Hydrogen R&D system HAZOP

Yury Ivanyushenkov

for

Elwyn Baynham, Tom Bradshaw, Mike Courthold, Matthew Hills and Tony Jones

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MICE Hydrogen system HAZOP

MICE Hydrogen system HAZOP

R&D Hydrogen delivery system:

- Preliminary HAZOP at the internal review – November 2005

Review panel recommended that “A full HAZOP study carried out with the aid of an external specialist, should be completed as a priority”.

- R&D system HAZOP study at RAL by SERCO experts – May 2006

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HAZOP at RAL

Mike Selway HAZOP Chairman (Serco) Andrew White HAZOP Secretary (Serco)

Gary Allen Target Station Controler (RAL) Tom Bradshaw Project Manager (RAL) Mike Courthold Controls Engineer (RAL) Matthew Hills Mechanical Engineer (RAL) Yury Ivanyushenkov Research Engineer (RAL) Tony Jones Mechanical Engineer (RAL) Chris Nelson Project Engineer (RAL) Jane Vickers ISIS Safety Officer (RAL)

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MICE Hydrogen R&D System

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HAZOP: Nodes

1. Metal Hydride Storage Unit(Including Heater/Chiller Unit)

2. Hydrogen Bottle and line to Buffer Volume(Including lines through HA-PV05, HA-RV06 & HA-PV07)

3. Purge/Fill Helium Cylinder and line through HA-PV18

4. Buffer Tank(Including lines through HA-PV08, HA-BD09 & HA-RV10 to Vent)

5. Lines from Buffer Tank to Cryostat

6. Absorber Volume and Condensing Pot

7. Test Cryostat and Mass Spectrometer Port to Vent and exhaust Vent(Including coolant lines)

8. Nitrogen System - Jacket and Ventilation Purge(Including nitrogen cylinder and lines through HA-PV11, HA-BD12 & HA-PV13))

9. Gas Panel

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MICE Hydrogen R&D System

Node 1

Node 2

Node 3

Node 4Node 5

Node 6

Node 7

Node 8

Node 9

Node 6

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HAZOP Keywords

Keywords

Level Instrumentation VentilationFlow Operator Action Loss Of ServicesPressureStructural Failure Effluent / Waste / ResidueTemperature Corrosion / Erosion SamplingComposition Contamination External HazardsConcentration Impact

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HAZOP Node 1

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HAZOP Recommendations

IndexNode 1: Metal Hydride Storage Unit, Parameter: FlowNode 1: Metal Hydride Storage Unit, Parameter: TemperatureNode 1: Metal Hydride Storage Unit, Parameter: Operator ActionNode 2: Hydrogen Bottle and line to the Buffer Volume, Parameter: PressureNode 2: Hydrogen Bottle and line to the Buffer Volume, Parameter: ContaminationNode 2: Hydrogen Bottle and line to the Buffer Volume, Parameter: Effluent / Waste / ResidueNode 4: Buffer Tank, Parameter: PressureNode 4: Buffer Tank, Parameter: Operator ActionNode 5: Lines from Buffer Tank to Cryostat, Parameter: FlowNode 6: Absorber Volume and Condensing Pot, Parameter: InstrumentationNode 6: Absorber Volume and Condensing Pot, Parameter: Operator ActionNode 6: Absorber Volume and Condensing Pot, Parameter: Structural FailureNode 6: Absorber Volume and Condensing Pot, Parameter: External HazardsNode 7: Test Cryostat and Mass Spectrometer Port to Vent and Exhaust Vent, Parameter: PressureNode 8: Nitrogen System - Jacket and vent purge, Parameter: FlowNode 8: Nitrogen System - Jacket and vent purge, Parameter: Impact

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HAZOP Recommendations

HAZOP Recommendations

Node 1 (Metal Hydride Storage Unit):1. Look at pressure of hydride bed "on a hot day" i.e. high ambient temperature MC(Failure of heater/chiller pump -> Increase of pressure in system)

2. Consider a chiller pump failure alarm for the hydride bed unit MC(As above)

3. Review consequences of a glycol release (leak) onto plant items from the chiller AJ(Leak in pipework -> Ehylene glycol dripping onto plant/equipment)

4. Review appropriate methods of crane operating areas to reduce risk of damageto plant from impact/dropped loads

AJ(Dropped load from crane -> Damage to plant/equipment e.g. ruptured pipework)

5. Consider linking temperature monitor with heater chiller operation to avoidoverheating in the event of thermostat failure MC(Failure of thermostat in heating unit -> Temperature >30C causing rise in pressure)

6. Consider automation of hydride bed hand valve MC(As above)

7. Assess ignition sources around the hydrogen generation unit to reduce possibilityof fire in the MICE hall CN(External fire in the MICE hall -> Possible flame impingement on metal hydride unit)

8. Review hydride bed operational sequencing for inappropriate actions MC(Failure of thermostat in cooling unit -> Lower temperature)

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HAZOP Recommendations (2)

Node 2 (Hydrogen Bottle and Line to the Buffer Volume):9. Review process for filling hydrogen bed for indication that the bed is full (includingthe location of bottles during storage and filling) MC(Excessive hydrogen delivered to hydride bed -> Higher pressure)

10. Consider back streaming with He during connection to avoid contamination withair during bottle changes MC(Failure to purge hydrogen filling line -> Lower pressure)

11. Review access to roof to avoid exposure to vented hydrogen CN(Emergency venting of hydrogen -> Potential explosive atmosphere at roof level)

Node 4 (Buffer Tank):12. Consider test mechanism to validate (RV10) seal after discharge of coldHydrogen MC/MH(RV10 operates and discharges cold hydrogen -> Potential to result in failure to reseal)

13. Confirm that control software system conforms with IEC61508 MC(Operator accidentally opens PV08 via control system -> Air ingress to system)

Node 5 (Lines from Buffer Tank to Cryostat)14. Identify appropriate procedure in the event of blockage due to condensation ofimpurities in buffer tank/cryostat line MC/TB(Condensation of impurities -> Pressure rise in the absorber volume)

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HAZOP Recommendations (3)

Node 6 (Absorber Volume and Condensing Pot)15. Ensure hydrogen sensors on UPS in case of loss of power MC(Loss of power -> Inability to monitor state of system)

16. Consider the benefits of having all control system on UPS in the case of loss ofpower to prove state of system information MC(As above)

17. Ensure that software intervenes when discrepancies are detected with provisionfor limited operator intervention MC(Operator makes wrong decision -> Cryostat fills with air if, for example, PV25 opened)

18. Consider installation of mass spectrometer (RGA) on PV25 to monitor potentialembrittlement issues MC(Hydrogen embrittlement issues -> Leak of hydrogen)

19. Assess ignition sources around the cryostat unit (as for Recommendation 7) CN(External fire on the MICE hall -> Possible flame impingement on cryostat and affect internals)

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HAZOP Recommendations (4)

Node 7 (Test Cryostat and Mass Spectrometer Port to Vent and Exhaust Vent)20. Review capability of bursting disc to withstand scenario of RV10 or RV23pressure surge MH(Activation of RV10 (from buffer volume) or RV23 (hydride bed) -> Disc bursts and hydrogen ingress into cryostat)

21. Confirm whether bursting disc would create ignition source on activation MH(As above)

22. Consider the inclusion of a non-return valve downstream of the burst disc toavoid pressure surge from RV10 or RV23 activation MH(As above)

Node 8 (Nitrogen System – Jacket and Vent Purge)23. Consider installation of flow meter(s) / indication device to alert low/ no flow fromnitrogen bottle around nitrogen jacket circuit MH(Empty gas bottle -> Air in ventilation line and cryostat jacket)

24. Consider fitting non-return valve to prevent hydrogen flow into nitrogen systemon activation of RV10 or RV23 MH(Discharge through RV10 or RV23 -> Hydrogen into nitrogen line)

25. Review need for protection/location of gas bottles to prevent vehicle (or other)Impacts AJ(Vehicle impact with cylinder bottle storage -> Potential rupture of cylinder)

Node 9 (Gas Panel)26. Review methods to minimise condensation on hydrogen pipework

AJ(High moisture content -> Condensation on hydrogen pipework leading to pools of water on floor)

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After-HAZOP steps

What’s next:

- Get final report from Serco.

- Examine HAZOP recommendations (being started)

- Implement changes/additions to the system based on HAZOP recommendations - Decide whether another session of HAZOP is required

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R&D Hydrogen system status and plans

Hardware:- Implement modifications into the system PID as recommended by HAZOP- Complete the technical specs package for a manufacturer- Get quotations from potential manufacturers and select one- Order the system hardware

( Delivery of hydride bed - last week of June – 1st week of July )

Control system:- Examine HAZOP recommendations and implement them- Complete technical spec- Develop the system