How important was the Battle of Manzikert in 1071 to the Rise of the Seljuk Turks

Amanda Mazur History 592 Early Islamic History

How important was the Battle of Manzikert in 1071 to the Rise of the Seljuk Turks?A truly decisive battle, Manzikert broke the Byzantine border defenses, opened Anatolia to Turkic in-migration and so launched a new phase in the expansion of the frontiers of Islam.

During the latter years of the 11th Century, the Byzantine Empire was in a state of constant flux. The successive reigns of the Macedonian dynasty had pushed the boundaries of the Empire to their furthest geographical extent since Justinian the Great had reconquered Italy and North Africa in the sixth century. The Empire now stretched from Dalmatia in the west, incorporating the whole of the Balkans, to Antioch in Syria in the south, and all of Anatolia to Armenia in the east. The aforementioned quote, taken from C.V. Findleys The Turks in World History concisely demonstrates the importance that this day had on the Byzantines, and how in essence, this one battle can be seen as the starting point for the Turks increasingly successful military drive westwards.Various incursions by surrounding forces were descending deeper into the Empire. In the East, the Turks were gaining territory through Anatolia, whilst the Normans under the watch of Robert Guiscard were slowly capturing any remaining footholds within Southern Italy. It was not just foreign expeditions which were leading to this demise; the constant internal strife between the military and civil aristocracy was creating divides between the leading families, and as such, much of the army was based on mercantile thematic troops, who were drawn from the furthest parts of the Empire, and as such held allegiances that could be easily swayed by better fiscal offers. The Seljuk Turks, from their first appearance at the end of the tenth century were known primarily for their military prowess, and as a nomadic people they had little regard for the niceties of land-ownership.

The Battle of Manzikert has received relatively little study in modern Western academia, and the majority of both primary and secondary sources have not been translated. Interestingly, for those academics who have studied this period, all have concluded that this Dreadful Day as Alfred Friendly so aptly puts it, was one of the greatest reasons both for the rise of the ever strengthening Muslim Seljuk Turks, and for the eventual fall of Byzantium in 1453 at the hands of the Ottomans. In modern scholarship, Angold stands alone for the past thirty years with the exception of Carole Hillebrand, who published Turkish Myth and Muslim Symbol: The Battle of Manzikert in 2007. With regard to primary source material, there are no contemporary accounts by the Turks, and all information must be gleaned from either the Persian, Arab or Christian chroniclers, most notably Byzantine Christians such as Anna Comnena (in her exhaustive Alexiad) and Michael Psellos Chronographia, which supply the greatest discourse of the events of 1071. The most striking account is given by Attaliates, who was actually present at the Battle, and was one of Romanos IV Diogenes close advisors.

To Western scholars, that Battle goes mainly un-noticed aside from to the most discerning Byzantinists. However, in modern Turkey, the anniversary of the battle is remembered every year, both nationally and locally in the area of Manzikert. It is used to help propagate political unity, and in 2004, the then Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoan stated that Nine hundred and thirty three years after this battle, we are striving for unity and peace in Turkey,..There is a national will to invigorate the country.

In essence, Manzikert saw the defeat of Romanos IV Diogenes and his troops on the western shores of Lake Van on the Anatolia plateau. Although in terms of a military defeat it was not a whole scale failure (according to John Haldon only 10% of the army were injured, and even less were killed) the impact that it had on the Empire has a whole, especially with regard to ever growing internal fractionalization, was massive. In the short term the Battle can be most definitely attributed to the vicious Civil War that was to ensue, as well as leading to a series of events that would eventually cause the fall of the Empire. The Battle of Manzikert was not the first time that a Muslim force had defeated Byzantine forces. As early as 674 A.D. the Ummayad Caliphate had turned to a conquest of the Byzantine Empire. Fortunately for the Byzantines, the Ummayad Caliphate was overthrown in 750 A.D., and was replaced by the Abbasid dynasty. In general, the Abassids stopped the ambitious plans for total conquest of the Byzantines, instead opting for smaller military incursions, which although sometimes did penetrate deeply into the Anatolian plateau, did not have the vast designs of their predecessors. Thus, what this essay will discuss is how and why the Seljuk Turks gained the momentum to decisively win this Battle, and their reasons for doing so, but how this event can be seen as one of the most important single events both for the decline of Byzantium and for the rise of the Muslim Turks, who were quickly to become one of the greatest military machines during this period.The Rise of the Seljuk Turks: The Religious Conversion to Islam

The movement of the Seljuk Turks into Anatolia had begun with their spread through Central Asia, as a series of tribal waves pushed westward. Intrinsically nomadic, the Seljuks were from a nomadic family of Orghuz Turks who converted to Islam at the turn of the tenth century. The first three Seljuk rulers, Tughril, Alp Arslan and Malikshah were quick to send troops to the ever growing periphery of their borders, and eventually led to the Turkish penetration of Azerbaijan, the Caucasas and finally the Anatolian plateau.

The Turks that were to overrun Anatolia in the eleventh century were inspired not only by the prospects of pillage and pasture but also by the holy purpose of extending the faith of Islam and crushing the Infidel. The underlying message of Islam, as had been spoken by the prophet Muhammad was a purpose of conquest and conversion, and in the few decades after the death of the Prophet, the Muslim converts had already successfully taken large tracts of land throughout Iraq and Western Persia.

The Seljuk Turks crossed into Armenian in the early eleventh century, and travelled deep into Anatolia, reaching the Byzantine port city of Trebizond on the Black Sea coast in 1054AD.The following year the Abbasid Dynasty in Cairo bowed to the inevitable and conceded political and military authority to Tughril, who was granted the title of Sultan and took Baghdad as his capital. The Seljuks were elevated from nomadic raiders to masters of a vast and sophisticated empire. The Seljuks proclaimed themselves protectors of Sunni Orthodoxy in the name of the Abbasid Caliphate against the rival Shia Fatimid Caliphate of Egypt.

In 1063, Tughrils nephew Alp Arslan became the Sultan of the Seljuk Turks, whom by this point held a realm that covered much of Persia and Iraq. As with many other families throughout this time, his first years in power were spent trying to cement his own position over other family members who may have rivalled his authority. Alp Arslans chief minister was proud of his leaders nature, and in a translation by H. Darke, Nizm al-Mulk wrote He was exceedingly imperious and awe-inspiring, and, because he was so earnest and fanatical in his beliefs and disapproving of the ShafiI rite, I lived in constant fear of him.

The Byzantine territory was not at the forefront of Arslans mind when he took power. The Turks, recent converts to Sunni Islam, were quick to fanaticize, and set their sights on attacking their major external foes, the Fatimid Shiite Ismaili caliphate of Cairo. Thus, in 1071 Arslan had actually been campaigning in Palestine and Syria, but having heard to the movement of Diogenes army in eastern Anatolia, he was forced to move his troops northwards to meet the Byzantine force at Lake Van.

The Byzantine Problem: The Question of Civil and Military Aristocracy

The Byzantine position at the Battle of Manzikert was a far cry from where the Empire had stood merely sixty years earlier. It is a fact acknowledged that the Byzantines were at their zenith under Basil II, whose reign ended in 1025. As previously mentioned, the heart of the fighting machine was the thematic armies, who were made up of basically mercantile troops who were free peasant-soldiers, who were subject to be called upon when the need arose under the command of a strategos. Warfare to the Byzantines was an exact science, and various records of handbooks have been found that give detailed instructions in theory and practice, which were tailored, to different type of enemies that they may fight. Basil IIs reign had provided such security and immeasurable territorial gains that it incited the Greek Nicephorus Bryennius to state, To write a treatise on frontier operations may seem at the presend day no longer very necessary, at least for the east, since Christ, the one true God, has in our day broken and blunted the power of the sons of Ishmael.

Regardless, the internal strife that the Byzantines were undergoing during this time can be directly attributed to their immense failure at Manzikert. After the death of Basil II, the aristocracy was in ruins, and competition through the leading families for the Byzantine throne was intense. After Basils death, his younger brother, Constantine VIII took the throne, and according to Friendly he conceived his primary duty to be the enjoyment to the utmost, for his personal pleasure, of the huge wealth that Basil had accumulated in the state treasury. What was to follow was a succession of Emperors who were affected by the bureaucracy and the military leaders. So perturbed were the civil government by the military that it systematically reduced the strength of the armed forces in a failed attempt to discover fresh revenue, and soon all national defence along the borders of the Armenian region were removed. According to Michael Psellus, who was to become Constantine IXs advisor,

Two things in particular contribute to the hegemony of the Romans, namely, our system of honors and our wealth, to which one might add a third: the wise control of the other two, and prudence in their distribution. Unfortunately, Constantines idea was to exhaust the treasury of its money, so that not a single obol was to be ledt there, and as for the honours, they were conferred indiscriminately on a multitude of persons who had no right to them.

In essence, from the time of Basil II, the leaders of Constantinople were becoming increasingly corrupt. What was to soon erupt, and eventually lead to Romanus IV Diogenes claim to the Byzantine throne was a coup by the military aristocracy in an attempt to secure their own familial ties to the Byzantine throne. It is not the place of this essay to describe this internal strife, but Alfred Friendly provides an excellent narrative that will help the reader fully understand the disenfranchisement that was imbedded within the Byzantine psyche at the time of Manzikert. In essence, the civil aristocracy, seeing the vast spending that had taken them into great debt tried to curb this by limiting the size of the army, and hiring mercenaries instead.

Romanus IV Diogenes claimed the Byzantine throne in January 1068, and married Eudocia, the widow of the previous emperor, Constantine X Ducas. Eudocia was acting as regent for her son Michael. Diogenese came from an old and sitinguished military family that had vast estates in Cappadocia. He had served as Governor of Sardica and had many excellent military victories in his recent history. Thus, to Eudocia he was the perfect husband to try to stabilize the state against the ever-increasing Seljuk menace, whilst also protecting her own son and his direct line to the Byzantine throne.

Diogenes reign was blighted by the risk of a coup every time he left Constantinople. Internal conflict thus ruled out any chance of a prolonged absence from Constantinople, for both the Ducas family and Psellus (the author of the Chronographia and the personal tutor to several of the Ducas family of previous generations) were intent on seizing Diogenes power. As such, the Byzantine forces that were to stand against Alp Arslan in 1071 were fractured both military and politically, and Diogenes in effect was leading many men who were firmly behind the Ducas family, and happy to see his demise. As will be seen from the narrative of the battle as recorded by contemporaries, this was to be exactly what happened. The internal strife that Diogenes had tried hard to minimize in his time as regent was to be eventually one of the distinguishing factors in the Byzantines crushing failure at Manzikert.What factors influenced Romanus IV Diogenes to fight the Seljuk Turk forces?

Romanus IV Diogenes was fully aware that the fractured internal structure of the Byzantine Empire would make it incredibly difficult to mount a successful campaign at the boundaries of the Empire on the Anatolian border. The past sixty years had seen a dramatic decline in the military prowess of the Byzantine force, and as such, the marauding Turkic forces were increasingly entering Byzantine territory. For the most part, this was not under the auspices of the Sultan, but as Turks, it became the prerogative of the leadership to take a stand against these troop movements.

It is possible that Diogenes believed that a tactical military victory would help to show his superiority over the Ducas family. There had been a succession of treaties drawn up with the Seljuk Turks, but the increasing frequency of Turkish raids finally persuaded him that a decisive victory would be necessary to quash Muslim threat from the East. The number of soldiers conjectured to have been drawn up for the Battle has been highly questioned in recent historiography. Most sources claim between 60 000 to 70 000 troops, but a few, such as Matthew of Edessa have estimated there to have been more that one million soldiers. The account of al-Bundari, an Arabic chronicler who lived in Syria and most probably worked for an Ayyubid ruler estimated that in Alp Arslans call to jihad.he had fifteen thousand men. The Byzantines numbered three hundred thousand or more, consisting of Byzantines, Rus, Ghuzz, Qipchaqs, Georgians, Abkhaz, Khazars, Franks and Armenians. The account of al-Turtushi, a leading religious and intellectual figure is one of the earliest Islamic sources for the Battle. In it he writes

The Byzantines had assembled armies the like of which were seldom gathered for anyone after him. The total of their number was six hundred thousand warriors self contained battalions, successive troops and squadrons following one after the other, so numerous that the eye could not perceive them and their number could not be quantified.

It is probable that the main reason for Romanos willingness to fight the Seljuk forces was due to his firm belief that his army was substantially greater in number than the approaching Muslim forces, and as such, a decisive victory that would bring him political eminence was just what was needed. However, what he did not contemplate was the tenacity of his own men to stay loyal to his side, and overlooked the elements that were sympathetic to the Ducas line. In essence, these were the very elements that were to lead to the whole scale failure of the Byzantine forces at the Battle of Manzikert, and his subsequent imprisonment by the Seljuk Sultan.

Why did the Seljuk Turks attack within Byzantine Anatolia?

As has previously been mentioned, it was not the initial aim of the Seljuk Turk Alp Arslan to attack the Byzantine forces at Lake Van. Most likely, the initial raiders were Turkish tribesman who had drifted westwards. Matthew of Edessa, writing about events in 1018 agonized over the growing incursions by the infidels stating that

At the beginning of the year, a scourge manifesting the fulfilment of fivine threats of affliction descent on the Christiansthereupon the apostolic and prophetic books trembled to their foundations, for winged sepents came to vomit flames on Christs faithful. At that period there assembled the savage nation of infidels known as Turks. Until then, the Turkish cavalry had never been seen before.

Despite the failure of Manuel Comnenus 1069AD campaign, the Sultan of the Great Seljuks Alp Arslan had been quick to seek a peace treaty with the Byzantines. Alp Arslan had inherited the Abbasids wary respect for Byzantiums military power and at any rate regarded the Fatimid Caliphate of Egypt as his main enemy; he had no desire to engage the Byzantines in unnecessary hostilities. Under the terms of the treaty, Alp Arslan had committed to preventing Seljuk raiding on Byzantine territory. Unfortunately, despite his grand title, Alp Arslan was in no position to control the Seljuk raiders. Most of the Seljuk clans still lived according to their Central Asian nomadic traditions and tended to acknowledge the Sultans authority only when they were forced to, or it suited their interests.Their raiding and constant feuding made them as much a nuisance to the Great Seljuks as to their neighbours, so to preserve order the most unruly Turcoman clans were pushed to the borders of the Sultanate where they could be encouraged to raid and plunder infidel territory. Consequently, Seljuk raiding into Anatolia continued unabated. In essence, until 1055, there were no organized raids by the Turks into the Anatolian plateau. However, as relations between the Byzantines and the strengthening Turkish forces broke down, Tughril, followed by his son Alp Arslan began to seek territory further into Byzantine lands.

Some Turkish historians of the 20th Century have claimed that the Seljuk incursions into Byzantine territory prior to Manzikert were part of a larger plan by the Sultans to topple the Eastern Roman Empire and to seize Asia Minor. This conclusion is most vehemently argued by the Islamic historian Abbas Hamdani who declared that the Turks were unmistakably in search for a permanent home and not simply grazing grounds for their animals. In addition, Sultan Tughril wanted to claim the title of King of the East and the West, by conquering not only the Fatamids, but also Byzantine lands. However, it is most likely that these earliest marauders were acting without official sanction for it is well documented that Alp Arslan was preoccupied with the Shiites of the Fatimid Caliphate. He did not leave his headquarters in Khurasan to capture the Armenian fortresses of Manzikert until 1070 and only after Romanos IV Diogenes had directly threatened him with affirmative action. In February 1071AD, Romanus IV Diogenes sent an embassy to Alp Arslan to renew the treaty of 1069 A.D. that had been allowed to crumble. Romanus envoys reached the Sultan outside Edessa, which he was besieging. Keen to secure his northern flank against Byzantine attack, Alp Arslan happily agreed to the terms, abandoned the siege and immediately led his army south to attack Aleppo in Fatimid Syria. The offer to renew the peace treaty was a key element of Romanus plan, distracting the Sultan long enough to allow Romanus to lead an army into Armenia and recover the lost fortresses before the Seljuks had time to respond. In essence, Romanus tricked Alp Arslan, who used this treaty to take Baghdad, for he had little intention of further incursions into Anatolia. What he of course did not know was at the same time, Romanus was moving towards his forces with the distinct intention of crushing the Turkish marauders and reclaiming much of the territory that had been lost at the hands of Turkic nomads.

The Battle of Manzikert

Throughout the historical narrative, there are a plethora of primary sources that give exhaustive accounts of the Battle and its aftermath. For the most part, both the Muslim and Byzantine sources agree about how decisive a failure it was on the part of the Byzantines. In essence, the narrative follows closely to that given by our only Byzantine source actually at the battle, Michael Attaleiates who accompanied the Emperor for two years of his campaign. Attaleiates often distressing account is only lifted by his rhetoric on the Emperors heroic character, and Attaleiates states When the emperor had transferred a large number of Romans to the town and established a commander, he returned to the encampment and was hailed with paeans, acclamations and proclamations of victory. A narrative account of the battle itself can be found in translation, and thus it is not my aim to give a full chronology of the battle, but to highlight the most important reasons for the crushing failure that was to ensue. Little is known of the Selkuj forces, except that each man was lightly armed and had at least one horse. Alp Arslan had to quickly re-route his forces to stand against the growing Byzantine force, and was probably highly perturbed that the Byzantine Emperor had gone against the treaty that they had recently both agreed to.

Against the wishes of the Byzantine officers, Diogenes descended upon Manzikert believing that the Turkish forces would be coming from the south. He split his army in two, sending one of his generals, Joseph Tachaneiotes in a different direction with a large bulk of the Byzantine military force to head off the approaching force. Soon the Tarchaniotes realized that Diogenes had been incorrect, and that he was on a direct path with the entire Turkish force and thus, alf the Byzantine army under his command withdrew back to Constantinople without joining battle, leaving Romanus and the other half of the army to face the Turkish force which was reckoned at being roughly equal in size.

In the battle itself the weaknesses of the Byzantine state played themselves out. The mercenary Normans refused outright to fight at the moment of battle, while the mercenary Turkish horsemen defected from the Byzantine army the night before the battle to join the Seljuks, thereby causing great unrest in Romanus army. At the critical moment of battle, when the Turks charged around to flank and surround Romanus, the Byzantine rearguard need only to have charged forward and crushed the Turks in a vice. But commanding the rearguard was Romanus bitter political rival, Andronicus Ducas. Almost definitely in order to help his family seize the Byzantine throne after a major defeat, Andronicus suddenly reversed the imperial standards on the battlefield to signal a retreat. As Michael Attaleiates claims

Most people give the information that one of those who had it in for him (the emperor), a cousin of the emperors stepson Michael, had hatched a plot against him in advance: he (Andronicus Ducas) spread this report to the soldiers, and, taking his own men quickly (for not a small portion had been entrusted to him by the goodness of the emperor), he returned to the encampment in flight. One by one the companies closest to him imitated him, one after the other succeeding to flight without giving battle. And so the emperor, seeing the inexplicable flight from battle, stood with those around him, recalling his men from flight in the usual way.

Why did the Turks win the Battle of Manzikert?

In the historical narrative, Romanus is squarely blamed for the crushing defeat that the Byzantine force felt at Manzikert. However, as can be seen, it was the divisions within the Byzantine political factions that truly led to the defeat, rather than the pre-eminence of the Turkish forces. As Hillenbrand claims

He (Romanus) had a number of different frontiers to defend at the same time. He had inherited from his predecessor an army that contained many mercenaries recruited from outside the Byzantine empire. However, under his command, the foreign mercenaries felt their importance was dwindling, and so there were tensions between the foreign mercenaries and the local Byzantine troops.

The Turkish forces were not superior in any way to the Byzantines, albeit they did have exceptional horsemanship skills. Anna Comnena, in her analysis of the battle claims that victory could have been gained for the Byzantines if it were not for two decisive factors. The first was the defection of parts of the Turkish contingents from the Byzantine side and the desertion of the rearguard due to the political tension between the Ducas family and Diogenes.

Carole Hillenbrand has assimilated an exhaustive selection of primary sources from both the Persian and Turkish literary tradition that allows the historian to review the many different accounts of the battle from an angle often not seen. In each one, Alp Arslans kindness to the fallen emperor is highlighted, and the reasons behind the Turkish success for the most part compliment each other. In addition, what the sources have a tendency to highlight is how inspired by the faith of Islam, Arslan was willing to forgive Diogenes, even when he had openly gone against their truce. The account of Ibn-al-Athir, a Medieval Muslim historian comes from part of his universal history, The Kamil, which is arranged annalistically and is the key to the Arabic chronicle for the history of the Seljuks. His portrayal of the Sultan is incredibly informative. In it he writes of the man,

He (Alp Arslan) gave order for him (Diogenes) to be brought in. When he was brought in, the sultan struck three whip blows with his hand and said Did I not send a message to you about a truce and you refused. What do you think I will do with you? He (Diogenes) said: Either you will kill me, or you will parade me in the lands of Islam, and the other is a remote possibility, that is pardon, the accepting of money and making me a deputy on your behalf. He (Alp Arslan) said: I have already resolved to do that.

In this light, the Muslim sources portray the Sultan in a good light. Not only did he return with a ransom the emperor, he also moved out of Anatolia, for it was a land that he was not seeking. His reasoning for going to war was due to a threat to his people, rather than an avid aim of expansionism.

How detrimental to the Byzantines was the loss of Battle?

Yet the battle was not as catastrophic as some modern historians have described in terms of a military failure. Contemporary sources note that half the Byzantine army did not even take part in the battle and that other large fragments managed to extricate themselves and retreat west under cover of night. Some estimate have concluded that the Byzantine military around twenty percent of her manpower at Manzikert, still leaving the Empire with sizable forces to defend Anatolia. In essence, the Byzantine army was dispersed, rather than destroyed. Alp Arslan made no personal attempt to follow up the victory, and although he took Diogenes as a hostage, he soon released him. Arslan held Diogenes in great esteem, and Attaleiates claims that the Sultan said Do not be afraid, O Emperor, but be optimistic before all, since you will encounter no bodily harm but will be honored in a manner worthy of the pre-eminence of your power. For foolish is he who is not cautious before the unexpected reversal of luck.

After the battle, Alp Arslan did not attempt to penetrate further into the Anatolian plateau. In fact, he turned his attention again to the religious cause, and again tried to assimilate a force to topple the Shiite faction in Cairo. Arslan died two years later, and it is important to note that even his son and heir, Malikshah did not try to exploit the Anatolian success, even though the Byzantine Empire at this point was amidst serious civil strife.

The importance of Manzikert lies mainly in the political effects that it had within Constantinople, and can be attributed as one of the main reasons for the Civil War that was soon to erupt and last for the following decade. Following Manzikert the Byzantines deposed Romanus to set the Ducas clan in power. To further disable a united defence against the Seljuks, local Byzantine Anatolian magnates seceded from the central government which was failing to come to their aid against the Turks. As isolated Byzantine aristocrats battled in vain against the onslaught of the Seljuks, the empire disembowelled itself in yet another civil war as Nicephorus Botaneiates marched against Emperor Michael VII to seize the throne With the bulk of Byzantiums military concentrated under one pretender against another, with the treaty between Romanus IV and Alp Arslan voided by Romanus deposition, the Seljuks closed in on the poorly defended Anatolian territories almost with impunity. As the Byzantines battled one another for the throne, transfer of land to the Seljuks in return for their military support was paid by the pretenders. Nicephorus Botaneiates even ceded west Anatolian cities such as Cyzicus, Nicomedia, Chalcedon and Chrysopolis to Sultan Suleyman to garrison and administer as his vassal. Within ten years, much of Anatolia was captured by the steady western movement of the Seljuks, whilst the Byzantines continued to fragment internally.

Conclusion:Many historians who have studied the Battle of Manzikert have concluded that it was one of the most decisive factors in the gradual demise and the eventual fall of Byzantium to the Ottomans in 1453. However, as can be seen from the primary sources, there was not a sudden catastrophe that led either to Manzikert, nor was the battle a catastrophe in itself. Indeed, Byzantium survived a further four centuries, whilst the Turks continued to expand through Anatolia, albeit the Byzantine empire much diminished in size. The piecemeal infiltration of the Turks into Anatolia was in part the main reason for their gradual rise. It set the stage for colonization, Turkification and the spread of Islamification. Slowly, the Turks adopted the Perso-Islamic centralized government, based on their Seljuk predecessors. In essence, what the Battle of Manzikert did was to allow the idea of Islam to spread further westwards, and spread the seeds of discontent through the Anatolian plateau. Although little was accomplished on That Dreadful Day that can be attributed to the whole demise of Byzantium, it was one of the first instances in which Islamic crusaders were able to successfully attack the Greeks, and cause one of the greatest political fragmentations in the history of the Byzantine Empire. C.V. Findley, The Turks in World History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 71.

Mehmet Altay Kymen, The Importance of the Malazgirt Victory with Special Reference to Iran and Turkey, Journal of the Regional Cultural Institute Vol. 5, No. 1 (1972): 213.

Alfred Friendly, The Battle of Manzikert: That Dreadful Day (London: Hutchinson, 1981), 27.

R.J.H Jenkins, The Byzantine Empire on the Eve of the Crusades (London, 1955), 3.

Friendly, The Battle of Manzikert, 29.

Carole Hillenbrand, Turkish Myth and Symbol: The Battle of Manzikert (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007).

The best translations of both of these accounts can be found in Michael Psellus and E. R. A. Sewter. Fourteen Byzantine Rulers; The Chronographia, (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966), and Anna Comnena, and E. R. A. Sewter. The Alexiad of Anna Comnen,. (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969).

Attaliates can only be found in fragments within secondary sources. The largest portion of his work can be found in Georg Barthold Niebuhr, Corpus scriptorum historiae Byzantinae. (Bonn: Impensis E. Weberi, 1828).

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan, cited in Hillenbrand, Turkish Myth and Muslim Symbol, 219.

John F. Haldon, John F. Haldon, The Byzantine Wars: Battles and Campaigns of the Byzantine Era (Stroud: Tempus, 2001), 127.

Nadia Maria El Cheikh. Byzantium Viewed by Arabs. (London: Harvard University Press, 2004), 62. 2004.

John F. Haldon, The Byzantine Wars, 127.

Carole Hillenbrand, Turkish Myth and Muslim Symbol: The Battle of Manzikert, 5.

Michael Angold, The Byzantine Empire 1025-1204 A Political History (London, New York: Longman, 1997), 67.

Friendly, The Battle of Manzikert: That Dreaful Day 1071, 35.

J B Bury eds., The Cambridge Medieval History. Volume IV The Eastern Roman Empire, 717-1453 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1936), 418.

Hillenbrand, Turkish Myth and Muslim Symbol: The Battle of Manzikert, 6.

Nizm al-Mulk, H. Darke trans, The Book of Government or Rules for Kings. (London, 1978),54.

Angold, The Byzantine Empire 1025-1204, 42.

Friendly, That Dreadful Day: The Battle of Manzikert 1071, 62.

For the most part, these works have been lost through the passage of time. However, the Byzantine Michael Atteliates gives a detailed description of the Battle itself, and also talks of the military methodology that was employed. Nizm al-Mulk, H. Darke trans, The Book of Government or Rules for Kings,( London, 1978) 47-61.

Nicephoras Byennius, trans. P. Gautier, Nicephorus Bryennius, Historia (Brussels: 1975), 104.

Friendly, That Dreadful Day: The Battle of Manzikert 1071, 87.

J B Bury eds., The Cambridge Medieval History. Volume IV The Eastern Roman Empire, 717-1453, 442.

Hillenbrand, Turkish Myth and Muslim Symbol: The Battle of Manzikert, 8.

Michael Psellus, and E. R. A. Sewter. Fourteen Byzantine Rulers; The Chronographia, 144.

Friendly, That Dreadful Day: The Battle of Manzikert 1071, 83-121.

John Julius Norwich, Byzantium: The Apogee (New York: Aldred A. Knopf, 1994), 344.

Norwich, Byzantium: The Apogee, 345.

Haldon estimates between 60 000 to 70 000 in The Byzantine Wars, 127.

al-Bundari in Zubat al-nusra wa nukhbat al-usra in Hillenbrand, Turkish Myth and Muslim Symbol, 58.

The account of al-Turtushi (1126) in Sirj al-mulk. Full account in Hillenbrand, Turkish Myth and Muslim Symbol, 27-29.

Matthew of Edessa, trans. Eduard Dularier, Chronicles (Paris, 1952), 140.

Hillenbrand, Turkish Myth and Muslim Symbol, 61-2, also discussed in depth in Friendly, That Dreadful Day: The Battle of Manzikert 1071, 129-161.

Abbas Hamdani, A Possible Fatamid Background to the Battle of Manzikert, Byzantine Studies Vol. 1 (1974): 171.

Friendly, That Dreadful Day: The Battle of Manzikert 1071, 212.

Norwich, Byzantium: The Apogee, 164.

Michael Attaliates, trans. Barthold Georg Niebuhr Corpus scriptorum historiae Byzantinae (Bonn: Impensis E. Weberi, 1828), 47.

Friendly, That Dreadful Day: The Battle of Manzikert 1071, 214.

Norwich, Byzantium: The Apogee, 349.

Michael Psellus, Fourteen Byzantine Rulers; The Chronographia (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966), 46.

Michael Attaliates, trans. Barthold Georg Niebuhr Corpus scriptorum historiae Byzantinae, 48-9.

Hillenbrand, Turkish Myth and Muslim Symbol, 14.

Anna Comnena, trans. E.R. A Sewter, The Alexiad of Anna Comnena, 302.

The account of Ibn-al-Athir in Al-Kamil fil tarikh cited in Hillenbrand, Turkish Myth and Muslim Symbol, 64.

Anna Comnena trans. E.R. A Sewter, The Alexiad of Anna Comnena, 307-9,Michael Psellus, trans. E.R.A Sewter, Chronographia., 504-5.

Michael Attaliates, trans. Barthold Georg Niebuhr Corpus scriptorum historiae Byzantinae, 48-9.

The account of al-Bundari, in Zubat al-nusra wa nukhbat al-usra cited in Hillenbrand, Turkish Myth and Muslim Symbol, 58.

Friendly. That Dreadful Day: The Battle of Manzikert 1071, 156.

Anna Comnena, The Alexiad, 446.

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