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HUMAN SMUGGLING TRENDS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Executive Summary The United National Office Drugs and Crimes (UNODC, 2018) estimates that, at a minimum, 2.5 million
people were smuggled across international borders in 2016, generating a revenue of between 5.5 and 7
billion USD. As the number of migrants reaches record highs globally, there are increasing economic,
social and cultural reasons for people to migrate by either formal or informal means. Increasing demand
for movement generates more business for migrant smuggling networks.
Migrant smuggling is defined as “the procurement, in order to obtain, either directly or indirectly, a
financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person
is not a national or permanent resident.” (Protocol on Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, 2000)
Smuggling is a complex phenomenon with criminal, economic, social and historical components.
Smugglers offer a variety of services, ranging from pre-departure provision of information and support
to services along the route, including: accommodation, transport, provision of counterfeit documents
and escorting, and support after arrival, including accommodation.
Smuggling routes encompass land, sea and air options. They are volatile and shift on a regular basis,
often on account of changes in border security measures. The fluidity of smuggling routes is
demonstrated by the effects of border wall construction – data indicates that although border walls
reduce crossings at their targeted points, they are often accompanied by increases in crossings at other
points. Routes are not only geographically malleable, but they are temporally flexible as well. Migrants
can choose to remain at one point on a route for a relatively long period of time, either to make more
money to proceed onward or for other reasons. Although routes are flexible, cities where logistical and
transport arrangements for smuggling are made – known as ‘hubs’ - remain constant.
Smuggling networks take a variety of different forms, from structured hierarchies to extremely informal
networks. Migrant smugglers are not systematically linked to other organised criminal networks such as
arms and drugs, although there are links along some routes. Smugglers often have strong ethnic and
linguistic links with the communities with which they work. Many migrant smugglers are either migrants
themselves, were formerly migrants, or are low level smugglers – that is, they undertake smuggling as a
part time occupation to improve household income. As such, informal smuggling networks may be
weakened if low-level smugglers were offered alternative economic opportunities.
Migrants are subject to a range of protection violations at all stages of the smuggling process – these
include death, physical assault and violation, extortion and transfer into human trafficking networks.
According to some studies, 76% of migrants have been subject to violations - most of which have been
perpetrated by smugglers or local law enforcement officials. Migrants rely on narrow sources of
information before departure, and are therefore not likely to be fully informed about the nature of the
risks they are likely to encounter on the road or after arrival.
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The current policy approach toward migration focuses on criminalisation of smuggling and enforcement
measures are taken to apprehend and prosecute smugglers. This policy approach is reflected in the UN
Convention on Transnational Organized Crime and is reinforced in the Bali Process and the Global
Compact on Migration. It also echoes the EU and US policies of ‘externalising’ border management1,
including by construction of walls. This is similar to the approach taken to legally address human
trafficking – but due to distinct differences between smuggling and trafficking, the current approach to
addressing smuggling has some key gaps, the most significant of which is that smuggling involves the
voluntary participation of the migrant. In addition to the voluntary agreement between the smuggler
and the migrant, this practice is typically supported by local social mores and economic needs. The
identification and prosecution of criminals in a context where most actors are complicit is challenging.
Adoption of a more market oriented approach to smuggling, aiming to reduce demand and to target
supply hubs rather than routes, may be a more effective method of addressing human smuggling. This
paper proposes five recommendations for policymakers and practitioners to address this gap.
Focus on migration hubs. Available research indicates that although migration routes vary significantly
and can shift, hubs remain constant. These hubs represent bases for smugglers and opportunities for
migrants to gain information, but due to the heavy concentration of smugglers, they also heighten the
risk that migrants will be subject to human rights violations. Initiatives that target hubs – for example,
provision of legal migration alternatives at hub locations– may generate longer-lasting changes in
migration and smuggling decisions.
Moving away from criminalisation and toward ‘market regulation’. International actors have adopted a
law enforcement approach to migration, in which smugglers are criminals and those who are smuggled
are victims not liable for prosecution. This does not reflect the consensual nature of smuggling as a
crime. International actors should adopt a more market-oriented approach. This involves identifying the
factors that generate and promote supply and demand, and working to influence these factors. An
example of such an approach could be provision of alternative income generation options to low level
smugglers located at hubs; this would reduce smuggling ‘supply’.
Holistic approaches to smuggling and migration. Smuggling has been defined as a criminal activity, but
it has strong economic, social and cultural ties and motivations. Research and policy approaches need to
address social and economic components in order to be successful.
Targeting populations of potential migrants. Potential migrants are often young, literate, unemployed
or underemployed, and from urban areas. A holistic approach to migration would focus on increasing
access to dignified employment in urban areas in countries of origin; it would target not the most
vulnerable, but those that have enough money and education to attempt to move.
In-depth research into smuggling networks. There is little data available on human smuggling networks
and research into these networks is limited. Investment at the global or regional level into qualitative
and quantitative data collection and the development of a comprehensive picture of smuggling
networks could generate more effective policies at the regional and national levels.
1 Externalization is the reproduction of a country’s migration policy at the external level, which entails (1) burden sharing with
regard to border policing with bordering countries and (2) the setting up of migration management policies in the countries of transit and origin
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Migrant Smuggling: Definitions and Concepts The most commonly accepted definition of migrant smuggling has been laid out in the Protocol against
the Smuggling of Migrants by Air, Land and Sea (2000), defined as “the procurement, in order to obtain,
either directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a
State Party of which the person is not a national or permanent resident.”
The International Legal Framework Around Smuggling. The predominant definition of smuggling was
developed as a part of the international framework governing migration, smuggling and trafficking. The
UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime governs the international approach to smuggling
and trafficking. Both the Protocol against Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea (2000) and the
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons (2000) fall under the Convention. These
documents form the basis of the approach taken to human smuggling in the Global Compact for
Migration - notably in Objective 9 of the Compact, which attempts to strengthen the transnational
response to migrant smuggling.
To ensure continuous policy dialogue and information sharing on smuggling, trafficking and other forms
of transnational crime, the Bali Process was established. The Process is a non binding international
forum that exists for policy dialogue, information sharing and exchange to aid each participating state to
address challenges associated with smuggling, trafficking and transnational crime. The Process, including
45 member states, is steered by Australia, Indonesia, New Zealand and Thailand (2002).
Distinction between migrant smuggling and human trafficking. The key differentiation between
smuggling and trafficking lies in coercion – those who are smuggled are generally voluntary participants,
whereas those who are trafficked are coerced and exploited by those who arrange their movement2.
This differentiation is clearly delineated in the definitions of migrant smuggling, laid out in the Protocol,
and human trafficking, defined in the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons. In
practice however, the distinction between smuggling and trafficking can be blurred – individuals may
embark on a route voluntarily, but may be coerced into an exploitative situation by smugglers along the
journey, for instance (Carling, Gallagher and Horwood, 2015). In some situations, smugglers also recruit
migrants into their smuggling networks; while such recruitment may be voluntary, it may also be linked
to some degree of financial coercion (Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012; Mohammadi and Nimkar,
forthcoming). Although the primary distinction between smuggling and trafficking is coercion of the
smuggled individual, under existing international legal frameworks, migrants who are voluntarily
smuggled and complicit in the process are safeguarded from legal consequences – including prosecution
(Protocol against Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, 2000).
Exclusion of ‘humanitarian’ smuggling. The definition of migrant smuggling clarifies that a smuggler
must receive a financial or other material benefit. As such, there is a loophole for ‘humanitarian’
smuggling. This constitutes a recognition that extremely vulnerable populations may need to rely on
informal actors or family connections to facilitate movement. The loophole is confirmed in the travaux
2 Specifically, 5 factors differentiate smuggling and trafficking: (1) Consent – typically smuggling is voluntary whereas for
trafficking, consent is irrelevant if ‘means’ are in place, (2) Purpose – smuggling is undertaken for material benefit whereas trafficking involves exploitation of the victim, (3) Transnationality – smuggling is always transnational, whereas trafficking can also take place within a country, (4) Source of criminal profits – smuggling derives its profit from facilitation of illegal entry or stay, whereas trafficking derives profit from exploitation, and (5) Who is affected by the crime – smuggling is a crime against the state, whereas trafficking is a crime against a person.
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preparatoires of the Protocol, which states that “the intention was to include the activities of organised
criminal groups acting for profit but to exclude … those who provided support … for humanitarian
reasons or on the basis of close family ties” (United Nations General Assembly, 2000). This legal
provision has, to date, rarely been used in practice (UNODC 2018). In practice, this loophole may
generate a lack of clarity, given that many smugglers have mixed motives. For example, people choose
smuggling networks in Afghanistan and Somalia on the basis of family ties, but then engage in a profit
relation. Another example consists of smugglers who may transfer a cargo of migrants who paid, but
may, along the route, pick up other extremely vulnerable migrants for humanitarian reasons.
Due to the definitional shortfalls outlined above, academics have complemented the formal definition
with wider and more comprehensive conceptualisations of smuggling. Some of the key
conceptualisations are:
Smuggling as a business. The prevalent academic definition asserts that smuggling is a business that
delivers a service for people who are looking to move in return for a profit in an open informal market.
In this conceptualisation, smugglers may “exploit … legal as well as illegal methods and channels of
entry.” (Salt and Stein, 1997). As such, smuggling may take place even if no national or international
laws are violated. The most common services provided by smugglers are (1) transportation, guiding and
escorting, (2) accommodation, (3) planning and contacts, (4) information and corruption of local law
enforcement authorities, and (5) provision of travel documents (UNODC, 2018). This conceptualisation
implies that policy measures to reduce smuggling and/or reduce risks associated with smuggling must
consider smuggling networks as market system, implying an understanding of demand, supply,
intermediaries, infrastructure and drivers of price.
Smuggling as part of a multi-level social dynamic. Understanding of smuggling as a social phenomenon
is relatively new. In 2018 (Majidi, 2018), academics proposed a model of smuggling using ecosystems
theory; smuggling networks are developed, and ingrained, at microsystem (family and friend network),
mesosystem (community level), exosystem (government actor, private sector, business and larger
networks) and macrosystem (wider social and cultural factor) levels. This model generally suggests that,
in order for smuggling networks to be successful, they need to be widely integrated and accepted at all
levels of society. Efforts to either reduce smuggling or mitigate risks, therefore, must account for the
factors that generated social acceptance and/or support for smugglers at all levels.
Smuggling within a historical and cultural context. Smuggling networks often have cultural and historic
roots. For example, in Afghanistan smuggling networks evolved from a group of people who originally
guided pilgrims to religious sites and who have passed on the profession of smuggling through
generations (Mohammadi and Nimkar, 2019). Similarly, in Ecuador, smugglers, known as coyotes, exist
within a historical and cultural framework that has generated widespread social acceptance and trust
(Stone-Cadena and Velasco, 2018). Due to the ways in which smuggling networks have evolved over
time, each network is likely to be influenced by different factors. As a result, generalised policy
approaches to smuggling are unlikely to be effective, and successful approaches will require tailoring to
the particular cultural roots of an individual smuggling network.
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Smuggling Today: An Overview
The Numbers Data on human smuggling is extremely limited and unreliable; it tends to reflect information gathered
from people apprehended for smuggling offences and some states are reluctant to share information on
these matters. Data from non-official sources, including academia, international agencies and think
tanks, is often not comparable and studies are unlikely to be longitudinal, making trend analysis
problematic. However, it is possible to develop some estimates regarding the minimum size of global
smuggling operations in terms of number of migrants smuggled and revenues.
In 2016, UNODC estimated that a minimum of 2.5 million migrants were smuggled across borders. This
estimate is conservative, given that it excludes smuggling into and within South America and Asia. This
number represents approximately 10% of the total global stock of migrants and about one-third of the
annual flow of migrants (estimated at 7.13 million) into OECD countries (IOM, 2018). Even rough figures
indicate that smuggling networks play a key role in facilitating movement for a substantial proportion of
the world’s migrants.
Smuggling networks also generate significant revenue flows. UNODC estimated that the minimum
annual income for smuggling networks globally was between 5.5 billion and 7 billion USD; other
estimates put the value of migrant smuggling at 10 billion USD per year (Ferrier and Kaminsky, 2017).
Paid services take place in the grey or black market and payment is often made through informal
mechanisms such as hawalas, which can be difficult to trace and is therefore likely to be
underestimated.
Routes and Flows Smuggling routes can be established over land, sea and air. Land routes often offer the simplest crossing
options with some areas only requiring transport and small bribes to border officials, while others
require counterfeit documents. Crossings by sea are possible along American, European and
Asian/Australian routes. Sea crossings are significantly more complex as they require the procurement
and management of a vessel large enough to accommodate many people. However, sea crossings can
help to avoid issues associated with strong security at land border crossing points. Air crossings can be
the safest routes for the migrants themselves as they are unlikely to be exposed to environmental
threats and harassment but are the most expensive and require high-quality counterfeit documents.
Often a combination of methods is used by migrants and by smugglers in order to reach their
destination and depend on the capacities of the smuggler (UNODC, 2018).
Logistical arrangements are often determined out of migration hubs. Hubs are often located close to
border crossing points, but exact location is often determined by security and geographical factors.
Given that smugglers are often organised by ethnic groups, hubs are often located where a particular
ethnic group feels secure and has territorial control (EU, 2015; Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012).
Smugglers may also hold migrants in a hub for a period of time while organising the next stage of a
journey; sometimes this may involve choosing between different routes. Routes may also shift in
response to different border management policies and protection regimes.
Many of the most significant smuggling routes are well known: the three routes across the
Mediterranean into Europe, the Mexico - United States routes, and the sea routes into Australia. These
routes have received significant amounts of publicity over the years, as well as attention from border
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management agencies. There are a variety of shifting and changing routes within Africa and Asia that are
less well understood. Again, due to lack of concrete data, it is very difficult to estimate route traffic or
costs, although the location of hubs are well known. The table below provides data on some major
smuggling routes analysed in UNODC’s 2018 report on migrant smuggling. Although this data is not
representative or complete, it provides a rough picture of the size and scale of various routes.
Figure 1: UNODC, Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants 2018
Available data indicates that the most significant migration routes in terms of volume and revenue run
from Latin America into the US. The routes to Europe are broken up into several stages; one of the
largest and most profitable flows takes place from within Sub-Saharan Africa to Libya, with additional
networks, costs and risks to make the final crossing into Europe. The route to Australia was significant in
earlier years (UNODC 2018), but has reduced substantially following a crackdown by the Australian
authorities. However, significant flows remain within Asia, leading primarily to Indonesia with the
objective of onward resettlement in Western countries (Mixed Migration Centre, 2017).
Characteristics and Trends The demand is increasing. Despite the relatively poor availability of data on smuggling, there is broad
consensus that migration, and thus smuggling, is growing The number of migrants globally is growing,
and has already reached record highs; similarly, the number of forcibly displaced and asylum seekers is
on the rise. As a result, there is more demand for the services of smugglers. The growth of this business
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has also been suggested in some of the very limited primary research conducted directly with smuggling
networks (IOM, 2018; UNODC 2018; Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012).
Routes are volatile. The precise routes taken by smugglers shift. The factors affecting smuggling routes
include, but are not limited to, (1) formal border security measures designed to deter entry, (2) attitudes
of border guards (openness to bribery, the use harsh or illegal enforcement measures), (3) seasonal
environmental conditions, and (4) destination demand among migrants (Salt and Stein 1997; UNODC
2018; Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012). The volatile nature of migration routes poses a challenge for
border management officials. It can be challenging for a state to ensure equal levels of enforcement
across a border, but it is easy for smugglers to shift to areas with low enforcement. This indicates that it
is necessary for states to adopt multi-faceted approaches to smuggling and border management.
Means of travel can shift. Means of travel often run in parallel and smugglers can choose between
various land routes, sea routes and air routes depending on demand, the context and their network
capacities, as well as external factors, as above. Smugglers choose between these routes both on the
basis of ‘internal’ factors, including their own networks, logistical capabilities and management
capabilities, and on the basis of ‘external’ factors such as the degree of enforcement in place along any
particular route (MacAuliffe and Laczko, 2016).
Journeys are interrupted. People on the move do not necessarily travel smoothly across a migration
route. Routes can be interrupted for a variety of reasons including but not limited to: (1) smugglers’
needs to adjust routes, (2) inability of the migrant to pay for the full route at a single time, and (3) need
to change between different nodes in a smuggling network at hubs (UNODC 2018; MacAuliffe and
Laczko 2016; Mixed Migration Centre 2017). The fact that journeys are interrupted offers policymakers
and practitioners several options to interrupt migration routes, either by disrupting smuggling networks
at the point of interruption, or by offering alternatives to migration at the points of interruption.
Hubs remain stable. While smuggling routes are volatile, hubs remain relatively constant. Hubs
represent points where supply and demand meet and are often under the territorial control of a
smuggling network or of an ethnic group from which a network originates – increasing their stability
(UNODC 2018). Hubs often provide a variety of services for both smugglers and migrants, and as such
they are economic centres. The stability of hubs represents an opportunity for both policymakers and
practitioners.
Smugglers and their Networks Services Provided by Smugglers Migrant smugglers provide a relatively wide array of services, depending on the precise route and the
obstacles to movement on the route. Their involvement in migration often starts before the decision to
migrate is made and continues past arrival in the destination country.
Marketing and Recruitment. Before departure, smugglers are often involved in the provision of
information to potential migrants, including the restriction of other sources of information to potential
migrants (Mixed Migration Centre, 2018). This can include providing inaccurate or incomplete
information to potential migrants, often minimising the risks along the route or providing an inflated
view of success upon arrival in the destination country. In recent years, smugglers have begun to rely
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more on social media platforms for recruitment and marketing; this includes Facebook as well as more
direct and personalised communication such as WhatsApp and Vibr (RMMS Briefing Paper, 2016).
Services Provided by Smugglers. Along the route, smugglers can provide a variety of services. This
includes: (1) guiding and escorting across border checkpoints, (2) accommodation both along route and
upon arriving at the destination, (3) transport, (4) counterfeit travel documents, (5) facilitation of bribes.
The precise range of services provided by the smuggling network depends both on the financial capacity
of the migrant and capacity of the smuggling network. Smugglers generally cannot guarantee a
successful border crossing and migrants generally pay for a number of attempts. Depending on the
route and the strength of the smuggling network, some smugglers offer ‘guaranteed delivery’. (UNODC
2018; MMC 2017).
Packaging of Services. Smugglers offer different ‘packages’ of services to migrants, including: (1)
Comprehensive service from the origin country to the destination country, (2) Service to the next hub
where migrants can then investigate a variety of smugglers and services that best meets their needs for
onward travel and make additional money should it be required. (3) Facilitation through a geographic
monopoly. In some cases, certain smuggling networks or ethnicities have geographic access over an
area; for example, the Baluch ethnicity has monopoly over a part of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. In
this case, migrants can contract smugglers to provide an interface with the monopolistic service
provider. (4) Travel agencies. Some travel agencies offer smuggling services, that is, arrangement of
irregular visas and air voyages, as well as formal and legal travel services. Such businesses, which are a
blend of formal and informal networks, are common in cities such as Mogadishu and Kabul.
(Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012; UNODC 2018; Majidi and Danziger, 2017)
Payment for Services. Fees are generally levied per service accessed by migrants and often heavily
negotiated based on a number of factors, including family ties and non-financial favours. The price of
any particular service is likely to vary based on factors affecting route volatility. Factors such as
negotiation ability, ethnicity, gender and citizenship of the migrant may also affect the price. Migrants
often pay for the services of smugglers as phases of the desired ‘package’ of services are complete. The
phased payment mechanism serves several purposes, notably: (1) it reduces the vulnerability of the
migrant, as a one-off payment at the beginning of the route risks exploitation, (2) it provides the
possibility for migrants and their families to raise money as the migrant travels, (3) it offers the
possibility to change smuggling networks along the route (Mixed Migration Centre 2017; UNODC 2018).
As mentioned previously, payment generally takes place informally through hawala money transfer or a
network of friends and family.
Linkages with Other Networks and Organised Crime. There is a common perception that migrant
smuggling is closely associated with other forms of organised crime, in particular drug and arms trade;
however, the relationship is more complex. While certain prominent smuggling networks are closely
linked to the drug and arms trade (notably the routes from Central America to the US and the routes
from Afghanistan), there is no systematic link between migrant smuggling and other criminal networks
(UNODC 2018). There are also indications that organised criminal networks and small scale migrant
smuggling networks can operate along parallel paths, such as the paths from Afghanistan to Europe
(Mixed Migration Centre 2017). In other locations, it appears that migrant smuggling networks have
systematic contact with, but are not the same as, organised crime networks; in some cases, the
systematic contact involves payment of a ‘tax’ for smuggling migrants (UNODC 2018).
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Smuggling Network Organisation and Smuggler Profiles Just as migrant smuggling networks differ dramatically in size, scale and form, smugglers themselves
have a range of profiles, although data is very limited.
Individual Smuggler Profiles. Smugglers are predominantly male, though women may be involved in
recruitment, provision of food and shelter to migrants and support functions such as caring for children.
Although women are not prominent in smuggling network hierarchy, they are not absent either – one of
the most significant Chinese human smuggling networks was led by a woman (Keefe 2014). In general,
smugglers are adults but relatively young adults (30 – 35 years old). There is a trend of smugglers being
recruited from among those who have previously migrated; this has been noted along the Sahel
smuggling route, along the Afghanistan – Europe route and the routes toward southern Africa (EU 2016;
Mohammadi and Nimkar 2019; Khosravi 2010). Smugglers who work in organising roles tend to share
ethnic or linguistic ties with migrants and smugglers who work to facilitate border crossings are of the
same nationality and/or ethnic group as border guards (Monsutti 2018; Monsutti 2012; RVI 2016).
Ethnic and Cultural Ties. In order for migrant smuggling to be effective, trust is required along the
market chain: between migrants and smugglers, and between smugglers and their networks. As such,
migrants and smugglers tend to rely on ethnic ties in selecting and providing services . The importance
of ethnic and linguistic ties has been noted across various smuggling routes (Stone-Cadena and Velasco,
2018; Monsutti, 2012; Khosravi, 2010; UNODC 2018). On a similar note, smugglers often have a
longstanding role in society, including a place in both local history and culture; migration has a
longstanding place in many cultures as a livelihoods strategy or a coping mechanism and smugglers
therefore form a part of the historical and cultural fabric of certain communities (Stone-Cadena and
Velasco, 2018; Monsutti, 2012).
Varying Organisational Models. Migrant smuggling networks take a variety of forms, ranging from
hierarchical, structured models to very loosely organised informal networks. An example of the
hierarchical model of migrant smuggling is the Chinese migrant smuggling network. Actors in this
network have very clearly defined roles and places within the hierarchy – for example, ‘little
snakeheads’ are responsible for recruitment and marketing (that is, finding people to be smuggled)
whereas ‘big snakeheads’ are responsible for investment and funding (Triandafyllidou and Maroukis,
2012; Chin, 2011). However, many smuggling networks are quite informal and offer services through an
open marketplace (Mixed Migration Centre 2017; MacAuliffe and Laczko 2018). Smuggling networks
“should… be seen as multicephalous and polycentric networks of criminals located in different
countries.” (Triandafyllidou and Maroukis 2012). The multiplicity of actors organised, not around
hierarchical structures, but around use of logistical infrastructure, implies that smuggling networks
function more as open marketplaces than they do as the stereotypical criminal organisation.
Lower Level Smugglers – Both Victims and Perpetrators. Those who engage with potential migrants,
including marketing, recruitment, and small-scale transportation activities are often engaged in other
livelihood activities such as shopkeeping, hotel operation, and farm work (Triandafyllidou and Maroukis,
2012; Mohammadi and Nimkar, 2019). Part-time engagement in smuggling is often used as a means to
meet household expenses. Low level smugglers can be recruited from amongst migrants, both those
who moved successfully as well as those who returned. It is possible for people to act both as smugglers
and as migrants at the same time (Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012; Triandafyllidou, 2018) out of
economic need.
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The Relationship Between Smugglers and People on the Move
Profiles of Smuggled Migrants The majority of smuggled migrants come from fragile or conflict-affected countries. Although data on
migrants themselves is relatively scarce, it is possible to identify some common migrant characteristics.
The factors that drive people to migrate inform the demand for services provided by smugglers.
Youth. Migrants are often young (below 35 years of age) are single and do not have children. In general,
the youth are unemployed or involved in precarious employment such as daily labour. There is some
qualitative data indicating that, in some countries of origin, families select a member to migrate as an
investment on behalf of the entire family. The individual is often young for several reasons: 1) there is a
perception that sending youth may increase chances of gaining asylum (Mixed Migration Centre 2018),
2) they will remain at working age for a longer period – increasing remittances over time, 3) youth may
be able to pursue family reunification.
Predominantly male. Approximately 70% of migrants are men who are generally single and childless.
Men are more likely to undertake migration as they are perceived to be better able to manage the
physical hardships associated with migration, to have more earning potential upon arrival, and higher
levels of social pressures to migrate in cultures where it is linked to manhood (Rift Valley Institute,
2016). Women travelling along migration routes are more likely to be divorced or widowed.
Urban. Migrants are primarily from urban areas. Along some migration routes, such as Afghanistan, over
70% of those who migrate are from urban areas (Mixed Migratin Centre, 2018). Although migrants are
from urban areas, they are often not fully employed – many migrants, across different migration routes,
are either unemployed or underemployed, often in precarious daily labour or in the service industry.
Literate and Educated. On average, migrants have higher levels of education when compared to their
countries of origin. Most migrants are literate and data from the Mixed Migration Centre indicates that
over 50% of migrants have at least enrolled in secondary education. Literacy helps migrants gain
information about migration routes and to access technology (e.g., WhatsApp, Vibr) that facilitate
migration journeys.
Elements that Influence Demand Potential migrants represent the demand side of the smuggling business. A significant amount of
research has been conducted on push and pull factors for migrants (Migration Policy Institute, 2018;
IOM, 2018; EU 2016).
Political and security conditions. Poor political and security conditions in country of origin are a
significant driver of migration. Security conditions can affect the decision to migrate through both direct
security threats or through the deterioration in the country as a whole that prompts fear for the future.
A proportion of migrants come from relatively stable areas in conflict-affected countries (e.g.,
Somaliland in Somalia or Bamyan in Afghanistan), but depart due to a perception that the situation will
deteriorate.
Economic Opportunity. Lack of economic opportunity is a significant push factor and perceptions of
economic opportunity elsewhere is a significant pull factor. Although many migrants are literate and
have basic education, most of them do not have secure employment. Across various migration routes, it
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can be seen that a high proportion of migrants are either unemployed or reliant on precarious
employment sources. There is a strong perception among migrants that economic opportunity is better
in the destination country. The perception of better economic opportunities elsewhere is strengthened,
in some cases, by the fact that several migrant-producing countries have a history of migration. In both
Afghanistan and Somalia, for example, migration is a part of traditional culture and is often used as a
livelihoods coping mechanisms (Monsutti 2012; FAO 2016).
Educational Opportunity. Most migrants have a base level of education and wish to continue their
education. According to DRC data regarding migrant aspirations, 24% of people migrating irregularly to
Europe are seeking improved educational opportunities.
Cultural Factors. Cultural norms play a significant role in migration decisions. In some cultures, such as
Somalia, migration is a part of the traditional ‘coming of age’ process for boys. While previously
migration routes would have been circumscribed to neighbouring provinces/countries, improvements in
transportation have made it possible to include international migration. In other countries, migration
has become synonymous with safety; in Afghanistan, for instance, migration guaranteed safety during
the Soviet invasion of 1979, reinforcing a belief among communities that migration will ensure physical
safety now.
Misinformation. Those who migrate are not always fully informed before or during the move. Migrants
often rely on a limited network for information before departure including family, friends, and the
smugglers themselves (Mixed Migration Centre 2018; Regional Mixed Migration Centre Briefing Paper
2016). Technology has allowed those who have arrived in the West to send home photos with
exaggerated impressions of their success home, either to relieve worry on the part of their families or to
engage in bragging. The limited information sources and positive personal testimony increases demand
for services provided by smugglers.
Mobility and Administrative Restrictions. The decision to migrate irregularly is often driven by the lack
of sufficient regular movement opportunities and the lack of information about these opportunities
where they do exist. Procedures to obtain formal visas are often very complex and opaque. They involve
significant cost in application fees and travel to embassies as well as an understanding of bureaucratic
processes. Both the administrative complexity associated with getting visas and the perception of lack of
transparency heighten demand for smuggling and informal migration routes.
Risks and Protection Concerns Those who are smuggled face substantial protection risks along the route. According to one study, 76%
of migrants arriving in Europe through the Mediterranean route directly experienced violence (MEDMIG
2018). Smugglers, in some cases, contribute to perpetration of violations by others.
Death. Available data suggests that the death rate along irregular migration routes is high (IOM 2018;
UNODC 2018; Mixed Migration Centre 2018). Some sources of data indicate that smugglers are directly
responsible for 50% of such violations (Mixed Migration Centre 2018); the second most prevalent type
of perpetrator is local authorities and border guards. Smugglers may cause death directly, through
beatings and physical assault, but they may also cause death indirectly – for example, smugglers who
arrange crossings on unsafe ships cause death by drowning, and those who engage in unsafe driving
cause accidents when crossing borders. Smugglers may also cause physical harm because they do not
12
provide adequate physical conditions for migrants – this includes lack of sufficient food and water as
well as lack of sufficient accommodation, particularly in harsh weather conditions.
Physical Assault and Crime. Violence and robbery are the two most common forms of crime to which
migrants may be subjected. According to one study, 65% of Somalis reported physical violence or
robbery on the route to Europe; Afghans report similar rates of criminality (IOM 2009). Extortion is one
form of violence that is often perpetrated by smugglers; smugglers hold migrants hostage and demand a
ransom from family members and friends (Nimkar and Frouws, 2018). There are indications that this
type of crime may target, not only families in the country of origin, but also members of the diaspora
(Split Loyalties). Such extortion may take place when migrants are transferred from one smuggling
network to another; some smuggling networks sell migrants to organised crime groups or armed groups
who then engage in extortion (UNODC 2018). Sexual violence is also common for women who take part
in migration routes. According to one study, 44% of women on migration routes experienced protection
concerns, and of this, 52% were subject to repeated violations. Lack of information contributes to this
issue – more than half of the women who experienced violations were not fully aware of the risks of
migrating (Mixed Migration Centre 2018).
Human Trafficking. Extortion through hostage taking on the part of smugglers may occur when migrants
are transferred from one smuggling network to another (Split Loyalties). Migrants may also be sold to
organised criminal groups who then engage in extortion (UNODC 2018). The irregular status that
smuggled migrants often have in both transit and destination countries leaves them vulnerable to
becoming victims of trafficking.
Policy Developments and Smuggling Policy toward migration is undergoing rapid change, particularly following the irregular migration crisis
in Europe in 2015. The precise nature of policy is dependent on the country and region, but the general
policy trends toward migration and asylum share some characteristics.
Criminalisation of Smuggling. International approaches toward irregular migration have been
developed relatively recently. The predominant definition of smuggling, outlined in the Protocol Against
the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea is a criminal definition, attempting to eradicate the
smuggling industry. The Bali Process also focuses on ensuring that anti-smuggling legislation and law
enforcement measures are in place in destination and transit countries. The Global Compact on
Migration also explicitly attempts to “prevent, investigate, prosecute and penalise the smuggling of
migrants” (Objective 9). The fact that smuggling is perceived as a criminal enterprise at the international
level indicates that policy is likely to focus on elimination of smuggling and on enforcement measures.
Externalisation. The European Commission and the US have placed increasing focus on common
integrated border management. The EU adopted the Integrated Border Management (IBM) strategy and
subsequent action plan in 2003 and 2006, respectively; this way forward establishes a single, non-military
border security authority according to EU Schengen Borders Code. One of the key elements of EU border
management has been externalization. Externalization is the reproduction of EU’s migration policy at the
external level, which “entails burden sharing in the policing of European borders with bordering countries
and the setting up of migration management policies in the countries of transit and origin…” (Doukoure
and Oger, 2007) Externalization can be defined as the overall aim of the EU to prevent unwanted migration
from reaching the EU territory (Lavenex 2004; Sirkesci and Pusch 2016). As a clear demonstration of
13
border security prioritization, 2018 will mark the first year that the EU’s annual investment in border
security will outweigh its investment in development in Africa (EURACTIV 2018). The US has adopted
externalisation measures since the Reagan administration and has been applied to Haiti, Cuba and other
Latin American countries in successive administrations. Some of the key facets of the externalisation
policy have included the interdiction and detention of irregular migrants, the increasing funding of border
management including coast guards and equipment and joint governmental policy initiatives (Human
Rights Watch 2016).
Border Walls. One of the more visible developments in border management is the relatively new policy
of putting walls up between states. At the end of World War II there were fewer than five border walls in
the world and only 15 by 1990. There are 70 walls either constructed or under construction today (Vallet
2014). Several of the recently-constructed walls have been successful in lowering the number of irregular
migrants through the targeted migration route. For instance, in 2014, approximately 19,000 people
attempted to cross the Mediterranean into Spain but, following the construction of the wall, the number
diminished to 3,700 people in 2015 (Harvard International Review 2017). Walls represent a significant
financial and human resource investment as they are considered to be most effective when they cover
short lengths and are heavily armed and, due to the flexibility of migration routes, often divert migration
to other more risky routes (Migration Policy Institute, 2016). Finally, walls do not address some major
forms of irregular migration, including overstaying of visas and crossing via sea (Heritage Institute, 2018).3
Addressing Root Causes. There is a clear understanding among policymakers that migration is linked to
economic opportunity. Many policy responses to the migration crisis have aimed to spur economic
growth, including in rural areas4. However, the relationship between migration and development is
complex; initial increases in household income may generate more migration in the short term (Migration
Policy Institute, 2018). In addition, programs to address root causes are generally diffuse and require
additional focus on addressing employment and long-term opportunities for urban youth.
Conclusion and Recommendations Policymakers and practitioners who aim to reduce the prevalence of smuggling networks and mitigate
the risks associated with human smuggling can alter and refine their approaches in order to better
target both potential migrants and smuggling networks.
In-depth research into smuggling networks. There is little data available on human smuggling networks,
and the research into factors driving smugglers is extremely limited. The lack of data around smuggling
reflects reliance on official statistics, differences in definitions of human smuggling, and reluctance to
share data on the part of law enforcement agencies. In order to gain a more comprehensive picture of
smuggling networks, their modes of operation, and to identify factors which may disrupt the networks,
it is necessary to have more complete information. Investment at the global or regional level into
qualitative and quantitative data collection, and into the development of a comprehensive picture of
smuggling networks and their modes of operation, could help to generate more targeted and effective
policies at the regional and national levels.
4 Examples of such programs include the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the UK Department for International
Development’s programming developments in Afghanistan in 2016, following the ‘crisis’ of 2015, as well as similar programming in Somalia and the Sahel.
14
Focusing on migration hubs. Available research indicates that migration routes shift to avoid changes in
border management practices but hubs remain constant. Many of these hubs are well known, for
instance Agadez in Niger, Nimroz in Afghanistan and Sabratha in Libya. Since hubs serve as bases for
smugglers and information gathering and service selection locations for migrants, a focus on hubs may
generate longer-lasting changes in migration and smuggling decisions and mitigate human rights
violations. Examples of potential policy interventions could include: 1) identification of smuggling
‘leaders’ and disruption of smuggling networks at hubs, 2) implementation of programs to offer
migrants alternative legal migration or mechanisms for free or low-cost safe return at hubs, 3)
implementation of programs to offer economic alternatives to lower level smugglers, and 4)
implementation of awareness raising campaigns to reduce and mitigate the risks of rights violations.
Moving away from criminalisation and toward ‘market regulation’. Currently, international actors have
adopted an approach to migration that focuses on prosecuting smugglers. Migrants are complicit in
human smuggling as smuggling takes place consensually. In addition, an economy has developed around
smuggling networks. Other actors in the smuggling economy (e.g., hotel owners, providers of
communication infrastructure) have no incentive to cooperate with authorities regarding measures to
reduce smuggling networks. International actors could adopt a more market-oriented approach to
smuggling. This would involve identifying the factors that generate supply and demand, and working to
influence these factors. Potential policy interventions could include: 1) development of non-smuggling
related economic alternatives for low-level smugglers at migration hubs and 2) information campaigns
among potential migrants regarding physical safety measures (eg ensuring they are aware of minimum
standards for boats, ensuing awareness of minimum vehicle safety measures); such campaigns would
influence migrants to put pressure on smugglers to adopt measures to improve safety.
Holistic approaches to smuggling and migration. Smuggling has been defined as a criminal activity, but
it has strong economic, social and cultural ties. Smuggling networks arise from strong social systems;
many migrants rely on friends and family to identify a smuggler, and then rely on the smuggler as the
predominant source of information about potential migration routes and risks upon these migration
routes. The fact that smuggling is so closely linked with ethnicity indicates that successful migrant
smuggling policies are likely to include explicit social components that engage with the ethnic groups
that are more heavily involved in smuggling networks. Reducing migration requires addressing cultural
and historical factors that promote migration, including linkages of migration with coming-of-age and
newer cultural developments such as tendencies to ‘brag’ among people who have reached the West.
Policy approaches need to include explicit social and economic components in order to be successful.
Targeting populations of potential migrants. Although data on irregular migrants and smuggling
networks is relatively limited, there is enough data to draw some conclusions. Potential migrants are
often young and are literate; many of them are unemployed or underemployed and from urban areas. A
holistic approach to migration would therefore be likely to concentrate not only on hubs, but also on
employment in urban areas in countries of origin. Employment opportunities would focus, not on the
poorest of the poor, but instead on those who are not the most vulnerable, but have enough money and
education to attempt to move.
15
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