Human Social Interactionperspectives from neuroscience

Dr. Roger NewportRoom B47

Drop-in Times: Tuesdays 12-1 & 3-4

roger.newport@nottingham.ac.uk

www.psychology.nottingham.ac.uk/staff/rwn

Understanding Minds: MNS and Theory of Mind

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Previously…MNs and action understanding

Now…MNs and intentions, simulation and problems with this idea

Can the ability to understand actions lead to the ability to understand beliefs, desires and intentions?

Is activity on a theory of mind task evidence for a theory of mind module in the brain?

All actions involve a covert stage including:its goalthe means to achieve it andits consequences.

These covert representations may be activated under a variety of conditions in relation to action, e.g.:self-intended actionimagined actionaction perceived from other individuals

Previously…understanding actions 2

Importantly…Action representations are subconsciously activated by observation of another’s action

Clearly, such a mechanism could be useful for informing us about what someone has just done (i.e. what their action was),

But, because these representations include the goal of an action and its potential consequences, can they tell us what another person will do next, what their intentions are, and what their beliefs or desires are?

Can action simulation provide a gateway to theory of mind?

Previously…understanding actions 2b

We naturally explain people’s behaviour on the basis of their minds: their knowledge, their beliefs and their desires

when there is a conflict between belief and reality it is the belief, not the reality that determines behaviour.

ToM is…the process(es) by which most healthy human adults attribute unobservable mental states to others …

…and integrate these attributed states into a single coherent model that can be used to explain and predict another’s behaviour. (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997)

Theory of Mind (ToM) - a definition 3

Explaining behaviour in this way is called ‘having a theory of mind’ or ‘having an intentional stance.’

We recognise that another person’s knowledge, beliefs and desires are different to our own.

These skills develop during childhood

Theory of Mind (ToM) - a definition 3a

Infants engage in pretend play at around 18 monthsFriedman and Leslie 2006 (drinking from cup filled with pretend water)

But violations in pretend play (drinking from the wrong cup (and shoes)) are detected from 15 months. Onishi et al., 2006.

Verbal understanding of the verb ‘to pretend’ doesn’t occur until much later (3-4 yrs).

Children understand what people desire (age 3) before they understand what they believe (age 4). Rakoczy et al., 2006.(“This way!”, “No! That way!”)

Fictional worlds do not collide. Batman thinks Spongebob is fictional (age 4). Skolnick and Bloom 2006.

Mar et al., 2006. Bookworms vs. Nerds.Lifetime fiction readers have better social skills than lifetime non-fiction readers and are more likely to empathise with others.

4Development of pretense and beliefs

Where will Sally look for her ball?

Sally has not seen the ball being moved and therefore falsely believes that the ball is still in the basket.

One of ToM milestonesPassed by 5 year olds, some 4’s, but very few 3’s.

Autistics and some brain damaged patients perform poorly

5A typical/traditional test for ToM: The Sally-Anne task

Sally-Anne task requires working memory and reality inhibition:

false photograph task is the same in all respects other than mental state attribution

6For imaging studies you need the correct controls e.g.

Non-verbal ToM task PET study. Brunet et al., 2000

Story

Proposedanswers

Attribution of intention condition

Physical causality with characters Physical causality with objects

Make sure you use the correct controls7

My own theory of mind story

Roger is a lecturer. He owns a bike. He took it to work one day, but it broke so he left it in university-approved secure cycle storage. While Roger was in his office, security came along and moved it to another part of the campus. Some time later Roger went to check on his bike.

Where did Roger look for his bike?

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My own theory of mind story

Roger is a lecturer. He owns a bike. He took it to work one day, but it broke so he left it in university-approved secure cycle storage. While Roger was in his office, security came along and moved it to another part of the campus. Some time later Roger went to check on his bike.

Where did Roger look for his bike?

Roger has a false belief. He thinks that the bike is in the secure area, but we know otherwise. In order to answer this question we have to suspend our knowledge of reality and entertain Roger’s false belief.

According to Baron-Cohen this is the acid test for possessing theory of mind.

Can this be done by simulation?

8a

(1) simulation of actions: we can activate motor structures of the brain in a way that resembles activity during a normal action but does not cause any overt movement;

(2) simulation of perception: imagining perceiving something is essentially the same as actually perceiving it, only the perceptual activity is generated by the brain itself rather than by external stimuli;

(3) anticipation: a simulated action can elicit perceptual activity that resembles the activity that would have occurred if the action had actually been performed.

Hesslow’s account of simulation, 2002

Simulation has 3 core attributes

Simulating intentions From motor to mind simulation

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Simulating intentions 10

Imagine going to look for the bike

Who did you imagine?

Roger went to check on his bike only to find that it wasn’t there.What did Roger think?

Roger walked around disconsolately, worrying about his bike’s disappearance and planning to call the police as soon as he returned to his office. In his absent-minded meanderings he passed an area where other bicycles were parked…and there was his bike, uncovered and locked up, but not with his lock.

What did Roger think?What would you think?

12Back to the story

Goldman’s account of full on simulation , 2002, 2005.

In order to understand the mental state of another when observing the other acting, the individual imagines themselves performing the same action.

This is a covert simulation that does not lead to any overt behaviour.

Note: In trying to attribute mental states to others, an attributor has to set aside their own current mental states and substitute those of the other person (Goldman, 2005).

They must put themselves in the ‘mental shoes’ of the other person.

Simulating intentions 11

It turned out that Security had, without his permission, carried his bike out of the secure area and locked it up somewhere else without trying to contact him or leaving a note on the bike to explain their actions.

What would you do?

A. Call the police, just to annoy security when the police arrived to investigate and found that their time had been wasted?B. Call security and ask them politely if they wouldn’t mind unlocking his bike?C. Shout down the phone at security and tell them where they could shove their £50 clamping fine?D. Take a pair of bolt-croppers and liberate the bike while causing deliberate and wanton damage to security property (the lock)… and keeping the chain?

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It turned out that Security had, without his permission, carried his bike out of the secure area and locked it up somewhere else without trying to contact him or leaving a note on the bike to explain their actions.

What did Roger do?

A. Call the police, just to annoy security when the police arrived to investigate and found that their time had been wasted?B. Call security and ask them politely if they wouldn’t mind unlocking his bike?C. Shout down the phone at security and tell them where they could shove their £50 clamping fine?D. Take a pair of bolt-croppers and liberate the bike while causing deliberate and wanton damage to security property (the lock)… and keeping the chain?

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In order to perform this task by simulation we need to:

set aside our own current mental states

be able to imagine ourselves performing these actions

be able to attribute the resultant mental states to the other person

These can mostly achieved through low-level domain-specific mechanisms

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In order to perform this task by theory we need to:

Inhibit the pre-potent response (inhibit what we know to be the truth using executive control)

Know things about objects and locations (e.g. what a bike is/does, using stored representations of things, places and experiences)

Know things about people and the way they behave in certain situations (e.g. specific person knowledge using stereotypes and folk psychology)

These are all higher-level domain-general mechanisms

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But you don’t know anything about me.

Knowledge beyond action understanding is sometimes necessary to know the intentions behind an action

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When the observers judged the actions to reflect a false belief, there was activation in the superior temporal sulcus, orbitofrontal, paracingulate cortex and cerebellum.

Grezes et al., 2004

humans are not only able to recognize actions fromobservation, but can also predict and infer underlying causes,intentions and beliefs from the behaviour of others.

30ToM by Simulation False belief from action observation

Failure to interpret actions correctly in ASD 31

So what do we know about lecturers?

Poor IT skills were also criticised

Attempts at being trendy “insufferable” That’ so phat man!

Ave-it!

According to 2006 survey in THES

I’m not at clown college

…lack of hygiene

Snooty” and have “objectionable facial hair”

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Other, better researched stereotypes

Race: Men with sticks and guns

Cunningham et al., 2004 White men viewing black v white 30ms (unconscious) or 525 ms (conscious) faces.

Greater amygdala activity at 30 ms (in those with high IAT scores). At 525 ms amygdala activity modulated by…

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Cunningham et al., 2003. Good vs. Bad

Good vs. Bad (vs. Past-present) on famous names

‘Bad’ activated the amygdala

Good-Bad judgments activated medial and ventrolateral PFC

Gender: Milne and Grafman 2001

Compared male patients with PFC lesions on gender IAT task

Dorsolateral PFC performed as controls on IAT (i.e. sexist)VentroMEDIAL PFC showed impaired automatic bias

18More, better researched stereotypes

a decisions about objects (Goel, 1995)b stories (Fletcher, 1995)c pictures (Brunet et al., 2000)d stories (Vogeley et al., 2001)e stories (Gallagher, 2000)f animated geometric shapes (Castelli, 2000)

Imaging studies of ToM: 3 main regions 19MPFC

ACC vs APCC

Bio motion and interpretation of action/intentions of others

STS/TPJ

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Predominantly right

Imaging studies of ToM: 3 main regions

a-f as previous slide

Episodic memory retrieval facts about of people, places and personal experiences.

Involved in pictures and stories, irrespective of mentalising?

Plus other ‘social brain’ regions+ amygdala responds automatically to socially salient stimuli and SM has some mentalising deficits (e.g. geometric shapes)+ OFC involved in empathy (Hynes et al., 2006) & more complex ToM tasks

Temporal poles: predominantly left

21Imaging studies of ToM: 3 main regions

a decisions about objects (Goel, 1995)b stories (Fletcher, 1995)c pictures (Brunet et al., 2000)d stories (Vogeley et al., 2001)e stories (Gallagher, 2000)f animated geometric shapes (Castelli, 2000)

Imaging studies of ToM: 3 main regions 19MPFC

Bird et al., 2004

So, on the one hand, theory of mind might be performed by simulation using mirror neurons in parietal and inferior frontal regions (perhaps in connection with STS)

While on the other hand imaging studies of theory of mind highlight totally different areas such as the medial prefrontal cortex, the temporal poles, temporoparietal junction, orbitofrontal cortex and the amydgala

Furthermore, you can have lesions to any of the ‘ToM areas’ and still perform theory of mind.

How are these different areas involved? Is there a core/dedicated ToM module?

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In recent weeks we have looked at domain-specific lower-level mechanisms crucial to human social interaction such as emotion recognition, eye gaze detection, direction of attention detection, biological motion detection and action recognition

They are dependent on domain-specific neural circuitry and their normal functioning is an essential precursor to normal ToM performance.

But are they sufficient by themselves for sophisticated ToM mechanisms to process social information?

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Gaze monitoring

Biological motion

Joint attention

Emotion recognition

Face processing

Executive function

Metarepresentation

Recursion

EF - keeps social elements in mind & inhibits knowledge of realityM - operates on eye gaze etc. - who saw what (+ who knew what)R - operates on Ms of mental states - allows reasoning about not just other’s thoughts, but other’s thoughts about other’s thoughts

Stone and Gerrans (2006) The outputs of lower-level (domain-specific) mechanisms are used for inferences by higher level (domain-general) mechanisms

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Not sufficient for ToM

Deficits on ToM tasks can result from deficits in low-level social input systems (e.g. joint attention) or in higher-level domain-general capacities.   Children with autism have deficits not only on ToM tests, but also in face-processing, gaze monitoring and joint attention.  All known cases of patients with ToM deficits arising from brain lesions involve deficits in either low-level social input systems or higher-level domain-general abilities… 

 Orbitofrontal patients with deficits on ToM tasks have lower-level social deficits in face-processing and tracking intentions. medial frontal and temporoparietal junction (TPJ) patients have either executive function deficits, general metarepresentational deficits, or no ToM deficits.   Is there a neural substrate of the fabled ToM module? Probably not. May be more useful to focus on uniquely human domain-general abilities

In recent weeks we have looked at domain-specific lower-level mechanisms crucial to human social interaction such as emotion recognition, eye gaze detection, direction of attention detection, biological motion detection and action recognition

They are dependent on domain-specific neural circuitry and their normal functioning is an essential precursor to normal ToM performance.

But are they sufficient by themselves for sophisticated ToM mechanisms to process social information?

Deficits on ToM tasks may result from deficits in low-level social input systems (e.g. joint attention) or in higher-level mechanisms (e.g. executive function).

So is it possible to find a pure independent ToM deficit or single ToM mechanism anywhere in the brain?

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Break

After the break

TT vs ST

ToM by Theory-theory e.g. Churchland 1991ToM through knowledge of the laws of behaviour

Non-intentional causal relationshipsA person who does not eat will feel hungerA person who gets hurt will feel pain

Intentional causal relationshipsA person who picks a cup by the handle wants to drink from itA person who picks up a cup by the top wants to move it

It does not need knowledge of psychology or even your own mind, simply knowledge of the laws themselves. Anyone, including Martians, who knows the laws can make predictions about another’s behaviour through proper use of the laws.

False belief by TT: A person (Sally) who hasn’t seen the ball moved will look in the original location

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Intentional causal relationshipsA person who picks a cup by the handle wants to drink from itA person who picks up a cup by the top wants to move it

Jeannerod: There are subtle, but detectable differences in the kinematics of a movement depending on the final goal of that movement (e.g. picking an object up to place it on the top vs. bottom shelf + see next slide

Rizzolatti and Craighero, 1995: 2/3 of mirror neurons in IPL that code for grasping code for grasping in order to eat vs. grasping to move

26ToM by SimulationIntentional causal relationships by ST

The right inferior frontal mirror neuron area responds differently to the sight of the same grasping action embedded in different contexts suggesting different intentions. This demonstrates that the MNS codes the intention of the observed action.Iacoboni et al., 2005

ToM by SimulationIntentional causal relationships by ST

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When the observers judged the actions to reflect a false belief, there was activation in the superior temporal sulcus, orbitofrontal, paracingulate cortex and cerebellum.

Grezes et al., 2004

humans are not only able to recognize actions fromobservation, but can also predict and infer underlying causes,intentions and beliefs from the behaviour of others.

28ToM by Simulation False belief from action observation

ToM and false belief by simulation e.g. Gordon, 1995, 1996A radical simulationist

We understand others’ minds by imagining ourselves in their situation

Children can pass the false belief task by imagining the world from the other’s point of view.

I [Sally] believe the marble is in the basket= the marble is in the basket

I believe p = p

No concept of belief is necessary, just the ability to have beliefs.

29ToM by Simulation False belief does not require a concept of belief

A theory of mind story answered using TT or ST

Roger is a lecturer. He owns a bike. He took it to work one day, but it broke so he left it in university-approved secure cycle storage. While Roger was in his office, security came along and moved it to another part of the campus. Some time later Roger went to check on his bike.

Where did Roger look for his bike?

TT: Where do people look for things?Where they last saw them/usually see them

ST: Generate a covert mental representation of Roger going to look for his bike.

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Meanwhile, back at the bike sheds…

Roger went to check on his bike only to find that it wasn’t there.

What did Roger think?

TT: what do people think when something they think/know should be there isn’t?

ST: Generate covert mental representation of Roger perceiving the absence of his bike. Then what?

Generate feelings as if it were me = sadness, surprise, anger, befuddlement. Then what?

Generate a mental representation of what I would think if Roger were me and attribute that thought to Roger. How do I know what I would think? TT that’s how.

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It turned out that Security had, without his permission, carried his bike out of the secure area and locked it up somewhere else without trying to contact him or leaving a note on the bike to explain their actions.

What did Roger do based on what we know about lecturers?

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lecturers are stuck-up, disorganised, unpunctual, unfunny, badly dressed and too desperate to be "hip".

academics are "snooty" and have "objectionable facial hair".

lectures assume that undergraduates are lazy.

Academics' have poor information technology skills.

They try to be funny and trendy.

They look down on students and have a lack of hygiene.

Lecturer stereotypes according to a bunch of soap-dodgers 34

What did Roger do?

A. Call the police, just to annoy security when the police arrived to investigate and found that their time had been wasted?B. Call security and ask them politely if they wouldn’t mind unlocking his bike?C. Shout down the phone at security and tell them where they could shove their £50 clamping fine?D. Take a pair of bolt-croppers and liberate the bike while causing deliberate and wanton damage to security property (the lock)… and keeping the chain?

So, given what we now know about lecturers…. That’ so phat man!

Ave-it!

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Simulation is so simple.

Argument from error (e.g. Kruger and Gilovich, 1999) couples asked about responsibility for good/bad events in own married life and then about how spouse would assignresponsibility. Predictions for spouse did not match own or spouses own scores. Not predicted by ST.Even if we could perform ToM by simulation, it might not be the way we do it

Saxe, 2005

Attribution of intentions from TT and ST are not always compatible.

The brain regions associated with TT and ST do not overlap

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Doesn’t work

Not parsimonious

ToM adjusts pretend inputs to match current situation

ST feeds into TT

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Unmediated resonance

ST or TT?A hybrid?

Why not both? The brain has been cobbled together through evolution and makes use of the functions it already has.

Finding times at which people do not simulate does not mean that they cannot simulate or never simulate (and vice versa for TT)

Both systems, developed for difference reasons, could coexist and work together or separately.

Damage to either system causes some, but not all, ToM deficits. There is probably not a single ToM mechanism.

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Summary

We can understand others’ intentions by simulation

We can’t (always) understand others’ intentions by simulation

We can understand others’ intentions by theory

We don’t need theory brain structures to perform ToM

Simulation and Theory areas of the brain do not overlap

Simulation and Theory (in theory) could overlap

How does it really work, and how could you tell?

Next Week

A bit more of this

And a lot more interesting recent studies