human rights violations by the police

Human Rights Violations by the Police

Niels Uildriks and Piet van Reenen

In some parts of the world, police forces are known for the brutality with which they operate. In Kosovo, for instance, the Serbian police functioned as a kind of paramilitary organization, responsible for numerous atrocities. In countries such as Brazil and Mexico, the police are known for all kinds of gross human rights violations: endemic brutality, torture, extrajudicial killings, and "disappearances. "1 The Palestinian police who have taken over from Israelis in the formerly occupied territories have a well-known reputation, especially where the torture of (political) suspects is concerned. This, however, elicits much less concern and derision from the Palestinian population than similar actions on the part of the Israeli police. 2

In this article we shall be concerned with the question of police human rights violations as part of normal or routine policing, rather than in the context of violent internal political conflicts or civil war. Repression and gross violations of human rights in the latter situations are normally perpetrated by the military rather than the police. The police tend to play no role in the political domain or are subordinated to the military. 3 The question we shall address here is why police forces are involved in certain excesses as part of routine policing in some countries and not, or to a far smaller extent, in others. Are there generally applicable processes or causes which can explain certain excesses? Which violations are characteristic for different types of societies? These questions will be addressed here in the first instance by looking at the relevant research literature concerning the causes of police violations of human rights. This will be followed by a discussion of variations in"context'and"complexity"of gross violations of human rights in different situations. Subsequently, we outline the specific characteristics of developing and more developed western societies that influence the nature and degree of police brutality. In this context, policing in "divided societies"will be discussed in the light of the democratization processes of a number of such traditionally divided societies in recent years.

1. Existing Knowledge about the Causes of Police Violations of Human Rights

An inventory of relevant studies indicates the scarcity of empirical research available and the paucity of theory formulated specifically on the causes of

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Uildriks and van Reenen 65

police violations of human rights. In view of the broad range of police actions which fall under the concept of police violations of human rights, available theory is inherently either of a fairly general nature or relates to a certain types of rights violations. Few if any comparable research data concerning both developing and more developed western societies exist. Most relevant research has been carried out in the field of police brutality and the lethal use of force, especially in the United States. 4 Studies have also been conducted by human fights organizations, especially Human Rights Watch (HRW). For instance, HRW's recent report"Systemic Injustice: Torture,'Disappearance'and Extraju- dicial Execution in Mexico" looks into a number of cases of police violations of human fights and analyzes their occurrence in the context of the government's approach to such violations and the functioning of the criminal justice system. Useful insights also emerge from HRW's study of state responsibility for rural violence in Mexico and its study on police brutality in urban Brazil.These studies provide valuable data and insights which can be used in a theoretical analysis of the causes of police violations of human rights, s

Some European studies exist on the poIice in wartime, such as the study of Hamburg police officers during World War II, who were sent to the Eastern front in Russia, and were involved in gross violations of human rights on a massive scale. In a study of the role of the Amsterdam police during the Sec- ond World War, an analysis was made of the support given by the police to the German transportation of Jews to German concentration camps. 6 Based on his experiences in charge of an inspection team of the Committee for the Pre- vention of Torture (Cl'q') from 1989 to 1993, Antonio Cassese uncovered the occurrence of police torture among the then 23 member states of the Council of Europe, including some countries in Asia, Cyprus and Turkey. 7 In a recent report, HRW examined police torture in Russia and suggested that possibly half of all suspects arrested are tortured, irrespective of the severity of the suspected offense, s

Most relevant research with respect to the causes of police violations of human fights, however, is to be found in American research on police brutality and the use of excessive force. 9 Such research has focused on situational, individual, and environmental variables. With regard to individual variables, research has been carried out on the influence of personality traits of police officers, particularly with respect to their readiness to switch to aggressive solutions in conflict situations. A general conclusion which can be drawn is that different types of police officers have a different propensity for violence. Other personal characteristics that have been looked into are number of years of service and sex. 1~ Whereas a psychological perspective may in itself be of value in connection with the broader area of police violations of human rights, a sociological and organizational theoretical approach is more appropriate for outlining a macrolevel perspective on why such violations occur.

66 Human Rights Review, January-March 2001

1.1 Sociological theory

Police work and violations of human rights always take place in concrete situations. Sociological research which concentrates on situational variables is based on the premise that police actions are influenced by the dynamics of a specific interaction between police and citizens. Such an approach is in principle also applicable to the broader field of the analysis of violations of human rights. Thus Schmid concluded that gross human rights violations are, inter alia, explicable as the result of situational pressure on individual persons2 ~ In situational analysis, attention is paid to the structural characteristics of the situations influencing the dynamics of a particular encounter. From this perspective, factors such as the age, sex, and demeanor of the suspect, the nature of the neighborhood, and the general character of police-public relations are used by police as cues in deciding how situations should be dealt with2 2 Egon Bittner speaks in this respect of the use of coer- cive force being employed in accordance with an intuitive grasp of situational exigencies. 13

I. 1.1 A Typology of Police Violations of Human Rights

Police violations of human rights occur in many different forms and situations, ranging from brutal police practices to extrajudicial executions. A distinction can also be made between different types of situations and the social realities in which they occur. In the symbolic interactionist research tradition, much attention is paid to the symbolic meanings which actors or groups of actors share and which form the basis for concrete actions. 14 Police violations of human rights can be analyzed from this point of view: the focus is on the ways in which perpetrators and victims perceive each other and the events in question. As an adaptation of an earlier schema of different categories of police violence, is we here distinguish seven types of gross human rights violations.

Police violations of human rights as hedonistic acts: Police officers see their target as a source of personal gratification. Evidence in several countries indicates, for example, that police officers may pick up women for the sole purpose of raping them for their personal enjoyment. They would subsequently be released under the explicit warning not to file a complaint. Amnesty Inter- national described a rape case in Mexico whereby a woman passing a police station in Cuetzalan was taken into the police station and subsequently raped by four police officers. Afterwards they forced her to take an anticonception pill to prevent a possible pregnancy. TM

Police violations of human rights as desire for profit: The citizens concerned are abused for the personal advantage of the police, in this instance as a means of extortion. In a Mexican case, a young male was pushed into a police car and


later, at the police station, kicked and hit by different groups of police officers. Later the police threatened to throw him off the top of a roof in order to force him to produce his bank card and PIN number, which he did not, in fact, have. He was finally released after giving them the $800 cash he had at home. 17 A doctor later diagnosed a ruptured spleen, internal bleeding, bruised ribs, and severe bruises on the head, arms, and legs.

Police violations of human rights as a response to danger: Police work involves confrontation with situations in which citizens pose, or are perceived as pos- ing, an immediate threat to the physical integrity of police officers. Under such circumstances the police may respond too hastily or excessively, be it by use of firearms or excessive physical force. Dutch research showed that just under half of all (excessive) force used was related to such a context. TM The use of excessive force is, then, often due to ineptitude or carelessness on the part of police officers who are incapable of dealing with the perceived threat adequately.

Police violations of human rights as informal punishment: This occurs when the violations either serve the function of an alternative to a criminal charge, an additional punishment, a form of revenge, or setting an example to deter others from committing similar acts. As an alternative to a criminal charge, the police may resort to physical punishment when they lack the necessary proof to successfully charge a suspect. They thus apportion guilt and punishment with regard to specific individuals who are held responsible for particular acts for which the police believe they should be punished. Char- acteristically, informal punishments may be meted out against individuals who have committed acts of aggression against the police. One may think in such a context of the filmed summary execution of a robber in Rio de Janeiro in the mid-nineties. The officer responsible justified the execution to the cam- eraman filming the incident by indignantly pointing out that the victim had shot at the police.

Police violations of human rights as acts of war: These are forms of violence against people whom the police regard as enemies to themselves or the state, wish to make an example of, or simply wish to impress upon the idea of who "rules." In a war context, such violence stems from a general attitude vis-a-vis certain groups of the population, in contrast to"violations as informal punishment," which are meted out against individuals who have committed a particular act. In a"war context," the target is the larger col- lectivity rather than a specific individual, and the violation of human rights will therefore not be restricted to the alleged perpetrator of a specific (criminal) act. Illustrative of this category, for example, are the excesses committed by both police and army in the region of Chiapas in Mexico as part of the battle against the separatist guerilla movement. Similar police excesses have also been reported in Oaxaca, where an active guerilla movement is op- erative. As part of joint police-military operations in 1996, following a previ-


ous EPR guerrilla attack, 127 people were arbitrarily detained, of whom 100 were tortured, and a further five executed. 19 The killings committed by the Serbian police in 1999 in Kosovo can, of course, also be seen in the same context.

Police violations of human rights as effective policing.. Police abuse of power in order to achieve formal aims is a well-known phenomenon in the police literature. 2~ The police often view the legal boundaries within which they have to work as inhibiting effective policing. In such a context, torture to extract confessions may be seen as a form of"effective policing"which is considered necessary to be able to combat crime successfully. This can be understood as an attempt to overcome impediments to "solving crime" or effecting arrests. What such violations of human rights have in common with other types of violations, such as"acts of war,'for example, is that they can be looked upon as a tough form of policing required to deal with certain groups or individuals. Such violations are committed to facilitate the arrest, prosecution, and criminal conviction of a particular individual. For example, the threat of rape may be used to induce criminal suspects to confess. Suggesting that possibly half the suspects in Russia may be tortured for the purpose of extracting a confes- sion, Human Rights Watch notes that the most common form is prolonged beating, but also refers to the use of asphyxiation, suspension by the arms or legs, and electroshocks. The police further make use of trusted prisoners in pretrial cells as proxies to beat and threaten suspects into cooperating with an investigation. The use of physical torture is usually combined with threats of further physical harm and other psychological abuse. In some instances the victim is known to have died as a result or become permanently disabled. 21 Israel is the only country in the world where the use of torture by Shin Bet against detainees suspected of so-called security offenses, considered essential for internal security reasons, was in fact legitimized by a specific procedure (the Landau Rules). In 1999 the Israeli High Court ruled the various related practices unlawful, making their use in an institutionalized manner impos- sible. 22 In Latin America, killing suspects in pre-arranged shoot-outs by the police is another form of violations committed as a means of"effective policing. "2a

Police violations of human rights as riot: these are similar to acts of war in that they are closely related to strong negative feelings towards and views of certain groups of the population as"the enemy. "24 These types of violations characteristically take place in the context of large-scale actions under the direct supervision of senior officers, notably in response to large demonstrations which have gotten "out of hand." Sometimes political motivation is involved, as in the case of the bloody suppression by the police of the student demonstrations at UNAM University in Mexico City.

The typology of the above mentioned types of fgross human rights violations can be schematized as follows:


Table 1.7

Human Rights Violations as:

Hedonistic act

Desire for profit

Definition of target by police officer

source of personal gratification

source of (potential) income

Motivation of p.o.* to commit a violation

personal satisfaction

supplement income

Victim's likely definition of the p.o.* involved

criminal/brutal

criminal/bent cop/police corruption

Victim's likely definition of the nature of the event

criminal act

act of extortion

Response to imminent personal or opponent police tactics/ danger threat public safety act of aggression

Effective criminal instrumental crime fighter/ police tactics policing enemy

teaching a lesson/revenge/ retaliation/ reaction against specific act

war tactics/to paralyze or defeat opponents

political/ revenge/ combatting disorder

wicked individual/ criminal/ personal foe

part of dangerous group/enemy

group threat to public order/ political enemy

authority figure/i oppressor/ revenger

enemy/ oppressor

Informal punishment

Act of war

Police riot

just desert/ punishment/ revenge

war tactics/to be expected from the enemy

state functionaries/ brutes/enemy

police state/ enemy tactics

*p.o. = police officer

Distinguishing different types of violations of human rights sensitizes us to the different meanings of such excesses for the actors concerned in varying circumstances. The case of rape, for instance, depending on the circumstances, can be understood in terms of (a) an act of war: a form of torture of political opponents in order to intimidate them or their relatives; (b) informal punishment: to hand out retributive justice; (c) effective policing: to extort a confes- sion; (d) a hedonist ic act: de tent ion of w o m e n for one's own pleasure. A distinction between different types of violations of human rights on the basis of the symbolic meaning and motivations underlying specific actions may be helpful in a search for different causes of such violations. Certain types of vio-


lations are more likely to occur under certain circumstances than others, and by distinguishing between different types of violations one can set out to dis- cover which factors contribute to the specific circumstances involved. For example, one might in principle assume that"violations for profit"are more likely to occur when police salaries are not sufficient to ensure a minimal level of subsistence. "Violations as responses to danger" are likely to be high crime levels are high. In combination with an ideology of a war against crime, high crime levels are also likely to influence the degree of"violations as effective policingY'Violations as acts of war" are especially likely under circumstances in which the police consider themselves involved in controlling or suppressing a particular social or ethnic group within society.

A further distinction between types of police violations of human rights can be drawn between the degrees of complexity involved on a horizontal or vertical level. When violations are in some way connected with the political authorities (i.e., include the vertical level), we can speak of complex violations. Where this is not the case, we refer to the horizontal level and speak of professional violations.

On a horizontal level within the police force, the following manifestations are possible: a) the occurrence of several types of violations simultaneously; b) the occurrence of violations in combination with other forms of norm violations; c) the involvement of third parties or other organizations; d) violations taking place as organized behavior or as plain occupational excesses; e) the extent of violations.

On a vertical level, complex violations involve the (political) authorities in terms of different levels of implication and organization. The authorities may be implicated in varying degrees in one or more of the following manners: a) the political tolerance of violations of which the authorities are aware; b) the directing of police violations; c) the prevention or impeding of enquiry into violations. On an organizational level the authorities' involvement can also differ, extending to either formal or more informal control of the police, on a local, regional or a national level.

I. 1.2 General situational patterns

In the police literature, certain general situational patterns of police actions leading to comparable processes in different social contexts emerge. Chevigny's research in the United States and four Latin American countries indicates that much lethal police violence occurs after car chases; in the Netherlands, as well, these do seem to constitute situations in which excessive use of force easily occurs. 25 The mental processes leading to retributive violence under such circumstances appear to be similar, except that in some countries shootings occur more easily and may sometimes even result in extrajudicial executions rather than simple physical violence. In different societies comparable police


human rights violations occur which can be explained in terms of generally applicable processes. To illustrate this point, Chevigny found that in each of the cities he investigated, actions which are perceived by the police as provo- cations directed towards them result in informal sanctions; only the nature of the response varies. For example, in Silo Paulo, someone who runs away can be shot at, whereas in Los Angeles this usually merely results in a beating. 26 Danger and police-public relations are relevant situational variables which partly relate directly to the specific circumstances, but also to the larger environment in which such situations occur.

Danger

Most research suggests a positive relation between the level of violent crime, the resultant indirect threat to the police, and the likelihood of police violations of human rights as responses to danger. However, possibly due to differences in methods used, research findings are to some extent conflicting on this point.

Several studies suggest that the greater the amount of violent crime and the resultant indirect threat to the police, the greater the chances of deadly use of forceY On the other hand, survey data from three Caribbean countries do not in fact reveal such a positive link. 28 There is, however, no dispute about the fact that the level of violent crime constitutes an environmental variable which affects the amount of danger experienced by the police.The perception of danger, however, is not only a result of the external reality in which the police operate but also is affected by internal influences of police culture and forms of organization as well as by situational variables.

With such variables, Dutch research has shown that just under half of non- lethal police violence occurs in connection with the perception of an immediate threat of violence on the part of the citizen in question .29 Moreover, as an external environmental variable, it appears that the"kind"of people the police are dealing with can have an effect on the perception of danger, and thereby upon the chance of police violence. 3~ Notions of"danger"may also contribute to a police culture within which certain groups of the public easily come to be seen as the enemy, and, consequently, as dangerous. Such general notions can influence police perception of the dangerousness of specific people in concrete situations.

Danger and police-public relations

Several studies, especially those based on qualitative methods, indicate that along with factors directly linked to the situation, general environmental factors can also influence the subjective experience of danger and thereby the occurrence of police violence. An environment in which contacts between police


and public are above all incidental, ad hoc, and anonymous leaves more room for mutual feelings of enmity and negative stereotypes. These augment the likelihood of violations of human rights, both within and outside the framework of perceived dangerous situations. 3~- Such circumstances also leave scope for differently motivated types of violence, for example retributive justice. In some studies the general attitude of the public emerges as a possible factor. The less respectfully the police feel themselves treated, the more they will feel the need to enforce co-operation by physical means. 32- Bennett also concluded on the basis of his survey data that the degree of respect for the police has explanatory value for the amount of police violence, especially retributive violence, in a society. It seems, however, improbable that"respect" as a variable has explanatory value for the whole range of police violations of human r ights , 33

I. 1.3 Violence and social order

In some societies there appears to be little respect for human rights, and hard, repressive conduct on the part of the police is regarded as legitimate by wide segments of the population. Some studies indicate that such an attitude, seen as an environmental variable, increases the likelihood of police violations of human rights.

The Brazilian anthropologist Teresa Caldeira contends that the inadequate recognition of individual rights in Brazil is accompanied by a correspondingly weakly developed sense of the integrity of the individual body. This makes the body the eminently appropriate vehicle for rulers to exert their power over groups such as street children, poor people, and criminal suspects. 34 Paul Chevigny considers this to be an important explanation of why in Brazil the poor, criminals, or"the merely disorderly" are vulnerable as a group, and are routinely exposed to punishment and torture. 35 Martha Huggins and Myriam Mesquita make a similar analysis in explaining the murders of street youth by death squads (often consisting of off-duty police officers) in modem Brazil. 36 They assert that as political and social outcasts the young victims of murder are virtually powerless in the legitimate system. This makes them"civilly in- visible."They further argue that the actions of their killers are neutralized by cultural stereotypes which transform victims into victimizers and make killers into social servants.

Chevigny argues that, in Brazil and Jamaica, violence is the pre-eminent means employed to keep marginal groups of the population under control. He concludes that there is a correlation between the socio-political structure and the level of police violence in the sense that police departments reflect and represent the relations existing within the social order. 37 Human Rights Watch attributes the persistent violation of human rights in Brazil, specifically those against children, to the country's poverty and lack of financial resources and the existence of large economic and racial inequalities. 3~

UUdriks and van Reenen 73

In a comparison of Jamaica, Brazil, and Argentina, Chevigny analyzes the potential impact of socio-economic factors both in the context of social control and in relation to public opinion. 39 He concludes that when the threat of social unrest seems high, on account of increased social mobilization together with increased economic misery, the police may summarily execute a group of suspects, provided that both elite and lower-class public opinion will tolerate the executions as legitimate. Due to the liberal nature of the states involved, the legitimacy of such homicides can only be established under the rubric of the rule of law. Both Chevigny and Bennett point out that, for this reason, such executions are virtually always justified to the public as acts of self-defense, typically in response to"shoot-outs. "4~ Experiences in other countries suggest that it is possible for the authorities to prevent such killings. Chevigny argues that the reason why this is not done in the countries studied lies in the fact that such acts constitute a means of social control that is acceptable to elite and mass opinion. In terms of informal means of social control, Chevigny considers lynch laws and police violence to be two aspects of the same problem. Police use of deadly force can in many cases be seen as official vigilantism, and arrests never appear to be made in response to acts of private vigilantism. This analysis would suggest that generalized cultural ideas about the impossibility of controlling civilian violence contribute to the legitimacy of civilians taking the law into their own hands. Such ideas also increase the likelihood of police involvement in vigilante activities and thus the likelihood of police violations of human rights.

1.1.4 State deconstruction

In various countries in Middle and Latin America, a complex nexus may exist between violations of human rights committed by police and informal death squads. On the basis of several Brazilian case studies, Huggins has ex- plored the possible symbiosis between formal police systems and informal death squads with origins in, and connections to, the state and the criminal justice system. 41 She has traced Brazil's modem death squads back to 1958, when the chief of police in Rio de Janeiro was pressured by Rio's commercial association to do something about the rise in theft and robbery affecting business. A specialized motor patrol unit was set up and its members were given an explicit mandate to kill"dangerous criminals"on their own initiative, which they did, both on and off duty. This meant the beginning of a new symbiosis between already long-existent"informal"murder teams and the modem centralized state apparatus, and reflected the ease with which a formal police unit could spawn informal death squads. Huggins considers such devolution to be a result of the escalation of official death squad"justice." She concludes that death squads are a product of a process of state deconstruction. As part of that deconstruction, the formal control system splits off, or"debureaucratizes,"and


increasingly carries out violence clandestinely and extra-legally. She argues that, in Brazil, a tightly integrated symbiosis between the criminal justice system, death squads, and illegal gambling keeps death squads under sufficiently indirect government control to allow government officials on occasion to punish some death squad murderers (notably in response to public outrage) without seriously disrupting death squad networks.

Huggins identifies four sources of devolution. To start with, she concludes, there is a formal organization that is characterized by bureaucratic central~a- tion, specialization, and competition associated with a war model of policing. In response there is an outgrowth of state-related death squad activities, which often also includes illegal activities such as robbery, drug smuggling, and gun sales. This in turn generates an increase of devolution into decentralization and loss of state control. In the context of market economy in Brazil, a commodification of social control takes the form ofjusticeiros, informal death squads for hire, and the proliferation of private rent-a-cops, the boundaries between them being very porous. Especially in relation to an ideology of a "war against crime,"death squads then do the state's dirty work, which a democratic state cannot do itself. Huggins argues that as a result, decades of police professionalization may not only have failed to eliminate death squads but even have spawned them.

1.2 Organizational theory

Some approaches involve an analysis of organizational features in order to understand police behavior. A considerable body of research regarding police use of force exists, which looks into organizational factors such as training, regulation, and legislation, mechanisms of rewards and punishment, and the police culture. We are not aware of any similar studies on to~ure, although in his comparative study Chevigny draws a number of conclusions that are of relevance from an organizational point of view. 42 The analysis of police torture in Russia given by Human Rights Watch in 1999 suggests a link between the extensive torture practices and the previous authoritarian Soviet criminal justice system, in which suspects were practically stripped of all rights and crime policy was based on a state plan which required police and prosecutors to solve a specific number of crimes.

1.2.1 Impact of organizational control mechanisms

Research findings on the kind of internal control mechanisms that are effective in controlling police abuses differ to some extent. In several studies, attention is paid to the quality of supervision as a crucial variable for the degree of excessive force employed by the police. Police culture, style of leadership, and the l ikelihood of sanctions appear to consti tute important


organizational determinants influencing excessive force. Police culture is iden- tiffed as being of great influence on police conduct in the street, and its significance is also seen in terms of its capacity to protect police officers from internal control systems and sanctions. 43

Skolnick and Fyfe conclude that excessive police force can above all be con- trolled by high-quality supervision. 44 Worden, however, found no indication on the grounds of his data analysis that supervision had a moderating effect in this respect. 4s Similarly, Bennett did not find any evidence to suggest that supervision, disciplining, or training were of importance in the three Caribbean countries investigated. In research within the United States, however, supervision, disciplining, and training did appear to have positive results) 6 In a study on police brutality in urban Brazil, Human Rights Watch attributes a gradual reduction in the number of police killings in Sao Paulo during the 1990s to the introduction of the Programme to Retrain Police Officers in High Risk Situations. As part of this programme, officers who had been involved in fatal shootings were assigned different duties in a different area, given psychological counseling, and evaluated over a three-month period. This was followed by a decision on whether the officer would return to his old duties. In Rio Grande do Sul, HRW found a higher level of professionalism and a less frequent occurrence of police violations of human rights. HRW attributes these differences from other urban areas to far better salaries and level of training. 47

Both Bennett's study in the Caribbean and research in the United States indicate that leadership, as well as police culture, has an impact on the level of human rights violations. This is especially relevant to the extent to which the management does or does not endorse certain facets of the informal police culture. Skolnick and Fyfe conclude that in police forces in which the top management endorses a siege mentality and an"us vs. them"attitude, for example, a relatively high level of police violence can be found. 48 Bennett's survey data suggest that sanctions have the greatest effect on the organizational culture, and thereby supports the conclusion of Skolnick and Fyfe that organization policy is the key to controlling excessive police force. The absence of such policy is, therefore, a probable explanation in situations where excessive force frequently occurs. Bennett has looked into the question of to what extent the lack of physical help and equipment influences the police culture and the use of retributive violence ("street justice"). Beyond what might be expected, he found no signs that this was the c a s e . 49

In a study by Meershoek, the role of a newly appointed chief of police turned out to be crucial for the assistance provided by the Amsterdam police in de- portation of Jews during the Second World War. In the face of a somewhat reluctant rank and file, the chief of police followed a policy of making the assistance provided to the Germans seem inevitable. He also countered the shock of this policy among the rank and file by taking various popular measures, so In Bennett's study, the police culture and the style of leadership ap-


pear to be the most important determinants of excessive force, followed by the estimated likelihood of sanctions when norms are infringed. His research shows that an important direct effect lies in the estimated likelihood that wrongdo- ing will be discovered and punished, a conclusion which concurs with other research, sl Studies of lethal force in the U.S. indicate that administrative regulation tends to limit the frequency with which police officers make use of fire- a r m s . 52

1.2.2 Crime levels and the police role

High crime levels may be a contributory environmental factor that directly increases the likelihood of certain police excesses, especially the frequency with which the police react excessively to dangerous situations. High crime levels may also have a more indirect impact on the level of police violations of human rights. In some countries, high crime levels are accompanied by a feel- ing that the criminal justice system is manifestly unable to respond adequately to and control groups of the population associated with criminality. Research suggests that in certain developing countries, this view in police circles may be conducive to various violent practices as an alternative mechanism of control (or, to use our previous terms, violations of human rights as effective policing).

An extreme example can be found in Brazil, where keeping criminals out of the formal criminal justice system and dealing with them informally simply by executing them is a well-known phenomenon. This tendency may be organizationally reinforced by policies. HRW points to the consequences of the au- thorization in Rio de Janeiro in 1995 for police officers to carry a second weapon while on duty. These weapons are personal possessions and are not registered officially. Violent police officers use such weapons to make an extrajudicial execution look like a shoot-out; HRW has pointed out that the police often corroborate their claim of armed resistance by producing a weapon attributed to the victim, s3 Another contributory organizational policy involved reward- ing"acts of bravery"by a raise in pay and promotion, s4 Such rewards were given to officers who killed criminal suspects, regardless of the circumstances. HRW analyzed 97 official police records in which 179 police officers were given a bravery promotion and evaluated these on the basis of whether the police officers had met the required criteria to be eligible. It was concluded that in the vast majority of cases, the special commission authorized a bravery promotion despite the fact that one or more of the 11 formal requirements of the promotion were not met. ss A subsequent Brazilian evaluation concluded that this policy was responsible for a doubling of the number of police murders, with victims mostly being shot in the back or the head, and did not have a positive impact on the crime level. In July 1998 the Parliament of the State of Rio de Janeiro repealed the legal basis for the system of the so-called"bravery bonuses," and the policy was subsequently abandoned.


Specifically addressing the situation in Sao Paulo, Chevigny observes that the tendency simply to execute suspects is reinforced by the division of function into maintenance of the peace by the military police on the one hand, and criminal investigations by the civil police on the other, s6 The abhorrence on the part of the military police of the ineffectiveness of the criminal justice system, and especially of the civil police, contributes to their execution of suspects as a supposedly effective way of combating crime. In all the countries investigated, Chevigny contends, criminal investigation departments may go their own way organizationally, thus considerably hampering the government's control of violent criminal investigation tactics and corruption.

Comparing various cities in the U.S. and Latin America, Chevigny concludes that departments with marked military features or affiliations with the military apparatus use more violence as a means to control certain groups of the population than police departments which are clearly characterized as part of the civil government. He ascertains that in Brazil the military analogy of war against crime contributed to the formation of specialized police groups with specific tasks, groups that adopt an isolated position within the police force as well as with regard to the public. Characteristic for such groups is that they formulate their own standards and criteria, and sometimes adopt paramilitary aims (extrajudicial executions). The military analogy leads to the dehumaniza- tion of the presumed enemy, which makes it easier to kill or torture.

The kinds of role different types of police play organizationally also influences the type of violations they may commit. For example, in S~o Paulo and Rio de Janeiro police killings have been attributed primarily to the military police (PM), who are responsible for patrolling the streets. Torture, however, has been viewed primarily as a problem of the civil police, who are in charge of police stationsY

1.2.3 Law, external control, and violations of human rights

In some countries information obtained by means of torture may not be used as evidence; in others it still can. Insofar as torture is used as a means of securing criminal convictions, the exclusion of such evidence logically makes its use ineffective. Prohibition of the use of non-voluntary confessions as a means of proof in criminal proceedings should, in principle, therefore lead to a diminished use of torture as a method of investigation by the police. This also depends, however, on the manner in which judges and prosecutors act in practice on this point. In Mexican law, for example, evidence obtained under torture is not admissible, but the prohibition of its use is not effectively enforced. HRW concludes that in the state of Tamaulipas during the period 1990-1996, human rights violations by police occurred in a predictable pattern. In cases in which the investigative Federal Judicial Police were involved, the detainees were illegally held and tortured prior to being turned over to prosecutors. 58 In


almost every case the prosecutors took no initiative to follow up torture allegations or medical evidence on this point. Sometimes prosecutors simply fail to investigate torture, or instead charge police with smaller crimes, such as "abuse of authority." In other instances, even when there were indictments, the authorities did not follow up on arrest warrants. HRW reports on Brazil and Mexico all point to impunity as an important contributory factor to the occurrence of gross violations of human rights. A report on police brutality in urban Brazil in fact identifies it as the single most important factor. 59

Chevigny ascertains that the process of ceasing to allow extorted confessions to count as a means of proof in criminal proceedings is accompanied by diminished tolerance of such practices by the general public. In Brazil such evidence is not in principle excluded from the averment. Chevigny attributes a reduction of torture practices by the civil police during the nineties, inter alia, to the new constitution of 1988, which turned torture into a crime. 6~ A criminal investigation department was set up, which was accompanied by a reduction of the number of complaints about torture. Comparing Brazil and Mexico, Chevigny concludes that external institutions of control are especially effective on torture practices in a situation of transition from a repressive to a more democratic regime.

A further point relates to the circumstances under which governments tend to introduce effective mechanisms of control. Chevigny analyzes the significance of international legislation relating to gross violations of human rights. He considers that its importance lies only to a limited degree in its formal enforcement, and more strongly in the authority emanating from formal acceptance of the codes. 61 For countries in a situation of transition from an au- thoritative to a democratic government, operating within a formal legal framework is essential for their (international) legitimacy. Scandals reported extensively in the media, together with pressure from foreign governments, the United Nations, and non-governmental organizations, induce governments to introduce institutions and mechanisms that can guarantee at least a minimal degree of control. Some of these systems turn out to be clearly more effective than others, but even a system which only functions to a limited extent appears to be much better than its total absence. As a result, Chevigny argues that systems of accountability can be used by the management in a preventive sense to avoid police violations of human rights without the necessity of sub- stantial changes in the political constellation of the local authorities concerned.

2. Gross Human Rights Violations Across Different Societies

There is no empirical research on the basis of which an adequate comparative analysis can be made of the nature and extent of police violations of human rights in different types of societies. With respect to excessive police violence, Bayley speaks of the paradox of openness. 62 Most insights are likely


to come from countries in which such violence probably occurs relatively rarely. The least satisfactory information comes from countries where its occurrence is probably the most frequent, HRW's report on Russian torture practices being an obvious exception in this respect. The relevant research concerning the causes of police violations of human rights in different societies, as we saw, has furthermore a very provisional and splintered character. The limited avail- ability of comparable empirical data notwithstanding, however, a theoretical framework can be formulated which helps explain the apparent general differences between violations of human rights in different societies. In this connection we shall distinguish a number of characteristics specifically related to modem developed societies, developing societies in general, and to divided societies in transition as a sub-category of developing societies. Such a distinction obviously is a simplification. Some countries show mixed characteristics; for instance, the former communist Eastern European countries cannot properly be classified in either one of these categories. Furthermore, the whole idea of dividing countries in to"developed" and " developing" societies is con- troversial, if only because societies may be developed or developing in some senses and not in others. As we shall contend, however, such distinctions are nevertheless fruitful from the perspective of providing a theoretical framework to understand certain differences in police violations in comparative perspective.

2. I Developed societies

In a comparative international analysis of patterns of policing, Bayley argues that the deployment of armies and militias for domestic control tends to exacerbate (political) problems, making law enforcement transparently political. In the nineteenth century, in the face of reluctant but too forceful armies and en- thusiastic but unreliable militias, many European governments withdrew armies from domestic riot duty, abolished militias, and developed a specialized public police. 63 In her study on political policing, Huggins argues that enmeshing police institutions within a complicated civil bureaucracy makes state repression much less obvious in protecting social class and state prerogatives. 64

Finer draws a similar conclusion in his study of military interventions. 6s He argues that certain societies are more vulnerable to political military interventions than others. Societies where such interventions do not take place are characterized by a delicate and complex political and administrative structure. W~thin such a structure, military interventions based on the threat of the use of force have little chance of success. Finer considers the use of force to be too coarse and limited a means of effectively exercising power in complex societies. With such forms of intervention, moreover, the legitimacy of the type of government in developed countries is undermined. Talcott Parsons comes to a similar conclusion in his analysis of the concept of political power. ~


If the above conclusion with respect to the use of force is correct, then it is certainly so for gross violations of human rights. Politically motivated violations cannot occur in modern and developed societies in Europe, Asia, and the United States without the risk of making those societies more difficult to govern. A modern society is, in all its intermediate sectors, to a large extent dependent upon individual persons who are able and dare to make decisions independently. Voluntary cooperation within the political structure is inextricably bound up with this. Social complexity renders it improbable that politically motivated violations take place routinely in view of the social interdependence and the undermining effect that such violations would have on the legitimacy of the government concerned. The exercise of power is based on trust, whereby coercion has merely a supportive function. Backed by an extensive body of research of policing in western societies, one can conclude that insofar as there is any question of violations of human rights in everyday police work, they have the character of professional excesses, rather than of complex violations where the political authorities are implicated.

Having been in charge of a Committe for the Prevention of Torture inspection team from 1989 until 1993, Antonio Cassese found different forms of police torture in various of the then 23 member states of the Council of Europe. 67 Cassese explains the occurrence of these violations as partly a result of the acceptance of violence within the societies concerned (e.g. Turkey), and in part to the absence of effective investigation techniques on the part of law enforcement officers engaged in such practices. Torture takes place for the purpose of extracting information or confessions, not only from suspects of political crimes but also from perpetrators of common crimes. Constituting professional rather than political complex violations, the perpetrators seek to avoid visibility and proof of their occurrence. The forms of torture they choose thus characteristically leave few physical traces and require little or no institutional planning. A "very widespread"form consists of insistently beating the soles of the prisoner's feet or the palms of the hands with a stick or a truncheon (in Mediterranean countries, especially Turkey; referred to as fhlaka or falanga). Another"fairly widespread" practice concerns tying a prisoner's wrist behind the back and suspending the body by a rope attached to the wrists from a hook in the wall (Palestinian hanging). Also regularly encountered by the Committee for the Prevention of Torture are practices of putting a boiling egg under the victim's armpit and pressing as hard as possible, and applying different forms of elec- tric shock treatment. 6a

2.2 Developing societies

As the previous discussion of relevant research makes clear, little in-depth study has been carried out on the causes of police violations of human rights


in developing countries. An inventory of police violations of human fights in the Amnesty International yearbooks indicates, however, that these are to a large extent concentrated in developing countries. Which characteristics of developing countries are of explanatory value in this respect?

"I~ne characteristics of the various developing societies in Latin America, Africa, and Asia are to a certain extent variable, depending on the particular character of the country concerned. What developing countries have in common is that they all have to cope with a large number of political, economic, and social problems connected with their development . Transparency International's listing for corruption points out important parallels between such problems and the extent to which human rights are violated in those countries. Corruption can constitute an integral element of human rights violations by the police, and in some societies up to 90 percent of all police are corrupt; violations of human rights and corruption occur simultaneously in their activities and are probably linked. This means that police violations in developing countries constitute part of, and are explicable in terms of, the more general processes of political and economic control.

Several schemata have been developed to analyze political and economic processes and control in developing societies, which can also be used to analyze those societies more generally. Migdal, for instance, has developed a model which relates the strength of the state to the weakness of societal forces and vice versa. 69 On the basis of this general schema he explains the successes or failures of developing countries. His model is not specifically written in terms of the concept of policing, but rather of the social control capacity of states; yet his conceptual framework allows for a differentiated analysis of developing countries. As an early scholar on the subject, Riggs concentrated on forms of public administration in developing countries. He analyzed societies accord- ing to their position on a scale from simple and traditional to complex and subsequently developed a conceptual framework for administrative processes in what he referred to as"prismatic societies. "7~ Violations of human rights can be related to some of the characteristics of such societies.

In the first place, in the social structure of all developing countries there are considerable differences between rich and poor. The maintenance of the sta- tus quo, and in particular the response to violent or non-violent protest linked with poverty, is conducive to repressive action. These deprived groups, "marginals,"are considered hostile to the existing order and are the most likely victims of police violations. Characteristically, the police and private groups or individuals are active in different modes of informal policing, of which death squads are but an extreme example.

In the second place, human rights violations can be explained by the often- diversified culture. In many developing countries a traditionally dominant culture lends support to the view that those in authority have the right to impose their will by forceful means.


A third relevant societal characteristic mentioned by Riggs is that the political systems are characterized as patronage or clientele systems, constituting a mixture of traditional and modern politics. Political power is retained and employed to favor those groups with whom the ruler has special ties, such as relatives, but also including supporters. Those favored have in turn special obligations towards their" patrons. "71 The police may thus serve the business and the political interest of politicians, for example, through practices of extortion or harassing political opponents. Such a patronage system may also exist within the police, with the lower ranks being expected to pay their superior for certain privileges. 72 This constitutes a strong inducement for extortion or corrupt practices visa vis ordinary citizens. Corruption not only may be related to practices of extortion directly but also may be an indirect contributory factor to violations of human rights, insofar as higher-ranking officers or political authorities benefit from such corruption, i.e. as the illegal use of organizational power for personal use. Widespread practices of corruption can further be expected to contribute to violations of human rights by impeding both its internal and external organizational control. The more pervasive the corruption within the system, the less likelihood there is of effective control mechanisms. In various ways the patronage system is thus conducive to both complex and non-complex forms of police violations of human rights.

A fourth and last characteristic is the excessive number of problems with which the police are confronted. These problems derive from the more general problems with which developing countries have to cope. Criminality is often linked to marked migration from the countryside to the city. Widespread and often violent criminality and problems of public order, poverty, the disorga- nized and uncontrollable nature of large groups of migrants in the cities, ethnic conflicts, and breaches of the peace are often endemic. In the absence of other solutions, the political system expects the police to deal with these problems. The political system of patronage also steers the police and to a large extent determines their actions, which also explains their relative invulner- ability in society. The general shortage of government funds in turn has its effect upon the police in the form of shortages of instrumental means and manpower, and inadequate salaries which are often barely sufficient to sus- tain life.

2.3 Divided societies in transition

In some developing countries, sharp divisions within society accompany the characteristics previously discussed. If there is a stable dichotomy of two different groups in terms of race, ethnicity, nationality, language or religion, one can speak of"divided societies.'In a divided society there is an identifiable group which has all the political and socio-political advantages, as opposed to the other group, which is poor and repressed. In a widely acclaimed study,


Brewer has compared the nature of policing in divided societies with policing in more integrated societies. 73 Drawing upon an analysis of South Africa, North- ern Ireland, and Israel, Brewer notes that in divided societies conflicts operate on two levels: the ethno-national level of inter-communal violence between the respective groups, and the intra-communal level where conflict fragments and breaks out within each ethnic-national group.

In divided societies the style and nature of policing are important factors in determining whether violence and conflicts are limited or perpetuated. As a result of the mode of policing, historic conflicts may either improve or deterio- rate. Brewer argues that it is precisely on this point that the significance lies of the contrast in styles of policing in societies with a greater degree of integra- tion. He attributes the following characteristics to the syndrome of divided societies:

�9 selective upholding of the law in favor of the dominant social group; �9 discriminatory practices restricting the exercise of the rights of the minority; �9 political partisanship; �9 lack of autonomy from the political system; �9 no effective mechanisms for external accountability; �9 relatively unrestrained use of force; �9 a dual role deriving from the responsibility for both combating crime and en-

suring internal security; �9 the polarization of attitudes towards the police and their conduct; �9 a social composition of the police biased towards the dominant group; �9 chronic and endemic manpower shortage;

close operational links between the police and the military.

Many developing countries are not divided dichotomously but are more pluralistic. As a result, several of the above characteristics of divided societies are also likely to be found in other developing societies. The political dimen- sion and the impact of political conflict in such societies are specifically connected with Brewer's concept of divided society.There is a considerable chance that violations of human rights can, in part, be politically motivated and, in part, fit in with the routine of police work. Simultaneously, however, Brewer points out that vast regions of such societies are so unaffected by the conflict that they appear relatively normal and that policing in such areas approaches the consensus mode notably associated with policing in liberal democracies. This implies that the nature of policing and related violations of human rights in those areas do not necessarily differ significantly from similar areas in more integrated societies. Also of importance from a theoretical point of view is that since Brewer's analysis traditionally divided societies such as South Africa, E1 Salvador, and Northern Ireland have undergone sudden and significant political changes. This means that in spite of the continuing divided nature of such societies in transition, the characteristic group conflicts no longer exist, or do so to a far smaller extent.


Characteristic of the political changes that have occurred in such countries is the transition in the political domain from an authoritarian/dictatorial to a democratic regime. There is strong internal pressure to put limits and controls on the exercise of political power and efforts are made to democratize the police from a formerly repressive apparatus to a more democratic and humane institution. Some countries receive important external impulses (financial or technical assistance or expertise) to support such developments. In divided societies that are in this kind of transitional phase, the syndrome as characterized by Brewer no longer, or only partly, applies.

For the formulation of theory it is important to assess which characteristics of policing in a transitional society are still linked with the divided-society syndrome and which have altered under the influence of the socioeconomic and political changes and the reduction or disappearance of ethno-national or inter-communal violence. To what extent are police violations of human rights still in part politically motivated, or is it, under the changed circumstances, mainly a question of professional excesses? To what extent are police violations of human rights directed towards persons belonging to the same groups as before the transition? Does the altered (group) composition of the police bear upon this point, and to what extent are changes in violations related to the changed political, organizational, and legal context in which the police operate? What are the effects of international police assistance and pressure in the domain of adherence to accepted human fights standards in policing? Are there still characteristic features of policing which distinguish such countries from policing in other developing countries, for example in relation to the military? These questions remain as yet unanswered, but for the development of a comprehensive theoretical model they are important ones for future research to address.

3 Concluding Observations

Drawing on our previous analysis, in this concluding section we shall put forward a number of propositions to explain similarities and differences in police violations of human fights in different societies. These are inevitably to some extent of a speculative nature, but are intended to contribute to a theoretical framework which clarifies the causes of police violations.

3.1 Similarities and differences in gross human rights violations in different societies: sociological theory

In the typology developed in section 1.1.1 we distinguished between different types of police violations of human rights. Such distinction is useful if we are to understand differences and similarities in violations of rights in developing and more developed countries. Certain kinds of violations occur in both


in developing and more developed societies. Research data of three Caribbean countries regarding the excessive use of force in"serious incidents" provide a similar picture to that of comparable research in the United States. This suggests that under similar circumstances the underlying causes of certain manifestations of police violations of human rights are the same in different societal contexts. Violations associated with danger to the police can be found in all societies; only the form taken and the extent appear to differ. The level of crime influences the sense of danger. The greater the amount or severity of crime, the greater the degree of perceived personal danger and related likelihood of gross violations of human rights. High levels of perceived danger can also have a more indirect impact, namely by contributing to a police culture within which certain groups of the public easily come to be seen as dangerous. The more divided a society, the greater the likelihood that this will happen and the greater the chance that individuals will be felt to constitute a threat in specific situations, making the occurrence of violations as a result of perceived danger more likely.

In combination with an ideology of a war against crime and an ineffective and corrupt criminal justice system, high crime levels are also likely to influence the degree of"police violations of human rights as effective policing." "Violations as acts of war"will occur more often in societies where the police consider themselves involved in controlling or suppressing a particular social or ethnic group within society. The more divided a society, the more such violations are likely to occur.

In more developed countries, police violations of human rights occur pre- dominantly in the form of professional excesses. Such excesses chiefly concern instances of police brutality and illegal killings in confrontations with suspects. Torture in developed countries is known when the police are involved in a fight against separatist movements, as, for example, the fight in Spain against suspected ETA members. Under normal circumstances, however, there is no question of institutionalized forms of torture, which only occur inciden- tally, if at all. The same can be said of"disappearances"and extrajudicial executions. In developing countries such excesses are often found in the context of more general political violations of human rights. These occur alongside professional violations, for example in the context of"police violations of human rights as effective policing,"in which shoot-outs with criminals may be prear- ranged, in effect amounting to a kind of extrajudicial execution.

"Police violations of human rights for profit"are a more frequent phenomenon in developing countries, where police salaries often are frequently insuf- ficient to ensure a minimal level of subsistence. Low police income levels are, however, neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for the existence of such practices. Bennett's research in three Caribbean countries indicated that one was virtually without corruption, in spite of the fact that the level of income there was similar to that in the other two countries. Instances of institu-


tionalized corruption and related practices of extortion (notably to avoid arrest in narcotics cases), giving false testimonies, and other human rights violations have also been well-documented in developed societies in cities such as New York and London/4

It is the presence or absence of a"culture of corruption"which appears to be the decisive factor of whether and to what extent corruption-related practices occur. This type of culture can be enhanced by various societal characteristics. 7s Corruption is enhanced (1) ideologically: when the world is seen as an environment to extract from, or everything (including corruption) is seen as divinely determined; (2) politically: the more personal discretion there is on the part of public officials, the more worthwhile it is to attempt to bribe one of them; (3) socio-politically: when public office is used primarily for personal advantage, and small sense of civic duty and a non-existent notion of altruistic public services is accompanied by internal socialization and peer group pressure encouraging corrupt practices; (4) technologically: when faulty techno- logical and administrative systems allow corruption to go unnoticed.

These corruption-enhancing characteristics are typically found in developing countries as part of a general patronage and clientele system. Such a system contributes to the occurrence of police violations of human rights based on the profit motive, as well as more complex violations, linked to the political authorities. The existence of a kind of patronage and clientele system in the United States has also been conducive to corruption and related practices there.

Russia, as a former communist society, serves to illustrate another type of interdependence between the politicial and judicial authorities which can produce similar effects. The criminal courts are financed by the local authorities and are thus politically dependent on local authorities which are primarily interested in carrying out a successful fight against crime. In its report"Con- fessions at All Costs," Human Rights Watch notes that in consequence these local authorities see the role of the courts primarily in terms of passing maxi- mum sentences and not hindering other law enforcement agencies by verify- ing evidence, resolving doubts, working on the presumption of innocence, or even acquitting someone. Such systems are a relic of the former communist policing system, which was characterized by a centralized political rather than legal control. In the light of the aforementioned evidence concerning impunity as a contributory factor, such systems are likely to be a major contributory factor to the extent of the present occurrence of human rights violations by the police in Russia.

Socio-economic factors may have an impact in the context of social control and in relation to public opinion. With regard to Latin America, Chevigny concluded that when the threat of social unrest seems high, due to increased social mobility combined with increased economic misery, the police may summarily execute a group of suspects, 76 provided that both elite and lower class opinion will tolerate the executions as legitimate. In developing coun-


tries it would appear, therefore, that a failure by the authorities to prevent extrajuducial executions--which experiences in some countries suggest is pos- s ib le- i s due to the fact that such acts are acceptable to elite and mass opinion.

3.2 Similarities and differences in gross human rights violations in different societies: organizational theory

Within an organizational theoretical perspective, the impact of variables such as internal and extemal control mechanisms, supervision, and training also explains differences in the level of police violations of human rights between developing and more developed countries.

Western societies all have, in one form or other, external control systems to deal with allegations of police misconduct. The effectiveness of such systems in developed societies has been the subject of much controversy and appears to have only a limited moderating impact on police behavior. 77 The available evidence regarding developing countries, however, suggests that a lower level of violations is likely when external control mechanisms are in place, irrespective of their quality. On account of their symbolic significance (violations are often not politically tolerated), the absence of such mechanisms in other developing countries can be seen as an indication that there is a lack of political will for effective control and consequently as a possible indication of the preva- lence of complex violations. TM Chevigny concludes that external institutions of control are especially effective in a situation of transition from a repressive to a more democratic regime. 79

In contrast, the importance of internal mechanisms of control appears more unequivocal. Their absence in specific police departments contributes to an important degree to corrupt practices and violent police tactics. Conversely, efforts to introduce stringent internal mechanisms of control may significantly reduce such practices, especially if these are in response to a scandal, as was the case in NewYork during the '70s. 8~ Whether primarily repressive internal measures have an unmitigated long-term effect is, however, uncertain. 81

Evidence on the impact of different internal mechanisms of control suggests some differences between developing and more developed countries. Supervision, disciplining, and training appear to be effective in diminishing police excesses in countries such as the U.S. Comparable research in three developing countries has found no such impact. Evidence on this point is, however, to some extent conflicting and may well depend upon the specific nature and quality of the mechanisms involved. In a study on police brutality in urban Brazil, Human Rights Watch attributes a gradual reduction in the number of police killings in S~o Paulo to the introduction of the Programme to Retrain Police Officers in High Risk Situations. The reason for a higher level of professionalism and less occurrence of gross human rights violations in one


region compared to other regions in Brazil was attributed to far better salaries and level of training.

It seems likely that supervision, disciplining and training will only have a moderat ing impact, insofar as work is carried out on the basis of a widely shared normative frame of reference in which the phi losophy of the rule of law is adhered to. Such an impact is only likely in the case of professional violations. Politically related or induced violations are unlikely to be influenced by such organizational characteristics, precisely because such violations are politically induced or condoned.

In addition to the corruption-enhancing characteristics previously discussed, corruption and related human rights abuses can also be influenced by specific organizational characteristics. In his comparison of gross human rights violations in various cities in both the U.S. and Latin America, Chevigny concludes that in all the cities he investigated corruption was fostered by a lack of clarity as to what is expected of the police and an ambivalence towards combating crime. He found the impact of these factors, however, significantly higher in Latin America than in the U.S. In particular if the proceeds are shared out in the political system, he concludes, corruption serves as a protection against possible sanctions in the event of excessive use of force.

Notes

1. Human Rights Watch (HRW), ttuman Rights in Mexico; A Policy of Impunity (New York: HRW, 1990); t [RW, Implausible Deniability: State Responsibility for Rural Violence in Mexico (NewYork: ttRW, 1997); HRW, Systemic Injustice: Torture, Disappearance and Extrajudicial Executions (NewYork: HRW, 1999).

2. Beverly Milton-Edwards,"policing Palestinian Society,"policing and Sodety 7:1 (1997): 19-44. 3. Sometimes the situation can be more complicated. In Nazi Germany the police were reor-

ganized, centralized, and dominated by the SS. The uniformed police force was milita- rized, and the criminal investigation police force was tailored to carry out political repression. Gross human rights violations were thus not merely carried out by the German army.

4. For an example of a qualitative study, see Paul Chevingy, Edge of the Knife (NewYork: The New Press, 1995).

5. HRW, Systemic; HRW, Implausible; HRW, Police Brutality in Urban Brazil (NewYork: HRW, 1997).

6. Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Battalion and the Final Solution in Poland (New York: Aaron Asher Books,1992); Guus Meerhoek, Dienaren van her Gezag: de Amsterdamse politie tijdens de bezetting (Officers of the law: the Amsterdam police during the occupation) (Amsterdam: van Gennep, 1999)

7. Antonio Cassese, Inhuman States: Imprisonment, Detention and Torture in Europe (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).

8. Human Rights Watch, Confessions at Any Cost: Police Torture in Russia (NewYork: HI[W, 1999).

9. Excessive force can be defined as the use of more force than a highly skilled police officer would find necessary to use in a particular situation (Karl B. Klockars,"ATheory of Exces- sive Force and its Control,'in And Justice for All: Understanding and Controlling Police Abuse of Force, ed. William A. Geller and Hans Toch (Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum, 1995), 11-29; see also Richard R Bennett"Excessive Force: A Comparative Study of Police in the Caribbean,"Justice Quarterly 14:4 (1997): 651-686. Fyfe and Bennett distinguish between brutality (willful and wrongful use of force) and excessive force, defining the


latter as the result of ineptitude or carelessness, occurring when well-meaning officers prove incapable of dealing with situations they encounter without needless or overhasty resort to force (James J. Fyfe,"Training to Reduce Police-Civilian Violence," in Geller and Toch, And Justice for All, 163-176). This tradition can be traced back to Westley's classic study of a small American town in 1950 0Nilliam A. Westley, Violence and the Police: A Sociological Study of Law, Custom and Morality (Boston: MIT Press, 1970). See for an overview of different types of police research: Robert J. Friedrich,"Police Use of Force: Indi- viduals, Situations and Organizations," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, ed. L.W. Sherman (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1980): 452, 82-97; Niels Uildriks and Hans van Mastrigt, Policing Police Violence (Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation, 1991); Robert E. Wordon,"The Causes of Po- lice Brutality: Theory and Evidence on Police Use of Force,"in Geller and Toch, And Justice, 31-60; Bennett,"Excessive Force"; N. Uildriks, De Normering en Beheersing van Politiegeweld (diss.) (Norms and Control of the Police Use of Force) (Deventer: Gouda Quint, 1997).

10. See for individual difference in propensity for violence: Susan O. White,"A Perspective on Police Professionalization,'Law and Society Review 7 (1972): 61-85; William K. Muir, Police: Streetcorner Politicians (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977); John J. Broderick, Police in a 71me of Change (Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press, 1977); Michael K. Brown, Working the Streets: Police Discretion and the Dilemmas of Reform (NewYork: Russel Sage Foundation, 1981); Gustav Keller, Die Psychologie der Folter ffhe Psychology of Tor- ture) (Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1981); Ellen M. Scrivner, Controlling Police Use of Excessive Force (Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 1994). See for the impact of the number of years of service: Mark Blumberg, The Use of Firearms by the Police.- The Impact of Individuals, Communities, and Race (diss.) (NewYork: State University, 1982); Geoffrey P. Alpert,"Police Use of Deadly Force: The Miami Experience,"in Critical Issues in Policing: Contemporary Readings, ed. Roger G. Dunham and Geoffrey P. Alpert (Prospects Heights: Waveland, 1989); Robert E. Worden,"Situational and Attitudinal Explanations of Police Behaviour: A Theoretical Reappraisal and Empiricial Assessment," Law and Society 23 (1989): 667-711; Fyfe,"Training"; Klockars,"A Theory"; Bennett,"Excessive"). See for the impact of sex differences: Lawrence W. Sherman,"An Evaluation of Police Women on Patrol in a Suburbian Police Department,'in Crime and Modernization (Carobondale: South- ern Illinios University Press, 1975); Worden,"Situational."

11. Alex P. Schmid, Research on Gross Human Rights Violations (Leiden: COMT, 1989). 12. Lawrence W. Sherman,"Perspectives on Police andViolence,"in Sherman, The Police, 1-11. 13. Egon Bittner, The Functions of the Police in Modern Society (Rockville, MD: National Insti-

tute of Mental Health, 1970). See also Worden,"The Causes." 14. See for example Lonnie H.Athens, Violent Criminal Acts and Actors: A Symbolic Interactionist

Study (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980). 15. Niels Uildriks and Hans van Mastrigt, Policing Police Violence (Deventer, Boston: Kluwer

Law and Taxation, 1991). 16. M. Jempson"Torture Worldwide,'in A Glimpse ofltelL ed. D. Forrest (London: no publisher

given, 1996), 70-72; Amnesty International, Mexico, Overcoming Fear: ttuman Rights Viola- tions against Women (London: AI, 1996).

17. Pieter van Reenen, Schendingen in de Schaduw: de Rol van de Politie bij Mensenrechtenschendingen (Violations in the Shadow: The Role of the Police in Human Rights Violations), Inaugural Lecture (Utrecht: SIM, 1998)

18. Uildriks, De Normering. 19. Human Rights Watch, Systemic, 72. 20. See for example Jerome H. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in Democratic

Society (NewYork: Wiley, [1966] 1975). 21. Human Rights Watch, Confessions. 22. N.A. Uildriks,"Torture in Israel," Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 18:2 (2000). 23. Bennett, "Excessive." 24. The term police riot was initially used by Stark in his analysis of such an event in 1968 in

Berkeley in the U.S. Rodney Stark, Police Riots, Collective Violence and Law Enforcement (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1972).

90 Human Rights Review, January-March 2e01

25. Chevigny, Edge; N. Uildriks, Geweld in de Interactie Politie-Publiek: een Onderzoek naar Opvattingen en Ervaringen binnen de Politie (Violence in the Interaction Between Police and the Public) (Deventer: Gouda Quint, SI-EUR 14, 1996); Worden, The Causes; Hans Toch, "TheViolence-Prone Police Officer,"in And Justice, ed. Geller and Toch, 99-112.

26. Chevigny, Edge, 252. 27. D. Lester,"A study of civilian-caused murders of police officers," International Journal of

Crimnology and Penology 78:6 (1978): 373-378; D.Lester,"Predicting murder rates of police officers," Police Law Quarterly 12:3 (1978): 20-25; C.Kenneth Meyer,"A comparative assessment of assault incidents: robbery-related, ambush, and general police assaults,"Jour- nal of Police Science and Administration 9:1 (1983): 1-18; J.R Sorensen, James W. Marquert, and Deon E. Brock,"Factors Related to Killings of Felons by Police Officers: A Test of the Community Violence and Conflict Hypotheses," Justice Quarterly 10:3 (1993): 417-440; Worden,"The Causes."

28. Bennett suggests that this discrepancy, can be explained by the different type of research data. In the Caribbean survey data, use has been made of the "perceived crime level," whereby the personal impressions of the respondents are taken as indicative of the level of crime. In other research, statistical records of violent events are used as indicators of the level of violence (Bennett,"Excessive").

29. Uildriks, Geweld. 30. Westley, Violence; Uildriks and van Mastrigt, Policing; Uildriks, Geweld; FrancisT. Cullen et.

al.,"Paradox in Policing: A Note on Perceptions of Danger," Journal of Police Science and Administration 11:4 (1983): 457-462; Robert C. Trojanowicz and Denis W. Banas, Percep- tions of Safety: A Comparison of foot Patrol versus Motor Patrol Officers (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University, 1985).

31. Westley, Violence; Uildriks and Van Mastrigt, Policing; Chevigny, Edge. 32. Paul Chevigny, Police Power: Police Abuses in New York City (NewYork: Vintage, 1969); James

R. Hudson"Police Citizens Encounters that Lead to Citizens' Complaints," Social Problems 18:2 (1970): 179-193; Muire, Police; Worden,"The Causes."

33. Bennett, Excessive. 34. Teresa Caldeira,"Violence, the Unbounded Body, and the Disregard for Rights: Limits of

Democratization in Brazilian Society." (Paper delivered at Lasa, March 1994.) 35. Chevigny, Edge. 36. Martha K. Huggins and Myriam P. Mesquita,"Scapegoating Outsiders: The Murders of

StreetYouth in Modern Brazil," Policing and Society 5:4 (1995): 265-280. 37. Chevigny, Edge. 38. Human Rights Watch, Final. 39. Paul Chevigny,"Police Deadly Force as Social Control: Jamaica, Brazil and Argentina,"in

Vigilantism and the State in Modern Latin America: Essays on Extra-legal Violence, ed. Martha Huggins (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1991).

40. Chevigny, Police; Bennett, Excessive. 41. Martha K. Huggins,"From Bureacratic Consolidation to Structural Devolution: Police Death

Squads in Brazil," Policing and Society 5:4 (1997): 207-234. 42. Chevigny, Edge. 43. Skolnick, Justice; Peter K. Manning, Police Work: The Social Organization of Policing (Cam-

bridge MA: The MIT Press, 1977); Elizabeth Reuss-Ianni, Two Cultures of Policing: Street Cops and Management Cops (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1983).

44. Jerome H. Skolnick and James J. Fyfe, Above the Law (NewYork: Free Press, 1993). 45. Worden,"The Causes of Police Brutality: Theory and Evidence on Police Use of Force,"in

And Justice, ed. Geller and Toch (1996), 31-60. 46. Bennett, Excessive; Gary W. Buchanan,"Managing Police Use of Force." Police Chief 40:8

(1993); Skolnick and Fyfe, Above. 47. In Rio Grande do Sul both civil and military police earn more then twice the national

average police income and also enjoy police training, two to three times the average length in Brazil, including a course on human rights. Human Rights Watch, Police, 48-54.

48. Skolnick and Fyfe, Above. 49. Bennett, Excessive, 573.


50. For example, he exculpated police officers who had got into trouble owing to their physical retaliation to a specific incident against the special"stormtroopers" (WA) of the Dutch fascist party, the NSB, even providing them with a gratuity. Meershoek, Dienaren (Offic- ers).

51. Uildriks, Normering (Norms). 52. James J. Fyfe,"Adminstrative Interventions on Police Shooting Discrefion,"Journal of Criminal

Justice 70:5 (1979): 309-323; James J. Fyfe,"Blind Justice: Police Shootings in Memphis," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 73:2 (1982): 707-722; James J. Fyfe,"Police Use of Deadly Force: Research and Reform,']ustice Quarterly 5:6 (1988): 165-205; Lawrence W. Sherman,"Reducing Police Gun Use: Critical Events, Administrative Policy, and Organi- zational Change,"in Control in the Police Organization, ed. M. Punch (London: MIT press, 1993).

53. Human Rights Watch, Police, 41-42. 54. The"promotlon for bravery"in Rio de Janeiro was first introduced among the military

police in 1975. In 1981 state legislation expanded the legal basis for the policy to all public security operations, including routine police actions. It was seldom put into practice, however, prior to Cerquera assuming control of the secretariat of Public Security in May 1995. (Human Rights Watch, Police, 34.)

55. In only less than one quarter of the cases did the police report having detained the c~imi- nals involved. The requirement of the need for two or more independent witnesses was disregarded in over 80% of the cases. The third requirement frequently disregarded was tha. ~ of the nume~ca', infe~o:-, 3, of ,~he police forces ~emc~ns~ati:~g brave."y. ~Human ~gh ts Watch, Police, 34-35.)

56. Chevigny, Edge, 249-273. 57. America Watch, Police Abuse in Brazil; Summary Executions and Torture in Sdo Paulo and Rio

de Janeiro (NewYork: HRW, 1987). 58. Human Rights Watch, Implausible, 22. 59. Human Rights Watch, Police, 3. 60. Chevigny, Edge, 171. 61. Chevigny, Edge, 272. 62. David H. Bayley,"Police Brutality Abroad, ' in And Justice, 265. 63. David H. Bayley, Patterns of Policing: A Comparative International Analysis (Brunswick, NJ:

Rutgers University Press, 1990), 43. 64. Martha K. Huggins, Political Policing; the United States and Latin America (Durham and

London: Duke University Press, 1998), 12. 65. S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (Boulder, CO: Westxdew

Press, 1988). 66. Talcot Parsons, Politics and Social Structure (NewYork: The Free Press, 1969). 67. Cassese, Inhuman, 62-90. 68. In 1999 several instances drew considerable media attention. In the trial of the beating

and sexual torture of a Haitian immigrant in New York, the accused police officer was found guilty on charges connected with sodomizing his victim with a stick and ramming it into his mouth while a fellow officer held him down. In the case of Sehnouni v. France (Application no. 25803/94, July 28, 1999) the European Court for Human Rights conwcted France for torture. In making its judgement the Court referred to a number of circumstances in the questioning of a 49-year-old Moroccan regarding his alleged involvement in importing drugs from the Netherlands. The Court notes that a large number of blows covering almost all of his body were inflicted, presumably with such intensity that these caused substar.tia! ~ain. Selmounl was ~arther dragged a!ong by his ha!r, made to run along a corridor with police officers on either side to trip him up; made to kneet down in front of a young woman to whom someone said,"Look, you're going to hear somebody sing"; one pohce officer showing him his penis, saying,"Look, suck this,"before unnattng over him; and threatened with a blowtorch and a syringe. The Court considers these acts heinous and humiliating and also attaches special significance to the fact that these acts were not confirLed to any period of police custody, when heightened tension and emo- tions might have explained--but not excused--such excesses, but occurred over a hum-


bet of days of questioning. Under these circumstances the court judged that the physical and mental violence directed against Selmouni caused "severe" pain and suffering and was particularly serious and cruel, thus amounting to acts of torture for the purposes of Article 3 of the Convention. It was the first time that a western European country had been convicted for toture (N. Uildriks,"Police Torture in France," Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 17:4 (1999): 411-423).

69. Joel S. Midal, Strong Societies and Weak States (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).

70. F.W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1995).

71. The patronage system could also be found in cities in the U.S. during the nineteenth century. Since the organization of the police force in the U.S. was related to urban indus- trial, social, and political turmoil, U.S. police to a large extent operated as part of the local politicians of their cities. Huggins notes that in fact a policeman's job depended on loyal services to local politicians (Huggins, Political, 9). Fogelson argues that what set the Ameri- can police apart from the more centralized French, German, and British police was the relationship between the American police and the local political machine. Robert M. Fogelson, Big-City Police (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985). See also on this issue James J. Richardson, Urban Police in the United States (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1974); Mark H. Haller,"Historical Roots of Police Behaviour: Chicago, 1890-1925,"Law and Society Review 10:2 (1976): 303-323.

72. In a country such as Mexico, for example, various interviews with academics, the police, and different human rights organizations in January 1999 made clear that a citizen is expected to pay for having a reported crime investigated. Also endemic are phenomena such as"paying off" police officers for alleged traffic offences, as well as a host of other extortionate practices. In certain developing countries, such practices are structurally em- bedded within the police organization, from top to bottom, but are also related to the wider patronage system within society.

73. The concept of divided society is thus not necessarily related to developing countries, where it is of primary relevance. The characteristics and extreme modus operandi of the Serbian police in Kosovo fit in well with Brewer's theoretical model.

74. For example, in NewYork the Knapp Commission on police corruption (1972) found corruption to be widespread and in some areas highly organized. Sherman (1974) has analyzed police corruption in NewYork, where it has also existed as part of a wider corrupt criminal justice system, in which police officers learn to break the rules for personal advantage. See for a general overview of corruption scandals in London and NewYork Maurice Punch, Conduct Unbecoming: The Social Construction of Police Deviance and Control (New York: Tavistock, 1985).

75. Gerald E. Caiden,"Towards a General Theory of Corruption," Asian Journal of Public Ad- ministration 10:1 (1988): 3-26.

76. Chevigny, Police Deadly, 168. 77. Uildriks and van Mastrigt, Policing;, Uildriks, De Normering (Norms). 78. In a report on police reform and human rights in Central America and Haiti, WOLA (1995,

12) considers the most important measurement of political will to be a government's record on sanctioning police abuse, resolving key cases, and establishing accountability mechanisms.

79. Chevigny, Edge, 273. 80. Sherman, Scandal; Punch, Conduct. 81. Punch, Conduct; Uildriks and van Mastrigt, Policing.

human rights violations by the police

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