hume kant deity

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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 43: 133148, 1998. 133c

1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

Hume and Kant on knowing the deity

BERYL LOGANUniversity of Toronto, Canada

I have found it necessary to deny knowledge inorder to make room for faith

(Immanuel Kant)1

In the opening paragraphs of Section 57 of the Prolegomena to Any FutureMetaphysics On the determination of the boundsof pure reason, Kant makes

reference to Humes Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion as an illustra-

tion of what might result if we conceded no things in themselves or set up our

experience for the only possible mode of knowing things : : : [which would]

have the principles of the possibility of experience considered universal con-

ditions of things in themselves,2 Regarding the way possible experience is

conditioned as the way things in themselves are conditioned (making the

principles of possible experience transcendent) results in skepticism: every-

thing that transcends experience is worthless as it is unknowable. Just as he

sought to relieve the skepticism that he saw resulting from Humes analysis

of causality, so too inx

57 ff. Kant seeks to relieve the skepticism with respect

to the knowability of the Supreme Being that he perceives in Humes work.

Kant suggests that noumena, as that which are presupposed in all possible

experience and through which reason achieves the satisfaction and complete-

ness not available in phenomena, are found in the void, beyond all experience.

He then asks What is the attitude of our reason in this connection of what

we know with what we do not, and never shall, know? (P:x

57, 113) How

does reason approach the unknown and unknowable world ofnoumena when

reason is applicable only to the known and knowable world of phenomena?

In this and the following sections, Kant intends to show how a connection is

possible between these two worlds, by means of such concepts as express

their relation to the world of sense, and he will use the notion of the Supreme

Being as an example, as a concept that may be thought, if not known.In this paper I will address the arguments that Kant uses to show the way

in which we can think but not know the Deity, and how Kant thinks his


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134 BERYL LOGAN

arguments combat the skepticism that he finds in Humes arguments in the

Dialogues. Kants reading of the Dialogues as negative and skeptical is in

accord with that generally adopted in the Hume literature, but by offering

my own account of the belief that is expressed in the Dialogues I show that

for Hume as well, the Deity is ultimately unknowable as it is not an itemof knowledge. However, Kants means of relieving this ignorance is quite

unHumean, as Humes means is quite unKantian.

Kant would appear to have had a more substantial acquaintance with

Humes Dialogues than with Humes other texts. A German edition of the

Dialogues was published in 1781, two years after the initial publication of

the Dialogues in English. In addition to referring to Humes arguments in the

Prolegomena, Kants knowledge of this text is clearly evident in his Lectures

on Philosophical Theology.3 He refers there to objections raised by Hume

against inferring that an intelligence is responsible for purposiveness in nature

(what Kant calls the physicotheological proof, which makes use of expe-

rience of the present world in general and infers from this to the existence of

an author of the world and to the attributes which would belong to its author

as such).4

I

Kant begins Section 57 of the Prolegomena, On the determination of the

bounds of pure reason, by opposing two absurdities, or contradictions. The

first has two parts: first, it would be contradictory to think that we can know

anything more about an object than belongs to the possible experience of

it. That is, we can only have experience of objects through the forms of

intuition of space and time, and we can only know them as phenomena, as

they appear to us as objects of sensory experience. We can never know any

object independent of or outside of space and time, or as something other

than a sensory experience. Then, of course, we can have no knowledge of

how any object that is outside of space and time and sensory experience can

be or whether or not it is determined by its own nature in the way that

the objects of sensory experience are determined by the a priori principles.

This sets the boundaries ofourknowledge, but objects are not limited by the

ways in which we are able to know them. Bounds: : :

always presuppose a

space existing outside a certain definite place and enclosing it; limits do not

require this, but are mere negations, which affect a quantity, so far as it is not

absolutely complete (P:x

57, 111). Completeness, things in themselves, lie

beyond the boundary.The second contradiction occurs when reason regards ourway of knowing

things as being the only way of knowing. The objects of possible experience


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HUME AND MANT ON KNOWING THE DEITY 135

must be intuited in space and time; as conditioned, they are limited to being

experienced in these ways. This is a contradiction, because things in them-

selves or noumena, which must exist for it to be possible to have experience

ofphenomena, would no longer be things in themselves but would be objects

of possible experience. It would be contradictory to regard things in them-selves as objects of reason (the role of reason being to apply the synthesis of

representation to its objects). And, it would be presumptuous of us to declare

that the means by which empirical objects are known intuited in space and

time conditioned by the principles of possible experience is the only way

any things, including things in themselves, can be known. Unless reason is

the object of a careful critique (P: 110) (an examination of the objects and

limits of reason), it may transcend the empirical use of the concepts go

beyond that to which they are by nature applicable - and attempt to similarly

limit things in themselves, i.e., know them as objects of experience. 5

The principles or conditioning concepts are valid only as they are applied

to the undistinguished manifold of perceptions, and the limits of reason lie

in its application of just these principles to just this manifold of perceptions.

The limits inherent in the principles and our reason (valid only as applied

to possible experience) must not be taken to indicate the limits of things

in themselves, which would make them unknowable because they cannot

be known by our way of knowing. Things in themselves are not objects of

possible experience, and thus are not knowable by the means that such objects

are known. If this means is regarded as the only way of knowing then these

objects are unknowable. It is the claim that there is only one way of knowing

which Kant is concerned with. And Kant regards Humes Dialogues to be an

example or illustration of this contradiction: Our principles, which limit the

use of reason to possible experience, might in this way become transcendent,

and the limits of our reason be set up as limits of the possibility of things inthemselves (as Humes Dialogues may illustrate): : :

. (P:x

57, 110)

I will now show why Kant regards the arguments of the Dialogues to be

an illustration of his point, and how he combats the perceived skepticism of

the Dialogues. In this section I will adopt Kants view of the Dialogues, that

Hume takes only a critical position, and draws only a skeptical conclusion.

II

In the Dialogues, Cleanthes presents the anthropomorphic Argument from

Design that draws analogical inferences regarding the nature of the Deity from

what is found in experience. He argues that the intelligence and benevolenceof the Deity, the cause, can be inferred from what we find in the world,

the effect. This position assumes that reason can achieve results in natural


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136 BERYL LOGAN

theology by using the same methods that it would apply to an empirical

investigation. For example, I can infer by an analogical argument that if I buy

a new car that is similar to my old car, and if I know from experience that my

old car uses x litres to drive y kilometers, then my new car will do the same.

In the same way, Cleanthes says, I can infer by an analogical argument thatas we know from experience that a machine or human artifact that has certain

features was designed by a being with intelligence, that the world, which

has similar features, was also designed by a being with intelligence. As the

effects resemble, the causes also resemble, in proportion to the complexity,

or grandeur, of their effects: as the universe, the effect, is vastly greater

and more complex than a computer or a sewing machine, their designers,

or causes, are proportionately different only in greatness a difference of

degree, not kind.

The thrust of Philos (Humes) criticisms of the Design Argument is that

nothing can be inferred about the nature of the cause, the Deity, by examining

the effect, the world. Philo shows Cleanthes that the methods he is using are

applicable only to empirical investigation, and not to objects that lie beyond

the limits of human experience.6

So long as we confine our speculations to trade, or morals, or politics, or

criticism, we make appeals, every moment to common sense and experi-

ence, which strengthen our philosophical conclusions and remove (at least

in part) the suspicion, which we so justly entertain with regard to every

reasoning, that is very subtile and refine. But in theological reasonings,

we have not this advantage; while at the same time we are employed upon

objects which, we must be sensible, are too large for our grasp: : :

. We

are like foreigners in a strange country to whom everything must seem

suspicious, and who are in danger every moment of transgressing against

the laws and customs of the people with whom they live and converse.We know not how far we ought to trust our vulgar methods of reasoning

in such a subject : : : . (D: 101)

As a result of the inability of the experimental, or empirical, method of

reasoning, i.e., making general inferences drawn from the data of experience,

to know anything about what is not an object of sense experience, no

determinate conclusion with respect to the Deitys intelligence, benevolence,

or mode of existence may be drawn. This position is an illustration of Kants

point in the following way. Kant had stated that a contradiction results if

reason, the means by which we know sensible objects, applies itself to objects

beyond its proper application (i.e., to sensible objects only) to objects thatare not sensible, and proceeds to claim that as such means cannot know

these objects, the objects cannot be known. This regards the way of knowing


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sensible objects to be the only way of knowing at all. So, if Hume concludes

that the experimental method fails with respect to the Deity because the Deity

is not part of the data of experience, this leaves him with only one position in

natural theology that of skepticism. No other way of knowing, in any sense,

is available.As the appropriate way of applying the experimental method to the Deity

is by analogy from what is known, and since what is known is the human

world of sense and experience, then any claims about the Deity must be

anthropomorphic. Kant argues that for Hume theism and anthropomorphism

are inseparable, such that if anthropomorphism falls so does theism. As

Humes arguments in the Dialogues devastate anthropomorphism, theism

vanishes.

Kant thus proposes a third way, one that preserves theism and combats

Humes skepticism by proposing a non-anthropomorphic analogical argument

through which we may think the Deity. The series of arguments in sections

57, 58 and 59 leads to this proposal.

Kant brings the contradictions from earlier paragraphs of x 57 to bear on

the concept of the highest being. Natural theology leads reason to the objec-

tive boundary of experience on our side of the boundary is the world of

phenomena, of appearances, of experience. At that boundary, reason connects

experience with that which lies beyond that boundary, in the world of things

in themselves, which are not objects of experience but which are the grounds

or conditions of experience. Hume is left on our side of the boundary, limited

to experience alone, unable to make the connections with what would give

perceptions an objective ground. He is thus left with skepticism with respect

to anything beyond perceptions.

Natural theology is: : :

a concept on the boundary of human reason, being

constrained to look beyond this boundary to the idea of a Supreme Being(and, for practical purposes, to that of an intelligible world also), not

in order to determine anything relatively to this pure creation of the

understanding, which lies beyond the world of sense, but in order to

guide the use of reason within it according to principles of the greatest

possible (theoretical as well as practical) unity. For this purpose we make

use of the reference of the world of sense to an independent reason, as

the cause of all its connections. Thereby we do not purely invent a being,

but, as beyond the sensible world there must be something that can only

be thought by the pure understanding, we determine that something in

this particular way, though only of course according to analogy. (P: x 59,

118119)


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138 BERYL LOGAN

This quote alludes to a distinction drawn by Kant in the Preface to the Second

Edition of the CPR between thinking an object and knowing an object.7 He

states there that while we cannot know these objects as things in themselves,

we must yet be in a position at least to think them as things in themselves.

Without being able to think of things in themselves as things in themselves,i.e., that there are things in themselves, we should be landed in the absurd

conclusion that there can be appearances [phenomena] without anything that

appears [noumena]. In a footnote, Kant explicates this distinction: To know

an object I must be able to prove its possibility, either from its actuality

as attested by experience, or a priori by means of reason. But I can think

whatever I please, provided : : : my concept is a possible thought. (That is,

it contains no contradictions.) Thinking an object does not answer for there

being : : : an object corresponding to it(CPR B xxvii). To know an object

is to determine or condition it, i.e., to know the conditions under which it

is an object of possible experience, or to know the concepts under which

it is subsumed. (As the contradictions discussed earlier show, though, such

knowledge of things in themselves is not possible as they are not able to be

either determined or conditioned.) While we think the possibility of such a

Being, we are not merely inventing it,8 as it would be absurd to claim that

there are connections in the world of the senses without there being a cause of

those connections. So we look beyond the boundary of what we can know

(the objects of possible experience), to thinkthe idea of a Supreme Being, but

anything we may say about that Being can only be accomplished by analogy.

According to Philos critical arguments, neither reason nor experience can

achieve anything that is useful for religion. According to Kant, though, while

reason is limited to objects of possible experience, its limits are only bound-

aries beyond which lie things in themselves. Kant thinks he can save theism

by pushing possible experience to the boundary and making a connectionbetween possible experience and the Deity as a thing in itself. The analogy that

he proposes does not depend upon the similarities of objects being compared.

Rather, Kant employs what he calls symbolic anthropomorphism, which

concerns language only and not the object itself (P:x

57, 115). It is a way of

thinking and talking about the Deity that reflects the relationship between the

sensible world and the Deity without purporting to describe the Deity. As a

thing-in-itself, the Deity is unknowable. It is the point of connection between

the worlds of phenomena and noumena.

This symbolic anthropomorphism is established by an analogical argument

that is relational rather than descriptive, i.e., it intends to establish similar

relations between items, not to describe the items. It does not allow us to have

knowledge of a thing-in-itself, something which Kant believes we are unableto do, but it does allow us to think and talk about the Deity through terms and


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relations that are within the scope of our knowledge; we are describing what

our experience is like for us and speaking about God in those terms that are

knowable by us. When we speak of, and reason about, God in these terms,

we are not describing what God is like nor are we drawing any conclusions

about God as God as a thing-in-itself. God as a thing-in-itself is unknowableas a thing in itself.

Further, this analogy does not mean, as is commonly understood, an imper-

fect similarity of two things, but a perfect similarity of relations between two

quite dissimilar things (P:x 58, 115). Dogmatic anthropomorphism, such as

that employed by Cleanthes in the Dialogues, attributes to the highest being

in itself those properties through which we think objects of experience.

A standard analogical argument infers a missing feature on the basis of

the similarity of the items being compared. Car X has features (a) standard

transmission, (b) V-6 engine, and (c) for every litre of gasoline, it travels 20

kilometers. If Car Y has features (a) and (b),then we can infer that it will

also have feature (c). The two cars being compared exhibit relevantly similar

features, and on the basis of this relevant similarity a conclusion may be

drawn with respect to the missing feature. The two items being compared are

placed in that comparison on the basis of their similarity, and the conclusion

draws its strength from the degree (and relevance) of that similarity. There is a

justification, based on similarity, for placing thesetwo items in the relationship

and inferring the presence of the missing feature. This is the form of argument

utilized by Cleanthes.

Kants analogical argument, on the other hand, is not based on similarity

of features of the items compared, but on their relationships: : : :

I can obtain

a relational concept of things which are absolutely unknown to me. For

instance, as the promotion of the welfare of children (= a) is to the love of

parents (= b), so the welfare of the human species (= c) is to that unknown inGod (= x), which we call love: : :

(P:x

58, 115116).

Making this relational claim does not infer that the Deity is or is not

intelligent, or if it is intelligent that the Deitys intelligence is anything like

human intelligence. It only determine[s] it as regards the [sensible] world

and therefore as regards ourselves. When we speak of the world as being

intelligently ordered, we say much about ourselves in the world of phenomena

when we speakof God being in a relation (one we can understand) to us like

the relation of parent and child, but we say nothing ofGod. The predicates

that we attribute to God in this way are thus determined subjectively for us

and by us. They are not determined objectively this is what God is like as

is the case in the standard argument.

If I say that we are compelled to consider the world as if it were the work ofa Supreme Understanding and Will, I really say nothing more than that as


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140 BERYL LOGAN

a watch, a ship, a regiment bears the same relation to the watchmaker, the

shipbuilder, the commanding officer as the world of sense (or whatever

constitutes the substratum of this complex of appearances) does to the

Unknown, which I do not hereby cognize as it is in itself, but as it is for

me or in relation to the world of which I am a part. (P: x 57, 115)

This, according to Kant, saves theism by freeing it from its dependence upon

anthropomorphism, as it is not an anthropomorphic analogy. It makes no

claim, as Cleanthes argument does, as to what are the nature or features of

the Deity, and whether they in any way resemble those of humans.

This kind of reasoning about God, in the face of our inability to know

things-in-themselves is confined to the reasoning we are entitled to undertake:

the Deitys features and existence is not directly knowable as our conscious-

ness of all existence: : :

belongs exclusively to the unity of experience: : :

any

existence outside this field, while not indeed such as we can declare to be

absolutely impossible, is of the nature of an assumption which we can never

be in a position to justify (CPR: 506). Any reasoning about religious matterscan and must take place only within the realm of sensous experience. The

analogy that we are entitled to employ i.e. one that makes reference only

to our experience and what humans are like and not what God is like can,

however, make no anthropomorphic claims, as the concept of God must be

carefully purified and freed of all such human ideas; from a practical point

of view, though, we may momentarily represent God using such predicates

whenever by this means the thought of God affords more power and strength

: : : .9 Thus our reasoning about God (and religious matters) is confined to our

reasoning about any other matter: it can only refer to the world of experience.

Through the symbolic anthropomorphism we indulge in this practical rep-

resentation to speak of God as we speak of humans, that God loves humans in

the way that a parent loves her child. But this reasoning is not knowing God

as a thing-in-itself something we cannot do it is rather reasoning about

our world and experience, and when we speak about God we (can only) speak

in these terms. The unknowability of things-in-themselves precludes us from

supposing, or reasoning, that how we speak and think about God is saying

something about what God is like.

Religion (as the recognition of all duties as divine commands10) is still,

however, within the limits of reason. Reasons recourse to the objects of sense

establishes the relation in the analogy as it applies to sensible objects, i.e.

parental love for children. But this analogy only serves to make perceptual, in

the interests of practicality, what is invisible: But we cannot know anything

at all about supernatural aid whether a certain moral power, perceptible tous, really comes from above or, indeed, on what occasions and under what

conditions it may be expected.12


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Religion must remain within the limits of reason, as applicable to and

referring to, only the objects of experience. We approach the limits of this

reasoning when we refer to God, as a concept lying beyond the boundary

between phenomena (benevolence, intelligence, etc. as they apply to humans)

and noumena (God as thing-in-itself) through the symbolic anthropomorphicanalogy. But reason would be going beyond its limits if it thought it could

apply these phenomena to God to say what God is like. God is not directly

knowable, and is not related to the world or its inhabitants in any vital way;

the anthropomorphic representation of God and Gods being, is harmless

enough (so long as it does not influence concepts of duty). 12 But what can

be known, and what is within reasons limits, is the recognition of our duties

and the laws. The representation of God through the relational, symbolically

anthropomorphic analogy, plays a practical role in making visible what is

invisible.

In the next part of this paper, I return to Philos claims in the Dialogues to

show that he too expresses a non-anthropomorphic belief in a Deity, and that

his role is more than just that of critic.

III

The purpose of the Dialogues, as stated by Pamphilus in the Introduction,

is not to establish the Deitys existence, which is self-evident, but only to

address the issue of the Deitys nature. Cleanthes claims to know the Deity

by inference from the data in the world, while Demea (and Philo) maintain

that the Deity is mystedously adorable.

According to Cleanthes arguments, the orderliness and purposiveness of

the world allow us to infer that the Designer of the world has an intelligence

that is like the intelligence of the designers of orderly and purposive objects

(machines or human artifacts) in the world. In Parts 4 to 8, Philo shows that the

claim that the designer of the world is intelligent like humans are intelligent

is only one of a number of hypotheses that are possible when inferring from

the data in the world, including the conjecture that there is more than one

designer, and that an anthropomorphic Deity is not like a Deity at all.13 In

Part 9, Cleanthes shows, in answering Demeas a priori argument, that the

necessity of the Deitys existence cannot be established. In Parts 10 and 11,

he shows that the data or evidence in the world permit only the inference that

the Deity is not benevolent and/or malevolent, but is indifferent.

In Part 12, Philo sums up these claims by stating that while there is some

analogy between the effects (human artifacts and the world) and the causes(humans and the Deity) it is veryremote one. All that results from an argument

like Cleanthes is the claim that the cause or causes of order in the universe


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probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence, but alleges that

the argument is too weak to provide any basis for religious belief. It warrants

only philosophical assent to its legitimate conclusion, as the argument

outweighs the objections. While earlier in Part 12 Philo had stated That the

works of nature bear a great analogy to the productions of art is evident : : : .No man can deny the analogies between the effects: To restrain ourselves

from enquiring concerning the causes is scarcely possible: From this enquiry,

the legitimate conclusion is, that the causes also have an analogy: : :

, this

is, I submit, Philo admitting simply that there is some analogy, and that it is

reasonable to draw the conclusion. The weakest analogy is still a legitimate

inference: if I infer from the fact that one pair of size 8 12

shoes fits that all

other size 8 12

shoes will fit, I am drawing an analogical inference, even though

it may be a very weak one because I am inferring from one case to many

cases. The issue is whether or not this constitutes Philos expression of belief,

and I would urge that it does not.14 It is merely what Philo refers to in the

penultimate paragraph of Part 12 as the plain philosophical assent that the

inquisitive person would give to the proposition as often as it occurs and

the only belief that arises from this assent is the belief that the arguments, on

which it is established, exceed the objections, which lie against it: : :

.

In Part 5, Philo tells Cleanthes that one who follows your hypothesis, is

able, perhaps, to assert, or conjecture, that the universe, some time, arose

from something like design: But beyond that position he cannot ascertain one

single circumstance: : :

(D: 131). Philo claims in Part 2 of the Dialogues

that while we can use words to describe the Deity, such as intelligent, wise,

benevolent, we should not think that the words we use actually do refer to or

accurately describe the characteristics or features of the Deity:

: : : we ought never to image that we comprehend the attributes of this

divine Being, or to suppose that his perfections have any analogy or like-ness to the perfections of a human creature. Wisdom, thought, design,

knowledge these we justly ascribe to him because these words are hon-

ourable among men, and we have no other language or other conceptions

by which we can express our adoration of him. But let us beware lest

we think that our ideas anywise correspond to his perfections, or that his

attributes have any resemblance to these qualities among men. (D: 108)

In sum, in spite of arguments to establish the Deitys nature, reason cannot

in the end determine anything about the Deitys nature. We cannot say that a

human-like intelligence is the cause of the world, that this cause is benevolent,

or that its existence is necessary. It is not possible to establish conclusivelyanything about a God who [does] not discover himself immediately to our

senses. We may use the words intelligent, benevolent, necessary, but


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we cannot claim that they accurately describe the Deity. Humes position

is, then, that we cannot know the Deity, i.e., grasp the Deitys nature, by

utilizing the experimental method.

This critical stance is not, however, Humes final word in the Dialogues. It

may, though, be the final suspense of judgement one faces when one appliesreason to issues of natural theology. It is my position that Philo (and Hume)

presents a positive statement of belief, and for this belief the Deity is likewise

unknowable.

Throughout the Dialogues, Philo has taken a consistent position: while

Cleanthes had maintained that the Design Argument constituted proof of

the Deitys existence and the Deitys similarity to humans (thus allowing

the Deity to be comprehensible), Philo shows Cleanthes that in fact the only

position tenable in natural theology is a suspense of judgement.15

This is hardly satisfactory to be religious belief, as Philo further notes:

the contemplative person feels some contempt of human reason if all it can

produce is such a weak argument, and the most natural sentiment which

a well disposed mind will feel on this occasion, is a longing desire and

expectation for some resolution of this position of profound ignorance. The

failure of the Design Argument to produce any definitive conclusion leads the

inquisitive thinker to seek a further revelation in nature. Early in Part 12 Philo

states that the striking appearances in nature prevent one from doubting a

supreme intelligence; that all a divine Being need do is copy the present

economy of things; render many of his artifices so plain, that no stupidity

could mistake them; A purpose, an intention, a design strikes every where

the most careless, the most stupid thinker; and no man can be so hardened in

absurd systems, as at all times to reject it (D:172). That is, Philo would say:

Look round the world, look at the wonderful variety and exact propriety,

look at the whole face of nature, how can one be so obstinate as to deny thatthere is a supreme intelligence.

I would argue that these claims of Philos are the result of an irregular

argument like the one that Cleanthes utilizes in Part 3: such arguments appeal

to the sentiments, to the imagination and emotions rather than to reason; they

contravene accepted rules. The model for such arguments in literature is some

forms of poetry. Rather than conform to accepted or established patterns of

rhyme and metre, many poems in fact lack both these features. Their con-

struction is meant to evoke vivid imagery and incite passions. Likewise, the

irregular argument in natural theology does not make a reasoned inference

from the evidence (the effect) to the Deity (the cause), as does the Design

Argument. (In fact, in Part 2, Philos initial criticisms of this argument focus

on its lack of adherence to the requirements for analogical arguments, rel-evant similarity and repeated experience, and that it commits the fallacy of


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144 BERYL LOGAN

composition16). Philos irregular argument, expressed in the above passages

as well as at the conclusion of the penultimate, and crucial, paragraph of Part

12,17 give rise to a belief in an intelligent designer that is not based on any

inference from the evidence or effect to the cause: it is drawn, quite simply

and quite irresistibly, when one is confronted with the very numerous (somany that no human nature can compute their number) and forcible (so that

no understanding [can] estimate their cogency) facts in nature.

The force of this argument is not drawn from the inference from effect to

cause by analogy. One is struck or impressed with great force by the facts of

nature, and cannot hesitate a moment concerning the cause of it all.18 What

is important to note for our purposes is that it makes no claim as to the nature

of the Deity, that the Deity has this or that feature that is comprehensible to

us because it is similar to us. We are by nature irresistibly and inextricably

drawn towards the belief in a Supreme Being to which we pay profound

adoration whenever we contemplate the complexities of nature.

I will now focus the interesting similarity that has emerged from our dis-

cussions of Hume and Kant on the Deity.

IV

We saw in a previous section that for Kant we cannot know the Deity, as

knowledge requires both a concept and a sensuous intuition, and as the Deity

is part of the noumenal world, such intuition is not possible. We may think

about the Deity, by drawing analogies to relationships that are knowable

in the phenomena world, and represent the invisible through the visible in

the interests of practicality. So when we talk about certain features of the

Deity, we are really only talking about what holds in the sensible world of

experience, and we are not truly describing the Deity. Further, for Hume,

the experimental method fails in its attempt to establish that the Deity has

the features of intelligence, necessary existence, and benevolence. The Deity

remains mysteriously adorable, and while we can use words such as wisdom

or benevolence when we speak about the Deity, we cannot presume that

these words actually describe the Deity. We may be irresistibly drawn to

acknowledge a designer of the world, but we can say nothing that would

claim to describe that Deity.19

Now that we have shown the arguments presented by Hume and Kant that

are concerned with the knowability of the Deity, we can see the similarity in

their positions. And this similarity is that, ultimately, the Deity is unknowable

by reason, and that any way we may come to speak about the Deity says muchabout us and nothing about the Deity. For both Hume and Kant, this lack of

knowledge derives from the fact that the Deity is not an object of (possible)


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experience, and the only way we have to refer to or speak about the Deity is

by our words that are applicable only to the objects of experience. Humes

criticisms of what Kant calls dogmatic anthropomorphism, and its claims as

to what the Deity is indeed like, show the failure of this position. The evidence

does not allow for the conclusion Cleanthes seeks, given that any number ofclaims as to the nature of the cause are possible, and that an anthropomorphic

Deity is like no Deity at all. While the empirical method is applicable to

the objects of sense experience, it is not applicable to objects beyond sense

experience. As a Kantian thing in itself, a concept beyond the phenomenal

world, the Deity is not knowable for Kant either. Any religious reasoning

must remain within the limits of reason alone, so any religious reasoning

must be confined to the objects of the senses. The religious reasoning that

directs us to the recognition of our duties must occur absent of knowledge of

God. We carry out what we know to be our duty independent of our knowing

the influence of God on our morality, or whether God approves. Knowledge

requires both concept and sensible intuition, and the latter is lacking in this

case.

So for both Kant and Hume, given the means by which knowledge is gained

for each, we are left eager to seek some other way to approach the Deity. But

the way that they each relieve this lack of knowledge is quite dissimilar,

reflecting their substantially divergent epistemological commitments.

Kant seeks to alleviate the lack of knowledge by use of a symbolic anthro-

pomorphic analogy. As an object that lies beyond possible experience, no

method or faculty or principle that is appropriate for inferring, grasping, or

ordering sensory experience is useable. We cannot know the Deity as a thing

in itself, but we can think the Deity through what we can know in the sensi-

ble world, and this is done via symbolic anthropomorphism. (I can obtain a

relational concept of things which are absolutely known to me: : :

) Withoutknowledge of the Deity, we cannot say that the Deity is intelligent, benev-

olent, loving, but we can think about the Deity as caring for us or as being

intelligent through a relational analogy with what we can know about what

caring and intelligence mean for us. And through the representation of God

made visible through this analogy, we picture to ourselves our duty in the

service of God, a means which, although really indispensable, is extremely

liable to the danger of misconstruction; for, through an illusion that steals

over us, it is easily held to be the service of Goditself : : : .20 Any reasoning

refers only to the world of experience, for us and by us, and not to the world

of the Deity.21

Hume alleviates the lack by claiming we have an irresistible urge, or senti-

ment, to acknowledge a Deity whenever we contemplate the complexity andorder in nature. It is impossible, in the face of nature, to maintain a position


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146 BERYL LOGAN

of skepticism with respect to the Deity. Science regards nature as being pur-

posive and intentional; scientists always seek a use or purpose for a newly

identified organ or canal, and they are faced with the wonderful variety

and exact propriety, suited to the different intentions of nature, in framing

each species. If even Galen could not withstand such striking appearances;to what pitch of pertinacious obstinacy must a philosopher in this age have

attained, who can now doubt of a supreme intelligence? (D: 173). No anthro-

pomorphic claims, no analogical arguments, no inferences from experience

we are simply struck with the force of the appearance of nature: a Deity who

does not present itself to the senses could do no more than render many of

his artifices so plain, that no stupidity could mistake them.22

Kant claims that Humes criticisms of Cleanthes analogical argument pre-

sentedin Parts 2 and 48 in theDialogues do not touch us. Not only do some

arguments not affect Kants claims, but this relational analogical argument

provides an answer to one of the requirements for analogical arguments: that

of similarity between items compared. A strong (or indeed any) analogical

argument must compare similar items and any dissimilarity weakens the argu-

ment. Philo claims that the world (universe) and machines are too dissimilar

to permit an analogical inference of any strength. Kants symbolic anthro-

pomorphism is immune to this criticism, as lack of similarity of objects is

irrelevant, only similarity of relationship is relevant.

Conclusion

According to Kants understanding of Humes Dialogues, which regards it to

be a critical work that devastates theism by devastating anthropomorphism,

skepticism is the only position possible given Humes arguments in the Dia-

logues. Hume has substituted skepticism for dogmatism. But Kant thinks

theism can be preserved by symbolic anthropomorphism which does not

oblige one to attribute any particular properties to the Deity. He has replaced

objective anthropomorphism (which makes claims about the nature of the

Deity), with symbolic anthropomorphism (which does not). By focusing on

Philos positive expressions of belief in the Dialogues, I would urge that

a similarity exists between Kants symbolic anthropomorphism and Philos

irresistible belief in that, for both, we do not describe what the Deity is really

like, we only talk about the Deity in words that are familiar to and meaningful

for us, that serve a practical purpose, and talk about what ourworld is like. It

is about our language and our world, not about the object.


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Notes

1. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N.K. Smith (Macmillan, 1929), B xxx.2. Immanuel Kants Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics in Focus, ed. Beryl Logan

(Routledge, 1996), p.109. Further references to the Prolegomena will be given in the textby P followed by section and/or page number.

3. See Lectures on Philosophical Theology, trans. Allen W. Wood and Gertrude M. Clark(Cornell University Press, 1978). Kant also refers, approvingly, to HumesNatural Historyof Religion in these lectures.

4. Ibid., pp. 3132.5. For in order to arriveat [transcendent] insight [reason] must make use of principleswhich,

in fact, extend only to objects of possible experience, and which, if also applied to whatcannot be an object of experience, always really change this into an appearance, thusrendering all practical extension of pure reason impossible (Critique of Pure Reason,Preface to Second Edition, B xxx).

6. Let us become thoroughly sensible of the weakness, blindness, and narrow limits ofhuman reason: Let us duly consider its uncertainty and endless contrarieties, even insubjects of common life and practice , David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural

Religion, ed. Tweyman (Routledge, 1991), p. 98. Further references to this text will begiven in the body, by D, followed by page number.

7. See also the following references in the CPR: To think an object and to know an objectare thus by no means the same thing. Knowledge involves two factors: first, the concept,through which an object in general is thought (the category); and secondly, the intuition,through which it is given (B 146); If I remove from empirical knowledge all thought(through categories), no knowledge of any object remains (A254/B310).

8. While elaborationon thispointis beyondthe scope of thispaper, some Hume commentatorsargue that the belief in an intelligent designer is a natural belief, like the beliefs incausality, the external world, and the self. In all four cases, there is no sense perception ofthe objects of any of these beliefs, and so they are regarded as fictions, although we aredetermined by nature to hold these beliefs. So, we are not merely inventing the objects ofthese beliefs, as we do with some truly fictitious ideas (like civilizations on other planetsor my dream house), but they are necessary to make our perceptual experiences connectedand coherent. In my A Religion Without Talking: Religious Belief and Natural Beliefin Humes Philosophy of Religion (Lang, 1993), I argue that the belief in an intelligentdesigner is indeed a natural belief.

9. Kant, Lectures on Philosophical Theology, p. 128129.10. Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, Greene & Hudson edition (trans andintro. T.M. Greene and H.H. Hudson, Harper Torchbooks, 1960).

11. Ibid., p. 179.12. Ibid., p. 156.13. See Philos arguments in Parts 4 and 5 of the Dialogues on the inconveniences of anthro-

pomorphism. An anthropomorphic Deity, and a Deity with human-like qualities, wouldbe finite, faulty, multiple, etc.

14. In general, commentators regard this paragraph to constitute Philos confession of belief,that it constitutes an about face forPhilo, that in spite of hiscriticismsthe Argument fromDesign is all we have to ground religious belief and/or that the weakness of the analogyis an expression of Humes atheism. See for example, T. Penelhum, Natural belief andreligious belief in Humes philosophy, Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1983): 166181;Nelson Pikes edition of the Dialogues; G. Priest, Humes final argument, History ofPhilosophy Quarterly 2 (l985): 349351; W. Austin, Philos reversal, PhilosophicalTopics 13 (1985): 103112.


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148 BERYL LOGAN

15. With respect to the Deitys intelligence, this position is achieved at the end of Part 8; withrespect to the modality of the Deitys existence, in Part 9; and with respect to the Deitysbenevolence in Part 11. The final statement of this position is found in the ambiguous,undefined proposition, that the cause or causes of the universe may bear some remoteanalogy to human intelligence.

16. Thought, design, intelligence, such as we discover in men and other animals, is no morethan one of the springs and principles of the universe, as well as heat or cold, attraction orrepulsion, and a hundred others, which fall under daily observation. It is an active cause,by which some particular parts of nature, we find, produce alterations on other parts. Butcan a conclusion, with any propriety, be transferred from parts to the whole (Dialogues,p. 113, italics added).

17. But believe me, Cleanthes, the most natural sentiment, which a well disposed mind willfeel on this occasion, is a longing desire and expectation, that heaven would be pleasedto dissipate, at least alleviate this profound ignorance [the final suspense of judgement],by affording some more particular revelation to mankind person, seasoned with a justsense of the imperfections of natural reason, will fly to revealed truth with the greatestavidity That is, a suspense of judgement is not a possible position to maintain innatural theology, as Cleanthes and Philo agree early in Part 12; the well-disposed mind(onethat recognizes the order and design in nature and seeks original rather than immediatecauses) seeks to alleviate this ignorance that results from the failure of reason to provide

clear arguments and looks to nature (heaven) for guidance. This well-disposed mindwill be drawn irresistibly to acknowledge an intelligent designer in the same way that onecannot hesitate to ascribe an intelligent cause to the Articulate voice or to the living books(Part 3).

18. See Humes Dialogues, Part 3.19. For the full arguments on which these points rely, see my The irregular argument in

Humes Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Hume Studies, November 1992, pp.483500; and my A Religion Without Talking.

20. Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, p. 180.21. In the Introduction to Religion Within the Limits, Greene writes as follows regarding

Kants sense of cosmic mystery. The starry heavens in their incalculable immensity, theinescapable finitude of all human cognition, the paradox of artistic genius, the sublimity ofthe moral law, the baffling complexity of life and human consciousness all this awakensin Kant a spirit of reference It is perhaps significant that his friend and biographer,Jachmann, was able to testify that, during all Kants destruction and construction of proofsof Gods existence, and in the presence of every intellectual doubt, he was ever convincedin his heartthatthe worldis in the hands of a wise Providence;that, in private conversationwith his friends, the philosopher and the man spoke out in undeniable testimony to aninner feeling and genuine conviction [of Gods existence] , pp. xxviiviii.

22. This is, I argue in my A Religion Without Talking, the belief in an intelligent designerexpressed as a natural belief. See note 8, this paper.

Address for correspondence: Professor Beryl Logan, Department of Philosophy, Universityof Toronto at Scarborough, Scarborough, Ontario, Canada M1C 1A4Phone: (416) 287-7167; Fax: (416) 512-9426; E-mail: [email protected]

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