i divorce you. i divorce you. i divorce you

Editorial Committee of the Cambridge Law Journal

I Divorce You. I Divorce You. I Divorce YouAuthor(s): David PearlSource: The Cambridge Law Journal, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Apr., 1971), pp. 40-44Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Editorial Committee of the Cambridge LawJournalStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4505436 .

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40 The Cambridge Ljaw Journal [1971]

England. There remained, however, one unsurmountable obstacle.

Macaulay J. had been appointed by the rebel government, and under

ss. 2 (1) and 6 of the Constitution Order 1965 his appointment was

void. It may seem strange that the Constitution Order, which left

the operation of the Southern Rhodesian courts untouched, should

have failed to make provision for the contingency that judges may have to be replaced. All attempts to close this gap by reference to an

implied authorisation of such judges to act or to the so-called doctrine of necessity failed in face of the clear wording of Acts and Regulations based on a legislature in constant session. Nor did the historical

learning of Owen Dixon (later Chief Justice of Australia) (1935-38) Res

Judicatae 285-292 persuade the President that acts of a de facto judge, even if capable of being treated as such in certain circumstances, could be so regarded here. Reluctantly he dismissed the petition, not without some reflections as to how the law might be improved.

Although the petitioner suffered hardship, it would seem that her

misfortune had little to do with the insufficiency of the rules of private international law which restrict jurisdiction in divorce to

the courts of the matrimonial domicile and to that of the courts

envisaged in section 40 (1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1965 or

by their Lordships in Indyka v. Indyka (supra). It stemmed from a

half-measure by the Executive in the United Kingdom which failed to achieve its own purpose. The Southern Rhodesia (Matrimonial

Jurisdiction) Order in Council 1970 No. 1540, without facing the

problem as a whole, now makes it possible for parties domiciled or resident there for any period to apply to the courts in any part of the United Kingdom for a decree of divorce or nullity, if the petitioner has been ordinarily resident in that part of the United Kingdom for not less than six months immediately before proceedings are begun. The lex fori applies.

K. Lipstein.

40 The Cambridge Ljaw Journal [1971]

England. There remained, however, one unsurmountable obstacle.

Macaulay J. had been appointed by the rebel government, and under

ss. 2 (1) and 6 of the Constitution Order 1965 his appointment was

void. It may seem strange that the Constitution Order, which left

the operation of the Southern Rhodesian courts untouched, should

have failed to make provision for the contingency that judges may have to be replaced. All attempts to close this gap by reference to an

implied authorisation of such judges to act or to the so-called doctrine of necessity failed in face of the clear wording of Acts and Regulations based on a legislature in constant session. Nor did the historical

learning of Owen Dixon (later Chief Justice of Australia) (1935-38) Res

Judicatae 285-292 persuade the President that acts of a de facto judge, even if capable of being treated as such in certain circumstances, could be so regarded here. Reluctantly he dismissed the petition, not without some reflections as to how the law might be improved.

Although the petitioner suffered hardship, it would seem that her

misfortune had little to do with the insufficiency of the rules of private international law which restrict jurisdiction in divorce to

the courts of the matrimonial domicile and to that of the courts

envisaged in section 40 (1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1965 or

by their Lordships in Indyka v. Indyka (supra). It stemmed from a

half-measure by the Executive in the United Kingdom which failed to achieve its own purpose. The Southern Rhodesia (Matrimonial

Jurisdiction) Order in Council 1970 No. 1540, without facing the

problem as a whole, now makes it possible for parties domiciled or resident there for any period to apply to the courts in any part of the United Kingdom for a decree of divorce or nullity, if the petitioner has been ordinarily resident in that part of the United Kingdom for not less than six months immediately before proceedings are begun. The lex fori applies.

K. Lipstein.

"I DIVORCE YOU. I DIVORCE YOU. I DIVORCE YOU."

On 27 April 1967, Dr. M. A. Qureshi wrote a letter to his wife. The letter said, "This is to inform you that as irreconcilable differences have arisen between you and myself I have formed an irrevocable intention to divorce you and I am divorcing you under the Pakistani law. ... I divorce you. I divorce you. I divorce you."

The wife prayed for a declaration from the High Court that her

marriage subsisted, notwithstanding this letter. The judgment was delivered by the President on 30 October 1970 (Qureshi v. Qureshi [1971] 1 All E.R. 325). It provides an authoritative statement on four fundamental issues in the conflict of laws: the retention of

"I DIVORCE YOU. I DIVORCE YOU. I DIVORCE YOU."

On 27 April 1967, Dr. M. A. Qureshi wrote a letter to his wife. The letter said, "This is to inform you that as irreconcilable differences have arisen between you and myself I have formed an irrevocable intention to divorce you and I am divorcing you under the Pakistani law. ... I divorce you. I divorce you. I divorce you."

The wife prayed for a declaration from the High Court that her

marriage subsisted, notwithstanding this letter. The judgment was delivered by the President on 30 October 1970 (Qureshi v. Qureshi [1971] 1 All E.R. 325). It provides an authoritative statement on four fundamental issues in the conflict of laws: the retention of



i divorce you. i divorce you. i divorce you

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