is suspected, or a complete loss of airspeed indication occurs (volcanic ash may block the pitot system), the flight crew will establish the appropriate pitch attitude;

e) land at the nearest suitable aerodrome; and

f) upon landing, thrust reversers may be used as lightly as feasible.

— — — — — — — —


APPENDIX C

COMMUNICATION AND DISSEMINATION OF PILOT REPORTS OF VOLCANIC

ACTIVITY

1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 ICAO Annex 3 — Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation (paragraph

5.5, g) and h)) prescribes that volcanic ash clouds, volcanic eruptions and pre-eruption volcanic activity, when observed, shall be reported by all aircraft. The ICAO Procedures for Air Navigation Services – Air Traffic Management (PANS-ATM, Doc 4444) contain detailed provisions on this special air report requirement in paragraphs 4.12.3 and 4.12.5, and the Volcanic Activity Report form in Appendix 1.

1.2 Experience has shown that reporting and sharing of information on volcanic ash encounters in accordance with the above mentioned provisions (in-flight and post-flight) varies across the world. The efficiency and quality of reporting currently depends heavily on regional characteristics and the level of regional integration. A high level of global harmonization is essential to achieve the desired level of implementation and consistency of the information. 2. PURPOSES OF VOLCANIC ASH REPORTING AND DATA COLLECTION 2.1 The main purposes for volcanic ash reporting and data collection are to:

a) locate the volcanic hazards: b) notify immediately other aircraft (in-flight) about the hazard; c) notify other interested parties: ANSPs (ATC, AIS, ATFM), VAACs, MWO, etc to

ensure the consistent production of appropriate information and warning products in accordance with existing provisions;

d) analyse collected reports from the post-flight phase in order to: 1) identify areas of concern; 2) validate and improve volcanic ash forecasts; 3) improve existing procedures; 4) assist in defining better airworthiness requirements; and 5) share lessons learned, etc.

3. PHASE OF OPERATIONS 3.1 The roles and responsibilities of the participants in the collection, exchange and dissemination of the volcanic information are distinctly different in two distinct phases:

a) in-flight; and b) post-flight.

3.2 The following section analyses these separately.


4. PARTICIPANTS IN THE REPORTING PROCESS, THEIR ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 4.1 Identification of the participants as well as their roles and responsibilities in general, but specifically during the two different phases of operations, is an important element in improving collection, exchange and dissemination of volcanic information. The number of participants and their roles and responsibilities depends on the phase of operations (in-flight, post-flight), their position in the information chain within one of these two phases and national/regional arrangements. One of the main issues regarding participants’ roles and responsibilities is that each of them is, at one time or another, both a data/information provider and user of the information. 4.2 In-Flight Phase 4.2.1 Participants, Roles & Responsibilities Participants Roles & Responsibilities Pilots, civil and/or military, observing

and/or encountering volcanic activity

To provide as much detailed information as possible about the type, position, colour, smell, dimensions of the volcanic contamination, level and time of the observation and forward VAR Part I immediately to the ATS unit with which the pilot is in radiotelephony (R/T) communication. Record the information required for VAR Part II on the appropriate form as soon as possible after the observation or encounter, and file the report via data link, if available.

ATS unit receiving the information from the pilot encountering volcanic event

To ensure that information received by an air traffic controller from the pilot has been copied, clarified (if necessary) and disseminated to other pilots as well as to the ACC Supervisor. In addition, air traffic controllers could ask other pilots flying within the same area if they have observed any volcanic activity.

ATS unit/ACC Supervisor (if applicable) or other responsible person within the Air Navigation Service Provider

To use all means of communication and available forms to ensure that the information received from the air traffic controller has been: passed on to the associated Meteorological organizations in accordance with national/regional arrangements; fully and immediately disseminated across the organization, in particular to adjacent sectors and the associated NOTAM Office (NOF); passed on to the neighbouring sectors and ACCs (if necessary);


passed on to the regional ATFM centre if existing (e.g. CFMU in Europe); passed on to the national/regional authority responsible for the handling of contingency situations.

Neighbouring ANSPs (ACCs etc.)

To ensure that information is provided to flight crews flying towards the area affected by the volcanic contamination; disseminated across the organization and the system prepared to cope with the possible changes of the traffic flows; and that the information is provided to the national authority responsible for the handling of contingency situations and passed on to the NOF and MWO as required.

MET Watch Office To use the information originated by flight crews and forwarded by the ATS unit which received the information in accordance with Annex 3.

VAAC

To use the information originated by flight crews, MWOs and other competent sources in accordance with Annex 3

AIS / NOF

To publish appropriate AIS messages in accordance with Annex 15

ATFM unit or centre (if existing)

To ensure that information received is stored and made available for information to all partners in its area of responsibility (ANSPs, airlines, VAAC, MET etc.). As part of the daily activity, coordinate ATFM measures with ACCs concerned.

4.2.2 In-flight reporting – Sample Flow Chart of the volcanic ash information 4.2.2.1 The chart below is a graphical representation of a possible path of the in-flight volcanic ash information and may differ between regions depending on regional arrangements. It also gives the position of the volcanic ash participants in the reporting chain. The flow chart is not exhaustive and the path of the information can be extended and new participants could be added depending of the national and regional requirements.


4.3 Post-Flight Operations Roles & Responsibilities and order of reporting

Participants Roles & Responsibilities 1. Civil and/or military pilots/airlines

having observed or encountered an eruption or volcanic contamination

To file the volcanic ash report with as much detailed information as possible about the volcanic activity and/or encounter (position, colour, smell, dimensions, FL, time of observation, impact on the flight, etc.). Ensure that the VAR is filed and transmitted to the relevant recipients as soon as possible after landing (if not filed via datalink already during the flight). Make an entry into the Aircraft Maintenance Log (AML) in case of an actual or suspected encounter with volcanic contamination.

2. ANSP To provide a summary report of effects of the volcanic activity that affected its operations at least once per day to the national authority with as much detailed information as possible about the number of encounters, impact on air traffic management, etc.).

Airborne pilots

MWO

Pilot encountering volcanic ash

Airline dispatch

ATS Unit (ATCO)

Adjacent sector & ACC

Regional ATFM

ACC Supervisor

(ANSP)

National Regulator

Airborne pilot

VAAC AIS/NOF

National/ regional /Global

database

Further links will depend on the regional & national arrangements

Further links will depend on the airlines’ &

national arrangements

Links to the database will

depend on national regional & global

arrangements.


3. AOC Maintenance - Post flight Inspection

To report about the observation of the aircraft surfaces, engine, etc, and to provide the information to the national (or regional or global, where applicable) central data repository.

4. Investigation authority

All aeronautical service providers (including operators, ANSPs, airports, etc) shall investigate the effects of a volcanic activity, analyze the information and search for conclusions; and report the investigation results and relevant information to the national supervisory authority and any central data repository.

5. National Authority To handle the national central data repository and report to the regional/global central data repository if any. To analyze reports from its aeronautical service providers and take action as appropriate.

6. Regional Central Data Repository To collect the national data and make them available to interested stakeholders under agreed conditions.

7. MWO

To use the national and regional information coming from national and regional central data repositories.

8. VAAC

To use the information originated by flight crews, and other competent sources to:

a) validate its products accordingly and; b) improve the forecast.

9. Global Data Repository (and research institutes - where appropriate)

To analyse the information stored in the regional central data repository and provide the research outcomes for lessons learnt process.

10. Knowledge management (e.g. SKYbrary)

To use the post-flight lessons learnt and disseminate them to interested stakeholders.

11. ICAO To review/revise ATM volcanic ash contingency plans.

4.4 Tools for presenting and sharing the volcanic ash information 4.4.1 To report, transmit and disseminate the volcanic ash encounter information, different types of tools can be used. The list below is provided to give ideas as to what tools can be used. It could also be split into regulatory and general information tools. At any case, it is not an exhaustive list and can be updated with new elements depending on regional experiences.

a) Radiotelephony and Data link Communications b) VAR c) NOTAM/ASHTAM d) SIGMET e) VA Advisory/VAG f) Central data repository e.g. CFMU Network Operations Portal (NOP)


g) Centralized web based sites with the regularly updated information and maps – e.g. EVITA - http://www.eurocontrol.int/services/evita-european-crisis-visualisation-interactive-tool-atfcm

h) Teleconferences i) Periodic Bulletins with the set of information defined by the data providers and data

users; e.g. Smithsonian Institution Weekly Bulletin. j) Centralized internet-based sites for the sharing of lessons learnt (Knowledge

management – e.g. SKYbrary http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Main_Page)

— — — — — — — —

Appendix F to the Report F-1

APPENDIX F

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AIRCRAFT INSTRUMENTATION

FOR CONDUCTING VOLCANIC ASH CLOUD SAMPLING

The following recommendations for airborne sampling of ash plumes result from the experience with the Eyjafjallajökull eruption.

It is important to perform airborne measurements in the eruption plume as soon as possible after the eruption to get early information on the source term and ash properties. Therefore, research aircraft with suitable instrumentation should be available on a short notice (within 1-2 days). The aircraft should be capable of making measurements in the entire range of flight levels used by commercial air traffic, i.e. at altitudes up to 40,000 ft. It is recommended that experienced pilots and instrument operators conduct the missions. The crew on sampling flights should also carefully document their visual observations. The planning of the flights should be based on all information available including data from satellites, ground-based observing systems, and predictions from dispersion models.

The recommended instrumentation of the aircraft includes a combination of remote-sensing (Lidar, IR radiometer, DOAS) and in-situ measurement systems for particles and gas-phase plume tracer. The Lidar provides information on the horizontal and vertical extent of the ash plume with qualitative information on the ash concentration and serves as pathfinder for the in-situ measurements. For the in-situ sampling, the ash plume is best intercepted using a combination of stacked flight runs and vertical profiles covering the entire vertical extent of the plume. Thereby data are obtained that are best suited for comparison with satellite observations and dispersion models. Table 1 below provides a list of recommended instrument types and measurements that are currently available.

The mass concentration of ash cannot be measured directly but is determined from the particle-number size distribution measured with the wing-mounted optical particle counter for given refractive index and density of the particles. Therefore, it is important to cover the entire size range of ash particles in the plume. The resultant uncertainty in ash mass concentration is about a factor of 2 (Schumann et al., ACP, 2011).

F-2 Appendix F to the Report

Instrumentation Measured quantity

Remote sensing instruments

Lidar (down, up or ahead viewing) Aerosol backscatter ratio, depolarization

IR remote sensing IR radiance at different wave-length

DOAS SO2 slant column density

In situ particle instruments

Condensation particle counter (with heated and unheated channels) in aircraft cabin

Integral number of ultrafine particles (0.005 < Dp < 2.5 µm) and non-volatile fraction (sampled through inlet characterized for particle loss)

Optical particle counter (Grimm OPC 1.129) in aircraft cabin

Fine particles (0.25 µm < Dp < 2.5 µm), (sampled through inlet characterized for particle loss)

PCASP-100X/UHSAS-A (wing mounted)

Fine particles, dry state (0.15 µm < Dp < 3.0 µm)

FSSP-300/CAS (wing mounted) Size distribution coarse mode, ambient state (1 µm < Dp < 30/50 µm)

2D-C probe/CIP-15 (wing mounted) Shape and size distribution of very large particles, water droplets and ice crystals (25 µm < Dp < 800 µm)

Nephelometer Particle scattering at three wavelength

Particle collection system (in cabin and wing mounted)

Chemical composition, particle size, shape, morphology(post flight analysis)

Trace gas in-situ instruments

Chemical ionization mass spectrometer SO2 , HCl, HF, HNO3 mixing ratios

UV absorption detector O3 mixing ratio

Vacuum UV fluorescence detector CO mixing ratio

Chemiliminescence detector NO, NOy mixing ratios

Meteorological data

Standard probes Position, temperature, pressure, humidity, wind

Table 1. Aircraft instrumentation for volcanic ash cloud sampling

— — — — — — — —

Appendix G to the Report G-1

APPENDIX G

PROPOSED GUIDANCE FOR CONDUCTING VOLCANIC ASH EXERCISES IN ICAO REGIONS

1. Overview 1.1 Volcanic ash exercises should be conducted by ICAO on a regional basis in order to practice and develop inter-agency response to volcanic activity, in order to maintain safety, regularity and efficiency of aviation in the event of a volcanic eruption. This guidance recognizes that there is significant regional variation in the nature, frequency, observation of and response to volcanic eruptions. The frequency and scope of volcanic ash exercises is the responsibility of the concerned ICAO Region. Where frequent volcanic activity results in adequate information about system performance, exercises may be omitted or constrained to infrequent, extraordinary situations or be held only to test revised procedures. 1.2 Volcanic ash exercises should be facilitated via the concerned ICAO Regional Office and support the regular assessment of system performance (in accordance with quality management principles), in particular the assessment of the safety performance which is required by ICAO Safety Management provisions, such as ICAO Annex 11 – Air Traffic Services, 2.27.3c). 1.3 Reports of the exercises or performance assessments should be reviewed by an appropriate sub-group or sub-groups within the concerned ICAO Region. The focus of these reviews should be the development of improved provisions. Recommendations for improvements to global ICAO provisions, based on the regional review of the exercises, should be brought to the attention of the concerned ICAO Planning and Implementation Regional Group and/or to the International Airways Volcano Watch Operations Group (IAVWOPSG). 1.4 A Volcanic Ash Exercises Steering Group may be established by an ICAO Planning and Implementation Regional Group to co-ordinate all aspects of the organization and conduct of the exercises. The steering group should have representatives from, as a minimum, concerned volcanic ash advisory centres (VAACs), air navigation service providers (ANSPs), airspace users and regulators. 2. Exercises and Performance Assessments 2.1 Volcanic ash exercises should be held at a frequency to be determined by the ICAO Region concerned. They should be held at least every three years where the frequency of real eruptions is low and additionally as soon as practicable when significant changes to the procedures have been implemented. 2.2 Volcanic ash exercises are designed to test volcanic activity alerting, aeronautical information service (AIS) and meteorological (MET) message routing, volcanic ash information, air traffic control procedures, air traffic flow and capacity management and aircraft operator response and the Collaborative Decision Making (CDM) between the various actors in accordance with regional and global procedures. 2.3 Exercises can only simulate a real event, while operation of the aviation system must continue normally and be unaffected by the exercise. The planning of the exercise needs to ensure that detrimental effects on the system performance are avoided, but that nevertheless useful experience and information is generated.

G-2 Appendix G to the Report 2.4 A complete, system-wide, exercise for volcanic ash contamination is an extremely complex undertaking since such an event involves a great number and variety of stakeholders. It might therefore be useful to constrain exercises to specific parts of the whole system, with other parts of the system being subject to testing at subsequent exercises. 3. Objectives 3.1 The exercises should be designed to:

a) Practice the conduct of volcanic activity response in accordance with the regional reference documents;

b) Verify existing information, AIS and MET message routing via AFTN addresses, relevant e-mail addresses, telephone and fax numbers; internet addresses (URLs);

c) Maintain appropriate information and message routing between all involved agencies and organizations;

d) Provide volcanic activity response training for key personnel involved;

e) Allow the regulators to assess the preparedness and operational response in terms of planning, process and procedures of operators; and

f) Provide, when appropriate, recommendations for amendment of the reference documents, in accordance with the lessons learned and conclusions contained in the final exercise report.

3.2 Exercises may also be designed to test suggested new procedures on a limited scale before regional/global implementation. 3.3 Exercise and system performance assessments should be aimed at a critical review of existing provisions and their further improvement. 4. Concepts 4.1 Each exercise involves a simulated volcanic contamination (e.g. eruption of a volcano or re-suspended ash) affecting aviation. Simulated ash clouds may cross international boundaries, depending on the objectives of the exercise and may affect more than one VAAC area of responsibility. Exercises may utilize real-time meteorological conditions, archived data or a scenario. 4.2 Each exercise may have different objectives, which the scenario will be designed to address. For example any or all of the activities listed below may be tested depending on the scope of the exercise:

1. AFTN, e-mail addresses, websites, message routing and voice communications;

2. Alerting and observation of ash (e.g. use of VONA and VAR);

3. VAAC Response e.g. Volcanic ash information;

4. ATS response (including ATC and AIS for NOTAM issuance);

Appendix G to the Report G-3

5. ATM response;

6. Aircraft Operator response (including SRA);

7. Met Watch Office response (i.e. SIGMET); and

8. Suitability of information, its frequency, format and content.

5. Planning and Reporting 5.1 Each ICAO Region should establish an appropriate structure (e.g. focal point or steering group) for the conducting of regional volcanic ash exercises and system performance assessments. For each exercise, an exercise leader should be appointed and a planning meeting held approximately three months before the exercise is due to take place. 5.2 An exercise directive should be published prior to the exercise which clearly describes the exercise scenario, participating agencies and any special instructions. 5.3 After the exercise, initial exercise reports should be prepared by all participating agencies. A debrief meeting should be held soon after the exercise to discuss the exercise reports. The exercise leader should then produce a consolidated final exercise report for consideration by the relevant ICAO group. 6. ICAO reference material

Annex 3 – Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation

Annex 11 – Air Traffic Services

Annex 15 – Aeronautical Information Services

Procedures for Air Navigation Services – Air Traffic Management (Doc 4444)

Manual on Volcanic Ash, Radioactive material and Toxic Chemical Clouds (Doc 9691)

Global Air Navigation Plan (Doc 9750)

Handbook on the International Airways Volcano Watch – Operational Procedures and Contact List (Doc 9766)

Global ATM Operational Concept (Doc 9854)

Manual on Flight Safety and Volcanic Ash – Risk management of flight operations with known or forecast volcanic ash contamination (Doc 9974)

— — — — — — — —

Appendix H to the Report H-1

APPENDIX H

MODIFICATIONS TO THE HANDBOOK ON THE INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS VOLCANO WATCH (IAVW) — OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

AND CONTACT LIST (DOC 9766) . . .

4.5 ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY VAACs IN THE EVENT OF A VOLCANIC ERUPTION

4.5.1 On receipt of information from an ACC, MWO, volcano observatory or any other source6 that a volcanic eruption has been reported and/or a volcanic ash cloud has been observed in the FIR for which the MWO is responsible, the VAAC should: . . .

g) in cases where volcanic ash cloud crosses approaches within 300 NM of the boundary between of another VAAC areas area of responsibility, the first VAAC should retain responsibility for the issuance of advisories until such time as the handover of responsibility has been agreed between VAACs. Standardized will initiate the operational procedures for the coordination and may request transfer of responsibility between VAACs for volcanic ash events are at found in Appendix C.

Note.— This means that, while the volcanic ash cloud straddles the common boundary, only one VAAC will issue advisories at any one time, and these advisories must be sent by each VAAC to MWOs and ACCs in their respective areas of responsibility. VAACs should insert a note in their “last”/“first” advisory of the message and graphical series that the “handover”/“takeover” will take place at that message/graphic number.

. . .

APPENDIX C

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES FOR THE COORDINATION AND TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY

BETWEEN VAACS FOR VOLCANIC ASH EVENTS Note.— The primary VAAC is defined as the VAAC with responsibility for coordinating the production of advisories for: a) an ash cloud from a volcanic eruption originating within its designated area of responsibility; or b) an ash cloud, of unknown origin, reported in its area of responsibility (includes false alarms). 1. As soon as one of the VAACs learns of an eruption (for a volcano erupting within 5 degrees latitude 300 NM of the VAAC’s boundary) or when an ash cloud is expected to come within 300 NM of the VAACs and/or FIR boundary, an information /coordination phone call will be made. The possibility of a hand-off handover will be discussed, if appropriate.

6. When initial notification of the eruption is received from a source other than an ACC/MWO, this information should be passed immediately

by telephone to the relevant ACC and/or MWO. Thereafter, the procedures in a) to g) should be followed.

H-2 Appendix H to the Report 2. Hand-off Handover of operational responsibility shall be discussed/coordinated by the lead primary VAAC with adjacent affected VAACs and MWOs when the ash cloud is not less than 300 NM from a VAAC and/or FIR boundary. The primary VAAC will coordinate with the neighbouring VAAC(s) to produce a seamless product covering the areas of responsibility. In the rare situation of large or persistent ash emissions, adjacent responsible VAACs, upon coordination, may agree to divide the operational forecast responsibility. 3. However, in situations of large or persistent ash emissions or for other reasons, adjacent responsible VAACs, upon coordination, may agree to divide the operational forecast responsibility and issue their own volcanic ash advisory (see paragraph 8). The primary VAAC will ensure consistency at the border with adjacent VAACs. If the ash cloud moves within 300 NM of the area of responsibility of a third (fourth) VAAC with no common border with the primary VAAC, the second (third) VAAC is responsible for initiating coordination. The second (third) VAAC is also responsible to ensure consistency at the border with the third (fourth) VAAC. In some situations, there may be agreement that provision of information can best be served by the primary VAAC from “start to finish”. If that is the case, a message in the remarks section of the volcanic ash advisory would advise users of who has the responsibility. 34. In the case where a hand-off handover has been decided, VAACs should insert a note in their “last”/“first” volcanic ash advisory and volcanic ash graphic that the handover will take place at that message/graphic number. the The last volcanic ash advisory issued by the lead VAAC before hand-off handover will include the following at the end of the message (in the RMK section):

“THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS ASH EVENT IS BEING TRANSFERRED TO VAAC aaaa THE NEXT ADVISORY WILL BE ISSUED BY VAAC aaaa BY xxxx UTC UNDER HEADER bbbb.”

Where: aaaa is the name of the VAAC taking over bbbb is the bulletin header that will be used by the VAAC taking over (FVCN01 CWAO, FVXX21 KWBCKNES, FVAK2022 PANCPAWU, etc.) xxxx is the time in UTC Example: “THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS ASH EVENT IS BEING TRANSFERRED TO VAAC MONTREAL. THE NEXT ADVISORY WILL BE ISSUED BY VAAC MONTREAL BY 2200 UTC UNDER HEADER FVCN01 CWAO.”

45. The first volcanic ash advisory issued by the VAAC that has taken over responsibility will include the following at the end of the message (in the RMK section):

“VAAC cccc HAS TRANSFERRED RESPONSIBILITY OF THIS EVENT TO VAAC dddd. THIS ADVISORY UPDATES MESSAGE eeee.” Where: cccc is the name of the VAAC which had the lead issuing the advisories before the hand-off handover dddd is the name of the VAAC which has taken over eeee is the full bulletin header (e.g. FVAK PANC FVAK22 PAWU 261200) of the last message issued by the VAAC which had the lead issuing the advisories before the hand-off handover. Example: “VAAC ANCHORAGE HAS TRANSFERRED RESPONSIBILITY OF THIS EVENT TO VAAC MONTREAL. THIS ADVISORY UPDATES MESSAGE FVAK2022 PANCPAWU 261200.”

Appendix H to the Report H-3

56. When the lead a VAAC is issuing messages covering a portion of another VAAC’s area of responsibility, or an ash cloud is approaching (within 300 NM) the area of responsibility of a non-lead another VAAC, the non-lead that other VAAC should:

a) issue a volcanic ash advisory directing the user to the correct product. The following wording is suggested:

“PLEASE SEE ffff ISSUED BY VAAC gggg WHICH DESCRIBES CONDITIONS OVER OR NEAR THE VAAC hhhh AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY.” Where: ffff is the full bulletin header of the message issued by the lead first VAAC gggg is the name of the lead first VAAC hhhh is the name of the VAAC re-broadcasting the lead first VAAC’s message Example of rebroadcast message issued by VAAC Montreal: PLEASE SEE FVAK2022 PANCPAWU 121200 ISSUED BY VAAC ANCHORAGE WHICH DESCRIBES CONDITIONS OVER OR NEAR THE VAAC MONTREAL AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY”

or

b) send the lead first VAAC’s VAA volcanic ash advisory as it is by changing only the WMO header in order to address the normal recipients within the non leading other VAAC’s area of responsibility.

67. For situations in which two or more distinct ash clouds would be present (different eruptions or one eruption for which the ash cloud has divided in two or more distinct parts), the “hand-off” handover only applies to the ash cloud approaching or crossing VAAC boundaries. 8. When two or more VAACs are issuing their own volcanic ash advisory for an ash cloud that stretches across their borders (see paragraph 3), the VAACs will coordinate a common issue time for their volcanic ash advisories and will also include the following at the end of their message (in the RMK section):

“PLEASE SEE ALSO ffff ISSUED BY VAAC gggg (and f'f'f'f' ISSUED BY VAAC g'g'g'g') WHICH DESCRIBE(S) CONDITIONS NEAR THE VAAC hhhh AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY.” Where: ffff, f'f'f'f' are the bulletin headers of the message issued by neighbouring VAACs gggg, g'g'g'g' are the names of the neighbouring VAACs hhhh is the name of the VAAC issuing the volcanic ash advisory for its area of responsibility Example of the RMK section for a message issued by VAAC Toulouse: “PLEASE SEE ALSO FVAG01 SABM 121200 ISSUED BY VAAC BUENOS AIRES AND FVAU01 121200 ADRM ISSUED BY VAAC DARWIN WHICH DESCRIBE CONDITIONS NEAR THE VAAC TOULOUSE AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY”

79. The ending of an advisory for a volcanic ash event shall be performed by the lead primary VAAC, upon coordination with the adjacent affected VAACs and MWOs. In the situation where more than one VAAC are issuing advisories, the ending of advisories will be coordinated between the VAACs involved. . . .

— — — — — — — —

Appendix I to the Report I-1

APPENDIX I

PROPOSALS FOR RECONCILIATION OF IAVWOPSG/IVATF WORK PROGRAMMES

Conclusion 6/14 — Reconciliation of IAVWOPSG/IVATF work programmes

That an ad-hoc working group formed by France (Rapporteur),Canada, New Zealand and IATA, be tasked to:

a) pursue additional work to ensure that, in light of theIAVWOPSG/IVATF work programmes, each of the mattersraised by IATA (in IAVWOPSG-WP/39) are currently adequately covered or clearly allocated to the appropriateforum or working group; and

b) report back to the IAVWOPSG in February 2012.

In order to deal with IAVWOPSG Conclusion 6/14, the Rapporteur, after consultation of all members of the ad-hoc group, makes the following proposals to the IAVWOPSG: I) 2.1 “Decision to operate

2.1.1 The decision to operate in airspace subject to volcanic ash should bee made by airlines. The airlines’ decisions will be based on their risk assessment, acceptable to their State of Registry or authorized State representative, in accordance with either ….” Proposal: This will be covered by IVATF ATM/SG and AIR/SG. II) 2.2 “2.2 Regional contingency plan 2.2.1 Standardized ICAO regional contingency air traffic management (ATM) plans need to be developed and implemented by the planning and implementation regional groups (PIRGs) under the auspices of the respective ICAO Regional Offices. 2.2.2 ICAO, in conjunction with the industry, should encourage the adoption of these revised procedures for use by all concerned stakeholders.” Proposal: The ICAO secretariat could check that each PIRG has formed an ad-hoc group with participation of ATM, MET (including VAAC ), IATA, IFALPA for adoption of regional plans for operational and test purposes.

I-2 Appendix I to the Report III) 2.3 “2.3 Reporting volcanic ash

2.3.1 The METAR should exclude any reference to residual ash.” Proposal: IATA should explain and clarify the request by providing a WP to the next AMOFSG meeting. The current version of Annex3 does not mention “residual ash”. IV) 2.4 “2.4 VAAC procedures” “2.4.1 ….agreed set of procedures” Proposal: This is already covered by the IAVWOPSG through the Conclusion 6/9 — Report on processes and methodologies employed by each VAAC and the Conclusion 6/8 — Workshop to develop VAAC best practices. “2.4.2 The project plan must include timelines.” Proposal: To be adressed during the VAAC Best Practices Seminar to be organized prior to IVATF/3 and reported to IAVWOPSG.

“2.4.3 For the purpose of ensuring global harmonization of procedures, performance metrics should be developed against which the VAACs will be audited.

2.4.4 ICAO should ensure that VAACs’ performance meets the required Standards through regular audits.” Proposal: To be adressed during the VAAC Best Practices Seminar to be organized prior to IVATF/3 and reported to IAVWOPSG. The VAAC products are part of aviation weather products and shall be audited along with the other ICAO products in the same way. IATA intends to provide a WP for IVATF/3.

“2.4.5 A harmonized VAAC output for VAA/VAG must be synchronized with operator requirements to conduct an effective risk assessment.”

Proposal: To be adressed during the VAAC Best Practices Seminar to be organized prior to IVATF/3 and reported to IAVWOPSG. We must keep in mind anyway that the VAA/VAG are used by different users (ANSP, AO; MWO).

Appendix I to the Report I-3

V) 2.5 Improved accuracies of the source parameters “2.5.1 Introduce proactive satellite monitoring of active volcanic areas” Proposal: To be adressed during the VAAC Best Practices Seminar to be organized prior to IVATF/3 and reported to IAVWOPSG.

“enhance routine communication with volcano observatories or other VAACs …”

Proposal: The part related to VOs is in the scope of IAVWOPSG Conclusions 6/13, 6/15 and 6/16 and the part related to VAAC’s communication will be discussed during the VAAC Best Practices Seminar to be organized prior to IVATF/3 and reported to IAVWOPSG. VI) 2.6 Observational data “Observational data should be used in both the VAA/VAG and the VA SIGMET” Proposal: This is already the case and the proportion of raw modelling/observation data used to produce VAA/VAG will be explicited in the VAAC best practices questionaire and document. “Other additional data from aircraft/LIDAR etc. should be included in both products.” Proposal: Input expected from VASAG and IVATF/SCI subgroup. VII) 2.7 VAA/VAG output “A standardized VAA/VAG output must be provided by all VAACs” Proposal: To be adressed during the VAAC Best Practices Seminar to be organized prior to IVATF/3 and reported to IAVWOPSG. “Information provided on the website must include an English language option” Proposal: Already addressed with Conclusion 6/6. “Provide levels of confidence in VA forecast that support the defined lateral and vertical boundaries of the ash.” Proposal: To be adressed during the VAAC Best Practices Seminar to be organized prior to IVATF/3 and reported to IAVWOPSG. An input from the IVATF/SCI is however needed to assess each source of uncertainties in order to provide levels of confidence. “Introduce a structured forecast narrative into the volcanic ash advisory …” Proposal: To be adressed during the VAAC Best Practices Seminar to be organized prior to IVATF/3 and reported to IAVWOPSG.

I-4 Appendix I to the Report VIII) 2.8 Flight Planning Requirements “All volcanic ash advisory information must be available in a 4D form (vertical, horizontal and time)” Proposal: Whereas we believed this to be the case, IATA users require more detailed information presented in a machine readable form. IATA will provide this detail for discussion at the VAAC Best Practices Seminar. “… volcanic ash advisory information shall describe the ash cloud based on the ICAO definition of volcanic ash concentration until …” Proposal: Input expected from IVATF/SCI subgroup. “All volcanic ash advisory information must be capable of being transmitted in XML/CSV formats…” Proposal: To be adressed during the VAAC Best Practices Seminar to be organized prior to IVATF/3 and reported to IAVWOPSG. Format should be provided by WMO following discusion with ICAO. VIII) 2.9 Volcanic Ash SIGMETs Proposal: All sub-items are in the scope of IAVWOPSG with interactions with METWSG. VIII) 2.10 Sulphur dioxide SO2 For the short term, observed areas of discernable SO2 should not be included in VAAC products. For the medium term, an agreed lower threshold is required before any SO2 information is introduced into the VAAC output. Proposal: In the scope of IAVWOPSG with input from VASAG or IVATF/SCI subgroup for the medium term.

— — — — — — — —

Appendix J to the Report J-1

APPENDIX J

Concept of Operations

(ConOps)

for the

International Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW)

in

Support of International Air Navigation

14 December 2012

Version 1.0

J-2 Appendix J to the Report

0.1 15 April 2011 Internal draft. New Document.

0.2 06 May 2011 Initial draft. Presented to IAVW coordination group of IVATF.

0.3 13 July 2011 Initial draft. Presented to IVATF/2 (Working Paper 04).

0.4 08 February 2012 Revised draft. Complete rewrite based on comments received on initial draft.

0.4.1 10 February 2012 Minor revision. Minor edits. Presented to IAVW coordination group at IVATF/3.

1.0 14 December 2012 Draft version for IAVWOPSG/7. Format and structure changed to harmonize with other ConOps being developed. Considered and/or incorporated comments received in response to IAVWOPSG Memorandum 56.


ContentsPreface 5 1.0 Introduction/Scope 6

a) 1.1 Purpose 6 b) 1.2 Background 6 c) 1.3 Problem Statement 7 d) 1.4 Identification 7

2.0 Current Operations and Capabilities 7 e) 2.1 Description of Current Operations 7

2.1.1 Monitoring the Threat of an Eruption 7 2.1.2 Volcanic Cloud Detection 8 2.1.3 Volcanic Cloud Forecasts 8 2.1.4 Communicate Volcanic Cloud Information to Users 9

f) 2.2 Current Supporting Infrastructure 12

3.0 Description of Changes 13 g) 3.1 Near-term Changes 14

3.1.1 Collaborative Decision Analysis, Forecasting and Information Sharing 14 3.1.2 SIGMET Enhancements 15 3.1.3 Development of Confidence Levels 16 3.1.4 Transition to All-Digital Format for All Volcanic Ash Information 16

h) 3.2 Far-term Changes 16

3.2.1 Nowcasts 16 3.2.2 Probabilistic and Deterministic Volcanic Cloud Forecasts 16 3.2.3 Integration of Volcanic Ash Cloud Forecasts Into Decision Support Systems for Performance-Based Navigation 17 3.2.4 Development of Index Levels for Ash Tolerances 17

4.0 Proposed Volcanic Ash Concept 17 i) 4.1 Assumptions and Constraints 18 j) 4.2 Operational Environment 18 k) 4.3 Operations 18 l) 4.4 Operational Requirements 19 m) 4.5 Supporting Infrastructure 19 n) 4.6 Benefits to be Realized 20

5.0 Requirements 20 o) 5.1 Function Requirements 20


p) 5.2 Performance Requirement 22

6.0 Operational Scenarios 24


1 Preface At the first meeting of the International Volcanic Ash Task Force (IVATF/1 held at ICAO Headquarters in Montréal from 27 to 30 July 2010), it was recognized that there was a need to further promote and improve the services provided by Volcanic Ash Advisory Centres (VAAC) and Meteorological Watch Offices (MWO). It was agreed that the development of a global Concept of Operations (ConOps) for volcanic ash that would cut across all service fields from a perspective of the providers of information to the users/operators of that information in support of both tactical and strategic decision making to address those issues discussed at the meetings. This resulted in Task TF-VAA10 of the IVATF which is titled the Development of a Concept of Operations for the International Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW). The fourth meeting of IVATF formulated 24 recommendations. One, Recommendation 4/21 which states:

Recommendation 4/21 — That, in the context of the development of a Concept of Operations for the International Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW), the Secretariat make the latest draft available on the International Airways Volcano Watch Operations Group (IAVWOPSG) website by 31 August 2012 and invite the IAVWOPSG to provide comment on the draft in time for the IAVWOPSG/7 Meeting to enable its further development.

The version of this ConOps is the version to be presented at the seventh meeting of the IAVWOPSG (to be held in Bangkok, Thailand from 18 to 22 March 2013). This is a living document that will evolve as the science and technology improves, and as operational requirements evolves.


2 1.0 Introduction/ScopeThis Concept of Operations for the International Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW) provides a description of the operations during a volcanic event, with focus on the provision of meteorological information related to volcanic eruptions and ash clouds used by the aviation community for international air navigation.

This Concept of Operations (ConOps) also presents functional and performance requirements for future meteorological information on volcanic clouds. The performance requirements are not complete in this version of the ConOps but they are expected to be formulated and validated through future work of the International Airways Volcano Watch Operations Group (IAVWOPSG) and published in subsequent versions of this ConOps.

This ConOps is intended to complement the ICAO ATM Volcanic Ash Contingency Plan7 and ICAO Doc 9974 Flight Safety and Volcanic Ash.

When used in this ConOps the term “volcanic cloud” refers to both volcanic particles (e.g., ash) and gases (e.g., sulphur dioxide).

1.1PurposeThis ConOps discusses current operations during a volcanic event, including the provision of information on the volcanic cloud in support of international air navigation. It discusses the problems with current operations and information services and identifies improvements envisioned for the future. This document also describes the manner in which the volcanic cloud information, provided through improved services, can be used in support of international air navigation.

1.2BackgroundThe Eyjafjallajökull volcanic event in April 2010 identified gaps in both the services and the science of volcanic ash cloud observations and forecasts. Eyjafjallajökull brought direct attention to the need for a better understanding of volcanic ash information and the use of that information in Air Traffic Management (ATM) and flight operations. In addition it was recognized that there were no measureable certificated tolerances for volcanic ash for safe and permissible aircraft operations. While the provision of volcanic ash information has served the international community well for many years especially in areas where the airspace is not congested and operators have greater flexibility in avoiding airspace, that same model did not work well in congested airspace as was evident from the Eyjafjallajökull’s ash cloud. The synoptic pattern caused the ash cloud to persist over Western Europe and the North Atlantic for days into weeks. The event affected the busy and often congested air routes of many Flight Information Regions (FIRs), served by many Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSP) and Meteorological Watch Offices (MWO). At one time during the event, more than 40 SIGMET messages were in effect for the ash cloud. In simplest terms, aviation users need to know the location and size of the volcanic cloud, and where it will be located in the future. In a perfect world, we would know the precise location and be able to predict the future locations with great accuracy, and for time scales ranging from minutes out to days. But today’s level of the science for observing and forecasting volcanic clouds cannot provide that precision or accuracy. Therefore, some measure of uncertainty in the observation and forecast will need to be considered in order to improve ATM and flight operations during volcanic cloud events. The way forward is described in the remainder of this ConOps.

7 The ATM Volcanic Ash Contingency Plan was drafted by the International Volcanic Ash Task Force.


1.3ProblemStatementVolcanic eruptions can eject many cubic kilometers of pulverized rock (volcanic ash) and corrosive/hazardous gases high into the atmosphere. Depending on the eruption, and each eruption has its own unique characteristic, there is potential that the eruption can cover a wide area for timescales ranging from hours to weeks or even months. Volcanic eruptions are a direct threat to the safety of aircraft in flight and present major operational difficulties at aerodromes and in airspaces located downwind from the volcanic eruption. Currently there are no agreed values of ash concentration which constitute a hazard to jet aircraft engines. The exposure time of the engines to the ash and the thrust settings at the time of the encounter both have a direct bearing on the threshold value of ash concentration that constitutes a hazard. Thus the current recommended procedure is to avoid volcanic ash, regardless of ash concentration. In order to improve efficiencies in air transportation during volcanic events, without compromising safety, some standards needs to be agreed on where aircraft can operate in a specified ash concentration. In addition, timely, reliable and consistent volcanic cloud information (observations and forecasts) are essential to mitigate the safety risk of aircraft encountering volcanic ash.

1.4IdentificationThis ConOps is expected to be included as either a standalone document, or an appendix to ICAO Document 9691 Manual on Volcanic Ash, Radioactive Material, and Toxic Chemical Clouds.

3 2.0 CurrentOperationsandCapabilitiesDuring a volcanic event the coordination and flow of information on the location and forecast position of the volcanic cloud is of paramount concern and involves cooperation among the providers of information in support of operational decisions. Providers of information are principally from MWO, VAACs, and Volcano Observatories. Users of information are ANSPs that include Aeronautical Information Services (AIS) and Air Traffic Flow Management (AFTM) Units, flight crews, and airline operations centers. Their cooperation in supplying States, operators and Civil Aviation Authorities (CAA) with the information necessary to support the pre-flight process and the in-flight and post-flight decision-making process is essential to continuing safe operations.

2.1DescriptionofCurrentOperationsServices in support of the provision of meteorological information for volcanic clouds can be categorized in four areas: (1) monitoring the threat of an eruption, (2) detecting the volcanic cloud, (3) forecasting the volcanic cloud, and (4) communicating the information to the users.

2.1.1MonitoringtheThreatofanEruptionThe ability to provide an advanced warning of an imminent eruption and the onset of the eruption rests with the World Wide Volcano Observatory program of the World Meteorological Organization’s (WMO) International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics (IUGG). It is these volcano observatories that have the capability to provide the advanced notification and to provide guidance on the magnitude of the eruption in support of numerical dispersion and transport models.

Pre-eruptive activity may come from several sources, including but not necessarily limited to: seismic monitors, physical observations of deformation, hydrologic activity, gaseous activity or debris flow. The international community has established a color code chart for a quick reference to indicate the level of threat of an eruption for a volcano. The system uses four color codes. The color codes are linked to state

J-8 Appendix J to the Report of the volcano (i.e. pre-eruptive vs. eruptive stage) and not to the volcanic cloud. The color Green denotes a non-eruptive state; Yellow denotes a state of elevated unrest; Orange denotes a state of heightened unrest with the likelihood of eruption, or eruption underway; and Red denotes a forecast of imminent eruption, or that the eruption is underway. While the international community has developed the color code chart, it should be noted that not all observatories provide information in the color code format.

In 2008, the IAVWOPSG agreed to implement a message to assist volcanologist in providing information on the state of a volcano to Air Traffic Services in support of the issuance of a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) for volcanic ash. The message referred to as Volcano Observatory Notice for Aviation (VONA) was introduced into IAVW Handbook on the International Airways Volcano Watch, Doc 9766. The VONA can be issued by an observatory when the aviation color code at a volcano is changed (up or down) or within a color code level when an ash producing event or other significant change in volcanic behavior occurs. The purpose of the VONA is to aid the volcanologist in their provision of a succinct message on the state of volcano to air traffic services so the information can easily be transferred into a NOTAM. The VONA also helps support the VAAC and MWO in the issuance of the VAA and SIGMET.

2.1.2VolcanicCloudDetectionDepending on many variables, an ash cloud can be detected from the ground, air, or from space. A large number of different ground-based instruments are available to monitor volcanic ash clouds, including lidar, ceilometers, sun photometers, radar, imaging cameras and aerosol sondes. However, many of these function in research mode, and are not yet operational. Satellite-based sensors are used to locate the ash cloud and aids in discerning the perimeter of ash clouds. Ash clouds can be “seen” on visible satellite imagery, but only during the day, and dependent on existing cloud cover and other features. Single and multi-band infrared imagery and applied techniques can be used both day and night, and can provide a means of estimating the top of the ash cloud. Both visible and infrared imagery have limitations when meteorological clouds (e.g., cirrus, etc.) are present, and depending on the thickness and height of the meteorological cloud cover, may prohibit the volcanic cloud from being observed. Infrared measurements can only detect volcanic ash if the ash is the highest cloud layer, regardless of concentration.

What is “seen” or detected by satellite is sometimes expressed as “visible ash cloud.” “Visible ash” also refers to ash clouds seen by pilots in the air, and human observers on the ground. At present, there is no single quantitative threshold value for visible ash that is common across different conditions and technologies.

2.1.3VolcanicCloudForecastsToday’s volcanic ash forecasts are simple textual and graphical products derived and produced using the output from dispersion and transport models. The various numerical models utilized by Volcanic Ash Advisory Centers (VAAC) depend on meteorological input (e.g. wind speed and direction) as well as input regarding the eruptive parameters at the volcanic source, known as Eruption Source Parameters (ESP). ESPs include (1) plume height, (2) eruption duration or start/stop time, (3) mass eruption rate, (4) fraction of fine ash particles, and (5) the vertical distribution of mass with height above the vent. Uncertainty or inaccuracy in any of the various sources can translate into large errors in the forecast of the volcanic cloud.

Value is added to the model output through forecaster augmentation. Such augmentation is dependent on real-time verification of the ash cloud model output against a range of observational resources, principally remote sensing by satellite.

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2.2CurrentSupportingInfrastructureTable 1 outlines service providers and their functions with respect to volcanic cloud information. The exact role of each provider depends on various circumstances that are not exhaustively described in the table.

Current Services and Providers

Functions for: Information

Service Provider Pre-Eruption Eruption9 Volcanic Cloud10

Information Received and Used

Information Provided (shared)

ME

T S

ervi

ce P

rovi

der

Volcano Observatory (VO)

Monitor volcano, report changes in status.

Report

Report Data from ground-based observing networks

Report. Issue VONA and Color Codes. ESP if able.

Met Watch Office (MWO)

Provide location and notice of eruption

Provide location and dimension of ash cloud

AIREP, report from VO, VAA., METAR/SPECI, NOTAM

Issue SIGMET

Aerodrome Met Office and Stations

Report pre-eruption activity

Report Report METAR/SPECI, VAR

Volcanic Ash Advisory Center (VAAC)

Proactive communication with VO

Determine initial forecast

Determine and predict location and dimensions of volcanic cloud

Report from VO. Data from ground-based, air-based, satellite-based observing networks. Input from other VAACs and Dispersion Modeling Centers.

Issues VAA and VAG.

Dispersion Modeling Center (if different from the VAAC)

Produce model derived predictions of volcanic cloud

Produce model derived predictions of volcanic cloud

Data from ground-based, air-based, satellite-based observing networks. ESP.

Deliver model derived predictions.

Air

Nav

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Ser

vice

Pro

vide

r (A

NS

P)

Air Traffic Control Units (Area, Approach, Aerodrome)

Establish appropriate areas 11 within airspace to outline hazard

Establish appropriate areas within airspace to outline hazard

Establish appropriate areas within airspace to outline hazard. Reroute traffic as necessary

SIGMET, NOTAM/ASHTAM, VAA/VAG, VONA or report from VO, Special AIREP

IFR clearances. FIR’s

sector capacity.

Affected aerodrome

arrival and departure

acceptance rate

Air Traffic Management (ATM)

Implement contingency plans

Lead CDM process for adjusting traffic capacity and routes

SIGMET, NOTAM/ASHTAM, VAA/VAG, VONA or report from VO, Special AIREP, Ash concentration forecast (if provided)

FIR traffic capacity

Flight Information Center (FIC)

Provide preflight and in-flight information about eruption

Provide preflight and in-flight information about volcanic cloud

SIGMET, NOTAM/ASHTAM, VAA/VAG, VONA or report from VO, Special AIREP

VOLMET, ATIS, D-ATIS

9 Known as the “Start of Eruption” cycle in Doc 9974 - ICAO Doc 9974 Flight Safety and Volcanic Ash. 10 Same as the “Ongoing Eruption” cycle in Doc 9974 ICAO Doc 9974 Flight Safety and Volcanic Ash. 11 In accordance with the ATM Volcanic Ash Contingency Plan


Current Services and Providers

Functions for: Information

Service Provider Pre-Eruption Eruption9 Volcanic Cloud10

Information Received and Used

Information Provided (shared)

International NOTAM Office (NOF)

Provide notice of hazard

Provide notice of hazard

SIGMET, VONA or report from VO, Special AIREP

Issues NOTAM/ASHTAM

Aerodrome Operations

Address ash contamination on runways, taxiways, ground equipment, planes

Address ash contamination on runways, taxiways, ground equipment, planes

SIGMET, NOTAM/ASHTAM, VAA/VAG or report from VO, Special AIREP

Ope

rato

r

Airline Operations Center (AOC)

Reroute planes from eruption

Apply SMS to adjust routes.

SIGMET, NOTAM/ASHTAM, VAA/VAG, VONA or report from VO, ash or SO2 report from flight crew, or ANSP (ATS, FIS, AIS).

Airline Dispatchers

Provide information to flight crew. Plan for reroute

Provide information to flight crew. Plan for reroute

SIGMET, NOTAM/ASHTAM, VAA/VAG, VONA or report from VO, ash concentration forecast (if provided), ash or SO2 report from flight crew, or ANSP (ATS, FIS, AIS).

Route/altitude selection, fuel, go/no-go decision, in-flight route/destination change.

General Aviation Operators

Appropriate decisions per SMS for operators of Large and Turbojet Aeroplanes.

Appropriate decisions per SMS for operators of Large and Turbojet Aeroplanes.

SIGMET, NOTAM/ASHTAM, Special AIREP, ash or SO2 report from ANSP (ATS, FIS, AIS)

Special AIREP, VAR

Pilot / Flight crew (Commercial and General Aviation)

Report eruption Report volcanic cloud, ash, sulphur

SIGMET, NOTAM/ASHTAM, Special AIREP, ash or SO2 report from AOC or ANSP (ATS, FIS, AIS)

Special AIREP, VAR

Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) or Type Certificate Holder (TCH)

Advice and information to operators

Reports from operator.

Technical information about aircraft operation in volcanic ash, future/ongoing maintenance information requirements, details of inspection requirements

Other State, Research, Commercial Services

Operate aircraft for airborne sampling of cloud

Cloud ESP particle/gas concentrations

Table 1. Current service providers and their functions with respect to volcanic cloud information.

4 3.0 DescriptionofChangesFuture services center on the following near‐term and far‐term changes. The time frames of ‘near’ and ‘far’ are not defined in this ConOps, but instead serve as a reference to what can be accomplished perhaps in the upcoming five years, compared to what is possible five to 10 years

J-14 Appendix J to the Report in the future. These changes do not directly address proposals for advancements in volcanic science and volcano monitoring technology. Rather, these changes will incorporate and utilize those advancements as they become available.

Near‐term: o Incorporation of collaborative decisions and information sharing into volcanic

cloud analyses and forecasts o Enhancements in the provision of SIGMET in support of operational decisions o Development of confidence levels for information provided to aid decision

makers are part of their safety risk assessment o Transition to all digital format for all volcanic ash information

Far‐term: o New volcanic cloud nowcasts o Volcanic cloud forecasts that include the use of probability o Integration of volcanic cloud forecasts into decision support systems for

performance‐based navigation o Development of index levels for ash tolerances for the various types of

engine/aircraft combinations

3.1Near‐termChanges

3.1.1CollaborativeDecisionAnalysis,ForecastingandInformationSharingThe term Collaborative Decision Making (CDM) is a process used in ATM that allows all members of the ATM community, especially airspace users, to participate in the ATM decisions affecting all members. CDM means arriving at an acceptable solution that takes into account the needs of those involved. CDM for ATM is described in ICAO Document 9854 -Global Air Traffic Management Operational Concept, and Document 9982 – Manual on Air Traffic Management System Requirements.

A similar process can be applied to volcanic cloud analyses and forecasts. From a high level perspective and for an example, collaboration on the perimeter of the volcanic cloud can be done, at a minimum, for events that affect high density traffic areas, or several FIRs and extend beyond the area of responsibility of one or more VAACs. This collaboration would be done between predetermined partners, based on the event and extent. Table 2 lists some of the volcanic cloud information needed by airspace users. As part of this process, information sharing between the partners is essential, so that all possible outcomes can be considered. Table 3 lists the partners for collaboration and information sharing as well as the expected role of the partners. The final decision will depend on agreed upon guidelines that may vary depending on the size and scope of the volcanic event, but the authority for the final decision must reside with one decision maker (in this case, the Lead or Primary VAAC), otherwise the final output (e.g., forecast) would not serve other decision makers (e.g., ATM) in an expected manner. Once the decision (e.g., outline of the volcanic ash boundary) is finalized, it can be integrated into ATM decision tools for a CDM process by ATM decision makers and airspace users.


Need to know Information Sharing Output from a Collaborative Decision

Location of the volcanic ash cloud.

Share data from ground, air, and space observing platforms

Current horizontal and vertical extent (perimeter) of the volcanic ash cloud to be used in decision support systems and forecast products.

How the cloud is changing and where will it be in the future.

Share various outputs of dispersion models

Forecast horizontal and vertical extent of the volcanic ash cloud and produce seamless products

If provided and available, ash concentrations12 within volcanic cloud

Share various outputs of dispersion models

Forecast horizontal and vertical extent of the lowest acceptable level of ash concentration

Table 2. Collaborative decisions for volcanic ash cloud information.

Partners Role

Lead or Primary VAAC Produces preliminary forecast and shares it with rest of partners. Considers input and suggested changes from participating partners. Has the final decision on the forecast after considering information and input from partners.

Other VAAC(s) Shares new information with participating partners. Reviews preliminary forecast and provides suggested changes.

VO

MWO(s)

State’s NMHS

Table 3. Partners for the collaboration and information sharing and expected roles.

3.1.2SIGMETEnhancementsA large volcanic ash cloud over Europe could result in more than 40 SIGMET information messages being in effect at the same time. Each of these SIGMETs becomes a puzzle piece for the user to put together, in order to obtain the entire area of the volcanic cloud. As a result the International Air Transport Association (IATA) has stated that they have preference for the VAA vs. the SIGMET. Since the SIGMETs are based on the first portion of the VAA, that portion of the VAA/VAG could be elevated in status to serve as the SIGMET. Making the VAA/VAG’s first six‐hour portion equivalent to the SIGMET would reduce the information overload experienced by users (pilots, operators, etc) who must now track dozens of SIGMETs for their flight.

The first six‐hour portion of the VAA is elevated in status to a Volcanic Ash SIGMET Advisory13

The first six‐hour portion of the VAA will be labeled as SIGMET Advisory

The SIGMET Advisory will not be restricted to one FIRs (i.e., one SIGMET Advisory can be valid for multiple FIRs)

12 Ash concentrations forecasts, where available, are a State provided service and are not part of the services provided in

accordance with Annex 3 – Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation. 13 SIGMET Advisory is a proposed term that valid for one or multiple FIRs and is issued by a regional center, such as a VAAC.


Traditional SIGMET Information messages (i.e., today’s SIGMETs) will not duplicate the information in the SIGMET Advisory; rather, it will refer the user to the SIGMET Advisory

It is noted that IATA have formulated a set of requirements which were presented to the VAAC Best Practices Seminar as IATA Information Paper 2. Those requirements will be considered in this enhancement process.

3.1.3DevelopmentofConfidenceLevelsIn February 2012, the IATA met with the VAACs and discussed their need for levels of confidence in the volcanic analyses and forecasts (i.e., VAA/VAG). These confidence levels would be used or translated into the risk assessment conducted by operators to best determine the aircraft flight route or track. The details on how confidence levels will be produced and implemented are being considered by the IAVWOPSG.

3.1.4TransitiontoAll‐DigitalFormatforAllVolcanicAshInformationToday’s volcanic cloud products are primarily text‐based (e.g., SIGMET), with some supplementation of graphic‐based products (e.g., the VAA and its graphical version known as the VAG). Future volcanic cloud information must be provided in a digital format in order serve aviation users and decision makers. The visualization of volcanic information must be capable of being displayed on moving maps, cockpit displays, radar screens, etc. The transition from text and graphic‐based products to all‐digital formats will take time, as there will continue to be a need for legacy text‐based products for several years, especially in certain regions of the world.

3.2Far‐termChanges

3.2.1NowcastsUsers need to know the current location of the volcanic cloud. Once the transition is made to a digital information data base for volcanic clouds, a three-dimensional representation of the current or near-current volcanic cloud, known in this ConOps as a “nowcast”, can be extracted and used by the user. Nowcasts would be updated at a high frequency (to be determined) and could ultimately result in a true “warning” for volcanic clouds, thus replacing any need for the legacy SIGMET information message.

3.2.2ProbabilisticandDeterministicVolcanicCloudForecastsCurrent volcanic ash forecasts, such as the VAA/VAG, are deterministic forecasts. They are a yes/no forecast, with respect to the depiction of the ash cloud. Often, a deterministic forecast includes a larger area than the actual cloud. This “buffer” zone is included to either smooth the forecast area, or to ensure the cloud fits into the simple sided polygon that describes the perimeter of the volcanic cloud. Unfortunately these buffer zones are not depicted as a buffer, nor are they known to anyone other than the producer (e.g., forecaster). The effect of the buffer zone is a larger area in the deterministic forecast.


Volcanic ash transport and dispersion models can produce an array of solutions (e.g., forecasts) by varying the model input. Changes in meteorological parameters and ESP will result in different forecast outputs that affect the 4‐dimensional shape (3‐dimensional shape and change of shape with time) of the cloud. The purpose of a probabilistic forecast is to provide decision makers with an assessment of all the likelihoods of a weather parameter’s risk of occurrence and magnitude. Probabilistic forecasts help multiple decision makers use the same weather information, applying their own operational constraints to determine risk to their operation. Section 5.1 identifies those functions that should be provided in deterministic and probabilistic terms. From a high‐level perspective, probability forecasts are similar to an ensemble approach. An ensemble is one way to account for some degree of uncertainty. For instance, the model can be run many times, each time with a realistic variant of one of the uncertain parameters (e.g. ash amount, ash column height, eruption start time and duration, input meteorology dataset, with and without wet deposition, etc.). Taken as a whole, the variability of the ensemble members’ output gives an indication of the uncertainty associated with that particular ash forecast. The application of probabilistic forecasts will best benefit high-density (congested) traffic areas, where decision makers can benefit from more than just a deterministic forecast. Also, decision support systems can use the probabilistic information to provide route and altitude selections based on user’s acceptance thresholds. For example, an airline may plan a route that has a 30 percent probability of ash, while not accepting that same route with a 60 percent probability of ash.

3.2.3 Integration of Volcanic Ash Cloud Forecasts Into Decision SupportSystemsforPerformance‐BasedNavigationFuture ATM decision support systems need to directly incorporate volcanic cloud nowcasts and forecasts and bypass the need for human interpretation, allowing decision makers to determine the best response to the potential operational effects and minimize the level of traffic restrictions. This integration of volcanic cloud nowcasts and forecasts, combined with the use of probabilistic forecasts to address uncertainty, reduces the effects of volcanic clouds on air traffic operations.

3.2.4DevelopmentofIndexLevelsforAshTolerancesThe latest generation of jet engines is much different from older generations, and ash can have greater effects on these newer engines. The development of a volcanic ash index for ash tolerances of various types of engine/aircraft combinations would allow operators and ATM to take maximum advantage of volcanic ash concentration forecasts. It is understood that the development of index levels is a long term goal of the industry, as it would involve considerable testing and evaluation. It is also desired that the development of ash tolerance design standards be concurrent with improvements in satellite detection capability.

5 4.0 ProposedVolcanicAshConceptThe proposed concept will involve all the changes described in Section 3 above. Specifically:


Implementation of collaborative decision making and information sharing Transition from text and graphic-based products to all digital formats for volcanic cloud

information Development and implementation of nowcasts and probabilistic volcanic cloud forecasts. Integration of volcanic cloud information into decision support systems and tailored to airspace

capacity Development of index levels for volcanic ash tolerances.

4.1AssumptionsandConstraintsThe proposed concept is based on the following assumptions:

The SIGMET information message can initially be replaced by the first six-hour forecast from the VAA

Probabilistic forecasts of volcanic clouds can be utilized by aviation decision makers Probabilistic forecasts are best suited for users in congested airspace, but can also beneficial for

users in uncongested airspace Index levels for volcanic ash tolerances can be developed

The following constraints may impede the implementation of the proposed concept:

The development of volcanic ash tolerances may take many years, or may not be feasible Some States may not accept the replacement of the SIGMET with information from the VAA

4.2OperationalEnvironmentVolcanic cloud information should reside on a common information sharing platform, produced and populated by regional or world centre(s), to be integrated into decision support systems.

4.3OperationsOperations during a volcanic event may largely depend on the kind of information available as well as how congested the airspace is with air traffic.

Nowcasts and deterministic forecasts may adequately serve the users of airspace that is not congested, and offers ample options for ash cloud avoidance without great fuel penalties for the operator. But for congested airspace, the provision and use of probabilistic forecasts of the volcanic cloud will be essential in order to achieve maximum efficiency of the air traffic system. Figure 3 provides a high level schematic of meteorological service per airspace capacity. It should be noted that the provision and use of probabilistic forecasts is not restricted or limited to congested airspace, rather the “optional’ block in Figure 3 denotes that operators in uncongested airspace, e.g., oceanic User Preferred Routes (UPR), can take full advantage of these forecasts.

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J-20 Appendix J to the Report In the long-term, all relevant information on the volcanic clouds will reside on a common information sharing platform, produced and populated by regional or world centre(s).

4.6BenefitstobeRealizedShort-term benefits can be realized by replacing the SIGMET with the VAA as it will reduce information overload for the pilot and other decision makers during large volcanic cloud events. Long-term benefits will be realized when information on volcanic clouds is digitized and integrated into decision support systems. Moving from a product centric environment to an information centric environment will meet the future operational needs of aviation decision-makers. Also, decision support systems can use the probabilistic information to provide route and altitude selections based on user’s acceptance thresholds. The integration of volcanic cloud forecasts, combined with the use of probabilistic forecasts to address uncertainty, reduces the effects of volcanic clouds on air traffic operations. In the longer-term, the development of a volcanic ash index for ash tolerances for various types of engine/aircraft combinations will allow operators and ATM to take maximum advantage of volcanic ash concentration forecasts.

6 5.0RequirementsThe requirements for new volcanic cloud information are presented in the following sections and are categorized by airspace capacity, or air traffic density. The performance requirements are left open with this version of the ConOps, pending further assessments.

5.1FunctionRequirementsTable 4 lists a set of functional requirements for volcanic cloud information based on different types of airspace and aerodrome densities (i.e., capacity or congestion). An “X” in the table’s cell indicates that this function is needed for this airspace and aerodrome. A “P” or “D” indicates whether the forecast function is Probabilistic or Deterministic. A “D, P” indicates that both are provided.

Functional Requirements for Volcanic Cloud

Route Operations Terminal Control Area (TMA) Operations

Aerodrome

Congested (High

Density)

Un-congested

(Low Density)

Congested (High

Density)

Un-congested

(Low Density)

Busy (High Density)

Low Density

Volcano Eruption Detect an Eruption in all kinds of meteorological and day/night conditions (i.e., including tropical regions where convective activity is common)

X X X X X X

Determine the Eruption Source Parameters (ESP) X X X X

Determine the height of the eruption plume X X X X

Determine the duration of X X X X




Aerodrome

Congested (High

Density)

Un-congested

(Low Density)

Congested (High

Density)

Un-congested

(Low Density)

Busy (High Density)

Low Density

the eruption Detect, determine and report the heightened volcanic activity (pre-eruption)

X X X X

Volcanic Cloud Determine the perimeter, top and base of the volcanic cloud in all kinds of meteorological and day/night conditions

X X X X

Determine when the “volcanic cloud” is a hazard due to:

Ash X X X X X X SO2 X X X X X X Electro-magnetic risks to avionics

X X X X

Other (TBD)

Determine the perimeter of the lowest acceptable ash concentration level (ash cloud)

X X X X X X

Determine the perimeter of the gaseous cloud X X X X X X

Determine the eruption source parameters X X X X X X

Forecast the perimeter of the lowest acceptable ash concentration level (ash cloud)

P

D, P

P

D

P

D

Forecast the top and base height of the lowest acceptable ash concentration level (ash cloud)

P

D, P

P

D

P

D

Forecast the movement of the lowest acceptable ash concentration level

D

D

D

D

Forecast the growth and decay of the lowest acceptable ash concentration level (ash cloud)

P

D, P

P

D

Forecast the location of the gaseous cloud

P

D, P

P

D

P

D

Forecast the top and base height of the gaseous cloud

P

D, P

P

D

P

D

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D

D, P

D

D

Forecast the growth and decay of the gaseous cloud

P

D, P

P

D

Determine when the volcanic cloud is no longer a hazard

X X X X

Determine when the X X X X




Aerodrome

Congested (High

Density)

Un-congested

(Low Density)

Congested (High

Density)

Un-congested

(Low Density)

Busy (High Density)

Low Density

volcanic cloud is hidden or mixed with clouds, especially cumulonimbus clouds and cirrus clouds Forecast when the volcanic cloud is hidden or mixed with meteorological clouds

P D, P P D

Volcanic Ash Accumulation

Determine the ash accumulation at the aerodrome

X X

Forecast the ash accumulation at the aerodrome

P D

Table 4. Functional requirements for volcanic cloud information.

5.2PerformanceRequirementThis section presents the performance requirements for the functions listed in Table 4. Table 5 and 6 addresses the function “determine and forecast the perimeter of the lowest acceptable ash concentration level (ash cloud)”. Additional tables will be developed in the future for the remaining functions.

Each table also represents an operating capability, from near-term (e.g., next 1 to 5 years) next to far-term (e.g., 5 to 10 years). The cells within this table are blank as these requirements are expected to be formalized through the workings of ICAO’s International Airways Volcano Watch Operations Group (IAVWOPSG).

Performance RequirementsVolcanic Cloud Element = Perimeter of Ash Cloud (lowest acceptable level of ash)

Near‐term Operating Capability (years 201x – 201x)


Aerodrome

Congested (High Density)

Un‐congested

(Low Density)


Un‐congested

(Low Density)

Busy (High Density)

Low Density

Observation Vertical resolution

Horizontal resolution

Update frequency

Accuracy

Format





Aerodrome


Un‐congested

(Low Density)


Un‐congested

(Low Density)

Busy (High Density)

Low Density

Nowcast: T1 to T2 (e.g., >0 to 2 hours)14

Vertical resolution


Temporal resolution

Domain or range

Probabilistic range

Update frequency

Accuracy

Format

Forecast: T2 to T3 (e.g., 2 to 6 hours)

Vertical resolution


Temporal resolution

Domain or range

Probabilistic range

Update frequency

Accuracy

Format

Forecast: Tn to Tn+1

Vertical resolution


Temporal resolution

Domain or range

Probabilistic range

Update frequency

Accuracy

Format

Table 5. Perimeter of Ash Cloud, Near-term.




Aerodrome


Un‐congested

(Low Density)


Un‐congested

(Low Density)

Busy (High Density)

Low Density

Observation Vertical resolution


Update frequency

Accuracy

Format

14 All the temporal ranges for the nowcast and forecast are given in the table, e.g., 0 to 2 hours, 2 to 6 hours, etc., are just

examples of possible ranges.





Aerodrome


Un‐congested

(Low Density)


Un‐congested

(Low Density)

Busy (High Density)

Low Density

Nowcast: T1 to T2 (e.g., >0 to 2 hours)15

Vertical resolution


Temporal resolution

Domain or range

Probabilistic range

Update frequency

Accuracy

Format

Forecast: T2 to T3 (e.g.,2 to 6 hours)

Vertical resolution


Temporal resolution

Domain or range

Probabilistic range

Update frequency

Accuracy

Format

Forecast: Tn to Tn+1

Vertical resolution


Temporal resolution

Domain or range

Probabilistic range

Update frequency

Accuracy

Format

Table 6. Perimeter of Ash Cloud, Far-term.

7 6.0OperationalScenariosTwo kinds of operational scenarios are envisioned, avoidance of the volcanic cloud, and planned flight into a cloud. The meteorological information for both scenarios is in the form of nowcasts and forecasts that are integrated into decision support systems.

Nowcasts

The three-dimensional representation of the current or near-current volcanic cloud, including depiction of the perimeter of the lowest acceptable level of ash, in a common exchange format that provides integration into decision making tools as well as offers a graphical depiction of the information. In the avoidance scenario, the nowcast provides users with the location of the ash

15 All the temporal ranges given in the table, e.g., 0 to 2 hours, 2 to 6 hours, etc., are just examples of possible ranges.


cloud. As the ash cloud moves or changes, the nowcast is updated at a temporal frequency that meets user needs and service provider capabilities. For flight into acceptable levels of ash, volcano ESP, in situ measurements of the airborne volcanic cloud (from ground-based, space-based, or airborne-based observing platforms) are required to provide a nowcast that has a high level of confidence of the ash concentration levels inside the cloud.

Forecasts

The four-dimensional representation of the volcanic cloud, including depiction of the perimeter of the lowest acceptable level of ash, ash concentration levels and indices, in both deterministic and probabilistic terms, in a common exchange format that provides integration into decision making tools as well as offers a graphical depiction of the information. For both scenarios, the forecasts would be valid “X” hours and up to “Y” days, but would contain finer temporal resolution in the near time frame. Forecasts would also be provided in terms of uncertainty (use of probability). For flight into acceptable levels of ash, volcano ESP, in situ measurements of the airborne volcanic cloud (from ground-based, space-based, or airborne-based observing platforms), would be needed to provide a forecast of the ash concentration levels to support airline decision making.

The Collaboration Process

Aligned with the above forecast process is the collaborative decision and information sharing process. In this scenario, collaboration on the nowcasts and forecasts will occur on a regular basis such that all users are afforded the opportunity to contribute information. Information will be shared and could be made available on an information database or web portal that is jointly run by the VAACs.

Civil aviation operators will then apply these new nowcasts and forecasts to their operations specifications per their Safety Management System (SMS) and any specific Safety Risk Assessments (SRA) for any operations other in areas of a volcanic ash cloud.

— — — — — — — —

Appendix K to the Report K-1

APPENDIX K

TASKS TO BE EVALUATED BY THE WMO-IUGG VASAG TO PRIORITIZE WHICH TASK(S) PROVIDE(S) THE GREATEST BENEFITS

TO MITIGATE UNCERTAINTY IN THE MODELS

1) Quantify dispersion model output uncertainty.

2) Choose/define ensemble members that represent the range of uncertainty.

3) Determine whether, and if so how, VAAC can use ensemble model output.

4) Assess dispersion model accuracy.

5) Conduct sensitivity studies to help prioritize which dispersion model inputs and model processes most affect model forecast accuracy.

6) Test use of mass eruption rate (MER) algorithm(s) for relatively small/weak eruptions, and continue testing of commonly used MER algorithm(s) for relatively large eruptions.

7) Investigate poor dispersion forecasts, which may be related to poor input meteorology, in region(s) of the world where they sometimes occur.

8) Use of inversion/data assimilation methods to refine the eruption source parameters.

9) Use of assimilation techniques to initialize models with observations instead of initializing with the eruption column.

— — — — — — — —

Appendix L to the Report L-1

APPENDIX L

PROCEDURE IN SUPPORT OF COLLABORATIVE DECISION AND ANALYSIS FORECASTING (CDAF)

While collaborative decision and analysis forecasting (CDAF) is considered a critical process to improve the quality of information provided in VAA/VAG, there is a need to establish priorities. For the initial notification of an eruption, or a notification of the detection of ash that poses a hazard, the first action of any VAAC is to provide an initial volcanic ash advisory that alerts users of the potential hazard. At the same time the VAAC follows its standard operating procedures to gather information and notify other users. Typically, the CDAF process takes the first 20–30 minutes, coordinating message content, analysing satellite imagery and other remote sensing data, running models, etc. In most volcanic ash events, it would be highly unlikely to be able to utilize the collaborative tool any sooner than about 20 minutes of notification of a volcanic ash event. The following are procedures that may serve as a model for how the collaboration process could work:

1. Partners/stakeholders become aware of a major* volcanic ash event.

2. Initial conversations, analysis/forecasting, coordination of messaging, dissemination of text and graphical products.

3. After the initial suite of products (e.g. advisories) has been sent, a message is sent to coordinate a collaborative session.**

4. The message contains the following information:

a) time of collaboration;

b) platform or tool to use (e.g. which EVCM server to connect to);

c) instructions (e.g. what folder to join and what the name of the session will be, such as the Alaska VAAC lead will join the “Alaska” folder and will join the session yyyymmdda. The next collaborative session will be yyyymmddb); and

d) telephone conference line and passcode.

5. The “lead VAAC” leads the collaborative session.

6. At the pre-determined time, all participants log into the agreed platform or tool that will support the CDAF (e.g. the EVCM tool).

7. The users join the pre-determined folder and session name.

8. The “lead VAAC” facilitates the session and shows the data relative to the eruption with annotation as needed.

L-2 Appendix L to the Report 9. Participants can ask for control from the “lead” and are handed off in an orderly/organized fashion.

10. Rules of engagement include no talking over one another, proper etiquette and respect for participants on the call.

11. The lead keeps the collaborative session moving along and ends the session when completed. The collaboration leader will keep in mind workload commitments of participants.

12. Before the session ends, the collaboration lead informs the participants of the next session, if needed.

* A volcanic event which either bridges or is forecast to extend across two or more VAAC boundaries at altitudes of FL250 or greater. ** Message will likely be an e-mail or lead collaborator may wish to call participants first to ensure they are able to participate.

Sample message to initiate collaborative session TO: All collaboration participants during XXXX volcano event

FROM: XXXXX VAAC SUBJECT: Collaborative Decision Analysis and Forecast Session – yyyymmdd hhmm UTC A CDAF session is scheduled for yyyymmdd hhmm UTC. The session is expected to last no longer than xx minutes. The purpose of the session is to ensure proper situational awareness of xxxx volcano eruption and its impacts. Please be ready to share information concerning xxxx eruption. Format must be in .kml and may reside on a web page or on your local drive. Telcon information: 1-888-999-9999 passcode 12345# Start EVCM session: join xxxx folder and yyyymmdda session Wait for the collaborative session leader to join for further instruction Thank you.

— — — — — — — —

Appendix M to the Report M-1

APPENDIX M



. . .

PARTII. APPENDICESANDATTACHMENTS . . .

APPENDIX 2. TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSRELATED TO WORLDAREAFORECASTSYSTEM ANDMETEOROLOGICALOFFICES

(See Chapter 3 of this Annex.) . . .

3. VOLCANIC ASH ADVISORY CENTRES (VAAC)

3.1 Volcanic ash advisory information . . . 3.1.2 The volcanic ash advisory information listed in Table A2-1, when prepared in graphical format, shall be as specified in Appendix 1 and issued using: a) the portable network graphics (PNG) format; or b) the BUFR code form, when exchanged in binary format. Note.— The BUFR code form is contained in WMO Publication No. 306, Manual on Codes, Volume I.2, Part B — Binary Codes.

Editorial Note.— Insert the following new text. 3.1.2 Recommendation.— The volcanic ash advisory information listed in Table A2-1, when prepared in digital form, should be as specified in Appendix 1 and issued in accordance with a globally interoperable information exchange model and should use extensible markup language (XML)/geography markup language (GML). 3.1.3 Volcanic ash advisory information disseminated in digital form shall be accompanied by the appropriate metadata. 3.1.4 The volcanic ash advisory information listed in Table A2-1, when prepared in graphical format, shall be as specified in Appendix 1 and issued using the portable network graphics (PNG) format.

19/6/13 Corr.

M-2 Appendix M to the Report Note.— Guidance on the information exchange model, XML/GML and the metadata profile is provided in the Manual on the Digital Exchange of Aeronautical Meteorological Information (Doc 10003).

End of new text. . . .

— — — — — — — —

xx/6/13 Corr.

Appendix N to the Report N-1

APPENDIX N



. . .

PART I. CORE SARPs

CHAPTER 1. DEFINITIONS

. . .

1.1 Definitions . . . Space weather centre (SWXC). A centre designated by regional air navigation agreement to provide

information on space weather affecting the earth’s surface or atmosphere that is expected to affect communications and navigation systems and may pose a radiation risk to flight crew members and passengers.

. . .


. . . Editorial Note.— Insert the following new text.

3.8 Space weather centres 3.8.1 A Contracting State, having accepted, by regional air navigation agreement, the responsibility for providing a space weather centre (SWXC), shall arrange for that centre to provide information on space weather affecting the earth’s surface or atmosphere expected to affect communications and navigation systems and which may pose a radiation risk to flight crew members and passengers by arranging for that centre to:

a) monitor relevant ground-based, airborne, and space-based observations to detect the existence and extent of the following in the area concerned:

1) geomagnetic storms;

2) solar radiation storms;

3) solar flares that result in radio blackout; and

N-2 Appendix N to the Report

4) ionosphere activity.

b) provide space weather information regarding the type, intensity and extent of the space weather referred to in a);

c) supply space weather information referred to in b) to:

1) area control centres and flight information centres serving flight information regions in its

area of responsibility which may be affected; 2) other SWXCs; and 3) international OPMET databanks, international NOTAM offices, and centres designated by

regional air navigation agreement for the operation of aeronautical fixed service satellite distribution system and internet-based services

3.8.2 SWXCs shall maintain a 24-hour watch. 3.8.3 In case of interruption of the operation of a SWXC, its functions shall be carried out by another SWXC or another meteorological centre, as designated by the SWXC Provider State concerned. Note.— Guidance on the provision of space weather information is provided in the Manual on the Effects of Space Weather on International Air Navigation (Doc ####).

END OF NEW TEXT . . .


CHAPTER 9. SERVICE FOR OPERATORS AND FLIGHT CREW MEMBERS

9.1 General provisions

. . . 9.1.3 Meteorological information supplied to operators and flight crew members shall be up to date and include the following information, as established by the meteorological authority in consultation with operators concerned: . . .

j) ground-based weather radar information.; and k) space weather information relevant to the intended route including aerodrome of departure,

intended landing and alternate destination. . . .

9.3 Flight documentation . . . 9.3.1 Flight documentation to be made available shall comprise information listed under 9.1.3 a) 1) and 6), b), c), e), f) and, if appropriate, g) and k). However, when agreed between the meteorological authority and operator concerned, flight documentation for flights of two hours’ duration or less, after a short stop or turnaround, shall be limited to the information operationally needed, but in all cases the flight documentation shall at least comprise information on 9.1.3 b), c), e), f) and, if appropriate, g) and k). . . .


PART II. APPENDICES AND ATTACHMENTS . . .

APPENDIX 2. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS RELATED TO WORLD AREA FORECAST SYSTEM AND METEOROLOGICAL OFFICES

(See Chapter 3 of this Annex.) . . . Editorial Note.— Insert the following new text.

6. SPACE WEATHER CENTRES (SWXC)

6.1 Space weather information 6.1.1 Recommendation.— Information on space weather should be issued in abbreviated plain language, using approved ICAO abbreviations and numerical values of self-explanatory nature, and should be in accordance with the template shown in Table A2-3. When no approved ICAO abbreviations are available, English plain language text, to be kept to a minimum, should be used. Note.— The effects of space weather may be hemispheric or global in nature and may not be specific to traditional aeronautical boundaries such as flight information regions. 6.1.2 Recommendation.— Space weather information should be made available in digital form. 6.1.3 Space weather information if disseminated in digital form shall be formatted in accordance with a globally interoperable information exchange model and shall use extensible markup language (XML)/geography markup language (GML). 6.1.4 Space weather information if disseminated in digital form shall be accompanied by the appropriate metadata. Note.— Guidance on the information exchange model, XML/GML and the metadata profile is provided in the Manual on the Digital Exchange of Aeronautical Meteorological Information (Doc 10003). . . .


Table A2-3. Template for notice message for space weather information

Key: M = inclusion mandatory, part of every message; O = inclusion optional; = = a double line indicates that the text following it should be placed on the subsequent line.

Element Detailed content Template(s) Examples

1 Identification of the type of message (M)

Type of message SWNA SWNA

2 Time of origin (M) Year, month, day, time in UTC DTG: nnnnnnnn/nnnnZ DTG: 20121108/0113Z

3 Space weather type Type of space weather event (geomagnetic storms, solar radiation storms, radio blackout)

SPACE WEATHER TYPE: GEOMAGNETIC STORM or SOLAR RADIATION STORM or SOLAR RADIO BLACKOUT

SPACE WEATHER TYPE: GEOMAGNETIC STORM

3 Name of SWXC (M) Name of SWXC SWXC: nnnnnnnnnn SWXC: BOULDER

4 AREA (M) Area of the globe affected AREA: nnnnnnnnnn AREA: NP-60N SP-70S NP-80N SP-80S

5

Notice number (M)

Number with year in full and unique message number

NOTICE NR: nnnn/[n][n][n]n

2013/1

7

Space weather details (M)

Concise statement that describes the activity

SPACE WEATHER DETAILS: Free text up to 256 characters

SPACE WEATHER DETAILS: ….

8

Onset of event (O)

If known, specify time of onset. Year, month, day, time in UTC

ONSET OF EVENT: nnnnnnnn/nnnnZ

ONSET OF EVENT: 20121108/0100Z

9

Duration of event (O)

If known, specify the expected duration of effects. Year, month, day, time

DURATION OF EVENT: nnnnnnnn/nnnnZ

DURATION OF EVENT: 20121108/1200Z


in UTC

10

Remarks (O)

Brief comments on related topics (monitoring data, recent history of solar eruptions, etc.)

RMK: Free text up to 256 characters

RMK: ….

11

Contact (O)

Names, phone numbers (voice/fax), email addresses

CONTACT: Free text up to 256 characters

CONTACT: ….

12 Next notice (M) Year, month, day, time in UTC NXT NOTICE: nnnnnnnn/nnnnZ

or Free text up to 256 characters or NO FURTHER NOTICE

NXT NOTICE: 20121108/0600Z

NXT NOTICE: WILL BE ISSUED WHEN SPACE WEATHER CONDITIONS WARRANT CHANGING THE AVIATION COLOUR CODE OR WHEN A SIGNIFICANT SPACE WEATHER EVENT OCCURS WITHIN THE CURRENT COLOUR CODE. NXT NOTICE: NO FURTHER NOTICE

END OF NEW TEXT . . .


APPENDIX 8. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS RELATED TO SERVICE FOR OPERATORS AND FLIGHT CREW MEMBERS

(See Chapter 9 of this Annex.) . . .

4. SPECIFICATIONS RELATED TO FLIGHT DOCUMENTATION

4.1 Presentation of information . . . 4.1.6 Space weather information shall be presented in accordance with local arrangements made by the meteorological authority and the operator. . . .

— — — — — — — —

Appendix O to the Report O-1

APPENDIX O

TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE IAVWOPSG 1. Terms of reference:

The IAVWOPSG should:

a) provide advice and guidance to the Secretariat concerning the operation of the IAVW and its effectiveness in meeting current operational requirements;

b) develop proposals for the development of the IAVW in order to ensure that it continues to meet evolving operational requirements;

Note.— Such proposals for requirements should be made under ICAO procedures for the amendment of Annex 3.

c) assist the Secretariat in the coordination of the arrangements between the various international organizations comprising the IAVW;

d) coordinate with the SADISOPSG and WAFSOPSG regarding the inclusion of volcanic ash advisories and SIGMETs on the ICAO aeronautical fixed service (AFS) satellite broadcasts broadcast and Internet-based services;

e) assist the Secretariat in the development of appropriate guidance material both for operations with volcanic ash in the atmosphere and also operations with volcanic ash deposited on aerodromes;

f) develop specific proposals for the provision of warnings for aerodrome management for deposition of volcanic ash on aerodromes;

g) provide advice and guidance to the Secretariat and the VAACs regarding the future ICAO IAVW and existing VAAC Websites, respectively;

h) provide advice to the Secretariat regarding the development of international arrangements for the provision of warnings information to aircraft of regarding the release of radioactive materials, and toxic chemicals in the atmosphere, and space weather; and

i) make regular progress reports to the Air Navigation Commission.

2. Composition

The IAVWOPSG should comprise representatives from States providing the VAACs, other user States that provided members to the VAWSG would ensure appropriate geographic representation, and representatives from International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), International Air Transport Association (IATA), International Coordinating Council of Aerospace Industries Associations (ICCAIA), Civil Air Navigation Services Organisation (CANSO), International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations (IFALPA), International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics (IUGG) (covering the International Association of Volcanology and Chemistry of the Earth’s Interior (IAVCEI) and its commission the World Organization of Volcano Observatories (WOVO)), and World Meteorological Organization (WMO).

— — — — — — — —

Appendix P to the Report P-1

APPENDIX P

WORK PROGRAMME (DELIVERABLES) OF THE IAVWOPSG

O = operational D = development

H = related to other hazardous conditions

Task number Name Description Source

IAVWOPSG-01 (O)

Volcanic ash advisory centre (VAAC) management reports

Issuance of nine VAAC management reports, every 18 months, 10 weeks before each IAVWOPSG meeting

MET/02: 1/22

IAVWOPSG-02 (O)

Updated ICAO provisions Development of updated ICAO provisions (Annex 3 SARPS, guidance material and regional procedures) to ensure their compatibility with the evolving International Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW)

MET/02: 1/22 IVATF 2/15; 2/28; 2/29; 2/30

IAVWOPSG-03 (O)

Improved production processes, format and content of all volcanic ash related messages

Improve the format, content and production processes of all volcanic ash related messages (including the reporting of multiple ash layers)

APANPIRG 12/32 & 18/46; MET/02: 1/17 + App. HEANPG 51/27 EANPG 51/31 IVATF 2/4; 2/6; 2/9; 2/22; 2/27

IAVWOPSG-04 (O)

Refinement of the provisions for the smell of sulphur as a condition prompting the issuance of a special air-report

Consider whether the smell of sulphur should be added as a condition prompting the issuance of a special air-report

164-10

IAVWOPSG-05 (O)

Updates to the worldwide ash encounter data base

Undertake periodic updates to the worldwide ash encounter data base

APANPIRG 8/27; IAVWOPSG 1/5; 166-13

IAVWOPSG-06 (D)

Improved tools for detecting and forecasting volcanic ash

Improve detection of volcanic eruption and volcanic ash clouds using future satellite and other systems; improve models used for forecasting the movement of volcanic ash

140-11; MET/02: 1/19; IAVWOPSG 2/8; 170-12 IVATF 2/1; 2/2; 2/3; 2/5; 2/7; 2/8; 2/10; 2/11; 2/12

P-2 Appendix P to the Report

Task number Name Description Source

IAVWOPSG-07 (D)

Refinement of VA deposition information in a suitable aeronautical message

Consider including VA deposition information in a suitable aeronautical message (primarily for aerodromes within range of volcanic ash)

IAVWOPSG 1/23; 166-13

IAVWOPSG-08 (H)

Improved notification concerning the release of radioactive material into the atmosphere

Assess and enhance, as necessary, the current operational procedures and notification practices on the release of radioactive material into the atmosphere

146-1&2; MET/02: 1/20 a); IAVWOPSG 1/28 & 1/31

IAVWOPSG-09 (H)

Information on solar radiation storms and other bio-hazards

Assess the need to provide information on solar radiation storms and other bio hazards

MET/02: 1/20 c); IAVWOPSG 1/33

IAVWOPSG-10 (H)

Health risks to aircraft occupants posed by sulphur dioxide and other hazardous gases in the atmosphere

Assess how to provide information on sulphur dioxide and other hazardous gases in the atmosphere that pose a risk to aircraft occupants to enhance guidance contained in the Doc 9766 and/or Doc 9691

IAVWOPSG 7/35

— END —

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