Human Geography: A Nomothetic Science?Author(s): Andrew BishopSource: Area, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1978), pp. 149-151Published by: The Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers)Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20001332 .

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Human geography: a nomothetic science? Andrew Bishop, University of Waterloo

Summary. Opponents of the nomothetic view in geography have been defining 'law' as causal law only. Laws need not be causal in the conventional sense. Stochastic laws can be generated in human geography, thus making it a nomothetic science.

Since Hartshorne (1939) wrote his treatise on the philosophy of geography, there has been much debate on diverse issues arising from his work (Schaeffer, 1953; Jones, 1956; Ackerman, 1958; Ad Hoc Committee, 1965; Harvey, 1969; Sack, 1972; Guelke, 1971, 1974). One issue is geography's claim to be a science, and whether laws can be generated in the discipline.

In considering this issue it is necessary first to examine the notion of science. Hartshorne was faced with this problem, but was reluctant to commit himself to a definition (Hartshorne, 1939, p. 367). Figure 1 is a well known and accepted

mode of inquiry which may be termed ' scientific'. The essential quality of this model is that of procedure. In some disciplines, for example chemistry, one may attain the level of theory or law and be quite scientific. In other disciplines, for example geography, one may be caught for a protracted period in the cycle of hypothesis-test-modify. This may be so for a number of reasons. The discipline

may be relatively young in scientific maturity: the subject matter of the discipline may require lengthy research aimed at understanding human behaviour. In any event, whether one has attained the level of law, or theory or hypothesis, the common bond and the critical element is the procedure involved. If science is conceived as a method of investigation with no implication as to the level of attainment, then geography's claim to science has to remain unchallenged.

LAW

THEORY

HYPOTHESIS

GENERAUZATION

test DATA COLLECTION rnodify

REAL WORLD

Figure 1.

Granted that geography is scientific, what kind of science is it? Rickert (1962), the German historicist philosopher, put forward that scientific disci plines may be idiographic (fact-finding) or nomothetic (law-seeking). The question becomes whether laws can be generated in geography. Guelke (1971) has argued in the negative. The typical argument is that the objects of study in human geography are unique, and so cannot be blended into laws. However, as Schaeffer (1953) pointed out, no two stones are identical, yet laws are gener ated concerning stones. Before this apparent enigma is clarified, it may be

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150 A nomothetic science?

instructive to point out that the crucial element here is the meaning of the term law. A law can be considered a statement of connection between two events. A causal law implies that the connection is a necessary one. Causal laws purport to hold in time and space.

The apparent enigma becomes understandable when one considers the principle of uncertainty developed by Heisenberg (1930). The principle states that there is an essential element of uncertainty in any human endeavour or

measurement. This principle, which has been accepted in the scientific com minity, explains a causal law as having an element of necessity so close to 100 % that the degree of uniqueness is so miniscule that it could be considered non existent. The greater the degree of uniqueness, the lower the probability becomes. This situation is the domain of the stochastic law: the element of necessity is replaced by that of probability.

There are therefore two types of laws-causal and stochastic. Opponents of the nomothetic proposition have been seeing laws as causal laws only.

Heisenberg's principle, however, shows that a causal law is simply a stochastic law with an extremely high degree of certainty. The fact that phenomena are unique, therefore, does not preclude the generation of laws. Geography is not simply idiographic.

Then what type of law can be generated in human geography? The central phenomenon in the subject matter here is man himself. Man can choose between possible courses of action and when he does his decision is a result of a multi plicity of elements which have a multiplicity of combinations. Moreover, the incidence and amount of these elements vary in time and among individuals.

Man has a will to act rationally or irrationally. His behaviour is not necessarily lawful in causal terms. A causal law in human geography is difficult to conceive or generate.

Yet laws may be generated in human geography. The general pattern of human behaviour in time and space may be identified from observations and on that basis a stochastic statement may be made. For example, a series of studies over a given time period and area may reveal that, within these two dimensions, interaction generally decreases with distance. The kind of law that can emerge

would be, ' given x circumstances, it is likely (a probability is given) that y will occur'. This is a stochastic law, and can accommodate the gravity principle, the central place principle, or any other observable and measurable event in human geography. Further, this type of law is not incompatible with the

deductive-nomological model of scientific explanation (Hempel, 1962). Summarizing, the notion of science is essentially one of method, and geogra

phy is undoubtedly a scientific discipline. Causal laws differ from stochastic laws in degree, not kind, and stochastic laws can be generated in human geography, thus making it a nomothetic discipline.

References

Ackerman, E. (1958) 'Geography as a fundamental research discipline', Univ. of Chicago, Dep. Geogr. Res. Pap. 53

Ad Hoc Committee on Geography, National Academy of Sciences (1965) The science of geography (Washington)

Guelke, L. (1971) ' Problems of scientific explanation in geography ', Can. Geogr. 15, 1, 38-53 Guelke, L. (1974) 'An idealist alternative in human geography', Ann. Ass. Am. Geogr. 64, 2,

193-202 Hartshorne, R. (1939) ' The nature of geography ', Ann. Ass. Am. Geogr. 29, 3/4, 173-658

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A nomothetic science? 151

Heisenberg, W. (1930) The physicalprinciples of quantum theory (New York) Hempel, C. (1962) 'Deductive-nomological versus statistical explanation', in Feigl, H. and

Maxwell, G. (eds) Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science (Minneapolis) Jones, E. (1956) 'Cause and effect in human geography', Ann. Ass. Am. Geogr. 46, 4, 369-77 Rickert, H. (1962) Science and history: a critique ofpositivist epistemology, trans. by Reisman,

G. (Princeton, N.J.) Sack, R. (1972) 'Geography, geometry and explanation', Ann. Ass. Am. Geogr. 62 Schaeffer, F. (1953) 'Exceptionalism in geography: a methodological examination', Ann.

Ass. Am. Geogr. 43, 3, 226-49

Politics, retailing and crime

A report of a meeting of the IBG Study Group in Urban Geography held at the University of Leicester, 26-28 September 1977.

The meeting consisted principally of symposia on ' Urban political geography', ' Re tailing and retail centres ', and ' Crime and deviance in the city ', but was opened by

David Herbert (Swansea) who spoke on Social geography and urban problems. He argued that in studying social distributions and problems, geographers are best equip ped to apply their accumulated experience and skills in spatial analysis techniques, and that geography is not able to offer any exceptional expertise in the study of the structural or behavioural sources of these phenomena. These points, as well as some difficulties of social data, were illustrated by reference to the intra-urban variation of offender rates in Cardiff.

The symposium on 'Urban political geography' was convened byProf. R. J. Johnston (Sheffield), and began with a paper by Jeffrey Stanyer (Exeter) titled, Are big cities ungovernable? This considered the merits of alternatively tiered arrangements of local government, and concluded that the prevalent two-tier form was the most suitable. A perfect system was regarded as a chimera, and the strengths and weaknesses of the 1974 Metropolitan County Structures were discussed. Ronan Paddison (Glasgow) spoke on Defining the urban community council: some administrative and political considerations, and reviewed the experience in Glasgow during the formative stages of these councils. The variable territories resulting from the self-determination pro cedure; the relationship of the community councils to pre-existing local pressure, tenants', and political groups; and the decline in activity after earlier enthusiasm, were all described. Steven Pinch (Southampton) delivered a paper on Political influences on housing and social service allocation in London. His comments focused on the technical and methodological problems of measuring political outputs, or service-specific local authority expenditures, and of relating these to independent variables which reflect needs and the political and administrative character of authorities. It was suggested that the study of political outputs and their impacts would be more useful foci for political geography than the study of voting patterns. Barbara Webster (Birmingham) discussed Distributional impacts of local gover-iment policy, and suggested that the immediate research task is to examine the spatial distribution of the level and quality of service provision in relation to distributions of need. It was also argued that the identification of desirable changes in provision requires an understanding of the pro cesses which determine service provisions.

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