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The Canadian Forces in Afghanistan

February – November 2009

Brigadier-General Jon H. Vance, OMM, CD

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Aim• The aim of this brief is to describe Canada’s

military operations in Afghanistan from February-November 2009

• It is the story of Canada’s sons and daughters working for the betterment of the people of Afghanistan in the most difficult of all circumstances

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Agenda

• Strategic Context• The Task Force – Canada’s Contribution• Building the Headquarters• Training the Headquarters• Preparing Ourselves• Developing a Plan• Taking Command – The Situation Upon Arrival• The Insurgents• Tactical Campaigns, Operations and Plans• Operational Activities• The Changing Theatre• Handover and Accomplishments• Questions

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HQ 5-09 Pre-Mission Assessment of The Strategic Context

• The strategic military context:

– Hold key terrain within the region that includes Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran

– Support the introduction of U.S. Forces, which provided the opportunity to achieve the missions goals

– Within this context concentrate limited Canadian capabilities to a tighter focus:

• Limited, achievable goals that support the larger strategy

• Recognize the nature of our foe and achieve operational objectives and an end-state appropriate to that foe (Jihad vs insurgency)

• Carefully design and deliver plans that seek limited success that Canadians can identify with

• Focus on the majority of the population in Kandahar Province

• Provide the population with the one thing they lack: security in all its forms

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• Kandahar City is the political, social and economic centre of the South

• It is the spiritual home of the Taliban and the Regional Centre of Gravity

Potential ungoverned spaceRegional lines of communication

Therefore, we must hold Kandahar City

The Regional ContextThe CONCERN: Existence of ungoverned space in Pashtun tribal belt, supported by funds from drug trade and a virtually unlimited supply of fighters

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Major Deductions

• Government of Canada signature projects alone would not ensure success in Afghanistan, and might not even be possible unless the insurgency was addressed decisively

• Major accomplishment at that time – retention of Kandahar City and Kandahar Air Field

• A Counter-Insurgency approach focused on protecting the population was therefore necessary

• Threats to the population extended well beyond the insurgency

• A viable police force was a critical path forward

• The iconic image of the mission – the ramp ceremony, had to change

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TFK Commander

TFK HQ

Provincial ReconstructionTeam (PRT) Battle Group

Operational Coord CentreProvincial (OCC-P)

National Support Element(NSE)

1-12 Infantry Battalion(TF 2-2)

Health Support Services(HSS)

All Source Intelligence Centre

(ASIC)

Theatre Support Element

(TSE)

Military Police (MP Coy)

Operational Mentoring Liaison Team (OMLT)

Task Force Kandahar

Air Wing

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Building The HQ• 258 personnel from Private to Brigadier-General in HQ 5-09• Provided staff and communications support to Comd JTF-

Afg/TFK for command and control over all the deployed forces

• Civilians from the Office of the Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK) fully integrated

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Kandahar Civilian FootprintRepresentative of Canada

in Kandahar (RoCK)

KAF KPRT

Visits

Office of the RoCK

Planning

INT/J2

Comms

6

2

1

1

2

24

CIDA

CSC

INT/J2

Comms

Civ Pol

11

11

4

1

1

TFK Commander

KPRT Dir 1

RC(S)2

DFAIT

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HQ Functions• It provided:

– Operational Planning Capability– National and ISAF Reporting and Assessment– National Command Functions– Logistics Planning and Operations– Information and Psychological Operations Capability– Public Affairs– Legal Support

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The HQ At the Tactical Level• Tactical Planning and Operations Capability

– Coordination of Joint Fires– Battle Command and Control– Application of theatre level engineer capabilities– The Higher HQ for:

• The Air Wing– Helicopters– UAV– Hercules Transports

• The Canadian Battle Group• U.S. Infantry Task Force• U.S. 97th MP Battalion• Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team• The Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team for 1/205 Bde• The National Support Element• The All Source Intelligence Centre• The Military Police Company• The Role 3 Hospital (till Lead Nation transferred to the U.S.)

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Challenges of Building the HQ• Finding the right people with the right skill-sets for the right

jobs• Built upon HQ 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, but

with significant augmentation from across the Regular and Reserve Forces from all across Canada– The challenge of building a cohesive team– Keeping the balance with augmentees – training time versus home

time• HQ TFK is the most technologically sophisticated HQ in the

Canadian Forces – providing the HQ a home in Canada that matched or even resembled that capability was challenging

• Integrating with Whole of Government Partners

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Training The HQ

• Training began following the stand-up of the HQ on 4 August 2008

• Consisted of individual and collective training• Included specialized courses for select individuals• Included Theatre Mission Specific Training and

Professional Development Training• Three Major Exercises in Edmonton, Wainwright

and Kingston

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Preparing Ourselves

• We were Educated by the experts, and it paid huge dividends

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DevelopingOPLAN KANTOLO

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Developing a Plan• Step 1 – Get oriented to the theatre of operations – read-in for several years!• Step 2 – Learn the history of Afghanistan – read every book you can find on the subject• Step 3 – Get educated on Afghanistan by the experts – academics and veterans• Step 4 – Capture everything you know about every aspect that may affect your mission in a

massive Mission Analysis• Step 5 – Develop a concept of operations and evolve it through constant feedback and

interaction with experts from all fields (civilian and military)• Step 6 – Sequester Chief of Operational Plans for a very long period to capture all the details

of the concept of operations and the deductions from the Mission Analysis to write the plan• Step 7 – Using DRAFT OPLAN, engage in “consultation” with Whole of Government

partners. Explain and communicate the plan and its supporting concepts to military and civilian audiences

• Step 8 – Refine plan, but maintain a firm grip over key concepts and objectives• Step 9 - Publish plan following endorsement by the Chain of Command

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Truly UnderstandingThe Three Lines of Operation

Governance

Development

Security

Increased Afghan Public confidence in government

Functioning Afghan economy

Increased capacity in the ANSF

Stability

FunctioningGovernment

Services

Freedom of

MovementBattlefield Success

SufficientSecurity

EnduringSecurity

BATTLEFIELD SUCCESS DOES NOT EQUAL MISSION SUCCESS

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Attack the Insurgency• Redefine the Insurgency• Redefine our Objectives• Re-align the AO to our concept

New Ideas Limited Success=+

Sufficient conditions for transition

Positive iconic images - type of success counts

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Afghanistan Government and ANSF take the lead and CF assets assume support role only

ANSF and CF assets, hold cleared areas to establish stable zone

StabilityFunctioningGovernment

Services

Freedom of

Movement

Operational ConceptDEFINE

SHAPE

CLEAR

HOLD

Development and Reconstruction deepens the HOLDBUILD

ENABLE

Through national and ISTAR assets, define enemy and determine its intent

Through SOF and national assets, shape enemy into terrain of our choosing

Through kinetic and non-kinetic means clear enemy from select areas

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If “it’s all about security”:

• All Lines of Operation must support this main line• We must recognize the multiple dimensions of

security• Align national instruments of power against tasks

along all lines simultaneously• No one agency owns any given Line of Operation

Failed State with Jihad-Enabled

Insurgency

Provincial Governance

Tribal Governance

Economic Security

District Governance

Social Security

Human Security Transition ofSec Resp

Functional Social

Programmes

SufficientSecurity

LegitimateGovernance

EconomicSelf

Sufficiency

Conceptual Operational Design

Economic Viability

Physical Security

Active Support of the Local Population

Sufficient StabilityWithin

AO

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Intent for HQ 5-09 Plan

• Stabilize, Kandahar City (KC)• Stabilize key villages on the approaches• Population Focus• ANSF in the Domestic Operations context• Close Coordination with GIRoA, Military, Civilians• Disrupt with combat forces away from population

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Mission

• TFK will establish sufficient security for a majority of the population of KANDAHAR PROVINCE to enable GIRoA, ISAF and Whole of Government Partners to implement the enduring programs that will contribute to the defeat of the insurgency and support the overall stabilization of KANDAHAR PROVINCE

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OPLAN KANTOLO Effects

National, Provincial, District and Community Level Programs Implemented

Populated Approaches Stabilized

Insurgent systems disrupted/destroyed

Afghan National Security Forces Capacity Building

Counter-Insurgency Operations Enhanced

Lines of Communication are Secure

Kandahar City Stabilized

Rule of Law/Governance

NATO and CanadianPolicy Objectives are achieved

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Taking Command

The Situation Upon Arrival

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NATHAN SMITH

KAF

COSTAL

2 2

3 RCR

KPRT

TFK

x

TFK AO AS AT 19 FEB 09

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Operational Context – On Arrival• TFK was responsible for the whole of Kandahar Province

• The British were responsible for the whole of Helmand Province, and had a smaller contingent

• American force expansion decisions had yet to be made, and thus only Americans in the AO were Police Mentoring Teams

• Pakistan had taken no action against the Insurgents in areas effecting the Canadian AOR

• The Canadian Battle Group had two Rifle Companies of four platoons each

• The KPRT was functionally organized – CIMIC Coy, FP Coy etc.

• A significant number of troops were tied to protecting Tactical Infrastructure

• Major capabilities like the CHF, PSS, PSA and PTDS and CHUD had yet to become operational

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The InsurgencyTFK

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Insurgency Campaign Plan

C of G

Legitimacy of insurgent movement

Military

Grow Mil Capability

Neutralize CF

Neutralize ANSF

Political

Rural

Urban

Social

Tribal structure

Religion

Justice

Economic

Local

Foreign Aid

Conduct shaping operations to gain control of districts (night letters, kidnapping and assassination) while causing attrition to CF to restrict their FOM and increase insurgent access to population

Waging an IO war to highlight the inability of the CF and GIRoA to provide services and security and to point out corruption of GIRoA. Targeted assassination of pro-GIRoA mid-level leaders

Insurgents provide justice services and a senseof security where they have a presence, rendering GIRoA irrelevant

Insurgents enable illicit economy, and use IO tohighlight GIRoA corruption and use of CF/ISAFto deprive rural population of their livelihoods through eradication programs

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What is the connection?

Insurgency Jihad

Tactical

Strategic

Quetta ShuraJihad inspiredRuns the insurgency

TFK Mandate

Who has this mandate?Pakistan, International Community?

What are the true critical vulnerabilities?

Pakistani Pashtun fighterGenerated for jihad, fights for insurgency

Rural Afghan Pashtun fighterFights for pay

Insurgency and Jihad

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Tactical Campaigns and Operations

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Hierarchy of Orders

OPLAN KANTOLO(Mil Plan sp KCP)

Op O DALBOR(ACROBAT/FoM)

Op O KATAKAWAL(SHREDDER/Disrupt)

Op O SAPA(WAVE/US In-flow)

Op O KALAY(VILLAGE/Vil Stab)

Op O ZARAWAR(STRONG/Framework)

KANDAHAR Coord Plan(WoG)

Op SPIN SAYA(Winter Campaign)

Op KALAY I(DEH-E-BAGH)

Op KALAY II(DAND)

Op TORA SAYA(Summer Campaign)

Op LUR SAPA(TFK AO Consolidation)

Op BADLOON (CLEAR/HOLD)

OperationalTactical

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85% OF THE POPULATION

OF KANDAHAR PROVINCE

LIVES HERE

SIMPLE VIEW OF INS INTENT

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R

R

HOLD

HOLD

BUILD

BUILD

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OP KALAY 1Focusing on the People of Kandahar

Deh-e-Bagh

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Project KUCHI CLEAN

Bazaar Improvement

D (22 May)

D+60

SET

CMO

Projects Timeline

Playgrounds

D+10

D+5

Dand DC Repairs

CIMIC

Irrigation CanalNew Connector

road

Agri Team

D+30

Project MOSQUE UPKUCHI Wells

Stabilization incentive kitsKUCHI Road

CIDA

DFAIT Governance

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OP KALAY 1 – Stabilization Projects

DAND DC

‘KOUCHI-VILLE’

MONARA CANAL (~500m)

ARTESIAN POND

DEH-E-BAGH BAZAAR

1st CANAL PROJECT (~800m)

PRB Road Project (~1.4 km)

MONAR

Deh-e-Bagh at Night

1828 hrs 24/06/2009

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Key Lessons Learned

BAERBADI DALBOR SHIELD

BAD SARA

SHAR SAPA LUR SAPA

MADAE SAPA SHAMAL SAPA

JANUBI SAPA SPEEN SARAMUS V

SPEEN SARAMUS IV

BADLOON II BADLOON I

KALAY IIKALAY I

SPIN SAYATORA SAYA

CONPLANS (WANJAWAL/FIRSAWAN/GUMBASA/521/522)OP ZORAWAR (Op DALBOR/Op KATAKAWAL/Op SAPA)

OPLAN KANTOLO

Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov

ENTEXAB II

AR

GH

WA

NI

PIL

AR

GH

WA

NI

PIL II

AR

GH

WA

NI

PIL III

JAL E

Y

TYR

UN

A 1

MU

NK

IRE

DA

L

SA

RA

K I

SH

I N M

EN

GA

RA

Y

TOR

A A

RW

A 1

CO

NS

TRI C

T OR

1&2

CO

NS

TRI C

T OR

3C

ON

STR

I CT O

R 4

TOR

A A

RW

A 2

TOR

A A

RW

A 4

TOR

A A

RW

A 3

TOR

A A

RW

A 5

TYR

UN

A 2A

TYR

UN

A 2B

QO

LBA

AS

T AW

EL G

RA

BTY

RU

NA

2C

CO

NS

TRI C

T OR

5

NA

F IZ 1N

AF IZ 2

NA

F IZ 3N

AF IZ 4

SP

I N A

RW

A 1

NA

F IZ 5

NA

F IZ 6

NA

F IZ 7

NA

F IZ 8JA

DU HYDRA

Overarching Orders

Campaign Plans

Stability Operations

US Inflow Operations

Governance Operations

Shaping Operations

LAM

RA

Y ZA

NG

HQ 5-09 STATS

CHOPS Division Operations: 97

Level 0 Operations: 63Level 1 Operations: 11Level 2 Operations: 23

Unit Generated Operations: 933 RCR BG: 112R22eR BG: 311 PPCLI BG: 42-2 IN (US): 151-12 IN (US): 5

KPRT (R7): 8OMLT (R7): 4OMLT (R8): 2Sig Sqn: 12NSE (R7): 2

3-08/1-09 RiP 1-09/3-09 RiPUS TF RiP

ELECTION ENTEXAB HAJJ

KWANDI LOYALAAR

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Operational Activities• Digesting and reacting to high level orders from Regional Command (South),

ISAF, and CEFCOM– First IJC Order was 672 pages long!

• Generating plans and order for operational level issues:– Counter-Narcotics Directives– Support to the Arghandab Irrigation Rehabilitation Project Security– Force Structure changes for TFK, in particular, the OMLT, P-OMLT and the PRT– Working with Whole of Government partners on Police Development plans

• Developing integrated plans such as the bi-national Canada/U.S. Kandahar Coordination Plan

• Managing the Commanders Contingency Fund - $36 Million• Managing theatre level engineering projects such as roads and bridges• Weekly, Monthly and Quarterly Assessment reporting to both ISAF and

CEFCOM

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Major Accomplishments• Successful Security Operations in support of the elections• Through a series of high tempo tactical operations, seized the tactical initiative from the Insurgency

in the Canadian AO, reversing insurgent encroachment on Kandahar City• Introduced and integrated new capabilities – HERON, Canadian Helicopter Force• Transitioned the AOR for American Force Flow – 34,000 troops into RC (S)

– Included major adjustments to TFK force lay down– Absorbed new capabilities

• Instituted a population centric COIN approach, leading the way for NATO• Supported Whole of Government and Afghan Government initiatives:

– Counter-Narcotics– Dhala Dam– Kandahar Model Police Plan– Polio Vaccination– EQUIP Schools program

• In concert with WoG partners, increased Kandahar Province Police tashkil from 2400 to 6000• Transformed the KPRT and OMLT structures for the evolving situation• Introduced new intelligence capabilities – Lab and additional Human Intelligence • Employed over 1000 local nationals on stabilization projects on any given day

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The Way Forward• Success in Afghanistan depends on whether the Afghans themselves

truly want to succeed– The Government has to start acting like there is actually an emergency in the

South• The critical path forward is to get the governance of Afghanistan

working– Reduction of corruption to a tolerable level– Government institutions that the people trust, and which work – especially the

police and justice system– Getting the Afghan Government to the point where they can help their own

people– Generating activities that give the country economic prospects for the future

• Military successes during the tour of HQ 5-09 will not be sustained unless we can accomplish this

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Questions?